2015 Legislative Session: Fourth Session, 40th Parliament
HANSARD
The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.
official report of
Debates of the Legislative Assembly
(hansard)
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Afternoon Sitting
Volume 28, Number 7
ISSN 0709-1281 (Print)
ISSN 1499-2175 (Online)
CONTENTS | |
Page | |
Orders of the Day | |
Committee of the Whole House | 9135 |
Bill 30 — Liquefied Natural Gas Project Agreements Act (continued) | |
S. Simpson | |
Hon. M. de Jong | |
B. Ralston | |
D. Donaldson | |
A. Weaver | |
Report and Third Reading of Bills | 9154 |
Bill 30 — Liquefied Natural Gas Project Agreements Act | |
Personal Statement | 9154 |
Service to Legislature and message of appreciation | |
M. Dalton | |
Royal Assent to Bills | 9155 |
Bill 30 — Liquefied Natural Gas Project Agreements Act | |
Bill 31 — Ombudsperson Amendment Act, 2015 | |
TUESDAY, JULY 21, 2015
The House met at 1:32 p.m.
[Madame Speaker in the chair.]
Orders of the Day
Hon. M. de Jong: Committee stage debate on Bill 30.
Committee of the Whole House
BILL 30 — LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
PROJECT AGREEMENTS ACT
(continued)
The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 30; D. Horne in the chair.
The committee met at 1:34 p.m.
On section 2 (continued).
S. Simpson: I’d note for the minister and the staff that we’re going to jump a little bit here to the appendices of the agreement that comes under the category “Other matters,” which largely deal with employment, skills training and some of those matters.
I guess I’d ask the minister, first, a general question regarding that. We know that throughout the project development agreement, it’s very specific as it deals with tax and financial matters in relation to Pacific NorthWest and the relationship with the government. Those are very specific, and they’re very locked in.
Could the minister tell us: was it contemplated to put more specific information in related to jobs and employment for British Columbians and, in fact, skills-training matters related to British Columbians?
I would note, as I’m sure the minister knows, the one section…. Five short paragraphs which essentially cover these matters in the appendices are quite broad and general in nature. They do not provide any sort of specificity around what may or may not be done.
Could the minister tell us why the decision was made that there should not be more specifics in the project development agreement in relation to employment training matters as they relate to the proponent?
Hon. M. de Jong: I’ll start with a relatively general answer to what I think initially is the general question, and then we’ll likely get into somewhat more detail.
I think the construct of the PDA, including the appendix that we’re now examining, reflects in large measure the nature of the discussion that took place. It’s a contract, so I think the term “negotiation” is also appropriate. We have had a fairly lengthy and detailed conversation about some of the — as the member points out — taxation provisions and certainty provisions that relate to that.
With respect to the conversation that took place around labour, I think it would be fair to characterize that conversation in the following way.
The marked preference displayed by the proponents…. In this case, I will refer particularly to Pacific NorthWest, but I think this is also generally true of other proponents. One of the distinct advantages they identified in coming to this jurisdiction, coming to western Canada, was the availability of a skilled workforce that they are anxious to tap into and whose talents they are anxious to avail themselves of.
It is also, I believe, accurate to point out that very early on in the conversations that ultimately led to the conclusion of the agreement we have before us, it became clear to us that one of the issues that confronted and confounded some of these proponents, including Pacific NorthWest — or the major partner within Pacific NorthWest; I should be specific about that — was around labour supply in other jurisdictions where they have created projects.
Much of the conversation as it related to labour involved the proponent, Pacific NorthWest, urging upon the government the need to ensure that proper training was in place, that apprenticeship programs were being properly aligned, because (a) there was going to be this need for labour, for skilled workers, and (b) their clear preference, their demonstrable preference and concern, was that labour, skilled workers, be sourced and supplied from, firstly, within British Columbia and then within Canada.
So the dynamic around which the conversation took place is very important to understand. The proponents want to tap into the talent base that is British Columbia and Canada and were urging upon the government that we take measures to facilitate that to happen.
S. Simpson: I appreciate the minister’s comments. I guess the reality of the situation we face is that when people look at the project development agreement, they can see that it’s quite precise in the terms as it relates to taxation, to revenue and, to some degree, to potential implications on environmental costs. It’s very precise for a 25-year period, with quite a bit of indemnification for the company, in many ways, through that.
They then look and they see nothing that resembles that in terms of the employment or the skills-training side. Now, there has been a lot of discussion. There’s the Premier’s working group. We’ll talk a little bit about that. There’s the memorandum of understanding with the federal government. We can talk a little bit about that.
But we do know…. It was reinforced yesterday by Mr. Keane on behalf of the alliance, saying: “Two things we
[ Page 9136 ]
need are a break on the provincial sales tax” — which I know the minister spoke to my colleague about earlier — “and flexibility around more temporary foreign workers presently.”
The situation, as I understand it, from a workforce point of view today in the province…. And we’ll see, because it changes. We have about 80,000 skilled tradespeople in this province, both union and non-union — roughly about 80,000. We have about, as I understand the numbers, probably a little less than 20 percent unemployment in that sector today, maybe as much as 15,000 people.
We also know that as Rio Tinto winds down in the coming weeks, that will add a couple of thousand more people to that list. So we might have somewhere in the range of 15,000 to 18,000 skilled tradespeople in the province, more than enough to completely build a pipeline with all-Canadian — and all–British Columbian, primarily, but certainly all-Canadian — workers.
The question I have, because there’s nothing clear in this document, is: how is it, and how do we get to an assurance, and where is the assurance that those companies in fact will use those workers first to build this? We’ve heard, certainly, a number of comments from the minister’s colleagues and from the Premier about this desire of B.C. first, Canada first, then someplace else. Fair enough. But what is the actual application to ensure that that occurs?
Hon. M. de Jong: A couple of things in response to the member’s observations and questions. One thing that he didn’t mention, which may have been inadvertent on his part in offering a rough and ready calculation, is Site C. I don’t say this to be mischievous about positions that members and parties have taken around Site C. We are, obviously, very enthusiastic over where I sit. But that is most certainly going to have an impact on the supply of skilled labour.
I think the essence of the question, though, relates to the absence of more specific language. I hope the member at one point will invite an analysis of some of the language that exists elsewhere. I think in second reading there was a lot of commentary about this agreement as compared to other agreements and the language that was used. We might have a chance to consider in a practical way the impact of the kind of language that did and does exist in other agreements.
Maybe the more particular response at this point relates to the practical economics associated with attracting and retaining workers who are located in the area and in the region. It’s way more economical, from the point of view of employers, than bringing people in from outside.
In addition to the preference that would accrue in favour of local workers who are more familiar with everything from building codes to basic building cultures, there is also the very specific reality that for employers, for proponents, who on projects of this magnitude most assuredly have their eye on the overall costs and the bottom line, it makes more sense economically.
It makes more sense economically to source and retain workers located within the region. That’s not a philosophical statement. That is borne out in example after example and, in the case of LNG, borne out in spades by examples that have taken place elsewhere in the world.
As I said a few moments ago, that reality revealed itself in terms of the conversations that we had with the proponents and has led to addressing the issue in the way that we have. As the member can see and, hopefully, would acknowledge, it tends to put more pressure on the government to ensure that we are doing and working in partnership with labour, communities, First Nations and the proponent themselves to ensure that there is a supply of skilled labour, because the proponent’s overwhelming preference is to draw from that pool of skilled workers first.
S. Simpson: In regard to the comment around Site C, I would agree. My comment was that this is a changing landscape at all times. The projects come and go. Obviously, assuming Site C proceeds in the coming months, it will be a significant project. If not initially, certainly in the coming years it will be a significant project for work.
What we do know is that we have a significant number of workers who are not working today and who, I’m sure, would be interested in that work. We know that if there has been a criticism from the building trades, as an example, who are very strong proponents of LNG and strong supporters of LNG, it is in regard to this agreement and it is in regard to what they see as the shortcoming of the agreement in terms of not providing assurances.
I think part of that — we’ll go back and talk a little bit about this at some point — goes back to a level of hopefulness on their part based on the work of the Premier’s LNG Working Group, which made a series of 15 recommendations, recommendations that were endorsed by the Premier at that time.
They deal with a range of things, including how you deal with temporary foreign workers and how that gets dealt with — specifically in the recommendations. We’ll come back and talk about that more particularly, because I think that’s a document that was endorsed by the Premier. The recommendations were accepted by the Premier on April 3, 2014 — that they would in fact have some assurance. Their concern, of course, is that they see none of those assurances in a document that is so explicit and specific in its assurances for the company in a range of other things.
One of the questions around how workers get selected…. I’m looking now at the document from July 2015, “Accessing Internationally Skilled Workers for LNG,”
[ Page 9137 ]
which was a document from the government of British Columbia. It talks about the need to utilize skilled international workers — 228,000 new workers by 2022 is the number that is here.
What gets interesting is how this program gets expedited — and it is an expedited program. At one point it says: “Expedited processing of foreign workers in ten days, with work permits issued within ten days.”
As it says, the conditions — in order to be on that list of expedited workers, to make the list — are pretty modest in some ways. For the provincial side it is to be paying these workers the median wage of $22 an hour — that’s the median wage that has to be offered — versus the federal program, which is $44 an hour; and that there be demand, through the labour market outlook and something called “sector validation.” I’m not sure what that sector validation is. Maybe the minister can tell me what that is. That, then, says they will qualify. Now, it’s a long list, of course.
Qualifying for exemptions. It’s gas fitters, carpenters, ironworkers, construction millwrights, industrial mechanics, electricians, electrical power line cable workers, contractors, supervisors, more electricians, crane operators, metal fabricators, fitters, steamfitters, pipefitters, machinists, sheet metal workers, transportation specialists.
It pretty much qualifies everybody except for construction craft workers, material handlers and other automotive mechanical installers and services. Those seem to be the only three that don’t qualify on this list. It’s a broad list, it’s expedited, and it is all about supplying this sector.
The document is called “Accessing Internationally Skilled Workers for LNG.” Presumably, that’s what the purpose of this is.
