Orders of the Day

Hon. M. Farnworth: I call second reading of Bill 35, Income Tax Amendment Act, 2022.

[2:50 p.m.]

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

Second Reading of Bills

BILL 35 — INCOME TAX
AMENDMENT ACT, 2022

Hon. S. Robinson: I move that Bill 35 be read a second time now.

These amendments to the Income Tax Act will pro­vide a temporary increase to the renamed B.C. family benefit. B.C. family benefit payments will be increased for the first three months of 2023 to help low- and moderate-income families make ends meet. Currently a family with one child would receive up to $1,600 throughout the year through the B.C. family benefit. A family with two children can receive up to $2,600 annually through this benefit. These benefits are paid automatically every month, and eligible families will receive the benefit without any need to apply.

With this enhanced benefit, the maximum amount of the benefit is increased by $58 per child, per month from January through March of 2023. Families with one child will be able to receive up to an additional $175. A family with two children can receive up to an extra $350, and 75 percent of B.C. families will receive full or partial benefits. For moderate-income families — those earning less than around $82,000 per year — the minimum annual benefit they can receive is increased by $50 per child, per month or an additional $150 per child over the three months.

The bill also renames the credit from the child opportunity benefit to the B.C. family benefit. This new name better reflects who benefits from the tax credit and will ensure people are able to recognize it when they receive it.

In our development of this legislation, we remain committed, under the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, to consult and cooperate with Indigenous peoples. Our assessment of this proposed legislation is that it does not uniquely affect the Indigenous rights described in the UN declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples.

We know global inflation is making life more expensive around the world. B.C. families have seen costs go up, from the grocery store to the gas pump. Household budgets are indeed being stretched. People in B.C. need a break, and we are focused on helping families make ends meet. This enhanced credit is one of a series of new supports to help people with the current cost-of-living challenges.

These cost-of-living measures that we’re taking — the ones to help B.C. families — also include funding to help parents and students make ends meet as they head back to school, capping the maximum allowable rent increase amount for 2023 at 2 percent, and a one-time enhancement to the climate action tax credit that low- and moderate-income people already received this month. Together, these measures are significant, and they’re targeted. It is through measures like this that we are able to provide immediate support to those who need it most.

N. Letnick: Thank you to the minister for introducing the legislation — Bill 35. The B.C. family benefit provides a tax-free monthly payment to families with children under the age of 18. Formerly known as the child opportunity benefit, the tax credit was launched in 2020, to the best of my records, to help combat child poverty and help low- and moderate-income parents provide opportunities for their children.

We believe that about 75 percent of the families will receive the B.C. family tax credit, will receive the enhanced payments, through to March of 2023 and also that a single parent, as the minister has said, with one child can receive up to an additional $58 per month from January to March, or a total of $175 — not $175 per month but a total of $175. Also, the increase will provide a family of four, as an example, up to an additional $116 a month from January until March or a total of $350 for a family of four. The estimated cost of delivering this temporary increase is $100 million.

[2:55 p.m.]

Now, as we’ve heard today in the news, the federal Finance Minister has reindicated that the inflation numbers for the country and, in particular, locally, here in B.C…. Our September inflation numbers have jumped to about 7.7 percent, which is higher than what the federal Finance Minister had indicated for the country.

While this is a start to address the challenges with inflation, it is our position, as the official opposition, that we could do more, that the government could temporarily suspend gas taxes, which was shown to reduce the price at the pump in Alberta. The government can do more to help families in need by lifting the PST on used cars under $20,000 instead of increasing used-car taxes like they did in the budget of 2022. They could also do more by stopping limiting and taxing the import of lower-cost gas from Alberta, amongst other initiatives.

In summary, the bill will support some people, and we will likely support the bill through second reading. Of course, we will have many questions for the minister during committee stage, and we will be looking for the practical aspects of this bill and how the government will ensure that this funding gets to the people who need it the most.

S. Furstenau: I rise to speak to the Income Tax Amendment Act today. I appreciate the comments from both the minister and the member for Kelowna–Lake Country.

This legislation provides a temporary increase to the renamed B.C. family benefit. The increase will be available from January to March 2023 and will provide enhanced payments to about 75 percent of families with children in B.C. We will be supporting this legislation.

British Columbians are facing desperate times, and the public is struggling. Housing is increasingly and consis­tently unattainable. Groceries are expen­sive. Gas is expensive. Child care is expensive. Everything is more and more expensive, and people are not making enough money to make ends meet. This is, of course, having disproportionate impacts for vulnerable and marginalized communities — those who are disabled, people of colour, single parents, poor people.

Last month this government announced an afford­ability package that includes this temporary increase to the B.C. family benefit. The problem is that it’s a band-aid on a bullet hole. It’s short term, half-measure. Studies, including the B.C. Basic Income Panel commissioned under the confidence and supply agreement, emphasized that consis­tent, ongoing, reliable social services and supports are more impactful than temporary measures. That’s because consistency allows households to plan. It’s a lot easier to make and maintain a household budget when you can rely on the money coming in.

I’m doubtful that affordability issues will magically disappear at the end of March 2023. With the windfall profits being reaped by oil and gas companies, the new billionaires minted through the pandemic, the profits of grocery store chains, the housing crisis, the system is not changing. If anything, it’s gotten worse.

I want this government to take a hard look and re-evaluate their decisions. I want them to look at the systemic changes that need to occur, not just a small, temporary handout that will leave British Columbians stranded come April.

B.C. has legislated targets to reduce poverty. By 2024, two short years away, this government, according to its own law, is supposed to have reduced the overall poverty rate by at least 25 percent and the child poverty rate by at least 50 percent. I’d really like to see us meet those targets, and I know the public would too. But I can’t say that I am confident, because when it comes to other accountability legislation, the climate accountability act, the government is actively breaking their own law and not on track to meet their targets.

If this government were serious about meeting its legislative poverty reduction targets, it would have brought in consistent, ongoing, permanent changes. It would have acted on the recommendations of the Basic Income Panel, invested in non-market housing options, increased the disability rates, removed clawbacks, raised shelter rates. There is no shortage of things that can be done, and I hope to see long-term, permanent options put in place for the people and families of British Columbia who are struggling enormously right now.

Hon. L. Beare: Seeing no other speakers, I move second reading.

Motion approved.

Hon. L. Beare: I move that the bill be referred to the Committee of the Whole House to be considered at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 35, Income Tax Amendment Act, 2022, read a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. L. Beare: I call Committee the Whole, Bill 33, Food Delivery Service Fee Act.

Deputy Speaker: We’ll just take a minute, a short recess, while we get the appropriate parties into the chamber.

The House recessed at 3 p.m.

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 33 — FOOD DELIVERY SERVICE FEE ACT

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 33; S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.

The committee met at 3:08 p.m.

Hon. R. Kahlon: I welcome the guests who are in the House watching this debate today. I want to recognize my deputy minister. Bobbi Plecas is here. The executive director of the small business division, Debbie Smollett, is with me as well.

Of course, I appreciated the debate that happened in the second reading of this and look forward to the questions the member may have on this bill.

On clause 1.

T. Stone: Thanks to the ministry staff, as well, who are here. I know they will do a great job in supporting the minister as we go through this. I don’t anticipate a tremendous amount of time, but there are some more technical questions that we just wanted to make sure were put forward to clarify a few things.

In this section 1, which, really, just establishes the def­initions for this Bill 33…. I’m just wondering if the minister can outline what efforts the government has taken to balance its approach to regulating business-to-business contracts, with a particular emphasis on ensuring that there isn’t government overreach. What consultation and efforts did government do to have that in mind as they pressed forward with the decision to make these caps a permanent fixture?

[3:10 p.m.]

Hon. R. Kahlon: We consulted with the big three — SkipTheDishes, Uber Eats, DoorDash — on the delivery side and some of the associations — the B.C. Restaurant Association, Restaurants Canada, ABLE-BC, the chamber network. We also consulted with a lot of individual restaurants, so it wasn’t just the associations.

