Contents

The House met at 1:02 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Routine Business

Introductions by Members

Hon. Josie Osborne: I’d like to ask the House to please join me in wishing Nabiha Sheikh a very happy birthday.

Nabiha is a dedicated respiratory therapist who moved from Alberta to British Columbia last year, and she now serves on the front lines at Royal Jubilee Hospital. Her commitment to patient care is matched only by her warmth as a great wife — not my wife but the wife of my very talented staffer Hasham — and her talent as a baker.

Would everyone please join me in wishing her a very happy birthday.

Harwinder Sandhu: It’s always inspiring to recognize homegrown success stories, and Kal Tire, which many of you know, is one that we’re so truly proud of.

Rooted in Vernon, Kal Tire has grown into a global leader while supporting the mining sector and helping create thousands of well-paying jobs across Canada.

A special shout-out to the Ford family, founder family of Kal Tire, for their tremendous generosity and work in the community to uplift many organizations in our community.

Yesterday their team had an amazing and informative display at the mining reception, showcasing the innovation, sustainability and expertise that make Kal Tire truly world-class.

I am thrilled to welcome here today my constituents and representatives of Kal wTire and the mining community: Christian Erdelyi, director of technology services; David Steinmetz, director of recycling services; and, last but not the least, Kevin Frame, western Canada mining services manager.

May I ask the House to please join me in welcoming my guests today.

Tributes

Frederick “Fred” Muzin

Hon. Jennifer Whiteside: I rise this afternoon to pay tribute to Frederick Muzin, who died on September 5, 2025, at the age of 75.

Fred was born in Montreal. He dedicated much of his career to health care in British Columbia before retiring and moving to Courtenay.

He leaves behind his girlfriend, Heather Bould; his stepdaughters Alana and Karen; his sisters Sandi Shapira and Marlene Wiseman; and his brother-in-law Phil.

[1:05 p.m.]

Fred was the president of the Hospital Employees Union for 15 years during a very tumultuous time in health care. It was his leadership and vision that shaped the union and left a lasting legacy in the labour movement and, indeed, across the province.

Fred first became active in HEU as a biomedical engineering technologist at St. Paul’s Hospital. His commitment to fairness, solidarity and public health care quickly made him a respected leader among his co-workers and fellow union members.

In 1993, Fred was elected provincial president of HEU, a position he held for 15 years until his retirement in 2008. During that time, Fred was there for both the victories and the struggles that defined an era for HEU members. He was part of the leadership team that delivered huge gains in pay equity for HEU members as well as the landmark health accord in the 1990s under the B.C. NDP government.

But he also stood firmly and resolutely with members through the B.C. Liberals’ unprecedented privatization, mass layoffs and wage rollbacks of the 2000s, always emphasizing solidarity, resilience, social justice and rooted in community.

I will remember him as a leader who didn’t stay behind a desk ever. I can still see him now, with a megaphone, leading members on picket lines in protests. He believed in being on the front lines with members. In 2002, he was arrested alongside other HEU leaders in the Chilliwack laundry blockade, defending the very jobs of health care workers and taking a stand for public health care.

For Fred, union work was always connected to community and to a larger fight for social justice. His voice carried beyond the health care worksites, into campaigns for peace, equity and for global solidarity.

Through good times and hard times, Fred helped ensure HEU emerged as a stronger, more stable and more united organization. His example continues to inspire generations of activists to stand up for what’s right, to care for one another and for a better world.

One of the ways he expressed his solidarity with people was through his commitment to blood donation, a practice that he began in 1968 while he was at university. In fact, he gave his 200th blood donation on his 70th birthday.

I will always remember Fred as a fair but firm convention chair, inspiring loyalty, if not always discipline, amongst HEU members. His legacy lives on in his commitment to social justice and in the countless lives he touched with his courage, his advocacy and his solidarity. He will be missed.

Point of Order
(Speaker’s Ruling)

The Speaker: Before we move to the next item on the agenda, I would like to share my ruling with the House.

Hon. Members, on Monday, November 24, the Government House Leader raised a point of order regarding the admissibility of Bill M219, intituled Health Authorities Amendment Act, 2025, standing in the name of the member for North Island.

The Chair thanks the Government House Leader and member for Kamloops Centre for their submissions. The Chair has examined the submissions and the bill and is now prepared to rule on the point of order.

With respect to the direction being sought on the application of Standing Order 66, which pertains to the consideration of motions by the House, the Chair will not provide a ruling, as Standing Order 66 is not applicable to the matter at hand, being Bill M219. Generally, Standing Order 66 applies to motions in the way that Standing Order 67 applies to bills.

Standing Order 67 provides: “It shall not be lawful for the House to adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address or bill for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue or any tax or impost to any purpose that has not been first recommended to the House by message of the Lieutenant Governor in the session in which such vote, resolution, address or bill is proposed.” As previously noted by the Chair, this stems from constitutional provisions that the House is bound by.

[1:10 p.m.]

The Chair must decide whether Bill M219 is a money bill, thereby offending Standing Order 67 without an accompanying message of the Lieutenant Governor or royal recommendation. As the Chair noted in previous guidance to the House, a royal recommendation is required if any provision in a private member’s bill would authorize a new and distinct charge to be effectively imposed on the consolidated revenue fund.

In examining the contents of Bill M219, the Chair’s read is that the bill requires the health authority boards to determine time periods for a patient to receive certain forms of medical care and provide notice to patients when that time period cannot be met, and it mandates related public reporting. The Chair must assess whether these requirements infringe on Standing Order 67.

The matter before the Chair is not clear-cut. Members will appreciate that the Chair took an unusually extended time to return to the House with a ruling as the Chair wanted to become better acquainted with the existing statutory framework that Bill M219 seeks to amend.

On an annual basis, this House approves an appropriation for the withdrawal of funds from the consolidated revenue fund for the Ministry of Health, which provides funding to the health authorities. The funds a health authority receives fall under the control of its board, which has discretion on how those funds are used, subject to the statutory and regulatory regimes those boards are bound by. Bill M219 prescribes actions that the board must mandate within its health authority and obligations for the responsible minister to report to the House on data transmitted by each board.

In the Chair’s view, Bill M219 does not prescribe or impose in any specific terms required spending that would clearly constitute a new and distinct charge. The bill appears to mandate health authority boards with functions that align with those already permitted in the Health Authorities Act.

In consideration of the above and based on available information and submissions presented to the Chair at this time, it is the ruling of the Chair that Bill M219 does not appear to offend Standing Order 67. As such, the bill will be permitted to proceed.

However, as a bill advances through the legislative stages of consideration, the Chair may again receive submissions on the admissibility of a bill reported from committee, specifically in its reported form.

Orders of the Day

Hon. Mike Farnworth: In this chamber, I call continued committee stage on Bill 29.

In the Douglas Fir Room, I call Section A, continued committee stage on Bill 32.

The House in Committee, Section B.

The committee met at 1:15 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 29 — Child, Family and
Community Service
Amendment Act, 2025
(continued)

The Chair: All right. I’ll call the House to order. We’re continuing committee stage on Bill 29, Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 2025.

On clause 3 (continued).

Rosalyn Bird: Before we finish our conversations from this morning, I actually would like to table an amendment.

[CLAUSE 3, in proposed section 19.2, by deleting the text shown as struck and adding the underlined text as shown:

Parties to safety plan agreement

19.2 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the following persons must be parties to a safety plan agreement:

(a) a director;

(b) each parent who, in the director’s opinion, meets all of the following criteria:

(i) the parent is apparently entitled to custody of the child to whom the agreement relates;

(ii) the parent has rights and responsibilities as a parent with custody that may be affected by the agreement;

(iii) the parent can be located;

(iv) the parent is able and willing to exercise the rights and responsibilities of a parent with custody.

(2) If a child has no parents as described in subsection (1) (b), then the first of the following that applies at least one guardian with care of the child to whom the agreement relates must be a party to a safety plan agreement:

(a) at least one parent who, in the director’s opinion, would be a parent under subsection (1) (b) except that the parent has no rights or responsibilities as a parent with custody that may be affected by the agreement;

(b) at least one parent with care of the child to whom the agreement relates.

(3) A parent described in subsection (1) (b) may only be a party to a safety plan agreement if, in circumstances in which the child is of an appropriate age, the child has been consulted.]

The Chair: Okay. We’ll just go into a short recess and have copies made of the amendment and circulated. Then we’ll hear from the member on the amendment. It’ll be a few moments.

The committee recessed from 1:16 p.m. to 1:19 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair: Okay. Everybody has got a copy of the amendment. I’ll call the House back to order.

On the amendment.

Rosalyn Bird: I know we talked about this extensively yesterday, and we’re going to agree to disagree, Minister.

[1:20 p.m.]

I wanted it on the record. I have serious issues with “in the director’s opinion.” If the language had been different in regards to the process or the evidence-based decision-making model that we have talked about, I would have been happy with that. But “in the director’s opinion” raises massive concerns for myself and parents that I have spoken with.

Also, I know yesterday that you were not happy with that addition. However, if you have semi-adult children — I would say actually any child above the age of 12 that is bright and cognizant and part of the plan — I actually think that strengthens the plan. I don’t think it takes away from it in any way, shape or form. So that is why I added para (c).

Hon. Jodie Wickens: The 19.2 section 1(b) around “in the director’s opinion” has been debated extensively. I continue to not support this amendment for the reasons that I have outlined numerous times.

The addition of the last point is problematic for a number of reasons.

Firstly, paramount in the act is that a director will take into consideration the views of a child, but putting it in as “must” also ignores the paramount consideration of the best interest of a child. If a child may potentially be traumatized by being included in a safety plan, that is not the best interest of a child. So this amendment ignores the paramount considerations in the act already.

For those reasons, I do not support the amendment.

Heather Maahs: Well, with all due respect, I guess that’s what this is all about. We disagree, you disagree, and we go back and forth, and that’s what this is all about.

I think this — if the child has been consulted and is deemed of an appropriate age by the director — is absolutely necessary. There are too many situations where children are left out of the equation, and this is…. I actually believe that it would be negligent for this not to be a “must” for a child to be consulted.

Rosalyn Bird: I have a clarifying question, actually. I just don’t know how they work, subamendments. Am I allowed to ask the minister, through you, if she would be open to a subamendment? I don’t know how that works.

The Chair: Okay, Member. Yeah, proceed and speak to that, and we can hear from the minister.

Rosalyn Bird: The only thing I would ask the minister…. If she and her staff would actually consider…. Based on the information that she provided, I can see where there would be instances where that would be problematic. However, would the minister consider adding that as a “may”?

[1:25 p.m.]

I think it’s extremely important in a lot of cases when children are consulted that they be participatory in a process for their family.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I do not support that. It would be redundant. It is already assumed in the act by the guiding principles.

The Chair: Seeing no further speakers, I’ll call the question on the amendment to clause 3 moved by the member for Prince George–Valemount.

Division has been called.

[1:30 p.m. - 1:35 p.m.]

Members, we’re voting on an amendment to clause 3 of Bill 29, moved by the member for Prince George–Valemount.

[1:40 p.m.]

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 37
Wilson	Milobar	Banman
Wat	Kooner	Halford
Hartwell	L. Neufeld	Van Popta
Dew	Clare	K. Neufeld
Brodie	Armstrong	Bhangu
Paton	Gasper	Chan
Toor	Hepner	Giddens
Rattée	Davis	McInnis
Bird	McCall	Stamer
Day	Maahs	Kealy
Boultbee	Williams	Loewen
Dhaliwal	Doerkson	Luck
	Block
NAYS — 47
Lore	G. Anderson	Blatherwick
Routledge	Chant	Toporowski
B. Anderson	Neill	Osborne
Brar	Krieger	Davidson
Parmar	Sunner	Beare
Chandra Herbert	Wickens	Kang
Sandhu	Begg	Higginson
Phillip	Lajeunesse	Choi
Rotchford	Morissette	Popham
Dix	Sharma	Farnworth
Eby	Bailey	Kahlon
Greene	Whiteside	Boyle
Ma	Yung	Malcolmson
Gibson	Glumac	Arora
Shah	Chow	Dhir
Valeriote		Botterell

The Chair: We’ll take a short recess while we’re clearing out.

The committee recessed from 1:42 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair: I’ll call the committee back to order and continued discussion on Bill 29, Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 2025, on clause 3.

Rosalyn Bird: I just sort of wanted to revisit where we had left off. I just wanted to re-ask the question that I had asked shortly before lunchtime, indicating that delayed and incomplete disclosures impact procedural rights and access to justice in the children and family services system. Notably, parents’ counsel are hindered in their ability to provide effective legal advice to the parents, and they are hindered in their ability to make informed decisions.

I asked the minister, and I will ask again. How does the minister reconcile with the fact that a piece of legislation has been tabled without protections for parents in standardized disclosure practices across B.C.?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Disclosure of files has nothing to do with safety planning and has to do with court proceedings, so it is not relevant to this bill.

Rosalyn Bird: That is absolutely not…. That is actually not true.

Safety plans can have massive ramifications on families, and you know that. You recommend that families request legal advice. In fact, you highly suggest it. If the information….

Interjection.

Rosalyn Bird: I beg your pardon?

The Chair: Hold on, hold on.

Member, just a reminder, remarks through the Chair. You don’t directly address the minister. It’s through the Chair.

Rosalyn Bird: Okay, my mistake. I apologize.

Chair, I have a huge issue with this. Safety plans have massive ramifications for families. They can involve removing a child. They can involve removing a parent. They can involve a number of things. They can request a parent attend recovery. They can request lots and lots of things that parents or children may find extremely egregious.

The reason that we ask for legal advice on these types of things is so that parents completely understand what it is that they’re signing. The fact that they are not getting all of the information or their legal counsel has not received all information regarding a situation makes it extremely difficult for somebody to make an informed decision about something. So I disagree with the minister entirely.

I would like to hear from the minister how she expects families to make informed decisions if they don’t have or if their counsel does not have all of the information that is applicable.

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: There were a number of gross assumptions made in that question that I don’t believe are helpful in the debate of this bill. I have outlined a number of complaint processes that families can take in the process of not agreeing with the director. I have outlined a number of support services that a director may take to support a family with respect to accessing legal counsel.

I need to remind the member that what we are talking about in this bill around safety plans are voluntary arrangements. They are voluntary plans. There are no removals in a safety plan. There is no removal of a child from the custody of a guardian in a safety plan.

The concerns that the member is bringing forward with respect to disclosure are about court processes and court orders, and they are not relevant to this bill.

Rosalyn Bird: Again, I completely disagree.

I dealt with a file this morning. I had a parent contact me. Their safety plan is supposed to be coming up for review, although the ministry has not confirmed that. They’ve asked for advice — they actually have obtained legal counsel — and were told by their lawyer that he cannot give advice on whether that plan should or shouldn’t be amended and/or extended without getting information regarding the file. This absolutely does apply, 100 percent. It may not apply in every situation.