The Premier’s LNG Working Group talked about how to refine…. Recommendation 15:
“Further refine and develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers in the context of an overall strategy that identifies the workforce needs of the LNG opportunity and immediately begins the skills-training plan to develop as many British Columbians and Canadians as possible to meet those needs. The structure contemplated in recommendation 1,” which we can go back to, “will be seized with the responsibility to refine and develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers.”
What we have is this document, issued by the government, that says we will expedite temporary foreign workers. We have the Premier committing to a recommendation from her group saying that they will develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers, which I am assuming is different than that. If it’s not in this document, does the minister foresee…? Is there some kind of complementary document that provides some specific and binding commitments as to how a company decides this?
I accept at face value what the minister says, that the company says: “We want to use Canadian or B.C. workers if they have the skills. We want to use them first.” Let’s accept that for the sake of this argument. How does it happen, then, that they make that assessment? They then judge that either they can or can’t fill that. They apply to expedite these workers, get it done in ten days, bring in a range of workers.
Where’s the process that allows the workers and their representatives to be confident that this was a process that made sense to get to the decision on TFWs that Mr. Keane says there are going to have to be many more of as this unfolds?
Hon. M. de Jong: A couple of things that I believe are relevant to the conversation we are having.
I appreciate and acknowledge that the member has referred to something that is a key feature to the landscape that exists today and will undoubtedly exist in the future, and that is the ever-changing nature of that as it impacts upon the supply of workers. It is a dynamic circumstance that will be influenced by the economic activity taking place within the province.
Today we are talking about a particular agreement with a particular proponent. It is entirely possible that months from now we may be confronted by the happy circumstance of a second proponent and a second project proceeding, which would significantly alter the situation confronting both workers and project proponents.
Some of the answers, I think, to the question that the member has posed exist within the documents that he has referred to and speak to the underlying principles that are intended to guide deliberations and moving forward on this — the notion of a cooperative approach that engages labour, government and the proponent themselves to take account of what the changed landscape might look like.
As attractive an argument as it might seem to say that there shall be a quota — and I get the attractiveness of that argument — its logic eludes me if we are correct in surmising that the circumstance that exists today may be very different six months or 18 months down the road. When I look at some of the other agreements that are in the public domain with respect to LNG projects of this sort, they have…. The ones that I have seen pointedly avoided the use of quotas.
The one that I think was featured in the conversations earlier in second reading, the Gorgon gas processing facility in Western Australia, talked about the preference for using local labour but had this qualification: “Except where not reasonable and economically practicable to do so.” Pointedly, it did not include quota stipulations or quota requirements and spoke instead, it seems to me, of the preference to use local labour but also the recognition that given some of the specialized functions and specialized needs that may exist, there may, from time to time, be a role and a necessity to bring people into the jurisdiction.
[ Page 9138 ]
Ironically, one could make the argument that if we find ourselves in the happy circumstance where more than one of these projects is proceeding — and particularly if they begin to proceed in anything approaching a sequential order — the need for bringing folks in with specialized skills from abroad will diminish because you will begin, in a very concerted way, to be training people. The experience they acquire with respect to one project will very much be transferrable to another.
Those are all, I think, considerations that mitigate against the notion of simply incorporating a quota number, which has a certain attractiveness for ease of communicating a point — that point being, let us ensure that British Columbians and Canadians benefit first and benefit most directly but, practically, stop short, I think, of acknowledging the changing landscape that will occur.
I should say, though, another component of this, which I think the member is familiar with from work he has done in other areas, is the ongoing labour market surveys that will be a part of the cooperative effort that will be required to properly assess what the need is and what the labour market in British Columbia is looking like on an ongoing basis.
S. Simpson: I guess I would just note for the minister that quota was his word and not mine. I don’t think I’ve ever used the word “quota” in this discussion. I think there’s an acknowledgment that should the government realize multiple projects, should the province realize multiple projects, the dynamic around workforce changes. There’s no question about that.
At this point, we have no projects. We have, potentially, a first project. We have, maybe, an investment decision some time in the next year or so from the first company. Things could change in the future, but that’s the situation we have. We have at least an aspirational goal here that it will be British Columbians first, Canadians first and then others to fill these jobs.
With that goal, I guess the question becomes: what is the tool for doing the assessment? How does the assessment happen to satisfy people about that need for workers? How does that assessment get done? If there are available British Columbian or Canadian workers, what is the tool or the vehicle here to ensure that they, in fact, are the people who get the jobs to extract our resource or build the infrastructure to extract our resource and sell it — have somebody take it out of the ground and sell it?
The question isn’t so much about saying it absolutely has to be this number of people or that number of people. That will move depending on the circumstance. But what’s the vehicle, what’s the tool and what’s the incentive or the enforcement should a company choose not to hire British Columbian or Canadian workers who may be available?
Hon. M. de Jong: I’ll try to answer the question in two parts. One is by referring to what we might describe as the vehicle by which we hope to achieve this aspirational objective — which the member, I am pleased, accepts is the objective — to ensure the benefits by way of employment opportunity accrue to British Columbians and Canadians first and foremost. Admittedly, the vehicle by which we seek to achieve that is a Premier’s council that is based on the notion of cooperative engagement.
I have to say two things about that. Those endeavours are generally more successful when there is genuinely a shared interest in arriving at a particular destination, and I would offer my observation to the member and the committee that, in this case, there very much is.
The objectives and the interests of labour are self-evident and articulated in a very clear way by representatives of labour and organized labour. The interests of government, as well, have been articulated in terms of what propels us forward in terms of advancing the interests of British Columbia families, particularly families in the areas that will be key to the development of the LNG resource but also families all over the province — but perhaps most pointedly, the interests of the proponents themselves, as evidenced by their experience elsewhere. By far and away the preferred route here is to facilitate and access a local skilled labour supply.
The vehicle is that Premier’s council. The tools that are available to achieve that shared objective are tools that I think the member is familiar with, things like labour market surveys.
I suppose we should be careful as well — I should be careful; the committee should be careful — not to discount the degree to which these are tools that have been in long use. The notion of people wanting to come, the notion of employers wanting to access labour outside of the borders of Canada, are not novel concepts. The kinds of tools that have been developed to ensure that we are not facilitating that in circumstances where there is a ready supply of skilled labour within the jurisdiction are something that is not new or novel.
The vehicle is that cooperative body that has committed to pursuing a certain objective. The tools that they will make use of will include things like basic labour market surveys, which likely will have a dynamic of their own and need to recur with regularity to take account of changes that are occurring within the labour market — particularly at a time when British Columbia’s economy, happily, is the positive outlier from what is taking place elsewhere in the country — and growth prospects, according to agencies like the Conference Board and others, that remain positive and are said to be leading the country and projected to lead the country in the future.
They will have to be adept. The vehicle, the council, will need to be adept and deft at responding to changing scenarios.
[ Page 9139 ]
S. Simpson: I guess that the challenge is a bit of this…. We don’t need to revisit the discussions you’ve had with my colleague from Surrey-Whalley. Our view, as you know pretty clearly, is that the government was involved in a cooperative venture at Pacific NorthWest to get to this PDA for what was, presumably, the common objective of setting up a business here and having it benefit. We would say that the government gave too much up. That would be our view — that the PDA has simply given far too much up.
That being the case, and knowing what has been said by company after company…. We have Mr. Keane and his comments. We have Pacific NorthWest in their submission around the environmental assessment, where they talked about 30 percent temporary foreign workers, maybe as much as 70 percent depending on terms of temporary foreign workers once you get to the high season, around year three of construction. They talked about all of the engineering and the technical services going offshore and not being done here by our professionals.
The company has been pretty clear. I don’t think there’s anything vague about their willingness to very quickly use temporary foreign workers if they see it as either in their interest or a necessity. It would be, obviously, a necessity if they can’t find the workforce elsewhere because everybody’s working, doing something else — that would be a good thing, and that would be a different conversation, but that’s not the case today — or if they saw it to be of cost benefit to go elsewhere for their workers. That’s the situation that I think we face here with this. We’ll talk about this some more.
I’m assuming that the minister, and he can correct me…. The Premier’s LNG Working Group that released its recommendations — is this series of 15 recommendations where the minister believes is…? The news release put out by the government was the “Premier’s LNG Working Group recommendation road map.” They called it a road map to get to the solution here around skills training and around TFWs.
Is it the minister’s expectation that these recommendations are going to be the foundation to answer the questions that are being raised about how TFWs get put in place, how British Columbians and Canadians get put in place?
Hon. M. de Jong: I appreciated the member’s reference. I don’t have — I’ll try and get it — the news release that he’s referring to, so I won’t offer a definitive….
S. Simpson: April 3, 2014.
Hon. M. de Jong: April 3, 2014. I won’t be definitive, but hopefully, my response will be helpful to this extent.
We have talked…. I won’t repeat what I have offered about the Premier’s LNG Working Group. I have endeavoured to communicate as best I can the dynamic that prevailed at the negotiating table and the discussions that took place around the question of labour and labour supply and how the interests aligned to the point of leading to the working group.
I have not spoken specifically about the work we are undertaking with the federal government and the Canada-B.C. MOU on a strong resource economy and that agreement to work jointly on labour market information and programming to ensure, specifically, that British Columbians are first in line for jobs across the resource fold, including liquefied natural gas. That’s a specific agreement and initiative that the province and the federal government are aligned upon.
I will offer this to the member, and hopefully, he will accept it as a measure of my practical assessment of how the world is evolving and changing. Capital is mobile. We are, in this case, poised to be the recipient of the benefits of that mobile capital to a degree that we have not experienced before in British Columbia. It is, I think, fair to observe that intellectual capital is also very mobile. A proponent like this will undoubtedly want to tap into that reservoir of intellectual capital that they have accumulated at the same time.
I am gratified to know that, as part of expanding and developing that reservoir of skills and intellectual capital as it relates specifically to LNG, the proponent in this case has made it clear that they see a role for British Columbians to acquire skills and experience by spending periods of time at other facilities operated by the major partner — in this case, Petronas.
The process of developing our skills base and the expertise required to both build and operate these facilities is one that will certainly engage the attention and efforts of government, of labour and of the proponents themselves. It will involve the engagement of, in this case, literally thousands of British Columbians.
It will see some of those British Columbians travel abroad for periods of time to acquire enhanced skills that will be applicable at various stages through the life of this project. On occasion, I expect it will see those who have acquired skills and reside abroad bringing those skills and talents to British Columbia. In many cases, I expect, some of those people will arrive here and become accustomed to what all of us take for granted and decide to plant roots here.