We actually, as I travelled, visited restaurants, talked to individual restaurants about their concerns, what they were looking for, in communities throughout the prov­ince, actually. I didn’t get a chance to get up into Prince George and into Kamloops with my travels on this particular piece, but I did, obviously, in the last round, when we brought in the temporary measure.

T. Stone: Just following on my previous question, I’m just wondering if there were any formal submissions that were received or provided by the big three, as the minister refers to them, and the restaurant association and the like. And if there are written submissions, if he would be willing to provide that information to me, even if it’s after we complete the committee stage on this bill.

Hon. R. Kahlon: I can share with the member right now. I can pass it across to him. This is from the B.C. Restaurant and Foodservices Association, as well as ABLE-BC — a joint letter that they sent to us. I can share that with him.

As far as the delivery app companies, they did presentations for the team, but there was some commercially sensitive information in there, so they didn’t want that to be shared beyond the presentation they did to us. But I can share this letter with the member if he wants it now.

T. Stone: Sure. I appreciate that.

The one definition in this section that I really wanted to better understand is perhaps one of the most important ones, and that’s the definition of “restaurant.” As it stands, the definition says a restaurant means “an establishment in British Columbia, other than a grocery store or convenience store, where food is prepared and served to cus­tomers.”

I’ve got a few questions on this definition. One is: can the minister confirm that all restaurants in British Columbia, regardless of the size of the restaurant, will be subject to the fee caps as provided for in this legislation?

Hon. R. Kahlon: Yes, I can.

T. Stone: Can the minister indicate whether or not any consideration was given to excluding the large chain restaurants, like the McDonald’s of the world, from the fee caps that are provided in this legislation?

[3:15 p.m.]

Hon. R. Kahlon: As I highlighted to the member’s earlier question, this doesn’t discriminate if you’re a small restaurant or a big restaurant. They’re all covered under the bill.

T. Stone: The impetus for my question is just understanding if any consideration was put into — again, with the very first question I asked in mind — striking that balance in terms of the regulatory approach of government in a business-to-business relationship. I mean, we have the food delivery companies on the one side, and we have the restaurants on the other side.

Certainly, an argument that I heard from some in this discussion, the food delivery companies, was that there perhaps could have been, or should have been, some consideration given, to the fact that larger franchise restaurants, like the McDonald’s of the world, may have more financial capacity or fiscal capacity. They could potentially operate in an environment without fee caps on delivery companies more effectively than the typical mom-and-pop restaurants, which I think, was really — in the public’s mind, anyway — the genesis of such massive public support.

The government and the opposition — we all supported the fee caps that were put in place during the pandemic. As I said in second reading, we support this legislation to make it a permanent thing.

Really, the emphasis on doing this was to support those smaller restaurants, those truly local mom-and-pop restaurants. That’s not to suggest, for a second, that franchise restaurants like McDonald’s aren’t also owned by locals. They typically are. But when you’re part of a larger franchise network, you may have more capacity for these kinds of costs.

I’m not advocating one way or the other, to be clear. I really want to understand if any consideration was given to differentiating between a typical, traditional, single-location, family-type restaurant and…. Maybe we can refer to it as a chain or franchisee-type restaurant. Was there any consideration given to the caps applying on one side and not on the other?

Hon. R. Kahlon: I appreciate the member’s comments.

[3:20 p.m.]

Sometimes a franchise owner is a local person. So it’s really difficult to kind of break that apart. I did hear a similar piece to the member from one of the food delivery companies, making the argument that perhaps the larger chains get a greater benefit than the smaller restaurants.

I think it’s important to note that the biggest call for this that I heard was from the smaller restaurants that wanted that certainty. What I also heard was that the bigger chains actually get an opportunity, in some cases, to negotiate lower rates for themselves because of the scale that they do with certain delivery apps.

It’s not entirely clear if it is a fact that maybe some larger chains get a greater benefit than others. But I can tell the member that overwhelmingly, the response that we got from smaller restaurants was that there was a need for this, and they wanted this protection. Of course, we responded to that.

T. Stone: I do appreciate that.

This definition of restaurant specifically references, as I said, establishments in British Columbia other than grocery stores or convenience stores. That’s a clear definition, and all-encompassing from a restaurant perspective, but it excludes convenience stores and grocery stores.

I’m wondering, and the minister can refresh my mem­ory just to make sure I’m accurate in this. During COVID, when the caps were first brought in, I don’t believe they applied to convenience stores at that time.

In which case, my question then is: is what we’re seeing here in this definition a continuation, from an eligibility or a scope perspective, of where the fees are actually applicable — continues to be consistent under this legislation with where the fees were applicable previously — meaning there were no caps on fees relating to delivery of items from convenience stores and grocery stores?

Hon. R. Kahlon: I can confirm they weren’t included in the last round. They weren’t covered under the emergency order. I’ve just been informed that the team actually also reached out to the Convenience Industry Council of Canada just to get their take, and they didn’t feel, at that point, that there was a big issue for their members.

T. Stone: Okay. Good. That was going to be my next question, so I appreciate that the minister read my mind on that one. I wanted just to canvass that, so we have.

That’s good for section 1.

Clauses 1 and 2 approved.

On clause 3.

[3:25 p.m.]

T. Stone: This section 3 establishes definitions for base tier fees, base tier offers, enhanced tier offers and a threshold number regarding service contracts, all of which are specified in regulation. I’m going to try to understand what the minister might be contemplating in terms of what we may see subsequently in the regulations that pertain to these.

[J. Tegart in the chair.]

I understand what’s being proposed here in terms of this tiered approach to fees and offers. But my first question would be: can the minister explain how this ap­proach to these base tier fees and offers in any way may differ from the approach that’s currently in place with the current legislation? Are there any differences between the two, or is it, again, really just a carry-forward of what’s already there?

The Chair: Minister.

Hon. R. Kahlon: Nice to see you in the chair, hon. Speaker.

There are a couple of things. I know the member is aware — I’ll just mention it again — that under the OIC, there was just a blanket 20 percent, and they couldn’t go higher. Of course, now we’ve actually built in the ability for them to innovate and create new products and allow the restaurants, if they choose, to take the additional pieces on.

Now, I think the member’s question is what may be considered in the regulation space. I can share this with him, but it’s also under section 27. There’s one entire page dedicated to the things that we may consider. But if it makes it easier for the member to read, I can give this to him now.

For example, the threshold number. Right now 500 restaurants that are being served by the app is the threshold to be considered — what’s qualified or not. Who knows? That may change in the future, depending on what type of technology rolls out. And what is considered core services…. Who knows? That might change in the future. The space is changing so fast with different types of kitchens.

So that’s what could be considered in regulation. But we have laid out what the initial plan is, and I can pass this to the member just so he’s got it for his own record.

T. Stone: I appreciate the reference to section 27. I’m aware of what’s in there, and I appreciate that the minister is sharing some additional information with me at the front end of this discussion. That’s appreciated.

I was wondering if there’s been any contemplation of fee caps for the enhanced tier services.

Hon. R. Kahlon: No, not at this time.

T. Stone: I just wanted to make sure I heard the minister correctly earlier. In terms of thresholds, did the minister say 500?

[3:30 p.m.]

Hon. R. Kahlon: That is the intention; 500 is going to be the threshold, yes.

Clause 3 approved.

On clause 4.

T. Stone: I’m wondering. What will be the reference period for determining if an app meets the threshold level for this act?

Hon. R. Kahlon: I think it’s important to note that the threshold amount, which is currently at 500, is there, and the member’s question is around the reference period.

Right now we’re leaning towards six months. Essentially, in that six-month period, if an app gets beyond 500 at the end of that six-month period, they would be captured after the six months. So they wouldn’t be captured within that six-month period.

Clause 4 approved.

On clause 5.

T. Stone: Section 5 establishes prohibitions on exceeding the fee threshold and prohibits deducting enhanced tier costs from employee’s wages.

The first question would be this. What would the process look like for rejecting a base tier offer and accepting an enhanced tier?

