Proceedings in the
Birch Room

The House in Committee, Section C.

The committee met at 2:44 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 7 — Economic Stabilization
(Tariff Response) Act
(continued)

The Chair: Good afternoon, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 7, Economic Stabilization (Tariff Response) Act, to order.

On clause 17 (continued).

Steve Kooner: All right. I was asking a line of questioning last time in regards to interpretation, and I believe I have one last question on the interpretation section. We did get to 17(2), and we talked…. The whole phrase, I’ll just state it: “The minister charged with the administration of the Transportation Act may disclose personal information for the purposes of this part.”

[2:45 p.m.]

Now, we already went through “charged.” I was given the information for charged and what that means. I believe we went through “administration” as well, because we had actually addressed it in the previous subclause, 17(1), on the Transportation Act. But what comes next, something that we have not canvassed, is the word “disclose.” “The minister charged with the administration of the Transportation Act may disclose….”

Now, this is a very specific word, so I would like to know from the Attorney General’s department whether this is just an ordinary meaning or this has a specific legal connotation to it or it’s a word that’s actually taken out of a different statute.

Hon. Niki Sharma: It doesn’t have a particular legal meaning in this bill, but the meaning of the word “disclosure” is…. It’s a well-used term in FOIPPA, so it’s clearly…. There are many provisions of FOIPPA that use the word “disclose” and talk about it in the reference of that, so the language, to be consistent, is included in this bill.

Clause 17 approved.

On clause 18.

Steve Kooner: I do have questions on this. Before I start, once again, thank you to the Attorney General’s department as well as the Attorney General for answering our questions and for being patient in answering our questions. We appreciate the hard work of the staff from the Attorney General’s department. Thank you.

The first question for today on clause 18 is this. What legal checks and administrative oversight mechanisms will be in place to ensure the Lieutenant Governor in Council’s ability to designate portions of provincial undertakings for tolls and fees under subsection 18(2)(a) is not exercised arbitrarily or inconsistently across different regions of British Columbia?

[2:50 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: The context that prevents arbitrariness, as the member is questioning, related to that, is actually the context of the whole bill and all of the powers and the way they are set out. They’re very clear on what they relate to and what they can’t relate to.

With respect to that, the powers to designate provincial undertakings or portions of provincial undertakings for a toll, fee or charge is actually very specific and quite necessary regulatory-making power that allows cabinet to decide which provincial undertaking they would designate, or a portion of it, to apply the toll, fee or charge. So it’s actually a pretty essential component of this whole legislative regime.

Steve Kooner: I thank the Attorney General for the response. Just a follow-up question to that.

I understand that the cabinet will decide. They will designate the provincial undertaking so that it will be limited in that scope. But what better discretion is there in terms of the cabinet deciding? What sorts of guidelines would they follow in terms of even narrowing that scope even more?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Cabinet, like all, in its decision-making, is bound to act in the public interest and would be bound to operate in the context of all the laws of British Columbia, including the constitution. We talked about some of the important ones, like FOIPPA, the Financial Administration Act, any other existing laws, our commitment to DRIPA that is under…. It’s very clearly in our legislative scheme, all of those general laws cabinet would be bound by — and the constitution, which is definitely a clear one.

The overall check and balance for, like anything…. I’m sure the member knows, being a lawyer, this is a judicial review. The check of the exercise of decision-making authority would be the judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Steve Kooner: Going back to my original question, I was talking about the exercise of power, whether it would be arbitrary and inconsistent. But the last phrase that was in that question was: “across different regions of British Columbia.” We did have the critic for municipalities here yesterday, and as this committee could probably see from the concerns of my colleague the member for Fraser-Nicola, there are concerns that the rural communities might be hit a little harder.

I understand there’s a certain regulatory or a certain legal framework on how the cabinet would apply decisions and how they would narrow their decisions accordingly. But what further particular framework is there to kind of make sure that it’s an equal application across the province and certain regions are not singled out and have extra burden?

[2:55 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: This piece of legislation, particularly this clause, is designed exactly this way to make sure that cabinet decision-making authority has the flexibility to address regional disparities, to address different impacts.

I just want to start by saying that this is a power that won’t be targeted at British Columbians, and I think we’ve talked about that quite a bit. It’s meant to retaliate, in the context of a trade war, at particular entities, but if there was a regional….

Let’s say, for example, under 18(2)(a), the province has decided to designate a certain portion of a provincial undertaking for a toll, fee and charge. The flexibility of the whole regime makes it so you can make it clear, if there are any unintended impacts or things that you want to mitigate to the local population and British Columbians, that you would have the tools to do that. It could be by timing, who’s targeted, various things. The goal was to make it and design it in a very flexible way to take into account all of that at the time or before the regulation is made.

Steve Kooner: Just going further on this line of questioning. I get the fact that the intent from the government is not to hit British Columbians with tolls, fees and charges. I get that point. But the fact of the matter is that the tolling, fees and charges will be in British Columbia. It’s for British Columbia.

If it’s for British Columbia, we have British Columbians living in British Columbia. Even if the intent isn’t to hit British Columbians, when you have infrastructure or you have infrastructure to collect tolls, fees and charges, or if you’re doing anything, it will indirectly have some sort of consequences. British Columbia will be impeded because you’re putting those tools on British Columbian soil.

I understand the point from the government that the intent is not to go after British Columbians. But if you indirectly look at where this application is going to take place, it’s going to be on British Columbia.

Just going to that concern. I get it. I got the answer in terms of that it’s not intended for British Columbians. But what does Attorney General’s department have to say about these infrastructure tools that will be put on British Columbia. How will they be protected? How will these people be protected, indirectly?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I just want to respectfully disagree with the member’s characterization of this. You actually could very effectively design a regime that doesn’t impact British Columbians at all, and that would be the intent. That’s the reason that it’s set up this way.

If you look at the powers in here, you can define the class of users. You could, for example, define the class of users that you were targeting to be American truck drivers that are licensed that way. You could define the operator or owner of the vehicle or provincial undertaking. You can define the class of users, the registration of the class of vehicle.

It’s actually, as an enabling statute, designed exactly to do what we want it to do, which is to not target British Columbians but target the places that you would want to target the power to — so the tolls, fees or charges. It’s set up to do exactly the opposite, I think, of what the member suggests.

I mean, obviously, none of us in cabinet have legal-making authority in America. We can only do the things that we have legal-making authority to do, which is anything entering our jurisdiction. So in that sense, yes, it would apply in British Columbia, but you can design it to target it to non–British Columbians.

Gavin Dew: Can the Attorney General explain what portion of this section would preclude the imposition of road pricing on British Columbians?

[3:00 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: We had a very extensive discussion about this and the wording of the provisions and clauses previously. There was even an amendment moved, and I explained pretty clearly in this discussion and debate why it’s not going to be used against British Columbians and why it’s not specifically worded…. We had this discussion already.

What we’re focused on with clause 18 is regulatory-making powers. If there was ever a clearer way to show through the wording of this provision about the way it was designed to use a regulatory-making power, to show its intended purpose, it’s the clauses that are located in 18.

The powers of cabinet are very clearly there to discriminate based on classes of people, vehicles, all the types of provincial undertakings. So this is a part of a clause that is an enabling part for regulatory power to do the thing we talked about in the clauses before, which is to make sure it’s not against British Columbia, that it’s not targeting British Columbians. That is exactly the design of clause 18.

Gavin Dew: We’ve talked a lot in previous discussion around intent versus effect. As I understand and review this, I don’t see anything here that precludes the possibility of these tools being used to impose road pricing on British Columbians. I don’t see anything in here that prevents that. What I’m hearing is that there’s not an intent to do that, but I don’t see anything here that precludes road pricing.

Can the AG explain not on the basis of intent, not on the basis of purpose, but on the basis of the legal powers enumerated, if cabinet chose to impose road pricing, would these powers allow them to do so?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I just want to put also clearly…. We’ve had this discussion before in the other clauses. Everything, every clause that we’re talking about has to be considered in context of the whole bill. We’ve had different discussions in different sections about the fact this is a tariff response bill. There are certain key purposes in it. There are certain powers that are designed there. What we’re looking at right now in clause 18 is a regulatory-making power that attaches itself to previous clauses that we’ve discussed.

So the regulatory-making power is a way to help the regulatory decision-making target the places that you want to take it. In that sense, the legislative drafting regime wouldn’t, in this stage, list the negatives, which is what the member is asking for. It wouldn’t list the negatives, saying, like, it’s clear that this would be…. It’s actually enabling regulation. It’s enabling the ability to discriminate so that British Columbians are not impacted, which is the way you would design it.

It’s enabling the ability to discriminate on vehicles, on things like that. It’s the design part of the regulation that shows that it’s meant to be targeted at certain groups of people.

Gavin Dew: I hear the Attorney General talking about the purpose and intent but, sorry, what part of the bill says that these powers can be used only in response to tariffs and cannot be used for domestic purposes? Where is that actually outlined in the bill?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Chair, I’ve had an extensive conversation about this in this part, in clauses. There was even an amendment moved on it. This clause is regulatory. It’s regulatory powers, so I’d just ask, if there’s a question on the regulatory-making powers here, that we would focus on that. I believe I’ve extensively talked about the powers which are in clause 14 and even addressed it through an amendment that was brought by the member about the extent of the power and how it could be used. We’re now talking about the regulatory-making powers of clause 18.

[3:05 p.m.]

Gavin Dew: I’m not really seeing or hearing a clear answer as to how the power to make regulations outlined in 18 in any way, shape or form is constrained to prevent it from being used to impose road pricing or a similar mechanism. I’m hearing a lot about intent, but I’m not actually hearing how that is restricted.

Given that the matter of road pricing as a concern has been raised since the first days this bill was made public, and given that government has amended the bill significantly to walk back portions of the bill that were the subject of greatest concern from the public, I just want to understand: why has the government not explicitly brought amendments to limit the power of the bill to prevent the imposition of road pricing?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Chair, I’m going to ask for your guidance here.

If we just look at the Hansard debate that happened yesterday…. All of yesterday we talked about the bill. We talked about the context and that it was a tariff response bill. The members from the other side raised many ways that they were assuming it would be used, whether it was road pricing, whether it was very many different things, and I have responded to that. I’ve responded to a large extent to that.

The context of the bill, the fact that it’s called a tariff response bill, that the context of it is a tariff response and that we have another piece of legislation that exists that already allows the Minister of Transportation to put tolls and fees and charges on provincial undertakings…. There’s already a broad power to do that.

This is focused on tariff response, and I just…. I’m struggling with the repeated questions here, Chair. In the context of this particular clause 18, if we could tie it to the regulatory-making power…. I’ve even answered specifically why you wouldn’t put something about excluding British Columbia in clause 18 because it’s a regulatory-making clause. I’ve answered it even specifically to this clause. So just your guidance on figuring out how to move forward.

The Chair: Member, the question has been answered.

Interjection.

The Chair: While you might not be satisfied with her answer, the Attorney General said it has been answered. Can you please find a different line of questioning in relation to clause 18?

Gavin Dew: Sure. Outside of the title of the bill, tariff response act…. I’m sorry, but the Attorney General is relying on a statement that is very broad, to the effect that the powers enumerated are limited to tariff response, but there is no section of the bill, outside of the title, that limits the powers.

I would just like to get the Attorney General to clarify that assertion, because her argument against answering my question appears to be that it is manifestly self-evident that the powers are restricted to tariff response when there’s nothing in the bill that limits them to tariff response.

So if the Attorney General could please clarify which section says “only in response to tariffs.” Simple question.

The Chair: I want to just ensure that the debate is relevant to the clause.

Gavin Dew: The debate is relevant to the clause because the Attorney General is declining to answer questions about the clause, citing the idea that these powers are restricted to only responding to tariffs. I am questioning the underlying logic that the Attorney General is using to decline to answer questions on the clause. If the Attorney General can substantiate the logic that she is using to decline to answer the question about the clause, then I would consider the question to be answered. But I haven’t heard it substantiated.

The Chair: Do you have another question in regards to clause 18?

Gavin Dew: Still looking for an answer as to what prevents these regulation-making powers from being used to impose road pricing on British Columbians.

[3:10 p.m.]

The Chair: Shall clause 18 pass?

Member for Kelowna-Mission.

Gavin Dew: Great. Let’s talk about some other sections of 18.

Can the minister elaborate on exemptions from the payment of tolls, fees or charges? What are the contemplated exemptions?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s an enabling statute. This will be up to cabinet when they’re making that decision, but this is exactly the type of provision that I was talking about in the debate that we were just having and yesterday, which actually allows cabinet to make sure there were exemptions for the payment of tolls, fees and charges.

Those exemptions could be used in a way to make sure that British Columbians are not impacted by any of the tolls, fees or charges.

Gavin Dew: It sounds like we’re now talking about making sure that British Columbians are not affected by the tolls, fees or charges. But if that is the intent, then why is it not made clear that British Columbians will not be affected by the tolls, fees or charges?

I really think this is a very simple question. I’m just looking for a simple articulation that these powers will not be used to impose tolls, fees or charges on British Columbians. Can the Attorney General simply answer the yes or no question? Will this government use these powers to impose tolls, fees or charges on British Columbians?

The Chair: Although the member might not be fully satisfied with the minister’s response, the minister has advised that question has already been answered.

Gavin Dew: The question has not been answered. Will the minister…?

Interjections.

The Chair: Hey, friends. We’ll take a five-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 3:12 p.m. to 3:19 p.m.

[Darlene Rotchford in the chair.]

The Chair: Okay. Members, before we continue, I’d just like to remind everyone…. I appreciate that this is a small house. We are on top of each other, and it can get a bit heated entering debate. However, we all have to remember to be respectful to one another and the Chair.

[3:20 p.m.]

Members, before we continue, I’d like to advise that, prior to the recess, a line of questioning has been canvassed quite thoroughly, previously, and in the Chair’s view has become repetitive.

Although members may not fully be satisfied with the minister’s response, I strongly encourage members to find a new line of questioning.

Kiel Giddens: I would certainly agree with the Chair that this is a small room, and the temperature sometimes gets a little warm physically and also sometimes emotionally, but let’s continue the debate in a respectful way. I appreciate the Chair’s advice in that regard.

I’m going to change the line of questioning to go back to some of the discussion we had in clause 14. If the Attorney General might recall, I was asking a number of questions that ended up saying this would be something we should discuss in 18, so I do want to go back to some of that if that’s okay.

In one of those questions…. I’m wondering if the ministry conducted any distributional impact analysis to determine how tolls or fees may disproportionately affect low-income rural or remote populations. Again, I go back to when you’re making the regulatory powers granting that so it goes into implementation later…. It’s making sure I can go back to my constituents and just have a deep understanding.

Again, when I referenced this yesterday, I talked about the northeast and folks travelling to Alaska and all that kind of thing and how that would work. So I’m wondering if the Attorney General could comment on that in relation to clause 18.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Thanks for the question.

This is exactly the place that I think I can explain. The member had questions about how that could be set up. So at the offset, it would be — if we ever get to this stage, or hopefully we won’t — at the time of regulatory-making power that you would make the considerations. I think we had a good discussion about what they might be to make sure the regional impacts were taken into account.

If you look at subsection (2), or actually all of the clause 18, it shows the tools that you can put in place to actually ensure that regional disparities or regional considerations are taken into place. First of all, you can choose the provincial undertaking or a portion of the provincial undertaking. The ability to choose portions of it is one way that you could figure out mitigating local impacts.

You could establish different amounts for tolls, fees and charges, times of the day. So you could target certain times of the day, like if the goal is to target traffic from the States travelling through, there might be some value that you could use this regulatory power to target types of vehicles and particular classifications of vehicles or characteristics. You could get down to that very specificity of commercial vehicle if you wanted to, travelling through a certain area without B.C. licence plates, let’s just say, or something.