I take comfort from the measures and the cooperative framework that is in place and the principles that have led to the establishment of that vehicle and see a very positive future and a very positive potential for workers in British Columbia — those that are trained and those that are yet to be trained.
S. Simpson: I appreciate the minister’s hope for that cooperative relationship. I would note that in the case of this project development agreement, this was a negotia-
[ Page 9140 ]
tion between the government and Pacific NorthWest. An agreement was signed. Clearly, the proponent, I am assuming, didn’t have enough confidence in that to simply allow it to sit as an agreement. They said: “Put it in law and legislate it.” Fair enough. So we’re here to legislate it. I accept that.
The minister might understand when others who haven’t got even that agreement in place with the detail are saying: “We’re not entirely comfortable with just waiting on a cooperative relationship.” But having said that, I’m going to go specifically….
In the clauses that are in the “Other matters” section there are two very specific initiatives of the government that are mentioned in that section. The minister has talked about both of them. One is the Canada-B.C. memorandum of understanding on a strong resource economy. The second is the working group. I’m going to focus on those two because they are referenced in the PDA, in the agreement.
The “Other matters” section says, “The province is working closely with the federal government and has signed the Canada-B.C. MOU on a strong resource economy, an agreement to work jointly on labour market information and programming to ensure British Columbians are first in line for jobs in resource industries” — obviously, very specifically as it relates to this, to LNG.
Could the minister tell us what that means, in practical terms, to be able to ensure British Columbians are first in line? What are the tools, the pieces, that have to be put in place and implemented to make sure? Presumably, it’s around assessing shortages, demand and shortage, availability — those things. What is it that’s in place that will ensure that to operationalize this MOU?
Hon. M. de Jong: Hopefully, I will begin to address the member’s points and queries, which relate to the means by which we seek to achieve the objective that I hope and believe is a shared objective of all concerned.
The labour market information component to this is very relevant. We talked a little bit about labour market surveys. Labour market information, in terms of outlooks that will need to be, and will be, validated by industry, generally…. Of course, in the case of LNG, there is a specific role for labour to play pursuant to the working group. Let’s call that leg 1 of the four legs, the first leg.
Secondly, there’s the skills-for-jobs blueprint, which really does represent a realignment and a purposeful focus on the part of government, through multi agencies and multi ministries and multiple billions of dollars, to ensure that people are acquiring the skills necessary to take advantage of these opportunities that this will represent.
The trades protocol that the member knows about, involving, again, multiple parties…. Labour is a key part, a key third ingredient in helping to align British Columbia and British Columbians to take advantage of the opportunities that will be presented.
Then, fourthly, the TFW protocol that the member referred to earlier — that is designed to ensure in a very real and practical way that that option is pursued only when British Columbians and Canadians have firstly had an opportunity to participate directly in the working opportunities that a project like this represents.
S. Simpson: Going back, again, to this memorandum. I believe, when I read the note on the memorandum — and I’ll be corrected if I’m wrong — that one of the things that gets referenced here, of course, is this “Accessing Internationally Skilled Workers for LNG,” this July 2015 document. This is the document put out by the government that talks about how you get to those workers.
It’s $22 an hour or more, in demand, based on the labour market outlook and sector validation. That’s how the provincial government identifies foreign workers who are eligible for expedited processing, and that expediting processing is up to ten days.
Then when I go back in the document further, and I read the selection for the foreign worker annex — which is that group of workers I just mentioned — there’s a list of seven areas. I presume this is a PowerPoint, so I’m sure it’s not as complete, by any means, in terms of detail, and I accept that. But nowhere in here does it mention hiring Canadians.
The only mention…. And I read the words carefully. It says “no significant displacement of employment of Canadians or permanent residents.” Now, I read that as saying people who have jobs now will not lose their jobs to be replaced by somebody else. It talks about displacement. It doesn’t talk about jobs, employment. And this is for anybody over $22 an hour, presumably. It says these are the conditions that allow for this exemption, for this ten-day turnaround.
The question I have, then, for the minister…. And ten days is pretty fast. If you’re going to implement this and be able to process and bring people in on ten days, that’s not a lot of time to talk about these things or do much assessment.
[R. Chouhan in the chair.]
How does this get dealt with, in terms of dealing with the question about making sure Canadians and British Columbians get employed? I don’t read anywhere in here where it says that’s a priority.
Hon. M. de Jong: Two things that I’d perhaps like to focus on. One relates to something that the member said. In fairness, I think he shared with the committee his interpretation of one aspect of the document, and that relates to the — I think the term he used — “displacement
[ Page 9141 ]
of Canadians.” He drew that from the document. Those weren’t his words necessarily, but he offered his assessment of what that represents or what that captures and what it doesn’t capture.
I’m going to beg to differ, though, with his assessment, because displacement of Canadians for the purpose that we are considering does not simply mean displacement of a Canadian who is presently employed and who, with the entry of someone from abroad on a temporary basis, would lose that employment. Displacement includes the displacement of opportunity, and that’s a pretty well-established principle in terms of the assessments that take place.
Yes, there are assessments. The labour market impact studies that are part and parcel of the federal process that this exercise relies upon examine the labour market, the availability of Canadian labour to determine whether there is in fact a shortage of available Canadian labour in a particular field.
I think some of the member’s concerns may be attributable to the fact that he has applied a narrower definition to “displacement” than is correct for the purposes of the kinds of labour impact studies that will take place. The question is not just whether an employed Canadian would be disadvantaged but whether a Canadian with the skills, the opportunity that that Canadian has, to enter the workforce in a particular area would also be negatively impacted.
S. Simpson: Moving back to the Premier’s working group. The minister talked earlier about training opportunities. I think he made the reference saying that actually, if we build a number of these projects, the situation may get better because there’ll be that opportunity for people — presumably, some level of apprenticeships, whatever — on the projects, and other skilled workers will be coming into the fore who may not be there today.
When I look at the recommendations, the strategies for the 15 recommendations of the working group, recommendation 9 says: “aspire to a goal of…25 percent overall of the apprenticeable trades workforce on LNG-related construction projects.” Then it talks about whether funding for apprentices can come from industry or government, so it’s not clear there. But clearly, the goal is to have a formula, which is a pretty good formula — one in four, 25 percent apprenticeships on these projects.
Presumably, this is a document that the industry signed on to and agreed to. They certainly do have significant representation on that working group, including a number of reasonably senior people, like David Keane and Bruce Wells and others.
Could the minister tell us if that’s the goal? Presumably, because again…. The “Other matters” section talks about the working group, and it talks about addressing skills training and workplace planning and how that’s an important part and is included to that extent in the agreement.
How does that get operationalized? How do we get an assurance, or are there any assurances or any place for assurances, that companies will in fact take on a significant percentage — maybe it’s 25; maybe it’s less — of apprentices? Is there any requirement around apprentices at all that’s actually enforceable?
Hon. M. de Jong: There is an aspect to this that we’ve sort of touched upon a little bit, and maybe I’ll return to it for the moment. This cooperative framework that the member and I are discussing through this portion of the debate is unique in the sense that it was very much absent. We have, over the course of the discussion and debate around this bill, spoken in various ways about the experience in Australia. This was absent, I am advised, from the Australian example, and its absence revealed itself in a very negative way.
We have set a goal. We have set a target. We have done so happily, not on a unilateral basis but collectively with the players and the parties who must work together to realize on that objective. The proponent, labour, government — no single party can, on their own, achieve this. We are going to have to work together.
The role for government, to be clear, is very, very significant in terms of aligning our apprenticeship programs in a way that will facilitate taking advantage of the opportunities that exist. I don’t underestimate the magnitude of the task that the Jobs Ministry is confronted with and the magnitude of the work that they are doing. That role for government in assisting to realize on this objective is very real.
I suppose, if we look ahead, the significance of that cooperative relationship and the manner in which it plays out over time will reveal itself and have implications for another phenomenon that will have a practical place and a realistic place in the evolution of this project, and that’s labour negotiations that will occur around collective agreements from time to time.
Not that the member has suggested this, but others in this debate and others that I have encountered have mistakenly suggested that once these vehicles or once these mechanisms or once these frameworks are settled upon, the parties simply go their separate ways and begin, in isolation from one another, to do their work.
Nothing could be further from the truth. There is a very practical dimension to the need to work together. As it relates to the relationship between workers and employers, the classic example and ongoing example of that will be the engagement that occurs through the collective bargaining process.
S. Simpson: Well, what we know is they don’t go their own ways, and we have clear examples in the private sector that have been fairly successful and of a major scale. The one that jumps out at me right now is Rio Tinto.
[ Page 9142 ]
Project labour agreement and a $5.6 billion or $5.7 billion project. It dealt with a range of those things. It was a negotiation that put that agreement in place.
Different parties probably feel better about different aspects of it, but they did an agreement. They put it in place. They understood the terms. Everybody worked in those terms. I think most people would say the Rio Tinto project has proven to be pretty successful.
That process is coming to a close right now. That agreement played a significant role in ensuring things like there isn’t labour dispute and that there are rules on how you settle things around who works, who doesn’t work, how people get selected. So there clearly are examples of that.
I don’t know what the situation is…. I don’t claim to understand the situation in Australia, for example. The minister has referenced Australia. We talked about it earlier, as well, because of being directed there by the Minister of Natural Gas. He directed us to Australia when he talked about the PDA and told us that that was one of the models that was used and we should go look at that. So we did what the minister advised us to do.
When I read the piece, though, about the labour side…. This is what the Barrow Island agreement says: “Except in those cases where the joint venturers can demonstrate it is not reasonable and economically practicable so to do, use labour available within Western Australia, using all reasonable endeavours to ensure that as many as possible of the workforce are recruited from the Pilbara” — I don’t know what that is, but I’m assuming it’s a specific area or group — “or if such labour is not available, then, except as aforesaid, use labour otherwise available within Australia.”
They have been clear that they had to demonstrate it was not reasonable and economically practical to do so. It didn’t say these companies couldn’t go and find people elsewhere to do it. They just had to prove that they had actually looked and couldn’t find people or that the price was so over the top that they couldn’t do the deal.