Hon. R. Kahlon: So “core services” is obviously defined with this bill, but anything additional, any enhanced services, don’t need to go through any process. That’s something they can negotiate directly with whichever delivery company they choose to use those services from.

[3:35 p.m.]

T. Stone: To be clear, the act does not in any way require restaurateurs to actually opt into enhanced services.

Hon. R. Kahlon: No, it does not.

Clauses 5 to 7 inclusive approved.

On clause 8.

T. Stone: Clause 8 deals with some requirements around recordkeeping. I’m wondering. Could the requirements that are outlined in section 8 require an app to turn over a customer’s order history in any investigation that may take place?

Hon. R. Kahlon: Under section 8, it lays out the specific pieces that we’re considering in this bill. So no personal information about a particular client. We’re asking for just the business-to-business relationship piece only.

T. Stone: Okay. Well, that’s a very important clarification, because I do not want the world to know I order a lot of fried chicken. There you go. Now everyone knows.

One other question on section 8. What types of investigations could be potentially carried out under this, or pursuant to this, particular section?

Hon. R. Kahlon: This is obviously directed by the director. Either it’s a complaint that comes in to the director, or the director decides to take further action. In the case of restaurants being charged more, I will note that in the two years that we had the emergency order in place, we didn’t get a single complaint. The food delivery app companies I think followed the rules fairly well.

Clause 8 approved.

On clause 9.

T. Stone: The minister just referenced the director, which is contemplated or provided for in section 2 and defined in, obviously, the definitions section. I’m just wondering if the minister could provide some detail on what capacity the director will have to delegate the consideration of complaints.

[3:40 p.m.]

Hon. R. Kahlon: The director would get the delegation from me, and the director would lead the investigation.

T. Stone: Will additional FTEs be required as part of the provisions provided for in this section?

Hon. R. Kahlon: Certainly, if the director needed additional supports, we would reallocate to support. Again, I’ll go back to the earlier point, which is that in the last two years there hasn’t been a single complaint. If a case comes, we would, obviously, provide that support, but there are no additional FTEs, if that’s the question.

T. Stone: Following on that, how would complaints then be followed up on, let’s say for unlicensed apps or underground apps?

Hon. R. Kahlon: Again, the process would be that if a restaurant believes they have been charged for the core services beyond the threshold we’ve set, they would file a complaint with the director. Even if it’s, say, an underground app, the director would have the power, obviously, to investigate.

Clauses 9 to 12 inclusive approved.

On clause 13.

[3:45 p.m.]

T. Stone: This is the section that relates to compliance orders. I just have a couple of questions here. How does the minister expect to ensure that compliance orders are actually followed? What is that going to look like? I think the actual details that pertain to what the compliance order must look like are clearly detailed here. But how are the compliance orders actually going to be followed?

Hon. R. Kahlon: It’s going to be important for them to show that they’re not charging more than 20 percent. If a restaurant files a complaint, we would investigate. Obviously, the director has the power to do spot audits. Of course, fines are included in this. During the emergency order period, we had fines up to $2,300 for businesses that were not complying. Again, there was not a single complaint made during those two years. So no fines were issued during those two years, either.

Clauses 13 to 16 inclusive approved.

On clause 17.

T. Stone: This is the section that establishes penalty amounts. I just wanted to ask the minister what penalties he may be considering or the government may be considering. I appreciate that in his previous response, he mentioned $2,300 as a maximum fine level. If he could give us a sense of what is being contemplated as part of this legislation, that would be appreciated.

Hon. R. Kahlon: It’s likely to continue at the same rate that we had in the period during the emergency order.

Clauses 17 to 29 inclusive approved.

Title approved.

Hon. R. Kahlon: I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete without any amendments.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 3:49 p.m.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

Report and
Third Reading of Bills

BILL 33 — FOOD DELIVERY SERVICE FEE ACT

Bill 33, Food Delivery Service Fee Act, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

[3:50 p.m.]

Hon. L. Beare: I call Committee of the Whole on Bill 27, Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act.

Committee of the Whole House

BILL 27 — ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTES
AMENDMENT ACT (No. 2), 2022

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 27; J. Tegart in the chair.

The committee met at 3:51 p.m.

The Chair: We will have a short recess while we wait for the minister and staff.

The committee recessed from 3:51 p.m. to 4 p.m.

[J. Tegart in the chair.]

On clause 1.

The Chair: I’m going to ask the Attorney if he would like to introduce his staff who are with him today.

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you very much. I would be pleased to do so.

I have with me Anita Nadziejko. I also have Tarynn McKenzie, who is the senior policy analyst for the policy and legislation division, justice services branch. Also with me, to the right, is Candace Woywada, who’s a senior policy and legislation analyst with the policy and legislation division of the justice services branch.

Clause 1 approved.

On clause 2.

M. de Jong: Let me say, first of all, I appreciate the assistance I have had from the minister’s office and the staff within the ministry, which I think will help to expedite proceedings somewhat today.

With respect to clause 2, I received the memo that I think helps clarify the confusion that I had and was, undoubtedly, my own fault, not the fault of those who were trying to explain it to me. As I understand it, what took place in 2018 was the repeal of section 4(2) — actually, 4(2) through to 4(6), according to the revised statutes that I have in front of me.

So 4(2), as it existed prior to being repealed, included three subsections, (a), (b) and (c). It was then repealed and, my understanding is, was inadvertently repealed in its entirety. What clause 2 in this bill seeks to do is recreate and re-establish what was, prior to 2018 or the 2018 amendments, 4(2)(c). Is that correct?

Hon. M. Rankin: Before I reply specifically to the member’s question, I would just like to thank him for giving us the opportunity of telling us where he had the most concerns for this section so we could prepare and meet his concerns as effectively as we can.

With that, I would say the answer is yes.

M. de Jong: Then the provisions that previously existed, prior to the 2018 amendments, in 4(2)(a) and (b)…. Do they exist now elsewhere in the act, or were they deemed unnecessary to re-establish and recreate and embed in the legislation?

[4:05 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: The answer to the member’s question is that monthly reporting requirements are now found in section 4.2. As the member noted, the section previously was 4(2)(a) and (b). Those clauses are now — not exactly the same, but the same principle, the same content exists in the monthly reporting requirements found in section 4.2 of the act.

M. de Jong: The Attorney’s advice to the committee is that the obligation on the part of an individual who files a return and must supply the registrar with the following information within the applicable period, in the previous sub (a) was any change to the information within 30 days after that occurs, and, in sub (b), any information required to be supplied under subsection (1), the knowledge of which the individual acquired only after the return was filed, again within 30 days. Let’s call them the update provisions. Those update obligations exist now in not precisely the same language, but in 4.2.

Hon. M. Rankin: Yes, that is correct.

Clauses 2 to 5 inclusive approved.

On clause 6.

M. de Jong: Let’s start, maybe, with a general question for the Attorney. I might invite him, also….

In the course of the second reading debate discussion we had, I tried to make a point of emphasizing the importance of what a power of attorney document is. It might be more meaningful for the record to show, rather than just my opinion, confirmation from the chief legal officer in the province the significance of that document, where someone is granting to another the legal standing to stand in their place and for all — well, depending on the nature of the power of attorney, but potentially assigned as if they were that person.

We don’t have to go on at length about that, but having established the importance of what we’re talking about, it would, I think, set the stage for the conversation we might have about the importance of having a firm set of rules around which that granting of that status can take place.

[4:10 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: Perhaps, Madam Chair, you and others will notice that I’ve been joined by another talented member of our team, Andrea Buzbuzian, who is the legal counsel to the policy and legislation division of the justice services branch. I appreciate her advice.

I appreciate the member asking us to acknowledge the very, very important nature of what a power of attorney is. The member is absolutely right. An enduring power of attorney is a document by which an adult may appoint another person — a so-called attorney for that person — to make decisions for them in relation to some or all of their financial affairs.

An enduring power of attorney will remain in effect even if the person who makes it becomes incapable of acting or making decisions about their financial affairs. Thus it’s one type of incapability planning or personal planning instrument that allows for the appointment of, essentially, a substitute decision-maker for a time when the adult may be mentally incapable of doing so on their own.