I wasn’t suggesting that safety plans said that children are removed. However, I have had parents tell me that they have been told that if they do not sign a safety plan, the child will be removed from their house. This is a document that you say is voluntary. It should be voluntary, and it should be collaborative, but that isn’t always how it works. So I have huge concerns around this.

Again, I expressed earlier that I don’t like paintbrush-type solutions. I don’t like paintbrush-type responses.

There are definitely multiple families across this province — probably dozens, probably hundreds, quite frankly — that don’t have all the information they need in regard to what is happening with their family, and they are not getting proper legal advice. So I completely disagree with what the minister has said here.

I would actually like to ask the minister: do you honestly believe that that is true, that your ministry is operating to…?

The Chair: Member, just a reminder….

Interjections.

The Chair: Folks. Members.

Just a reminder, through the Chair, not to refer to “you.” Thank you.

Rosalyn Bird: I’ll rephrase the question. Thank you, Chair.

I’m extremely frustrated that this is not…. You just threw out an answer saying that this doesn’t apply to safety plans. That astounds me. That answer absolutely astounds me.

I’m going to ask the minister again, through you, Chair, if she…. Maybe I’ll rephrase the question. Is the minister aware of any children that were removed from a home because a safety plan was not followed?

[1:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Chair, I have spoken at length about the guiding principles of this act.

I encourage the member to read the guiding principles of the act. Asked and answered.

Rosalyn Bird: I’m going to ask the question again. It was a fairly straightforward question. Is the minister aware of any child that was removed from their family because a safety plan was violated or not followed?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: What the member has asked me is if I know of any individual case where something has occurred. What I’ve expressed to this House, at multiple times, is that any information that I obtain under the Child, Family and Community Service Act I cannot disclose to anybody in this House.

So I cannot answer that question, but I will reiterate, as I have answered multiple times through this process, that directors use structured decision-making tools to make evidence-based decisions about the safety and well-being of children in many different situations.

Rosalyn Bird: I want to clarify. Is the minister telling this House that her ministry is unaware of children in care that have been removed from their families?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: It is not relevant to the bill.

Rosalyn Bird: It is 100 percent relevant to the bill. What I asked was…. I didn’t ask about a specific case. The minister said to me that she cannot give me that information because it is privileged through the act. These are statistics that the RCY publishes annually. They are statistics the ministry should be publishing annually. So the question is relevant.

If in fact a parent violated or something happened with a safety plan and it escalated and a child was removed because that parent may or may not have had the correct information disclosed to them through the ministry, it is 100 percent applicable. We are talking about safety plans. The results or the ramifications of safety plans are significant, including possibly having a child removed.

To point to the principles of the act…. I’m quite aware of what the principles of the act are. If I didn’t care about the principles, quite frankly, I wouldn’t be standing here in committee asking questions about this bill, and my caucus members wouldn’t be here to support me.

Once again, I will ask if she is aware of any children in this province — not a specific case — being removed from their family home because there was a violation or a particular piece of a family plan that was not followed.

The Chair: Member, you’ve asked that question a number of times. We’ve heard the response from the minister. I know we may not have agreement on that, but just in light of not having a repetitive discussion, I’ll ask you if you have additional questions.

Rosalyn Bird: I’d like to take a five-minute recess, please.

The Chair: Okay, yeah. We’ll have a five-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 2:00 p.m. to 2:13 p.m.

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

The Chair: Okay, we’ll call the committee back to session.

I have made some remarks in terms of questions being repetitive. I recognize that it’s very passionate, a lot of interest on this bill. And I give the opportunity for the minister to respond, if she wishes.

Just in terms of direction, moving forward, I remind everyone to try and keep questions relevant to the clause that’s being debated.

Peter Milobar: Madam Chair, I was hoping to seek a little further clarification from what you just said actually.

Our understanding…. This is not a brand-new piece of legislation where we are dealing with an act that didn’t previously exist. This is amending legislation to amend certain provisions within an existing framework and legislation. Therefore, the questions we’re asking about safety plans directly tie into existing legislation and how they have been used in the past and how safety plans under these amendments may or may not be impacted.

We are very mindful that we cannot ask about specific files, let alone identifying casework or anything like that. The questions we are trying to ask that may seem repetitive at times are simply because the minister is refusing to answer said questions, not because we seem to be out of the purview of what the bill itself is trying to accomplish.

Again, we are looking at amending legislation. To not understand how that amendment will impact the functionality of existing legislation makes it very, very hard.

[2:15 p.m.]

If the government’s premise is that they can’t answer any questions, based on the facts that it’s to do with the act and it’s child welfare at stake, we might as well find a way for the government to take all of these proceedings in camera so we can at least, as opposition, do our job to find out what the changes to the act will actually mean to people in their daily lives.

That is, I think, the premise and the basis that these questions are being asked on. Repetition only results when they are valid questions because a minister is refusing to answer the question, not because the opposition has asked the same question 16 times with 16 succinct answers.

The answer we’ve been getting back is, “I can’t talk about that,” where, in fact, there needs to be a mechanism for the government, when we’re asking non-identifying questions about existing legislation and how this amendment will impact that existing legislation, to actually answer in this place. For if they’re not, I’m not sure what the role of opposition is supposed to be when it comes to legislation if that’s the out that government is able to take.

I guess we just seek a little further clarification, but you did seem to cover it off with your previous comments.

So I just wanted to make sure that the Chair understood where we were coming from as opposition. We’re not trying to be obstructionists. We are not trying to be argumentative or repetitive, but we do need the minister to cooperate in that regard.

We are very mindful and will be very mindful moving forward that we cannot have identifying-type questions that we are asking for clarification for the impact of this amendment with the existing legislation as it stands.

The Chair: Minister, do you wish to respond to the previous questions?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I just want to, for the record, make it very clear that I have only cited privacy of the act one time during this debate, which I felt was important to highlight, and that when I have referenced things that we have talked about in previous clauses, it’s because I’ve answered similar questions in previous clauses and find the question has been already answered.

But with respect to the privacy that is required under the Child, Family and Community Service Act, this is the very first time that I have spoken to that.

Rosalyn Bird: I’ll carry on to a different question.

To the minister: did your office, in December 2024, receive a letter regarding a survey that 25 parents’ counsels participated in?

[2:20 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: This line of questioning is not relevant to this amendment to the CFCSA. The clause that we are on is clause 3: “Making a safety plan agreement.”

Rosalyn Bird: I disagree. In clause 2, it says: “As applicable, the parent may seek independent legal advice at any time with respect to the agreement.” That’s what we are talking about, actually being able to get legal advice and whether or not that legal advice is accurate.

So I will ask the minister. In the letter that I have no idea if the minister’s office did or didn’t get, because she did not answer the first question…. If she is reminded of the letter, did that letter state that parents’ counsel do not always receive complete disclosure, even in cases where requests for specific records have been made to the director’s counsel?

Again, this particular information that I’m asking about actually does apply to safety plans. A parent cannot get legal advice from counsel if they have not been given all the information from the minister. So I will ask the question again. Did the letter that the minister’s office received contain information that parents do not receive all of the information from counsel that they have requested?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Court proceedings and disclosure are not a part of safety planning. They are a part of a different part of the Child, Family and Community Service Act.

Rosalyn Bird: I will move on to a different question, because, clearly, the minister is not wanting to answer any of the questions regarding legal counsel that her ministry is not only encouraging but requesting that parents signing a safety plan get.

Para 3 states: “As soon as applicable after making a….”

The Chair: Member. I just want to recognize the member from Penticton-Summerland.

Amelia Boultbee: Thank you so much.

I apologize to the MLA for interrupting her.

If I may just ask a clarifying question of the minister.

The Chair: I thought you were asking for leave. We’ll hear the question from Prince George–Valemount, and then, after that, we’ll recognize you.

Rosalyn Bird: Paragraph 3 indicates: “As soon as practicable after making a safety plan agreement, the director must do all of the following.” Can the minister provide, using the terms “as soon as practical” and “reasonable effort”…? Does the minister have benchmarks for what is practicable and reasonable?

[2:25 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: “Practicable” and “reasonable” are common terms used in law, and they are used in various places in the CFCSA. They’re used because there is a need for a certain amount of flexibility with respect to the work that’s done.

For an example, there are certain places in this province where it may take three hours for a protection worker to get to a family and back again, whereas in other places it may take 20 minutes. So “practicable” and “reasonable” are common terms, and child protection workers do everything that they can to make sure that they are working quickly with families and providing them with support and information in the fastest ways so that they keep children safe.

Amelia Boultbee: If I may just ask a generalized clarifying question of the minister. Is it the ministry’s position that disclosure is not mandatory under this section because the safety plans contemplated here are purely voluntary?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I’ll try and provide some clarity. They are two separate issues. Providing, obtaining particular legal advice in relation to a short-term voluntary plan is different than file disclosure to support a court proceeding.

Rosalyn Bird: I apologize for the pause. I thought there was going to be a follow-up question there.

Safety plans under the current policy…. Chapter 3, 3.2, states that they have to be approved by a supervisor and documented within 24 hours after they have been completed.

Will the minister explain why the bill does not specify a 24-hour time frame currently being used within policy?

[2:30 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I just gave an example in my previous answer and just answered this question.

Rosalyn Bird: I want to understand this, because I’ve heard from the minister a number of times over the debate of this bill. She has stated that when a safety plan is being considered — we are talking about making safety plan agreements — there are a number of things that happen within the family unit.

Obviously, there’s been a report made that there is a concern within a family — one child, multiple children. It could be egregious; it could not be egregious. But it’s concerning enough that the ministry wants to examine it.

My understanding is they will make a visit to that house, that they will interview the parents, will talk to children if they are of appropriate age. They may have a look around the house to see if there are things that are concerning. There may or may not be enough food. Do they have a washer and dryer and are able to wash their clothes? Do they have running water? Do they have electricity? All the standard things that people would look at when they’re considering safety of children.

The regulation also states that the directors or the person working with the family needs to contact any community agencies that the family may or may not be involved with that could help with the safety plan. It directs that you should contact other family members to ask about concerns around that. So there’s a lot of information that is taken into consideration prior to determining what a safety plan looks like.

When the director comes back or the social worker or whoever it is that is going to be engaging with this family in this collaborative, supposed voluntary process, why is a safety plan not actually documented at that time with family members? And if it’s not documented, why can it not be documented within the 24-hour time frame that is actually currently in the policy that is being followed?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Asked and answered.

Rosalyn Bird: Well, it is apparent that there’s a lot of vagueness that goes on in this ministry in regards to safety plans, which I was hoping was going to actually be rectified with this bill, although I have more concerns now than I had before.

The current policy also states, “affirm parents are informed” and “voluntary consent to the safety plan.” Will the minister confirm that this is the intent of paragraph (c)(ii)?

It says that a signature is required on the agreement and “written confirmation that the terms and conditions as set out in the agreement reflect what the party has agreed to.” Is it the minister’s purview that that signature is voluntary?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Yes.

Rosalyn Bird: Parents frequently report that being told refusal to sign a safety plan will, in fact, result in apprehension of a child. The power imbalance, the urgency and the fear of losing a child mean that consent may be formal but not truly voluntary, raising fundamental justice concerns.

[2:35 p.m.]

How will the minister protect families from feeling coerced into signing agreements that threaten a child or a parent being removed from the home or for another violation?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: This is exactly why it is important that we are putting safety plans explicitly in the act and enshrining them in law. Providing procedural safeguards in the act is the reason why we’re doing this, to ensure that it is explicit in the legislation that these are voluntary.

The director must communicate with prospective parties in a manner that is appropriate to their abilities in an effort to help them understand the terms and conditions of the safety plans, including the right to withdraw. Before entering into the agreement, the director must also inform parents that they can seek legal advice at any time. The director must make all reasonable efforts to confirm the agreement in writing.

The written agreement must include an acknowledgement that parties can seek legal advice. The legislation makes it clear that parents and others who are parties to the safety plan may withdraw from the agreement within a set number of days described in the agreement. The agreement can be discontinued or the terms and conditions can be revisited if a party no longer agrees to them.

In addition, I have spoken previously in this debate around all of the other actions that are explicitly outlined in policy for directors to take if there is a disagreement with a family around the safety plan. They could take an arrangement for the child or youth to live with an extended family member. They could create a support service agreement with a youth or a child.

Safety planning is looked at as the least disruptive measure available through policy, but there are a number of tools available to directors should there be a disagreement with themselves and the parent caregiver.

Rosalyn Bird: A clarifying question. I believe this is what I just heard. The minister said that safety plans are apparently voluntary.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Safety plans are voluntary.

Rosalyn Bird: With all due respect to the minister, based on the conversations we’ve had this afternoon, safety plans are apparently voluntary.

On the date…. Actually, I’m going to go back to (3)(b), and (3)(b) states: “Make all reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each party.”

Can the minister provide an example or a reason why every party that is involved in an agreement would not receive a copy of that agreement?

[2:40 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I just want to reiterate what it actually says in the clause. As soon as practicable after making a safety plan agreement, the director must do all of the following: “(b) make all reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each party.”

Rosalyn Bird: I understand what the clause says. My question to the minister was why would a written agreement not be provided to one of the parties?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I will try and give a real-life example, and hopefully that will be helpful. In the unfortunate time when Lytton burned down in our province, child protection workers quite literally had to interact with children and their families and make plans on the spot. Some of those things were verbal agreements. Because of that environment and because of what was happening there, they were not able to then provide a written document in the timeline.

So there are real circumstances where things like this occur. Internet is down. We have extraordinary events that happen. There are a number of things that could happen where this circumstance would take place.

Rosalyn Bird: I wouldn’t disagree in those circumstances at all, but I would assume that after things had sorted down and people had been evacuated from Lytton and you made sure that children and families were reunited, you’re going to, obviously, put together an agreement to make sure they continue to be supported and protected if they were at risk because they’ve lost their home.

They’ve lost their…. Of course, I would not have any argument with that whatsoever.

However, at some point you would have sat down with those families, even from Lytton, and you would have actually signed a formal agreement.

So my question was: why would a parent not get a copy of a written agreement?

[2:45 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: When there is a verbal agreement, it is followed up as quickly as possible with a written agreement.

Rosalyn Bird: Again, that didn’t answer the question, but I’ll move on to something else.

This states that there has to be a signature on the agreement. My question would be: if a member or a party of the agreement doesn’t actually get a copy of said agreement, how would they sign said agreement?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I mentioned that when a verbal agreement is made, it is followed up with a written agreement. It says at (3)(c)(i): “signature on the agreement, or (ii) written confirmation that the terms and conditions as set out in the agreement reflect what the party has agreed to.”

Rosalyn Bird: Just to clarify, when you say written confirmation that terms and conditions set out that the party has agreed to, are you referring to an email? Can you specify what you’re referring to there?

[2:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Yes, it could be an email.

Rosalyn Bird: Paragraph (4)(a) states: “on the date on which all parties agree to the terms and conditions of the agreement.” Can the minister provide an explanation of how a director or a social worker would…? I’m trying to figure out…. If a verbal agreement was made originally, and it was put into a written agreement, but a party of that safety plan didn’t actually get in agreement, am I to assume that…? I don’t understand how this clause works actually.

Actually, I’m going to move on to (4)(b). It states that whether or not the party or any other party signs a written agreement or gives written confirmation, as described, then the safety plan agreement is in place. But if you go back to the previous paragraph, in (3)(c), it says there has to be a signature on the agreement. So if nobody has signed the agreement, I don’t know how the agreement can actually be in effect. If the minister could clarify that, through the Chair.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: So (4)(b) allows for the verbal plan to be in effect, and then we follow up with written confirmation as soon as practicable.

Rosalyn Bird: Can the minister just, and I hope it’s not the complaint process, please explain what a family has the ability to do if the verbal agreement does not actually reflect in the written agreement that they receive to sign?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: The family can refuse to provide written confirmation if there is a disagreement, and then the director can work with the family on other least intrusive measures, or they can work with the family on a different written safety plan agreement.

Rosalyn Bird: I just want to go back to…. You’ve stated a couple of times through the debate that if there is a disagreement with a safety plan, and in making a safety plan, and there is something within the process that they’re not happy with during the safety plan, including the inability to collect enough information to get proper legal advice…. You have indicated that a family can initiate a complaint process through the complaint department.

My question is: if that process is actually initiated, what happens to that safety plan in the interim?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: If the family is unhappy with the terms of an agreement or the process that has been undertaken, they can seek to explore other least intrusive measures. They can seek to explore other terms of the agreement and take the same measures that I just listed in the previous question.

Rosalyn Bird: I’d like to go back to a previous question. I want to make sure that…. I’m pretty sure this is what the minister said, so I need clarification.

I asked her earlier if (3)(c)(ii) — written confirmation that terms and agreements and the conditions set out — was, in fact, the clarifying document or clarifying piece that makes these agreements voluntary. Can the minister confirm that’s what she said earlier?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: All aspects of safety planning are voluntary. The terms of the agreement, what is in the provisions, the agreed-upon timelines, written confirmation, the whole aspect of safety planning is voluntary.

Rosalyn Bird: Again, paragraph (4) states that a safety plan agreement is in effect as it applies to a party on the date on which all parties agree to the terms and conditions of the agreement, whether or not the party or any other party signs a written agreement or gives written confirmation as described in section (c). So I am just again….

I am sure the minister is going to say to me that this is in regards to a verbal agreement and that’s why this clause is in here. Yet further up in the clause, it states that a verbal agreement actually has to be put in writing.

So as I understand this amendment or the way it reads…. And I’m not going to be the only person reading this. There are going to be, probably, thousands or, at least, hundreds of social workers across the province that are going to be referring to this. So I’m very concerned about the language.

Again, my question is…. In section (4), if you have not received a signature and you have not received the terms and conditions, then I don’t understand how this agreement can actually be in effect.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I have already answered this. I’m going to try to answer it one last time.

There is a period of time between which a verbal agreement is made and a written confirmation happens. So (4)(b) allows for that to take place.

Rosalyn Bird: That is not a clear answer, but it’s clear I’m not going to get a clear answer, so I would like to table an amendment.

[CLAUSE 3, in proposed section 19.4, by deleting the text shown as struck and adding the underlined text as shown:

Making a safety plan agreement

19.4 (1) A safety plan agreement may be made verbally or in writing.

(2) Before making a safety plan agreement, the director must inform each parent who is proposed to be a party to the agreement under section 19.2 (1) (b) or (2), as applicable, that the parent may seek independent legal advice at any time with respect to the agreement.

(3) As soon as practicableWithin 24 hours after making a safety plan agreement, the director must do all of the following:

(a) if the agreement was made verbally, prepare a written copy of the agreement;

(b) make all reasonable efforts to provide a copy of the written agreement to each party;

(c) for each party referred to in section 19.2 (1) (b) or (2), as applicable, and section 19.2 (4), if any, make all reasonable efforts to obtain the party’s

(i) signature on the agreement, or

(ii) written confirmation that the terms and conditions as set out in the agreement reflect what the party has agreed to.

(4) A safety plan agreement is effective as it applies to a party on the date on which the agreement as been signed by all parties.

(a) on the date on which all parties agree to the terms and conditions of the agreement, and

(b) whether or not the party, or any other party, signs a written agreement or gives written confirmation as described in subsection (3) (c).]

The Chair: Member, while we’re getting copies, would you like to speak to your amendment?

On the amendment.

Rosalyn Bird: We have gone back and forth and back and forth. I made it quite clear at the beginning of this section that I had serious reservations around verbal agreements, and this is why.

[3:00 p.m.]

I have talked to lots of parents and advocacy groups that have massive concerns about verbal agreements. They also have huge concerns about how these agreements go from being verbal to being in writing. They also have concerns about how and whether or not these are or are not voluntary, specifically around the legal piece.

The minister’s office has received multiple letters containing information and concerns that I have voiced here today.

I have huge issues with the way that this particular section has been laid out. I do not think it is protective for parents, and I do not believe that it is a voluntary process under the guise of the way the legislation is currently written, so I have tabled an amendment.

The Chair: Thank you, Member.

We’ll take a recess as we make some copies and distribute to all members.

The committee recessed from 3:01 p.m. to 3:08 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

The Chair: Members, we will call this House back to order.

We are considering an amendment on Bill 29 to clause 3, section 19.4(3), where we will be proposing removal of “as soon as practicable” to “within 24 hours.” Also, under (4), there will be a proposed change to (a) and (b), and that change will be “on the date which the agreement has been signed by all parties.”

The motion is in order.

Minister, would you like to take an opportunity to speak to this amendment?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Yes. I do not support the amendment for a number of reasons that we’ve discussed.

I’m really hoping…. I’m happy to talk to the member at length at another time, but in both cases of these amendments, what the member is doing is removing the ability to be flexible at all. In any extenuating circumstance, it would remove the ability for a verbal agreement, which means that a child protection worker would not be able to be responsive and act in the best interests of the child in the middle of the night or in a remote location.

It would essentially create a situation where the guiding principles of the act could no longer be paramount in an interaction. For that reason, I am not in support of the amendments.

[3:10 p.m.]

The Chair: Seeing no further speakers, the question is the amendment as proposed by the member for Prince George–Valemount.

Amendment negatived on division.

The Chair: Members, we are continuing our committee stage. Are there any further questions on clause 3?

Rosalyn Bird: Currently the policy regarding safety plans uses them as a transitional tool prior to moving to more aggressive options, such as court orders, to protect children or youth.

I go back to the language “must” and “may” under this section. I’ve looked at this a number of times, and once again, we’re going to be back looking at 19.5(1) and (2). I’ve raised a number of concerns in regard to that. So 19.1 says a director “may,” but this one says they “must” withdraw from a safety plan.

I can assume, the way that this has been written, that paragraph 1, at least, is applying to the actual times when a director may have made a safety plan in regard to the circumstances or the pieces that have been laid out in paragraph 19.1(2). Is that actually the case?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Yes, that is correct.

Rosalyn Bird: Is there not room…? In my understanding, there is room.

Again, she just said, in the spirit and the principles of the act, that there can be a desire to have greater safety concerns addressed through a court proceeding or a judicial proceeding, which is why a director, or somebody that is working the front line, would submit an application or request a court date. Still, this says that a director may, under those circumstances, have a safety plan.

My question to the minister is: are there not circumstances where you have both a court order or a judicial proceeding coming up and a safety plan?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: It depends on the court order.

[3:15 p.m.]

Rosalyn Bird: That’s an odd answer. If the minister could elaborate on what exactly she means by that.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: You may have a safety plan in place when there is a court proceeding or a court order if a parent was arrested and you had a safety plan in place with another parent who is a protective parent.

A safety plan cannot be in place if there is a different type of court order, like a supervision order.

Rosalyn Bird: I want to make sure I’m clarifying. Did you say that there wouldn’t be a safety plan in place if you had a situation where a parent was under a supervision order but the other parent wasn’t?

I’m a bit confused. You could have two different parties from the same family living in different places. There could be concern with one parent being around children. So there’s a supervision order for whatever purposes, for the moment or for a specific amount of time, that that parent is not allowed to be around those children.

I would assume that a safety plan would be in place with the parent that has custody of those children, to ensure that their living situation, their safety and their feeling of safety are being looked after or being considered while these processes take place.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I think I’m understanding what the member is trying to ask. If there are two separate homes and there are two separate, complete, different concerns in each one of those homes, theoretically, you could have a safety plan in one home and a supervision order in a different home — if they were completely separated and there was a child that was living in both of those homes.

Rosalyn Bird: That’s actually almost exactly what I was asking. Thank you for clarifying that.

The reason I’m asking the question is because in 19.1 — the reason I’m referring to that and not 19.5, is because they’re related, are talking about the same paragraph — it says “(b) further to an assessment or investigation…the director has applied under the act for a court order….” I’m going to assume a court order could be a supervision order. It could be any number of types of orders that the court delivers.

[3:20 p.m.]

My question around that…. I would assume that, as part of the assessment phase, a safety plan would be initiated during the assessment and the assessment phase would not actually be completed until that court proceeding was finished. The result of that court proceeding would then either change, terminate or extend the safety plan that had been in place.

Is that the case, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: If a court order is made, the safety plan ends.

Rosalyn Bird: I have further questions regarding clause 3, Chair. I’m confused by what the minister just said.

Again, in clause 2, it states that a director may make a safety plan while there is an assessment going on or an investigation or further to an assessment or an investigation, the director has applied for a court order.

She just stated that if there is a court order, the safety plan terminates.

I’m not sure if I’m misunderstanding, but can you clarify that please, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Because the court has made a decision, the safety plan would be over.

Rosalyn Bird: Okay, so the safety plan terminates when the court has made their…. It’s not while the court proceedings are awaiting. So I was correct. The assessment piece does actually take into consideration or doesn’t finish until the court proceedings are done. Then the safety plan terminates because of a court decision.

I have some questions around that. So if we go back to the example that you used, where you have two households, parents living in separate places. They do have or had shared custody of a child. There were concerns raised in one household but not another household.

My question is: why would a safety plan from the first household be negated or terminated once a court decision had been made? I’m not clear on how the safety of the child has…. It doesn’t necessarily mean with a court order that the child is automatically safe. That’s not what court orders necessarily mean.

I’m confused as to why that would be, when you stated earlier that you can have both at the same time.

If the minister could clarify, please.

The Chair: Thank you, Member. Just a reminder about the word “you.”

[3:25 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: There are a couple of things here.

In the example that I gave before, we had two distinct, separate situations. We had one parent and another parent. Each parent had two separate processes happening. One parent had a safety plan in place. Another parent maybe had a supervision order in place. Those are two separate scenarios, and one would not negate the other or influence the other. They would have two separate processes with respect to how a director would interact with either one of those parents.

Rosalyn Bird: I understood that part. I’m not confused on that issue. What I am confused about is…. Actually, maybe I can ask a clarifying question.

Let’s take something…. And we’re going to go back to…. I hate bringing this up because it’s not pleasant for anybody to hear. But if you’re talking about a child where you have a parent and sexual assault or sexual inappropriateness has taken place…. I mean, we never want to see that, but unfortunately, it is something that we have to deal with.

I need to understand the assessment and the investigation period. So investigating something like that, there is the director’s investigation, and then there’s the entire investigation that takes place outside of MCFD with the police forces, with the courts, with all of, sort of, that piece.

Does the investigation or the assessment that the director is making in regard to a child in a situation of that type…? Are the investigations…? Do they align with each other? Or if there’s still something continuing outside of MCFD, like I said — that the assessment remains in place until the final determination of that situation has been made.

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: A couple of things with respect to the example that the member brought forward. When a protection worker gets called on a concern for the safety of a child and that concern is the concern that the member outlined and that concern is found to be a credible concern, the protection worker would call the police right away, as you discussed. We have structured protocols between MCFD protection workers, MCFD staff and police. They are distinct processes that occur.

That’s the first step. Then a child protection worker could work with the non-offending parent on a safety plan, if that was an appropriate tool to use, while they also, as quickly as possible, sought a protection order against the offending parent. There would be a lot of moving parts and different competing pieces of information, so it’s hard to really speak to specifics on a situation like that. A safety plan could be in place. Staff would work with police. We’d work to get a protection order as quickly as possible and then the process would unfold after that.

Rosalyn Bird: That was my understanding of the process also, which is really one of the reasons that I’m actually asking the question. When we are talking about children that are in…. Say there’s been an accusation or there’s been a report filed but somebody actually hasn’t been found guilty of what it was that they were accused of and that process is ongoing….

The process that you laid out makes sense to me, but in regard to your point that you made earlier about being flexible and being able to move and pivot and ensure that families are being kept safe…. If a safety plan was in place, my question is: what if a director wants to withdraw that safety plan, but the family wants it to remain in place because they don’t feel secure while there is a legal or an investigation going on outside of MCFD’s purview?

I’m trying to figure out…. These two things can actually cohabitate together. I want to make sure that the flexibility is actually built into the bill, and I’m questioning that at the moment. I’m not saying that was your intention, but the way that it has been worded is where my concern lies.

[3:35 p.m.]

If you could take some time with your staff and help me better understand that, because it’s something that has been raised with parents that I have spoken to.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I think this might help. There does not have to be a conviction of a crime or there does not have to be police involvement for MCFD involvement or to respond to concerns. So the threshold is not the same.

If a family continues to have concerns, the ministry will not walk away in any case where courts or other processes are underway and have made different decisions. If a safety plan is in place, if an assessment is still ongoing, if there are still ongoing concerns, the ministry will continue to work with a family around those concerns.

I’m not sure if I answered the question.

I would like to ask for a bathroom break, if that would be okay, Chair.

The Chair: Absolutely, Minister. We will consider a recess for ten minutes.

The committee recessed from 3:38 p.m. to 3:45 p.m.

[Lorne Doerkson in the chair.]

The Chair: Thank you, Members. We will call this chamber back to order, and we will recognize the member for Prince George–Valemount on clause 3 on Bill 29.

Rosalyn Bird: Again, to go back to paragraph 1, I actually think we could almost agree on this one as we’re trying to remain flexible for children, youth and families.

I have a couple of concerns around this. Some of the ones we’ve discussed. The other challenge that this brings for me is we have a number of communities around the province that don’t have the right number of social workers or MCFD workers in place.

It raises concerns about how files are handled, how they’re processed, how assessments actually get completed and the time it takes those assessments to get completed, especially if it’s a community that is fairly rural or fairly remote. It complicates things again. It probably doesn’t happen very often, but in a circumstance like that, you could actually have the results of a court proceeding before you finished an assessment, which raises questions about the safety plan that should have been put in place when that assessment was initiated.

I would like to ask the minister — it’s not the child’s fault, not the parent’s fault; it’s just the unfortunate situation of the system and where we’re sitting currently at the moment — how we would deal with a situation like that in regard to the context of paragraph 1.

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: There would not be a situation where a court would make a decision about a safety concern where an assessment or an investigation was not complete. If there was a safety concern, there would be an assessment. There would be an investigation. If a court order happened in relation to that safety concern, the order would not come before the assessment was complete on that safety concern.

If it was a separate concern, the safety plan would be in place with respect to the original safety concern.

Rosalyn Bird: I just want to clarify that.

The community of Mackenzie — unfortunately, there are a number of MCFD cases there, but the staff is just not there. They’re not on the ground. That is not something parents or children can control.

Often in MCFD cases, there are multiple things going on at the same time. Like you said, these cases can be extremely complex. There are probably circumstances that could have court decisions made prior to an assessment completely being finished — specifically, an investigation being finished.

When you’re talking about a community that has nobody on the ground, if there’s an investigation going on outside of MCFD — with the police, with courts, with that type of thing — if a decision has been made, particularly if somebody has been abusing a child physically to the point where charges have been laid and Crown has decided to proceed or, again, if we’re talking about a child that, unfortunately, is experiencing some kind of sexual assault or something like that, it is possible in those circumstances that that investigation actually could complete and a ruling be made that Crown is going to follow through with charges.

In that case, I would assume that if the assessment had been completed or there were people on the ground, that the assessment would take all that into consideration. The safety plan would be amended. All of those things would be taking place. But if you don’t have the actual staff in place to do those things, how do we continue to protect or make families feel safe in circumstances like that?

[3:55 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: For the court to make a decision on a court order in relation to the CFCSA, they must rely on the assessment or the investigation of a director. Investigations outside of the CFCSA are outside of the parameters of the bill and are a separate process.

Rosalyn Bird: I’m going to try and give an example here. Maybe it will make more sense — to both of us, quite frankly.

If you have a parent, the mother or the father, that has been accused of child abuse, of physically abusing, and the court is looking at that…. There are proceedings taking place. The court makes a decision, and they have determined for it doesn’t matter what reasons that abuse did not happen.

However, the parent where the child resides, almost full-time, but the other parent is now allowed to have that child back in their house…. If that parent still has significant concerns around the situation of their children, but a court decision has been made, what happens to the safety plan in a case like that? According to this, if I understand this correctly, it terminates, and the director must withdraw from that safety plan.

Can the minister explain?

[4:00 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Just to be clear, a court order in our justice system does not have the ability to terminate a safety plan. It is a separate court process. It is not the same as the court order under the CFCSA.

So in the example that you provided, it would not necessarily terminate a safety plan with a family. Our process would be under provincial court with respect to the Child, Family and Community Service Act.

Rosalyn Bird: I’ll ask for leeway with the minister with this next question, because I just want to clarify.

In paragraph (1)(c), it says that the court has made a decision with respect to an application for an order described. So, specifically, what are those orders?

I believe you gave me a list — I don’t know how many hours ago — but I want to confirm that we’re talking about the same types of orders, so that I can better understand this. If you don’t mind, I would appreciate that.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: The vast majority of court orders would be the following: a supervision order, a continuing custody order, a temporary custody order or a protection order.

Rosalyn Bird: I appreciate that again, for going through that list again.

I know there’s the family court process and MCFD, and they often, unfortunately, intersect on a lot of cases. I’m trying to figure out in this situation….

I can think of a case, at the moment, actually, where the family court has decided, based on the evidence that they received, that a parent again is allowed to now have custody for a child. The other parent does not believe that that parent should, in fact, have custody or, actually, even any sort of visitation over that child. The one parent very much believes that the risk and safety of that child is still a huge issue.

I’m trying to figure out if that type of court decision is captured inside this paragraph.

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Regardless of any proceedings that happen in family law or any sort of custody order, a child protection worker under the Child, Family and Community Service Act has the authority to proceed under that act with actions with a parent.

In addition, I just wanted to add some information about how the CFCSA interacts with family law.

Firstly, under section 75 of the CFCSA, it closely restricts disclosure of information obtained under the act, which would include information collected while developing and implementing a safety plan agreement. If a parent sought to use a safety plan agreement in a family law proceeding, it would constitute a breach.

That said, there is a potential pathway for lawful disclosure through the court. A parent could seek a Family Law Act production order to require the director to disclose information about the safety plan agreement. Such an application would need to be served on the Attorney General. The director would then be able to consider what position they want to take given the specific circumstance.

If a parent sought to rely on a safety plan agreement as evidence in a family law proceeding, despite being unlawful unless authorized by the court, arguments as to the weight of the evidence that would be given are dependent on the facts and would likely focus on the short-term nature of safety plan agreements and circumstances of a current or very recent child protection investigation or assessment of interim period until a protective order could be obtained.

That’s a little bit about how they can interact.

Rosalyn Bird: I wasn’t suggesting at any time that somebody should use a safety plan as evidence in family court. That’s not what I was getting at, at all.

I was trying to figure out if a decision was made in court, whether it was family court or criminal court or any other court, and somebody had been accused, for example, of abusing their child in any way, and the court decided that they hadn’t done that, but there were possibly concerns or even evidence within an investigation through MCFD that even they felt that that child still might be at risk, even though the court has deemed that charges aren’t being laid, that they’re not guilty, for whatever reason….

I can’t presume what evidence would determine yes or no on those. Luckily, I don’t have to look at those types of things. So in that case….

That’s what I’m concerned about. I’m not suggesting that family plans are being used as evidence. It’s the complete opposite, actually.

I’ll use criminal court, because I believe that’s where you would try those cases. If somebody was found not guilty, but even within your ministry there was information that was still raising alarms for you, and you’re kind of like, “Hmm, something’s off” — I know it happens — what happens with that safety plan and that assessment? If I’m reading this correctly, it stops. It’s withdrawn. Honestly, in this, it’s almost like if you had put “may” in (1) and “must” in (2), it actually would have made more sense to me.

I apologize. I’m new to the role. MCFD is extremely convoluted, and I’m trying to balance figuring this bill out with a very massive amount of information. I just simply have not ingested all of it current to date.

[4:10 p.m.]

So if the minister could help me better understand, I’d be very appreciative.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: The “must withdraw” is in relation to court orders made with relation to the CFCSA — continuing custody orders, temporary custody orders, etc. Court decisions made outside of the CFCSA would not have bearing on a safety plan or actions of a child protection worker.

I think there are probably examples where, you know, there is a stay of proceedings or there may not be enough evidence in a situation. That is separate from the process that’s undertaken in MCFD. If a director still has a concern about the safety and well-being of a child, they still have to legally act on that concern.

Rosalyn Bird: Thank you for that answer.

I don’t know why it took us so long to get there, quite frankly, but that was the answer I wanted. This is why I didn’t understand this section. I couldn’t figure out what court orders or what decisions did apply, didn’t apply.

I still have some concerns around the language, only because multiple people are going to be looking at this legislation within the act itself now, and I think there could be confusion there. I hope, and I’m sure that that will be communicated through the ministry, that this is really well understood — if families and children still feel they’re at risk, even though court decisions have resulted in something that they don’t agree with, that those plans would stay in place. So I very much appreciate that answer.

Thank you, Minister.

I do have one question. When a director may withdraw…. The pieces here are fairly clear, but when a director is withdrawing from a safety plan, can the minister help me and explain to the public why that would not be put in writing along with the reason for the withdrawal?

[4:15 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: In withdrawing from a safety plan agreement, there are a couple things. It depends on the reason for the withdraw of the safety plan agreement. There are different ways that a party to the safety plan agreement would be informed of that, based on the reason for the withdraw.

For example, if the reason for the withdrawal is a court order, they would receive that in writing. If the reason for the withdrawal is direct protection of a child, they would be notified of that.

In every instance, a director will communicate in the best way that they possibly can with the family, based on how the family receives communication best, and a family can request that information in writing if they would like to as well. Also, all of the reasons for withdrawal would be documented and would be uploaded into our integrated case management system.

Rosalyn Bird: I want to just clarify what you just said at the end because it might have actually answered my question. That was a good answer. There was a lot of information on the front end there that was helpful, actually, for me.

Paragraph (2) says that a director can withdraw verbally, but it doesn’t state in the following subparagraphs that that verbal withdraw actually has to be put in writing.

A minute ago, you just indicated that all of the reasons and the background information for a withdrawal are actually written into MCFD documentation.

I just want to confirm that is what I heard, to the minister through the Chair, because it doesn’t state that in the actual bill, that that happens.

The Chair: Just a reminder, again, about the word “you” and bringing those questions through me to the minister, please.

[4:20 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: All of the decision-making of a director is documented in our integrated case management system. If a director withdraws an agreement with a family and that withdrawal happens verbally, the family can request that that withdrawal be documented and the reasons for the withdrawal, and that can be provided to the family.

Rosalyn Bird: In a situation like that, if a family wasn’t in agreement with a verbal decision or actually a withdrawal at all, you said that they could request the information and it would be provided to the family. If, once they look at that information, they have concerns, is there an ability to reinstate that? Does that process continue with the worker, or is this a decision that is finalized by the director?

[Mable Elmore in the chair.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: I think there are a bunch of different circumstances that could happen, and I think I know where the member is going.

I think if a safety plan is in place, an assessment occurs, and the assessment ends and there is no concern, or the director believes there is no longer a need for a safety plan but the family or the parent still feels that supports are required, there would be a different process that would be taken with that.

[4:25 p.m.]

If it was they felt that they still needed respite support or other parenting supports to help them with their child, that would be explored in different ways, and the director would continue to work with that family and that child.

If it was…. Sorry, I lost my train of thought there. I’m going to come back.

The Chair: Minister.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Sorry about that. I think it’s the longest time I’ve ever been speaking to anything in my life, frankly.

If there continues to be a concern, and I think what the member is trying to get at is a concern with one parent about another parent, and there is a disagreement, we would expect…. The parent would have to undertake a sort of dispute resolution process with the ministry, speaking with the team leader, the director of operations, filing a complaint, filing for an administrative review and having their concerns looked at through those processes.

Rosalyn Bird: I have one question about withdrawals from safety plans when it is specifically the director. Is there any instance where that information of why the director actually withdrew from the plan would be protected or not disclosed under section 75 of the act?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: This is covered in clause 4 of the bill. There are a couple of circumstances. The circumstances would include if information included solicitor-client privilege.

I think this also might be helpful. While every party needs to know when a safety plan ends, the actual reason the director is withdrawing could include personal information that the parents don’t want the directors to share with others, that the director does not have authority to disclose. So in some circumstances, a director could still share this information with other parties — for example, if doing so is necessary for the safety and well-being of the child.

[4:30 p.m.]

Rosalyn Bird: I just want to clarify what you just said. So the ministry…. If a director withdraws from a safety plan, the reasons for that withdrawal may actually be provided to third parties. However, they might not necessarily, based on some circumstances, actually be provided to the parents.

Did I misunderstand that, or is that what you said, Minister?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: In section 19.2, it was outlined that there are other parties that can be or may be a party to a plan. For example, a grandparent could be a party to a plan. If the parents in the safety plan don’t want that party to know about the reason for withdrawal, then that information would not be shared with those parties.

Rosalyn Bird: I am a bit perplexed by this, because we had a rather heated discussion around whether these plans are or aren’t voluntary.

So when people are participating in a plan of all parties…. I’m trying to understand what that agreement looks like. If myself, my mother and my aunt want to participate in a safety plan for my child, and we all agree to that safety plan….

Actually, this is a good question to start with. Does the withdrawal have to be agreed upon by everybody in the safety plan?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: No, not all parties need to agree upon a director withdrawing from a plan.

Rosalyn Bird: I’m trying to better understand the information you provided earlier.

You said that if a director withdraws from a plan, the information regarding why they withdrew from that plan may be available to a third party but may not be available to a parent. You just indicated that a third party may be a grandparent. I’m trying to figure out what the disclosure process is for all the individuals that are parties to that plan.

When a director withdraws, I don’t understand why everybody that voluntarily signed on to that plan wouldn’t be given all the information as to why that plan is now being withdrawn.

Quite frankly, this may happen in a more collaborative process than I’m aware of, and I just don’t understand how this happens. I’m looking for clarification from the ministry.

[4:35 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: The director would notify all parties who are a part of an agreement that they are withdrawing. The reasons for withdrawal…. The director has the obligation to notify the mandatory parties to the agreement. The mandatory parties to the agreement are outlined in section 19.2(1)(b), 19.2(2).

I want to just put it on record that I did not say that information would be shared with a third party.

Rosalyn Bird: I apologize. That’s why I asked the clarifying question. I wasn’t suggesting. I asked the question to make sure I hadn’t heard what I thought I had heard. I apologize. I didn’t mean any offence.

Why do parties have to inform the director within a number of days in advance of withdrawing from their agreement, but the director doesn’t have to give advance notice to the parties in the agreement?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: There are two parts to this answer.

The first is why the director may withdraw from the agreement without providing notice, and this really has to do with risk. A director has a statutory duty to protect a child. So if the safety plan is no longer protecting the child and that child is in danger, the director must intervene.

[4:40 p.m.]

The director can provide advance notice in other situations, like if a safety plan is no longer needed, but requiring notice in all situations would make them unable to carry out their duties and functions in a timely, effective manner.

Safety plans are used when the director has concerns that a child may require protection or where further assessments are required to decide whether a child may be in need of protection. Parents and other parties are asked to provide some advance notice to give the director the opportunity to assess the safety risk and step in to protect the child if necessary.

Really, here the parents are being assessed. An investigation is happening, and if the parent wants to withdraw, there needs to be some time to allow for the director to assess whether that child is in immediate danger.

If a director deems, for the reasons I outlined, that a plan is no longer relevant, they need to make that decision sometimes very quickly.

Rosalyn Bird: I would never, ever…. It was not my intention…. If a child is at imminent risk, then absolutely, I know why they would withdraw without notice. No question there.

However, if we think about what this process looks like and the aggravation, the trauma, all of the emotions that swirl around these types of agreements…. You know, we’ve mentioned lots of times that families are very complicated. These situations can be extremely convoluted. I understand that the family gives notice because the director needs to reassess.

However, my concern is that if a director can withdraw without any notice, the other side isn’t respected either. If a director makes a decision and says, “Okay, we’re withdrawing from the safety plan,” and there’s no notice given, it doesn’t give the family the actual ability to take 24 hours, 48 hours to consider the fact that they’re no longer under what they probably consider to be almost a safe umbrella.

They’ve had a process or have had a number of processes in place where, hopefully, there has been peace and harmony brought back to their home. But a sudden withdrawal, without notice, from something like that, actually, could create some sort of distress with the parents or even the children.

That’s why I was asking the question, in regard to it being a collaborative process, as to why a director wouldn’t engage the parties and the family to say that they’re very happy with what has happened over the last 30 days, 60 days or three months — whatever it ended up being: “You have managed to achieve these goals and make these markers. We can see it. We think that you’re ready, and we don’t need this plan in place anymore.” But the parent may not feel the same way.

Now, that doesn’t mean that they can’t come to that conclusion, but that’s what my fear is around a director having an immediate withdrawal from a plan. I would just like to hear the minister’s thoughts on that. Was that considered when this clause was put in the bill?

[4:45 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: This is outlined in (3)(b): a director may inform a party in advance of the director’s intention to withdraw, if other things don’t apply. In practice, this is exactly what happens. Directors, at first availability, will communicate with families. This is a part of collaborative family planning.

I would say that with the safety planning process and protection involvement, typically, families are not super happy to have this process happening. Many families are incredibly happy when a director says: “There are no longer any concerns. We are withdrawing the safety plan.” I think this is exactly what happens in practice all of the time.

Rosalyn Bird: I’m glad that this happens on a regular basis. That makes sense to me.

If we look at paragraph (c), outside of immediate risk to a child, when we’re escalating, it says that if the party was not informed in advance, then you need to inform of the withdrawal as soon as practicable. Is this clause in there strictly because…? Basically, is it repeating (a)? That’s what I’m trying to figure out.

Because (a) says “must not inform” if a child is still at risk or at increased risk. Then (b) says “may inform a party,” which you say happens very often. And then (c) says that if they weren’t provided the information, they have to be given the information as soon as possible.

I’m trying to figure out if we’ve repeated ourselves here. Or are there different circumstances that I’m unaware of?

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Paragraph (c) is about withdrawal as soon as practicable. And (b) talks about that the director may inform the party, in advance notice, of the director’s intention to withdraw if there’s not a serious safety concern. That would be like we’re informing a parent that the concerns are no longer applicable. They’ve engaged in a parenting program, things like that. Then (c) is: “must, if a party was not provided information in advance under paragraph (b).”

So let’s say a grandparent was not informed in advance. The director must inform the party as soon as practicable, so as soon as they possibly can, that the safety plan is no longer in place.

Rosalyn Bird: When we’re talking to parties that may be subject to the agreement, you had referred to 19.2. Unless I’m not seeing it somewhere, and it’s very late, so I might not be seeing it somewhere, quite frankly…. In 19.2, there are a number of scenarios, including other parties that can be part of an agreement. Am I understanding you correctly in that there is actually a single primary party within a safety agreement?

Although there are…. Say we have four people that are in an agreement — a mother and, I don’t know, whoever else, three other individuals. Under 19.2(1), a withdrawal from a safety plan that has four individuals, that notification would actually only be given to anybody that qualifies to be part of a plan under paragraph 19.2(1)?

I just want to clarify if that’s what you just said. That’s how I understood your response.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Yes, this goes to what I was speaking about before. All parties to the agreement get to know that the agreement ends. Not all parties get the reasons for why the agreement is ending. So there are, like I said before, mandatory parties to an agreement, and then there may be other parties to an agreement.

The (3)(c) and (b) talk about the director’s withdrawal as soon as practicable.

Rosalyn Bird: I did understand in regards to why the withdrawal. You did explain that earlier, and that part I did get.

[4:55 p.m.]

What I’m trying to figure out is, if there are four people in an agreement, if it’s only people that qualify under 19.2(1), which basically are only parents — if they’re the only ones that get advanced notification that there’s going to be a withdrawal. Or does every party within the safety plan get told the same thing?

It’s a collaborative process, so the director or the social worker or the caseworker would contact everybody on that safety plan and say, “Let’s have a meeting,” and say: “I intend to withdraw the plan at this date.” That doesn’t necessarily mean they’re giving the reasons to all four people, but at least the notification of withdrawal goes to all four people participating in the plan. That is the question I’m trying to get clarification on.

Hon. Jodie Wickens: They could give advance notice to all parties.

Rosalyn Bird: Thank you, Minister. That’s what I was trying to determine with that paragraph.

I have one other question, actually, that we may have time for.

What is the process if any of the individuals that are parties to the safety plan want a director or a social worker or a caseworker that is also a party to that safety plan to withdraw? If a family has an issue with one of the parties within the safety agreement, within ministry staff, is there a process that that family or the parties of that safety plan can request a change?

Hon. Jodie Wickens: Mandatory parties of a safety plan can always revisit the terms of the agreement.

I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair: This committee is adjourned.

The committee rose at 4:58 p.m.

The House resumed at 5:00 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Mable Elmore: The committee on Bill 29 reports progress and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

Susie Chant: Section A reports progress on Bill 32 and asks leave to sit again.

Leave granted.

The Speaker: Hon. Members, the Administrator is in the building, so we will be just waiting for him to arrive shortly. Please remain seated.

His Honour the Administrator requested to attend the House, was admitted to the chamber and took his place in the chair.

[5:05 p.m.]

Royal Assent to Bills

Clerk of the Legislative Assembly:

Construction Prompt Payment Act

Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2025

Housing and Municipal Affairs Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

Employment Standards (Serious Illness or Injury Leave) Amendment Act, 2025

Energy Statutes Amendment Act, 2025

In His Majesty’s name, His Honour the Administrator doth assent to these acts.

Hon. Leonard Marchand (Administrator): Thank you. I know that you’ve all been working very hard on this legislation and on other legislation and the people of British Columbia greatly appreciate the seriousness of your deliberations, all of the hard work and the results of your hard work.

I know the session is not over. You have some more work ahead of you, but this is the last time I’ll see you for probably quite a while. I wanted to wish everyone all the very best for the upcoming holiday season. Thank you.

His Honour the Administrator retired from the chamber.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Hon. Mike Farnworth: Hon. Speaker, I know we could do another 15 minutes, but I know the weather is pretty miserable, and people are going to go to the ferry and drive carefully.

Hon. Mike Farnworth moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The Speaker: This House stands adjourned until 10 a.m., December 1.

The House adjourned at 5:08 p.m.

Proceedings in the
Douglas Fir Room

The House in Committee, Section A.

The committee met at 1:13 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 32 — Mental Health
Amendment Act (No. 2), 2025
(continued)

The Chair: Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 32 back from adjournment.

I will look to the member for Skeena.

On clause 1 (continued).

Claire Rattée: Thank you so much, Chair. I’m wondering if you would indulge me so that we could go back so that I could move an amendment before clause 1.

The Chair: Yes. Go ahead, Member.

Claire Rattée: I would like to move that we add a clause 0.01 prior to clause 1:

[NEW CLAUSE .01, by adding the underlined text as shown:

.01 The Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288, is amended by adding the following:

Mandatory training

8.1 The minister must ensure that directors are trained respecting the scope of authority of directors in respect of the provision of a professional service, or care or treatment authority under this Act, and applicable consent and capacity laws.]

The Chair: Okay. You can speak to the amendment now.

Claire Rattée: Perfect. Thank you.

With the legal landscape changing, I believe it’s essential that directors actually understand what they can and cannot authorize. I believe that training protects everyone — patients, clinicians and the Crown — by reducing errors and unlawful decisions.

In my opinion, this is a basic competence and safety measure if the government plans to change the law but not train the people applying it. I think this is a way that we can prevent that from happening.

The Chair: We’re going to take a quick recess, and then we’ll come back to the amendment.

The committee recessed from 1:15 p.m. to 1:23 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair: Before I make any ruling, I would ask the member that made the amendment if there’s anything else you would like to add in speaking to this amendment.

Claire Rattée: I don’t think so.

The Chair: It appears to the Chair that the amendment is beyond the scope of this bill, and it is therefore out of order.

So we will return to clause 1.

Amendment ruled out of order.

Claire Rattée: Thank you, Chair. I appreciate that.

Next, I would like to ask a few questions with regards to other pieces of legislation that kind of interact with this. I think it relates because I’m trying to understand when this act is going to be applicable and when it is not.

I have some questions around the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. I’m trying to understand when that act is relied on and when this one is relied on.

So my first question would be if the minister agrees that repealing section 31(1) causes consent to default to the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. I’m assuming it does not, but just for the record, please.

[1:25 p.m.]

The Chair: Member, to clarify, I think the question you just asked actually falls under clause 2, not clause 1.

Claire Rattée: We did discuss this a little bit earlier. Because these two clauses are really closely linked, I’m doing my best to make sure that I have them separated to both clauses, but it’s been a bit tricky because there are a lot of…. I understand this is a very short bill. Many of the questions do kind of stray, if you’re looking at it in a very narrow sense, but the context is important, I think, before making decisions about changing this act.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

Hon. Josie Osborne: I’m going to repeat what I said in the closing of second reading debate.

[The bells were rung.]

The Chair: We will take a short recess, and then we will return.

The committee recessed from 1:26 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair: I will call the committee back. Again, we are on Bill 32, clause 1.

Minister, I will look to you to answer the question.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Just before we broke there, the question was around the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act and, essentially, whether repealing subsection 31(1)…. Would treatment authorization default? Like, what is the relationship between this proposed bill and the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act?

Section 2 of said act, the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, specifically says that the act does not apply to the provision of psychiatric care or treatment of patients involuntarily detained under the Mental Health Act. So involuntary treatment for involuntary patients cannot, by definition and operation of the legislation, default to the HCCCFAA.

Claire Rattée: Thank you. That definitely helps to clear it up a little bit.

I’m not sure if this is an admissible question or not, but I’m wondering if the minister might be able to provide for the record what the exact process is under the Mental Health Act right now to obtain consent.

I understand that that’s not expected to change with these amendments, but I’m wondering if we can have clarity on what that exact process actually looks like as dictated by the Mental Health Act so that I can have a clearer understanding of whether or not I determine that any of these amendments may potentially impact that.

[1:50 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: I’m going to give a somewhat lengthy…. I want to give a detailed answer.

The authority for a director to authorize involuntary treatment is found in section 8(a) of the Mental Health Act, which describes the powers and duties of directors of designated mental health facilities. For clarity, this section states specifically that each patient admitted to the designated facility is provided with professional service, care and treatment appropriate to the patient’s condition and appropriate to the function of the designated facility. For those purposes, a director may sign consent-to-treatment forms for a patient detained under section 22, 28, 29, 30 or 42.

The authority for a director to sign consent-to-treatment forms on behalf of a patient under the Mental Health Act does not come from section 31(1). After a patient is involuntarily admitted under the Mental Health Act and the director signs form 4.1, the first medical certificate…. After an assessment by a physician or nurse practitioner, the person is admitted for 48 hours if they meet criteria for involuntary admission. As soon as possible after form 4.1 is signed, the treatment team develops a treatment plan.

Form 5 is the consent for treatment that we’ve discussed at least once today already. In here, the treatment team will describe and explain the patient’s treatment plan. They’ll discuss possible treatment options, and the patient has the right to know what treatment they will receive and how it might affect them.

At this point, the patient is also advised that they have the right to access an independent rights advice service. They’re advised of that right.

One of two things may happen after form 5 is completed.

First, the patient may understand the treatment plan. If the patient understands the treatment plan, the patient can choose to consent to the treatment plan by signing form 5.

If the patient declines to consent or the treating physician’s assessment finds that the patient cannot consent to treatment, the Mental Health Act director of the designated facility can consent to treatment on the patient’s behalf by signing form 5. If the director consents on the patient’s behalf, the director that signs form 5 must be a different person from the treating physician.

At this point, the patient would receive treatment. This is the first 48-hour period. After the 48 hours, if the patient is admitted on form 4.2 and the second medical certificate and treatment plan significantly changes, a new form 5 would be completed. Form 4.2 continues the admission for one month if the patient continues to meet all four of the involuntary admission criteria. It is at this point, as well, that the patient can request a second opinion.

I understand that’s a detailed response, but I hope it outlines the process, and I’d be happy to share more information in writing with the member afterwards.

Claire Rattée: Thank you. That does really help.

I’m curious. Does the Mental Health Act outline what the protocol is for determining whether or not a patient is capable of making that decision about consenting to the treatment plan or how a director or clinician is supposed to determine whether or not they are?

[1:55 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: No, the act does not outline that. This is an assessment that is made by the clinician based on their professional experience, judgment, training and expertise.

Claire Rattée: I understand that this may be outside of the scope of what we’re supposed to be asking questions about, but I’m hoping that the minister will indulge me.

What specific piece of legislation or regulation outlines those protocols — just so that I can look it up for my own benefit — of how they make that determination about whether or not someone can give their consent or is deemed incapable?

Hon. Josie Osborne: Yes, I think this is outside the scope of this bill for certain. But I would advise the member that she could examine the credentialing and licensing that is undertaken by the College of Physicians and Surgeons, in order to understand the specifics of psychiatry — for example, to understand what the professional obligations, duties and responsibilities would be of a psychiatrist who is making that type of assessment.

Claire Rattée: I appreciate that. So I would assume then that means that these decisions are essentially left up to that physician, that psychiatrist, to make that determination based on best practices of what they were taught in school and what their professional experience is and that there isn’t specific regulation around that.

The reason that I’m asking that is because, obviously, we’re talking about applying liability coverage for a physician that’s making that determination to treat somebody involuntarily.

To put it simply, does the ministry believe that is best practices, to not have specific guidelines? I understand that would be very difficult to craft, but to not have specific guidelines dictating how those decisions are supposed to be made from a liability perspective…. Or is this clause supposed to just provide liability coverage no matter what, carte blanche? Because, you know, obviously, physicians can make mistakes.

So that’s why I’m wondering if it might be helpful to have some specific regulation and guidance around making those determinations.

Hon. Josie Osborne: I’ll just repeat the answer that I gave yesterday in a line of questioning around the fact that section 31(1) currently is an implicit liability shield. We are proposing to amend section 16 to add an explicit liability shield for said health care provider, but always with the condition that the care is provided in good faith and with reasonable care. That is the test that is explicit in the act.

Claire Rattée: I think one thing that I would ask then is…. When I’m reading through these amendments, I understand that this is to explicitly provide liability coverage. But should we not also, then, have it worded that it is explicit only when that provider is acting in good faith and without negligence?

Hon. Josie Osborne: I would say the act does just that already.

Claire Rattée: Sorry. Would I be able to have the specific part of the act that references that?

[2:00 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Section 16 begins: “A person is not liable in damages as the result of doing any of the following in good faith and with reasonable care.” Then the addition of clause (b.4) would be: “providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this act to be given to the patient, including treatment described in a consent to treatment form signed under section 8 (a).”

Claire Rattée: So “in good faith and with reasonable care,” I believe, is what was said. Can negligence still apply, though? Could a practitioner be acting in good faith with reasonable care but still end up being negligent? My understanding is that they can. Again, I’m just trying to determine whether or not these liability protections will protect against negligence.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Coming back to the intent here, in the Charter challenge that’s before the court…. Should the judge decide that subsection 31(1), where this implicit liability shield exists currently, is unconstitutional, we feel the best thing to do for patients, for their families and for the health care workers is to ensure that they can continue, under the operations of the act, to provide psychiatric treatment to patients who are admitted involuntarily and to do so under an explicit shield that would be listed under section 16.

Now a health care provider who is providing said treatment in good faith and with reasonable care has that protection that’s provided to them under the act. Should somebody allege negligence and sue a health care provider — that can happen — it, of course, would follow the due process in court, which would examine the situation and the specific circumstances and make a determination in that case.

Claire Rattée: I appreciate that response. I think that starts to help to clear that up for me.

If I could go back really quickly, a thought popped into my head. With the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, can I just get clarity on whether or not, for a capable voluntary patient, that act applies to them? Or is it still the Mental Health Act that applies, based on what was said already about the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act — that it doesn’t apply in any situation where it’s a psychiatric patient? Or was it just if it was an involuntary psychiatric patient?

Hon. Josie Osborne: Section 2 of the Health Care (Consent) Act specifically says that the act does not apply to the provision of psychiatric care or treatment of patients involuntarily detained under the Mental Health Act. It’s a specific exemption in this case.

Claire Rattée: I appreciate that. I have so many questions on that. I know I can’t get into it, because that’s not what we’re talking about, but I appreciate the clarity on that.

My next question would be: if an involuntary patient is capable but refuses treatment, what happens under this proposed framework then? Does this default, then, to that other act? Just so that I can clarify that.

[2:05 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: No, it does not default to the act. Again, for a patient who is involuntarily detained under the act — whether they provide consent or are deemed to be incapable of providing consent to the treatment that is provided to that involuntarily detained patient — the exemption, as outlined in section 2 of the consent act, applies.

Claire Rattée: Just for clarification, even if they are deemed capable of making that decision but are still being held involuntarily, their care would still be governed under the Mental Health Act?

Hon. Josie Osborne: Yes.

Claire Rattée: Talking about the liability and litigation risks — I don’t know; this might just be too broad, or it may be too difficult to answer — I’m wondering if there is a way to get a list of, specifically, what conditions the clause 1 immunity would apply under.

Hon. Josie Osborne: No. I don’t think that’s possible. Again, each situation is particular to that individual. That’s why form 5, the consent for treatment form, describes and explains that specific treatment plan for each patient. It wouldn’t be possible to outline every possible scenario or condition.

Claire Rattée: Would it be reasonable to assume that, in a fairly simple term, it would be any treatment that’s provided in accordance with that patient’s treatment plan and that it would cover that for liability?

Hon. Josie Osborne: If I understand the question correctly, I’d just point back to the specific amendment, the addition in section 16 of (b.4): “providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this act….” That is a fairly broad description of psychiatric care that could be applied under the act.

Claire Rattée: I think what I was getting at is that if something were done outside of the treatment plan that had been signed off by the director to an involuntary psychiatric patient — medication given, treatment given, something to that effect, something that was outside the scope of what was deemed admissible in that patient’s care plan and authorized by the director — would that still be covered, either in an emergency or in a non-emergency situation?

Say that somebody accidentally gives somebody the wrong medication, for example, or they think that this medication would be better but it wasn’t authorized by the director. I’m just trying to understand in which conditions that would actually apply and then, obviously, if it still applies in an emergency situation.

Say somebody becomes incredibly violent or they’re self-harming or whatever it is and then a clinician needs to make a determination about administering medication that hasn’t been authorized by the director at that point in time. Would they still have liability coverage, as long as they were acting in a non-negligent manner, in good faith and with due care?

[2:10 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: I appreciate the member’s question here. I think getting at, for example, emergency situations that could arise, emergency situations are dealt with distinctly and under the common law.

Claire Rattée: Is that something that clinicians are advised on? Is that part of their training materials so that they understand that in any emergency situation, effectively, it’s governed and covered with liability through a different law? So they know where to look for their coverage, I guess.

Hon. Josie Osborne: I think we are…. I mean, we’re veering into a place that is very detailed and specific to how physicians are…. We’ve been discussing how they are trained, how they are certified and licensed to practise what they do and, in the course of their decision-making about what the best treatment is for a patient, how they are protected.

There are avenues outside of this act in which a physician or a health care provider could be sued or investigated or some other process to look at the decisions they’ve made.

Again, I just want to come back to the fact that under section 16 of the Mental Health Act, this pertains to a liability protection that pertains specifically to applying treatment that is done in good faith and with reasonable care and that it is specific to psychiatric treatment that is applied under the Mental Health Act to a patient that is involuntarily detained.

I think, you know, just kind of…. We’re broadening out into other areas that don’t specifically pertain to this bill.

Claire Rattée: I appreciate that response. I think maybe if I frame it in this way, it’ll make more sense about why I’m asking.

What I’m concerned about is just ensuring, essentially, that a clinician will still be covered for liability in an emergency situation. I guess another way to word it might be: was there a determination about why we aren’t explicitly mentioning “in an emergency situation” or “according to the care plan” or more specifics about what is covered or what isn’t covered?

Is it just because this covers everything, and we don’t need to be concerned about that? Could there be benefit to making sure that that is explicit?

I’m just trying to ensure that, still, clinicians will have that coverage that they need, just given the fact that I think the understanding was always that they did under the deemed consent portion. I just want to ensure that they will still maintain that same level and that nothing is going to change.

[2:15 p.m.]

I understand the difference between implicitly implied and explicitly implied. But when something is explicitly implied…. I just don’t know if it would be helpful to have it explicitly applied so that it’s listed as what is covered or if this actually, the way it’s worded right now, covers everything.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Again, this is moving an implicit liability shield from section 31(1) to an explicit shield in section 16 for psychiatric treatment. I point to the definition of “treatment” in the act, which reads: “Treatment means safe and effective psychiatric treatment and includes any procedure necessarily related to the provision of psychiatric treatment.”

[2:20 p.m.]

Emergency health care is not explicitly stated in the current section 31(1) nor in section 16, the proposed amendment, because, again, it is dealt with distinctly and under the common law.

Claire Rattée: Thank you. I really appreciate that.

Could the minister answer: does liability protection cover treatment that is later determined to have lacked lawful consent? Lawful consent obviously meaning that the person was capable of consenting, did not give consent.

Hon. Josie Osborne: The deeming of consent and the application of treatment are two separate things. Under form 5, the consent for treatment, if the patient declines to consent or the treating physician’s assessment finds that the patient cannot consent to treatment, then the Mental Health Act director of the designated facility can consent to treatment on the patient’s behalf. But remember that the director who signs form 5 must be a different person from the treating physician.

So if the question is around the deeming of consent and that is found, through some process, to be unlawful, as the member described, that is separate and distinct from the physician’s treatment, and the treatment is still protected under the auspices of the act.

Claire Rattée: Did the government receive any legal opinions on whether or not these changes could increase litigation risk under any other statutes, given the removal of deemed consent? And if they did, would I be able to know what the opinions on that were — about whether or not there was any chance that this could increase litigation risk?

Hon. Josie Osborne: That is privileged information.

Claire Rattée: Will this change in any way potentially affect coroner’s investigations or patient care quality office complaints?

Hon. Josie Osborne: The answer is no. It will not. This, again, is specific around liability and damages for a specific court case, that court action brought against a health care provider.

Claire Rattée: Also, how many health care workers have ever been prosecuted for providing services, care or treatment under sections 28, 29, 30, 42? Are there any instances in British Columbia where that has happened? And if there are, have any of them been successful?

[2:25 p.m.]

Sorry, just to clarify. I just wanted to make it a bit clearer.

I’m not expecting to know every single time or the outcome of all of them, just a general sense of whether or not this is something that happens frequently, recently, and whether or not one has ever been successful. I don’t expect you to pull up every single instance.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Yes, in 2018, the court here in British Columbia used section 31(1) to defeat a battery claim for a patient having to take drugs involuntarily.

Claire Rattée: I would like to move an amendment on clause 1 here.

The Chair: Please speak to the amendment, Member.

On the amendment.

Claire Rattée: I would like to amend clause 1 by adding the following subsection:

[CLAUSE 1, by deleting the text shown as struck out and adding the underlined text as shown:

1 Section 16 of the Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 288, is amended

(a) by adding the following paragraph:

(b.4) providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this Act to be given to the patient, including treatment described in a consent to treatment form signed under section 8 (a); .

(b) by renumbering section 16 to section 16 (1), and

(c) by adding the following subsection:

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b.4), “authorized by the director” means authorized in accordance with applicable provincial consent and capacity laws, established clinical standards and written protocols of the designated facility.]

Speaking to it, I believe that this ensures that liability protection only applies where directors act within the law and accepted clinical practice, not arbitrarily or outside of proper processes. I think that it protects patients and clinicians at the same time. Clinicians know when they are covered. Patients know when there are guardrails.

[2:30 p.m.]

If this is an amendment that is deemed to be not necessary, I believe that with the repeal of deemed consent, the meaning of “authorized” becomes central to this debate. Leaving it undefined invites litigation and inconsistency. I think that this amendment would be responsible and prudent.

I do have some concerns about some of the way that this is currently worded. As I’ve stated previously, I do think it’s incredibly important that we make sure that health care workers and clinicians have liability protection, especially if we want to be able to ensure that involuntary treatment is still provided in this province and if we want to avoid those situations of clinicians potentially hand-wringing and worrying about whether or not they’re covered.

I do think it’s also similarly important that we ensure that it is clear when they are covered and it is clear when they are not. Unfortunately — I wish it weren’t the case — I do know of incidents where people have involuntarily received treatment that was not appropriate. It doesn’t happen frequently, but it does happen sometimes. I do think that if there’s ever negligence that is taking place, there should be an option to patients to be able to ensure that they get some kind of justice in that matter.

This can have very serious side effects and very serious harms for people. So I think it’s important that we still make sure that we’re also maintaining the rights of a patient, to be able to ensure that they are not going to be taken advantage of, that there’s a mechanism by which they’ll understand there are certain guardrails for those clinicians as well.

The Chair: All right. We’ll take a short recess, and then we’ll come back.

The committee recessed from 2:31 p.m. to 2:37 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair: I will call the committee back.

I have confirmed the amendment is in order.

I will look to the minister to see if she wishes to speak to the amendment.

[2:40 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you very much to the member for putting forth the amendment.

I’m not going to support it, and the reason is this. First, the overall assumption is that the director is already acting in accordance with the law and that it doesn’t need to be explicitly stated. In fact, that would be outside of the standard practices in legislative drafting.

It could conceivably add confusion by adding this to the act, as is proposed, in its reference to other consent capacity laws, other documents, other protocols.

I would also say this. If a director had court action taken against them, the court would consider all of those things — provincial consent and capacity laws, clinical standards, written protocols of the facility — and they would consider whether those actions were taken, again, as is explicitly stated in the Mental Health Act, in good faith and with reasonable care.

In summary, I don’t think that the amendment is necessary and therefore will not be supporting it.

The Chair: Okay. We will go to a vote on the amendment.

Division has been called.

[2:45 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.]

The Chair: Does everyone agree to waive time?

Leave granted.

The Chair: We will go to the vote then. The question is on the amendment moved by Skeena.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 4
Botterell	McInnis	Mok
	Williams
NAYS — 5
Routledge	Osborne	Morissette
Kahlon		Malcolmson

Claire Rattée: I’m wondering if the minister could provide some clarification around the use of virtual psychiatrists as it relates to this act and these amendments. If a virtual psychiatrist has to provide the director authorization, are they able to do that in compliance with clause 1 and still have those liability protections if this is a decision that is made through a virtual visit?

Hon. Josie Osborne: The answer is yes. That would qualify as a professional service or care or treatment as stated in the proposed section (b.4) under section 16.

Claire Rattée: Then would clause 1 provide immunity for police or paramedics that are acting under medical direction in psychiatric crises?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: I think I’ll just come back to, again, the specific wording. Under section 16, “a person is not liable in damages as the result of doing any of the following in good faith and with reasonable care.” Subsection (b.4): “providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment, authorized by the director under this act to be given to the patient, including treatment described in a consent to treatment form signed under section 8(a).”

So a professional service or care or treatment that’s authorized by the director under the act is what this liability shield explicitly protects a health care worker in the provision of.

Claire Rattée: Just to clarify that, then, so that I can make sure I’m understanding and on the same page here. It’s not just about a health care provider though. It’s anybody that is providing a treatment or care under the authorization of the director. So that can include police, paramedics and any kind of first responders. It could basically cover anybody that’s doing that under that direction. But if it’s an emergency situation, that is not governed by this act and the liability protection is not within this amendment. That is within a different piece of legislation.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Yeah. Again, emergency health care is distinct and under the common law.

Claire Rattée: Does clause 1 protect clinicians when they’re treating patients who overdose multiple times in a day?

Hon. Josie Osborne: Again, it provides that liability shield to a person who is providing to a patient a professional service or care or treatment authorized by the director under this act to be given to the patient.

I think the member is describing a number of different situations that could or could not occur, but this is specific to people who are detained under the Mental Health Act, under the provisions provided, for whom treatment has been authorized by the director.

So that is what…. The liability shield is for those health care providers, those care providers, working under those auspices, again, always when delivering that work and following good faith and with reasonable care.

Claire Rattée: I’m sorry. I know I’m asking a lot of questions that are kind of along the same line. I just want to make sure I’m covering bases of any offshoots that I can think of, just to make sure that this is still all applicable within this space.

So if a patient has a toxic drug–related brain injury and they appear articulate, but they lack insight, that determination is made…. Again, same thing, this still applies?

Hon. Josie Osborne: I am not a medical professional, so I won’t speculate on the different circumstances a patient may or may not be under.

[Susie Chant in the chair.]

But, again, to say that this is very specific to patients who are detained involuntarily under the Mental Health Act, patients who have had psychiatric treatment authorized by the director, and the liability shield is for those care providers who are providing to a patient a professional service or care or treatment that’s authorized by the director under the act to be given to the patient.

Claire Rattée: Then when treating youth there is no difference? This is still…? The same rules apply? Youth being treated are still covered under this liability and under this act?

[3:00 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you to the member for the question.

There’s no distinction between youth and adults. I’ll just point to the definition of “patient” in part 1 of the act. A patient means a person who, under the act, is receiving care, supervision, treatment, maintenance or rehabilitation, or is received, detained or taken charge of as a person with a mental disorder or as apparently a person with a mental disorder.

Claire Rattée: What about if it’s a parent that’s authorizing psychiatric treatment on behalf of their youth who has refused treatment? My understanding is that it would still have to be authorized by a director. But if that was at the discretion of a parent that was acting on behalf of that child, or maybe even just to make it more broad, in any sense where it’s a substitute decision-maker, do these liability protections still apply? If so, do they only apply to the clinicians, or do they also apply to the substitute decision-maker that determined that course of action?

Hon. Josie Osborne: Again, this section applies to any person who is, following in good faith and with reasonable care, providing to a patient a professional service or care or treatment authorized by the director under this act. I think the pertinent piece here is: “authorized by the director under this act.”

Claire Rattée: Am I to understand then that, overall, substitute decision-makers are covered under this provision? Maybe I’m not completely understanding the process. Regardless, if a substitute decision-maker makes a determination about a treatment plan, I’m guessing that still has to be authorized by the director, which is why this liability protection would still apply.

It’s not as simple as a substitute decision-maker just going “yes or no” on a treatment plan. That still then has to go back to the director of the facility to authorize. Am I understanding that correctly?

Hon. Josie Osborne: This amendment is specifically focused on the persons providing the care. It is not an amendment that’s relevant to the person making the decision, although we have canvassed that in our debate today around consent and how that is provided, or when a patient is deemed to be incapable of providing that consent, what happens. We walked through the process under which the forms are signed and consent for treatment is given or deemed to be given.

Again, this amendment is specific on the health care providers, the care providers that are providing care to that patient under the authorization of the director under the act.

Claire Rattée: Sorry. I think some of my confusion was coming from when I was asking the questions around first responders being covered, because that’s beyond just a clinician or a health care worker if it’s also providing coverage to a police officer, for example, or something.

That’s where I wanted to clarify where that starts and ends, if that makes sense. So it doesn’t extend to a substitute decision-maker or a parent or anything like that. That’s likely governed in some other act or part of this act. But it does extend to a first responder, paramedic, police officer — anything like that.

Hon. Josie Osborne: This would be a person providing to a patient a professional service or care or treatment. I think “a person” is the broad category under which a person might be a physician, might be a nurse, might be a paramedic. But this is specific to a person providing to a patient a professional service or care or treatment authorized by the director under the act.

We also have canvassed, as part of today’s debate, around actions that a care provider of any kind might do that are outside of the psychiatric treatment that the director of the facility has authorized. We’ve talked about emergency health care, for example, and how that is covered. But this bill specifically focuses on persons providing those services and treatment that are authorized by the director.

I don’t mean to be…. Yeah. Okay, thank you.

[3:05 p.m.]

Claire Rattée: I apologize. I realize what my mistake was there in not understanding. It’s about the term, actually, “administering the treatment.” It’s that person that’s actually giving the treatment. So somebody making a decision is not covered there. I apologize.

I’m getting close to being done on my questions here for clause 1. I would like to just go back a little bit around the consultation piece. I’m wondering if any Indigenous health organizations were consulted in the drafting of this, and if so, what their thoughts were.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you to the member for the question. I really appreciate it.

This is a bill that is proposing some very narrow and focused amendments to make explicit what is currently implicit to protect health care providers in the provision of psychiatric treatment that’s authorized by the director under the Mental Health Act. So it doesn’t change clinical practice. It doesn’t change the operation of the act.

No Indigenous health organizations were consulted in the drafting of these amendments, but I do want to pause to reflect on the disproportionate impact that the toxic drug crisis has had on Indigenous Peoples, that Indigenous Peoples face generally when it comes to the really serious issues of severe mental illness and concurrent disorders.

[3:10 p.m.]

I think this is an appropriate time to also mention that, with the commitment to undertake a review of the Mental Health Act, that is absolutely one of the intents and purposes in such a review: to deeply engage, consult and cooperate with Indigenous Peoples around the Mental Health Act, noting that disproportionate impact that is felt by Indigenous Peoples in the province, in part as a result of the type of treatment that we are discussing today and the circumstances that people may find themselves in, in which they are deemed, under the current Mental Health Act, to be incapable of seeking care for themselves and may be at risk to harm themselves or other people.

It’s a very serious issue, and I do really appreciate the question from the member.

Claire Rattée: Thank you to the minister for that response.

As the minister knows, I represent an area that has a lot of Indigenous population, and that was part of the reason why I was asking. Not only are Indigenous people typically more disproportionately affected by some of these issues but also, in a general sense, I think a lot of rural and northern communities are, particularly given that that is where a good portion of our Indigenous population in British Columbia lives.

I know we’ve mentioned and touched on this a fair bit earlier already, but part of the reason why I’m asking about these consultation pieces is because we have very different realities on the ground, as the minister knows, in northern and rural parts of the province.

Currently there are more problems in those facilities, typically, when it comes to treating severe psychiatric illness and concurrent substance use disorders just due to a lack of resources, a lack of capacity and the fact that we’re typically in a different situation where you’re not going to have as readily the access to a psychiatrist.

That’s where I’m kind of wondering again…. I know I’ve said this a few times, but I just really want to make sure that this isn’t going to accidentally result in health care providers in northern or rural communities or Indigenous communities hand-wringing and worrying that they may not be able to provide the same care after this legislation passes.

So that’s where I’m asking those questions from. Just trying to have a better understanding of whether or not they were consulted in the sense of talking to some health care workers and just saying: “If you read this, what would your interpretation be?”

Now, I don’t know. Maybe health care workers don’t really read the Mental Health Act that clearly and they’re just operating off of what they’ve been taught in school or something and it’s fairly basic and understandable to them. I’m not sure.

But that’s where the questions are coming from — trying to have a clearer understanding of whether or not we know how the average clinician is going to interpret this when they read it and what their understanding is going to be of what is now giving them the authority to be able to act in that way when they deem that it is necessary and appropriate.

I’m assuming, based on some of the questions I have asked around consultation, that I’m not anticipating that there…. I could go down a list of questions about consultation, but I think it’s probably irrelevant at this point because I don’t think that there was consultation outside of with Dr. Vigo on this, as far as I can tell, based on the questions I’ve asked.

If that could be clarified by the minister, I would appreciate it.

Hon. Josie Osborne: As we’ve canvassed this over today and yesterday, I know we’ve talked about some of the rationale for this bill, its narrow scope on the amendments that are proposed to move an implicit protection into an explicit protection for those care providers who are providing essential psychiatric care for people and that these amendments have come, in part, at a time as the Charter challenge in court proceeds.

[3:15 p.m.]

We want to mitigate the risk that should section 31(1) be deemed unconstitutional by the judge, those health care workers, those care providers can continue to do what they are doing and have the certainty of knowing that they’re protected in that work that they do every single day.

Dr. Vigo, as we discussed yesterday, has been involved and supports these amendments. We’ve discussed the role of internal legal counsel, etc., that has brought us to today.

But again, just because this bill has been put forward by government now, at this time, in no way changes the intention of government to continue through with the commitment we’ve made around the review of the Mental Health Act, at which time numerous parts of the act will be considered and done so in a very deep, comprehensive and thorough way to address issues that have been brought forward by numerous different groups of people over the past years.

That’s why government has made this commitment. We want to ensure that people are getting the best care possible. As I’ve said in the House many times, involuntary care has a role to play in our mental health care system, but it always must be applied in a very thoughtful, comprehensively defined way and with the legal safeguards in place to protect people’s rights, their dignity and their ability to access the care that they may need.

Claire Rattée: Thank you to the minister.

I think one thing that I really pulled out of that is “in a comprehensively defined way.” I think that’s part of what I have been getting at, and I understand that some of it goes a bit outside of the scope of what this piece of legislation is trying to achieve, but that is what I’ve been hoping to get out of this — that we can find a way to have that more comprehensively defined.

I know we spoke about it previously, about what exactly the regulations are that will guide a clinician in making a determination around whether or not somebody can give their consent and things like that. So I agree. I do think it’s important to have those things properly defined, because I think, also, from a legal standpoint — providing liability coverage — it’s important to understand what those definitions are.

I’m going to shortly here pass this over to my colleague to ask some more questions on clause 1. I have one question left on clause 1.

Before I do that, I just want to say: thank you.

I really appreciate that the minister has been very kind in answering all of my questions and allowing me and indulging me on some things that I know maybe have gone a little bit past the scope. I do really appreciate that.

I would just like to end on…. Just for the record, what exact statutory provision authorizes the treatment to which clause 1 immunity applies?

[3:20 p.m. - 3:25 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Clause 1 of Bill 32, with its specific focus on any treatment authorized by the director under the act…. The focus here is on section 8. I think that answers the member’s question.

Rob Botterell: It’s nice to be back in committee. I missed it.

I just want to reiterate that mental health is a serious matter. I certainly don’t want anybody to take from my, at times, jovial comments or colouring of answers that I don’t see this and the Green caucus doesn’t see this as an incredibly important issue.

Through the last day or so, there have been lots of very helpful questions and answers and context provided. There are some items that have been discussed that have been brought to our attention by British Columbians following the proceedings, so I want to clarify a couple of items, and as we’re in section 1, I think I’ll be in scope.

I’d like to issue concern about the minister’s comments related to involuntary treatment and substance use disorders.

Yesterday in here, the minister stated: “I also want to frame these comments, too, in the toxic drug crisis. This crisis is evolving on such a quick basis and demanding so much of us. I know that every member of the House stands together in knowing that we have to address this as best as we can so that it’s essential that people who need treatment can get treatment and, again, when they are unable to make these decisions in their best interest.”

I’d like to express my shared commitment to addressing the toxic drug crisis that has taken over 17,000 people in B.C. since it was declared a public health emergency. However, I’d also like to share concerns around the comment regarding the need for people with substance use disorders getting treatment “when they are unable to make these decisions in their best interest.”

The B.C. Human Rights Commissioner stated that involuntary treatment for substance use violates autonomy and self-determination; disproportionately harms Indigenous, Black, disabled, gender-diverse and low-income people; lacks evidentiary support; and cannot be justified when B.C.’s voluntary, community-based system is profoundly under-resourced.

In a joint letter, Harm Reduction Nurses Association and Doctors for Safer Drug Policy write that compulsory substance use treatment is ineffective and dangerous. They state — and I’m coming to a question:

“The evidence is clear and consistent. Compulsory treatment has no demonstrated long-term benefit. Relapse rates are extraordinarily high. One study reported 96.4 percent relapse within two months after mandated treatment. The risks of overdose and death are significantly elevated immediately after discharge from compulsory treatment. Involuntary settings sever trust, increase trauma and escalate risk.

“Leading human rights scholars have concluded that mass detention for treatment constitutes a grave violation of human rights and cannot be justified by claims of substance use disorder alone. As research and our clinical experience demonstrate, people are most vulnerable to overdose after periods of forced abstinence. Coercion increases risk; it does not reduce it.”

[3:30 p.m.]

To the minister, who is informing her guidance on the link between the responding to the toxic drug emergency with approaches like involuntary care?

The Chair: I’m going to ask the member how this actually correlates to clause 1, please. I recognize the correlation between the conversation yesterday. I know it has a wide latitude, but could you clarify for the Chair, please, how it relates to clause 1.

Rob Botterell: I think the way it relates to clause 1 is that over the last day, we’ve been engaging on clause 1, and statements have been made in relation to clause 1 by the minister that have raised serious concerns amongst the public trying to understand what this section is intended to do and what its relationship is to the toxic drug crisis.

I didn’t bring in the toxic drug crisis. The minister did, and I quoted what the minister said. Therefore, I think it’s important on the public record both to hear this perspective and also to ask the minister the question I’ve asked.

The Chair: Very good. I will accept your response. Thank you very much.

Hon. Josie Osborne: I’m pleased to address the concerns that the member has brought forward. Thank you for doing so.

I want to be clear to the member that in our dialogue throughout this debate, my comments on the toxic drug crisis and on substance use disorder generally in no way should be inferred that that is a supposition that the act should apply to people who are experiencing only a substance use disorder, for example.

In fact, one of the reasons why we have Dr. Vigo advising us on psychiatry, the toxic drug crisis and concurrent disorders is to help interpret and help clinicians apply the provisions of the act to those people who are experiencing concurrent disorders.

At the basis of the Mental Health Act, it is about providing care for those people who meet the conditions under the act. The four conditions generally, as understood and that are outlined in the act, are around severe mental illnesses in a place where a person may not be able to accept treatment or seek treatment, may not be able to understand or agree to it. That is why, as well, we have continued to deal with and add safeguards, like providing an independent rights advice service, for example, for those people who are detained under the Mental Health Act.

I absolutely share the member’s perspective that these are really serious matters; that these conversations need to be taken comprehensively, carefully, articulately; that they must be made in a way where the patient is at the centre; and that this is about the rights and dignity of a person. It is also, in government’s view, about being able to have, as part of a continuum of care for people with serious mental health illnesses, the ability to provide such care.

The substance of this bill here, Bill 32, is about protecting those workers who are providing the care, as we’ve been canvassing along the course of the debate.

But just to come back to my original point, which is that I am fully aware of and understand how the Mental Health Act is applied and that this is not about forced treatment in any way for people experiencing substance use disorders alone. But the advice that Dr. Vigo has provided to help more consistently apply the Mental Health Act across the province for clinicians is intended to be a helpful thing.

Again, coming back to a lot of concerns that have been raised by different groups, different stakeholders, different parts of society about the Mental Health Act altogether, that is why we have committed to undertaking a review of the Mental Health Act. There will be a lot of opportunity under that review for different perspectives to be brought forward, again, including the voices of people with lived and living experience, which need to be absolutely central to such a review.

[3:35 p.m.]

Rob Botterell: There’s another aspect of the committee deliberations that I’d like to touch on and just clarify, recognizing that I have no interest or licence to revisit speeches made at second reading.

One of the themes that has arisen on a number of occasions over the last day, which we have been contacted about by British Columbians and by those that are watching these proceedings, relates to the linkage between section 1 and, as the minister was just describing, the overall review of the act and the linkage there.

We know that any changes to this legislation need to be informed by experts, advocates and, as the minister just mentioned, people with lived and living experience.

We need to make sure that people who need treatment can receive treatment in a manner that is aligned with human rights. When people receive mental health treatment in B.C., they must be treated with dignity and respect. These changes do not grapple with this, and as we’ve been advised over the course of the day, they’re not intended to.

I’d again like to echo my colleagues’ comments and express the need for the overhaul of the existing Mental Health Act to create concrete steps to build out a voluntary, person-centred mental health care system.

We already know that there’s a lack of adherence to the existing act, which raises concerns around how clause 1 and the balance of the amendments will be implemented, with only a quarter of the necessary forms being filled out for involuntarily admitted patients. The existing procedural safeguards are not being adhered to, which raises the concern around liability protections and whether those liability protections may be found to be unavailable because of the lack of following of procedural safeguards that is already occurring. It’s clear that so much work needs to be done to improve oversight and accountability.

Obviously, all people deserve to be treated with dignity and respect in the health care system, and it’s our greatest hope that the minister and cabinet will recognize the urgent need to work with front-line health care workers, experts, advocates and people with lived experience to develop that new system. Clearly, we’re also very excited and hopeful about the review of the Mental Health Act, and we want to express our support.

We’ve had discussion over the last couple of days about the amount of consultation in relation to clause 1 and the amendments generally and discovered that it is a far cry from the level of consultation that I think the minister and others have indicated they would like to see in terms of the Mental Health Act review.

A couple of questions I have. When will the review of the Mental Health Act be completed, and if there are recommendations in that review to repeal the changes that are the subject of this amendment act, will the minister be making those amendments if the review suggests we’ve just gone down the wrong path?

The Chair: Again, I’m a little concerned with how the question around the upcoming mental health review connects itself with clause 1 of the Mental Health Amendment Act (No. 2), 2025, just in terms of how that connects specifically to the clause.

[3:40 p.m.]

I know there’s lots of latitude in clause 1, but that’s a lot of latitude.

Member, I will look to the minister for her preference, but you really are well out of scope here.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you, Chair. I agree with your assessment. This is outside the scope of this bill. I’d be very happy to talk to the member when we’re done debate about his question.

Rob Botterell: Thank you, Minister, and thank you, Madam Chair.

In deference to a good friend of mine and a colleague, not in the same party, on the opposition side of the benches, I would like to begin asking some questions in relation to the amendment that are, I think you’ll find, clearly within the scope and won’t be testing the latitude of clause 1 comments.

Can the minister describe what a professional service would entail?

[3:45 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: The member, I’m certain, has noted that there is no definition of “professional service” in the act, but a reasonable person might assume that it is a service within the scope of practice of that particular provider or professional providing the service or care.

I cannot provide an exhaustive list to the exclusion of anything else, but I will note that it is terminology that’s consistent with the already existing section 8.

Rob Botterell: In the section, as well, there…. When we read it, “to provide to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment….”

To the minister: could you provide a definition of “care”?

I know that in our discussion earlier this spring of other bills, we requested dictionary definitions, but I’m not sure what…. If somebody is asking what forms of care are covered or what qualifies as care, it would be helpful for us to know what that is.

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you to the member for the question.

My answer is similar to the answer that I just gave, on what is a professional service. I just want to point back to that part of my answer in saying what a reasonable person might assume is a professional service or what is care within the scope of practice of that professional and, again, point to the importance and the responsibility of said professional care provider to exercise their discretion and reasonable judgment and, as is outlined in the act, that it is applied as appropriate to the patient’s condition.

I will also point out that this is language that has been in the act since the 1960s, that it has been carried forward and that, even in the absence of a specific legal meaning, it was not something that was contemplated in Bill 32.

In any individual case that was brought forward before the court, of course, the judge would consider an individual’s actions, look at the individual’s situation there and make a determination as to whether something constitutes professional service, care or treatment, just as the judge will look at whether that was delivered in good faith and with reasonable care.

Rob Botterell: What would be the difference between treatment and care?

[3:55 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: “Treatment” is defined in the act. It means “safe and effective psychiatric treatment and includes any procedure necessarily related to the provision of psychiatric treatment.”

I think “care” can be understood more broadly as the provision of services that maintains health, prevents disease, treats injuries or illnesses and disabilities. It is more the broader concept of patient well-being, beyond just treatment. That may involve improving or maintaining the health or quality of life of a person as much as possible.

Rob Botterell: How would you distinguish care from a professional service?

[4:00 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Two answers ago I spoke to professional services, and in my previous answer, I spoke to the definition of treatment and what might reasonably be considered to be care. Again, just pointing out that this is phraseology, this is language, that has been carried forward in the act since the 1960s.

I’d invite the member to be more explicit if there’s a particular concern he’s bringing forward or what he might be driving towards so that I can better understand his line of questioning.

Rob Botterell: I’m approaching my question this afternoon from two perspectives.

One perspective is to make sure that those that are extraordinarily concerned about this legislation have on the record a description of key elements of the liability protection that is being proposed so that it’s on the record and in Hansard for future reference and, secondly, to just ensure that the scope of liability protection is sufficient.

From my perspective, respectfully, just the fact that something has always been done this way doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s not going to introduce either some uncertainty about something being missed or something being needed to be added.

You know, this act has historically included and continues to include the provision of physical restraints, use of force, electroconvulsive therapy, forcible injections, solitary confinement. Can the minister explain if these strategies — I guess they’d be called — are covered by the definitions of professional service or care or treatment?

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Before I answer a little more fulsomely, I just want to recognize the sensitivity of the conversation. I know it is difficult to speak of these things, and as the member and I have both referenced, these are really serious matters. I want to be clear that our debate today is centred on Bill 32 and that it necessarily brings up a lot of thoughts and feelings, emotions, opinions, perspectives, all of which are valid, about things that can happen when a patient is involuntarily detained under the Mental Health Act and when psychiatric treatments are delivered to the person.

Again, I want to point to the act and its definition of “treatment,” meaning “safe and effective psychiatric treatment includes any procedure necessarily related to the provision of psychiatric treatment.” The act itself does not reference the specific “strategies,” I think is what the member referred to them as. They are not listed in the act.

Again, I want to point to the due care attention, the need to apply treatment in good faith, with reasonable care. And that is in the discretion and professional judgment of the care provider who is applying treatment.

I also want to note that I think some of what…. You know, I really take seriously what the member is saying about this line of questioning and why it’s important and, again, point back to the need…. I think it’s underscored in this line of dialogue here. The Mental Health Act necessarily must be reviewed and will be. Some of these questions around what, how, when and why can be answered, and should be answered, through the review of the act. So I think some of what we may discuss today is just going to be more appropriately placed in that.

I want to be clear, once again, that bringing forth Bill 32, which necessarily has this narrow focus on these amendments around liability protections and providing them explicitly for health care providers, in no way is to say that the review of the act will not take place, that it is happening now for a specific set of reasons that we have canvassed today and yesterday.

But the Mental Health Act review is a very, very important component of government’s work moving forward, especially in light of the really important conversations that are taking place in the public.

Rob Botterell: Thank you, Minister, and thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Did you want to speak through the Chair?

Member.

Rob Botterell: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Minister.

I also wish to acknowledge…. I’m very familiar, over many years, with discussions like this that we’re having on a serious matter, with sensitivity, that the implications can, in a very unintended way, cause triggering events. So I just want to make clear that I’m trying to be as sensitive as I can but also be clear in my questions.

I respect the Chair’s ruling earlier, but I do note for the record that the minister is bringing us back to a discussion of an issue which I’ve been advised, and I accept that, is outside the scope of the discussion of this, which is the Mental Health Act review. So I’m not going to raise a further question on that, not because it hasn’t come up again but because I understand that’s outside the scope.

The question I do have: is detaining someone for observation considered treatment?

[4:10 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: As the member, I know, understands, detaining a person under the Mental Health Act can only be done when the criteria that are outlined in section 22 are met, and a person may be observed after they are detained. I don’t think you could consider the detainment to be treatment, but the act of observing for the purposes of assessment, that observation and assessment together, could, I think, reasonably be considered part of treatment and care.

Rob Botterell: Then I take it, from the answer, that detaining someone for observation would fall under treatment. Is that where we land? Just to clarify.

Hon. Josie Osborne: I might ask the member to clarify. A person is not detained for observation.

A person is detained because a physician or a nurse practitioner is of the opinion — I’m citing from the act — that the person to be admitted or the patient admitted under subsection 1 of section 22 of the Mental Health Act requires treatment in or through a designated facility; requires care, supervision and control in or through a designated facility to prevent the person’s or patient’s substantial mental or physical deterioration or for the protection of the person or patient or the protection of others; and cannot suitably be admitted as a voluntary patient.

[4:20 p.m.]

Again, a person is not detained for observation. They are detained because they meet those criteria, and then observation is an action that may happen after that detainment.

Rob Botterell: The observation is a form of treatment or a form of care? I’m looking at (b.4) and trying to see where observation fits within the definition of (b.4). Maybe I’m misconstruing the section, but I’m just trying to understand. This liability protection that we’re looking at is intended, presumably, to also cover observation.

People can be held for a period of up to 48 hours for observation, often by nurses and often when the person is suspected to be engaging in stimulant use, and then be released shortly after. It’s a step in the process. But I’m just trying to understand how it fits within the liability protection framework.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Let me do my best to try to answer in my words.

Once a person is detained under the Mental Health Act, everything that happens, even in that first 48 hours…. Whereas the member says it might be a person who…. Well, I won’t even speculate. At that point, the actions that are undertaken all form part of that professional service, care or treatment, the delivery of which is protected. The liability waiver is given through the addition of subsection (b.4) in section 16.

As to whether observation is a professional service or care or treatment, I won’t speculate. It is that group of services together, the professional service, care and treatment — the observation, the assessment, what is deemed to be necessary under the discretion and judgment of the professional involved.

Rob Botterell: The subsection is drafted as “providing to a patient a professional service, or care or treatment.” That observation — there are three options here. Which one is it?

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Whether observation is deemed to be professional services, care or treatment…. I don’t think I understand the member’s question. It’s encompassed in that. It doesn’t matter which category it fits into in the sense that the liability extends to all three of those things listed in that phrase of “professional services, care and treatment.”

Rob Botterell: I’m sensing a certain degree of frustration with my line of questioning, so I’ll ask one more question that is unrelated to observation and then move to other aspects.

Would this definition of professional service or care or treatment include physical health interventions?

[4:30 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: If I understand where the member is going here, this is not a clause that is intended to apply to the general physical health of a person. It is very specific in the professional service, care or treatment that is authorized by the director under the act to be given to the patient.

Just referring back to the definition of “treatment,” meaning the safe and effective psychiatric treatment, including any procedure necessarily related to the provision of psychiatric treatment, I think, as an example, a person who was admitted…. Again, this is around people who are involuntarily admitted under the Mental Health Act because they meet the criteria as listed in section 22. They are receiving psychiatric care.

If there’s another physical health issue — I don’t know, an infection or something like that — that is not the type of care that is covered under this clause. This has a very specific meaning, and I think the meaning is defined in the act.

Rob Botterell: My understanding, and I just want to see if I understand this correctly, is that treatment is determined by the form 5. Would the provision of professional service, care or treatment that’s covered by this proposed protection of liability clause in clause 1…? Would the provision of that be guided…? I’m still trying to understand the distinction here, having only looked at this act for a day or two. Would that be covered under the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act?

Hon. Josie Osborne: This question is very similar, I think, to something that we have already canvassed with the member for Skeena, but I would ask if the member wouldn’t mind asking again so we could determine if there’s a difference in the question he is asking.

Rob Botterell: Thank you, Minister. I wasn’t here for that.

My understanding is that the form 5, in my words, is the core document that determines treatment. Would the provision of professional service, care or treatment through the form 5 be guided under the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act?

Hon. Josie Osborne: The answer is no.

Rob Botterell: If it’s not guided by the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, then where does the authority arise from?

Hon. Josie Osborne: It arises from section 8 of the Mental Health Act.

I understand the member wasn’t here for questions that we previously discussed with the member for Skeena, but I will say we have discussed this extensively today.

[4:35 p.m.]

Rob Botterell: One of the items that relates — as I would expect, but I’ll be seeking some clarification — to the ability to avail oneself of this liability protection would relate to the process and the documentation in relation to the providing of a professional service or care or treatment. Given the Ombudsperson’s findings of significant and continued non-compliance with procedural requirements for involuntary admissions under the Mental Health Act, we’re concerned that this government is not addressing the serious issue of non-compliance.

In Fraser Health, for example, the legally required admission documents were missing, late or improperly completed 90 percent of the time. The average found only 28 percent compliance across the province. These documents include forms outlining reasons for detention, treatment consent, notification of a patient’s rights and notification to relatives.

What happens if these forms are missing, and how does it potentially impact the liability protection that you’re proposing be enacted here?

[4:40 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you to the member for the question.

First, I just want to address the Ombudsperson’s report and say that it was a serious report, and the recommendations that were provided were accepted by government. The Ministry of Health has been working closely with health authorities to improve practices, and I am happy to say that there has been a significant improvement in compliance with the requirements, and that is exactly what I, as minister, would expect to see.

As long as the treatment was authorized by the director, then it is covered by the liability shield. I would point out that it’s not limited just to treatments that may be outlined on form 5 and, as the clause is phrased, that it is the “professional service or care or treatment authorized by the director under this act to be given to the patient, including treatment described in a consent to treatment form signed under section 8(a).”

Rob Botterell: Focusing on the items that are covered under form 5…. It seems reasonable that it would be difficult to determine whether the care was reasonable and in good faith, as set out in section 16, if there’s no record of notification of a patient’s records and notification to relatives, no information outlining the reasons for detention.

So I would appreciate the minister’s perspective on the relationship between incomplete forms and the ability to create and have in front of those looking at this the necessary information to determine whether care was reasonable.

[4:45 p.m.]

Hon. Josie Osborne: I think the member’s question underscores the importance of documentation, be it records, forms, notes. It would be, I think, inappropriate for me to broadly speculate on the relationship between incomplete forms and whether they comprise the necessary information to determine whether care was reasonable, because that is the job of, for example, the courts.

If in the case, in the delivery of care, an action is taken and brought before the court, then it would be looked at based on the evidence in that situation as to whether professional services, treatment or care was delivered in good faith and with reasonable care. Again, just emphasizing that it would be, you know, the specifics of that particular case that would be examined by a court, for example.

The Chair: Just be advised that this will probably be the last question for this evening.

Rob Botterell: I would like to return with a follow-up question to a discussion we had yesterday around suspension of the court decision, which is one of the main triggers, if not the main trigger, for considering this amendment on a very rushed basis.

I believe that if you review the court records for the case in question, which I encourage you to do, you will find your legal counsel has requested that the court grant a one-year suspension to the effective date of any court declaration striking down section 31 or section 8. You will find that counsel for the Council of Canadians with Disabilities have advised the court that they do not oppose a six-month suspension with the proviso for extension beyond six months with leave of the court.

While it is true that the agreement of the parties to the litigation is not determinative, there is no case of which I am aware where, in similar circumstances, the court has refused to grant a suspension as requested.

[4:50 p.m.]

To the minister, my question is: are you aware of such a case? If so, please, it would be appreciated if you could advise British Columbians and organizations and individuals considering this legislation so they can review that decision and satisfy themselves that this is not an option open for the government to consider.

I have a couple of follow-up questions, but I’ll just leave it there, given the time.

Hon. Josie Osborne: Thank you to the member for Saanich North and the Islands and the member for Skeena for today’s dialogue.

To the member’s question, I think the point here is that this situation has never before arisen. Even in a suspension of the declaration of invalidity, we do not have clarity on the effect of such a suspension on civil liability. And we think it’s important to protect health care providers. That’s why we brought the bill forward.

Noting the hour, with that, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair: This committee stands adjourned.

The committee rose at 4:55 p.m.