That still provides a lot of flexibility for, in this case, those who are called the joint venturers, but it does put some obligation on them to actually prove that they did something. That’s the situation there, and I think that that becomes part of the challenge. I’m sure that the minister may talk to that.
When I look, again, at the recommendations from the Premier’s working group, an interesting one…. This is one that actually references…. Presumably, this would count for the Rio Tinto folks and others. It says: “Target areas of opportunity by focusing on workers finishing construction or other projects in all areas of the province.”
That assumes that there becomes some priority. We know the nature of the construction industry is that construction is not temporary work. It’s just the nature. You go. You do a project. You move to the next project. That’s how that business works, whether it be contractors or the people who work for them.
How does that particular piece get applied here in terms of creating some priority of opportunity for those workers who might be finishing other work, British Columbians, who then may see the opportunity coming to move to this project? How will that work?
Hon. M. de Jong: Before I get to the nub of the question, I wonder if I might offer a quick response to a few things that the member said parenthetically in his last submission to the committee. He referred to, I think in a positive way, the merits of project labour agreements. The example he used was Rio Tinto, I think.
I should point out that nothing in the material before us today precludes a similar type of arrangement from being arrived at. I don’t believe the government is a party to the project labour agreement that the member has mentioned. The government is not an essential party to those types of arrangements.
Insofar as proponents seek to eliminate as much uncertainty as they can around labour supply and cost, it seems entirely reasonable that they and representatives for the workers that they will be engaged with may arrive at a similar type of arrangement. Secondly, the member, in referring to I can’t remember which project, spoke to some of the language that is included in that project around encouraging the retention of local and regional and, ultimately, national workers — workers that are located locally in the region or in the country; in that case, Australia.
We have those requirements as part of the ordinary processes associated with sourcing labour outside of the country. Much of the conversation we had a few moments ago was about outlining the requirements that exist through the federal agency, the agreements that exist relating to the completion of labour market information and labour market impact studies. So that is an ongoing exercise.
The cooperative work as a practical matter…. To come back to the example that the member has offered, where a worker or a group of workers are coming to the end of their time at a particular project — let’s take a scenario where we’re talking about larger projects: a Site C, a second LNG facility — the means by which the parties have become engaged surely is our best guarantor.
Representative bodies, organized labour bodies, would be in a position to say: “Hold on. Before we begin to explore the markets outside of British Columbia and outside of Canada for workers, we have workers who are finishing at this project site and will be available in the next three months.”
Our hope is that by fostering that collective, cooperative energy in a very practical way, we will be better equipped to facilitate the smooth transference of workers from one opportunity to another.
[ Page 9143 ]
Now, I’m not underestimating the magnitude of the task at hand and the requirement that the parties continue to work cooperatively together. The member mentioned a project labour agreement and the opportunity that that represents to facilitate that process. I think that is true.
I think the collective bargaining process generally can be a mechanism to enhance that, and then we have these other tools that have been created to foster and facilitate the collective energy of the three parties involved.
The last thing I’ll say is this, because it does tend a little bit to get lost in the discussion of this. In the example where one project is ending in one part of the province and significant numbers of workers will become available for deployment, if they wish, in another part, there is no question that from a purely economic point of view it is in the employer’s or proponent’s best interest — they will be motivated by, if nothing else, economics — to tap into that wealth and reservoir of talent within British Columbia.
So all of that, I would suggest, will operate in favour of developing these opportunities for British Columbians. And hopefully, and we believe, the additional mechanisms and tools that have been created will enhance us in achieving that objective.
S. Simpson: A couple of observations. The first I guess I’d make…. The minister talked about labour agreements, union negotiations — those processes. For half the potential workforce, that is an option. For the other half of the workforce, they’re non-union. These are skilled workers, and they’re going to be working this project too.
You can look around at where contractual agreements or where successful contractors are coming from, and I suspect it’s going to be, oh, 50-50 or so between those contractors who are union contractors and have agreements and those who are non-union and have agreements to build parts of this industry as well. I think it’s a bit of a mixed bag there.
In terms of project labour agreements, the minister talked about the government not being a party to that. Of course, the government has been party to project labour agreements before and has now, obviously, moved away from that in the case of Site C, but that’s a choice the government has made.
The bit of a difference here is we’re talking about the creation of a new industry, and we’re talking about an industry that is going to take a very valuable and finite asset that belongs to us as British Columbians. We get two benefits out of this. There are two things British Columbia can get out of this deal.
The first one is a return to the treasury, whether that comes from royalties, from the tax regime, from whatever. What’s the return to the treasury? We have already heard criticism of what we have here. We know that, among others, Mr. Brown, in his comments on this — who understands something about these issues — is critical about the return to the treasury.
We know the decision by government, and maybe it’s the decision that had to be made. And we supported the decision. We voted for the legislation to cut the rate from 7 to 3½ percent — all of that. So the return to the treasury…. there’s still an argument that it will be significant, but it certainly has been squeezed.
The other benefit is people getting to go to work. Those are the two significant benefits for British Columbia. More money to pay for health care and education, and people got good jobs.
So the government does have an obligation to pursue both of those. Pretty detailed on what…. The government has found an acceptable way to go when it comes to the return to the treasury, and that’s all in this agreement and in the legislation that was passed in the spring. Not so much on the job side — not so much there.
So that becomes the challenge here — that you don’t see that clear indication. I think the government has at least an obligation to be part of the conversation about how those companies meet those objectives for those jobs moving forward.
I’m going to go now to recommendation 15 from the working group. It says: “Further refine and develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers in the context of the overall strategy that identifies the workplace needs of the LNG opportunity.” Then it goes on to talk about a skills-training plan, but let’s just go with this. “Refine and develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers in the context of the overall strategy.”
First, I’ll ask the minister: should I accept that that strategy is this July document? Is that the strategy? And if that is, then not a lot there, but fair enough. Or is there some other strategy that will be put in place, and if so, what force does it have?
Hon. M. de Jong: The member has referred to recommendation 15 and, I think, is posing the question: how do we intend to breathe life into that and the role that the various agencies will play?
I should say this. I think he asked this specifically as well: does the document he’s been referring to represent the strategy? The answer is no. It does not.
If I were to use a term intended to describe the tool belt and what the various mechanisms might be to achieve the underlying principle….
The body that is largely responsible for operationalizing, if you will, recommendation 15 is the TFW working group, whose deliberations are underway to develop the criteria, to develop the strategy for the application of the criteria. Labour proponents, government, First Nations — that work will continue.
Knowing what I know of the people involved and the interests that they represent and take very seriously, we will hear — the public will hear and the member will hear
[ Page 9144 ]
— in the event that they are not able to settle upon a strategy that each one of those communities finds reasonable and appropriate.
By the way, I do contrast that…. I understand the point that says: “Well, we have these other agreements from Australia, which at least make reference to these matters.” And they do. I would suggest this: the manner in which they make reference to them can hardly be described as an ironclad guarantee of anything.
I understand that the member says: “But at least they are referred to in this document.” But the document in that case was the product of a bilateral discussion. The process that we are describing here involves far more than just the proponent and government. It involves labour itself, First Nations.
I believe I can make a plausible argument that says that in addressing this feature of what we know will arise on a project and projects of this magnitude, we are better off in swinging the door open and inviting agencies other than just the proponent and government into the room to settle upon a strategy. We are better off inviting labour, First Nations, to play a direct role in determining the appropriate approach to this issue in a way that will ensure that the maximum benefits accrue to British Columbians and Canadians.
S. Simpson: I appreciate the minister’s comments. I might suggest that it might have been a worthwhile thing, at some portion of the discussion around the PDA and the limits of its parameters, if the minister had chosen to engage some other people in the discussion around the parameters of the agreement.
Obviously not the detail of the tax regime that would be developed between the government and Pacific NorthWest — I appreciate that that’s a conversation between those two parties. But when you put the limited parameters on that agreement that we see, it might have been worthwhile to have had some discussion with some others there. That didn’t happen.
You have now, the minister says, the TFW working group, which will kind of put the meat on the bones, presumably, for what recommendation 15 references.
Two questions, or a two-part question. First of all, should they be successful in putting together that framework the parties can agree on…. It’s all speculative, but let’s speculate in the positive and say they can do that. Then what is the commitment of government to apply that to projects that move forward — to say, “Okay, this is the agreement of all of the parties, including the industry interests, and we expect this to be applied to projects moving forward,” presuming they can come to some kind of agreement?
What’s plan B for operationalizing the position that the Premier has endorsed on temporary foreign workers from the LNG working group if that committee can’t come to an agreement?
Hon. M. de Jong: I was going to say something off the top. The member triggered something in my mind.
One of the components of what the member said that confused me a little bit around the question of enforcing the agreement — presumably in a scenario where the parties have collectively and cooperatively arrived at an approach and an agreement — is that they have all agreed to an approach and a mechanism for achieving that approach. The notion of enforcement in that scenario is a little different.
I suppose one should await the results of the agreement, assuming one emerges, for how the parties themselves determine that they will secure performance on the part of all of those who participate.
Perhaps a more interesting aspect of the member’s question, though, relates to a situation, as he says, where there isn’t an agreement and what takes place in that scenario.
Without oversimplifying this, I would say that just as the governments today — and I include the province and, certainly, the federal government — play a role across the economic landscape for determining access to people abroad for employment purposes, nothing has occurred that in any way diminishes the sovereign authority of both the government of Canada and the government of British Columbia, individually in their spheres of constitutional responsibility and collectively where we have agreements to exercise that jurisdiction.
We believe the interests of everyone are better served — thus far, labour, First Nations and the proponent have agreed — when we work collectively and cooperatively on these matters.
But relating to what has been developed so far, nothing in this agreement or this legislation in any way diminishes the capacity of the governments of Canada and British Columbia to exercise their sovereign and constitutional responsibility to ascertain the manner, if at all, that parties access workers on a temporary basis beyond our borders.
S. Simpson: I concur with the minister’s last comment. I think that people who look at this agreement and this piece of legislation would say what we are asking the government to do is define that and enunciate what that looks like in here so that we understand what the obligations are and aren’t, because it is government’s responsibility.