This act before us is a power of attorney act that governs these enduring powers of attorney. I believe that the member is right in asking for recognition of just how solemn this is. It’s used many, many times in people’s lives, especially if they are getting to a point where their mental incapacity would cause them to wonder whether they could, in fact, look after their own affairs. The member’s point about having the rules crystal clear is equally valid. That is, of course, what we’re trying to do with the thrust of this legislation — to provide that clarity so people know the rules.

M. de Jong: Thank you to the Attorney for that description.

The section we’re dealing with has, in the heading, “alternative process.” My questions over the course of the next few minutes — I hope the Attorney won’t be offended — probably will gravitate between clause 6 and clause 8. I won’t be repetitive. If we deal with them in clause 6, I won’t repeat the questions in clause 8.

The amendments to the Power of Attorney Act seek to create an alternative process by which a person can sign their enduring power of attorney. Can the Attorney General, again, just to highlight the nature of the changes being proposed in a very formal way…. The existing process is a very specific one.

I understand that this change derives from experiences that took place and some temporary orders that were put in place during the COVID period. But if this is the alternative process that the amendments seek to create, what’s the standard process by which someone creates or can bestow an enduring power of attorney today?

Hon. M. Rankin: The current requirement in the act is that the adult and the attorney, the person who is to be the representative, will sign in each other’s presence, and that has been interpreted as requiring in-person attendance, not unreasonably.

But the amendments that we propose would add the authority for regulations to permit electronic witnessing or remote witnessing of these enduring powers of attorney and set out the parameters or the processes for doing so.

Currently, as the member has alluded to, there is a temporary COVID measure in place under the COVID-19 Related Measures Act adopted by this House. It permits the remote or electronic witnessing of these enduring powers of attorney, but it’s set to expire at the end of this year. So the addition of this authority for alternate or remote witnessing in the legislation would allow for this temporary measure, in effect, to be adopted on a permanent basis. That’s the objective of this initiative.

[4:15 p.m.]

Now, remote witnessing would provide greater flexibility, including for adults in more remote areas of the province, where there may not be ready access to lawyers or notaries, and in situations where access to the adult may be limited — for example, given COVID-19 concerns or other health care issues that may prevent or thwart the ability of people to come together as required under the general law.

We say that setting out the manner in which these enduring powers of attorney may be witnessed in regulations will provide British Columbians with greater flexibility. Because it’s through regulation, they can be revised in the future as needed — for example, to respond to any problems that arise with remote execution or to expand the procedural options. That, of course, just addresses why regulations, instead of putting all the details in an act…. We’ll learn as we go along. If there are problems, we’ll have the opportunity to address them.

M. de Jong: The Attorney has anticipated one of the questions, or maybe my next question, and that is…. The temporary measures were put in place to address a specific set of circumstances and some specific challenges that those circumstances created. I understand from the Attorney’s remarks, though, that the regulatory power that is going to be created with the passage of this legislation, and the regulations that will flow from it, is intended to apply, going forward, on a permanent basis and won’t be tied to some unique set of circumstances.

There won’t be, for example, a prerequisite requirement that a person must satisfy before they will be able to avail themselves of this alternative process. Is that a correct assumption on my part?

Hon. M. Rankin: Thanks to the member for putting that on the table. The manner in which these enduring powers of attorney may be witnessed in the regulations, as I said earlier, will provide the flexibility to be revised in the future — for example, to expand procedure options. I want to give an example.

Under the current COVID rules, only a lawyer or a notary is allowed to be that attorney. Under the act itself, one can have the signing of an enduring power of attorney, and dated by the adult, in the presence of two witnesses.

So we can, in regulation, decide whether we wish to continue with the current approach, if I can call it that — the COVID related measures approach of simply and solely allowing lawyers or notaries to do this — or not. That kind of flexibility, of course, is provided by regulation-making authority, and we’ll see as the circumstances evolve.

That’s merely one of the examples of the parameters that would be contemplated by regulation.

M. de Jong: Thanks. That’s helpful. I fear I didn’t express my question very clearly, but the information that the Attorney provided is also relevant and helpful.

[4:20 p.m.]

I think my question was…. The COVID orders and ex­ceptional processes were created in response to an exceptional set of circumstances. My understanding is that the regulations that we’ll continue to explore for a few mom­ents, though, are intended to apply on a permanent basis and are intended to be available to citizens without the need to demonstrate some pre-existing condition or some societal, exceptional circumstance threshold. It will just be an alternative means by which you can execute the power of attorney. Is that a fair statement?

Hon. M. Rankin: That’s entirely correct.

M. de Jong: In an earlier answer, the Attorney alluded to the rationale — or, I think, part of the rationale — and I’m going to invite him to expand upon that. It will become clear in a moment why I’m asking him to do that.

He and the government have clearly concluded that, as a result of recent experiences and analysis, this is an appropriate measure to take. I think he will enjoy support from the House and the committee in taking that step. But he alluded to some problems or some challenges that are in his mind in bringing the measure forward, and in the government’s mind. He alluded to people located in remote parts of the province. In those same remarks, he spoke of the difficulty in accessing either a lawyer or a notary.

Maybe, one, he could make clear, under the present set of rules, how the presence or accessibility of a lawyer or a notary is relevant to the execution of a power of attorney document or an enduring power of attorney. Secondly, if there are any other factors, complications, or challenges around the execution of enduring powers of attorney that have given rise to this amendment, I’d be interested to hear it.

What I’m going to say next is not meant to be, necessarily, a criticism, but it may be that it’s just deemed more convenient. If that’s so, then I’m anxious to hear that also.

[4:25 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: As I said, under the current act, one could have two witnesses and not a lawyer or a notary. Under the regulations that are contemplated, one could have two witnesses or a lawyer or notary.

Having said that, I do want to say, in just going back to the member’s opening comments, this is a very solemn document. Its legal importance is crucial to the life of the individual who enters into it, who assigns to another human being his or her entire worldly goods, for example, so one would want to recommend strongly that a notary or a lawyer be consulted before entering into such a document.

The accessibility piece — the objective is to say that those people who have, for example, mobility challenges, can’t get to the lawyer’s or the notary’s office, or people who live in a remote part of the community where there are none, no lawyers or the like, they may be content with two individuals. Once again, I would strongly recommend that they not do so. But we’re trying to look at those circumstances and take them into account once we get to drafting a regulation.

M. de Jong: Again, helpful from the Attorney. What he and I have been discussing and what I understand the essence of the amendment and what it is intended to facilitate is what the Attorney has been describing — an opportunity by which an individual can grant an enduring power of attorney in circumstances where they’re not in the same room as the person receiving the power of attorney, or possibly the witnesses, which suggests to me….

Maybe the Attorney can begin to clarify a little bit of what’s in his mind in terms of the regulations that follow, what this might look like under the regulations. Could, for example, an individual in a room alone, connected electronically with the person receiving the enduring power of attorney and others to witness…? Must there be witnesses located with the individual, or can the witnesses witness electronically? Well, I’m sure the Attorney will deal with that in a moment.

But beyond this question of an electronic connection, which is what all of our examples back and forth have been about, does the term “alternative process” contemplate anything different than that? I can’t imagine what it would be. I mean, I can’t think of anything. But I suppose even in that remote and electronic connection that this is designed to facilitate, must it be visual? Could it be by telephone or electronic mail? Is there going to be a visual component to this in the regulations?

[4:30 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I think the member’s question is an excellent one. The flexibility you achieve with regulations allows us to address these questions as we go along, but it might be helpful — because the member asked what we envisage to do with the regulation — to look at what we did with the COVID orders, the Emergency Program Act ministerial order that dealt with this very issue.

In that, there was a description of what was called “communicate.” How do you communicate? That word was defined as meaning, and I’m paraphrasing, communication using audiovisual technology, including other different things for the visually impaired, etc. Then “electronic presence” was defined in that order as “circumstances in which 2 or more individuals in different locations communicate” — again, audiovisual — “simultaneously to an extent that is similar to communication that would occur if all the individuals were physically present in the same location.”