I mean, I’m speculating in terms of the content, and I don’t want to prejudge what cabinet might come to a decision about if this was ever used. I just wanted to use it as an example to illustrate why the regulatory-making power gives you that ability all the way through clause 18, in the very thoughtful drafting of it, to be sure that you can target it in a way that makes sure that any regional disparities or considerations that you want to take into account, you can take into account.

Kiel Giddens: Just so I have a good understanding of that. Under the regulatory-making power, it technically would be possible to make differential pricing for commercial versus personal vehicles in that case, is that correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yeah. You can figure out the class of vehicle that you want to attach a toll or fee to. There are tons of considerations that would have to go into whether or not you would actually do it, but the ability to do it is here.

Kiel Giddens: Okay, that actually…. I appreciate that.

[3:25 p.m.]

On those classes, is there…? I guess it hasn’t been contemplated yet whether there will be differentiation between various classes of users, is that correct? Am I understanding that correctly that it hasn’t been done?

Hon. Niki Sharma: That’s right.

Kiel Giddens: Has there been any economic modelling on what that would look like at all, or is that still work that would have to be done, I guess, by the Ministry of Transportation?

Hon. Niki Sharma: We’ve had discussions about economic modelling before. In the context of understanding what powers and tools are needed if this was ever to happen, that’s kind of as far as we’ve gotten with the enabling statute.

In terms of what it would mean, economic modelling, for the particular thing, it really honestly depends. We talked about all the ability to enter agreements with particular third parties that might help us with it. We talked about the ability to figure out which provincial undertaking we’re attaching it to, and that would result in different…. If you did attach it to road versus something else, then of course there’s going to be different analysis that goes into it.

At this stage, there is not a detailed economic analysis because there’s nothing to attach that analysis to. There’s no contemplation of a regulation. There’s no contemplation of using this power at this time.

Kiel Giddens: I guess in designing these as retaliatory measures, there’s certainly going to be a lot of work that would be needed to go into that. In that regard…. I am just looking at subsection (1)(a) through (d) and trying to ensure that I understand the types of things that could be contemplated in that. I’m wondering if an example could be permitting something like time-of-day or peak-use pricing models.

The reason I say that is because, you know, if you’re designing specific retaliatory measures, are there ways that could…? Again, I go back to that commercial versus personal. There are ways that you could kind of design it. Is that technically possible under that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: The power to have the ability for days or times is under 2(a)(i), and it says, “dates, days or times of use of the provincial undertaking or portion of a provincial undertaking,” so it gives you that ability.

Kiel Giddens: Thank you to the Attorney General for pointing that out for my benefit.

This is another one that we talked about. Can the Attorney General just point out where it would authorize dynamic or automated tolling systems? We talked about licence plate recognition. Really, if it is used, how would the technical standards for that be governed? Which ministry would be doing that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: As I don’t have a specific contemplation of when this power would be used, I don’t know, to answer, how it would be done, if it ever would be done. But the way that the bill is structured…. If you see 18(1)(a), it says, “respecting the system of tolls,” and “system of tolls” is a common use of language throughout. That describes the ability to figure out which system you’re going to put in place, to answer the question.

Kiel Giddens: I do think, yeah, the system of tolls is what I had tagged with that particular question in mind.

[3:30 p.m.]

But trying to figure out how the system would be implemented, how it would be in practice…. Again, this is a question I think I asked yesterday when we were back on 14. I think I might know the answer, but I just would like to get clarification.

How will that system, that type of pricing, the amount, be communicated to drivers in advance? How will they get notice of that? Just would like clarification, if that would be okay.

Hon. Niki Sharma: We answered part of that, I think, a similar question, but I’m happy to attach it to this. This regulatory power would give specifics. You could say time of day. You could say type of vehicle. There are different ways you could communicate that or would communicate it.

First of all, the regulation is public. It would be publicly available to understand what was contained in that regulation. It would be posted on public websites, like DriveBC and/or other ones that might be relevant, to spread the information.

Then depending on the circumstance, there’s also the ability to put on signage in the exact area, like roadside signs or something that would say: if you are this vehicle, here’s a notification that here’s the toll or fee that applies to you.

Kiel Giddens: Yeah, I had in my head the DriveBC example. I appreciate, that’s a good example, that signage could also, of course, be used.

I guess maybe a different question. Another one we talked about yesterday was…. We talked a lot about collections. We talked a lot about how that process works. Again, I think a lot of it is…. Under the “Power to make regulations” is how some of that is set.

One that we talked about I think that we just want to make sure we’re clear on is how interest rates would be set in the case of a fine or a charge and the determination if there would be any caps. I’m assuming that has not been set or contemplated yet, but maybe the Attorney General can just clarify that.

Hon. Niki Sharma: So 18(1)(d) gives the cabinet the power to prescribe interest rates and the manner of collecting it. In the context of the regulation, if there was an interest rate prescribed by cabinet, it would be clear in the regulation and then communicated in the various ways we talked about. But no, there’s no contemplation of that yet.

Kiel Giddens: With those interest rates and penalties for non-payment, will they align with the consumer protection legislation? I know we have new legislation, Bill 4, that just, I believe, received royal assent — Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Can the Attorney General just confirm that those actually align?

[3:35 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: Just for clarity, the consumer protection — the bill that the member talked about — wouldn’t apply here. That’s for consumer contracts. This is a toll, fee or charge. But just to give more guidance on how government sets interest rates or prescribes it, of course the Treasury Board is generally the one that controls, in a government-wide way, the perspective or analysis with respect to interest rates.

To give you an example of how it’s done, there’s an Interest Rate under Various Statutes Regulation that’s in force that shows how statutes like look at an approach that’s taken government-wide when it comes to these things, and they’re generally pretty low.

Kiel Giddens: I appreciate the response. I do recall some of our discussion related to the Ministry of Finance’s role in some of that, so I can refer to that discussion as well.

As we’re looking at the system of tolls, maybe one that…. I was just wondering if it would be technically feasible, if the regulations would technically permit real-time enforcement, so things like mobile alerts, electronic toll violations that are kind of automatic — that type of thing.

Hon. Niki Sharma: The same with the member’s previous question. Just to make it clear, the regulatory-making power is technology-neutral. So it doesn’t require or set out what would be used by that, and that would be an operational decision that would be fact-specific depending on…. In this case, it would be the Ministry of Transport that would have the tools and would understand, to assess the best technology needs for the regime that would be put in place.

Kiel Giddens: Sometimes the clauses do blend together for me at this point, but I do recall, in the course of part 3, we talked about retroactivity a fair bit. But just in respect to clause 18, I want to understand, I guess: would this clause specifically allow for retroactive regulation-making? If not, where would that fit in the context of part 3 overall?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Every part you can kind of look at as, except for the provisions we’ll get to, generally containing its own definitions and its own things like regulatory-making power. That’s how it’s set up. So the one that we were talking about previously in part 2 with the retroactivity was specific to that part. In this, you can read clause 18 as being inclusive, and no, it doesn’t contain that type of regulatory-making power.

Kiel Giddens: Going from retroactivity to looking forward…. Given that obviously we’re going to get to talk later about sunset clauses and whatnot, would there be the ability for regular updates? Is that just a cabinet decision? Or could cabinet decide if they want to make updates every six months? Obviously, we’re looking at and we’ve talked a little bit about government trying to, attempting here to respond, but the ability for updates…. We want to make sure that when things change, we can actually change with the times and continue.

[3:40 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: That’s exactly why the bill is designed this way. We talked about it almost in every section — that the regulatory-making power actually allows for that really quick adaptation, depending on what’s happening on the ground or what needs to change in the trade war.

Kiel Giddens: I’m wondering. I’ll maybe just move into a different question: will the draft regulations, once they’re contemplated by cabinet under this clause, be subject to any public consultation or pre-publication under the Regulations Act?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes, it would be open to cabinet to use the provisions under the Regulations Act or whatever the consultation would be. I think the important things to remember are the few things that would likely happen in the context of these even being contemplated. We would have an escalating trade war and a Team Canada response of escalation.

In that context, if you were going to do something related to this and use the powers in here, you would likely have to have very targeted consultations, because it wouldn’t be the whole province that would be affected. It may be just like a region that you want to say, “Here’s how we’re going to target American” whatever, trucks or I don’t know what the context would be, and you’d have to do that.

It would be open to cabinet to see which powers are effective, which way the consultation would go and where it would be directed at, and it would depend on the circumstance.

Kiel Giddens: I guess the reason I’m asking is because the public consultation requirement is not explicitly required because of this. It doesn’t actually….

So because of that…. We talked quite a bit, I think it was yesterday, about border communities and their potential concern — border Indigenous communities, local governments, that type of thing.

I agree that targeted consultations would probably work, but I’m wondering if the Attorney General could commit to those targeted border community consultations to happen in the case of this regulation-making, if that’s something that can be committed to here today.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes, communities like that are very key to understand the localized impacts if there would be any. Just to say that, also, the beauty of this power is that you would be able to design it after talking to them in a way that would minimize or reduce the impact.

I think the unfortunate reality is that in the trade war that we find ourselves in, those communities are already impacted in a very serious way, just from the reliance that they have on the cross-border relationship more directly than maybe some of us that live farther away from the border. That is just an unfortunate impact that we didn’t ask for. So it’s important for us to understand what those communities need at any time, especially if it was to escalate and there’s a constant of an escalating trade war.

You know what? There are ways that you could design the tolls, fees and charges in a way that might actually support, be targeted to support those communities, right? So that could be a consideration that cabinet thinks about.

[3:45 p.m.]

Kiel Giddens: I appreciate that commitment here from the Attorney General. I agree that border communities, certainly, are disproportionately impacted by a trade war, and we need to find however we can to support them through this time.

It just so happens that, yeah, the opposition does have representation in many border-area communities, so I think this is an important topic for me to be able to bring back to my colleagues. I’ll thank the Attorney General for making that confirmation on behalf of MLAs in this House.

Maybe a different question on that. Could the Attorney General just describe, under the power to make regulations here, whether cabinet could delegate its clause 18 powers further to ministry officials? And if so, how can we as MLAs track who is actually setting tolls, schedules or exemptions or anything like that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: This is a power for cabinet, and it can’t be delegated.

Kiel Giddens: Thank you for the confirmation, to the Attorney General.

Obviously these are still…. I understand that the Attorney General referenced that the powers are limited to tolls, fees and charges and all of that, but it’s still pretty wide-ranging how they could be implemented or designed.

I’m wondering what role, if any, the Legislative Assembly could have in reviewing the tolls, fees and charges before they’re implemented. Or is that simply going to be cabinet deciding and then there won’t be any role for us in the Legislature?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Just like regulatory-making power in every statute, it’s a cabinet-level decision. Regulations don’t go before the Legislature.

Steve Kooner: All right. There was some discussion about urban and rural — I think that’s where I left it when I was asking questions — and then how you make sure certain regions are not disproportionally affected. I believe the answer that was applied back then was: “Well, there’s a certain degree of flexibility.” It was great to receive that answer that there is some flexibility in cabinet.

What comes to mind is that there’s often a complaint amongst British Columbians that certain parties or regional or…. In politics, we see references that there’s a divide between urban and rural. That all comes down to, the microscope comes down onto flexibility, because the target from British Columbians, essentially, becomes the politicians in terms of their flexibility in how regional divides are being addressed amongst the province.

Now going back to that question that I said — the ask was: how do you prevent certain regions from being disproportionately affected? The answer going to flexibility…. What can the Attorney General say to alleviate the concerns of British Columbians that argue about whether there’s a divide in British Columbia between urban and rural?

Will this particular cabinet be able to restrain itself, make sure that there’s adequate protection, so there aren’t politically motivated decisions?

I believe that’s a valid question based upon a common issue that we actually do see in British Columbia, and it’s often raised. If the Attorney General can elaborate on that. I know that my colleague here did talk about, I believe, the border and stuff like that, bordering communities, but this goes to the specific question about what we often hear about the divide between rural and urban communities here in British Columbia.

[3:50 p.m.]

Just something for the people that are listening and are concerned there might be decisions made in cabinet that could affect particular regions more than others through the flexibility mechanism that was introduced by the Attorney General earlier when I asked that question.

If the Attorney General can elaborate any further to just say that, well, yes, there will be flexibility, but in order to address the concerns of what certain British Columbians have voiced — maybe a division between urban and rural — this is how it’s going to address that.

Is there anything further that the Attorney General can provide in terms of that particular issue?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I want to take strong exception to what the member is suggesting, and that is that the cabinet doesn’t represent all of British Columbia.

The member may not know this, but I was raised in Sparwood, which is a town of 3,000 to 4,000 people in the Rocky Mountains. We are representing everybody across this province every time we make a decision. The insinuation that I think is coming from there, which is completely unfounded, is that we would only make decisions to benefit certain parts of the province. I find that not only wrong but quite a terrible thing to accuse cabinet of doing, a cabinet of British Columbia.

I’ll just put that on the record right here. The member should not prejudge where people come from in this province and what they represent.

There are, again, regulatory-making powers in this bill that allow cabinet, in their consideration, to make sure that regional perspectives are determined.

Steve Kooner: With all due respect, I wasn’t trying to offend the Attorney General in any way. I was just referencing. I wasn’t making any accusatory remarks. I was clearly referencing. This is something I’ve heard.

I’ve studied political science in this province, as well, and that’s something you read about in political science books and when you’re studying politics here in this province. I’ve been brought up in the urban area — right? — but I’ve learned about this stuff. Basically, it’s not an accusation of something’s going to occur.

I guess what I was looking for is: is there a mechanism? Obviously, everybody has good intent. If you’re going into public office, you want to serve, and you want to serve to the best of your ability. But there are still concerns that we still have to have certain safeguards to make sure that people have confidence in our system.

The justice system you’re often speaking about…. You don’t want any sort of disrepute being hinting to the administration of justice. It’s not that the people that are working within the system are biased or anything like that, but we have to kind of have certain mechanisms that instil confidence. That was the particular question.

I don’t know if the Attorney General has anything more to say on the topic. I was not accusing the Attorney General of anything. If it came across that way, I just want to reiterate that was not my intention.

My intention was just to get to mechanisms so we can instil confidence from the public, saying: “There are these mechanisms. What you’re thinking can’t actually be taking place, because we actually have these mechanisms in place.”

Public confidence in our system, in our political system, and what we do politically, is very, very important. That’s where the point was going.

I don’t know if the Attorney General has any further elaboration on that. If the Attorney General doesn’t, I’m happy to move on, but I’d like to give the Attorney General the opportunity.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I have answered the regulatory power and how it could be designed to make sure that it addresses the regional issues.

Steve Kooner: All right. I’ll proceed further.

There has been some discussion, I believe from my colleague the member for Prince George–Mackenzie, about the classes. I believe the Attorney General brought up…. There’s a provision here. It was 18(2)(c)(iii) that talks about classes — class of user of provincial undertaking. I think there’s another reference to it throughout the section that talks about it: (3)(a) talks about “establish or define classes of users.”

[3:55 p.m.]

Okay, so whenever we get to classes and whenever we get to differentiating certain groups, then the topic comes up. “Okay, how?” Now, I’m going to a mechanism. I’m not accusing anybody of anything. It’s going to the mechanism.

I guess what comes about when you have different classes is that people like…. Okay, well, we want to make sure people aren’t discriminated against when we have different classes. We just want to make sure we’re balanced in addressing all these different classes of groups that we have. We have human rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and also in the B.C. human rights code.

In regard to that, now we have classes. How did that legislation apply, and how do we protect all classes and make sure we are not discriminating or have any sort of perception that there could be discrimination? That’s the next question.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Obviously, the government is bound by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the member suggests, and all human rights laws related to that, and we would fully expect to be challenged if we ever crossed one of those lines. But there is very careful legal review that happens not only when an OIC or a regulation is even contemplated to make sure we’re abiding by all of our very important obligations for the rights and the Charter.

We always are expected to act in accordance with all of our laws and act in the public interest.

Steve Kooner: Once again, with all due respect, I understand the intent is probably very good, from the government, when they’re trying to come up with policy.

It’s great to know that there was some sort of legal review done. Can the Attorney General’s department give me examples of what legal review was actually done? Maybe dish up something that I can have here that gives me assurances that proper legal review was done.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Obviously, no regulation has been made under this bill, as it’s not enforced, but I can give the member assurances about what happens when a legal regulation may be put into place.

It is analyzed through a legal review of compliance with FOIPPA; human rights; the constitution and admin law; understanding whether it’s vires, meaning the regulation fits into the powers of the enabling statute or not; and the Financial Administration Act, along with any other applicable laws that might need to be looked at, to review, before it’s considered something that we can bring forward.

Steve Kooner: I thank the Attorney General for referring to these statutes and assuring us that it’s within vires of the constitution — these provisions. That’s kind of helpful, and hopefully the people that are listening at home and are hearing about the classes have some sort of assurance in terms of some accountability measures that are put in place, in terms of the legal review.

[4:00 p.m.]

Okay. I just want to kind of switch my line of questioning from classes to something else more financial in nature.

Now, the purpose of these tolls, fees and charges, as the Attorney General’s department and the Attorney General have iterated earlier, is for tariff response. It’s to denounce certain behaviour for actors south of our border. That seems to be the purpose: denouncing certain actions taken by a certain administration south of our border.

I get the point that that was the intention of the government when they were trying to bring this forward, but that leads me to the next question. Has the Attorney General’s department conducted modelling to determine whether any future scheme enabled under clause 18 would be revenue-neutral or would constitute a significant fiscal tool during deficit recovery?

I think this is a valid question because this province has reached a deficit level that it has never seen in the history of this province. I think that’s a valid question because a lot of people are worried about the finances of this province.

The other part of this question, essentially, goes to the tariff response. If this is, essentially, just to denounce and make sure the United States backs off from whatever tariffs it’s doing, would this be a revenue-neutral type of mechanism here? So just a question on the financial nature and, I guess, the financial purpose of what those funds would be used for — whatever revenue was generated as a result of tolls, charges and fees and interest, actually.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Asked and answered.

Steve Kooner: All right. I guess we can take it to the next question.

In terms of the next question here, it is in regards to trade agreements, in particular. Canada has many trade agreements, and we have talked about this specific issue in regards to other previous clauses.

Now, a lot of our questions were left towards clause 18. I believe, in previous clauses, we were told to come back to certain things in clause 18. So clause 18 seems to be more of the regulatory, more of the legal framework for tolls, fees and charges.

Coming back to this clause, I think it makes sense to ask this question again in terms of trade agreements. In regards to trade agreements…. Basically, what I’m after is that we want to make sure this province is protected. We want to make sure British Columbians are protected from legal consequences. So that’s the kind of narrative behind this question. And that goes to what legal advice has been had. So what legal advice has been sought or received regarding the impact of clause 18, tolling regulations under interprovincial and international commerce? If the Attorney General can provide that clarification in regards to this particular clause.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I won’t be able to disclose legal advice. I’m sure the member understands that. But the thing that I can offer to answer his question is something that is part of the list that we talked about last time, which was if there was a regulation that was contemplated, one of the analyses that would need to happen was how it interacts with trade laws, because it would be targeting international actors.

I think we’ve talked a few times in this debate about the law. How we’re viewing it, along with other jurisdictions, is that if there’s a bad actor, you would exclude them from…. They’re already not abiding by trade agreements, so you would respond by likely not abiding by those trade agreements with any retaliatory response, but our position is that we would uphold our obligation to other jurisdictions that we’ve signed agreements with.

[4:05 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Just a clear response. There was a lot in that answer. All I would like to know is that trade agreements would be honoured, so there would not be any legal consequences. Is my understanding correct on that point?

Hon. Niki Sharma: We have talked about this to quite some extent, about our approach to the trade agreements. I would refer the member back to the debates we’ve had almost on every section.

We also talked about an escalating trade war with the States. Canada has already filed disputes at the WTO, with the States not operating under our agreement with CUSMA. So we are in a state of legal uncertainty with respect to one actor.

Steve Kooner: I thank the Attorney General for that response. I’m going to switch my line of questioning to another topic. There’s a lot to cover here, so I’m sorry if I’m kind of jumping all over the map. There’s just a lot of stuff I have here.

There was a little bit of a discussion that was brought forward by questions from my colleague here, the member for Prince George–Mackenzie. That had to do with legislative oversight, and the Attorney General, I believe, provided an answer to that. But just a follow-up to that particular question.

Now, I get it that the question was answered in terms of what legislative oversight there may be, but my question goes a little bit further. Will the Legislative Assembly have some opportunities to review, amend or reject specific tolling regulations enacted by the order in council, so essentially enacted by cabinet? Would they specifically have…? Would the Legislative Assembly have any mechanism to actually review, amend or reject specific tolling regulations or not?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s a regulatory power. Like many regulatory powers, it’s a decision by cabinet.

Steve Kooner: All right, and one further.

My colleague here asked about interest earlier, and I guess I’ve got a further question in regards to interest. I believe the answer was supplied that there’s a certain statutory mechanism of how you kind of calculate the interest, and the interest is fairly low. I get that point — that it’s fairly low.

Then the next question that pops in is…. It’s fairly low. But can it be brought up? Can there be a maximum rate, or is it unlimited? I know it’s currently low, in where the reference points are. But can it be brought up in this mechanism? Is there any mechanism that allows it to be brought up to unlimited? If there’s no opportunity to be bringing that interest rate to an unlimited amount, is there a maximum cap that you can go to? I guess that’s my next question.

The Chair: Member, can you help the Chair understand how the question relates to clause 18, please?

Steve Kooner: Okay. In 18(1)(d) — the rules respecting administration and system tolls, fees and charges.

The Chair: Thank you, Member.

Steve Kooner: Did you want a clarification on my question again?

The Chair: I got the clarification — thank you — for the clause.

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: Okay. Just to start, the time that the interest rates would apply is…. Essentially, you’re already targeting certain vehicles that are in response to a tariff, so they’re probably American vehicles or something associated with that. The interest rates would apply if somebody hasn’t paid. So you’re in that category or situation, and the government has a lot of policy related to what it sets for interest rates.

I’ll refer the member again to the interest rates under various statutes regulation. That helps to understand how we coordinate interest rates along with a core policy, on interest rate for monies owed, that government has. Then, of course, there’s the Criminal Code, which sets an upward — that everybody has to apply to — of interest rates.

Steve Kooner: I know about the criminal rate. I believe it’s like 60 percent. What’s the exact rate under the provincial statute for interest?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Referring the member to that regulation, I’d just given a range because it depends on what regulation or framework it is. The range is around 1 to 3 percent above prime.

Steve Kooner: Does that statute also say it…? Sometimes when you’ve got 1 to 3 percent, it gets compounded, and then there’s compounding off of compounding. How does that particular statute work?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Again, there’s a prescribing interest rate power under here that cabinet would be able to use. I was giving guidance on how interest rates are set. The interest rate under various statutes regulation is the way…. That generally is an example of how that happens. If you look at that, it’s not a compounded…. It’s in the range of what I was talking about, 1 to 3 percent above prime.

[4:15 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Just in regard to interest, interest is different from the actual, say, toll, the fine that someone has to pay. Is there any sort of grace or if somebody says: “Look. I have these concerns. I can’t really afford it. Can I get some leniency?” Because it is an extra penalty, is there any sort of grace in terms of that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Asked and answered yesterday.

Steve Kooner: Going specifically to clause 18, I know that yesterday we were in clause 17, so just on 18 now, we just want to see if the dynamics are any different on 18.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Not different than my answer yesterday.

Steve Kooner: All right.

In terms of my next question here, we’ve spoken a little bit about tolls and amounts of tolls. We’ve spoken a little bit about interest, and we’ve spoken…. The Attorney General said she had already provided a response on whether this is revenue neutral or whether there’ll be excess funds that will be there to kind of pay for other stuff.

But has there been any sort of internal projections in regard to what clause 18 can generate in terms of potential revenue from clause 18? Throughout these different classifications, I know there’s a little bit of a dynamic that you can set it to dates, days, times. Is there a certain analysis that has been done to kind of see what could be the difference in terms of internal projections of revenue as a result of this provision?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Asked and answered, Chair.

Steve Kooner: All right. I can go on to the next question. I don’t remember hearing the response to that, but I will move on to the next question.

Okay, so we’ve talked a little bit about review mechanisms in terms of human rights codes, the charter and all that, but in the legal framework, there are different areas of law. In addition to the constitution stuff, in addition to the human rights stuff, we have the administrative law stuff.

Under the administrative law stuff, we see principles of natural justice, procedural fairness. In regard to that particular area, my next question comes about. How does this deal with that particular area of law? Are there mechanisms to have judicial review inside the federal court or to take it up to the Supreme Court? How does that apply?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It would be in the Supreme Court of B.C.

Steve Kooner: Well, thanks for the answer. That answer is a very important one, because often in the public, we do have confused lay litigants that are often trying to determine where do they go for recourse. Sometimes people don’t know what the proper jurisdiction, which proper court they’re in.

We’ve had some discussion in earlier questions about different areas or different types of courts and tribunals that are applicable in terms of this legislation, and we’ve discussed that Supreme Court now. We discussed the Provincial Court, as well as the Civil Resolution Tribunal. This would probably be helpful for the people that are watching and wondering how administrative law principles apply to clause 18.

Now, just going further to a different line of questioning here. We do have some flexibility here in terms of in this particular provision that we haven’t seen in previous clauses. The other previous clauses were pretty direct on, but as the Attorney General was mentioning, there’s a certain degree of flexibility, especially when you get down to 18(2)(c).

[4:20 p.m.]

It talks about “without limiting subsection (3), in making a regulation establishing a system of tolls, fees or charges, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may do one or more of the following.” It goes down to (c), “establish different amounts for tolls, fees or charges based upon one or more of the following,” and then subsection (i), which was referenced earlier: “dates, days or times of use of the provincial undertaking or portion of a provincial undertaking.”

I get it, that when it’s, say, rush hour, there might be different fees than when there’s less rush hour. I understand why there’s a requirement for a certain degree of flexibility. I get that portion. But hand in hand, what flows with that is the administration of it. How labour-intensive would it be to operate those mechanisms?

What can the Attorney General’s department tell us on this side of the House about how labour-intensive those administrative mechanisms will be because there is a certain latitude of flexibility?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It really does depend. We mentioned about the fact that there’s nothing in here that prescribes how cabinet decision-making would be on the operational side, of how it would do. It doesn’t prescribe a certain…. It’s technology-neutral in how it could do so.

When you’re making a decision for regulation is when you would consider all those questions that the member asked, about how to effectively do it in a way that minimizes the labour intensity of it.

Steve Kooner: Just a follow-up question to that: is it fair for me to understand that the mechanism that will be used for the administration of these tolls, fees and charges will be specific to technological means and will be less focused on human resources but more focused on technology resources? Am I correct in my understanding?

Hon. Niki Sharma: No. Just to be clear in my response, what I’m saying is the bill right now doesn’t set out any things that need or don’t need to be used in terms of technology. We leave it to the cabinet decision with the regulation to understand what the best use of technology or not use of technology would be for that particular regime.

Steve Kooner: I thank the Attorney General for that response. I understand that this is enabling legislation, and it will be up to the relevant ministries to determine which technology that they go with.

Is there any sort of indication…? There have probably been some discussions around the cabinet. There’s been some cross-ministerial collaboration. Have there been any sort of discussions of what a human-based administration versus a technological operation would cost, or whether there are fluctuations within even the technological administration as well as the human resources?

Could I get some sort of in-depth understanding of how this would work in terms of the different resources?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I have nothing to offer for the member’s question at this time.

Steve Kooner: Would it be possible for the Attorney General’s department to provide some information in writing to our side of the House at a later date if this information is available?

Hon. Niki Sharma: My role here as Attorney General is to put in place enabling statutes and legislation, and the ministers responsible will take over if they ever need to do that. I would defer any decision to answer the member’s questions at that time to the minister responsible.

Steve Kooner: Just to comment on that, it is very important. That question is very important, because that’s going to show British Columbians what the cost is. British Columbians are always worried about cost, taxpayer dollars, what they’re putting into our system. That would be highly relevant information when we’re talking about this section.

[4:25 p.m.]

It would be nice if we could actually get more information on that when the applicable time period arrives.

In regards to my next question, I’m just going to change up the line of questioning here a little bit.

We’ve heard a little bit, from previous sections, that this part…. We got an elaboration at the beginning of this part when it was introduced by the Attorney General to us. She said: “Let me give you a little bit of understanding before we get into these provisions.” The understanding that was bestowed upon us was essentially: “Look, this is kind of a last resort measure — these tolls, fees and charges. The government doesn’t want to do them, but it’s an extra tool in the toolbox to deal with the people south of the border in terms of what actions are taken upon British Columbians.”

I get that. I understand that according to the government’s intent, there may be a situation where some of these tools don’t get used or some of these regulations don’t get used. The government has indicated it’s their intent to try to refrain from using these tools if they don’t have to.

Now, this particular question goes to this particular clause 18. This is important, to understand this particular section. Can the Attorney General identify historical examples where powers similar to clause 18 were placed into legislation but were not exercised? Have we had a situation like that in the past?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I do have an example of when this has happened. In 2003, at the time, Premier Campbell introduced an act called the Significant Projects Streamlining Act. It was an act that was meant to be put in place to streamline major projects, and it was never used.

The Chair: We’re going to take a five-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 4:29 p.m. to 4:38 p.m.

[Jennifer Blatherwick in the chair.]

The Chair: Good afternoon, Members. I call the Committee of the Whole on Bill 7 to order. We are on clause 18.

Steve Kooner: We were on a certain line of questioning before. I’d like to switch that line of questioning to a different topic.

Something that comes to mind…. I’ve had people kind of address this to me. When there are traffic lights, say, when you…. Some people don’t like to live close to traffic lights, and you wonder why. I’ve asked some people, and they think, “Well, when you stop your car, there’s extra exhaust, or there’s braking that happens as a result of that,” right?

That leads me to this question. Because when you’re thinking about tolls…. Say there are some pieces where you’ve got to stop and go. I know that the Attorney General did mention that, in a previous clause, there might be a mechanism where you obtain different drivers’ information by hand. If you’re going to obtain that information by hand, somebody is going to have to stop their vehicle.

[4:40 p.m.]

It’s going to be stop and go, and with that, you’ll probably see excess exhaust. You’ll probably see an excess in braking. Those issues might come up.

Then that brings me to kind of see: well, how does that correlate if we have…? I don’t know how much the tolling might happen. It might be a lot. How would this clause 18 relate to…? How does clause 18 align with British Columbia’s CleanBC climate plan or any strategic transportation policies that promote model shifts away from, say, tolling personal vehicles?

Basically, I think the logic behind that question is that we have to kind of go away from this tolling. They don’t go hand in hand. These measures don’t go hand in hand.

I would just like to put that question over to the Attorney General maybe. Maybe the Attorney General can let us know how bringing forward these tolling mechanisms will work hand in hand with any sort of provisions that deal with exhaust and braking — that kind of stuff.

Hon. Niki Sharma: That’s a design consideration that would likely be put into the analysis to put it there. I’ll just point the member to clause 18(d), which says you can establish rules respecting the administration of the tolls.

Steve Kooner: So 18(d)?

Interjection.

Steve Kooner: Okay. Other than 18(2)(d)…. The 18(2)(d) just says: “establish rules respecting the administration of the system of tolls, fees or charges.”

It doesn’t specifically go to address these types of measures where there might be exhaust emissions or…. I don’t know what happens as a result of brakes stopping. I think it’s dust from the brakes. That’s what the hazard is there.

So how would these rules…? How would the minister have that framework? Okay, they see this type of issue. How do you fit it in with establishing rules respecting…? What would limit their discretion?

If they have this “establish rules respecting the administration of the system of tolls, fees and charges,” what will make them say: “Look, I have to do this. I have to use this tool in (2)(d) to establish rules respecting the administration of the system of tolls and fees and charges, and I have to apply them in a way that kind of respects this”?

How would that happen?

Hon. Niki Sharma: That’s something, again, that would be considered at the time of the design of the tolling. I know that the Ministry of Transport has many versions of…. We’ve only had tolling a few times in this province, that were removed. But just around the world, there are many examples of how you can prevent stopping and how you can….

You could also design it in a way where it’s not even close to high-traffic residential areas, where you collect the toll. Or you could do it based on an app. There are so many ways to do it that if we ever, ever have to get there, that would be part of the design. The enabling bill gives the regulatory power to be able to do that.

Steve Kooner: Okay, next question. The intent of this legislation as per the Attorney General is to target individuals from the south. And that’s the intent. In regards to this…. Then the Attorney General said that there might be uses of technological measures or tools to kind of enforce the collecting of tolls and information.

So in regards to this clause in particular…. We may have canvassed this in clause, maybe, 17 or 14. But in clause 18, in particular, when you have U.S. drivers with U.S. driver licences and plates, how do we enforce this?

[4:45 p.m.]

I know that lawyers sometimes have a problem. They are able to sue somebody because they know the plate. They’re able to get an address. But sometimes service becomes a problem, to serve those people in the United States. Or service isn’t a problem. You’re able to sue them successfully and get that remedy of judgment from British Columbia against them, but then it becomes an enforcement issue.

I know a lot of lawyers, when they’re taking a case and they see that issue and they’re like: “Hey, client. We may not want to take your case because it’s very difficult.” Although there are the mechanisms, it’s difficult to get the final result in this case because it’s a multi-jurisdictional issue in terms of enforcement.

This is an important issue because we’re doing tolls, but we’re doing tolls as a deterrent mechanism to make sure we stop, we put pressure — I guess, the government can put pressure — on the United States to say: “Hey, don’t tariff us here in British Columbia.” And in order to kind of get the attention of that particular government, if their citizens are being affected, they will take it up with their government.

But say if we have these tolls, and we can find these people, but then there’s that extra layer in the United States trying to get them to actually pay these, we may have interest, but how do we get them to actually pay when they may stop coming here?

That is a common example that lawyers see in terms of litigation cases, especially here in British Columbia because we are dealing with Washington state people all the time, dealing with maybe some people coming up from Oregon and California as well. But mostly people coming from Washington state. That is a common issue.

In regards to this particular clause 18…. Because this clause 18 actually involves a lot of diversity in terms of dynamic mechanisms, in terms of how you can toll people by date, time and different intervals of actually tolling people. How would that all work when you’re doing all these different intervals? You’re having a foreign jurisdiction, and then on top of it, you’re trying to get the funds. And then on top of that, you’re trying to get the interest from them.

You’ve got the legal mechanisms. You can register the judgment here in British Columbia. How are you going to go even further? Are you going to take that judgment and go and register it in Washington state? And then you’ve got to look at the conflict of laws and mechanisms, whether you can go and register that judgment in Washington state. Will that judgment be treated as a British Columbian judgment or as a Washington state judgment? How does all that work?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I have answered this question under the enforcement provisions which we went over in clause 15. The Court Order Enforcement Act would be the one that would apply in the case of collecting.

Steve Kooner: I get it that we have a statute here. It’s a court-enforcement mechanism, and you can use that to kind of get recourse.

But if one studies the conflict of laws, a common theme that goes in conflict of laws is that you can get enforcement mechanisms — you can have those; they’ll be fully applicable here in British Columbia — but how do you enforce them?

Because you’re dealing with a British Columbian order from a court jurisdiction here, how do you enforce that in a different jurisdiction? Will they recognize the British Columbia court decision there, in that jurisdiction, as well?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes, they do recognize it.

Chair, if I can get your guidance. We talked about the enforcement already in clause 15. Clause 18 is to do with regulatory power, so I don’t believe that the question has relevance to this clause.

[4:50 p.m.]

The Chair: In order to ensure that the debate does not become repetitious, we’re going to encourage the member to move on to another line of questioning.

Steve Kooner: Okay. That’s fair.

Going to clause 18, it states, as written here in 18(1): “The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations as follows.” Then subsection (b) states: “Respecting payment, collection and enforcement of tolls and fees and charges.”

My question had to deal with how that payment’s going to be collected. Am I wrong in thinking that’s relevant? It has to go to…. This regulation talks about payment, collection and enforcement, and I’m talking about how payment will be collected.

The Chair: I think the member…. I was not debating the substance of the question, just the repetition.

Steve Kooner: Okay. All right.

Basically, I was supplied an answer, and the answer was that there’s a certain provision in British Columbia that deals with civil enforcement, I believe, and that would be relied upon. I understand there may be a court judgment here in British Columbia, and then the next step is to give it to them for civil enforcement. The challenge with the civil enforcement is: how does it become applicable to another state, in the United States? We’re trying to collect from another state, in the United States.

Is there some sort of law that allows you to circumvent, say, having to go through the process of filing a legal proceeding in the United States to get your Supreme Court of B.C. order registered in Washington state? Or, under that civil enforcement mechanism, is there something in there that says that you can circumvent those rules of reciprocal registration of court orders? Is there something along those lines?

Am I missing something? Maybe the Attorney General has some information there. Maybe there’s agreement under the civil enforcement provision. Maybe I’m missing something here. Maybe the Attorney General can clarify.

Hon. Niki Sharma: The Court Order Enforcement Act that I reference below sets out all the procedures related to that, and we also have reciprocal agreements with states like Washington in order to respect our judgments.

Steve Kooner: That’s actually a really helpful answer because that’s what I was after. How do you deal with conflict of laws? It was a bit unclear to me.

[4:55 p.m.]

Now that I’m aware that there’s a civil enforcement procedure, and under that, there is a way to apply our court orders in different states as well, there isn’t something left unturned here in terms of trying to have the regulation in here be enforceable. That’s all I was looking for on that line of questioning, so I can ask another question.

Actually, my colleague here does have a question as well, so I’ll turn it to him for a second.

Gavin Dew: I’m not sure I really got an answer to my question earlier, so I did just want to circle back and seek clarification one more time on what, if anything, under this section or the bill as a whole would preclude the government from using the powers enumerated as a basis to implement road pricing on British Columbians.

The Chair: I’m sorry. The member wasn’t here earlier for this conversation, but I will remind that this line of questioning was canvassed earlier, and the Chair determined that the debate had been repetitious. I strongly encourage all members to find a new line of questioning.

Gavin Dew: While the line of questioning may have been repetitious, the answers have not been forthcoming. I do think that it’s very important that we provide British Columbians with absolute confidence and clarity. Given the volume of public discourse and debate over whether or not road pricing will be enabled by Bill 7, I thought it would be an easy answer to be provided, and I’m disappointed that it hasn’t been.

In order to seek clarity and to provide the public with absolute clarity as to whether or not the powers enumerated under Bill 7 will be used to impose road pricing, I will be bringing an amendment, which I will pass forward:

[SECTION 18, by adding the underlined text as show:

(4) In making a regulation under this part, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may not impose a toll, fee or charge on British Columbians.]

The Chair: We will take a brief recess and come back in ten minutes.

The committee recessed at 4:58 p.m.

The committee recessed from 4:58 p.m. to 5:05 p.m.

[Jennifer Blatherwick in the chair.]

The Chair: Members, we have an amendment on clause 18.

On the amendment.

The Chair: Section 18, by adding the underlined text as shown: in making a regulation under this part, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may not impose a toll, fee or charge on British Columbians.

[5:10 p.m.]

Given that everyone appears to be here, is there agreement to waive the time?

Leave granted.

The Chair: A division has been called. Before putting the question, I remind all members that only members of Section C, or their duly appointed substitutes, are authorized to vote. The question is the amendment to clause 18.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 5
L. Neufeld	Bird	Maahs
Wilson		McCall
NAYS — 7
Wickens	Sandhu	Routledge
Sharma	Bailey	Malcolmson
	Botterell

[5:15 p.m.]

The Chair: We will resume discussion on clause 18.

Steve Kooner: All right. In terms of a different line of questioning…. In this province, we have different types of highways. I believe there are provincial highways and federal highways. And in terms of water, there are federal waters, and there’s provincial jurisdiction as well.

So then looking at the tolling mechanisms, as stated in clause 18, with that background in place, has the federal government been consulted to determine whether provincial tolling authority, under clause 18, may infringe or duplicate federal powers over interprovincial transportation corridors?

Hon. Niki Sharma: This was covered in the definition of “provincial undertaking” in 13, where we had questions related to this.

Steve Kooner: All right. Then I’ve got another question in terms of these. We’ve spoken about this already in terms of the topic. It has to do with how these tolling mechanisms are going to work. The Attorney General has actually spoken about technology, and I brought up human resources and technological resources as well. Also, in part 2, we talked about procurement directives in terms of services and stuff like that. There’s buying and selling of services.

Now, going to this part, in part 3, if we’re having technology that might be possibly involved, how does clause 18…? There’s all this flexible language in clause 18. How does it play out in terms of getting this technological infrastructure in place for setting the tolls, fees and charges? How does that work?

Would that work in correlation with part 2, which speaks about procurement procedures? Then for this technological framework for the tolls, fees and charges, would we just be going after Canadian vendors? How would that all work out?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I think there are a few ways that this could happen. It depends, but really what would happen is you could actually not have to contract anything out.

[5:20 p.m.]

You could just do it internally, so there wouldn’t be a need for using any third parties. You could use the provisions that we talked about before to come up with agreements for how you would implement that.

I can’t imagine a scenario where you’re procuring to the levels that would require the procurement policies to kick in for a project like this, but if you were, then of course like any procurement directive or…. There would be the government’s own procurement policies that would apply to that. But it just would really depend.

Steve Kooner: Now I’d like to switch my questioning to questioning along the lines of interpretation. We’ve had some of it but not in the depth that this section is involved.

Okay, starting from the top, section 18(1): “The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations as follows respecting the system of tolls.” The first word that comes, “respecting”: is that ordinary meaning, is that legal interpretive, or is that pursuant to a section?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Ordinary meaning.

Rob Botterell: Is it the case that in drafting clause 18 of the act — in fact, all clauses of this legislation — experienced legislative counsel were involved in drafting these sections in accordance with established legislative drafting protocols in British Columbia, taking into account the fact that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of acts that the legislative counsel, through their extensive experience, draw on to make the choices in terms of legislative terms?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes, it is true.

Steve Kooner: That was a good point brought up by the House Leader of the Third Party.

My questioning has to do with interpretation, not the actual effect of the drafting, so I will continue. There are probably people listening, and what we’ve found out by asking these questions…. I was really surprised in some of the answers too. I thought sometimes there was ordinary meaning that would be applicable, but there was actually a legal meaning to it. So I think this is a helpful exercise in terms of how to interpret this particular section.

Thank you for that response to my question earlier in regards to “respecting.” I will go further: “respecting the system of tolls, fees or charges referred to in section 14.” Then we move on to subsection (b), and then again we see “respecting.” We have now, on the courtesy of the response from the Attorney General in terms of the previous subsection…. We can continue: “respecting the payment.” The Attorney General did supply a definition for “payment” earlier.

I don’t believe we addressed “collection.” In regards to “collection,” is that the ordinary meaning? I believe that “collection” may be used in other statutes. So just some clarification here. Is that the legal meaning, or is that just taken from another statute?

[5:25 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s just as an ordinary meaning, collecting of the debt.

Steve Kooner: Thank you for that explanation.

Respecting the payment, collection and enforcement of tolls, fees and charges…. Now, “enforcement” seems to be a pretty straightforward explanation, and that goes to…. My understanding is that just goes to another word for the collecting of tolls, fees and charges. Is there a reason why we have both “collection” and “enforcement” in this phrase?

Hon. Niki Sharma: The language is consistent with clause 15, and it ties in the regulatory-making power with the powers in clause 15.

Steve Kooner: Going further with the collection and enforcement of tolls fees and charges…. Then we’re in the next subparagraph: “respecting exemptions from the payment of tolls, fees and charges.” The only word in that particular line that I would just like a clarification on is “exemptions.”

Hon. Niki Sharma: Ordinary meaning.

Steve Kooner: Going further, in subsection (d), “prescribing interest rates and the manner of calculating interest payable for the purpose of this part,” we’ve already covered calculating. We’ve covered interest. We’ve covered payments. The only thing that we have not covered…. We’ve covered interest. The only thing we have not covered is “rates” and the word “prescribing” — maybe just an explanation on those two.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Prescribed means, in the Interpretation Act, section 29, prescribed by regulation — interesting definitions — and rates is ordinary meaning.

Steve Kooner: Okay. In terms of this particular phrase, I think we are good with the definitions here. Actually there is one more. It’s (d), prescribing interest rates and the manner of calculating. So the word “manner” — can there be an explanation of that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s ordinary meaning, so it’s the way that you would calculate that.

Steve Kooner: All right. Now we can move on to subsection 18(2): “Without limiting subsection (3), in making a regulation establishing a system” — I believe we’ve had an extensive discussion on the previous sections about establishing a system as well — “of tolls, fees or charges, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may do one or more of the following: (a) designate provincial undertakings….” So to designate — can there be an elaboration on that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s the ordinary meaning. It’s just applying that to something.

Steve Kooner: All right. Subsection (b) is pretty straightforward. We’ve covered most…. Actually, I think we covered “terms and conditions,” but there was something extra supplied in the previous section. So I’d like a clarification on “terms and conditions” for this clause 18, as well, because this is a pretty lengthy section here.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Ordinary meaning.

[5:30 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Just a follow-up to that. It was my understanding that there was a further elaboration that was provided — terms and conditions — and this is how, in legal drafting, these specific words are actually used. It wasn’t exactly ordinary meaning in a previous reference. Has that changed in this situation?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It hasn’t changed. It’s ordinary meaning.

Steve Kooner: Onto the next clause, subsection (c). “Establish.” I remember when we were discussing “to differentiate.” This is what was interesting in something previous. If you want to have some different standards, I believe the Attorney General was saying that you’ve got to differentiate.

For this word “different” here, I will ask for the meaning on this one. Is that ordinary meaning, or is this one that has the legal connotation, has actual legal significance, and you have to put it in here in order to charge different levels of amounts for different items?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s the same answer as last time I was asked about this. It gives you the power to discriminate between things.

Steve Kooner: Thank you for that. That’s why I ask these questions about interpretation, because I’ve actually never heard of that answer before, and I’ve been a lawyer for approximately 18½ years. That was the first time I got that explanation. It was really helpful for me to understand that you need to have that clarification in order to actually have different classes. If you don’t differentiate, you can’t do that, according to legal drafting. Thank you for that interpretation.

“Establish different amounts for tolls, fees or charges based upon one or more of the following.” Now, we know in statutory provisions, when you’re talking about dates, days, times and use…. When you’re talking about even different court statutes and when you’re trying to calculate different periods of time, there are two clear days or they have all-inclusive days, so this could be subject to interpretation.

In terms of dates, days, times: are these words just taken directly out of the Interpretation Act, or is there any other significance in term?

Hon. Niki Sharma: As they sit here, it’s the ordinary meaning of all those words, and then the Interpretation Act offers guidance as to what a day means, like business day or not. There’s a way that the Interpretation Act sets it out. If there was a regulation under that and you needed that guidance to interpret what five days means, you could refer to the Interpretation Act.

Steve Kooner: Pursuant to the Interpretation Act, is it fair to say that when we’re talking about days in this context, it would have to be business days not calendar days?

Hon. Niki Sharma: No, it wouldn’t have to be.

Steve Kooner: “Dates, days, or times of use.” I know “use” shows up a few more times. If explanation can be provided on this particular clause for “use.” Is that the ordinary meaning?

Hon. Niki Sharma: That terminology is linked back to clause 14 and the setting out of the powers. It’s a regulatory-making power that’s linked to that.

[5:35 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: I thank the Attorney General for the explanation. There’s another reason why we canvass these questions. There are sometimes references to other pieces of legislation.

Going further. “Use of a provincial undertaking or portion of that provincial undertaking.” In terms of portion, would there be a degree of portion that they have to be, or it could be just any type of portion? It could be 1/10 of the size or half of the size? What constitutes a portion?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It leaves it open to the decision of the regulation. It doesn’t determine what…. It just means a portion, which is less than a whole.

Steve Kooner: In law we have this de minimis terminology that we use. There has to be a certain level or degree in order to qualify. There is no qualification on this? It could just be just a little bit, and it’s in there? Correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma: No, as enabling, it doesn’t set any bounds on that. But of course, in the regulation, you would have to define it so there was a geographical region that that thing applied to.

Steve Kooner: Okay, just going forward. “Portion of a provincial undertaking.” Then the next clause, subsection (ii): “extent of use of that provincial undertaking.”

“Use,” we got, but “extent”? That’s kind of similar to “portion.” Maybe an elaboration can be provided. I know there were certain guidelines for “portion,” but what about for “extent”?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Just the ordinary meaning of the word “extent.”

Steve Kooner: Going further. “Extent of use of the provincial undertaking or portion of a provincial undertaking.” Then we get into: “class of a user of provincial undertaking, portion of provincial undertaking.”

This “class from a previous….” I don’t see it in any previous classification in a definition. But this is really important because we talked about classes and distinguishing between classes. There could be different tolls or different amounts for different classes of groups.

In terms of class, can the Attorney General elaborate on that particular item?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s elaborated quite extensively under 3(a), where it talks about how you can define a class of users, operators, vehicles in a provincial undertaking.

Steve Kooner: Thank you for that.

“Class of user of a provincial undertaking or portion of a provincial undertaking.” Okay, now this is important. “Ownership or registration of a vehicle.” Ownership, as we have discussed in previous areas…. We talked about corporations, and ownership could be so many different things. I think the previous explanation I had in something else I asked in the previous section was that that the provincial government would try to find out whatever levels to latch on. I don’t remember the exact provision that we were looking at that time.

Ownership is actually a very important term in legal language, and ownership could be a lot different. There could be different classes of interpretation and different legal entities and all that.

When we’re looking at ownership in this context, can the Attorney General please provide me that. And then, to just speed up the process here, maybe just provide me the explanation for registration and vehicle as well.

Hon. Niki Sharma: It’s to differentiate the fact that you could own something but not be registered for that vehicle. You could own the vehicle but not be the one that’s registered to ICBC or whatever to drive that vehicle. It’s to make sure that that’s clear.

Steve Kooner: In vehicle ownership, we sometimes have…. Well, I guess you can’t call it ownership. But there’s lien interest, and that could be a proprietary interest as well in a vehicle. Would that apply to a lien interest as well in this situation?

[5:40 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: We need a little bit more clarity to understand how that’s relevant to this.

Steve Kooner: Well, in regards to this particular clause, it talks about “without limiting subsection (3), in making a regulation establishing a system of tolls, fees or charges, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may do one or more of the following.” And then we have “establish a different amount for tolls, fees and charges based upon one or more of the following, based upon ownership.”

For example, certainly, my interpretation of that is different owners can have different tolls, fees and charges. So if that is the case, then ownership is relevant, because if there’s a whole bunch of people with lien interest and that’s considered a ownership class, they could actually have a different fee or charge under this legislation. That’s how it would be relevant.

Hon. Niki Sharma: We’re, unfortunately, still having trouble on this side understanding how ownership of liens or liens would be relevant to this.

What would be set up is a regime that would design something to determine who’s responsible for that toll, charge or fee. And that would be either like an owner of a vehicle, for example, or the person registered, the owner of that vehicle. That would be the more relevant way that you would design it, so that’s where we’re at on this side.

Steve Kooner: So I guess I can shed more light on the question.

In ownership of a vehicle, there could be somebody on paper who owns that vehicle, and you’ll see that on the registration. But there could be somebody like a bank that essentially owns that vehicle. They will get that vehicle back if some people fail to make the payments. That would kind of be like a lien interest.

What do they call that interest? There’s a word for it, for property, I think, rather than lien. There are other examples, such as some person has an in-trust interest in that property. There are some similar provisions. Although you’ve passed on the title for the vehicle, the vehicle could actually go back to, like, whoever sold it, to the dealership or whatever. They could have a remaining interest in that vehicle. That could be in the form of a lien or something like that.

I’ve seen similar stuff like that. Yeah, and that’s called like a proprietary interest in the actual property. So that’s a form of ownership, but it’s not ownership by just having a name on the record. So would they avoid…?

Point of Order

Rob Botterell: Point of order. I fail to see how this line of questioning is relevant to the discussion of subclause 18(2)(c)(iv). The plain meaning of ownership is the plain meaning of ownership, and as cabinet puts together regulations, cabinet will, with the support of legal counsel and with the support of senior public servants, establish for the purposes of the regulation what ownership entails.

I don’t see “lien” listed in here. I don’t see how that line of questioning is relevant. The meaning of ownership is its ordinary meaning, and senior public servants and legal advisers to the minister will define it for the purposes of a particular regulation, and the regulations may differ. So I fail to see the relevance of this line of questioning.

[5:45 p.m.]

The Chair: Thank you, Member. Please give us a moment.

The member’s point of order is well taken. The Chair was not convinced of relevancy as well. I encourage the member to move on with his line of questioning.

Debate Continued

Steve Kooner: Basically, I’m getting at the meanings of the actual term “ownership” here, and the question was for the government. I wasn’t asking the Third Party House Leader for the answer. So I’m left in…. I know there are different proprietary interests with ownership. I’ll leave it for the record: I asked a question, and it wasn’t answered. I will go forward.

Moving forward, we’ve heard the government’s perspective so far on ownership and registration of a vehicle, and we’re going further into subclause (v), which deals with the characteristic of a class of vehicle. Now, in terms of “characteristic,” is there any further elaboration on that?

Point of Order

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I would like to raise a point of order please. The member has stated that he asked a question that wasn’t answered. In fact, what I witnessed was the Chair directing the member that that was not an in-order question. In fact, it wasn’t answered…. There was no opportunity to answer it. The Chair had made a ruling, and I think having that down on the record does not correctly capture what just occurred.

The Chair: Thank you for stating that on the record.

And so just confirming that the member is going to explore a new line of questioning.

Debate Continued

Steve Kooner: We’re on the next clause, clause (v), and this deals with “characteristic.” Or yeah, clause (v), sorry. And so the question is for clarification of that meaning.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Ordinary meaning.

Steve Kooner: Okay. So clause (v), “characteristic or class of vehicle,” moving on to (d), “establish rules respecting the administration of system, tolls, fees and/or charges,” and then going further to subsection (3), “in making a regulation under this part, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may do one or more of the following.”

Now, “in making a regulation” — that prompts my attention. Can I please get clarification on that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: It means as it says: in the making of the regulation of this part, so when you’re making the regulation.

[5:50 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Okay. If the Attorney General can look at the whole of subsection (3) and just have a quick glance at it, is there anything in this whole paragraph that doesn’t deal with ordinary meaning? There is actual legal meaning to it or it’s taken from a different section or a different statute?

Hon. Niki Sharma: The definition of all of those is defined as “provincial undertaking,” which is what we talked about in a previous clause.

Steve Kooner: Okay. That concludes my line of questioning in terms of interpretation.

Now on this particular clause, there were some questions answered that I need further clarifications on. I asked a question earlier on in terms of human rights and the constitution — well, part of the constitution, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in terms of the different classifications and all that.

There are certain classes of people that it’s not by their trait that they’re classified, but they may be classified by their financial, socioeconomic place in society. That goes to the affordability question.

We are talking about tolls, and we have been told that there’s some degree of flexibility in how the relevant minister will implement those tolls, fees and charges. But whenever the issue comes up, some people may have different financial means of either paying for tolls, different financial means in terms of paying for some of this.

What is some extra safeguard that can help us in understanding this provision in regards to affordability and in regards to these particular tolls, fees and charges?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Asked and answered, Chair.

Clause 18 approved on division.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Just to note that I think by agreement, and I would ask my critic to stand up if they have a question of this, we were going to pair 19 to 26 collectively, and as the tabled amendment was that these would be removed from the bill, that we would just hold a vote right now to vote them down. I think that’s…. Just wanted to let you know for the next clauses from 19 to 26. That’s the agreement.

Clauses 19 to 26 inclusive negatived.

On clause 27.

Steve Kooner: We’re on clause 27 now, which deals with part 5, general provisions. I know when we started part 3, we asked the general question whether the Attorney General wanted to kind of just give us an overview of part 3.

[5:55 p.m.]

Would the Attorney General want to give her overview on part 5, as well, or should we just go to the clauses?

Okay. In terms of clause 27, it speaks of application of the Offence Act: section 5, general offence, of the Offence Act, does not apply to this act, the regulations or directives.

I guess the first question I have is: why does the Offence Act not apply to this piece of legislation?

Hon. Niki Sharma: We just wanted to make it clear that nothing creates an offence under the Offence Act. In a lot of the provisions…. There’s one good example that we were talking about just now, which is the procurement — that a government procurement entity under 7(4) must comply with their directive. We wanted to make it clear through this clause 27 that nothing creates an offence if they don’t comply. That’s to add that clarity.

Steve Kooner: Okay. If nothing creates an offence, what enforcement mechanisms, if any, are available if a government procurement entity or a service provider or individual fails to comply with Bill 7, its regulations or directives issued, and we don’t have access to the Offence Act here?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I’ll just walk through the member’s question, how it applies to each part.

With part 1, there are no “must” provisions in there, so there would be nothing to attach any enforcement or make sure to clarify there was no offence under the Offence Act. In part 2 — I spoke about that — the government procurement entities must comply. It makes it clear that that’s not an offence under the Offence Act if they fail to comply. We already talked about the consequences of enforcement on that, and we talked about the indemnity provisions and the ways that we would have compliance or enforcement under that.

Then for part 3, what clearly would be established is — through clause 15; we talked about that — a separate enforcement regime that’s related to the tolls and charges and fees if they were to come by. This also brings clarity to those provisions. There is a “must” in clause 14, too, under part 3. We wanted to make it clear it couldn’t be an offence under the Offence Act if somebody didn’t comply with it.

Steve Kooner: I get the part that the Offence Act does not apply. The question that comes to mind that…. These procurement entities are going to be handling millions of dollars. I keep mentioning an example in earlier parts of this debate, and the amount that the Attorney General highlighted was, I believe, $600 million. That amount can go even higher, although that amount was provided — $600 million. In terms of accountability measures, people handling British Columbia taxpayer funds….

[6:00 p.m.]

To get more certainty in regards to the Offence Act not applying but where these entities are still using taxpayer money, and some of the money is in the millions…. We’re looking at accountability here.

The follow-up question is: does the government believe that the civil remedies alone, that whatever’s in here alone, are sufficient to ensure compliance with important directives and regulations under this act, particularly when public funds and infrastructure are at stake?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes. I think we had an opportunity to talk at length during the individual parts about all the laws and enforcement that would apply to each one of these parts.

Steve Kooner: Thank you for that answer.

Okay. All right. I understand that we may have spoken at length of it, and there’s a certain degree that there are audit mechanisms, I believe. Back in that discussion, we were talking about certain things they have to do, and then there are protections for these procurement entities in terms of indemnification — in addition to indemnification, certain actions against them being statute-barred. So I get that. There are protections for them, and then there are some accountability mechanisms.

But what happens if British Columbia money is lost? Other than, you know…. What exactly would happen to them under…? If you want to do something punitive to the entities that have cost millions of dollars, how do you deal with that?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Asked and answered. I’d refer the member to the very extensive conversation we had during part 1 about the consequences and the ways that there’s protection against corruption or actions that the member’s bringing up again in this section.

Steve Kooner: Would that go to the bad faith qualification?

Interjection.

The Chair: The Chair recognizes the House Leader for the Third Party.

Point of Order

Rob Botterell: We’ve canvassed this, all of this, very extensively under previous sections. The member is really reopening discussions that we’ve had, and we’ve covered all these points in some detail — in fact, in extensive detail — over numerous days and numerous hours. And, to maybe make the point, we probably wouldn’t be having to deal with time allocation and closure if we weren’t spending so much time redoing questions that have already been addressed.

The Chair: I would remind the member to avoid repetition and remain relevant to the clause.

Debate Continued

Steve Kooner: Just to address that point, we also wouldn’t have a closure and time allocation if we didn’t have Bill 7. Just for the record.

Moving to my last question on this particular section. Are there any precedents for where offence acts have been omitted in relevant legislation such as this?

Hon. Niki Sharma: There are, I’m told, hundreds of examples of this, and the reason for it is that the section 5 of the Offence Act says if a legislation says you must do something and you don’t do it, then it’s an offence automatically. Many legislative regimes that are out there are designed to have their own mechanisms, but the Offence Act provides a really good legislative, I guess you would say, background for that. If you want to make a breach of a provision an offence, then you can just rely on section 5.

Clause 27 approved.

On clause 28.

[6:05 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Okay. So we’re on to clause 28.

In regard to clause 28, my first question here, as written: can the Attorney General explain why such broad and open-ended regulatory powers are necessary under clause 28, rather than relying on more specific authority targeted to known issues?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Section 41 of the Interpretation Act — it’s very common to have this included as a general power to reference that section, because it makes it clear. Then anything ancillary to the regulatory-making power that’s in other sections is also included in that power.

I’d just refer the member…. We can pull the statute book up to section 41(1) of the Interpretation Act, because it really makes it clear what that is.

Gavin Dew: Casting our minds back to clause 10, there was an amendment brought forth by the Attorney General which added greater definition to the matter of delegating a matter to a person, as well as conferring a discretion on a person. That was done in clause 10, and it added greater specificity to limit the scope of individuals to whom a delegation or the conferring of discretion could be undertaken.

Could the Attorney General explain why the same specificity is not being added to this clause?

Hon. Niki Sharma: This is a statutory interpretation principle at play here. Generally, the specific overrides the general. So when we talk about the amendment that was in section 10…. And that’s being specific to that part. That would be the one that was read as being, clearly, the specific one for the regulatory power in that part.

[6:10 p.m.]

In this one, this is a general power-respecting regulation. So this is a standard clause that’s added, related to regulatory-making power, as it’s very common when any ministry does regulation that there are delegation authorities and that power to do that.

Gavin Dew: I appreciate the explanation, and while that makes logical sense, I am still just a little bit concerned here in that, under this clause, we are giving the LGIC the ability to delegate a matter or confer discretion to a person, any person. That doesn’t really strike me as being sound. That still does strike me as being a little bit concerning.

I do think that the amendment to clause 10 was brought forward in a way that did create greater specificity. I don’t think that there would be objection on this side of the House if the AG wanted to bring forward a similar amendment to this section that would create greater specificity around who could be delegated or have a discretion conferred to them. It does strike me as being something where there should be symmetry between the parts.

I’m not a lawyer, to be sufficiently informed as to the difference exactly, but it does strike me as something where an amendment has been made to a prior clause that by all appearances made sense, and it could well be made to this same clause for clarity.

Hon. Niki Sharma: This is a standard, general clause when there’s regulatory-making powers.

I’ll just give the member an example to help understand why it’s needed. So cabinet is not going to be the one that collects a toll, right? If it was ever put in place, it’ll be another person, so you need the ability to delegate any regulatory-making power to individuals or persons in the province. So that’s the reason for this.

Again, the amendment to section 10 is very key and is direct to that part, so then that protection of who you’re going to delegate that procurement-making decision to is very clear and confined.

Gavin Dew: Thank you. I appreciate the explanation. So just to dumb it down for me, what you’re referring to, effectively, would be delegating the front-line collection of a toll and those kinds of areas?

Thank you. I appreciate the explanation.

Steve Kooner: In this particular section, in 28(1), it states: “The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations referred to in section 41 of the Interpretation Act.” It goes on further: “The authority to make regulations under another provision of this act does not limit subsection (1).” So it talks about giving clarification that certain provisions are not limited.

I have a question in regard to this. Why was it necessary to state that the general powers in this clause, 28(1), are not limited by any other specific regulation?

[6:15 p.m.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: This subsection (2) is there as a safety net type of provision. Section 41 of the Interpretation Act — and the member could look at it — gives this kind of residual ancillary power like procedural matters that you might need to have to have procedural fairness, setting a fee through an enactment, these types of general ancillary powers for making of regulations.

I mentioned before that, generally speaking, what you say is that the specific will override the general, but in this situation you’re flipping that, and you’re making it clear that, actually, these kind of ancillary-making powers…. It doesn’t matter what any other section says, you still have them — the regulatory-making powers in the Interpretation Act. It acts as that safety net for the types of things you need to do. I was mentioning procedural fairness or procedural mechanisms or fee setting that you might need to do through the ancillary regulatory-making power to make that clear that it still exists.

Clause 28 approved.

Rob Botterell: I rise to move the amendment standing in my name on the order paper to add a new clause 28.1 to the bill. This clause requires all regulations that are made, amended or repealed under this act to be, as soon as practicable, published on a publicly-accessible website. It must include a summary of the regulation made or amendment, a rationale for the enactment, amendment or repeal the regulation and any other prescribed information.

The clause ensures transparency and accountability of government decision-making as the government navigates these changes, and I encourage all members to support this amendment.

The Chair: The debate is now on the new clause 28.1 moved by the Third Party House Leader.

On the amendment.

[6:20 p.m.]

Gavin Dew: I appreciate the amendment brought forward by the member. Certainly I see a lot in here to like. We on this side of the House are certainly favourable to this kind of transparency, this kind of disclosure, and I certainly intend to support the amendment.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I’ll be supporting this amendment. I just want to thank the member for bringing it forward, and I really appreciated the discussions we’ve had to work together, along with many members of the public, to make sure that this bill is a strong one and that it helps us in the face of the threats that we’re having. I appreciate the work.

Kiel Giddens: I will also be supporting this amendment. This is a topic that we have discussed multiple times in previous parts of the bill, if members here may recall.

This is something that should be looked at because that transparency for the public…. In the last part, we talked about some of the need of public reporting and making sure that that’s possible. But there was also that reporting to make sure that the public has knowledge of what’s actually happening, that the business community can see what’s happening. I think that’s a reason I’m supporting this amendment.

I’ll thank the House Leader for the Third Party for bringing this forward. I’m pleased to support it today.

Steve Kooner: I want to thank the Third Party House Leader for bringing this proposed clause amendment, as 28.1. Throughout this debate, we have been talking about accountability. We have been talking about transparency. We have been talking about getting information out to the public about this bill. The publishing requirements under this proposed amendment actually address some concerns that we have been highlighting.

I echo the remarks of my colleagues, the members for Prince George–Mackenzie as well as Kelowna-Mission. I will also be supporting this proposed amendment.

The Chair: Shall the amendment to add a new clause, 28.1, pass?

Amendment approved.

Rob Botterell: I rise to move the amendment standing in my name on the order paper to add a new clause, 28.2, to the bill.

[CLAUSE 28.2, by adding the underlined text as shown:

Review of the Act

28.2 (1) In this section, “select standing committee” means the select standing committee of the Legislative Assembly that is designated for the purposes of this section.

(2)A regulation made under section 3 (4), 5, 7, 14, 18, or 28 stands referred to the select standing committee.

(3)If a regulation is made under section 3 (4), 5, 7, 14, 18, or 28, a copy of the regulation must be filed as soon as practicable with the select standing committee by the minister charged with the administration of the section under which the regulation is made.

(4)Within 30 days after the date a regulation is filed under subsection (3), the select standing committee must begin a review of the regulation.

(5)On or before September 1, 2027, the select standing committee must present a final report to the Legislative Assembly.

(6)The select standing committee may file any interim reports and the final report with the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly if the Legislative Assembly is not sitting.]

This amendment, should it pass, will task a select standing committee of the Legislative Assembly to be referred all regulations made under this act. The committee will have 30 days after the date a regulation is filed to begin a review of the regulation. The select standing committee will be enabled to file interim reports on the reviews of regulations and present a final report on or before September 1, 2027.

This amendment allows the committee to have the ability to receive and review regulations as soon as practicable and is a practical way to ensure legislative oversight.

I hope all members will support this amendment.

On the amendment.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I just wanted to also show my support for this amendment. Again, I appreciate the work of the member and all of our work to get this bill across the line.

Kiel Giddens: This is an interesting amendment that’s been brought forward by the House Leader from the Third Party. I actually was considering an amendment to this myself. We as the opposition have been tabling amendments all throughout this process so far, and I had been considering an amendment that would direct this to the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services.

[6:25 p.m.]

In considering this, I actually prefer the amendment as proposed that we’re discussing right now because I think this requires a special select standing committee. I think that would be very useful to private members, especially those private members who have taken part in this debate thus far.

I think it is important that…. I myself am not on the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, but I think some of those…. I’d be happy to sit next to the member for Saanich North and the Islands as part of that committee, if appointed to do so.

I think it goes to part of why this is needed. We’ve talked a lot about the need for legislative oversight, and that’s something that throughout the course of this entire bill, as we’re now on the last part, finally, of this Bill 7…. I certainly am very glad that we were able to vote down part 4, which the public had an outcry for. I was pleased to be in the room to witness that.

We still do need oversight and transparency. We’re not going to get that, as we’ve canvassed it in this room already. We as MLAs are not going to be, on the opposition side, able to scrutinize some of these regulations as they’re brought forward. They are going to be ordered by cabinet.

In the last part that we were talking about, it was, of course, on the ability for the government to have pretty wide-ranging power in establishing, varying or revoking of toll systems. That’s something that the opposition and we as private member MLAs won’t have an opportunity to take part in, some of those discussions, even though that can actually be considered a taxation-like authority to the executive, when section 53 of the Constitution Act of 1867 reserves all money bills to the Legislature. That could be something that can be considered a money bill, so we are concerned about that.

We’re concerned about the fact that the opposition…. Whether it’s in internal, interprovincial trade, whether it’s in procurement directives or whether it’s in the tolls, fees and charges, the opposition still will not be able to take part in some of the discussions on how those are going to be implemented.

There still are broad, sweeping powers from this bill. MLAs need to be able to review those after the fact, and that’s why I think this amendment will actually give MLAs the opportunity, in a select standing committee, to make sure that we have knowledge of what’s happening. We can review it, and the public…. We can bring transparency to it, moving forward. In that case, I will be supporting this amendment.

Thank you for the time, Madam Chair.

Gavin Dew: To echo what’s been said by my colleagues, certainly we remain concerned about some of the aspects of the bill. We remain concerned about the lack of oversight, and that is precisely why we’re pleased to see this amendment brought forward and the Attorney General signalling that the government will be supporting it.

I think it’s certainly fair to say that we appreciate not only the intent of the amendment but also the structure and thought that has gone into it by the member. Certainly, I will also be supporting the amendment.

Rob Botterell: I just want to clarify one point so there’s no confusion on this. This clause establishes that it’ll be a select standing committee that does the work of reviewing regulations. This won’t be a special all-party committee.

I think whichever select standing committee is designated for the purposes of this clause, we will find a stampede of MLAs who are qualified to be on that committee, lobbying to be on that committee to be able to participate in this work.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I just wanted to maybe take a moment to say that there’s been a real level of solidarity in this room in the last two clauses that I haven’t seen in the debate yet.

[6:30 p.m.]

I think it’s, hopefully, a sign that we all understand the threat and what we’re facing and that we need to work together as British Columbians to face that and that it leads to support of the work through this bill.

Steve Kooner: I thank the Third Party House Leader for this proposed amendment.

I echo the remarks of my colleagues, the member for Prince George–Mackenzie, as well as my colleague, the member for Kelowna-Mission. We are still very concerned about this particular Bill 7 in terms of…. As you can see from the debate we have had, we are all for protecting British Columbians and making sure British Columbians are protected if there are threats of tariffs against British Columbians. But with the same token, we also want to see that there’s no executive overreach and British Columbians’ rights are protected in this province.

We have been asking throughout this debate for accountability, transparency. In line with that reasoning, this particular proposed amendment, brought forward by the Third Party House Leader, is an extra tool in the toolbox for accountability. So for that particular reason, I, like my colleagues for Prince George–Mackenzie and Kelowna-Mission, will be supporting this proposed amendment.

The Chair: Shall the amendment to add a new clause of 28.2 pass?

Amendment approved.

On clause 29.

Steve Kooner: All right. We’re on clause 29….

The Chair: Sorry, could the member just hold on for one second. My apologies.

Attorney General.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Thank you, Chair. I just wanted to note the amendment that’s on the order paper for clause 29, and I would like to move that amendment. This is an amendment that addresses the removal of part 4.

[CLAUSE 29, by deleting the text shown as struck out and adding the underlined text as shown:

Repeal

29 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the following are repealed on May 28, 20272026:

(a) Part 1;

(b) sections 6, 7, and 10 and 11;

(c) Part 3;.

(d) sections 19 to 24.

(2) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may, by regulation, repeal a provision of this Act referred to in subsection (1) (a) to (d)(c) on a date earlier than May 28, 20272026.

(3) Unless earlier repealed, a regulation made under this Act is repealed on May 28, 20272026.]

Amendment approved.

On clause 29 as amended.

Steve Kooner: All right. We’re now on amended clause 29?

The Chair: We are now on clause 29 as amended.

Steve Kooner: Okay.

The Chair: Member for Kelowna-Mission.

Gavin Dew: Sorry, just a little musical chairs there.

Certainly, there’s, I think, a healthy level of support and respect on all sides of the House for addressing matters around interprovincial trade barriers. I think it has been widely stated, publicly and in this House, that our side is, certainly, supportive of addressing interprovincial trade barriers.

We’ve also brought forward our own proposed legislation around interprovincial trade barriers. It has been a matter of extensive discussion in the business community, and I think it would be fair to say that it is the area of the bill that has the greatest approximation of consensus.

I would like to better understand why it is that the government intends to have part 1 sunset rather than having those changes around interprovincial trade barriers be ongoing?

[6:35 p.m.]

[George Anderson in the chair.]

Hon. Niki Sharma: I think there was a general acknowledgement throughout this discussion that we’re in unprecedented times, and that has led us to do things — and good things — because I think individual trade barriers are one of those things to move quickly on things.

In light of the powers that were in the bill in each section, including the powers in part 1 that relate to just dropping all regulations, and for goods and services, legislation regulations for goods and services that could impact interprovincial trade barriers, it is a very broad and kind of unprecedented way to do it, and we stand by that. We think that meets the moment. It is the right thing to do.

But the checks and balances of that…. This sunset clause, with the timing, provides an opportunity for there to be a check-in with the Legislature again within the next year. So we would be able to have the flexibility of the regulatory power in part 1 and have ministers make the decisions to make things permanent that they think should be permanent, with that check and balance of having the legislative check-in and oversight that would come as we come up close to that sunset clause.

It is a way of balancing the ability to move quickly and put the powers in there to move quickly while putting in that kind of oversight that we’ve been talking about a lot in this bill.

Gavin Dew: I appreciate the answer from the Attorney General.

We certainly have substantial concerns around this short-term approach. In particular, I would note that under this amendment brought forward by government, we’ve now actually reduced the duration of removing trade barriers down to only 13 months. I think it has been a consistent message from the business community that that would actually create quite a level of complexity and instability.

When it comes to the kinds of signals being sent to markets that will actually cause companies to make different decisions around their own commercial behaviours, what investment thrives on is stability, predictability and certainty, looking forward. What would be created, I would submit, by this 13-month removal of trade barriers is a situation where probably a significant number of decision-makers in markets would either be unable to make appropriate long-term capital planning and capital allocation decisions or would be left with uncertainty.

With the new exposure to the ability to trade between provinces, obviously people need to plan. People need to hire. People need to invest in plants, in people, in equipment, in order to be able to really actually take advantage of this. And 13 months is not a workable timeline for anything but the most incremental, relatively smaller decisions in terms of interprovincial trade barriers. If the intent truly is to break down these trade barrier walls that have constrained our country and our province for so long, it seems quite problematic to do it for only so short a period of time.

[6:40 p.m.]

With that in mind, could the Attorney General talk about any studies, analysis, white papers, quantitative economic work that might have been done by government in order to substantiate their belief that a two-year, or now a 13-month, period of removing trade barriers would actually be effective?

In particular, were there any specific unintended consequences identified from that short period?

Hon. Niki Sharma: The way this is designed, actually…. And I appreciate the member’s comments about certainty. We want to provide certainty. This is an economic stabilization bill, and certainly the meetings that I’ve been having with those impacted by these tariffs have been saying that we need to stabilize this way.

The balance that’s found in this bill does a few things that I think are very important to this discussion. One is that it adds to our ability to drop interprovincial barriers quicker than other pieces of legislation. We talked about this extensively in part 1. It allows us to do things through exceptions and regulations quicker than other jurisdictions, with the ability to have this broad power to drop them with one section and then make exceptions to regulation.

We’ve had discussions, quite a bit, in this debate about how you balance overriding authority or cabinet authority with the right guardrails. In that context, the sunset clause in the provision is one of those guardrails that makes it so there would be a legislative check. There would be a point where the ministers, while making these things permanent and assessing which ones are permanent over the year, would do the work of doing those legislative checks to make sure where we have debates about where the permanence will be.

It also will give us the ability to move faster in another way. The timeline that’s set out here, actually, I think does the opposite of what the member was talking about. It makes the ministers, any of the ministers responsible…. It makes it very clear to them that they have a time limit as to when all of these things can be put into place permanently.

So we’re dropping the trade barriers through regulation instantly, and all the permanent changes, there’s a timeline that they have to make them permanent. We, through that process and the minister’s communication with all stakeholders, can provide the certainty that I think the member is asking for and, actually, move quicker than other provinces are doing or potentially are doing, because the reciprocity and the requirement for reciprocity could mean that if you’re waiting for every province to give you reciprocity before you drop a trade barrier, that you’re actually stuck.

Gavin Dew: Could the Attorney General elaborate on what she referenced in terms of the timeline and help us to understand how that works? Is there a specified…? I’m not sure if the Attorney General is referring to the 13-month timeline.

A couple of things. Firstly, 13 months is a very long timeline to actually get things into place. If the intention here is to move quickly, I would think that there would be fast action. I would assume, in that instance, that if the belief was, “hey, we need to move quickly,” then one would think that the kind of timeline that would be being set would be a timeline to implementation rather than a timeline to repeal.

It’s brought to mind for me, again, that we still don’t have B.C.-based craft spirits on shelves some two months after that promise was made by government. I understand the logic that the Attorney General is coming from, but is there not a better way to create urgency in terms of the timeline to implementation? It strikes me that what this sunset clause is doing is creating a timeline from implementation, not a timeline to implementation.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Just to provide further clarity, it creates the timeline for permanency.

There is now if this is passed, the minute it’s passed, first of all, the immediate dropping of trade barriers through those exemptions. So that’s a quick process right there. That provides a signal and a certainty to everybody in this province that we intend to drop these.

Then there’s an absolute timeline on that, through the sunset clause, that puts that pressure on every minister that might have something in a category that is an internal trade barrier to drop that within this certain time.

[6:45 p.m.]

We’re expecting them to do the work instantly and make through those permanent changes.

I just want to talk a little bit about why it…. One of the reasons that it’s been so hard for interprovincial trade barriers — and I’m sure the member knows this — across the country is the complexity of all the regulatory and legislative regimes out there that show up as an interprovincial trade barrier. You may not intend it to, but it does.

The power that is in part 1 is quite exceptional because it drops it. It drops those things that are interprovincial trade barriers for goods and services. So the signal that we’re sending to businesses in B.C. and the country and our partners in other provinces is that we are going to do this quickly.

Then the checks and balances, the timeline that we’ve set out in the sunset clause and the fact that the ministers have to get to work right away to make that permanent…. I think that the net result of this will be B.C.’s ability to move way quicker — there are timelines built in, and the sunset clause is part of that — than any other jurisdiction in doing that. We’re also at other tables that are working through agreements. We’ve talked about that at length. This gives us the legislative framework to drop things quickly and also have the legislative check-in that I know we’ve had lots of discussion about.

Gavin Dew: Thank you very much to the Attorney General for the answer.

I do just want to go back to a prior question to pull on a thread that we didn’t quite get to. That is: what study has been undertaken to evaluate the responsiveness of the market and of investors and of decision-makers in a commercial context to the uncertainty of a 24- or, now, 13-month period?

What the Attorney General is describing is not necessarily how this is or will be perceived in markets. So creating a change that asks people, that asks markets, that asks commercial actors to be very responsive is very hard for people in the business of making business decisions to respond to if they don’t know what is forthcoming. The only certainty that is offered under this structure is that you better hire a good lobbyist, because you’re now going to have to lobby the minister to extend the temporary provision.

Again, it just goes back to the uncertainty created by that short window of time. Even if…. Again, on a number of occasions during the debate on this bill, I brought up the matter of intent versus effect. I think that while the Attorney General is probably accurately describing the intent, what I am concerned about is the effect of the signal that a 24- or 13-month sunset clause actually creates.

Again, was any study undertaken to understand, on the basis of just fundamental economics, what the effect of a 13- or 24-month sunset clause would be?

Hon. Niki Sharma: We mentioned earlier, when we were talking about part 1, about the study that JEDI is doing about the dropping of interprovincial trade barriers. I just would say to the member, in this discussion, ministers are communicating directly with all stakeholders about our desire to make any changes related to this permanent.

[6:50 p.m.]

But I think that what we also have to understand is that ministers will have to be responsible and charged with the fact that in their stakeholder group of who they’re working with, there may be different considerations at play, right.

For example, we were talking about this a lot in part 1. We want to open up liquor for everybody in the province. You may have to do different things through regulation to do that effectively, and we talked about the regulatory-making power of part 1.

The ministers responsible are going to be, really, charged with making sure their…. The power that is sweeping, of dropping them, is the immediate effect, and then the ministers responsible are going to have to work with their stakeholders to put that permanence in place.

It also gives the, I think, really excellent opportunity to make sure it is made in B.C. and maximizes B.C. businesses through that process. I know that Minister Gibson, the Minister for JEDI, is hard at work at those tables, figuring out what they are. This is moving quicker than this sunset clause, but it still gives that opportunity for us to have that permanent check-in with the Legislature to check that power.

Rob Botterell: In relation to this clause and the sunset nature of the clause, this change was really, certainly, identified from our perspective as being an important check on the cabinet-making power in relation to each of these provisions.

Also, just for the record, in my meetings with constituents in the business community in Saanich North and the Islands, they have not expressed a concern about this sunset clause. What they see is that it facilitates moving quickly. To the extent that it lands and everybody is comfortable with it, there is the ability to move more quickly to legislation, even before the sunset clause comes into effect.

They expressed a comfort with working closely with the JEDI Ministry and others to ensure that — they’re all in different sectors — for the particular sector, it makes sense and they can lead the discussions around tariff reduction in a very expeditious way.

I think the question to the Attorney General is: have there been real concerns raised about having this sunset clause, in relation to the trade barriers? Has the Attorney General heard extensive concerns about this in terms of this particular part of the act and the sunset?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Through the work that we’ve done, and I think that’s demonstrated in the process at the committee stage, we’ve attempted to be responsive to the various perspectives about how to land this bill correctly. Since the tabling of the bill, I’ve talked about the meetings that I’ve had. We’ve gone through that quite a bit. I know JEDI has met with many reps from different industries to talk about part 1.

I think there is a level of, I guess, excitement about the fact that we’re finally moving quickly on dropping interprovincial trade barriers, that this is a thing that is being realized not only across the country but in the province and that we have the tools to do so.

Through those meetings, there’s a lot of goodwill developing and the commitment to move quickly and to get there. I think this legislation gives the tools we need to get there and puts a timeline on the permanency of it.

Gavin Dew: I certainly appreciate the various commentary.

We have heard pretty extensively from institutional stakeholders in the business community that there is a robust desire to see the sunset clause on part 1 eliminated. There’s been public commentary to that effect from a number of different organizations, groups like the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.

[6:55 p.m.]

It seems as though, as we’ve walked through the course of this bill — and we are, thankfully, coming close to the end of it — what we’ve talked about over and over again is trying to make sure that the bill accomplishes what it set out to accomplish.

We obviously don’t share some aspects of the government views about certain powers that we believe constitute overreach, particularly in subsequent sections of the bill, including in sections of the bill that the government has now walked back. But we are very supportive of removing interprovincial trade barriers.

We have, again, heard loudly from stakeholders that there is a desire to see permanence, from the perspective of trying to ensure that the intent of the bill is brought to life. I would just go back to the point that I’ve made in previous questions — that a brief period of two years, or less than two years, in which changes will be in place is really not sufficient to actually drive the kinds of investments and the kinds of commercial decision-making that would be necessary in order to really maximize the short-term and then long-term effect of these removals of interprovincial trade barriers. We very much believe that part 1 should not have a sunset clause applied to it.

I wonder if the Attorney General can illuminate for us whether there were…. What we’ve heard from institutional business voices is a strong desire to not have a sunset clause on the removal of interprovincial trade barriers. Has the Attorney General heard something different in the consultation undertaken by government?

Hon. Niki Sharma: We’ve done a review of our correspondence that we’ve received related to the bill. I would say, from the analysis that we’ve taken, that there’s not a widespread discussion about the sunset clause or concerns about it. It was part 4 that was the one that we have the correspondence on, and we of course have responded with the amendments to the bill. So that’s been our experience in the general correspondence that we’ve received.

I think we’ve gotten a wide analysis of it from everybody here that’s read that and reviewed it — that there’s a support for the dropping of interprovincial trade barriers, but there was concern about the part 4 powers related to that.

Steve Kooner: I echo the remarks of my colleague here, the member for Kelowna-Mission. We have heard a lot of concerns from the business community in regards to this provision. There needs to be some sort of consistency and predictability that businesses rely on in order to make decisions. There are issues around this sunset clause, so we on our side of the House are proposing an amendment at this stage.

The amendment, essentially, in regards to clause 29, would strike out its applicability to clause (1)(a), part 1.

I will hand up the provision.

The Chair: The committee shall take a five-minute recess. We will return at 7:05 p.m.

The committee recessed from 7 p.m. to 7:12 p.m.

[George Anderson in the chair.]

The Chair: I call the committee back to order on Bill 7, Economic Stabilization (Tariff Response) Act. We’re on clause 29.

The member for Richmond-Queensborough brought forward an amendment which, I will state, is not in proper form and required significant amendment and changes by the Clerk’s office. We would ask that in the future, if there are proposed amendments, members utilize the Clerk’s office.

We now have a proposed amendment, and the member has confirmed the intent of the amendment.

[CLAUSE 29 (1), as amended, is further amended by striking paragraph (a).]

The Chair: Recognizing the member for Richmond-Queensborough, if you have any remarks.

On the amendment.

Steve Kooner: In regard to striking out clause (a), we canvassed that in a great deal of discussion. There are a lot of concerns from the business community; they would like certainty in terms of interprovincial trade barriers being removed not only temporarily but on a long-term basis.

Having interprovincial trade barriers removed on a long-term basis would essentially allow businesses to have predictability to do business in British Columbia, to change, essentially, whatever operations they have to get into place to actually start the interprovincial trade that would allow them to go forward with that.

When you have a time period of only 13 months to make a change to your operation and then have the uncertainty that the interprovincial trade barriers will again be reapplied, that really creates a lot of uncertainty for businesses operating across the country.

[7:15 p.m.]

For that reason and many others that we have already canvassed throughout debate, I urge this House, from all sides, to support this amendment. I will be supporting this amendment.

Hon. Niki Sharma: I can appreciate the perspective that the member is presenting with this amendment, and I have to say they can’t have it both ways.

We have had an extensive debate through this bill about the proper checks and balances that are necessary when you exercise cabinet power. They have also spoken, quite a bit, about their concerns, and we have debated about the role of the Legislature and how the Legislature’s role should be included in the discussion. When you have sweeping powers, there always have to be checks and balances related to those powers. That is the nature of the debate that we’ve been having in this House, so I am quite surprised that they’re moving this amendment, which I think goes…. It removes a role for the Legislature actually, in providing progress and update on the ministers and what they would present for their permanent work in dropping of the trade barriers.

To the concerns that were raised — that I’ve said before are unwarranted — about the progress that we are able to make in terms of trade barriers, I just want to reassure the members or anybody listening that might have those: we have been speaking with JEDI in the ministry and their outreach to businesses about the interprovincial trade barriers. That’s been happening constantly, full speed ahead, related to that, and they are not expressing concerns about the sunset clause in those discussions.

They are saying that we can move towards these all being permanent and that we’re excited about the work. If what can happen is that some of those exceptions that come through regulation, the minister says, “These are exactly what we need to do. We’ve consulted with everybody. This is a permanent thing,” it will come to the Legislature for that discussion. I think that’s exactly the discussion that we’ve been having in this House.

I won’t be supporting this amendment. We are providing, at every level, the level of certainty through our discussions that are needed and still having a piece of legislation that has the right accountability in it and the ability to move quickly.

Gavin Dew: Like my colleague for Richmond-Queensborough, I will be supporting this amendment.

As I’ve previously articulated, I do, fundamentally, believe that business and investment thrive on stability, predictability and certainty. I don’t believe that having a sunset clause after 13 months creates that certainty that would drive investment, would drive commercial decision-making.

I certainly do believe that we would be better served by having clarity not only at the technical level but at a visible, symbolic level that businesses and individuals and commercial actors making decisions could have certainty that this, in fact, is a long-term, predictable, stable decision-making basis for making decisions in markets.

We’ve tried, over the course of this bill, to make amendments that we believe are constructive. We’ve tried to make amendments that we believe give clarity to British Columbians and to businesses where clarity has been absent in the bill.

We tried, a few sections ago, to bring an amendment that provided government an opportunity to make it unequivocally clear that they won’t use the powers of Bill 7 to impose road pricing, and government voted against it.

We’re now trying to afford an opportunity to make it abundantly clear that the intention is to have these changes to interprovincial trade barriers be lasting and ongoing, and what I hear from government are statements to the effect that they will be long term but an unwillingness to provide that clarity through this amendment to the bill.

Again, we want to provide clarity, stability, forward-looking investment conditions for folks making decisions on the basis of the removal of interprovincial trade barriers and, accordingly, I will be supporting this amendment.

Rob Botterell: I will not be supporting this amendment. I don’t want to repeat points that have been made, but I do want to summarize two or three key points.

[7:20 p.m.]

The first one is that throughout these committee deliberations I have appreciated the amendments that have been brought forward and, in each case where I did not support the amendment, I laid out in some detail the reasons for not supporting the amendment and addressed the concerns, to the best of my ability, that were raised by the member proposing the amendment.

In this particular case, the use of regulation as a mechanism to move quickly is an extraordinary step to deal with an extraordinary situation, and we absolutely must have sunsets for that type of broad-ranging power.

There is nothing in my consultations and discussions with my business constituents in my riding where they have raised concerns that they can’t work with this approach. In fact, to echo the Attorney General, they’ve been quite excited that this is finally getting underway. There is nothing to stop the JEDI Minister or other ministers who may be involved from moving more quickly than the sunset clause.

If, in a particular sector or a particular business area, there is a willingness and a need to move more quickly in the form of legislation, say in the fall session, that’s certainly doable. But I think the discipline of having a sunset clause for this type of extraordinary regulation-making power is absolutely fundamental to maintaining the important role of the Legislature in legislating, through acts, major changes. I think it strikes the right balance, and for that reason, I will not be supporting this amendment.

[7:25 p.m.]

The Chair: Before putting the question, I remind all members that only the members of Section C or their duly appointed substitutes are authorized to vote.

The question is the amendment to clause 29, as amended.

[7:30 p.m.]

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS — 5
L. Neufeld	Paton	Maahs
Wilson		McCall
NAYS — 7
B. Anderson	Krieger	Routledge
Sharma	Arora	Phillip
	Botterell

The Chair: Shall clause 29 as amended pass?

Some Hon. Members: Aye.

The Chair: So ordered.

We’ll take a two-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 7:30 p.m. to 7:32 p.m.

[George Anderson in the chair.]

The Chair: Calling the committee back to order. Recognizing the member for Richmond-Queensborough.

Steve Kooner: Is that clause 30?

The Chair: Sorry. My apologies. Recognizing the member for Richmond-Queensborough on clause 29.

Steve Kooner: Just a couple of clarification questions here. What will be the legal status of the directives, toll systems, procurement decisions or other actions taken under these regulations once those regulations are repealed after May 28, 2026? Will there be a transitional provision to manage this?

The Chair: Just for confirmation, we are on clause 29, and the committee has consented to the reopening of clause 29.

Hon. Niki Sharma: The power that expires after the sunset clause is the power to make new procurement directives. The ones that have been issued under this would stay in place.

[7:35 p.m.]

Steve Kooner: Okay. Just a clarification. Obviously, there’ll be certain actors acting under various parts of this bill. There’ll be procurement entities. There’ll be people acting under the interprovincial trade provisions, and there might be certain systems put in place through the part 3 part of this bill.

Can the Attorney General confirm that once these parts of Bill 7 are repealed on May 28, 2026, the government will require new legislation, not just regulation, to reintroduce these powers? If the government wanted to reintroduce the powers after that, they would have to do it by new legislation, not regulation, correct?

Hon. Niki Sharma: I’m just going to clarify my answer previously, which was a little bit off. The procurements that were made under the procurement directives that were existing obviously wouldn’t be stopped. They would go in accordance with whatever procurement directive that they were under. But the procurement directives are regulations under this act, so they would be sunsetted once the timeline kicks in.

To the question that you had about what would happen, yeah, once the sunset clause is kicked in, the powers of the act are gone, so then you would have to come back to the Legislature with a piece of legislation to enact similar powers.

Gavin Dew: A very quick question on this, just to understand. Procurements made during the time of the act would not be interrupted. Just help me understand. If, for example, a procurement decision is made, and there is a long duration to the duration of the contract, how would that work in terms of long-duration contracts relative to the sunset clause?

Hon. Niki Sharma: Let’s say there’s a procurement directive that’s put in place through regulation, and that directs a Crown agency to do something, and then they’ve set out their procurement process, and they’ve made their bids or they’ve entered into a contract. The time that the sunset clause kicks in…. It may remove that regulation so that will remove that procurement directive. But that procurement process that was initiated, including any contracts created out there — that stands on its own.

Gavin Dew: Just for clarification, hypothetically, a procurement decision made during the duration of a directive could be a five- or ten-year procurement decision, and that procurement decision would remain in place despite the sunset provision.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Yes.

Clause 29 approved as amended.

On clause 30.

Steve Kooner: In regards to clause 30, it deals with commencement of the provisions in this bill. So: “The provisions of this act referred to in column 1 of the following table come into force as set out in column 2 of the table.” And then it has a couple of items. The first item in column 1, provisions of act: “Anything not elsewhere covered by this table.” And column 2, commencement: “Date of royal assent.”

So there are two commencement periods essentially. For item 1, it’s a date of royal assent, and that’s “Anything not elsewhere covered by this table.” And then the other different commencement is for sections 1 to 5. This is part 1. It refers to part 1, sections 1 to 5. It’s by regulation of Lieutenant Governor in Council.

[7:40 p.m.]

Just a question in regards to this. Why does the Attorney General not intend sections 1 through 5 to be enacted with royal assent?

Hon. Niki Sharma: That goes back to the construction of part 1, and the thinking was the dropping with exceptions. The exceptions are by regulation, so then the dropping comes into force once the exceptions are in place by regulation, and that’s how it was designed.

Clause 30 approved.

Title approved.

Hon. Niki Sharma: Chair, I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete with amendment.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 7:41 p.m.

[7:45 p.m. – 7:50 p.m.]

The House in Committee, Section C.

The committee met at 7:54 p.m.

[George Anderson in the chair.]

Committee of the Whole

Bill 5 — Budget Measures
Implementation Act, 2025

The Chair: Good evening, Members. I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 5, Budget Measures Implementation Act, 2025 to order.

On clause 1.

Peter Milobar: I just have a few overarching decision-making questions around the bill, and then I’ll get into the more direct clause by clause — just for the minister’s information.

Recognizing that there was the fall election, obviously, cabinet then gets sworn in and the minister assumes her new role. What types of modelling did the minister do or was provided when the decisions around the various either tax increases or tax breaks in Bill 5 were decided upon?

[7:55 p.m.]

Hon. Brenda Bailey: The process that goes on to create this document is really a cycle of briefings, due consideration and then decisions. That is quite similar to most years, and that’s what led to the bill before us.

Peter Milobar: Well, I guess what I’m trying to get at is that the minister in her mandate letter was directed very clearly by the Premier to take some actions and try to look for some overarching themes. We’ve heard that in various budget speeches and delivery. This bill enacts essentially the only tax changes we’ll see other than the carbon tax, which was a separate bill, in this budget.

[8:00 p.m.]

I’m just trying to get a better understanding based on the mandate letter. The minister was instructed when she became the minister, recognizing it’s a year-long process, essentially — budget creation.

Was the minister, then, based on those directions from the Premier’s office to her through the mandate letter, instructing the Finance staff to find a particular target in terms of either net increase or net decrease in revenues that would be coming to government? Was the decision point a return on: if a certain tax cut is made, it will generate this much in other industry revenues; if a tax is increased, it will do the opposite.

What type of modelling was the minister relying on to get to the landing point that we’re at with Bill 5, with the various tax measures that are laid out for this year’s budget?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: Yes, in fact, the mandate letter does inform our budgeting process. But I will remind the member opposite that a mandate letter is for a four-year period, generally. That instruction and that guidance is to be delivered in multiple budgets, not necessarily all in one budget.

The member asked if we modelled out the implications of tax measures that we’re considering and delivering. I will point the member to part 2 of our tax measures within the budget document, on page 59, “Budget and Fiscal Plan ’25-26,” if they’re interested in looking at the modelling out.

Included in the guidance provided by the Premier to me in this new role…. One of the measurements that we considered in doing this work, and will continue to consider going forward, is the instruction to ensure that we maintain one of the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios in the country when compared to our peers, which did guide us in that work. We have hit that mark and will continue to do that work.

[8:05 p.m.]

We’re beginning the work on getting on the path to balance. We’ve begun that work in Budget ’25-26. There’s certainly much more to go in that work, which we’re doing now.

Peter Milobar: The minister touched on an area that I was going to be mentioning: the path to balance. So that’s why I’m asking: was the instruction from the minister to the Finance staff that the tax measures in Bill 5 need to be a net revenue increase or a revenue decrease to government?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: Essentially, when we’re considering particular tax measures, we’re looking at the totality of the budget alongside our whole fiscal plan and decisions that we’re making.

The member has heard me speak already about our approach to ensure that we’re protecting core services while we do the work to reduce spending and to ensure that we’re stepping down towards a balanced budget.

But I do look forward to getting into a measure-by-measure look at the clauses in this bill in front of us.

Peter Milobar: The budget measures in Bill 5 and in totality: do they add to the deficit, or do they reduce the overall deficit of the budget?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I would point out to the member that there is benefit in the positive in terms of the fiscal plan in regards to the tax measures included. I’ll point to page 59, part 2 in our tax measures that the taxpayer impacts ’25-26 in total at $45 million, ’26-27 at $31 million — so beginning that movement towards balance.

But again, we’re talking about the budget on the whole, not the Budget Implementation Act, which is the statute that’s before us. I look forward to having fulsome discussion. We have many hours together during the estimates debate to get into that, and now it’s the opportunity for Bill 5.

Peter Milobar: Respectfully, the minister keeps going back to the whole budget. I’m asking about the budget measures in Bill 5, and the question is whether or not the budget measures in Bill 5 add a net benefit to the overall budget or if they’ve added to the deficit.

In other words, would the deficit be, instead of $10.9 billion, would it be $10.8 billion? Or would it be $11 billion or some other number on either side of that equation with the measures in Bill 5?

[8:10 p.m.]

Hon. Brenda Bailey: The tax measures are overall net positive.

Peter Milobar: The reason I was asking those questions is it actually does tie into clause 1. Clause 1 is about extending the year that the government no longer is required by law to have a balanced budget and is enabled to run deficits. This extends it out to the 2027-2028 fiscal year, which would be the end of this fiscal plan that was presented. Why, if we are on a path to balance, is 2027-2028 cited, yet in that same fiscal plan those same years are projecting a $9.9 billion deficit?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: We do expect that it will take multiple budgets for us to get back to balance.

Peter Milobar: This certain clause has been amended a few times. It went from ’21-22, then to ’25-26, as the current language says. Then it went to ’26-27, now substituting to ’27-28. Can the minister explain to the public why this needs to be extended, and what financial penalties would happen to cabinet if there was not an extension and a change to the act this way?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I’m happy to explain to the public why we are prioritizing core services and ensuring that we’re protecting what people in British Columbia need and expect from their government, while we do the work to ensure that we get back to a path for balance.

We’re going to do it through a number of different ways, including growing the economy. This work takes time. We’ve been through a global downturn economically. We’ve been through a pandemic. We’ve been able to protect services for British Columbians and stand up important services for them. We’re going to continue that work.

At the same time, and in parallel, we’re doing the work to make sure that our own house is in order, that every dollar is being spent well for British Columbians. We’ve put a freeze on public service hiring. We’ve initiated a very in-depth review of program spending. And at the same time, we’re working to grow the economy in a number of different ways, which include bringing down trade barriers across Canada, prioritizing major projects in British Columbia and ensuring that we have the workforce necessary to continue to build a robust British Columbia.

[8:15 p.m.]

I think the public will understand when I say that it’s very important to us that we get back to balance, but that we do it in a way that’s very rational and that protects services that we know they very deeply rely on.

Peter Milobar: To be clear, I’ll shorten the question. The question was: what is the financial implication to the cabinet if this particular section is not amended to extend out when the government is legally allowed to run a deficit or not?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I think that, in fact, there is no implication for cabinet. I think the member is referring to a collective holdback which was repealed in 2022.

Peter Milobar: Then why does section 2.2 of the balanced budget ministerial act need to be amended, let alone with years attached to it, if there’s no impetus?

[8:20 p.m.]

My understanding, and I remember the debates when this happened, is there used to be a 20 percent holdback for cabinet ministers — 10 percent on your ministerial balance and 10 percent for the overall global provincial budget balance.

That was changed the first year that the NDP realized they were going to go into a deficit. It was around the COVID years. That got changed, and a 10 percent holdback was still in place. That is when section 2.2 started getting amended moving forward, and it has been amended almost every year since — except for the years that the government has just jumped ahead a couple of years.

Is the minister now saying that there is absolutely no holdback for any ministers, for any type of balancing of any budget, in these budgets? If so, what is the purpose of still having section 2.2 in the Budget Transparency and Ministerial Accountability Act?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I heard the member ask about cabinet holdback. To me, the collective holdback is referring to cabinet. That’s why I answered it accurately, the way that I did, that there was a repeal of that legislation in 2022.

The member, I understand, is now asking about the minister holdback, which is in fact what we’re referring to in section 1. The further question of why we would continue to have this if it’s being adjusted is that it still has resonance.

There may be a time in the future where it’s appropriate to have it in place, but that has not been the case in the past number of years — with an economic slowdown during the pandemic and, I would argue, now in light of a very significant threat of tariffs from the south.

Peter Milobar: When I read the act, section 2, “The main estimates for the fiscal year must not contain a forecast of a deficit for that fiscal year;” section 2.1 was repealed; and section 2.2 was added in:

“The prohibition in section 2 [prohibition against deficit budgets] does not apply to the main estimates for the 2021-2022 to 2026-2027 fiscal years.”

Now that’s being amended further to ’27-28. The next clause within the Balanced Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act is on salary holdback:

“(1) The salary otherwise payable under section 4 of the Members' Remuneration and Pensions Act to each member of the Executive Council must be reduced by 10%.

“(2) A reduction in salary, under this section, of a member of the Executive Council is to be restored, in full or in part, to the member as provided in, and subject to, section 5.”

Then individual responsibilities are in section 5. Section 4 was the cumulative, which was repealed in 2022.

Just to be clear, the reason section 2.2 needs to be amended this year is that if it were not, ministers would be facing the potential of not having their 10 percent salary holdback released to them when the final accounting happens for the fiscal year ’25-26.

[8:25 p.m.]

Hon. Brenda Bailey: Section 2.2 is giving the ability for us to run a deficit. It is not related to ministerial holdbacks or to any specific amount related to that.

Peter Milobar: With this section, the provision is going to 2027-2028 in this change, and the current fiscal plan is forecasting a $9.9 billion deficit in that year.

Recognizing that the 2025-26 budget would have been very new into this minister’s mandate as the minister, I think the public could easily assume, taken from this, that this change is happening this year, despite the fact we could have still had a deficit this year without this change from ’25-26. In fact, we could have had one for ’26-27, based on the current wording.

By adding in the last year of this year’s fiscal plan, the minister is acknowledging that there is no intention of the government to get to a balanced budget through the life of this three-year financial plan. Is that correct?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: We have stated many times that we expect it will take multiple budgets for us to get back to balance. We’re beginning that work now. It’s work that we’re doing very carefully, very methodically and while protecting core services for British Columbians. It’s possible that it will take longer than three fiscal years to accomplish this important work.

[8:30 p.m.]

Peter Milobar: It would be understandable if section 2 of the act had said that the main estimates for the fiscal year must not contain a forecast of deficit for that fiscal plan, but it says “for the fiscal year.” So I can understand if this needed to be changed to meet the legislation around a fiscal plan, but right now this clause in the existing act has ‘26-27. It actually has next year, as well, already covered off as a fiscal year, not fiscal plan.

So again, I guess we can take from “many years,” by the minister, to mean “not in the life of this fiscal plan.” Given that this isn’t extended to ‘28-29, is the minister then saying that she’s confident that ‘28-29 will be the year that the government is back in a balanced budget?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: The legislative requirement is really for one year, but it has become legislative practice to include all three years of the fiscal plan, and you see that reflected here.

I will say to the member that I have never said that we expect to get back to balance within this mandate. I’ve always said that it’s going to be over multiple years. I think what’s really important is that we show progress, that we show that this is occurring and that our investors and the public can see that we are doing the work necessary to ensure that we’re on the pathway back to balance.

In fact, it is the work that we are engaged in now. We will have an update in September, in Q2, to reflect the beginning of this work.

I think it’s important to know that our intention is to show us stepping down towards balance over time. By doing it in that way, it provides us the ability to be very careful and strategic, to ensure that we’re protecting services for British Columbians and not doing it in a way that is rash and causes difficulties to those services that are so deeply important to us.

Clause 1 approved.

On clause 2.

Peter Milobar: I’m just wondering if we could get some insight as to why it essentially seems to be deemed by the government to be more efficient to transfer to Treasury Board the authority to approve B.C. Assessment bylaws that set taxes and rates for land improvements, instead of remaining as an order in council through the cabinet.

I ask that because Treasury Board typically has non-cabinet-related members — in this case, there are four — that would not necessarily have the same access to some information that that cabinet might otherwise have.

[8:35 p.m.]

What was the driving reason? Is it efficiency? Is it speed? Why is this change suddenly needed?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: It is about those two things. Essentially, the member is correct. It’s about both efficiency and speed.

The reason for the change is that this streamlines B.C. Assessment’s budget and levy approval process from a two-step process, Treasury Board and Lieutenant Governor in Council, to a one-step process, Treasury Board only. This addresses the challenges within the current process of meeting B.C. Assessment’s legislative timelines by providing tax information to the taxing authorities.

The levy bylaw sets the tax rate by property class for taxing authorities within the tax revenue funding B.C. Assessment’s operations. Treasury Board has authority over management and capital expenditures of government bodies, and this does not materially change the B.C. Assessment funding mechanism and will not have current or future impact on the government fiscal plan.

Peter Milobar: Will the Treasury Board chair or its designate have the authority to independently deal with these issues, as other provisions have now been created for Treasury Board?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: The process as such would not change, but in a circumstance like this, rather than going to the chair, it would go to the vice-chair.

Peter Milobar: I appreciate I was a little cryptic, maybe, with that first question.

The minister has said — and it makes sense if it’s having to go through both bodies — that only going through one body would be quicker. In any organization, that should be the case.

However, it’s Treasury Board, which this minister’s predecessors have characterized as slow and plodding and not being able to move quick enough and hard to get meetings and everyone in the same room, and that’s why the law was changed so that the chair and the vice-chair of Treasury Board could make unilateral decisions and proceed.

[8:40 p.m.]

Now, I’m paraphrasing slightly, but I know the staff know what I’m talking about, and that’s really what I’m getting to. It was never really clearly defined what level or order of magnitude those decisions were transferred to, in terms of what power that would involve, how much Treasury Board could be potentially cut out of decision-making or not and left in the hands of one person to override or just deal with it if they felt it was inconvenient trying to get a Treasury Board meeting together.

That’s what I’m checking to see — if these provisions under the Assessment Authority Act would qualify for that level of decision-making. Or does it have to be a regular Treasury Board meeting that these decisions are made at, involving all of Treasury Board or at least a quorum of Treasury Board as opposed to the provisions that were changed by the NDP that gave a whole lot of power to the heads of Treasury Board?

Hon. Brenda Bailey: I think the way that this plays out is that the vice-chair has the discretion to make a decision or to move it to Treasury Board. The considerations that a vice-chair would use in making that decision would be things like the complexity of it, perhaps the size, any particular significance related to the decision.

If it’s a relatively straightforward decision, they’re likely to make it, and if it’s a decision of significance where they would want the Treasury Board to weigh in, that’s where it would go.

With that, hon. Chair, I would like to move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The Chair: This committee stands adjourned.

The committee rose at 8:45 p.m.