In terms of the agreement…. I find it interesting, and I would, again, concur. I mean, recommendation 15 says: “Further refine and develop a process for the use of temporary foreign workers.”
All of the people engaged in this process — whether it be senior government officials, senior industry officials, senior labour officials, senior First Nations representatives and leadership — are all people who understand something about negotiation and about how to come to
[ Page 9145 ]
a deal. They all are sophisticated and professional at it. If there’s a deal to be found, they will negotiate to a deal.
You can be assured that they all know, as well, that when these deals get put in place, the strength of the deal often is based on the ability to quantify it and to enforce it, whatever it is — to quantify it and make sure everybody agrees on the facts and then to enforce the intent of the agreement. That can be fairly passive, that enforcement, but there’s usually some tool to do that other than “trust me” in agreements of this magnitude. I think that’s the question there — how that works.
The question I have…. I think this will be my last question. If there is an agreement from the working group that lays out 15 and puts a process in place for how 15 works, around how temporary foreign workers are engaged in the LNG industry, how does the government respond to that other than saying: “We like it” or “We don’t like it”?
Presuming the government says, “We accept this,” because it has been that cooperative process that the minister talks about…. If they reach that agreement, is the government committed to then operationalizing that in some substantive way so that everybody in the industry knows what their representatives agreed to?
I’m assuming the industry representatives will be at that table and will be part of that deal. They won’t be excluded from the discussion. They’re going to be a key part of that discussion. If there’s an agreement there, is the government prepared to say: “All the parties were represented, all of the parties came to a reasonable understanding about how to do this, and now we’re going to make this the standard for this industry in this province”?
Hon. M. de Jong: I’m cautiously optimistic that we will see the work of this group mature into an agreement. The member has some experience around arriving at protocols, agreements, understandings.
My sense is that when that happens, it is generally because the parties involved, on the one hand, believe that there are benefits to be received from agreeing. It generally involves some compromise too, but at the end of the day, they see benefits for the people that they represent emerge from the agreement.
The other reality is in achieving those benefits for their constituency, for their members, for their agency, they assume certain obligations. The two generally go together. If one of the parties decides that they want to enjoy the benefits without fulfilling their obligations, it won’t take long for the other parties to say: “No, hold on. You’re not abiding by the construct that we have mutually agreed upon.” On a project of this sort, with a long-term relationship where there will be interests to proceed expeditiously and on a schedule, there are consequences.
There are consequences for a breakdown in that relationship that can reveal themselves in a variety of ways and, generally, to the detriment of the parties.
At the same time, the abiding interest — not just interest, but ability — and overriding ability that the governments — the Crown in the right of the province of British Columbia and the Crown in the right of Canada — have to determine these matters ultimately prevail. The member kindly indicated this might be his last specific inquiry and submission during these parts of the proceedings.
I simply wish to state again that the objective for the government of British Columbia could not be clearer. We pursue and have pursued this opportunity on behalf of British Columbians and incurred the commentary — at times, the criticism. We have done so, first and foremost — because the member mentioned two benefits that flow from this, and I tend to place them in the reverse order that he did — to facilitate opportunities for British Columbians and all of the good things that flow from that. And, yes, there is a revenue component to that that flows to the Crown. But first and foremost, we have pursued this with a view to generating new opportunities for British Columbians and are guided at every single step of the way by the desire to realize on that objective.
We have opted for an approach to this that is different than what has revealed itself elsewhere, insofar as the framework and the cooperative framework that we have been a party to and have developed with other partners.
At the end of the day, again, my experience is — and perhaps if you had asked me this 20 or 22 years ago, I might have had a different answer — that the prospects for realizing on our objective are, I believe, improved by virtue of the steps that have been taken to bring parties together, achieve agreement on what the principles are, achieve agreement on what the objectives are and to continue to work together on an ongoing and continuous basis to adjust to changing circumstances to ensure that we are achieving that, firstly, on behalf of British Columbians and Canadians.
B. Ralston: That was the member for Vancouver-Hastings’ concluding question in that section. I’m going to return now to some further questions in the definition section of the agreement itself.
I’m going to begin with what is described as FEED, front-end engineering and design. I looked up a few definitions of front-end engineering design. One definition was that it’s basic engineering that comes after conceptual design or a feasibility study. It focuses on the technical requirements as well as the rough investment costs for the project.
In the definition that’s here, it seems to be less generic and more specific, because it focuses on “the scope of activities required to achieve the equivalent of an AACE cost engineering class 3 cost estimate.” Can the minister explain what that is and how that might differ from the more generic description of basic engineering coming after conceptual design or a feasibility study?
Hon. M. de Jong: The notion of FEED, or front-end engineering and design…. The member may ask, and then I’ll endeavour to get more information. For the moment, though, I will offer this to the committee, that “AACE cost engineering class 3 cost estimate” is a term and a notion known to the estimating process.
The significance of the definition is that for the purposes of this agreement, the benchmark has been set at 80 percent. I’m advised that that can vary from agreement to agreement. The higher the number, of course, the more certainty there is. But the threshold for the application of the FEED principle for this agreement is 80 percent of the cost and quantity of major equipment.
B. Ralston: Again, some of the reference material I looked at said that…. Obviously, this definition is significant, because it figures into the issue of project certainty. It’s one of the requirements for achieving or determining project certainty, which is a major event in the contract going forward. We discussed this at some length yesterday.
In the way in which it’s described, it’s the step before detailed design or detailed engineering, and it basically establishes a price for the execution phase of the project and evaluates certain potential risks.
Not being familiar with this term prior to its use here and the reference to the class 3 cost estimate, would requiring an 80 percent certainty or percent of the cost and the quantity of major equipment…? In that context, would this be a typical step in a contract, or is this something different that would not be generally used or recognized? I’m just wondering the degree to which this is routine or the degree to which this is unique.
Hon. M. de Jong: I apologize for the delay. The member’s question, I think, was to what extent this is a standard. By that, I mean the class 3 and the 80 percent. My advice is that it can vary. It has emerged on the basis of their project plan. It must be read, with respect to the project certainty matters, in conjunction with all of the other requirements set out under that definition. In and of itself, it doesn’t trigger anything, but in conjunction with the other provisions under that definition, it certainly has significance.
So in other types of projects, a different class, a different percentage. This threshold has emerged as a result of the conversation, the discussion, and is largely influenced, I think, by the proponent’s assessment of their project plan.
B. Ralston: Again, some of the information that I referenced…. One estimate was provided as to how long it might take to achieve this FEED assessment. For a major project the estimate was — I appreciate this varies, and these are unique projects — approximately a year to complete.
As I recall, the Deputy Minister of Finance has some background in engineering. It may be a little rusty, but perhaps he can draw on that, to get a sense of what kind of…. This is obviously something much more detailed than simply an estimate. This is a much more detailed survey and calculation. I just want to get a bit of a sense of the time that this might take. Without being bound by that kind of an estimate, can the minister give some sense of how long it might take — or certainly according to the proponents?
Hon. M. de Jong: The member is right, I’m advised, about this being the establishment of, achievement of front-end engineering and design. It’s a complex and potentially very lengthy process.
The information we’ve been provided with that I can pass on to the member and the committee is that in the case of Pacific NorthWest LNG, we’re advised the work has been ongoing for a lengthy period of time and is very close to completion. That is certainly consistent with the impression we have and that I have shared with the member of the committee and the House — that this proponent seems very anxious and very motivated to begin work and begin this project.
B. Ralston: Just one final question on this topic. Is the definition, including the reference to the AACE cost engineering class three, an internationally recognized definition, or is that a specifically Canadian definition? I’m wondering the degree to which that would be shared by engineers trained elsewhere.
Hon. M. de Jong: Hopefully, this is helpful. The term that we are dealing with is known in engineering circles internationally. It’s not a term or a principle with unique application within Canada. The numbers, of course, the class and the percentage, are unique to this particular project and agreement.
B. Ralston: I want to move now to the definition of “force majeure.” That’s set out in clause 5.1. There’s an extensive definition of it there.
Basically, the principle is events or circumstances that are beyond the control of the proponent that the proponent can’t prevent or overcome and therefore would occasion delay in achieving certain mileposts or goalposts along the way to completing the project. There’s a mechanism for recognizing that and reactivating the time clock, if I could put it that way.
What I’m interested in is 5.1(h). Included in the headline…. There are a number that are, I suppose, more obvious: riot, civil insurrection, rebellion, revolution, hurricanes, war. But in (h) it says: “any discriminatory action or inaction of the province.”
[ Page 9147 ]
Clearly, that seems to be broader than the four headings of arguably or putatively discriminatory action in relation to tax matters and emissions matters. This seems to be very expansive language. I’m wondering why that is there and what the purpose is for having that there as part of the definition of force majeure.
Hon. M. de Jong: I believe the member’s proposition is that the term “discriminatory action” here would apply in circumstances beyond the four change events that we have talked about and trigger other…. I think I agree with that proposition by the member.
The relevance, of course, of the principle of force majeure is defined and limited in the agreement — “discriminatory,” by definition, meaning something that targeted the proponent, the project itself.
We had a little bit of a discussion. It probably went on for too long. But the clearest example of that might be a decision by the Crown to expropriate all or a portion of the lands upon which the project is situated.
I think there would be a compelling argument that that would qualify as a force majeure for the purposes of the agreement. There are undoubtedly others.
But I agree with the member’s proposition that in the case of 5.1(h), the term “discriminatory action” contemplates something beyond the four areas of negative change event that we have been discussing previously.
B. Ralston: The language is: “any discriminatory action or inaction of the province.” Clearly that term is there for the benefit of the proponent, not particularly the province, because in section 5.3 it suspends the performance of obligations under the agreement and extends the time for achieving commercial operations to the extent it’s “delayed by force majeure.”
It would seem to be for the benefit of the proponent. I understand the example that the minister has given. I am wondering, given that the discriminatory heads that have been spoken of earlier were fairly clearly defined, why this very open-ended clause was included in here — in my view, for the benefit of the proponent.
What was the thinking in doing that, given that typical definitions of force majeure are confined to the list of events that are obviously beyond the control of an individual proponent? Weather events, hurricanes, war, strikes, security threats or epidemics — those are all pretty standard. I’m just wondering why this clause was agreed to in this particular version of the agreement.