I think we don’t want to tie the hands of cabinet — which, of course, ultimately will make regulations under this act — but I think that’s a pretty good indication of the kind of communication, if you will, that we envisage in this alternate process.

M. de Jong: That’s helpful, from the Attorney. Here’s, candidly, why I wanted to spend just a couple of minutes on this point. We’re dealing with a document that both the Attorney and I — and, I think, most people in this committee — would agree is a significant, important, weighty document.

There are always two concerns around the emergence of these documents. One, was it created through the deployment of any kind of fraudulent activity? That can exist under any system. It’s something that needs to be, obviously, guarded against and for which there are remedies.

The second one — the Attorney alluded to this in one of his earlier examples: in a case where we are frequently dealing with seniors who may be coming to a point in their life where mental capacity is an issue, and they are trying to address that in a pre-emptive way.

I have seen enough of these situations professionally — and, I suppose, even personally — to know that sometimes, at that stage, the concern is whether undue influence or undue pressure is being brought to bear by a family member, by multiple family members or by an acquaintance.

[4:35 p.m.]

The general question is: to what extent does the Attorney…? How does the Attorney believe, and how would he convey to the committee, that safeguards will be built into these regulations to ensure that the alternative process which, as we’ve already discussed, will become a permanent feature on the landscape, is not misused — that, to be blunt, a vulnerable senior isn’t, in the comfort of their own home, put in front of a computer screen and told: “Here’s what you’re going to do, mom or dad, or grandma and grandpa”?

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

To what extent, in pursuit of establishing a more convenient process, are we potentially upping the risk of that kind of abuse taking place, once the procedure becomes widely understood and more widely used?

Hon. M. Rankin: Thank you to the member for the question. He’s 100 percent correct. This is something very much in our minds as we contemplate a new regulation under this section.

I think it really is a function of balancing the access, the ability to take advantage of this remote service so people who have disabilities or who live in a remote area can still have the benefit of this access — but to balance it against the very real concerns to which the member alluded.

Fraud, undue influence — these are things that will always have to be dealt with, and he’s right in pointing out that that has been something in the past that happens, whether you’re under an alternate system or under the usual system, if I can call it that, under the act. Those fac­tors will be taken into account.

Perhaps I can give an example of how that might be done. It may be that one could contemplate a regulation that would require, for this remote service, to have a lawyer or notary — the reason for which is that they are subject to professional discipline if they were to abuse that trust. They would also have an obligation to make their own assessment, with professional judgment, as to the mental capacity of the person in this circumstance — which, I would suggest, is exactly what has to be done, whether it’s remote or otherwise.

M. de Jong: Well, I think the Attorney, happily, has put his finger on one aspect of what I hope the regulations will seek to capture: the creation of some mechanism that provides for the involvement, in these cases, of someone with both an obligation and some ability to make an assess­ment, independent of the parties involved, around the voluntary nature of the granting.

I get it. I share the assessment offered by the Attorney that it is a balancing act. We’re trying to enhance the convenience of doing this, but as we’ve also established, this is not just a mechanism that will be available for someone in Atlin. This will be available to someone in downtown Victoria or Vancouver, and the obligation to go somewhere — a lawyer’s office, a notary’s office — and to be present with others will disappear.

Offering up that suggestion — that as a requirement of accessing the alternative process, the regulations may require, as a prerequisite to that happening, the involvement of a third-party professional — may well be wise and may alleviate some of the concerns that might otherwise exist, around the possibility of, for example, a senior being steamrolled into doing something they’re not entirely comfortable doing.

[4:40 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I think the member makes an excellent point. One of the things I can report is….

Under the COVID measures, we’re not aware of any abuses that occurred during that period. Not to say that they may not have been brought to our attention — I accept that immediately — but that is something that gives us comfort, to some degree, as we offer up a regulation that would allow this to be permanent in nature.

I appreciate the member’s suggestion of the involvement of a third-party professional — i.e., a notary or a lawyer — as has been done and is required under the COVID measure. That will be something that will certainly be taken into account during the regulation-making process.

Clauses 6 and 7 approved.

On clause 8.

M. de Jong: I will try to make sure I’m not duplicating some of the areas that we already covered.

I made the point to the very able staff, when we had the conversation last week, that I thought, in what will be 41.1(1)…. The first three subsections, (a) through (b), were sort of procedural in nature, and (d) seems to be a more substantive provision governing what needs to be in an enduring power of attorney. They made the point to me, I think correctly, that because of the wording in (1)(d)…. The provisions of (d) apply only to the alternative process procedures.

I want to confirm that. We haven’t created an entire new regulatory power that applies across the board. Is that correct?

Hon. M. Rankin: Yes. I can confirm that is the case. The opening language of 41.1 says that the “Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations establishing an alternative process for” various things, including the (d) clause.

[4:45 p.m.]

As a consequence, it’s limited to that process. That’s the only thing that’s intended to change. I think that’s consistent with the formulation of the opening clause.

M. de Jong: Sticking with (1)(d), again, very helpfully, the staff suggested, without committing, of course, the minister or the government to anything…. An example of what might constitute additional information that must be included in an enduring power of attorney executed under the alternative process would be some indication on the document itself that the signing was witnessed remotely or electronically.

The Attorney, perhaps, could confirm that that was an accurate example, from his point of view, and whether or not anyone has thought of any additional, additional information that might be called for in the regulations pertaining to this alternative process.

Hon. M. Rankin: The member will be pleased to know I have been consulting with my able staff. That’s exactly the example that they have considered.

Any document…. The additional information under clause (d)…. The best example, and the only one which we’ve contemplated, is the statement that this particular document was witnessed remotely. I think that would be the kind of additional information. That, of course, would not be the case in an ordinary situation, but it seems like a very good suggestion for contemplation in the regulation-making process.

M. de Jong: Well, let’s, then, just briefly go back up to sub (a) and, if I can prevail upon the Attorney, have him place on the record something that we touched on earlier but not in the specific context of the enabling regulatory power.

Sub (1)(a) of 41.1 will allow for the creation of regulations prescribing what being in the presence of another person actually means. The Attorney, to be fair, referred a few moments ago to the existing provisions for what we are calling the COVID exceptional regulations. Again, those relate to electronic and audiovisual presence.

I’ll just ask him to confirm whether that is what we should anticipate with respect to regulations that will be forthcoming under 41.1(1)(a).

Hon. M. Rankin: Well, of course, the member would know…. We can’t tie the hands of the Lieutenant-Gover­nor-in-Council as they go forward. It’s very likely that that is exactly what would be contemplated.

M. de Jong: The terms we have used in this conversation, “remotely” and “electronically” — are they interchangeable? Sometimes those that we rely upon for legislative and regulatory drafting will tell us that there are differences that the rest of us haven’t considered.

Is the term that we will see in the regulations likely to be the term “remotely” or “electronically” or both? If both, is there a difference?

[4:50 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: The phrase in section 41.1 that would be added by this bill includes prescribing what “being in the presence of another person” means. Prescribing means, of course, that, by regulation, you would provide meaning. You would provide a definition of what that would mean. The word “remote” does not appear. The word “electronic” does not appear in the alternate process that’s here.

I don’t want to tie the hands of the legislative counsel who would be called upon to draft, but I can tell the hon. member that the word “remote” is simply used in our jargon as a shorthand for what, when we say, “being in the presence of another person” would mean. We’re expanding that clearly with this alternative process.

One can look to the language that was used in what we call the COVID order as a likely example of what the legislative counsel would do to put meaning into this phrase that has to be prescribed by regulation — namely, what “being in the presence of another person” means.

I don’t mean to be circular, but the word “remote” is not likely a word that would be found here. I’m not able to exactly draft on the fly. I think a better indication is what has been used in the past to communicate the meaning of what “being in the presence of another person” would mean in a context like we’re contemplating.

M. de Jong: I think my last question with respect to the clause relates to, on the subsequent page of the bill, the creation of 41.2. Again, staff were helpful in drawing to my attention that the provisions — I believe the exact provisions — of what would become 41.2 are contained in what is now 41(4). The Attorney can, perhaps, confirm that. Then my mischievous, curious question is: what prompted the need to pull out (4) and create a separate section?

[4:55 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: The member is absolutely right. There has been no content change whatsoever. The current section 41(4) is exactly the same as 41.2.

The member’s mischievous question is: why? The answer is that legislative counsel thought it appropriate, for clarity, to include regulation-making power, 41.1, for the general regs in relation to signing enduring power and 41.2 to deal with the extrajurisdictional part. It was not intended to change. In fact, the words are exactly the same. It was a drafting convention that was used for greater clarity.

Clauses 8 to 14 inclusive approved.

On clause 15.

M. de Jong: We don’t need to spend a lot of time on this. I thought it might be…. Since it does represent the creation of a new power of intervention on the part of a member of the executive council in a matter that legal counsel traditionally holds very dear and special, I might at least pose one or two questions about how this is intended to function in the future, hopefully on a very rare basis.

I should have, and did not, warned the Attorney, through his staff, for this next question. So I’ll understand…. I’m sure there’s a myriad of people with electronic devices standing by who might be able to get him this information.

How many KCs are there now? How many are there now? Do we know?

Hon. M. Rankin: As the member thought we could do, we managed to do. We’ve managed to get that information at our fingertips. There are 491 Queen’s Counsel, now King’s Counsel, in British Columbia. Under the statute, to be renamed the King’s Counsel Act, a maximum of 7 percent of the bar can be designated as King’s Counsel.

[5:00 p.m.]

While I’m on my feet, to provide context to the member’s question, I’m told that some time ago, many years ago, the words “at pleasure” were in this section. So an appointee to a Queen’s Counsel or King’s Counsel was an appointment explicitly at pleasure. That was removed over the years. We don’t know — quite some time ago.

It seemed to be relevant to have the ability for the cabinet, who, after all, on the advice of the Attorney General with an advisory committee consisting of the justices of the courts, the Law Society, the Canadian Bar Association that helps create the designated King’s Counsel every year…. It seemed appropriate that if the cabinet has the ability to bestow this honour, it should likewise be the cabinet, on the advice of the Attorney General, who could remove it.

That power exists, I’m told, in every other province where they have King’s Counsel designation. As the member may know, some provinces have elected to repeal the King’s Counsel designation. Ontario comes to mind.

M. de Jong: Thanks to the Attorney and the staff.

When a situation like this comes up, it is generally under the glare and spotlight of public attention because someone has done something bad. So we won’t go on at length about this, because I think what is intended in here is to build in some safeguards around the revocation process through the involvement of the chief justices and the judges and the Law Society.

But what, if anything, does the Attorney want to offer to the committee about what would, to his mind, constitute the threshold for revocation? I mean, there’s the general notion of conduct unbecoming, but would sanction by the Law Society for a violation of professional conduct in and of itself meet that threshold, or is it very much a subjective test whereby the nature of the transgression…?

On the order of magnitude, the fact that a member of the Law Society were sanctioned by a discipline committee for virtually anything — would that trigger these provisions? I suppose the Attorney is going to say, well, we’re creating a power that future Attorneys General will use.

The best I can do today is to ask the Attorney, who is bringing forward the provision to lay before the committee and place on the record, what he — what this Attorney — thinks should constitute the threshold for the use of this power and the recommendation for revocation going forward. Is it, by contrast, a conviction under the Criminal Code, under any provision of the Criminal Code, that should, in the Attorney’s mind, trigger the revocation provisions that are being created here?

My attempt to, at least at the time the power is created — or as the Attorney points out, perhaps recreated — to seek some indication from the Attorney around the circumstances in which he believes the power should be used.

[5:05 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: I appreciate the question a great deal because it allows me to talk a little bit about processes that are analogous that I think would be used in this circumstance.

But let me just say, by way of introduction, that the revocation power would certainly be used automatically in the context of a member who’s disbarred from the Law Society and no longer can practice law. That’s an easy one. But then the other kinds of things that the member is quite properly asking us to discuss is what about people, for example, who are suspended for egregious conduct that doesn’t amount to a disbarment. That, I would suggest, is an area for discretion.

I also want to say that zealous advocacy in a cause against the government of the day is not the kind of thing we’re contemplating here. The member has framed it properly as about conduct, not doing things that might be unpopular. Lawyers have a duty to advocate zealously for their clients, a fundamental rule of law that lawyers contribute to. Enhancing every day in our courtrooms re­quires that zealous advocacy.

I want it to be clear that the revocation terms here are about conduct. It might be helpful to the member if I used the analogy — the benchmark, if I may — to the Provincial Symbols and Honours Act, recently changed to ensure that a person who has been given the Order of British Columbia could have that terminated on the following grounds. I think this is indicative of what would be contemplated here.

I stress, again, before doing so, that this would only be done after consultation with the judges of the three courts — the Court of Appeal, the B.C. Supreme Court and the Provincial Court — as well as the Law Society and the Canadian Bar Association.

Never should it be thought that it’s simply the government of the day who could make, through the Attorney General, a recommendation to the cabinet, who could revoke someone’s KC. I just want that to be crystal clear.

As a benchmark, as I said, the Provincial Symbols and Honours Act says that appointment to the Order of B.C. may be terminated if the person has been convicted of a criminal offence or the conduct of the person, and I think this language is helpful:

“(i) constitutes a significant departure from generally recognized standards of public behaviour which is seen to undermine the credibility, integrity or relevance of the order; or (ii) detracts from the original grounds upon which the appointment was made; or (c) the person has been subject to official sanction, such as a fine or a reprimand by an adjudicating body, professional association or other organization.”

This is policy that’s adopted under that other act. I’m not meaning to suggest it’s necessarily applicable, but the member quite helpfully notes that there’s a range of conduct that could be considered. It will inevitably — I think the member would agree — be discretion required, but with the safeguards that I want to stress exist before the step of revocation could occur.

M. de Jong: Again, helpful commentary from the Attorney. With respect to clause 15, to confirm that the obligation that would exist for the Attorney General of the day would be to consult with the eminent individuals referred to in what would be section 9(2) of the King’s Counsel Act, but the obligation is not to secure concurrence or agreement.

[5:10 p.m.]

It is possible for the Attorney of the day to bring forward a recommendation to the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council that did not enjoy the unanimous, or even any, support, from those individuals.

Hon. M. Rankin: I would agree with that.

The Chair: Shall clause 15 pass?

Interjection.

The Chair: Oh, okay, sorry. With unanimous consent, we will reopen clause 15. Any opposed? Okay, back to clause 15.

M. de Jong: I was on the next page and didn’t see that section 10 of the act is contained within clause 15 of this amendment.

The Attorney correctly pointed out how the revocation procedures apply automatically upon disbarment. I just thought it would be worth having it confirmed on the record that that is different than a situation in which a member of the Law Society, either a practising or non-practising member of the Law Society, voluntarily allows their membership to lapse. That would not trigger the revocation provisions under the act.

Hon. M. Rankin: The member is right. Disbarment is one very clear category. The other category that the member alludes to is a situation where, in the face of potential disbarment, a person voluntarily withdraws membership and allows the membership to lapse. It was not considered that it was necessary to take that to include that, although I concede it happens from time to time that a person doesn’t face disbarment but escapes before that occurs.

We thought, however, that if the discretion that’s available, as discussed earlier, exists, we could capture that situation readily. In other words, the people on the consulting group, the eminent people to whom the member refers, would have every ability to take that into account in exercising their discretion.

M. de Jong: Thank you to the Attorney for clarifying. I think my question, though, is more basic.

It’s simply to make clear, which I think the Attorney will in a moment…. I think the term is “retirement.” Someone that retires as a member of the Law Society, either as an active member, a practising member or a non-practising member, and — no longer being a member of the Law Society in any capacity, because they’re now 75 or 80 years old and whatever, and simply wanting to stop working and paying their dues — doesn’t have to worry that that triggers some provision of this legislation that revokes their K.C. designation.

Hon. M. Rankin: I can confirm that that’s exactly the case.

Clause 15 approved.

On clause 16.

M. de Jong: The staff alerted me to the what I think is the significance of the first part of clause 16, under the Representation Agreement Act — which contemplates, as I understand it, the incorporation of an alternate process. In what will become (3.01), I understand that the phrase “in the presence of the adult and one another” has been added to align it with the Power of Attorney Act, and that is the relevant addition to that provision. If the Attorney wants to confirm that.

[5:15 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: Perhaps at the outset — since we’re dealing with a new statute, just as I was invited to do in the context of the Power of Attorney Act — I could say a few things about what these representation agreements are about. It’s an agreement that an adult may make, appointing another person to assist them with decision-making in the event that they are unable to do so on their own.

Generally speaking, there are two types of representation agreements in British Columbia, one under section 7, one under section 9. The scope of decision-making under a representation agreement is in relation to deci­sions about the adult’s health care and personal care. That’s distinct from the financial work under the Power of Attorney Act.

However, I should add that under section 7 representation agreements, the representative may also be authorized to make or help make decisions in relation to the routine management of a person’s financial affairs. But the act defines a “representation agreement” as an agreement under either of those key sections.

Now, just with that by way of introduction, the addition of 3.01, to which the member refers…. The adult must sign the representation agreement “…in the presence of 2 witnesses….” It is our belief that that has not changed the legislative intent. We have, of course, after this section the ability, as we discussed previously under the Power of Attorney Act, to address so-called remote witnessing. But generally speaking, we wanted to be consistent with the requirement of two witnesses under the other statute.

We believe that there has been no change. If the member is interested, that’s confirmed by the fact that under the Representation Agreement Regulation, form 4 talks about “certificate of witnesses” and a certification that “the adult who made the representation agreement was present when I witnessed the representation agreement.”

[5:20 p.m.]

In other words, there’s no intent to change anything here. It’s just to provide consistency. We always believed that there were two. “In the presence of two witnesses” was the way it was before, but the drafter wishes to provide that clarity in this bill.

I’m not sure if I have answered the member’s question. I look forward to his response.

M. de Jong: That is also helpful.

It may be that the most straightforward way to address this section is to simply ask the Attorney General, if he can and if what I’m about to say is correct, to confirm…. In the context of the two types of documents, one a power of attorney and the other a representation agreement, which, in different ways and sometimes for different purposes, allow a person to bestow upon another rights to conduct affairs on their behalf….

The intention is to create a permanent statutory authority for an alternative process that allows for the creation, the execution of those documents in circumstances where the person granting that authority is not necessarily in the same location or with the person.

The question that flows from that for the Attorney…. My reading of the provisions is we should anticipate regulations governing that remote…. What’s the term we…? Well, I’ll use the term “remote” because I can’t remember the one that we were using a few moments ago.

The regulations governing that alternative process for the execution of a representation agreement will be substantially similar to what are created to govern the alternative process for powers of attorney. If the Attorney General anticipates any significant departure or difference between the two, I’d be interested to know what they might be.

Hon. M. Rankin: I think I can, in fact, confirm to the member and to this House that there’s no intention to depart from the approach that we’ve already discussed in the context of the Power of Attorney Act. In other words, we can anticipate regulations that would be substantially in line with the Power of Attorney Act, noting, of course, that representation agreements are different instruments. So there may be some specific need to alter them.

The general approach contemplated is…. Indeed, we expect the regulations to be consistent.

Clauses 16 to 18 inclusive approved.

On clause 19.

[5:25 p.m.]

M. de Jong: I’m not sure what our ratings are like this afternoon for this discussion, but I expect somewhere in offices in this building, people are wondering at what point this scintillating exchange will end. It will end shortly. So for those who are on deck to carry on with other business, this might be a good time for them to start gathering their binders and making their way here.

Clause 19 deals with the Wills, Estates and Succession Act — and, in particular, not just an intestacy but a fairly unique type of intestacy. We use these terms. I suppose it’s worth saying that people who die intestate don’t have a will. In the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, there’s a whole series of rules that govern what happens.

I think the Attorney will probably take advantage of the opportunity today to recommend to all and sundry that they should have a will. But the notion that, if you don’t, suddenly the government comes in and scoops up your entire estate is something of a societal myth. There are rules that, then, govern what happens to your estate.

This clause 19 purports to add a provision to section 130 of the wills-and-estates act. I’d like the Attorney to explain what, if any, problem has arisen to give rise to the inclusion of this provision in this bill, how it’s intended to operate and in what circumstances it’s intended to operate.

Hon. M. Rankin: I’m going to take the opportunity to do precisely what the hon. member suggested. That is to say to the people of British Columbia: get a will. It’s to avoid this very situation we’re going to talk about.

Having your estate proceed through the administration under intestacy is a situation in which the state, through legislation, determines who gets your estate. So unless you want to have that occur…. A will will allow that to not be the case. I just say that.

Normally, if it’s an intestacy, it goes to the close relatives. But what if you have no close relatives? That’s the situation that this is intended to address. Where you have no close relatives, the expression is the estate escheats to the government. It is an ancient concept but essentially means there’s nobody else but the state to whom it can go, and that’s who it goes to.

This amendment would allow the government to appoint an independent person who can ensure that the deceased’s relatives are properly traced to confirm that there are no close relatives with a better claim in instances where someone may make a moral claim to the deceased’s assets under the Escheat Act.

[5:30 p.m.]

Since the assets will belong to the province, the province should be able to nominate someone to administer the estate. That was the gap that this section is intended to fill.

M. de Jong: I should remember this from the lengthy and enjoyable conversation I had with the then member for Nanaimo, Leonard Krog.

The use in this section of the term “government”…. I can’t remember, although I have it right in front of me…. I’m not sure if that’s a defined term under the act or not. It’s not, as I look at my hard drive here. So in the context of this new subsection, who is “the government”?

Hon. M. Rankin: I thank the member for a really intriguing question. One could have said the Crown. One could have said the capital-P province. “The government” was seen by legislative counsel to be a term that would be clearer in the tradition of plain-language drafting.

But it’s a provincial statute, and therefore, the government in question would not be the federal government. It would not be a local government. It would be the government — presumably, and I think pretty obviously — of British Columbia. But I would agree that another expression would be “the Crown in right” of British Columbia or some other formulation. In the tradition of plain-language drafting, I think legislative counsel thought this would be as clear as could be.

M. de Jong: It’s probably some kind of a commentary that the presence of plain language would come as something of a shock to us in a proposed statute.

All right. Well, “the government” then will have to, I suppose, designate someone under the provisions of the act who actually makes the decision.

So here was, ultimately, my question on this. There’s other work to be done here today. As the Attorney has pointed out, in the case of this kind of an intestacy and an escheatment to the Crown, the government has an interest, which I understand it acquires not by virtue of the application process; it already has that interest.

[5:35 p.m.]

But I thought to myself: given that the Crown has that financial interest in whatever the value of the estate might be, would it have made more sense to designate the public trustee as the person?

Now, I understand that probably the Attorney is going to get advice to tell me that, in all likelihood, that’s who’s going to be consulted. But I wondered, in a situation like this, why it would not have been perhaps wiser to specify the public trustee as that agency that would look after things in the unique circumstance that we’re talking about.

Hon. M. Rankin: I just wanted, in response to an earlier question the member for Abbotsford West raised about the term “government”…. In addition to the plain drafting points, I have been advised that the Interpretation Act, section 28, defines the government as: “Her Majesty the Queen in right” of British Columbia. So in a sense, it gets us to the same place with the plain-language benefit I talked of.

Interjection.

[5:40 p.m.]

Hon. M. Rankin: “His Majesty.” Sorry, old habits die hard.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, as the member has said, is the most likely person who would take on this responsibility, but it doesn’t have to be,. There may be some cases where there would be conflict of interest or other reasons why that might not be a good choice. It could be a government lawyer. It could even be an outside lawyer or another person. I’ll give you an example, as the member asked for, when he identified some of the things that he wanted to raise today.

There was a recent example where a remote relative notified the government of their intent to apply. That person was a Supreme Court justice. Just for clarity, when I say “remote relative,” why is that relevant? It’s because we’re saying there are no relatives. The act talks of the close family and defines it within four degrees of separation, if you will. But this was a person who was a remote relative, at best, and happened to be a Supreme Court justice.

In that case, the government was fine with them making the application, provided certain conditions were met regarding their efforts to establish that there were no closer relatives. That’s an example of where it might be appropriate. I think the member is right in assuming that the majority of the time, if not the vast majority of the time, the person who would take on this responsibility would be the Public Guardian and Trustee.

M. de Jong: The gap that is being addressed here and that the Attorney referred to — I’m not necessarily asking for a number, but is this a scenario that develops on an annual basis or, perhaps, numerous times on an annual basis? Or, because of the other provisions of the act and how they kick in with respect to an intestacy, is it a gap that has revealed itself fairly infrequently?

Hon. M. Rankin: I will confirm to the member that it happens very infrequently, but it does happen. It would be an intestacy, and there would be a relative who could step in and be involved, but most of the time, this is a very infrequent circumstance. It happens every few years. That would be my assessment.

Clauses 19 and 20 approved.

Title approved.

Hon. M. Rankin: I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 5:43 p.m.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

Report and
Third Reading of Bills

BILL 27 — ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTES
AMENDMENT ACT (No. 2), 2022

Bill 27, Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2022, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

[5:45 p.m.]

Hon. N. Cullen: I call second reading of Bill 31, the B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act.

Second Reading of Bills

BILL 31 — B.C. PAVILION
CORPORATION ACT

Hon. N. Cullen: I move that the bill now be read a second time.

I’ve looked forward to being able to present this bill to the Legislature. I know that some colleagues across the way have been interested in this procession as well, because, for those who are familiar with British Columbia history, this was an important part of our history in the B.C. Enterprise Corp. That needed a little bit of housecleaning. That has been some time in the coming.

The proposed amendments that are contained within this bill will in fact dissolve the British Columbia Enterprise Corp. The reason for that is that it has not carried on business for over 30 years. New Democrats are sometimes accused of being in a hurry; legislatures are not. We eventually made our way to this place.

This is an important piece — as I said, a little bit of housekeeping. We are going to preserve the provisions for the B.C. Pavilion Corp., and I’ll speak to that in a moment, under a much more appropriately titled B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act.

The brief history — I won’t take much of the House’s time with this, because it’s a well-canvassed history and, I hope, not controversial, although we will find out in the debate. In 1986, the World Exposition on Transportation and Communication, better known as Expo 86, was held in the city of Vancouver. Expo 86 featured pavilions from 54 different nations and a number of corporations at the time, showcasing various transportation and communication advances.

[S. Chandra Herbert in the chair.]

This was a seminal event, not just for Vancouver but for British Columbia — stepping onto the world stage, in a way. We’ve, of course, subsequently had a number of globally featured events, like the Olympics and whatnot, that have helped draw more and more attention to Vancouver, but this was certainly a bit of a coming-out party, in some ways, for the city and, in other ways, for the province itself.

At the time, the B.C. Development Corp., a Crown corporation, owned and operated two properties used as part of Expo 86 — B.C. Place and the Vancouver Convention Centre. B.C. Place held the opening ceremonies of Expo 86, and the convention centre served as the Canada Pavilion.

I note that the Speaker is nodding. It’s glad for me that that some of our more youthful people in this chamber do remember — fondly, I hope — some of those events. It’s always disturbing when we recount a bit of history and, yes, there are some, to my right, who in fact were maybe not alive when all this took place. But for those of us that were there, which may be a majority in this House — I’m seeing thumbs-up — Expo 86 was incredibly important. These two pavilions both played an important role in that.

Following Expo 86, the B.C. Development Corp. merged into the B.C. Enterprise Corp. Then, between ’86 and ’89, the B.C. Enterprise Corp. owned and operated B.C. Place and the convention centre in Vancouver. Then, in 1989, the British Columbia Enterprise Corp. ceased operations and transferred all of its assets, rights, interests, obligations and liabilities to the B.C. Pavilion Corp. and to the province of British Columbia.

The time has come to repeal this redundant piece of legislation, more than 30 years after that date, to reflect the fact that BCEC has had no ongoing business operations since 1989. For this reason, Bill 31 seeks to repeal the British Columbia Enterprise Corporation Act while preserving the existing rights and responsibilities of the very much active B.C. Pavilion Corp. under a new act entitled the B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act.

There were some concerns — I am talking to some MLAs, particularly from the Lower Mainland — that there would be any disturbance of activities over these two very important event centres within Vancouver. The way that we are making this legislation happen is that operations will continue as they are, and liabilities and all of those things that pre-existed will continue as well.

By repealing the redundant act and establishing a new act for the B.C. Pavilion Corp., the province will streamline our legislation, improving transparency to the public and eliminating administrative costs, which serve no benefit whatsoever to the public we represent. The proposed amendments in Bill 31 are supported by the B.C. Pavilion Corp., where the amendments impact them specifically.

[5:50 p.m.]

With that, hon. Speaker, I want to thank you and all members of the House. I look forward to hearing from my colleagues in the continued debate, if there is much of one, on the second reading of this bill.

Deputy Speaker: I remember Expo. I was five.

D. Ashton: Thank you Mr., Speaker. It must almost be the end of the day.

I would like to thank the minister for his quick briefing. It’s a pleasure today to rise and provide a few remarks on Bill 31, the B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act. I will keep my remarks quite brief.

On the surface, this appears to be a bill which seems to be quite administrative in nature. It’s my understanding that this bill removes redundant statutes related to the British Columbia Enterprise Corp., an entity which, as we have heard, has not carried on business for almost more than three decades, and under the provisions that impact B.C. Pavilion Corp. will now continue under the new B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act.

It’s my understanding, again, that under this legislation, we’ll see the dissolution of the British Columbia Enterprise Corp., BCEC, and the repealing of the British Columbia Enterprise Corporation Act, under which B.C. Pavilion Corp. — i.e., PavCo — acts as the agent of the government. It will transfer, again, under my understanding, all of the assets as well as the obligations and liabilities of BCEC to the government. It will also allow the government to deal with these assets, even though they now may be registered in the name of BCEC.

I understand from the Minister’s introductory remarks that the goal here is to streamline the legislation and get rid of redundancies. Again, it seems very straightforward and very administrative. But as we all know, there may be some further questions during the committee stage. I expect at that point in time that there will be some additional dialogue, not only from myself, but maybe some of my peers on this side.

Hon. Speaker, thank you very much, and once again, thank you to the minister. I look forward to the committee stage.

Deputy Speaker: Seeing no further speakers, I turn to the minister to close debate.

Hon. N. Cullen: I move that the bill be referred to a Committee of the Whole House to be considered at the next sitting of the House after today.

Deputy Speaker: We have to do the question on second reading first.

Shall second reading of Bill 31 pass?

Motion approved.

Deputy Speaker: Now we do the next part, Minister.

Hon. N. Cullen: Apologies for that.

Mr., Speaker, I move that the bill be referred to a Committee of the Whole House to be considered at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 31, B.C. Pavilion Corporation Act, read a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. N. Cullen: I move that the House do now adjourn.

Interjection.

Deputy Speaker: Is there other direction? If the House Leader would like a short recess, we can. Otherwise, we do have the Speaker here.

Hon. N. Cullen: I take your direction.

Deputy Speaker: I’ve heard the question from the minister, the acting Government House Leader.

The question is adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

Deputy Speaker: The House is now adjourned.

[Mr. Speaker in the chair.]

Mr. Speaker: Members, the House is now adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

The House adjourned at 5:54 p.m.