Hon. M. de Jong: I think the member’s observation and taking note of the presence is a legitimate one. I’d say this — just following through on the conversation here with some of the officials — and that is that in the ordinary course, generally, contracts are the product of a negotiation, an agreement, between two individuals or two corporate entities.
In this case this is an agreement between a corporate entity, to be sure, but the Crown, with significant powers to intervene and create both rules of general application and sometimes rules of specific application. To the extent that a government or a future government chooses to act and chooses to exercise some of that authority and it could be deemed specific discriminatory action, that is a scenario that a company generally doesn’t have to confront when they are contracting with another corporate entity — the state having more powers than your average corporate entity.
B. Ralston: The minister is right, I suppose, but it does seem to me to open up the possibility of prospective liability for the province.
I think in LNG Canada there was reference to drawing water for cooling from the Kitimat River. I’m not sure what the provisions are for drawing water if this plant were to be built in the Skeena River and what cost that would be set at and if, for example, there were a change in the price of water. It’s a bit topical these days.
Would that constitute a discriminatory action? Given the massive quantities of water that this operation might use for cooling, arguably, would that constitute a discriminatory action by the province, giving rise to a force majeure and a negotiation that not necessarily but might lead to some kind of compensation?
It seems to me that it introduces an element of uncertainty into the agreement that’s entirely to the benefit of the proponent and not to the province. After all, part of this discussion that we had about project development agreements was that they’re more typical in the Third World, where arbitrary actions by the state might be more common. Certainly, they’re an effort to limit that risk of those kinds of consequences.
Canada is bound by law. Governments generally act in…. There’s access to the courts and all the attributes that we attribute with our rule of law here. So it would seem that this may result from the experience of this proponent in other jurisdictions in the world. I’m wondering why it was felt, again, necessary to characterize the potential actions of government in that rather bleak and draconian way.
Hon. M. de Jong: In his submission a moment ago, the member alluded to the possibility of triggering an entitlement to compensation or liability. I was reminded by folks here that it would be worthwhile at this point to, in discounting the possibility of that occurring, refer the member to clause 10.18, which contains the very blanket limitation of liability: “…the province will have no financial or monetary liability to the proponent, including with respect to any damages, losses, costs, fees or ex-
[ Page 9148 ]
penses suffered or incurred by the proponent as a result of any action or inaction of the province pursuant to this agreement, except as provided in clauses 3.6 or 10.2, to the extent a determination under section 10.2 is made with respect to clause 3.6.”
The point is that the concern articulated by the member, I think, is addressed fairly conclusively by that provision.
Again, to emphasize, the significance or the relevance of the principle of force majeure, as contained within this agreement, relates only to timelines, for the reasons I’ve just alluded to, with respect to 10.18. It cannot trigger a liability or an entitlement to compensation.
We were thinking, though, riffing off of the member’s example…. I suppose that if the province, a future government, for some reason cut off the proponent’s supply of water for one reason or another, that might trigger the force majeure provisions — but only with respect to the application of the timelines. Again, with reference to 10.18, it creates no compensatory entitlement, no liability on the part of the Crown.
B. Ralston: Looking at 10.18 and the limitation…. This is a first blush, so it’s not a considered opinion. I hope that that will be recognized. It says: “…damages, losses, costs, fees or expenses suffered or incurred by the proponent as a result of any action or inaction of the province, pursuant to this agreement.”
The ambit of the definition “force majeure” was broader than anything contained, any specific head or negotiated item in the agreement. It was any discriminatory action, regardless of whether it was referenced in the agreement or not. That’s how I would read that.
I would say that the limitation of liability might not apply. That would be my caution in that respect. The minister can, I’m sure, tell me that I’m wrong. Given the legal advice that he’s likely to get, I’m sure that it would be prudent to tell me I’m wrong, because one would not want to open up a head of liability when it would be better policy to deny that.
[D. Horne in the chair.]
Even in 5.4, in the definition of force majeure and how it is to be resolved, there is: “(ii) Where possible, the means proposed to be adopted to remedy or abate the force majeure; and (iii) the nature and extent of the obligations affected by, or other consequences of force majeure.” And there’s reasonable diligence. There are a number of steps about how to resolve such an impasse — in this case, were it to be discriminatory action.
Is the minister then saying that in order to resolve a discriminatory action, arguably of the province, that none of these — it’s a fairly open-ended discussion and language here about how those might be resolved — would involve compensation, offsets, recognition of reciprocal financial obligations, nothing at all that would be monetary?
Hon. M. de Jong: Yes. I believe, if I heard the member correctly, that is correct. The application of the term and the principle of force majeure is, for the purposes of this agreement, very specific and very limited.
I wonder, with the member’s indulgence, whether this might be an appropriate time to take a ten-minute recess.
The Chair: The committee will recess for ten minutes.
The committee recessed from 4:04 p.m. to 4:18 p.m.
[D. Horne in the chair.]
B. Ralston: I want to touch upon the definition of “material adverse impact.” This was covered in the briefing, but I think it’s important, perhaps, to place some material on the record as to what that means. This is the calculation of the threshold at which the province or the government would be obliged to pay under the agreement, under the four headings of discriminatory action that are referred to: a change in the LNG income tax, a change in the natural gas tax credit, a discriminatory carbon tax event and a discriminatory GGIRC event.
Can the minister explain — I think this is included in the briefing material, but just for the sake of the record here — what is meant by a material adverse impact and how it would be calculated? There’s a definition here and some sums. I’m assuming the dollar values there are Canadian dollars. Perhaps he could elaborate on that.
Hon. M. de Jong: Maybe I’ll answer generally, and the member may have some more specific questions.
The concept is relevant from this point of view. We’ve talked about how the provisions of the agreement operate such that if there is a change event in one of the four areas that we have spent some time canvassing, there is a process that includes discussion and arbitration and can in certain circumstances lead to an entitlement to indemnification.
One of the hurdles that must be overcome in order for that to occur is there must be what is termed a “material adverse impact.” A change that qualifies as a change event in one of those four areas but has a quantifiable impact of $100,000 would not trigger an entitlement to indemnification or the processes that lead to that.
The term is relevant insofar as it limits the circumstances in which an entitlement to indemnification would exist. The thresholds that are set out there, for the information of the committee and the member, are set out there in Canadian dollars.
B. Ralston: Then, looking at section 3.6, the “Consequences of an adverse change event,” the dollar threshold
[ Page 9149 ]
that’s referred to…. That’s not something that is a condition precedent. The dollar threshold would not have to be proven as a condition precedent to enter into the process to make the calculation.
That could simply be asserted at the outset, perhaps negotiated and ultimately arbitrated, if that were the case, if agreement couldn’t be reached. Only if at that stage it were proven that that was the true or the actual financial consequence of the event would it then be an obligation to pay.
I guess my concern is that…. I want to understand whether simply by asserting that this has a major financial impact without the obligation to prove it…. Would that be sufficient? Would that pass the bar to enter the process, or would there require some more definitive proof of the value of the adverse change event — how much it might cost — before entering into the process to determine what it actually was?
Hon. M. de Jong: I think (a) I understand the member’s question and interest and (b) can point within the agreement to 3.6(d), which I think provides guidance to the scenario the member has described.
A change or an allegation of a change event, delivery of the notice, and then (d) operates to say: “Within one hundred and eighty (180) days after delivery of the notice referred to in clause 3.6(a) the parties shall use all reasonable efforts to agree on compensatory measures. During this period the parties shall provide to each other such information as is reasonably necessary in order to enable the parties to determine the scope and nature of the net impact, if any, of the adverse change event on the proponent.”
That conversation takes place before the conversation shifts to questions of indemnification or compensation or remediation during that 180-day period.
B. Ralston: The definition of “project certainty matters.” We’ve had some considerable discussion of this earlier, but I want to focus on (e) there: “the proponent having the financial resources and a funding plan in place to enable the investment decision for the LNG facility referred to in paragraph (f) to be reached.”
There is in 2.4…. The province would review the material submitted by a proponent who is seeking to be certified, I think the language is, or “satisfied” is the word that…. There’s a requirement from the province to be satisfied that these conditions are met.
In regard to this specifically, the proponent is…. I think people understand what is meant there. But there are the adherence agreements as well, which bring in other partners, and as I understand them, the obligations and the rights are basically transferred to each of the parties.
Is the calculation of financial resources and a funding plan a calculation of the proponent, the lead proponent or the group and all its constituent parts? Would there be an assessment of the financial resources and the funding plan to the degree to which they are participating — the various participants in this agreement or in this consortium? There are a number, so I’m just wondering to what degree there will be due diligence of their financial capacity.
Hon. M. de Jong: We do, under the provisions of this agreement and the adherence agreements, have the ability to trace and engage in the same way with the partners, to the degree that they are participants in this project, as we do with Pacific NorthWest LNG, with whom we have signed the project development agreement. But the various partner agencies — of which Petronas is one, but there are others — are also bound by the terms that afford us the ability to examine and satisfy ourselves that the work has been done and the terms are being adhered to.
B. Ralston: In the agreement, in section 2.1, “Ratification and operation,” the effective date is referred to. That would be triggered by the passage of the legislation and then a cabinet meeting — perhaps tomorrow, if we finish today — which would ratify the agreement, and that would start the clock ticking. That would be the effective date of the agreement. Is that correct?
Hon. M. de Jong: To the member, his question, I believe, was based on the following scenario. Were this bill to pass through the final stages of debate in this House and receive royal assent today and were that to be followed tomorrow with an OIC ratifying the PDA and the adherence agreements, would that mean that tomorrow is the effective date for the agreement? The answer to that is yes.
B. Ralston: Looking at the next clause, “Term of agreement,” I think it’s fairly straightforward, but I just want to confirm this. It would commence in my examples, assuming the effective date, and continue for a period of 25 years after the commercial operations date. Within the agreement, the commercial operations date could take place as late as December 31, 2025. So arguably, a minimum of 25 years, a maximum of 35 years — would that be right?
Hon. M. de Jong: Yes, that is correct.
B. Ralston: Again, on the timetable, we’ve talked about project certainty matters. I know in earlier debate I’ve referenced this.
I just wanted to confirm that in 2.4, the project certainty date, which is calculated from the effective date — in my example, say, tomorrow — would be 24 months after the effective date. That’s the outside limit of when the
[ Page 9150 ]
project certainty date can be reached. If it’s not reached by that time, then there are remedies in the termination section, which we’ve discussed earlier, that would involve ending the agreement should the province so choose.
Basically, from the effective date to the project certainty date or long stop date is 24 months. Is that correct?
Hon. M. de Jong: The member is essentially correct. I am reminded of the ten-day period that allows for a response from the Crown.
B. Ralston: The member for Stikine has a question on project certainty matters which he wishes to ask at this point.
D. Donaldson: Yes, I have a question on section 2.4(d) of the project development agreement we’re considering here. It says: “The project certainty date is the date that the province gives notice to the proponent accepting that the project certainty matters have been satisfied.” In the definitions section of the project certainty matters, there are references to a number of things, including the approval process through the federal government’s Canadian environmental assessment certificate, but there’s no reference to aboriginal title.
Is it the position of the government in this project development agreement that infringement of aboriginal title concern — which are concerns of at least two First Nations hereditary chiefs in connection to this particular project — is not a certainty matter and that the government will proceed with the project development agreement, even in the absence of resolving aboriginal title issues?
Hon. M. de Jong: I think the member has rolled two questions into one. The first one I can answer. It’s fairly self-evident from the definition section, which enumerates what is included within project certainty matters for the specific purpose of the agreement.
The second question, though, I think obliges me to alert the committee to the work that has taken place and the ongoing work that is occurring, which is relevant generally. It is particularly relevant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act work.
I can tell the member, who I know has interests in these matters, that there is very significant engagement involving the Crown in the right of Canada, the Crown in the right of the province British Columbia, the proponent Pacific NorthWest LNG and First Nations representatives.
The other thing I can say is the bilateral nature of this contractual arrangement in no way minimizes, diminishes or excuses the Crown in the right of the province of British Columbia from fulfilling the obligations that we have vis-à-vis First Nations, as those have evolved and emerged over time, whether it be in the sphere of consultation or accommodation. Happily, much good work has occurred, and very positive results have been achieved.
Hopefully, that provides the member with some background to where we are.
A. Weaver: I have one final question to the minister on this topic.
Does the minister have a legal opinion as to the constitutionality of the commitment of this agreement to future governments? In particular, let us suppose that under the constitution a First Nation takes the province to court because its constitutional rights have been violated, in their view, and the courts rule in favour of the First Nation. Does this, then, mean an indemnity would have to be paid to the proponent as a consequence of that because the government has entered into an agreement that puts in an indemnity if something like that were to happen?
Hon. M. de Jong: I’ll try to answer the question by referring a little bit to the question. So if I got the question wrong, the answer might not address the member’s main point of concern.
The first part of the question I thought related to the legal/constitutional authority for the Crown to enter into this agreement in the first place. I can tell the member that there are two reasons that we have convened the Legislature in the heat of the summer to consider this.
One was because we believe, I believe, the agreement enjoys a magnitude of importance and longevity that warrants an examination in a very public forum, and this is that forum. The second reason was to ensure that there was very explicit legal authority to enter into the agreement so we are satisfied that that duty and that legal authority properly exist.
The second part of the member’s question is — and this is where I’m a little bit hypothetical, but that’s kind of what we do in these debates sometimes: what would the impact be of a court coming along and striking down this agreement?
I think the member posed that question in the context of the agreement being struck down for reasons relating to the Crown’s discharge of its duty to First Nations. The member is nodding. This will be a variation of my answer.
The obligation that exists between the Crown — both the Crown in the right of the province of B.C. and the Crown in the right of the government of Canada — is one that flows bilaterally to First Nations, and the existence of agreements that we may sign with others does nothing to diminish or minimize that obligation. So the remedy that the member has alluded to is speculative.
I should put on the record that we believe absolutely that the Crown has discharged our duties, and continues to do so on an ongoing basis, vis-à-vis First Nations and that we have discharged those duties as it relates to consultation and, where appropriate, accommodation.
We do believe that we have satisfied those tests as we
[ Page 9151 ]
know them to be and proceed and commend the legislation and the agreement to the House with that measure of confidence that we have appropriately dealt with the issues and met the obligations that the Crown has vis-à-vis First Nations.
B. Ralston: Perhaps continuing with the theme of court challenges, I’m looking at 3.2(b)(iii), which describes a situation where a court, an arbitrator or a tribunal found that the LNG tax legislation is invalid. That would not constitute a change in the LNG tax event for the purposes of triggering compensation.
On the other hand, in section 3.7 there’s a prohibition against any signatory, presumably the proponent and anyone signing an adherence agreement, to not “commence proceedings to challenge the constitutionality or other legal basis of the LNG tax legislation in whole….” It goes through every permutation one can think of, of where one might lodge an action: “court, tribunal, arbitrator, panel or other judicial or quasi-judicial body.”
I appreciate there may well be a certain constitutional sensitivity to the LNG tax legislation. I don’t expect the minister to talk about that, but I think he’ll understand what I mean.
Is the provision in 3.2 simply insurance in the event that there ever were a challenge that would result from, presumably, the action of a third party? The signatories, by signing the agreement, are explicitly agreeing not to challenge the tax legislation. So is that just a question of insurance against an event that might take place out of legal caution? Is that what we are to conclude from the inclusion of that reference in 3.2(b)(iii)? The two do seem to be somewhat contradictory.
Hon. M. de Jong: With respect to 3.2(b)(iii), which speaks to circumstances in which the parties agree that a change in LNG tax event has not occurred…. The member can see from the language that it does speak to a circumstance in which a third party, or by some mechanism other than the proponent themselves…. Steps have been taken which create a need for the Crown to introduce an amendment to LNG tax legislation to cure a defect identified by the court.
The introduction of that curative provision in this chamber and that amendment…. It is agreed by virtue of this section that that does not qualify as a change in LNG tax event for the purposes that that is significant in the agreement.
B. Ralston: Further in section 7.1, the specific termination rights for the province, again dealing with this issue: “The province may terminate this agreement by notice in writing to the proponent if....(d), a court, an arbitrator or tribunal with competent jurisdiction…has issued an order finding or declaring, in whole or substantial part, the LNG tax legislation to be constitutionally and/or legally invalid….” And if the province hasn’t done something in six months to remedy that, then the province would have the option of terminating the agreement.
Can the minister explain the purpose of this particular section and why it would be contemplated to terminate the agreement rather than simply to sever that tax and the revenue that might flow from it from the other rights and obligations in the agreement?
Hon. M. de Jong: I think the short answer is, as a product of the discussion and negotiation, it is intended to act as a disincentive for those who might seek, after the fact, to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions. We, by the way, based on all of the advice that we have received, are confident that the provisions will withstand judicial scrutiny. Were that ultimately proven not to be the case, the province has preserved the option to terminate and, with it, the certainty and the stability that accrue to the benefit of proponents. So therein lies the secret, in part, to the disincentive.
B. Ralston: So not withstanding 3.7 — where a proponent has agreed, by signing, not to challenge the legislation — this would effectively be the remedy that would be available to the province if the proponent were to breach that term and commence a legal action and be successful in having the legislation struck down. That’s what I’m interpreting that as.
Secondly, because time is getting short and these happy days are almost about to end…. Section 7.4 also says that termination doesn’t give rise to a compensation claim. In the event — and I’m sure that this has been thought of — that this termination right was exercised for reasons in (d)…. I’m taking that the reading of this is that this would specifically provide the province with protection and no obligation to pay tax that had been collected previously under a tax which, in this scenario, had been deemed invalid or unconstitutional by the court. The province would protect the revenue that it had already collected under the statute.
Is that language specifically designed and strong enough to bear that interpretation?
Hon. M. de Jong: Well, I do think the member is correct when he points out that the intention here is to ensure that we have protected the Crown against liability upon termination.
I should say, as well…. In the earlier question we had, the member posed questions about 7.1(d) and who might bring that action, if not the proponent itself. Really, I think what was in the minds — I was reminded a moment ago — of our folks was an industry association, which isn’t technically the proponent, but it certainly
[ Page 9152 ]
understands the interests of the proponent. Industry associations can say all sorts of things and advance all sorts of propositions on behalf of members of that community.
B. Ralston: Indeed, the minister’s answer is very topical.
The next question I have is about section 10.17. The heading is: “Most favoured nations protection.” Again, perhaps following the theme that was set by the minister, there has been recent discussion by an industry association of relief from the provincial sales tax. So would this provision apply if, for a subsequent project, it was decided to provide some relief from the application of provincial sales tax in the construction or building of a subsequent project? Would that benefit, then, according to this clause, also be required to be extended to this proponent?
Hon. M. de Jong: I apologize for the delay.
The first thing — I’m not going to use the member’s example, because I don’t want there to be any doubt or question lingering around the issue that the member has referred to in terms of the PST. The other reason is it actually doesn’t apply insofar as the capacity of the Crown to alter statutes. It doesn’t fall within the ambit of what is being considered here.
Maybe a better way for me to explain this, though, would be to take a scenario with a subsequent proponent in a subsequent agreement where the Crown provided favourable access to land that was not, for example, part of the agreement that we have before us. The proponent here would say: “Well, hold on. That’s a benefit not made available to us.” Then the provisions that are contained within this clause kick into effect.
There’s a mechanism by which a conversation takes place to assess the overall value of that benefit and endeavours to quantify it vis-à-vis the remainder of the agreement.
B. Ralston: The minister said something that I didn’t quite catch. He said that this section would not apply where it involved or required legislative changes within the power of the government. I’m not quite sure what he said, so I wanted to be sure that I understood the qualification that he was putting on entering into this clause. Perhaps he could either repeat it or elaborate upon that answer. I’d appreciate that.
Hon. M. de Jong: Again, with respect to the example that the member advanced originally, I was alerted, reminded about the provisions of subsection 2(1) of the act, which make it clear. “Subject to subsections (2) to (4) and section 9, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the minister may, on behalf of the government, enter into an LNG project agreement under which the government provides to a person an indemnity respecting (a) the amount of additional tax paid by the person in the event of a tax law change, and (b) the person’s direct costs of complying with a greenhouse gas regulatory change.”
A “tax law change,” being a defined term under the legislation, means only “a carbon tax change, an LNG tax change or a natural gas tax credit change.” Therein, that was the point I was trying to make around the applicability of changes to the PST.
B. Ralston: If the future tax law change was not one of these three enumerated and defined carbon tax change, LNG tax change or natural gas tax credit change, it wouldn’t trigger this clause — the most-favoured-nations protection — or, sometimes, as it’s probably known in labour, the me-too clause. Is that what’s being said?
Hon. M. de Jong: I think the point is that it can’t be included in the PDA. The statute that we have before us makes clear what the PDA must be restricted to.
B. Ralston: Would the minister not be concerned that a substantial tax change that benefited a subsequent proponent wouldn’t trigger the provision that we discussed earlier about discriminatory action by the province?
Hon. M. de Jong: I guess the point I was trying to emphasize is that this most-favoured-nation provision doesn’t apply to tax changes and taxes of general application. It applies to agreements, not taxes, which, by definition, are created by the statute and are of general application.
B. Ralston: I wasn’t talking about general tax changes. I was talking about specific tax changes that would benefit a single or a class, if it were to be, of subsequent LNG proponents, not a general tax change but a specific tax change that would benefit them. That would appear to be different from a general tax change. I understand how the agreement works in relation to general tax changes.
Would that change the minister’s answer?
Hon. M. de Jong: It would not.
B. Ralston: In the appendix there’s a reference to a number of matters. Some of them have been discussed at some length — with my colleague from Vancouver-Hastings, skills and training; with the member for Stikine, First Nations; and ambient air quality — but I have a question relating to one of the last ones there — infrastructure.
These are, basically, I suppose, recitals or general agreements between the proponent and the province that these are significant topics that efforts will be made to work on, if I could put it that way.
[ Page 9153 ]
There’s a reference to the northwest community readiness study to ensure that providers are prepared to meet infrastructure. It focuses on provincial infrastructure — roads, airports, bridges, hospitals, policing, schools , municipal infrastructure and essential — service levels.
Has there been…? In the debate at second reading, many members on the government side were quick to quantify the tax benefits. We’ve had some discussion about whether that was based on a chimera or a chimerical number, a hypothetical number — certainly not a market number. Has there been any concomitant effort to quantify the cost of infrastructure were a project to go forward or were several projects to go forward?
Certainly that’s a keen concern. I know that the mayor of Prince Rupert, who was here today, and other mayors in the northeast and in the northwest have expressed concern about how they are going to meet the additional demands of infrastructure changes upon their communities that are required. Has there been any effort to quantify that in dollar terms and give those communities a sense of what might be available to them to meet those challenges?
Hon. M. de Jong: In fact, there have been and continue to be specific discussions and consultations taking place led, on the part of the provincial government, by the Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development. Specific engagement with communities — much of that work, of course, is awaiting or tied to decisions relating to advancing with liquefied natural gas projects.
My own observation…. The member mentioned the interest and concern shown by community leaders — the two that I think were in the precincts today from Port Edward and Prince Rupert. I would say this: yes, they are very much alive to the issue, very much engaged and very much interested in ensuring that the province is there as a partner with them, which is our intention.
I would finally say this. They are very excited and see the challenges associated with ensuring that there is sufficient infrastructure in place to be one of those problems that has eluded their community for far too long — the problem associated with growth and opportunity.
We are, as a government, resolved to work with them. They are fully engaged, and one senses the excitement that exists in their minds and in their communities around the possibility — the now strong possibility — of the first of these projects advancing.
Sections 2 and 3 approved.
On section 4.
B. Ralston: Section 4 says that certain sections of the Financial Administration Act will “not apply to an indemnity provided to a person by the government under an LNG project agreement.”
Subsection 72(8) — and this is one of the sections that, by this section, would not apply — says: “The Minister of Finance must, as soon as possible after the beginning of each fiscal year, lay before the Legislative Assembly a report respecting the guarantees and indemnities approved by the Lieutenant Governor in Council or the Treasury Board during the preceding fiscal year.”
As I read that section, what this section proposes is that when indemnities are paid, if they were to be paid under this agreement, there will be no requirement to publish them and publicize them in the normal way. Can the minister explain the purpose for excluding that section from this act — or those three subsections of the Financial Administration Act from this act?
Hon. M. de Jong: I was just cross-checking my recollection. In the event that there were to be an indemnification payment, the mechanism by which it’s paid out is a statutory appropriation. It is, therefore, disclosed not in the bowels of some 50-page report but in a very specific way in the financial statements as a specific statutory appropriation. It will be fully disclosed.
B. Ralston: By disclosed publicly, then, is the minister saying that it would be gazetted, or would it be in the annual compilation that comes forward once a year chronicling all the payments, of which there are thousands and thousands? I’m not sure that that’s a more transparent way to disclose the payment. Perhaps the minister can just correct me if I’m wrong on that.
Hon. M. de Jong: Cross-referencing again, in this case with the deputy. The statutory appropriations as disclosed — that just happened last week. The statutory payments is a pretty short list: forest fires and a few other things. It will be noticeable and feature pretty evidently where a statutory appropriation relating to an indemnity has been paid.
B. Ralston: So the minister is saying that this is to enhance the publicity attached to any such payment as opposed to diminish it. That seems to be what he’s saying, and that’s why publication in the previous way, in a report respecting indemnities, would be excluded. Is that what he’s saying?
Hon. M. de Jong: Yes.
Sections 4 to 10 inclusive approved.
Title approved.
Hon. M. de Jong: With thanks to all members and the
[ Page 9154 ]
member for Surrey-Whalley in particular, I move the committee rise, report the bill complete without amendments.
Motion approved.
The committee rose at 5:23 p.m.
The House resumed; Madame Speaker in the chair.
Report and
Third Reading of Bills
BILL 30 — LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
PROJECT AGREEMENTS ACT
Madame Speaker: Members, please take your seats to assist in the taking of the division.
Bill 30, Liquefied Natural Gas Project Agreements Act, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed on the following division:
YEAS — 43 | ||
Horne | Sturdy | Bing |
Hogg | Yamamoto | Michelle Stilwell |
Stone | Fassbender | Oakes |
Wat | Thomson | Virk |
Rustad | Sultan | Hamilton |
Reimer | Ashton | Morris |
Hunt | Sullivan | Cadieux |
Lake | Polak | de Jong |
Clark | Coleman | Bond |
Letnick | Barnett | Yap |
Thornthwaite | McRae | Plecas |
Lee | Kyllo | Tegart |
Throness | Bernier | Larson |
Foster | Dalton | Martin |
| Gibson |
|
NAYS — 28 | ||
Hammell | Simpson | Robinson |
Farnworth | Horgan | Dix |
Ralston | Corrigan | Fleming |
Austin | Chandra Herbert | Fraser |
Karagianis | Eby | Mungall |
Bains | Elmore | Shin |
Heyman | Darcy | Donaldson |
Krog | Trevena | D. Routley |
Simons | Weaver | Chouhan |
| Holman |
|
J. Horgan: I know it’s late in the day for members to be going out and getting a birthday card for the member for Vancouver–Point Grey, but you’ve still got one more day to find something for the member for Port Coquitlam, who, again this year, is demonstrating that he is older than I am.
I would like ask the House if, in lieu of a card, they would please give the member for Port Coquitlam a warm round of applause for having yet another birthday. [Applause.]
Personal Statement
SERVICE TO LEGISLATURE
AND MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION
M. Dalton: I would like, first of all, to recognize in the gallery my beautiful wife, Marlene. I only have one wife, and she is beautiful, and she is Marlene. That’s for the record.
In a few days we will be celebrating our 30th wedding anniversary. I want to express to her my joy and appreciation for the support that she’s been to me all these years. It takes a very special woman to do that, a lot of patience and forbearance. I want to publicly say that I love you, Marlene.
As the members may know, I am in the federal nomination, and if I win, this will be my last time that I have to speak in the Legislature as an MLA. Marlene and I would like to thank members on both sides of the House for your friendship. We have a great deal of memories here, and it’s been a privilege to work on issues of importance to British Columbians.
Though I am officially an independent, I specifically want to express my thanks to the Premier and the members of the B.C. Liberal caucus for the privilege it has been to be part of your team for the past six years. I have a tremendous amount of respect for you, your competency and your passion to make this province an even better place than it already is.
I’ve had a great deal of satisfaction in the knowledge that during my years here I’ve been able to make a difference on many issues and be of help to many people.
I want to say thank you to my support staff and all the work they do daily: Mark Duyns; Sharen Parkinson; Carly Fedyshen, who is on a mat leave; and Corrine Brosz, who stepped in when Rod Deacon passed away about a month or so ago.
Finally, I want to say thank you to the residents of Maple Ridge and Mission for giving me the honour to represent them provincially since 2009. I’ve worked hard for them.
I hope to continue to represent constituents at the federal level. If I’m not successful in the nomination and I’m back in the fall, I hope that you’ll still extend to me the right hand of fellowship.
Thank you very much.
[ Page 9155 ]
Madame Speaker: I am advised that the Administrator is in the precinct. Please remain in your seats.
His Honour the Administrator requested to attend the House, was admitted to the chamber and took his place in the chair.
Royal Assent to Bills
Deputy Clerk:
Liquefied Natural Gas Project Agreements Act
Ombudsperson Amendment Act, 2015
In Her Majesty’s name, His Honour the Administrator doth assent to these acts.
His Honour the Administrator retired from the chamber.
[Madame Speaker in the chair.]
Hon. M. de Jong: I move that the House, at its rising, do stand adjourned until it appears to the satisfaction of the Speaker, after consultation with the government, that the public interest requires that the House shall meet or until the Speaker may be advised by the government that it is desired to prorogue the fourth session of the 40th parliament in the province of British Columbia. The Speaker may give notice that she is so satisfied or has been so advised, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice and, as the case may be, may transact its business as if it has been duly adjourned to that time and date. And in the event of the Speaker being unable to act owing to illness or other cause, the Deputy Speaker shall act in her stead for the purpose of this order.
Hon. M. de Jong moved adjournment of the House.
Motion approved.
Madame Speaker: Hon. Members, I wish you safe travels. This House, at its rising, stands adjourned until further notice.
The House adjourned at 5:42 p.m.
Copyright © 2015: British Columbia Hansard Services, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada