2015 Legislative Session: Fourth Session, 40th Parliament
HANSARD

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.

The printed version remains the official version.

official report of

Debates of the Legislative Assembly

(hansard)

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Afternoon Sitting

Volume 23, Number 5

ISSN 0709-1281 (Print)
ISSN 1499-2175 (Online)

THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

The House met at 1:33 p.m.

[Madame Speaker in the chair.]

Speaker’s Statement

REQUIREMENT FOR RESPECTFUL DEBATE

Madame Speaker: Good afternoon, hon. Members.

I have reviewed the transcript of remarks by the member for Cowichan Valley prior to the noon adjournment. The rules governing parliamentary debate require that members’ comments are respectful of this institution and of each other. Parliamentary debate can, at times, evoke considerable emotion and passion. However, as Speaker, I will ensure that members do not resort to disrespectful conduct or personal allegation, be they directed to individual members or groups of members.

This legislative chamber is the heart of our parliamentary democracy in British Columbia. All members must contribute to debate without using language that impairs the dignity of our proceedings.

Personal Statement

APOLOGY FOR COMMENTS
MADE IN THE HOUSE

B. Routley: Thank you, hon. Speaker.

I apologize unreservedly if I have offended or hurt anyone with my comments or statements, particularly you, Speaker, and, I know, the member from Prince George. I apologize for my statements.

Routine Business

Introductions by Members

A. Dix: I had the pleasure just a few minutes ago of meeting a class of students from David Thompson Secondary School in Vancouver. They were unbelievably enthusiastic, I have to say, even at meeting government MLAs, never mind opposition MLAs. It was great to have them there.

I think one of the remarkable things that we do together in this Legislature is to greet people who come here and who find, in the institutions that we represent here, real excitement and even express their willingness to stand for office here one day.

On behalf of all members, we want to wish the students from David Thompson our very best for a visit in Victoria.

[1335]

R. Sultan: I seek leave to present a petition.

Leave granted.

Petitions

R. Sultan: Emily Kelsall is a student in grade 11 at Collingwood School in West Vancouver, and she has collected 165 signatures on a petition which reads:

“The petition of the undersigned, the youth of West Vancouver–Capilano, states that the Port Metro Vancouver’s proposal to increase exports of American thermal coal through the Fraser Surrey Docks coal transfer facility by eight million tonnes annually would pose extensive risks to the health and well-being of the communities in proximity to rail lines, port facilities and power plants.”

Dated the 30th of March.

Orders of the Day

Hon. M. Polak: In this chamber I call continued second reading debate on Bill 9, the Workers Compensation Amendment Act, and in Committee A, the estimates of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

Second Reading of Bills

BILL 9 — WORKERS COMPENSATION
AMENDMENT ACT, 2015

(continued)

B. Routley: Again, I’d like to reiterate that we will be supporting this bill and these changes as a move in the right direction.

The steelworkers did leave the recent hearings, and I’m extremely concerned about that and the impact that has not only on this kind of legislation but on the overall getting to the truth of the matter. While the Babine inquest is scheduled for July of this year, the Lakeland inquest began on the 5th of March. The steelworkers tell me that from the outset they have had strong concerns that the inquest would be limited in its ability to determine the causes of the explosion and the circumstances leading up to it.

At no time have the steelworkers believed that there was ever the proper venue to determine the entire cause of the explosions or how both investigations were so badly botched. Nevertheless, the steelworkers believed that it was important to participate and do our utmost to help uncover as much of the truth as possible in this coroner’s hearing.

Sadly, the inquest thus far has failed to produce the truth. At the outset, John Rogers, legal counsel from Victory Square, who was acting on behalf of the woodworkers and their families through the steelworkers, endeavoured to ensure there was a full hearing of the facts, including the regulatory environment administered by WorkSafe B.C. They wanted to ensure that that was fully canvassed, despite the fact that they were ruled against by the coroner in their request to subpoena the former
[ Page 7298 ]
CEO of WorkSafe, David Anderson, and other senior management.

The steelworkers complain that they’ve been thwarted in their efforts to ensure the coroner’s jury would have the full ability to see all pertinent documents, and their counsel wanted the opportunity to cross-examine all appropriate individuals. Instead, the steelworkers felt that there was a kind of defensive posturing by Lakeland’s legal representatives and, in particular, those representing WorkSafe B.C. They believe that the inquest essentially ground to a halt and has led to the workers’ representatives withdrawing, which I believe is a sad state of affairs.

Again, the purpose of the legislation and the recommendations of Macatee and others to make improvements is definitely worthwhile, so this bill can be supported in that regard. But I’m concerned when I hear that the workers’ representatives are saying…. And Mr. Steve Hunt was going to give testimony. In advance of his testimony, it had been made abundantly clear by WorkSafe B.C. that they were essentially going to take actions to avoid any scrutiny of what happened in previous events in the timeline leading up to the events and the accident.

[1340]

Any of us that have been involved in accident investigations…. And that certainly has been something that I’ve done in my career as safety chairman of a mill with 550 employees, to ensure that the accident was thoroughly investigated and that we didn’t simply conclude at the end of the day that the worker was at fault — which, by the way, is obviously something that is an easy conclusion to come to. You know: the worker stumbled into the hole. Well, wait a minute, why was the hole there? Don’t we need to fix the hole rather than saying: “Well, what was the worker thinking stumbling into the hole?” That’s a simple example of the kind of problem.

The Steelworkers say they cannot lend credence to a process that they feel is fundamentally flawed and fails to ask the most critical questions to get to the bottom of the root causes to ensure that this kind of situation doesn’t happen again. I think we can all acknowledge that that would be a worthwhile endeavour, indeed — to really get to the bottom of it.

It should be one of the absolute demands that the process be transparent and thorough and that there should be nothing withheld. There should be no blockages or walls that the workers’ representatives should have to try to plow through or go over. They should be torn down. The authorities responsible should be doing everything to work with the workers’ representative. Apparently, my understanding is that isn’t happening. That’s why, I’m told, the Steelworkers’ position at this point is to call for a public inquiry, and they’re asking other unions and the public involved to join with that.

I was also told by the president of the Steelworkers that he, too, supported the amendments that were being made as a move in the right direction, that there were definitely some good parts to the new legislation that make it worthwhile, in a sense. But it’s unfortunate that at this juncture, when workers in both of those mills simply want to get to the bottom of exactly what transpired.

Hon. Speaker, I’ll leave it to you to determine…. I do very much respect your views and your opinion. I’m doing my best to be very careful with my words as a result of my noonhour reprimand that I should be careful in how I convey my emotions and my concerns about these matters.

I do want to emphasize in the strongest possible terms that if you’re a worker and you feel somewhat powerless by the system, if you’re a worker and you discover — whether it’s on a non-union site or, in this case, a unionized site — that the workers’ needs and concerns and questions can’t be addressed or will not be addressed, that leads to a feeling that the system is somehow flawed and unfair.

I hope that you would see it from the context of how a worker might feel, if you imagined yourself walking through that plant gate every day and, essentially, having no power. When you walk through that gate, you hang your rights at the door to any say in, ultimately, how all of the rules and regulations are going to be developed. You might have a say in the lunchroom. They might come and ask you what you think, but ultimately, the rules and the regulations are going to be written by somebody with higher authority.

When we have a situation like this, clearly, the system failed somehow. There’s no question about that. Now, is it in multiple ways? Will we ever get to the bottom of the fact that at the hearing there was evidence given that the dust explosions were known about? I was surprised to read in the note from the Steelworkers that there was even a fireball at the mill prior to the ultimate explosion. There had been another event that had not been properly…. When you have an event that could potentially lead to injury or even death, there’s an obligation to report that to WorkSafe B.C., or the Workers Compensation Board. That didn’t happen.

[1345]

There are a number of errors and omissions that, tragically, can lead to a death. I have seen that before — simple errors or omissions. I can use the example in the Youbou mill, where there was a tipple table. They forgot to put a strap cable and bolt it to the ceiling. They should, at the end of the shift, have a brand-new tipple table. The evidence that came out later was: “Yes, we knew we were supposed to put a cable there and a clamp, and we were supposed to be able to clamp it to the ceiling with ¾-inch cable.” But it was a new system, and the evidence was that it was an error or an omission — that they had simply forgot to do it at the end of the shift.

Tragically, the next morning an 18-year-old young man showed up for work with his wheelbarrow and his
[ Page 7299 ]
rake and his shovel, walked underneath a 2½-tonne tipple table, touched a pencil whisker switch — just touched it with his rake — and down came 2½ tonnes of steel and squashed him like a bug.

I got called. It was in the middle of the night. I got called, and they said: “We need you, as safety chairman, to come down here right away. There’s been a fatality.” When I went into that mill and walked down the walkway and saw this figure draped with a millwright’s blanket, essentially, my heart sunk. I realized that he was still trapped. It was a horrible, outrageous situation to witness and to be involved with.

The poor millwrights were trying to figure out whether to activate the machine and literally start it up so you could lift him out of there — it was like a mousetrap — or if they were going to cut bolts and nuts and try to tear the machine apart.

Anyway, I know I’m straying, but I’m making the point, I hope, that without due diligence…. This bill starts to talk about compliance and enforcement. You know, my mistake today…. Let me use myself as an example. Us human beings are, after all, human. We don’t always do the right thing, and I apologize again.

I don’t want to offend people or hurt people, but sometimes I have a way of going above and beyond, and again, for that I’m truly regretful and sorry. I want you to know that I’m trying to emphasize in the strongest possible terms, and I don’t mean hurtful terms, that what workers need and want is to have a listening ear — to be able to get to the bottom….

It’s not about just pointing fingers of blame. It’s not about just punishment, but there is such a thing as being accountable. For example, I think I was held pretty well accountable today. I don’t want another one of those trips down the hall to see the Speaker, so I’ll be behaving myself more carefully in the future.

The reality is that’s what sometimes has to happen, I would suggest — even to management. Even though managers are wonderful people, it’s sad but true that sometimes somebody needs to overlook them. They get busy, and again, it’s not out of ill will or bad intention. Often it is those errors and omissions that just come with day-to-day life that, being human beings, allow people to stray away and get their thoughts pulled away from an issue like the dust thing.

Again, after having one explosion, though, I would have thought everyone would have been on red alert throughout the province of British Columbia. I’m sorry if that offends people that I think that, but I’m sure that most workers, particularly after the Babine explosion, would be saying: “Whoa, if I work at a workplace….” Apparently, that did happen. There were phone calls made by workers saying: “We don’t want to be the next Babine.”

Again, this starts to move in the direction that is helpful and will be helpful for forest workers and their families. Does it go far enough? No, I don’t think it does go far enough. There are ideas that we have on ways that we can get even more improvements.

[1350]

Some of the ways of finding those improvements would be to have a proper commission into this event and get some transparency and some discussion amongst all of the stakeholders on how we can better work together. It is important to say at this juncture that it’s not without notice that there are not enough forest workers or not enough workers in general who are holding roles of importance at any of the…. Whether it be WorkSafe or workers compensation, there seems to be a bent towards more management positions.

Again, that’s what I’m told by the workers. They tell me it’s been their experience that they feel like they’re a voice in the wilderness sometimes in trying to talk about the issues that are critical to workers and their families. And nothing could be….

I have a lot of respect for a guy named Reynold Hert. He was a Western Forest Products manager. He came to the Cowichan Valley, but he also represented a lot of people in Western Forest Products mills as the CEO. He had an amazing attitude towards safety that was refreshing. It was like a breath of fresh air to have him walk around…. I was actually there at one of his sawmill lunchroom talks to the workers, and he said: “Safety is not just something that we do; it’s something we have to own.”

He said he believes that as a result of working safer, we’re going to have not only more people go home with less injuries and/or, potentially, fatalities, but it’s good for business too. He urged the workers to shut down. “If you see something unsafe, you shut down, and do the right thing.” That was very rare to see that kind of thing.

I do want to conclude by saying that I hope that as a result of this discussion or this debate, there will be some more thought into the potential for a full commission. We need a public inquiry into this matter to get to the bottom of it. That’s certainly what I’ve heard that the workers are calling for, as late as this morning. It’s alarming that things are unfolding as they are. I’m sure the minister and others are paying attention to these events and what’s going on.

If they come to the conclusion, as I have, that there is something very wrong…. Again, I understand there was an internal report done by the company, which was offered to WorkSafe in the event of one of these fires, and WorkSafe declined it on the basis that they were reviewing other matters.

There are a lot of these things that, to me, are a mystery. I don’t understand some of the information that I’ve been given and how it’s possible that we couldn’t be using exhaustive efforts to get to the bottom of this. For the sake of those workers and the families, we need to do our best.

D. Barnett: I am pleased today to stand here to support Bill 9, entitled Workers Compensation Amendment Act, 2015.
[ Page 7300 ]

For those of us that have been around for a few years, been employers and have worked for people — in my world, safety has always been number one with the employer and with the employee.

We have a society today that has all kinds of different people — employers, employees. Some communicate, and some don’t. But there is no one that I know — and I have the utmost respect for unions, for employees and employers — that would do anything to harm an employee, a visitor or anyone else coming to their establishment.

We are all human beings, and there are incidents that happen in this world. No matter how much legislation you pass, how many regulations or laws you have, there will be incidents, because we are human beings.

[1355]

I am proud that our minister has done so much work over the past two years to improve the quality of life for workers, for employees, and has collaborated to put people together to understand what human life is about. I can speak from the heart. My dad, back in the early days of sawmilling, on Knight Street with Wellwood, fell in a chipper. My dad’s legs were cut off here. We got a phone call. It was devastating, but the support that we got from the employees, from the employers, from Workers Compensation — it was called at that time — was amazing.

[D. Horne in the chair.]

My dad was a stubborn guy. My dad, a year after he had lost his legs here…. I can still see him, when I went to the hospital and they told us he might not live. He looked up, and he said: “Don’t worry, Sis. We’ll be dancing in a year.” And we did. They retrained my dad. He didn’t give up. He went to work in another part of the mill, and he had an office job. My dad lived a good life, with the support of Workers Compensation and his employer.

Today, as we stand here, this is not pointing fingers. This is about learning, and this is about moving forward and making life better for all of us. When I look at the coroner’s inquest…. I understand the coroner’s inquest. They will come out with recommendations, and they will find the cause. We have all learned from this. We have all been hurt from this. Families have been desecrated, decimated, but yelling and pointing fingers is not what we must do.

When I look at Mr. Macatee’s report, he has made 43 recommendations outlined in the action plan. Twelve require legislative changes in order to be implemented. And they will be.

WorkSafe B.C. has its issues. As one of my colleagues across the way said, they get people coming to their office who are claimants that are having difficulty getting their cheques. We all as MLAs do what we can to work through this to help people. Sometimes there’s a good reason for them not getting a cheque. Sometimes it’s not the right thing that WorkSafe has done, but it is corrected.

I can’t say enough about how important it is that we work together and we understand human life, we understand tragedy, and we understand legislation. Our job as legislators in this great House is to help improve the quality of life. It is to help put rules and regulations in place, and it’s to help see that they are implemented. But I cannot say it enough. Human errors and human life are most important, and there will always be incidents in this province and in this country that are unforeseen.

J. Darcy: I am pleased to stand today to speak in support of Bill 9.

I think we all know, in this chamber, and I think people know right across British Columbia of the horrific events that happened at the Babine and Lakeland mill explosions that cost four workers their lives, that injured 42 others — perhaps one of the worst indictments of WorkSafe B.C. and of the lack of proper health and safety protections, the lack of sufficient occupational health and safety inspections in this province.

I rise to support this bill because it begins…. It begins. It’s a first step to fixing some of the systemic lapses in workplace safety that frankly — and it must be said — were caused, in part, by a decade of neglect by this B.C. Liberal government of issues related to workplace health and safety.

[1400]

This bill, following up on the Macatee report released last year, takes some important steps forward to addressing some very, very grave concerns. The bill will provide a range of new safety enforcement tools. It will shorten the process for finalizing financial penalties to improve their effectiveness as an enforcement tool. It will ensure more timely employer investigations of workplace incidents and reports. It will enhance workplace safety expertise on the WorkSafe B.C. board of directors in the area of occupational health and safety and in the area of law and law enforcement.

Those are certainly important steps forward, but let’s be very clear why this issue is in front of us today. Let’s be very clear that WorkSafe B.C. has one main job. It has one main job. It exists for the purposes of keeping workers safe. It exists to help ensure that workers are able to return to their families at night safe, whole — alive.

The workers who worked in these mills and the families of the workers who worked in these mills — I’ve had the opportunity to meet with them. I know the minister has. People on both sides of this House have had the opportunity to meet with them. They have said to me over and over again: “You know, it wasn’t a secret. It was known that dust in these mills was a hazard.” Workers had gone to the employers. They had raised these issues. It was known throughout the industry.

Despite the fact that people were pointing to wood dust as a factor in the first mill fire and were certainly speaking out in the days that followed it, the time before
[ Page 7301 ]
action was actually taken in mills across the province was far too long. Then we were faced with another horrific mill fire that again killed workers, that again meant that workers would not be returning at night to their families and their loved ones. This is despite the fact that WorkSafe had received a briefing from a U.S. expert in 2010 — 2010 — about the dangers of wood dust.

The WorkSafe report that was issued a year ago found very clearly that sawdust was a factor in the explosion at Lakeland that killed Glenn Roche and Alan Little and left 14 others critically injured, and it also found that it was preventable. It was preventable. It also determined the same with the Babine explosion that killed Robert Luggi and Carl Charlie. Those deaths were preventable.

This bill moves us forward. Unquestionably, it moves us forward. But we have an awful lot of moving forward to do, it must be said. It must be said that we have to look at the context in which these fires and these tragic deaths and these injuries that will scar workers physically and emotionally for life took place. I think it is appropriate, and I will say it calmly. It must be said that we’ve had a decade of action by this government that has contributed to workplaces across British Columbia becoming less safe for workers — less safe for workers.

As part of the B.C. Liberal government’s deregulation exercise, WorkSafe B.C. was asked to cut health and safety regulations by a third. WorkSafe B.C. exists to keep workers safe and for no other reason. Under the B.C. Liberals, WorkSafe B.C. made major cuts to its staff and to services.

[1405]

In 2002 alone the budget of WorkSafe B.C. was reduced by 12 percent, a move that resulted in office closures and a 30 percent reduction in site visits by prevention officers. I know that many of the people who work for WorkSafe B.C. are not happy about this. They’ve wanted, in the past decade, to be able to do their jobs more effectively. But with those kinds of cuts, those kinds of staffing levels, it gets harder and harder.

Under this government WorkSafe B.C. drastically reduced inspection reports — down 45 percent just from 2002 to 2004. Written orders were down 49 percent in that two-year period; employer penalties, down 36 percent just in a two-year period.

Also in 2002, when some of these more sweeping changes were made to workers compensation, the government virtually eliminated…. Virtually all loss of earnings pensions for permanently injured or ill workers were eliminated. As a result, the annual number of loss of earnings pensions awarded dropped from 927 to only 39 in a few-year period, and the average value of those pensions was also reduced.

Again, going back over a decade. But this is part of the context, and we can’t ignore it. We can’t sweep it under the table. We can’t refuse to recognize it or talk about it.

In 2002 the government also made significant changes to the Workers Compensation Act which made it almost impossible for police officers or other emergency workers to access stress-related compensation. For many of the workers, the survivors of these mill fires, that’s what they’re living with — post-traumatic stress disorder, which also affects many other occupations, like police, like firefighters, like ambulance paramedics.

At the same time that the government made these cost-saving changes to reduce the amount of compensation paid to workers, they set employer premium rates that were at the lowest level in 30 years — the lowest level.

Some of my colleagues who spoke to this bill earlier today asked the question, and I ask the question as well as these workers — as the survivors of the mill fire did, as their families have, as working people across B.C. have — why did these fires happen? The answer is clear: because profits came before safety.

Profits came before safety. Warnings were ignored, warnings by some of the same workers who were severely injured in those fires. I’ve spoken with them. I’ve heard the stories of the people they went to and told about the hazards and said something needed to be done, that were ignored.

It is for all of us an incredibly moving experience to speak with some of these workers, to meet them personally, to meet with the widows, to meet with family members of the workers who were killed or severely injured — injured physically, injured emotionally — for life. I want to say in this House that these workers, these survivors, their widows, their children, their relatives have shown remarkable courage over these last few years since they lost their loved ones.

The workers who survived that fire live with memories that will never, ever go away of what happened that day when the workplace that they were accustomed to going to every day turned into a fireball, when they saw their co-workers incinerated.

[1410]

Some of the workers who survived, some who were most severely injured, dragged as many of their co-workers to safety as they possibly could before they were overcome. They suffered incredibly serious burns and trauma as a result. Some of those workers, many of those workers, remain traumatized to this day.

It also must be said that some of the workers who survived that fire with severe burns to most of their body and severe trauma are diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. We’ve heard those words so many times in recent years that sometimes, maybe, we’ve become inured to what they mean. But imagine how it scars the psyche, the well-being and the emotional health, not to mention the physical health, of these workers to have experienced what they did.

Yet some of those workers suffering today from PTSD have, in the intervening time since the fire, actually been victimized again. Some have been followed, some have been videotaped, and it’s wrong. It’s wrong. They were
[ Page 7302 ]
victimized. They were victimized so severely in that fire, and their families were, and some of them continue to be victimized as they fight for justice today.

Despite that, these same workers stand up, speak out, travel the province, attend the inquest and give their heart and their soul to get justice not just for themselves but, also, to do everything in their power to ensure that what happened to them, and to their co-workers who died, doesn’t ever happen again.

Despite the unspeakable grief experienced by wives and family members — daughters, sons, sisters, brothers…. Despite the unspeakable grief and horror that they live with — because they have learned so much about exactly what happened to their loved ones…. They are learning more all the time. Despite them living with the horror of what happened to their loved ones, they continue to have the courage to speak out for justice. And so should we.

We owe it to them. We owe it to those workers who lost their lives. We owe it to those workers who’ve been injured for life. We owe it to the families whose husbands and fathers and sisters and brothers didn’t come home at night. Those families are still seeking justice. They are still seeking a public inquiry in order to finally, decisively, get to the bottom of what happened and why.

They’ve said to me, as I’m sure they’ve said to the minister and as I know they’ve said to many people in this House, that nothing will ever bring back their loved ones. Nothing will ever fill that hole in their lives. But knowing what happened, a public inquiry that digs deep, that can ask every question, that can call any witness, that can truly get to the bottom of why these horrific fires happened and why these workers were injured and killed…. They deserve justice, and they don’t have it yet.

In conclusion, let me say that this bill is a step forward. I will certainly be voting for it, as I know my colleagues on this side of the House will. But I will also say that these workers and their families deserve much, much, much more. They deserve better than this. Workers across British Columbia deserve better than this.

[1415]

Too many workers still go to work every day and are often forced, through pressures of various sorts, to make unacceptable choices about whether they’re going to keep their job, stay on the job or come home safe and whole. Workers make those unacceptable choices every day, and families have the right to know that their loved ones will return to their families whole, safe, alive.

I will be supporting this bill, but I think we should all say in this House, on both sides of this House, that this bill is the beginning. It’s not the end; it’s the beginning. I would hope that everyone in this House would join together in a solemn commitment to the workers from Lakeland and Babine, join together in a solemn commitment to the families and the survivors of those workers, that we will stand with them. We will stand with them as they continue to seek justice.

These workers are calling for an independent review. Their family members are calling for an independent review. Right across this province workers and the organizations, the unions, that represent them are calling for an independent review. Let’s support that call. The memory of these workers deserves no less.

G. Heyman: Let me begin by saying that along with my other colleagues, we will support this bill because it’s better than what we currently have. It’s a step forward, and over the course of this debate and committee stage we will discuss whether it could be improved, whether it should be improved. Whatever the outcome of that debate, the end result hopefully of this bill, once it’s passed, will be better than what we’ve experienced for the last 13 or 14 years.

As I begin my remarks, I want to talk a little bit personally about my own experience in the areas of occupational health and safety — in fact, in the workforce. I spent much of my working life, about 15 years of my working life, in the logging industry directly or in jobs that were related to the logging industry which put me on logging sites.

I know what it’s like to work in operations where there is a culture of safety and an attention to safety that’s entrenched, and there’s a real commitment. The measures are taken that ensure that together managers and workers meet regularly to review practices and ensure that the workplace is safe, the conditions are safe and the practices are safe.

I also know what it’s like to work in operations where that is not the culture; where danger is ever-present; where, frankly, going to work is frightening and life-threatening; and where there is a high degree of intimidation of workers who stand up for their rights — most importantly among those rights being the right to return home to their families whole: whole in body, whole in mind, in order to, with their families, see the growth of their children and eventually retire in health and enjoy their children and grandchildren.

I also spent probably 20 years of my life in negotiating health and safety language in collective agreements; teaching health and safety courses; serving on regulation consideration and advisory committees for the Workers Compensation Board in British Columbia; serving on the board of directors of the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety; and ultimately, serving on the board of directors of the Workers Compensation Board.

I know what it takes to develop a culture and a system of ensuring that workers are safe and, where regrettable accidents take place, that workers are properly compensated.

[1420]

My own interest in this field is quite simple. When I was in my 20s, I was a faller. I injured my back. I filed a workers compensation claim. Three days later I was fired.
[ Page 7303 ]

I did get my job back. I think it’s pretty evident that it should be — and is — difficult to get away with firing somebody for filing a workers compensation claim when they’re clearly injured. But this was not a small employer. This was a large employer that should have known better. Their manager should have known better. There should have been more respect for the obvious, yet there wasn’t.

Like many people who have taken an active interest in workers’ health and safety, we came to it from our own experience, and we came to it with a determination to try to do our best to see (a) that other workers were not injured and (b) that if workers were injured, they were treated fairly. That’s my background.

Having said that, let me talk a little bit about what I’ve seen, as somebody with an interest in the field, somebody charged with making regulations, somebody charged with overseeing, ultimately, a system that both regulated health and safety in the workplace and the compensation of workers.

I know that there is constant tension in the history of what workers compensation is in British Columbia. It’s referred to as a historic compromise. The compromise is that employers are protected from suit by individual workers and the possibility of having to pay millions of dollars in compensation, depending on the outcome of the suit, for a form of collective insurance. The compromise by workers is they give up the right to sue for no-fault insurance.

Notwithstanding this history, notwithstanding the fact that it’s still entrenched in law in British Columbia, I know firsthand what the pressure from employers looks like: the pressure to limit the basis of claims; to limit the size of claims; to rush workers through a rehabilitation process and force them back to work, sometimes before they’re ready; to not admit certain categories of occupational injury, illness and disease until finally the evidence becomes so preponderant that there’s no choice but to recognize those.

Workplace cancers are one example. The risk of injury from workplace violence is another example. During my career it went from complete refusal to admit that workplace violence was even a problem or a source of compensable injury to actually taking measures to require employers to address these. Repetitive strain injuries from either lifting or bad ergonomics is another clear example. Post-traumatic stress disorder is another example.

We have seen some gains made in these areas. But, every step of the way, the tension was always with recognizing injury to workers, sometimes cataclysmic injury — although not necessarily the kind of cataclysmic injury we think of with the Lakeland and Babine fires, where workers are killed — things that affect workers emotionally and psychologically for the rest of their lives, impinging on their ability to maintain relationships, impinging on their ability to enjoy life, impinging on their ability to enjoy their children and families or perhaps having to live with pain for their whole life due to back injuries or other forms of injury.

On the other side of that tension is the categorization of Workers Compensation Board premiums as a payroll tax. They’re not a payroll tax. They’re an insurance premium.

In British Columbia, where we have a board charged with regulation as well as with compensation — and prevention activities, in addition to regulation and compensation — there’s a reason for that. The reason is that there’s a direct link between learning from the cost of compensation and taking the steps necessary to protect workers’ health and safety and therefore limit the amount of compensation that will be paid.

[1425]

Other speakers before me on this side of the House have talked about some of the changes and pressures on compensation, the limiting of pensions in the case of workers who have been injured, both in terms of quantum and how many are actually awarded.

It’s critically important in protecting workers’ health and safety that the system not be subject, or be subject at least on as limited a basis as possible, to the kinds of pressures where employers or industry or corporations come forward and say: “We can’t afford to do business with these onerous regulations. We can’t afford to do business if the cost of compensation rises this high.”

I know from my experience at the Workers Compensation Board that if that’s the attitude you take, you end up with cycles that look like this. I realize that hand gestures do not suffice to a written transcript, but if you can imagine a wave that goes up and down and up and down, that’s what it looks like.

If you don’t ensure that there’s proper regulation of workplace safety because somehow it’s deemed too expensive, if you suppress claims, eventually you end up with more injuries and eventually you end up with those claims, at least some of them, being upheld on appeal and you see the costs rise.

So when employers complain that their premiums are too high, what they’re really saying is: “Our premiums are high because we have a bad insurance record and we’re a bad insurance risk. Rather than make ourselves a better insurance risk, we just want to change the rules of the game to keep the premiums low, and other people will have to suffer the consequences.”

There’s something wrong with our values and our compensation in an economic system that sees heads of large corporations awarded massive amounts of severance when they’re shown the door for failing in their duty and workers who are injured and can’t return to the gainful employment they formerly held are forced to choose employment that pays much less, are denied adequate compensation for the difference, are denied enough time to recuperate and be able to do their work and are denied the compensation or pensions that should go with their injuries.
[ Page 7304 ]

Underlying all of this is the simple fact…. Notwithstanding the statement of the member for Cariboo-Chilcotin that we’re humans and that injuries will always happen — there’s a grain of truth in that — the truth is that fewer injuries will happen if we take the precautionary principle and we make an underlying value of the workplace that it is a worker’s right, it’s their family’s right, to work in the safest possible environment. That’s simply the cost of doing business, and it’s not a cost that companies should be allowed to pressure governments to find a way out of.

We will support this bill. This bill addresses serious issues, and it is a step forward. But this bill is a result of some history. This bill is a result of history that began in 2001.

Let me talk a little bit about what a system of regulating workplaces that is based on evidence and science and a reasoned dialogue between employers and worker representatives looks like. It looks like collecting evidence, employing researchers to evaluate that evidence, looking at experience and deciding what level of protection is absolutely necessary to protect people and then allowing that decision to be implemented.

I had the experience — on a board that had a government representative, a couple of independent representatives, a worker representative which was myself and an employer representative who was chosen from the Business Council of B.C. — of having those dialogues and finding myself more often than not reaching an agreement with the employer representative based on conversations we had which went like this: if we ignore evidence, we can never trust each other and nobody can ever trust us, least of all our constituents.

[1430]

If we honour the evidence — whether it’s what we think is necessary or not, whether it’s what our constituents are pressuring us to do or not — we will make good decisions, and they’ll be defensible decisions.

I and my employer colleagues served on that board for four years. In the last year we spent a year looking through hundreds of pages of evidence — and I offer this as an example — of the danger of environmental tobacco smoke. That danger is now accepted by everyone — by this government, by the Workers Compensation Board, by the public — on the understanding that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke puts people at risk of diseases, including cancer, and it’s unacceptable.

[R. Chouhan in the chair.]

There was a lot of pressure to do nothing. Nobody thinks the bar industry has gone under because you can’t smoke in bars now, but back in the late ’90s that was the narrative. People said: “If you introduce regulations to remove environmental tobacco smoke from our workplaces, you will put us under. Find another alternative.”

We reviewed all the alternatives that were suggested, we reviewed the scientific evidence, and we decided after many months of discussion that the only safe workplace with respect to environmental tobacco smoke was a workplace that didn’t have environmental tobacco smoke, so we introduced a regulation.

Shortly after we introduced the regulation, the then Minister of Labour, Graham Bruce, called the chair of the board and asked that the board reconsider the regulation, which was his power under the act. We had a meeting. We discussed it, and I had a discussion with the employer representative. His answer to me when I said, “What are you going to do?” was: “I didn’t spend a year reviewing scientific evidence, making a hard decision that many of my colleagues dislike me intensely for, to reverse it because somebody who hasn’t reviewed the evidence made a call.”

A couple of weeks after that decision, and our message to the minister was: “We made our decision based on science. You have the power to change the regulation yourself. Don’t look to us for cover. Take responsibility for your action if you want it taken.” He overruled the regulation, and he fired the board. I’ve never been prouder of being fired in my life, because we were fired for doing the right thing. The minister many months later was forced to acknowledge, by reintroducing the protection himself, that it had been the right thing.

Why do I raise this? I have listened to the Minister of Jobs and for Labour speak many times in this House about how concerned she is about the victims of the Lakeland and Babine fires. I don’t doubt that she’s sincere in that. I don’t doubt that anybody in this House would be sincere about that. But accidents, serious incidents, do not happen in a vacuum. They happen because we allow them to happen, and they happened twice in a period of months because we haven’t learned from our mistakes.

I would say to the Minister for Labour: if you’re sincere, it’s important to acknowledge that you are part of a government…. She was part of the government that made significant changes to protection of workplaces, to regulation, to prevention activity. There are consequences and results of that.

Colleagues have spoken about the Workers Compensation Board being asked to reduce regulations by an arbitrary number of a third because employers said they needed that. That process happened. Rules regarding first aid were eliminated. Rules regarding fall protection were eliminated. Rules regarding ladders and scaffolds were eliminated.

Changes were made to staffing. The budget was cut in 2002 by 12 percent, resulting in office closures and a 30 percent reduction in visits by prevention officers. This was arbitrary. It was done in order to reduce the premiums that employers were paying.

[1435]

I was a member of the board of directors of the compensation board. I was chair of the audit committee. I
[ Page 7305 ]
know what the injury rate was. I know how rates were set. I know all the measures that were taken to keep rates low. I know the measures that were taken internally to reach every administrative efficiency that we could and to keep looking for more.

The one thing we did not do was pick a number and drive premiums down to that without regard for the consequence. If workers are being injured, it takes a certain level of premium to pay them compensation. If workplaces are unsafe, it takes a certain level of premium to support the educational and prevention and inspection activity that will protect them. That was what was given up when the government first took office.

The Labour Minister was part of that government, and she was part of that cabinet. I accept the minister saying that she is introducing this bill in order to protect workers and prevent tragedies like those that happened at Lakeland and Babine. But I’d have more faith in the process and more faith in the development of the bill if anybody on that side of the House — but particularly the Labour Minister — would acknowledge that the approach that was taken to prevention and compensation when they first took office was a mistake, that they’ve learned from it and that they’re going to do something different.

We will support this bill. I will vote for this bill. It’s an important bill, but it’s not good enough. More needs to be done, and perhaps more will be done.

But more will only be done if there’s a commitment that yes, we do need to have an environment that allows businesses to make a profit and employ people — we all agree with that — but if workers are injured, they should be compensated; that if there are occupational diseases, they should be recognized; that if there are measures that can be taken to ensure that all employers understand the rules necessary to protect workers from incident, from injury, from occupational disease and illness, those measures will be taken; that those employers who don’t follow the rules while other employers do are made to pay for that; and that the staff needed to make the inspections, to bring out the education and to make the orders are in place and have the tools necessary to do their job.

With that, I’ll take my place.

Deputy Speaker: Seeing no further speakers, minister closes the debate.

Hon. S. Bond: I appreciate the opportunity to make just a few comments. I appreciate also the Speaker’s latitude in some of the discussion that has occurred this afternoon in this House. I also appreciate the apology that was offered by the member for Cowichan Valley. I appreciate that, and I accept it.

The debate we are having in the House is not about hurting a minister’s feelings or getting emotional or having a heated debate. That’s what people send us here to do. Believe you me in my 14 years as a cabinet minister, I have had a significant number of debates in this House, many of which were difficult and painful. But I have to say, in honesty, that probably some of the commentary that occurred today would be registered as a low point in my cabinet career.

While I absolutely understand and agree that this is a place that brings passion and different experience…. I don’t have the same experience that members on the other side of the House, and even on the same side of the House as me, have. But what I will not do is make commentary or assign blame that members on one side of this House or the other feel more strongly, in a more principled way, about worker death in this province.

Every single member of this House — every British Columbian, for that matter — is horrified when a worker is injured or even, more tragically, killed in a place where they should be able to go and believe they are safe.

[1440]

The most offensive part of the discussion is not about hurting someone’s feelings. British Columbians expect more of us. While I have sat and listened, and tried to listen with open ears, for constructive, thoughtful additions to what we can do together to improve…. I look forward to committee stage, because we’ve certainly heard that this bill is a good start and yet it’s not good enough. Of course it’s not good enough.

I heard the member, and I very much respect the passion and intellect of the member for Vancouver-Kingsway. I quote what he said. This bill is “nowhere near sufficient.” Of course it’s not. There is nothing that we can do in this House, as people or as legislators, that will make up for the loss of life that occurred at Babine and Lakeland — nothing.

I’ve heard, over and over, from the speakers before, just previously: “We owe it to these families.” Of course we do. It is certainly not a matter of saying “it must be said.”

I would remind the members opposite that we on this side of the House have certainly not once stepped away from the fact that WorkSafe made mistakes, that it needs to be fixed. We’ve embraced it. We’ve grappled with it.

Is this bill perfect? Probably not. I’m not an expert, but I can tell you this. We asked someone who has integrity to go in and look at WorkSafe from top to bottom and to come back to this government with recommendations that said: “How can we ensure that this never happens again?”

I wish today that I could stand in this House, along with every other member who has been elected to represent their constituents, and say: “It will never happen again.” We have absolutely no guarantees. It doesn’t mean we’re not going to work tirelessly on both sides of this House.

I want to read to the members opposite, particularly the last two, who have implied that, over the last ten years, somehow this government has been negligent. Let
[ Page 7306 ]
me read some numbers — tragic, horrific, hurtful numbers: 125, 147, 156, 168, 157, 170, 134, 188, 160, 139, 160, 121 and 156.

Do you know what is significant about those numbers, other than the fact that every single one of those numbers reflects a person, a family, a job, a worker-related death? Those numbers span two systems of worker safety in this province — the workers compensation system and WorkSafe B.C. They span two governments, not one. The thing that is so troubling about those numbers is that it doesn’t matter who sat on either side of this House. I’m sure we could go back and look at years and decades before. Those numbers haven’t improved nearly enough.

This bill is one piece — one piece — of the work that is underway. While we want to stand in this House and talk about whether it’s an inquest or an inquiry, we didn’t arbitrarily decide that an inquiry wasn’t the appropriate way. We went and asked one of the most highly respected lawyers in our country: “Would it make a difference? Would it change the outcomes?” As I’ve shared in this House on numerous occasions, when we asked that question, the answer was: “No, it wouldn’t.”

[1445]

There is an inquest underway. All of us want to ensure that it has integrity, that it gives families an opportunity to hear, though painful, what happened. Not one of us can put ourselves in their shoes. I wouldn’t, and I know other members wouldn’t attempt to try either.

Worker safety is a core value for everyone in this House. To make the implication that a change in a system was responsible when, in fact, we look over two decades plus worth of numbers…. Tragically, workers in this province…. Throughout the course of the ‘90s, the 2000s and, tragically, into 2011, ’12, ’13, ’14, the numbers show very little variation.

That says to me we all have a job to do. I look forward to the dialogue and the input. I really hope that we can concentrate on this bill as one piece of ensuring that workers go to work in the morning and come home at the end of every day — one piece. Not one person on this side of the House has suggested this is the answer. There is much work to be done.

I appreciate the passion of members opposite. I appreciate their experience. I appreciate people coming to this place with strong beliefs and values. But I also believe that comes with responsibility.

I appreciate the comments that we’ve heard. In fact, we do owe families a legacy. We need to make sure that they get answers and that we respond to the coroner’s inquest so that the families of Carl Charlie, Robert Luggi, Alan Little and Glenn Roche know that we took this seriously. Nothing will ever make it sufficient. There is nothing that we can do that will ever make up for what happened to those families.

It is incumbent upon all of us in this House to recognize that it doesn’t matter what side of the House you sit on. It doesn’t matter if you sit in this House or not. British Columbians’ core value is ensuring that workers can go to work and come home safely at the end of every day.

With those comments…. And there will be others as we go through the process, as we look at trying to clarify some of the issues that have been brought forward, issues like whether or not there are random and unannounced inspections. Of course there are. The implication today was that there are not.

The questions about worker rights. In fact, today in British Columbia…. One of the things I’m passionate about is making sure that workers understand their rights. Do they have the right to shut down an unsafe workplace? Yes, they do. There were implications here today and there were comments about how workers don’t have that right. Yes, they do. But do many workers know that, understand it and feel confident enough to exercise it? No, they don’t.

That’s why we brought in members of the Steelworkers to say: “What can we do to give workers in this province the tools and the confidence and the power they need to say: ‘I will not work in an unsafe workplace’?” All of those things are the pieces that we need to work on in order to ensure that British Columbians feel confident in the workplaces that they go to each day.

With that, I move second reading of Bill 9.

Motion approved.

Hon. S. Bond: I move the bill be referred to a Committee of the Whole House to be considered at the next sitting after today.

Bill 9, Workers Compensation Amendment Act, 2015, read a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. T. Stone: I now call second reading of Bill 21, intituled the Fish and Seafood Act.

BILL 21 — FISH AND SEAFOOD ACT

Hon. N. Letnick: I move that Bill 21 be now read for a second time.

I’m pleased to speak to the new Fish and Seafood Act. Before I talk about some of the details of the new bill, I want to provide a little context as to why we feel that this sector is so important and why new legislation is important.

[1450]

Around 100 species of fish, shellfish and marine plants are produced commercially from British Columbia’s marine and fresh waters. In 2013 British Columbia produced a range of 483 seafood commodities with a combined wholesale value of $1.43 billion, the second-highest
[ Page 7307 ]
wholesale value in the last 25 years. In the same year 159,000 tonnes of processed B.C. seafood was shipped to 62 export markets, with a total value of $902.6 million.

These statistics show the current demand for B.C. fish and seafood. I believe that significant future growth is also possible. Part of that market growth will be supported by the new Fish and Seafood Act, which is the cornerstone of the new fish and seafood strategy mentioned in the 2015 Speech from the Throne.

The Fish and Seafood Act will update and modernize provincial legislation to be responsive to today’s business environment and to better serve the public interest. The Fish and Seafood Act ensures that processing facilities producing products for consumption within British Columbia will meet modern food safety standards. Although products sold into international markets are processed at federally regulated processing facilities, the handling, storage, transportation and basic preparation functions are all regulated under this act.

I’d like to touch on a few of the highlights of the new act now, which regulates a range of activities, from the growing and harvest of aquatic plants to receiving, selling, storage, transport and processing of aquatic plants and fish.

First, in part 2 of the act there is a new and important requirement for all persons to ensure that the fish and aquatic plants they are dealing with are safe for human consumption.

Part 3 enables licensing of certain functions, which will be set out in future regulations. Generally speaking, the regulations will involve more stringent standards for higher-risk fish-processing activities. While there may have been no serious food safety outbreaks to date, a report conducted in 2009 by the B.C. Centre for Disease Control shows that the fish-processing facilities have a higher risk of listeria than dairy or meat-processing facilities.

The future regulations enabled by the Fish and Seafood Act will prescribe licensing requirements. Once the act is passed, the ministry will be consulting with affected parties prior to drafting these new regulations.

Parts 4 through 6 of the new act set out the new enforcement system. The current enforcement system mainly relies on a series of warnings, tickets and prosecution. In future, inspectors also will have the ability to make orders similar to the Animal Health Act and the Public Health Act. Higher penalties will provide a significant deterrent to non-compliance. A future administrative penalty system is enabled by the act that allows for penalties to be assessed by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Part 7 provides for regulation-making authorities, which continues some of the regulation-making authorities of the Fisheries Act and Fish Inspection Act and includes new regulation-making authorities to support the new licensing, traceability and enforcement provisions.

In summary, the Fish and Seafood Act is a cornerstone of the ministry’s commitment to growth and development of this sector and the production of safe food. With that, I look forward to comments of other members.

G. Holman: I’m pleased to speak to this legislation. We will be supporting the bill, with debate, but in general, there are some positive aspects. We do have some questions about specific aspects of the new legislation that we’ll be dealing with in committee.

There are some concerns that I did want to just touch on today. British Columbia does have somewhat limited jurisdiction in fisheries — jurisdiction only over some finfish and aquatic animals and aquatic plants. Nevertheless, that jurisdiction is important. It’s important not just in terms of food safety, but it’s also important in terms of ensuring that fisheries are conducted in a way that doesn’t threaten their sustainability or have deleterious environmental impacts on either the environment in general or other species.

[1455]

As the minister indicated, this legislation brings together two older bills, older pieces of legislation. To some degree, it’s a kind of housekeeping function, although there are some new provisions, as the minister indicated, in order to support growth in the industry but, also, to ensure that we’ve got the highest possible standard for food safety.

Some of these measures are welcome — for example, the newer provisions around traceability. It is very important. It’s analogous to systems that are in place for other agricultural products in British Columbia. Hopefully, it will ensure that for fish and aquatic animals, we know where they’re coming from, know where they’re harvested and can trace back to origins. This is an important provision.

The modernized inspection powers with higher penalties are also a good thing. There’s no point in having rules that are disregarded simply because the penalties are too weak and because the enforcement system has too many loopholes.

The legislation, as I understand it, though, is about more than just food safety. There are licensing and tenure provisions in the legislation, which are important. The minister was kind enough to have his staff give several MLAs, including the member from Delta, a briefing on the legislation. In the discussion in that briefing there were some concerns raised about, for example, sustainability for aquatic plants.

Now, aquatic plants, in general, are under provincial jurisdiction, so it’s not just the food safety aspects or the harvesting. It’s the aspect around the sustainability of those harvests and whether those harvests are having impacts on other species and impacts on the environment.

For example, one of the questions asked was: “How do we know, for certain aquatic plants, that the harvests are sustainable?” The response we got from staff was: “Well,
[ Page 7308 ]
in general, they’re so minimal that we don’t regard sustainability, the concern about harvestable surpluses…. We don’t see that as a major issue because the volumes being harvested are so tiny.” But it still begs the question about the denominator. It’s not clear whether we do have reasonably up-to-date, accurate inventories of biomass for aquatic plants and, therefore, what the harvestable surplus would be. This concern may also apply to aquatic animals. So that’s one of the issues that came up in the briefing.

Members of this House will be aware of, for example, commercial harvesting of seaweeds in the Comox-Courtenay area — fairly large-scale commercial harvests of seaweed coming up onto the beaches. There has been, certainly, concern expressed in those communities about those activities and whether or not we’ve done the proper science to ensure that, in fact, the harvests are sustainable and that they are being done in a way that doesn’t negatively affect the environment or other species.

One of the specific issues also raised during that briefing, and a briefing from our own research staff, was that there is an element of the former Fisheries Act — which is one of the acts, along with the Fish Inspection Act, that are being brought together in Bill 21. It removes provisions for the protection of fish resulting from dams or hydraulic projects.

[1500]

Now, it may be that those provisions are picked up elsewhere in other legislation, and that’s a question that we’re going to have. But it is an example of a concern that this legislation may be focused too strictly on just the food safety aspects and that there may be broader considerations that we want to make sure are addressed, if not in this legislation, at least in other provincial legislation.

There is a context here. I realize I may be getting a little bit further or broader afield than the specific legislation, but there is a troubling context when it comes to environmental protection in British Columbia and certainly around fishways, around fisheries — for example, the gutting of environmental provisions by the federal government, the so-called Navigable Waters Protection Act and the weakening of those provisions.

There are also concerns expressed by our own Forest Practices Board around habitat protection and logging practices, bridge-building practices in and around fish streams. There’s a context here that does raise concerns about not just managing and administrating and ensuring food safety for fisheries products but also the environmental context.

Provincially, of course, as well, the environmental assessment process twice approved the Prosperity lake mine, the so-called Fish Lake mine, where essentially the proposal was to turn Fish Lake into a tailings pond. This is the kind of context in which this legislation appears. We do want to make sure that, if not covered in this legislation, at least other provincial legislation is going to provide better protection. The trends are not good. The trends appear to be a weakening of environmental legislation both at the federal level and, our concern as well, at the provincial level.

One issue that was raised in our briefing was the applicability of this legislation to First Nations. It’s our understanding that technically, so-called legal First Nations fisheries — the handling, processing, the laws, the rules in this legislation would also apply to those activities. But as the minister, I know, is aware, there are a number of First Nations fisheries that are so-called illegal, where there’s a question there about whether and how these rules can possibly apply to those activities.

There is a more general point there, as well, around First Nations fisheries. Again, as with the Tsilhqot’in decision, over time court decisions have gradually been recognizing First Nations’ rights to fish, not just for food and ceremonial purposes but also rights to effectively use those fish for commercial purposes, either sale or trade or barter, which for millennia they’ve been doing.

We created rules in the early 1900s to establish so-called food and ceremonial fisheries, and the settler culture telling First Nations: yes, you can have access to these fish, but you can only use them for food and ceremonial purposes. That is patently…. That’s nonsense.

In court decisions, including more recently the Ahousaht decision, the courts are beginning to recognize and understand and rule that First Nations do have a right, not just for food or ceremonial purposes; they also have a right to use those fish for so-called commercial purposes. That trend is going to continue, and in my view, this is a good thing.

We need to bring First Nations fisheries into the mainstream so-called, like the Nisga’a treaty. I had an involvement in the Nisga’a treaty as a fisheries consultant working for them. That’s an example of what formerly were food and ceremonial fisheries also opened up for commercial use and sale and processing.

[1505]

That’s where we need to go in this province, to bring those fisheries into the mainstream and to ensure that the same provisions around food safety apply to those fisheries as well. Let’s bring them into the management mainstream, regulate them properly. But that’s predicated on acknowledging that First Nations have a right around their traditional fisheries to use them not just for food and ceremonial purposes but for commercial purposes as well.

Fish farms. We want to clarify the extent to which this legislation applies to tenuring of fish farms in British Columbia. Clearly, a number of concerns coming…. Well, the federal Cohen commission was a response to concerns about the impacts of fish farms on passing migrating salmon stocks and in fact recommended, essentially, a moratorium in some of those fish migration routes.
[ Page 7309 ]

We want to understand and make sure that there is legislation in place, again, not just around the technical aspects of issuing tenures for certain periods of time; but where, in either this legislation or other provincial legislation, are the potential environmental implications of fish farms for wild fish being addressed?

It is interesting. One of the provisions of this legislation, which I understand is new…. I’m a rookie at this, so I’m not sure necessarily what’s new or not, but there is a provision in this legislation for protection of marine beds when it comes to harvesting aquatic plants. This is a good thing. Again, it does speak to that concern that licensing should be addressing not just food safety issues but environmental issues as well. That particular provision does speak to that, does address that concern.

I guess a question I’m going to have in committee is: does that same level of concern also apply, for example, to aquatic animals? Does it apply to fish farms? When we issue licences and tenures for these activities, are we also taking into account their potential environmental consequences and implications? Maybe it’s not in this legislation, although there does appear to be a reference in there to aquatic plants. So a question is: well, what about other species that are under provincial jurisdiction? Why is there not provision, for example, around tenuring of fish farms in here?

This legislation actually allows government to discontinue a licence if, in the view of the licensing officer, there are negative impacts associated with aquatic plant harvesting. That kind of provision is important, and one of the questions we have is: does that apply to other species or just to aquatic plants?

Again, in summary — I believe my colleague from Delta may also have some comments on the legislation — we’ll be supportive of the bill. It does in some respects represent some steps forward. We have some questions about implications of certain provisions or lack of.

By the way, one concern in terms of consultation. It’s our understanding that the seafood processing industry and also the salmon farmers industry are supportive of the legislation, although, because many of the specific regulations will be brought in later, there is a concern that the process for developing those regulations will be fulsome and transparent. I know the minister has heard that, and we’re hopeful that that process will be comprehensive and that government will be listening to concerns of industry.

[1510]

One other interesting issue came up in our briefing. We were provided with a list of the organizations that were consulted — that was very helpful — so we know exactly who the ministry was talking to. There wasn’t one environmental organization on that list.

I would strongly urge the minister to think about that in developing regulations, to think about consulting with environmental groups, because as I say, there are broader considerations here. It’s not just about food safety. If those concerns are addressed with other pieces of legislation, let’s hear that, and let’s talk to groups who aren’t necessarily just within the salmon-farming industry or the seafood-processing industry.

I think that’s it for my comments at this point in time. I believe other colleagues may want to speak to the bill. I very much look forward to further discussion during the committee stage of the bill.

V. Huntington: I’m pleased to briefly speak to Bill 21, the Fish and Seafood Act. On the whole, it is a welcome modernization of our laws around health standards for the processing and sale of seafood and aquatic plants sold for human consumption. This bill is designed to ensure that everyone selling defined classes of seafood to the public is licensed to do so under food-safe guidelines and procedures. There is no denying the necessity and value of updating our laws that ensure seafood is meeting provincial health standards. In that respect, this bill is an admirable step. I congratulate the minister in bringing the legislation forward.

I would also like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank the deputy minister and his staff for their lengthy and thorough responses to our many questions. That said, there are a few components of the bill that, in my opinion, need to be further canvassed.

One is the very tricky and sensitive issue of illegal sales of fish caught under the traditional food, social and ceremonial provisions of the native fishery. The briefing left a definite impression that insufficient thought had been given to the province’s role in regulating the illegal sales of fish caught during food, social and ceremonial fisheries. These fish are consumed by the public, yet the safety of the fish has no oversight by either provincial or federal officials. It is something the province should consider — how or whether the sale and consumption of these fish properly belong under this act.

The legislation also fails to recognize some key components that should be part and parcel of the licensed harvesting of wild aquatic plants. While this is presently a rather minor economic activity, as it was described during our briefing, it was obvious that the province has no guidelines in place to ensure that future harvests are sustainable.

There is no baseline data on the quantity and quality of the wild aquatic plant beds on this coast. Case-by-case monitoring of the marine beds would not cover a potential spike in demand of a class of plant. I urge the minister to consider this important issue prior to pursuing the licensed harvest of plants that have no inventory baseline data attached to them. The harvest under this act is not limited to farmed aquatic plants, and it is thus critical that monitoring and measuring be required.

Royalties are important, but royalties gathered in ignorance are irresponsible. The legislation opens the door
[ Page 7310 ]
for the potential destruction of our marine environment. Its failure to set out parameters around the aquatic plant–harvesting industry is notable.

We were also told that while ministry staff are cognizant of the vulnerable-species-at-risk list in B.C., the legislation does not bind the ministry or government when making judgments around conservation values or administrative actions. There is no species-at-risk legislation in B.C., and failure to regulate harvests in the face of scientific recommendation regarding a species at risk is a failure to respect our environment and its carrying capacity.

I will also want to explore in committee stage the administrative penalties and offences contemplated by the act. The premise upon which the regime is based should be an interesting discussion.

[1515]

Further, the consultation done prior to developing the legislation was interesting — a survey sent to a long list of stakeholders in the hope that there would be helpful responses to the survey. However, not many stakeholders responded, and only the Allied Tsimshian Tribes Association responded from First Nations. Given the number of products available through First Nation companies, I believe a stronger attempt to discuss the legislation would behoove the government.

I am also very concerned that environmental stakeholders were not surveyed. There are many knowledgable individuals within that sector, and the ministry could well have benefited from their advice. I also believe it would be very helpful if the survey responses were publicly available, as assessing the legislation would be much easier and more meaningful.

My final concern is the lack of manpower to properly implement and enforce this bill. At the moment there are only three agricultural inspectors in this province — three. Clearly, to properly enforce this bill, there will need to be more. Officials and employees of other organizations can be delegated the authority and responsibility, but we have seen how the lack of independent inspection authority has desperately hindered enforcement of offences on the ALR by the Agricultural Land Commission.

I hope the ministry is giving this manpower issue a great deal of thought. Why have an offence if you can’t enforce it? Why have an enabling bill that may end up being toothless?

In conclusion, this is a positive piece of legislation which certainly has the public interest in mind. There are, however, a few sections which I believe are worthy of further consideration. I hope the minister will reflect on same during committee stage of the bill.

Deputy Speaker: Seeing no further speakers, minister to conclude the debate.

Hon. N. Letnick: Thank you to the hon. members for their input and their words — especially, a thank-you to them for identifying areas in the bill that they had some concerns with. I’m sure that’ll help our staff go back and do some work over the weekend before we get to committee stage, whenever that occurs. Of course, that’s up to the House Leader. We’ll have a good discussion at that point.

Mr. Speaker, I move second reading of Bill 21.

Motion approved.

Hon. N. Letnick: I move that Bill 21 be referred to a Committee of the Whole for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 21, Fish and Seafood Act, read a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. T. Stone: I now call the estimates of the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure.

Committee of Supply

ESTIMATES: MINISTRY OF
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The House in Committee of Supply (Section B); R. Chouhan in the chair.

The committee met at 3:20 p.m.

On Vote 43: ministry operations, $813,473,000.

The Chair: Minister, are you going to make an opening statement?

Hon. T. Stone: Very briefly.

The Chair: Proceed.

Hon. T. Stone: It is my pleasure to stand in the House today as we begin the estimates for the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure. I look forward to a good discussion, particularly with the opposition critic, the member for North Island. I know a number of her colleagues will also take an interest in different parts of the Transportation and Infrastructure estimates process.

I’d like to begin by introducing a couple of fine individuals who are here with me today from the ministry. We have Grant Main, the deputy minister; Kevin Richter, the new assistant deputy minister responsible for the highways division as well as the infrastructure folks; and Norm Parkes, the executive director of engineering.

This is the third time I’ve been through this estimates process. It’s always a pleasure to take a couple moments at the front end to acknowledge the hard-working men
[ Page 7311 ]
and women in the ministry, many of whom I’ve had the privilege of meeting and touring offices with, doing field visits with. I really want to say — on behalf of, I know, everyone in this chamber — thank you to the men and women in the Ministry of Transportation as well as the Crowns that we’re responsible for: B.C. Transit, ICBC, PavCo, the TI Corporation, the BCTFA. We really do appreciate the efforts of everyone who works in those Crowns and in the ministry more broadly.

I want to just take one moment at the front end of this process to also acknowledge how proud I was, on behalf of government, about three weeks ago to launch our government’s new transportation plan, a ten-year plan called B.C. on the Move. It’s not every day that you get the opportunity to put together a ten-year plan for what will really be critical infrastructure investments in every facet of transportation and infrastructure across the province.

This plan covers all facets of transportation. It provides for about $2.5 billion of investment in the first three years of the plan. That is building upon the $17 billion and change which we have invested in transportation and infrastructure since 2001 — one of the most robust transportation programs in the country.

This plan provides for 12 key themes, including for the first time a real laser focus on ensuring that, in transportation, we are focusing on supporting partnerships with First Nations and supporting projects which foster economic development opportunities on First Nations lands.

For the first time ever in a transportation plan, we have a trucking strategy which recognizes just how important the trucking industry is to the province of British Columbia.

This plan provides for a lift in funding of about 50 percent for the replacement and upgrading of bridges across the province. This plan provides for a 33 percent increase in funding for rural side roads and secondary highways — about a billion dollars in the first three years of the plan allocated to highway expansion on all of our major corridors around the province.

[1525]

It provides for a continuation of a record level of funding for B.C. Transit to support the transit systems that we have across the province, outside of Metro Vancouver. It continues the record level of funding for our coastal ferries in British Columbia.

It also provides a heightened commitment for cycling and related infrastructure investments as well. We have increased the budget for cycling by 50 percent in the first three years of the plan.

Certainly, the resurrection of an airport program, which is contained within B.C. on the Move, is something we’re also very proud of. It’s providing about $24 million over the first three years of the plan alone, which will see strategic investments in community, rural, local and municipal airports in every corner of the province.

I’m very proud that with B.C. on the Move, we’ve been able to reset the context through which we will be prioritizing transportation and infrastructure investments. As we move forward, we’ll be looking through the lens, obviously, of safety, first and foremost, but also economic development and partnerships — partnerships with First Nations, with local governments, with the federal government and, indeed, with the private sector.

With that, I look forward to today’s round of questions and answers — I assume, for the most part, by the member for North Island. I will now take my place.

C. Trevena: To the minister, I thank him for his opening remarks. Yes, this afternoon, since it’s our little bonus time in addition to the rest, it’ll be primarily myself asking questions. Because it came with quite short notice, I’m going to try to keep as general as possible in my questions so we’re not calling on people who may not be here, and we can proceed, I hope, quite smoothly.

But I just really do need to…. While I don’t want to use time in a preamble, I would like to respond to a couple of the items that the minister said when he was giving his short preamble on the ten-year transportation plan. It’s a very bright, jolly document, B.C. on the Move. The details seem to be in the first three years, as is the budget that we’re looking at. I think there is a reflection there.

When you get to the ongoing seven years, it seems to be a bit more vague, without specific costs attached. It is very interesting, though, when the minister talks about this fantastic plan. I think it’s very well worth noting at the beginning of the budget estimates that the plan itself has got a value — it states several times — of $2½ billion.

It sounds like a lot of money, but that is less than the cost of Port Mann Bridge overruns. So we’ve got the Port Mann Bridge at $3.3 billion and growing, and the whole ten-year transportation plan is $2½ billion. If I’m wrong, I’m happy to have that corrected by the minister, but this is how I’m reading it.

You also hear the minister talking about how we’ve got, this year, record funding for B.C. Transit. We are actually $1 million down on B.C. Transit. This is the value of this budget estimate process. It gives us a chance to go through the budget line by line and deconstruct some of the myths, talk about some of the different ways of speaking about the investment, whether it’s an investment or a subsidy. I attest that when we are putting money into B.C. Ferries, which is at crisis level, it is an investment in our infrastructure. The minister talks about a subsidy. I think we’re going to be having a little bit of friction there. That is not today’s discussion.

I’m going to start today’s discussion on an area that I expect the minister knows quite well and his assistant deputy minister would know quite well, as well as the engineers who are assisting. That is the Highway 1 improvements and the four-laning of Highway 1. I’d like to focus some attention to this through the next little while.

I’ve recently travelled Highway 1. I think the minister
[ Page 7312 ]
is aware of it. It’s in his constituency. We have the proposal to four-lane the highway from Kamloops to the Alberta border, but there seem to be two distinct projects. There’s Kamloops up until Golden, and then there’s the Kicking Horse project, which I believe is separate.

First question, very simple. Is the Kicking Horse project regarded as part of the four-laning of the Trans-Canada, or not? And is there a time frame for the whole Kamloops–Alberta border completion?

[1530]

Hon. T. Stone: Yes, the Kicking Horse Canyon project is part of the Trans-Canada Highway four-laning project that our government has committed to. For point of reference, I will say, again, with respect to the Kicking Horse Canyon, there are 26 kilometres through that stretch of the Trans-Canada Highway. I’m very proud of the fact that to date, in partnership with the federal government, we have completed four-laning on 22 of the 26 kilometres, which leaves one remaining four-kilometre section to do. I know the member was in that neck of the woods recently. I’m not sure if the member made it that far. She’s nodding, so yes. It really needs to get done, that final four kilometres.

Another point of reference. We typically spend about $10 million per kilometre for four-laning. That’s the rough ballpark on most sections of highway in British Columbia — about $10 million per one kilometre. The estimates that we have for this particular four-kilometre section, for four-laning, is upwards of $650 million. That’s right — $650 million.

As I’ve said on numerous occasions in and out of this House, it is going to be very critical that we receive federal support and federal partnership dollars in order for us to conclude the final four-laning in that four-kilometre section.

To that end, we have requested of the federal government that they consider this particular project a project of national significance and, as such, allocate federal dollars towards it from within the national component of the Build Canada fund, which is a merit-based component.

This is an argument or a position that we have put forward with the government of Canada and one that we will continue to press as often as we can moving forward.

C. Trevena: I think I’m going to treat the two sections a little separately. We’ve got the cost for that last four kilometres, five kilometres, in Kicking Horse, $650 million. Yes, I have driven it recently. I drove it in good weather. I’m very pleased I drove it in good weather. It’s not an area I’d like to drive in the dark or the rain.

One of the things that you hear everybody talk about anywhere along the highway — effectively, from Salmon Arm to Golden — is the fact that everybody who lives along that highway knows somebody who’s been involved in an accident on the highway — somebody, often, who has been involved in a fatal accident on that highway.

There is a huge sense of urgency. There is a real, complete non-partisan approach. Everybody who lives along that highway looks at the road and knows it needs repair. They know it needs rebuilding. So, literally, whichever side of the political fence you’re coming on, you’re looking at it as a safety issue and secondly as an economic issue.

I go back to my original question to the minister. Is there a complete cost? So $10 million per kilometre — can the minister give a dollar figure for the four-laning? And can he give a timeline for when this four-laning will happen? We’ve had the billboards up since 2009. They look in good condition. I guess they’ve been cleaned off a little, because we’re six years on and they’ve still got all their colours up.

I wondered if the minister could give both the timeline and the dollar cost for Kamloops to the section of Kicking Horse where we know that it’s going to cost $650 million.

Hon. T. Stone: The $650 million estimate that I previously provided to this House for the final four kilometres of the Kicking Horse Canyon is included within the overall global estimate. In today’s dollars we estimate it’s somewhere in about the $6 billion range to complete the four-laning of the Trans-Canada Highway from where it currently ends, which is actually quite a ways east of Kamloops now, in the Pritchard area.

[1535]

So it’s from Pritchard right through to the Alberta border — obviously not including the federal parks, which represent sections of the Trans-Canada Highway that are purely federal responsibility — that entire stretch, the four-laning work that’s still required to be done we estimate would cost somewhere in the neighbourhood of $6 billion. Again, that’s inclusive of the $650 million for the four kilometres of the Kicking Horse Canyon.

C. Trevena: Well, the project is…. I mean, it’s a wonderful concept — the idea of four-laning this national highway. It is the Trans-Canada. It is an iconic highway. It would be a great project for making work, for training people, for literally getting people to work and for getting apprentices trained. Putting a lot of emphasis on this $6 billion. It’s a nice figure. It’s just $2 billion less than it’s estimated the Site C dam is going to cost.

I’m wondering, from the minister: does he have a timeline to get from Pritchard, basically where we are now…? Noting that there are one or two places and a couple of bridges which are being worked on in the current coming seasons, does the minister have a timeline to get from that point east of Kamloops to the Alberta border?

Hon. T. Stone: We have invested over $700 million in the Trans-Canada Highway four-laning project between
[ Page 7313 ]
Kamloops and the Alberta border since 2001. We have committed, through our B.C. on the Move ten-year transportation plan, an additional $650 million, though we will be leveraging that up to about a billion dollars over the next ten years. We recognize that that’s not going to complete the job — no question about it.

This highway corridor receives perhaps one of the most robust investments of any highway corridor in the province. In the last decade we’ve invested about $420 million in the Cariboo connector. We’ve invested several hundred million dollars in the Okanagan. We’ve invested about $150 million on Highway 16. We’ve invested, as I said in my opening remarks, about a billion dollars with B.C. Transit in the last ten years. We’ve invested $1.3 billion in coastal ferries during that time period.

We have many modes of transportation across the province, as the member knows well. Government’s job — it’s a tough one at times — is to balance and allocate those funds, those precious resources that we have available to us, in as equitable a fashion as we can, where the highest needs are and the largest volumes and so forth. We could have spent more on the Trans-Canada Highway over the past ten years. We could allocate more going forward.

Does that come out of the transit budget? Does that come out of the coastal ferries budget? Does that come out of highway budgets for corridors in other parts of the province? These are the critical questions that we are constantly faced with as we allocate the resources around the province.

I will say again that we have spent $17 billion on transportation-related infrastructure in the last 12 years in every corner of the province and all modes of transportation. On a per-capita basis that’s the most robust transportation infrastructure spent in the country. We are quite intent on ensuring that British Columbia continues to lead the country in terms of our infrastructure spend, because we do believe it’s a critical element of quality of life and it’s a critical component to a strong and growing economy.

C. Trevena: We’ve had the billboards up since 2009. We have the statement that we’re going to four-lane the Trans-Canada. As I asked the minister in my last question, do we have a time frame to get from Pritchard to the Alberta border?

Hon. T. Stone: I’m wondering if the member for North Island could just repeat her question for us.

[1540]

C. Trevena: Does the minister have a time frame to get from Pritchard to the Alberta border?

Hon. T. Stone: As I’ve said here this afternoon, we’re going to leverage up to another $1 billion to invest in four-laning projects through the corridor. We identified a number of those priorities in B.C. on the Move.

Specifically, we’re doing design work now on a four-laning section. It’s called Donald East, and that’s between Golden and Revelstoke. There is another section that’s called Illecillewaet. That’s, I believe, about a 2.4-kilometre section that will also provide a ponding location when there are highway closures so that cars and trucks can be more safely parked on the side of the road.

We are in design on Salmon Arm West, which is a very significant project that involves a tremendous amount of four-laning as well as the replacement of the Salmon River Bridge. We’re doing the design work on that now.

We are doing design work on the Bruhn Bridge, which is in Sicamous. We are doing design work on the Kicking Horse Canyon component, which I just mentioned. We are doing design work on the North Fork Bridge to, hopefully, be in a position to replace that very soon.

We are in design on the next two sections that are east of Kamloops, east of where the four-laning ends now at Pritchard. Work is underway at Hoffman’s Bluff. We’re in design on the next two sections, which would take us from Hoffman’s Bluff up to Jade Mountain, which is just east of Chase.

Part of the balancing act here is there’s only so much that you can do so fast in terms of the resources that you have available. Again, as I said in my previous response, we’ve allocated the leveraging of up to $1 billion for continued four-laning. That’s not going to get the entire job done. That’s going to get a big chunk of the work done.

Part of the consideration moving forward is that the federal government, in terms of Build Canada funding and their willingness to partner on projects, don’t tend to like the province to get too far out in front of them in terms of announcing projects before funding has been approved. So there’s a certain amount of back and forth that takes place with the federal government as we sign off on different sections that will receive federal dollars.

But as the member knows well — and she just drove this corridor recently — there is a good amount of work underway on various locations through the Trans-Canada, east of Kamloops — in the Monte Creek, Pritchard, Hoffman’s Bluff areas, as well as the Malakwa bridge, which is under construction between Sicamous and Revelstoke. As I said, there’s a tremendous amount of design work that is being done now so that we’re ready when we receive the confirmation from the federal government on federal funding for the next batch of sections.

C. Trevena: Well, frankly, what’s being done now are the easy stretches. It’s the wide places where it’s quite simple to four-lane. I’m not an engineer, but the road is much easier where the four-laning is going.

The minister cannot tell people when this wonderful project, that I would have thought that people would really want to get behind…. Having travelled this corridor and having talked to people, across the board they all
[ Page 7314 ]
want to see it happen. But the minister cannot give them, from the 2009 billboards, a date of completion when they can say: “We’ve got a safe, reliable four-lane highway from Kamloops to the Alberta border.”

[1545]

Hon. T. Stone: The member knows well…. There are probably a few people in this chamber — other than perhaps her colleague from Columbia River–Revelstoke or my colleague from Shuswap — who also, like me, live along and represent a constituency along the Trans-Canada Highway from Kamloops east.

We want to get this work done. There is no question about that. As I said, previously the estimates on the completion of all of the remaining four-laning is approximately $6 billion. The entire corridor is not going to be four-laned tomorrow. Nor is the entire corridor, up to Prince George from Cache Creek on the Cariboo connector. Nor is the Okanagan corridor.

But what we are doing is we’re making significant improvements in all of these corridors: Highway 16, Highway 5, Highway 3, Highway 97, Highway 1, the Island Highway. We’re making significant improvements, which are making the highways safer and which are reducing commute times for people.

So if the member has got a suggestion as to other facets of transportation investments that she would like to put forward as areas that she would suggest we reduce our allocations, our intended investments, if she would like to suggest to the people of the Okanagan that we spend less on the Okanagan corridor and more on the Trans-Canada, she’s welcome to do that. If she would like to suggest that we spend less on coastal ferries, moving forward, she’s welcome to do that. We can spend less on B.C. Transit and put more on the Trans-Canada Highway. She’s welcome to suggest that.

Again, we’ve invested $700 million on the Trans-Canada Highway over the last decade, and we’re going to be investing upwards of another $1 billion over the coming years. I listed off a good number of the projects that we have either started design work on or we’re well into design on. These projects are all well known and understood to people who live up and down the corridor. We’re going to continue to get that work done as fast as we possibly can.

C. Trevena: I think that the minister…. While he’s playing within his budget, if he was committed to fighting for infrastructure, he’d be fighting for a larger budget, because there is a need. This is our link.

If the minister doesn’t want to look at safety…. I think that safety is essential in this. I mean, there were six accidents on the highway between Revelstoke and Salmon Arm alone, six fatalities, just around the Christmas period. To be honest, as somebody said to me out there, if there’d been six measles cases, you’d have the health authorities descending, schools closed for immunization. Everybody would have acted, but six fatalities on that road are taken as par for the course.

Without fatalities, the road was closed 67 times last year. I mean, it has an impact on safety and on people’s psyche knowing they have to drive what is a dangerous road. It’s not even just a perception of a dangerous road; it is a dangerous road. People who live along it know that it’s a dangerous road. They are dealing with people who don’t know the road, who are driving possibly too fast. Or you hit a patch of black ice or whatever it is, and you’re going to get into trouble. In addition to which, 60 percent of the highway use is containers, heavy traffic. It is a commercial route.

If the minister isn’t looking at the safety aspect and willing to be planning out on this very important part of our infrastructure on the safety issue, what about the economic issue? The rail lines are full. I don’t think the minister is going to be going to the Minister of Transportation in Ottawa and saying, “Can you double up the rail lines?” which would help. So the rail lines are full.

The only way of getting goods to one of the largest ports on the west coast, Port Metro Vancouver, which is part of the gateway project, is using the Trans-Canada Highway. The Trans-Canada Highway from Alberta to at least Pritchard is a mess. If the safety aspect doesn’t encourage the minister to go and get money from other pockets, to go and convince his cabinet colleagues that we need to raise money in other ways to ensure that we pay for this, surely the economic aspect would do, because it is an essential corridor for the growth of our economy.

[1550]

Hon. T. Stone: Well, this is an area where the member for North Island and I agree. I certainly don’t need anyone to extol the virtues of safety on the Trans-Canada Highway. I live there. I live on the Trans-Canada Highway. I vacation in the Shuswap, which is off the Trans-Canada Highway. I spend a lot of time in this part of the province.

Nobody needs to lecture me on the importance of safety along this important corridor, which is why the most important thing that we need to continue to do, which I know that the member supports, is to continue to make as much investment, as fast as we can, on four-laning. That is, without question, the most important component of the strategy moving forward.

When we also think of safety and of the fact that there are limited resources…. You know, resources are not limitless, and this was a defining difference between the members opposite and our government in the last election. We do not believe that money grows on a tree. We are very disciplined in our spending.

The most solemn commitment that we made to the people of British Columbia in the last election was to balance our budget. We are one of the few provinces, if not the only province this year, that will be balancing
[ Page 7315 ]
our budget. We’re maintaining our triple-A credit rating. We’ve been able to do all of that and all the while maintain the most robust infrastructure transportation investment program in the country. We’re going to continue to make those investments.

In the absence of being able to four-lane the entire corridor as quickly as we would all like, there is, indeed, a wide range of other initiatives that we will be pursuing and we are pursuing, many of which were detailed in B.C. on the Move, our ten-year transportation plan.

In that plan we announced a new roadside safety program, which is going to involve investments of about $25 million per year. This is a brand-new program. The types of investments that will be contained within this program will be enhanced avalanche investments, which is really important through a few key sections of the Trans-Canada Highway, as the member knows well.

We are going to install three pilot variable speed zones in the province, one of which will be installed west of Golden. This will involve the use of state-of-the-art technology, sensors and radar to detect, on a very current basis, the weather conditions. That will enable ministry staff from our traffic management centre to change the speed limit on electronic speed signs which will replace the current static speed signs which are in place today.

This technology is in use in other parts of the world. It is proven to save lives. That will significantly enhance safety. We’re going to pilot that technology, again, in three locations: west of Revelstoke, on the Sea to Sky Highway and on the Coquihalla Highway.

We’re also going to make investments in wildlife detection systems. We’ll be installing some pilot systems this year. That’s going to reduce the prevalence of collisions with wildlife. We’re going to be installing more roadside barrier, more median barrier, on highways around the province.

We’re also going to work much more closely and in a spirit of collaboration with local governments up and down the Trans-Canada corridor and, frankly, all of our safety partners, including the coroner’s office, the RCMP, ICBC and others to get better as a team of safety organizations at reducing the number of closures on the highway and reducing the duration of closures. That’s an important part of this this as well. That will involve refinements to the traffic management protocols, which we’re working on now.

[1555]

We are responding to the calls in Revelstoke and Golden for a speedier location of coroner and RCMP reconstructionists on the scene of an accident. That can often be the cause of a third to a half of the road closures — waiting for the coroner or the RCMP reconstructionists to arrive, because they have to come in from Kamloops or Kelowna. We’re working with the RCMP to see if reconstructionists can’t be based in Golden or Revelstoke. Likewise, we’re working with the coroner’s office to see if there isn’t a way for a coroner to be based in Revelstoke or Golden.

All of these initiatives taken together are about safety and are going to enhance safety. They’re going to help reduce the number of closures and reduce the duration of closures on the highways. But I’ll say again that, without question, the ideal here is to continue four-laning as much of the highway as fast as we can, and that is certainly our intention.

C. Trevena: So the minister doesn’t have a time frame. It’s just “as quick as we can.” Tell the people who know friends or relatives who have been involved in accidents: “Okay, we’ll fix it as quick as we can.” I don’t think that really is good enough. I think people are very concerned, and as I say, this is not a partisan issue. This is very clearly a safety issue.

I think it’s not appropriate for the minister to start talking about the previous election when we’re talking about something that is so fundamental to many thousands of people who live and work along that highway, who drive that highway regularly — to throw in the parts and lines about the last election.

I’d like to ask the minister…. Since he cannot give people an assurance that there is anything, apart from “We’re going to try to do it as fast as possible. Don’t worry. First I’ll do my constituency, and I’ll do my neighbour’s constituency, who happens to also be a Liberal MLA. We’ll get to you guys in the mountains later….”

Since the minister cannot provide a time frame, can the minister offer one assurance? I would hope that this is a quite simple assurance. He says he’s driven the road a lot. There are certain areas where you do have passing lanes, going up or down the some of the mountains and in other areas where it might be flat.

I drove the road in the…. Luckily, we had wonderful weather — it was sunny; it was dry for most of the time — and drove through good conditions. I couldn’t see lines on the road, either the fog lines on the side, or in the centre. There are times where you’re only using your own instinct that you know that it is your right to pass. That’s in good weather. For people who are driving that in poor weather…. There are many, many kilometres. I started taking notes, but basically, you run out of…. You’re trying to check the speedometer, keep it in your head and keep a tally of how many kilometres there are where there are simply no lines.

Since the minister can’t assure the people that there are going to be serious improvements that they need outside of his own constituency, will he assure them that there will be new and regular line-painting to at least be able to keep people in the right lanes?

[1600]

Hon. T. Stone: Well, with respect to the line-painting issue that the member just mentioned, there are kind
[ Page 7316 ]
of two parts to that question. First off, for the member’s benefit, we begin to apply the line-painting in the spring when the weather allows for it. That can be early spring. In some years it can be late spring. We start in the lower elevations, and then we work our way up to the higher elevations, for obvious reasons.

Nothing is out of the ordinary this season, compared to previous seasons. That’s how we have always done it. The bigger challenge with line-painting is the actual paint itself that we have to use. It was only a few years ago when the federal government changed the regulations relating to the types of line paint that are allowed to be put on roads and effectively banned the use of oil-based paints.

This came as a major surprise to all provinces. We all have winter, tough winter months of varying degrees, in every part of the country, and this came as a surprise to us. The water-based paints, which are available to us to use, simply do not last like the old oil-based paints used to.

We are doing a lot of work to research new paint options. We are working closely and collaboratively with other provinces. We’re looking at other jurisdictions around the world, at other types of applications that could potentially be used. But fundamentally, that is the challenge.

Now, I can say that since that change was made with the federal regulation, we are applying more paint than we ever have before. We are trying to get out there as early in the season as we can on corridors around the province and are doing our best based on the elevation of the highway and the weather conditions at a particular time.

I do want to address quickly the earlier part of the member’s question, which maybe was more of a statement — the suggestion that there’s a tremendous amount of work going on in government-held ridings versus non-government-held ridings. This is simply nonsense, and the member should know better.

[D. Horne in the chair.]

I will read into the record so that it’s crystal-clear for her and for others. I mentioned earlier that $700 million has been spent to date over the last decade on the Trans-Canada Highway. About half of that has been invested in the Columbia River–Revelstoke riding held by her colleague. He’s not a government member; he’s an opposition member. The other half of those dollars…. I should point out that $327.9 million was the Kicking Horse Canyon project that we talked about earlier — 22 of the 26 kilometres of the most treacherous and challenging highway in the country.

In addition to that, in Columbia River–Revelstoke there was the Woods Overhead replacement. That was a $12.2 million project. Outside of the Columbia River–Revelstoke riding the other investments have largely taken place in kind of a combination — roughly half in the Shuswap riding, which borders on Columbia River–Revelstoke, and the Kamloops–South Thompson riding, my riding, which borders on the Shuswap riding, as one would expect.

On a go-forward basis, as I said a moment ago, a top priority for the government, which we made very clear to the federal government, is our desire to see that final four-kilometre section of the Kicking Horse Canyon get done. We’ve strongly encouraged that the federal government make funds available from the national component of the Build Canada fund to partner with provincial dollars so that we can get on with that final four-kilometre section.

That will represent the single-largest investment in one particular project on the Trans-Canada Highway in the history of the Trans-Canada Highway. Again, that’s in the Columbia River–Revelstoke constituency.

Aside from that, we’ve also put forward projects that I mentioned previously. I’ll say them again. The Illecillewaet component is 2.5 kilometres of four-laning that’s in design and development. The Quartz bridge is in early design and development. That’s a four-kilometre section of four-laning. Donald to Forde Station Road, which is tender-ready, is a two-kilometre section.

[1605]

The North Fork Bridge I mentioned earlier. That, I believe, is in the Shuswap riding. It’s right on the border of Shuswap and Columbia River–Revelstoke. That’s a 3.8-kilometre section. The Malakwa bridge, which is in the Shuswap constituency, is 3.1 kilometres of four-laning. We’re in design on the Bruhn Bridge and Old Spall Road, which is in Sicamous.

We’re in design and development on the Salmon Arm west, which involves three projects, a very significant improvement leading up to Salmon Arm, on the western side of Salmon Arm, including the replacement of the Salmon River Bridge. We’re in design and development on Fort Tucalt. That’s a 6.5-kilometre section. We’re in design and development of the Squilax Bridge to Little River Road. That’s a 3.8-kilometre section.

Hoffman’s Bluff to Chase Creek, which is on the eastern edges of my constituency — that’s a five-kilometre section. We are in design and development there. We are in construction right now on both phase 1 and phase 2 of Hoffman’s Bluff, which, combined, is about 6.1 kilometres of four-laning, as well as 7.5 kilometres of four-laning Monte Creek to Pritchard, phase 2.

Every one of these projects which I just listed off are all projects that we intend on proceeding with. Some will be projects that we will be able to go forward with because of federal contributions. Some we will do on our own as a province. But these are the priorities on the Trans-Canada Highway. These projects represent over 60 kilometres of four-laning that is going to take place in the near term on the Trans-Canada Highway. It would be a dramatic improvement in four-laning.
[ Page 7317 ]

In fact, when these projects are done, we will be, for the most part, four-laned right up to Salmon Arm. There may be one section between Sorrento and Salmon Arm that has yet to be done, but we should be four-laned almost all the way up to Salmon Arm, most of the way into Sicamous. If we can convince the federal government of the value of the Kicking Horse Canyon project, we will have that very important section also four-laned. This represents tremendous progress that builds upon the $700 million of investment that we’ve made over the last decade.

The Chair: The member for Surrey–White Rock seeks leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

Introductions by Members

G. Hogg: We are blessed today to have a wonderful 4-5 split group from White Rock Christian Academy with us, ten parents and their wonderful teacher who comes back every year, Ms. Whitmarsh. Could I ask the House to please make them most welcome.

Debate Continued

C. Trevena: I’m going to get back to the line-painting in a moment because that’s a comparatively easy fix on safety issues for people who are living there. They’d like to know that this was happening more than just once a year, so by this time of the year, when it’s completely gone — or even in the middle of the winter, when they can’t see the lines because they’re gone already — they know that there is going to be some better fix than they are seeing.

I want to come back to that in a moment, but the minister said that these projects — a number of them are still in the design phase; a number of them haven’t had dollars committed — will be 60 kilometres of the Trans-Canada four-laned, just around Sicamous, which, as we acknowledged before and I think the minister will well acknowledge, are some of the easier bits of the road. But that’s 60 out of, as the ministry’s own webpage says, 339 kilometres under provincial jurisdiction. It’s not much when we’ve been having those billboards out there since 2009.

Again, I’m just voicing — on behalf of the many, many people who I talked to, when I was going along the highway, of all political stripes — the frustration that it is taking so long and the sense that, while we have the websites and we have the minister reading the list and everything, there is a lack of transparency. People just want to know when it’s going to be finished. You know, we’ve got the signs up there. When’s it going to be finished? Obviously, the minister isn’t going to give us that end date because he has no idea himself.

[1610]

I’m going to go back to the issue of road lines and safety. I wondered if the minister could just…. It might be a bit of a digression from the four-laning of Highway 1. The road-line-painting budget. I understand that is centralized now, but every area has to apply for a certain amount every year. Am I correct in that? Secondly, how many times can a road get painted? For instance, we’re talking here about the Trans-Canada — highly used, lousy winters. How often could that highway get painted to ensure that people who have to drive it very regularly are doing so safely?

Hon. T. Stone: With respect to line marking, for the member’s benefit, the way this works is that the Ministry of Transportation has a number of contracts — five to be exact — with specific contractors who do the line-painting. These are separate contracts from the contracts we have with the maintenance contractors.

Each of these contracts, obviously, is focused on a region. There’s Vancouver Island, Lower Mainland, Thompson-Cariboo, Okanagan-Kootenay and the northern region, each having their own line-painting contractor.

The dollar value that is assigned to each of these different regions varies. It’s based on two key considerations. First and foremost, the total number of line kilometres that need to be painted within that region obviously impacts the volume of paint that is needed and, therefore, the budget required and, secondly, the geographic location and the weather conditions within that geographic location.

So if, for example, you look at the Vancouver Island and Lower Mainland regions, the dollar values for line-painting within each of those two regions is considerably less than the dollar value of the line-painting contracts for the northern region or the Thompson-Cariboo or the Okanagan-Kootenay regions because there are far, far fewer line kilometres to paint in the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island than there are in the other three regions. Likewise, we experience, as the member knows well, much harsher winter conditions in those three Interior regions in comparison to Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland.

[1615]

The estimated 2015-2016 fiscal contract dollar value for all five of the contracts is about $12.4 million. But, again, that is not allocated in equal fifths across each of those regions. It’s allocated based on the number of line kilometres in each region and the weather conditions that are encountered in each region as well.

C. Trevena: The subsequent part of my question to the minister was: is there a capacity in that budget to allow for twice-yearly line-painting on the Trans-Canada to ensure that if there’s not going to be the physical fix, at least there will be that small piece of safety there.
[ Page 7318 ]

Hon. T. Stone: In some of these regions, particularly the three Interior regions, it is quite common that each and every year we end up having to do two paint applications, one in the spring and one in the fall. Whereas in the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island, in most of the areas of those two regions, we tend to only need to do one paint application per year, which would typically take place during the spring months.

We do, however, obviously, monitor this very closely. If we deem it necessary to actually apply an additional set of paint lines on any particular section, we will typically look for and find those funds from elsewhere in the Ministry of Transportation budget to cover the cost of that additional paint application.

Again, we’re applying a lot more paint than we had needed to apply prior to the federal government’s decision, which was actually passed through federal legislation on September 9, 2010. That’s when the federal government amended the Canadian Environmental Protection Actand, specifically, the volatile organic compounds, VOC, concentration limits for architectural coating regulations.

This was what resulted in the province having to move to a water-based paint versus oil-based paint. We’ve had the challenges ever since. But, again, while we do not typically move dollars between the line-painting contracts, we will often add some additional dollars into a particular contract if we deem additional paint is required in a particular section of highway within one of the regions.

C. Trevena: Is this the road engineers, the Ministry of Transportation people who are just going out on the roads and saying: “It’s getting a bit bad. We’re going to paint it up”? Or is it the maintenance contractors? Who’s going to decide this?

It’s something that I heard as an ongoing concern. People are aware nothing else is going to get fixed, so let’s look at trying to get more permanent lines.

[1620]

Hon. T. Stone: Yesterday we were talking about sipes and rubber traction and tire socks and, today, line paint. It’s an exhilarating ministry.

We have about 800 employees around the province who have, as part of their responsibility, the monitoring of the responsibilities that our maintenance contractors and our line-painting contractors have. Our staff, our hard-working men and women in the Ministry of Transportation — again, about 800 people in every corner of the province — are out there every day of the week monitoring the conditions on our highways to ensure that the maintenance contractors are adhering to the specs in their contracts and that the line-painting contractors are adhering to the specs in their contracts.

It’s a very close relationship that we have with these contractors. We’re in constant contact with them. If we determine at any point that we feel that (a) they’re not fulfilling their obligations or (b) there perhaps is a need, in the case of the line painting, for an additional application in a particular section of highway, then we will direct the line-painting contractor to do that — and ensure that, again, if it’s a net new addition to the expectations in their contracts, the additional funds are provided to make that happen.

C. Trevena: Briefly going back to other issues on the highway, the physical issues. Going back to that last section of the Kicking Horse Canyon, the $650 million improvement. I know that there would be great willingness from mayors along the route, regional directors along the route, the local MLA there to join with the minister to go and lobby the federal transportation minister for extra funds for that.

The minister is talking about avalanche control. I might be wrong here, but I understand that the ministry recently made changes to the Kicking Horse Canyon concession agreement which meant that the ministry took back avalanche control in that area from the concessionaire. I wonder if the minister could confirm that and, if so, explain the reasoning behind that — what happened to make that happen.

[1625]

Hon. T. Stone: Yes, the member is correct with respect to the Kicking Horse Canyon agreement. We did bring the avalanche control responsibilities back into the ministry.

That came about as a result of coming to an understanding and an agreement with the concessionaire that the ministry’s avalanche team was better positioned to provide the avalanche control — the expertise that the ministry has with respect to when it is most appropriate to close a section of highway and to do the control and when to open the highway. The ministry’s expertise, which I know the member knows well, is world renowned — our avalanche team. The ministry is better positioned to undertake those avalanche control responsibilities.

I will take this moment to acknowledge the men and women of our avalanche control team around the province. I have had a good opportunity to meet a number of them, most recently the team in Revelstoke. I’m not sure if the member had a chance to talk to them on her recent travels. What these folks do and the risks that they take every single day of the week, whether it’s in a helicopter or on the ground, is quite remarkable. It was something that I truly wasn’t able to appreciate until I was there and was able to participate in almost some mock exercises with them and go up in a helicopter and see it with my own eyes.

I know the member joins me in congratulating and thanking these folks for the exceptionally good work that they do to keep all of the rest of us safe on our highways.
[ Page 7319 ]

C. Trevena: I think we thank anybody who works on behalf of our safety for all of us.

When the concession agreement was established, surely the ministry looked at avalanche control and deemed that the concessionaire was adequately suited for this. So why the change at this stage in the agreement?

[1630]

Hon. T. Stone: The decision to include within the Kicking Horse Canyon concessionaire agreement the avalanche control responsibilities was a business case decision that was taken at the time. This was the first time that the province had included in a concessionaire agreement avalanche control responsibilities, and it was the only time. This, indeed, became an outlier situation.

We have spent a good amount of time today, the member for North Island and I, talking about public safety on our highways. Certainly, expertise related to when to close a highway, the types of avalanche control measures to employ during closures, when to open a highway again — these are pieces of expertise which we have in spades within the Ministry of Transportation.

Respecting the fact that this was an outlier situation to begin with, more importantly, from the perspective of public safety on our highways, we felt that, based on the depth of expertise that we have in the Ministry of Transportation, it made more sense.

We came to this agreement with the concessionaire that it makes more sense, on a go-forward basis, for avalanche control responsibilities within this particular component of the Trans-Canada Highway to be carried out by the Ministry of Transportation avalanche control team.

C. Trevena: Did it cost the ministry anything to change the contract?

Hon. T. Stone: My understanding is that there were no additional costs. In fact, I believe there were actually savings to the ministry by moving the avalanche control responsibilities back into the ministry. That being said, I will endeavour to look into this further and provide some additional information to the member once I have that information.

C. Trevena: I appreciate that. I know that we were both quite thrown into this, so we’re working with what we have. While I respect the people with you, these are not necessarily questions that you were expecting on a Thursday afternoon. A couple more questions on the Trans-Canada, on the four-laning, and then I will move on from the four-laning to other areas of the Trans-Canada.

The minister mentioned, in his list of projects that are happening, Salmon Arm west, their bridge replacement there and the potential straightening out of the road, maybe putting a roundabout in, all of that. I did stop in Salmon Arm and talked with people there, as I did in many of the communities along the highway.

[1635]

There was a real concern that the consultation process was completely inadequate. Frankly, it was that the people felt that they had not been listened to. They had gone along, seen the options there, had tried to make their voices heard and either got no response or felt that they were not being heard.

I’m wondering, from the minister, at what stage is the project? Is it planned, going to be going ahead no matter what? Or do people — local people, people who are members of the chamber of commerce and otherwise — actually have a serious opportunity to have their views heard?

Hon. T. Stone: I’m intimately familiar with the project that the member has mentioned, Salmon Arm west. It’s about a 5.7-kilometre four-laning project west of Salmon Arm, leading into Salmon Arm. It includes the replacement for the Salmon River bridge.

There have been two rounds of engagement up to this point, which I know the member is aware of. One was 2012, which was the broader Trans-Canada Highway engagement seeking public input on what the next round of priorities should be for the highway.

In 2014 we did the second round of engagement, which was the B.C. on the Move engagement process. We were able to further refine, from the perspective of the public’s input, what the projects leading up to Salmon Arm from the western approaches should look like.

This project is in the early design stage. There have been a number of discussions and meetings with a wide array of stakeholders. A number of discussions have been held with First Nations in the area, I believe Adams Lake and Neskonlith, as well as with the city of Salmon Arm and a number of businesses.

[1640]

Initial very, very preliminary designs, which were shared with all of the above in different interactions, resulted in a great deal of feedback. In fact, there were concerns — expressed from First Nations, local government and, particularly, businesses in the area — relating to access. There were also concerns conveyed with respect to the bridge alignment and whether or not flooding would be properly mitigated as part of the design of the project.

As we do with every highway project, we will continue to engage very, very closely with First Nations, local government and, indeed, businesses impacted by this particular project and who have an interest in this project. That is the case today and will be the case moving forward.

C. Trevena: Is the plan that is there in the design — is that finalized? Are we talking about a certain one, or is it still in development? Can people have their voice heard still on the potential — not just the immediate land-
[ Page 7320 ]
owners but others who are concerned? I mean, we have about 1,500 transport trucks a day going through the community and then over that bridge. So it’s got a lot of interest from a lot of people.

Hon. T. Stone: The design for this particular section is not complete. It isn’t finalized. There will still be ample opportunities for local governments, First Nations and businesses to offer their input into this particular section of the Trans-Canada Highway. In fact, we have a public open house scheduled for later this spring. Everyone will be invited to come out and look at some potential alignments and offer their feedback, all of which will be taken into account as we continue to refine this particular project.

I will say this. The member alluded to the volume of traffic and quite correctly has pointed out the increasing truck traffic on the Trans-Canada Highway. Depending on the time of year, the volumes of traffic moving up and down this highway fluctuate greatly. But it can rise to a high of about 12,000 vehicles, in total, during the summer months.

At any given point it can involve upwards of 2,000 commercial trucks per day, and that’s year-round. In the winter months, when you have about 6,000 vehicles per day, you still have about 2,000 of those that are commercial trucks. So it’s a much larger percentage of the overall volume of traffic than in the summer months, when there’s a huge swell of, largely, tourism traffic.

The point is, this particular bridge contained within this project is a great example of the types of bridges that need to be replaced across the province and particularly on the Trans-Canada Highway. We certainly will make that happen once the final decision to move forward with construction on this particular phase is made.

C. Trevena: My last comment — and it is really a comment — about the four-laning of the Trans-Canada. I am very disappointed that there isn’t really the vision to give an end date and fight with tooth and nail to bring in funds — looking at new ways of raising revenue and to say: “We’re going to do this. This is a legacy project. This is such an important project.”

It would be remiss of me to end this section of the estimates without saying something that my colleague from Columbia River–Revelstoke mentions quite a lot when he is talking about the four-laning of the Trans-Canada Highway. It’s the amount of money that’s actually allocated to it in the budget. We’ve got $45 million this year, $46 million next year and $60 million the year after. And just to replace the bridge, we’re talking approximately $40 million. So it’s a drop in the ocean.

The minister has admitted it’s going to be at least $6 billion now. When I was talking to people, they were talking about how a few years ago it was at $3 billion. In fact, somebody suggested: “Well, if the federal and the provincial government had committed $150,000 for ten years, we’d have made the $3 billion a number of years ago.”

[1645]

There is nobody who seems to be willing to make the commitment to ensure that this project, which is so important for the whole country — to be honest, for our identity, for our economy and for the safety on that highway…. There should be that commitment that goes forward. That being said, the minister clearly isn’t willing to make that his legacy project.

I want to move down a little bit further along the Trans-Canada, which is the Abbotsford West section, Langley to Abbotsford. B.C. on the Move has the six-laning. I’ve talked to the minister’s staff at times. They’ve mentioned that the six-laning of this section of highway to connect it to the Port Mann Bridge, which we’ll be talking about on a separate day….

I wondered if the minister could just give me, again, whether he has a final dollar figure on this and a time frame for it.

Hon. T. Stone: The continuation of the six-laning from Langley out to Abbotsford, as the member has quite correctly pointed out, was one of the projects which we featured in our B.C. on the Move plan, which we rolled out a number of weeks ago. As the member knows, a significant amount of money, many billions of dollars — $3.4 billion, I believe — was invested in a new Port Mann Bridge and related six-laning coming off of the Port Mann Bridge, which ends in Langley.

While we’re extremely proud of that investment — and we hear from British Columbians every day who appreciate the one hour in commute-time savings that they experience every single day, which at the end of the day is about more quality time with your family and your friends — we recognize that the six-laning needs to continue east from Langley. That is why we are committed to doing that six-laning work from where it ends presently in Langley right on out to probably Whatcom Road in Abbotsford.

Now, there are two critical components to this. One, there’s a tremendous amount of design work to do for this project, which we have initiated, and we have design dollars in the budget that are allocated to getting that work done. Secondly, this is a project which we have signalled to the federal government as a project that we would hope the federal government is willing to partner with us on in terms of Build Canada funding. We’re having those discussions with the feds at this time.

This is a project that will uncork the remaining section of the Trans-Canada Highway east of the Port Mann Bridge and will ensure the smooth flow of traffic in and out of the Lower Mainland on the Trans-Canada Highway.

C. Trevena: Unlike the Massey bridge, where we actually have the billboard and a start date, this is still just
[ Page 7321 ]
very much a pipedream. “This is what we’d like to do. We’re going to do it eventually to get more traffic moving.” It’s not going to be in the next three-plus years.

Hon. T. Stone: With all due respect, when we say we’re going to do things on this side of the House, we do them.

[1650]

We said that we were going to replace the Port Mann Bridge and invest in a tremendous amount of improvement on the Trans-Canada Highway east of the Port Mann Bridge, and we did that. We said that we were going to build the South Fraser Perimeter Road, and we built it. We said we were going to build the Sea to Sky Highway, and we built it. We said we were going to build the W.R. Bennett Bridge in Kelowna, and we built it.

We said that we would do $700 million worth of four-laning on the Trans-Canada Highway, and we did that work. We committed to two phases of the Cariboo connector project, $440 million, from Cache Creek to Prince George. We delivered.

I can assure the hon. member…. By the way, the hon. members know the hon. member across the way did not support a single one of those projects — not a single one.

We have made the commitment that we are going to replace what is today the largest bottleneck in the province of British Columbia, the largest choke point on our highways, now that the Port Mann is done. We are going to replace the George Massey Tunnel with a new bridge, and we’re going to deliver on that.

I would suggest that in light of the fact that we have included in our B.C. on the Move transportation plan a commitment to the people of British Columbia that we’re going to continue to six-lane the Trans-Canada from where it ends today in Langley right out to Whatcom in Abbotsford, we are going to deliver on that commitment.

C. Trevena: I take it that that means the minister has neither dollars nor a time frame for this, so I will move on. I don’t want to belabour the point on this. But it is unfortunate there is the boast of putting money into this, six-laning this piece in the Lower Mainland, when we have spent the last hour and a half talking about a major piece of infrastructure for this province, the Trans-Canada Highway — the four-laning of this — which is something the government keeps saying they’re going to do and, I would say, have not done.

I just want to ask the minister, before we move on to the next stage, because this has been thrust upon us…. I’ve got a couple of areas where I could ask questions. One of them is the Massey Tunnel replacement project. I know the member for Delta South also wanted to ask some questions on that.

One of my first questions on this is…. Again, we’ve had the billboards up now since 2013, saying that it’s going to happen. We are assured that there is going to be a hole in the ground in 2017. I know that there are people working on this, but I wonder if the minister could perhaps explain where we are with the project and how we are going to get this all started by 2017.

I would also like to know the exact cost of the project and the design of the project — if we are still talking the potential ten-lane bridge. Or what is it that we are now talking about?

Hon. T. Stone: With respect to the George Massey replacement, I will very quickly update the member on the progress that we have made to date.

As with any major bridge replacement project similar to what we’re doing with the George Massey piece — let’s take the Port Mann Bridge project as an example — phase 1 is always the phase whereby you confirm that there is a problem that needs to be fixed. You get out and you talk to the community, and you engage with stakeholders. You really affirm that there is a need to replace an asset. That phase obviously was completed. That moved us into the second phase.

[1655]

The second phase involved — again, through engagement with the community and with other stakeholders — an assessment of the type of replacement and alignments. Should the tunnel be replaced with another tunnel, or should the tunnel be replaced with another bridge? What should the alignment be? Is it on the existing alignment, or is it on a different alignment? Similar questions to that.

That phase has been completed as well. As the member knows, the decision coming out of that phase, based in large part on the feedback we received from the community and stakeholders, was to proceed with a new bridge that will be constructed over top of the existing alignment of the George Massey Tunnel.

That then moved us into the third phase, which is the phase that we are currently in. That is the technical and engineering phase. That is looking at a broad spectrum of issues. How high does the bridge have to be? How long does the bridge have to be? How wide should the bridge be? What amount of road work — which could potentially include interchanges and widening of roads leading up to the bridge on both sides? How much of that work should be done?

We are in the midst of this particular phase. We expect to be done this phase in late spring, early summer. The end result of this phase will be a really tight scope on the actual bridge. How many lanes? How much road work will we do? How high and long will it be? And so forth. This will then enable us to assign a price tag or a project cost to the overall project.

That will then lead us into the next phase, which will be a period of determining the options for financing this asset. Then we move into a construction phase at that point.

All of that being said, we remain confident that this project will be delivered on time and that that will mean construction beginning, as we have committed, in 2017.
[ Page 7322 ]

C. Trevena: The $24 million for the project this fiscal year and the $29 million the next fiscal year are for planning.

Hon. T. Stone: That is correct. We have $24 million earmarked for planning for the current fiscal year and an additional $29 million of planning for the 2016-2017 fiscal year.

C. Trevena: A couple of questions.

This is still subject to Treasury Board approval for the business plan and the funding strategy, and yet the minister is talking with great confidence as though it’s going to go ahead. Treasury Board still hasn’t approved the business plan, and the minister said that only when we get the designs will we get the funding strategy.

I wonder if the minister could clarify which comes first.

Hon. T. Stone: Yes, this project will require a business case that will need to be signed off by government — no question about that. As, I’m sure, the member knows, before you make a decision on the final business case, there are a number of important steps that have to take place leading up to that.

Again, we’re still finalizing the scope of the project itself. Is it a six-lane bridge, an eight-lane bridge, a ten-lane bridge? How much road work are we doing on either end of the bridge? If this project is to involve a significant amount of road work and, potentially, interchanges on either side, that’s going to significantly affect the price.

[1700]

You can’t determine the price until you have nailed down the scope. I’m not sure if the member has built a home. Or when you go and buy a car, you determine what your needs are. You assign a budget to that, and then you figure out how to pay for it. That’s also how you build infrastructure. We did that with the Sea to Sky project. We did that with the SFPR. We did that with the Port Mann project. We’re doing that with George Massey. You determine what exactly it is that you’re building.

I’m sure we can agree, Member, that a six-lane bridge would cost less than a ten-lane bridge, no? We need to determine what that scope is and how much roadwork is done. Once we have that scope nailed, we will be able to assign a price tag. Then we have the discussion around how to look at all the different potential financing options and decide which option will be embraced for the financing of the bridge and then get on with construction.

As I said earlier, this government is committed to construction beginning on this project in early 2017.

C. Trevena: Maybe it’s an issue of semantics, but the minister is talking about defining the scope of the project, and I understand. Obviously, the cost is going to be different depending on…. No bridge at all would be no cost, except for the remediation of the tunnel. No question, four-lane, six-lane, ten-lane bridges are going to cost different amounts — and interchanges. It all makes sense.

But the minister says that after they’ve done the scope, they’ll realize the business plan. Now, he used the analogy of buying a car. Well, before I go and buy a car, I know why I need a car. Surely the government has done…. And I’ve requested it several times and had no response, so maybe I’m wrong, but I would have thought that the government, in working on a project of this magnitude, would have already done its business plan.

Could the minister please confirm what he means by realizing the business plan after having done the scope? Has there been any business plan done about the need for this bridge and the impact this bridge will have?

Hon. T. Stone: I see the member for North Island talking to the member for Delta South, so I assume the member for Delta South is informing the member for North Island just how horrific the congestion can be every day of the week heading in and out through the George Massey Tunnel. I’m sure she’s passing that information on.

This is the single-largest bottleneck in the province of British Columbia, now that this government has resolved what was previously the number one bottleneck, the Port Mann Bridge. Tens of thousands of people work their way through this bridge every single day of the week.

On this side of the House we want to help people repatriate more time for loved ones, more time for families. The member for Delta South is laughing. I’m not sure why. I’m not sure what she would have against people having more time with their loved ones.

The Port Mann project has added an hour per day into people’s lives. They were previously sitting in cars, idling, sitting in traffic. You can now leave half an hour later in the morning and be home half an hour earlier in the evening. That’s more time to do what’s important to each individual. That is the same motivation for this particular project, the George Massey replacement.

On the issue of the business case and so forth, I would draw the member for North Island’s attention to page 17 of the Ministry of Transportation’s ’15-16 to ’17-18 service plan. On this page in the service plan, very clearly indicated under “Transportation Investments,” it says: “George Massey Tunnel replacement project.” It has a little “1” next to it. You go to the little note, and it says, “Subject to Treasury Board–approved business plan and funding strategy” — completely transparent.

[1705]

For the member’s benefit, this is how infrastructure projects are built. In ’15-16 there is $24 million assigned for business planning. In ’16-17 there is $29 million assigned for business planning, for a total of $53 million over these two fiscal years to complete the business plan. That gets us through the scoping phase, which we are in the middle of right now.
[ Page 7323 ]

As the member will see if she looks at the service plan, under ’17-18 there are zero dollars allocated. That indicates that at that point we are under construction. We’re actually building the bridge and addressing the congestion which I know the member for Delta South will attest to in that part of the province.

C. Trevena: I take it that the minister’s hyperbole and very strange use of the estimates process means that there is no business plan yet for the George Massey Tunnel. This is something that was a purely political effort. We’re going to just put up the billboard in 2013, ahead of one election, to say that ahead of the next election we are going to be building this behemoth. It doesn’t really matter whether we need it, how much we’re going to spend on it. We don’t know how much we’re going to spend on it, because it’s going to look glorious. I really don’t understand why.

We’ve been spending the last…. Since we started these estimates nearly two hours ago, we’re spending much of the time talking about a major piece of infrastructure that needs millions of dollars of spending. The minister acknowledged $6 billion spending. The last bridge this government built was 120 percent over budget. It came in at $3.3 billion, and it’s still rising.

For the cost of replacing the George Massey Tunnel, you could have done half the Trans-Canada Highway. I mean, we should be realistic on this. This is a pure vanity project. It’s going to ease traffic through the Lower Mainland. There are other ways of easing traffic through the Lower Mainland.

I would just like the minister to confirm, without the hyperbole, without the opportunity that he’s taking to make certain political points and the instruction he feels is necessary to give about how infrastructure projects are made…. We look at how we build projects, we look at failed projects, we look at costly projects, and we hope that the government has done a business plan.

I’d just like the minister to confirm yes or no. Has he done a business plan? Has his ministry done a business plan? Has the Jobs ministry done a business plan? Has anybody on that side of the House done a business plan for the replacement of the George Massey Tunnel?

Hon. T. Stone: I see the member for Delta South looking down at her notes. I’m assuming she’s sending out a tweet now to inform the people of Delta and the people of Richmond that the Transportation critic for the New Democratic Party does not support alleviating the congestion at the number one congestion point in the province of British Columbia.

Let that be on the record right now. She just suggested that those dollars be allocated to the Trans-Canada Highway project — lock, stock and barrel. Well, we feel differently on this side of the House.

As I’ve said over and over and over again in the last 15, 20 minutes, the member only has to look at the service plan to see in the last fiscal year and this fiscal year the dollars that have been allocated, a combined amount of $53 million, for the business planning. That’s what we are doing right now. I’m not sure what part of that the member for North Island does not understand. We are doing the business planning now.

That involves confirming the need. That involves determining the type of alignment. That involves determining the type of structure. That involves then putting a fence around the scope for the project, which is what we’re doing right now. Once we have confirmed the scope, then you assign a price tag. Then you determine how you’re going to finance the asset.

That is how it has been done in this province for many, many, many years. There is nothing but transparency wrapped around this, as the member would see if she were to look at the budget documents or the service plans. It’s all right there.

C. Trevena: Well, I did actually refer to the budget papers at the beginning of this discussion about the George Massey Tunnel replacement.

[1710]

I’m going to cede the floor at the moment because I know my colleague from Delta South has some questions of the minister. But I just want to get on the record that what the minister has effectively said is that the billboards were put up in 2013, ahead of the last election, but only now are they trying to find a business plan, at the cost of $53 million, to justify this project that is, I believe, a purely political project that was done for one election and to be ready for a next election.

I know my colleague from Delta South has some questions. I’ll come back after my colleague from Delta South.

V. Huntington: Firstly, I think the minister forgets that he really ought not to be talking about what members are doing in the House. However, that being said, I was using my pen, not my phone, to do some work here.

I’d like to reply to a couple of the comments the minister made. Firstly — and this is something that I have just not understood about this process — business plans are normally done before a project is started, not after a project begins. What you’re doing is technical planning, and I wish the ministry would stick to that comment. You’re doing technical planning of the process and the project now, because no business case was ever formally done. We have made FOIs up our yingyang trying to get hold of anything the ministry had done before they made the announcement about the bridge.

Secondly, yes, Delta South is very pleased the ministry has decided to go ahead with the new crossing. What we’re very concerned about is where the next choke point is going to be. That’s going to be in Richmond as you try and access Vancouver, because you’re not dealing with congestion along the whole roadway.
[ Page 7324 ]

There have been comments from the ministry that studies are showing that half, or 60 percent — I think Mr. Freer has the exact number — of the traffic is actually going into Richmond. We’d sure like to see that data because nobody in Delta feels that that’s the case. Certainly a good percentage is but not all of it.

The biggest concern I have with the comments that Delta is thrilled is the fact that we aren’t getting the crossing replacement that the people of Delta wanted, so there’s been a feeling that we haven’t been heard, which is not abnormal in Delta. However, pleased with the crossing, yes. Concerned with where the crossing is, yes, and, I will say, very concerned that we have heard nothing about how much the province is expecting the port of Vancouver to contribute toward the construction of this crossing.

Before the crossing was announced, the port spent months, years talking about the need for the ability of large ships to move up the Fraser River so that they could start expanding industry further up the river. They needed the clearance, and over and over again the president of the port of Vancouver talked about the need for additional clearance at Massey Tunnel.

Now that we have the bridge coming on line, the port has gone totally silent. In fact, what we’re starting to hear now is that no big ship could ever transit the Fraser because they just don’t have the operating width on the river to bring up the larger vessels.

Well, I think this is all a ploy by the port, and I certainly hope the province is doing its due diligence. There isn’t a person in South Delta or in Richmond that doesn’t believe this bridge is basically going in at the present time because the port has been demanding that it do so.

To get to a couple of my questions. There are some rumours flying around South Delta, two of which…. I know the answer to one. Mr. Freer has been good enough to keep me up to date on much of the project. There was a rumour that the bridge alignment was now shifting north of Deas park. I don’t believe that’s so, but I would like to get that on the record for my community’s sake.

The second rumour that is flying around the community at this point is that the ministry has decided the Ladner exit will not be part of the project. I understand that also is not the case, but I would like the minister’s confirmation of that.

[1715]

Hon. T. Stone: I do appreciate the member for Delta South and her comments in support of the bridge.

In terms of traffic patterns, there continue to be efforts put into determining exactly who’s going where. What we do understand is that at least 50 percent, and likely more, of the overall traffic that will flow through this — that goes through the tunnel today and will go over the bridge in the future — is moving between Delta, Richmond and Surrey — at least 50 percent, potentially upwards of 60, of the overall traffic. I put that out there for the member.

In terms of the funding discussion and the member’s comments about Port Metro Vancouver, I understand what she’s saying. I really do. Once we have the scope finalized and the price tag determined, as I mentioned previously in the estimates here, we will then move into the funding component of the project planning. We will certainly, as part of that discussion, look at all potential funding partners, including the port of Metro Vancouver and, potentially, the federal government and other funding partners.

I appreciate the member for raising that particular piece of this discussion. It is a very important piece. With respect to the two specific questions that the member for Delta South asked, I can answer both of them very directly.

First off, the member is correct. The alignment of the bridge will continue to be on the existing right-of-away. There’s no change to the alignment. I believe the member said that that’s what she had heard from Mr. Geoff Freer, and that is correct.

The second question related to whether or not there would continue to be access to River Road south into Ladner as part of a new bridge. I can confirm for the member that, yes, there will continue to be access to River Road south into Ladner as part of this project.

V. Huntington: That will be of great comfort to the community. It has begun to panic a little, and it would be nice to be able to stop it in its tracks. I am pleased that the minister, or the government, is considering entering negotiations with the port. I think there is a real need that they be involved in the development of the funding pattern for this project. There is no doubt in anybody’s mind, on the ground, that they are definitely part of the decision to proceed.

I’d like to just move on to the irrigation enhancement project that came out of the South Fraser Perimeter Road development. Again, I’ve spoken with Mr. Freer about this issue. As the minister may know, the Delta Farmers Institute had commissioned an independent engineering study on what they felt were shortcomings in the irrigation project itself and had wanted the ministry to complete the work as they had outlined in their report.

I understand the ministry felt that the report did not reflect reality on the ground. I’m sorry that there seems to be this dispute between the two parties.

[1720]

I know, at least I understand, the municipality has now moved in to complete the work as the farmers had requested. I want to know if the minister can advise whether his ministry has taken a second look at the issue. And will it be assisting in upgrading those aspects of the irrigation project that the farming community feels are insufficient?

Hon. T. Stone: As the member knows well, the ministry has invested about $22 million within the overall
[ Page 7325 ]
SFPR budget for upgrading irrigation in Delta as part of the overall project. We continue to be committed to fulfilling the commitments that we have made to the corporation of Delta and to the farmers in Delta.

The report that was provided in January of 2015 did identify a few areas that represented areas that required some work to fulfil those commitments. Those are items that we are going to get done.

I’m sure the member is aware that there is some work underway at the moment that the corporation of Delta is doing. The Ministry of Transportation is actually paying the costs for that work. There are a number of culverts as well that we will be replacing in the coming weeks.

I think the overall message for the member for Delta South is that we’re absolutely committed to fulfilling the commitments that we have made to farmers and to the corporation of Delta with respect to the upgrades of the irrigation system.

V. Huntington: I have two other questions. One is a follow-up on the SFPR issue and the numbers of deer killed. Again, I’ve had a chat with Mr. Freer. The last count we had was over 76 deer that have been killed since the road opened and a number of bears.

[1725]

I had asked Mr. Freer if there was any thought on the part of the ministry with…. I’ll never forget the response of Minister Lake, when he was Minister of Environment, to a question I asked him. The response was: “Member, human impact on animals is the responsibility of the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources, but animal impacts on humans is the responsibility of the Environment.” I always have to go through that mantra before I ask the question, because I never know who’s responsible without asking it.

At any rate, the SFPR has resulted in the death of, at last count, I heard, 76 deer. The fencing is now up, and hopefully there won’t be any more slaughter on the roads. My concern during the discussion with Mr. Freer was that that number of deer — because I doubt whether there was a baseline conducted prior to the construction of the road — could well be by far the majority of the deer that were resident in Burns Bog and environs.

If that’s the case, then the genetic ability of the deer to survive, basically, is going to be at threat, I would think. Has the ministry asked for any environmental studies to be done on the numbers of deer still in the area and whether or not the herd would be able to survive over time?

Hon. T. Stone: As the member knows well, there were a number of components incorporated into the SFPR project to address a conflict with wildlife — the overpasses, underpasses, the fencing.

[1730]

I think we have acknowledged on a number of occasions that we didn’t install enough fencing initially, and that played a role in the number of collisions, particularly with deer. We subsequently installed a fair bit more fencing.

We have been monitoring the SFPR closely. We have had not one single deer collision since December, which is good. Obviously, as part of that, we’re ensuring that our wildlife consultants, who we have actively engaged throughout this project…. They are the ones that are really attesting to whether or not we should attest to the zero collisions since December as a sign that the additional fencing and so forth is working or if there are other problems if there are no deer left.

We are seeing lots of deer on our cameras. We know that to be a fact, so we are confident that there are still lots of deer in the area. Again, this is an aspect of the project which we will continue to monitor in the weeks and months ahead.

V. Huntington: I thank the minister for his answer. I’d like to pursue that particular issue a little bit further at some other time.

The critic has allowed me the opportunity to just bounce to another subject, and I hope it’s not too difficult for the minister. Perhaps I’ll ask it more rhetorically.

Ladner and other secondary-channel communities on the Fraser are extremely concerned that the dredging dollars were completely spent. I don’t think the minister quite understands the history I’ve had with his ministry over this issue. I would like the minister to stand by for a request from my office to meet with him with regard to the dredging situation.

Interjection.

V. Huntington: I’d just like the minister to stand by for a request from my office to meet with him and his staff to discuss the next steps for monitoring the dredging needs of the secondary channels of the Fraser. There is a second part to this issue that needs to be resolved and worked on over the next few years, and I think that work needs to start now. I hope the minister will entertain a meeting with me on the issue.

Hon. T. Stone: Yes, I would be more than happy to facilitate a meeting with the member for Delta South to discuss that particular issue.

C. Trevena: I wanted to quickly go back to the Massey Tunnel replacement. We have $53 million being spent on drawing up a business plan for a project that had been announced some time ago.

I wondered if the minister could tell me how many people are actually working on the project at the moment. How many of them are ministry, how many are Partnerships B.C., and how many are private consultants?

[1735]

Hon. T. Stone: My understanding is that there are approximately ten full-time Ministry of Transportation employees working on the George Massey planning. There are five part-time Partnerships B.C. folks and approximately 30 consultants — engineers and environmental consultants — all of whom were selected as part of an array of RFP processes which were conducted and awarded, I believe, in December of 2013.

That being said, I would be more than happy to provide the member for North Island with a more definitive and detailed breakdown of employees, full-time and part-time, and consultants as well, following the estimates process.

C. Trevena: I’d appreciate that and thank the minister for that.

I know the minister has explained that certain things are going to happen after this planning process is through and Treasury Board has approved the business plan and we’ve got the funding strategy in place.

I’m not sure whether the minister can answer this, but there are lessons learned. With the Port Mann Bridge, it was being built in one way, and then it was changed to a different way, so we now have the Crown corporation of TIC. We have had a massive overspend on the build of the bridge, under anybody’s estimate.

I’m wondering whether the minister has got any framework of how he would like the bridge to be built — whether as a 3P, whether as a Crown corp, or whether it’s just going to be one of these things that’s a bit like the business plan. Just do it and see what evolves.

Hon. T. Stone: Yes, there’s no question that a significant part of the business planning process for any project of this magnitude, a key component of that planning, is looking at lessons learned from projects of similar size or scope that have been built in the past. There are a number of folks who were directly involved in the SFPR project who are now working directly on this, the George Massey replacement project. There are, I believe, people that were involved in the Port Mann project who are involved in the George Massey project.

On an ongoing basis, there is a constant effort at ensuring that lessons learned, best practices developed from previous projects, are incorporated into the business planning for current projects, such as the George Massey replacement.

C. Trevena: Do those lessons learned give the minister any idea of whether it’s going to be a 3P or a Crown corp or what the governance is going to be to get it to the next stage, to actually build it?

[1740]

Hon. T. Stone: It would be premature to speculate on, again, the funding mechanism for this particular project or the governance model. Those are details that will be determined once we move into the financing component of the business planning process.

As I’ve said previously, we’re putting the finishing touches on the scope of the project, which will then help inform the cost and which will then lead us right into that financing component. That is where we will look at methods of finance as well as methods of governance for this particular project.

C. Trevena: I’m going to move on now. Just to give the minister some idea, I wanted to move on briefly to infrastructure.

We’ve been talking a lot about money from the federal government. I’m going to come back to roads and highways, and obviously, my colleagues have a number of local questions that relate to their constituencies on specific roads. So we will be coming back to roads and major projects. I’m aware of making the best use of our time here.

I wanted to ask the minister about the new Building Canada fund. I understand that there are sort of two pockets of money, and possibly the minister is talking about a third one when he’s talking about leveraging money for major projects such as the Kicking Horse.

I understand that we have at the moment the money for the small communities, for those communities under 100,000, that has been allocated or is being allocated. First off, everybody needs money for infrastructure. There’s no question. Every community is desperately asking for money for infrastructure. I wonder whether the minister knows whether this has been oversubscribed and if we know yet how many successful applicants there have been.

We’ll start there, and then we’ll move on to the other sections of the fund.

[1745]

Hon. T. Stone: The Build Canada fund does have a number of different funding components to it. As the member for North Island has pointed out, one of those components is the small communities fund. It’s reserved for municipalities with less than 100,000 in population. That’s federal criteria. There is $109 million in that fund allocated to infrastructure projects for the under-100,000 population communities in British Columbia over a ten-year period.

You know, I’ve said this many times. We are very grateful for the federal infrastructure dollars, and we appreciate their partnership, but the infrastructure needs of communities across this province are significant, as they are across Canada. While $109 million sounds like a lot of money — and it is — over a ten-year period for all communities across the province under 100,000 in population, it can only go so far. So that’s the first general comment.

Now, in terms of how priorities are determined and how the application process works and so forth, this is actually a component of the Build Canada fund whereby the priorities are developed between the Ministry of
[ Page 7327 ]
Transportation in collaboration with the Ministry of Community. So between the two provincial ministries the application process is facilitated. There is a formal intake or application process, as I’m sure the member knows. It has recently been closed.

I can confirm that…. It is my understanding that the program is significantly oversubscribed in terms of the dollar value of all the applications that have come in.

The way the process works is: again, the two provincial ministries that I just mentioned facilitate that intake process. There is then a component of engagement with the Union of B.C. Municipalities, which is facilitated through the Ministry of Community. The UBCM has observer status — probably the best way to describe it — in this process.

Our colleagues in the Ministry of Community meet with the UBCM, go over the list, receive feedback from the UBCM on the priorities on the list. That helps, to some degree, inform those priorities and maybe move some things up and down and so forth on the list.

We then as a province — and this is where the Ministry of Transportation really steps forward — take that list to the federal government. The priorities are then negotiated between the province and the federal government. That’s where the actual funding decisions will be determined.

Now, it is our intention to accept proposals that will total somewhere around 50 percent of the total dollar value that’s available in this component over the ten-year period. So somewhere around $50 million to $55 million, of the $100 million, in decisions will be made as part of this initial intake process, and then there will be a second intake process, application process, that will take place — and potentially a third. This is an approach that we suggested to the federal government, which the federal government indicated they were supportive of.

C. Trevena: I understand that there is $1.1 billion — as well as the $109 million for the smaller communities — for the larger communities of over 100,000, which obviously there are not as many of in B.C. I’m wondering what the status is, where that money is. What is the status with that part of the new Building Canada fund?

Hon. T. Stone: The member’s correct. There’s approximately $1.1 billion in total that’s reserved for British Columbia, and that’s based on population. Each province gets their fair share of those dollars. Then those dollars are allocated between the small communities fund, which we’ve just discussed — about $109 million — and about $900 million which is contained within the PTIC, the provincial-territorial infrastructure component.

[1750]

Now, while the small communities fund is reserved exclusively for municipalities under 100,000 in population, the $900 million in the PTIC component has a broader set of eligible organizations and governments. The PTIC — all local governments are eligible there, so small communities as well as the large communities. The projects can be investments in federal infrastructure, provincial infrastructure, municipal infrastructure, as I just mentioned, First Nations infrastructure and, indeed, private sector infrastructure. So it’s a much broader potential application of those dollars.

Those PTIC funds can be allocated to a wide array of different types of infrastructure investments, from highways to rail to airports to cycling and coastal ferries. You know, we were able to confirm recently with the federal government that the B.C. Ferries projects would be considered eligible.

Again, we have the overriding challenge of $900 million or so in the PTIC component that has to get us through a ten-year period covering all facets of transportation and other infrastructure in the province of British Columbia. It’s a big number, but it’s a great challenge to spread those dollars around and try and receive maximum impact, when you look at the billions of dollars’ worth of need that we have from an infrastructure perspective in the province.

C. Trevena: Okay, so this is the fund that when we talk both of B.C. Ferries and the island ferries, the foot passenger ferry, we’ve been talking about accessing. I know that local governments are very keen to be able to access this fund because they’ve got massive infrastructure needs. I think that the minister is very well aware of the needs for local governments and infrastructure across the country and no less here in B.C.

We’ve been talking about the need to get leverage on federal money for major projects of the provincial government. My question, then, is the decision-making, because everybody is going to want a piece of this pie. There’s no question about it. We already know, let’s say, two sets of ferries, the municipalities and the provincial government themselves. The minister himself has been talking about needing this.

When we’re talking about accessing federal dollars and leveraging federal dollars, from the minister’s point of view, for the infrastructure that we have been talking about — whether it be the Massey Tunnel replacement, Highway 1 or whatever it is — is the minister talking about this pot of money, the provincial-territorial infrastructure component? Or is the minister looking to leverage extra funds beyond that?

Hon. T. Stone: I’ll just really quickly run through the different components here.

There’s a little over $1 billion, $1.1 billion, available. That’s for the provincial and territorial infrastructure. That’s based on the population that British Columbia has.

Two components fall underneath that. There’s the small communities fund, which is $109 million. That’s just municipalities with populations of under 100,000.
[ Page 7328 ]
On the other side there’s about $900 million, which is for other priorities. As I said earlier, that can be investments in provincial infrastructure, federal infrastructure or municipal, First Nations or private sector infrastructure. In terms of the $900 million, we’ve identified a number of key project areas or themes, whether it be airports or major highway corridors or northwest readiness projects or port infrastructure, transit and so forth.

[1755]

Underneath each one of those themes, we have identified specific projects which have been informed by project applications we’ve received from municipalities of all sizes, project proposals that we’ve received from private sector proponents and from First Nations bands and, indeed, that the federal government has identified. This is really a process now of negotiation between the province and the federal government as we work our way through each and every one of those proposals, recognizing that, again, there is not enough money to do everything that everybody would like exactly when they like it.

With that, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 5:56 p.m.

The House resumed; Madame Speaker in the chair.

Committee of Supply (Section B), having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Committee of Supply (Section A), having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. R. Coleman moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

Madame Speaker: This House, at its rising, stands adjourned until 10 a.m. Monday morning.

The House adjourned at 5:57 p.m.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE
DOUGLAS FIR ROOM

Committee of Supply

ESTIMATES: MINISTRY OF
ENERGY AND MINES

(continued)

The House in Committee of Supply (Section A); M. Morris in the chair.

The committee met at 1:37 p.m.

On Vote 20: ministry operations, $25,524,000 (continued).

N. Macdonald: Just to come back to some of the answers. The minister mentioned, as part of the tool set he has for making sure that companies do what he wants, he closed a mine in 2014 or for a certain period of time. So just the name of the mine, how long it was closed for and an example, maybe not as specific, of how that was used.

I did ask about a fine system, so if the minister could just say if there was any fine system and perhaps give an example there. And the report actually says that the ministry is not the designer of the mines or the dams or any of these things. But the ministry is responsible for the design, I would say.

So while it is true that the ministry is not responsible for actually doing the design work, ultimately the ministry is responsible for the design. Just maybe those two questions and then come back to the original question again. That was: did the Ministry of Energy and Mines review the 2006 Mount Polley dam safety review? Who in the ministry reviewed it, and what qualifications did they have?

That’s a whole bundle of questions. I don’t know if you need them repeated, or we can try to get a few of them, but I think….

Hon. B. Bennett: I think it’s more than semantics. It’s not a hill to die on or anything, as between myself and the critic. Strictly speaking, the ministry, the regulator, is not responsible for the design of a tailing storage facility. The engineer of record is responsible for the design. The ministry is responsible to enforce the laws and regulations that exist at the time.

[1340]

There is an important distinction that you’ll see in the report in several places where they make reference to what I talked about before lunch, which is the fact that the regulator cannot be the engineer of record. The regulator can ask all the right questions. Did you do this? Have you looked at that? But if the answer is, “Yes, we looked at that. We are sure that it is safe. We are sure the margin of risk is satisfactory. The safety factor is correct,” then short of the regulator becoming the engineer of record, that’s about as far as they can go.

As I say, there isn’t anything that is specific to British Columbia in the way that works. That is the way that buildings are designed and constructed in this country and around the world and the way dams are built and constructed in this country and around the world and all of the things that engineers are involved with.

The member asked me for the name of the mine that was closed in 2014. That was Bralorne. It was closed on the basis inadequate free board. There was another mine, the QR mine, that was shut down. There was an order to
[ Page 7329 ]
shut down because of non-compliance. There’s more detail to that, if the member wants it.

The member also asked about some specifics around enforcement. I talked earlier, before lunch, about the number of orders that go to companies operating mines. There were more than a couple thousand in 2013. What I propose to do here is read very briefly just the relevant sections of the act that will, I think, provide the member with an idea as to how the enforcement works.

This is section 35(1) of the act, I think. If an inspector finds that a mine is not being operated in accordance with an order or a provision of the act, the inspector can order the owner, agent, manager, etc., to comply with the order. That’s the first step. You had an order. You haven’t complied with it. Comply with it. This is subsection (2): “If a person fails or refuses to comply with an order of an inspector…the inspector may apply to the Supreme Court for an order directing the person to comply.” That’s the next action that’s available.

When they go to court and prosecute, they can rely on this section 37(3): “A person who commits an offence is liable to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year or both.” “If an inspector serves a written notice on a person alleging a contravention of this Act, the regulations or the code, or an order…that person, on conviction, is liable to a penalty, in addition to the penalties provided under subsection (3)” — that’s the $100,000 — “not more than $5 000 and not less than $500 for every day during which the offence continues to be committed after receipt of the notice.”

It’s pretty typical of regulations and compliance and enforcement scenarios where you have an initial instruction to the company to do something. That’s the order. You have a follow-up: obey this order. And then if they don’t, you prosecute and you seek a penalty up to $100,000, plus the per-diem penalty in addition to that.

N. Macdonald: This is my fault, because I bundled a number of things together.

Hon. B. Bennett: Yeah, I forgot a couple.

N. Macdonald: Just the 2006. I think you’re pretty comprehensive — just the 2006 DSR. Was it reviewed? Who in the ministry reviewed it and what qualifications they had, if you have that information.

Hon. B. Bennett: The answer to the member is yes. It absolutely would have been reviewed. The other part of the answer to the question, by who — we don’t have a name yet. I am advised, and I will quote my staff, “almost certainly done by a geotechnical engineer,” but we can’t say that conclusively at this point.

N. Macdonald: At some point we’ll come back to the information on the process that the minister has available to enforce, but we’ll stick for awhile with the beach issue, which was raised repeatedly in the report.

[1345]

As I say, the beach is of importance because the report says that the dam, despite the slippage, would have survived had the beach been in place. What we’ve established is that in 2006 that fault was pointed out in the dam safety report. The minister has said that the ministry was aware of that. We’re talking about an issue that was supposed to be addressed if one was following the design that was put in place. It’s a design feature of the beach, and it is a requirement, and the ministry knew it was a problem in 2006.

On page 65 of the report. The Ministry of Energy and Mines — I think it’s 2010, but I could be wrong on that — after an inspection, noted an inadequate tailings beach along the dam, and then it flagged it as a problem. According to the report, the Ministry of Energy and Mines officially noted an above-water beach was a requirement of the design.

This is the ministry, aware of it since 2006, but in, I think, 2010 communicating to Mount Polley Mining Corp. that they had to get on the fact that there wasn’t a dam. It’s “a requirement of the design,” was their words. The Ministry of Energy and Mines considered its absence to be a departure from approval, and it ordered the beach, as soon as possible, to be made, as the dam design required.

I guess the question is: did that happen? There is an order. Maybe the minister could explain the nature of the order. Was it an official order? Is it something that’s written down? Was it attached to some sort of threat of closure? I think the minister can be fairly specific in some of those answers and then fairly general.

I think the minister knows…. I mean, it’s pretty predictable where I’m going with this. I just want to understand the fact that you have an issue that’s of relevance to the safety of the dam, and ultimately was a factor in its failure, that’s identified in 2006, and then we move forward and it comes up again and again. In the report this is just one instance. I think it’s 2006. In 2010 it’s an issue. The ministry is pointing out that it’s a problem.

I guess, the question is: was there actually action on this? Was there an official order? What tools did the ministry employ to make sure that there was some action?

Hon. B. Bennett: I would question that the panel actually stated that the accident wouldn’t have happened if there had been a beach or beaches in place. Perhaps I missed it, but I don’t recall. I certainly don’t have it in my notes, and I’ve read the report several times.

I think I would answer the question, though, to begin with anyways, by making reference to efforts that were made by the ministry. As I said this morning, these efforts were ongoing. They were made by ministry staff from the beginning, from the 1990s through. But specifically, in 2006 there were queries.
[ Page 7330 ]

I’ll quote again from the report, page 59. There were queries from MEM concerning the GLU foundation materials. “One concerned the characteristics and effects on dam stability of softer GLU deposits.” It was at a groundwater well that was just downstream from the perimeter embankment.

In response, Knight Piésold cited area test pits and auger borings as confirming that the glaciolacustrine deposit encountered in that test well “is a discontinuous unit and will not adversely affect the dam stability.”

[1350]

I can read out a number of examples of where MEM staff were asking the engineers of record at various times throughout the life of this mine for some comfort, if you will, if the design that was effectively on the ground in the form of the dam at that time was sufficiently strong and reliable to protect against any sort of catastrophic event. As the panel points out in numerous places, those engineers of record responded. I’m obviously paraphrasing, but they responded: “It’s okay, Ministry of Energy and Mines. It’s okay.”

The panel says that, for example, the one and only test of GLU for undrained strength analysis was asked for by the Ministry of Energy and Mines. That was in the dam safety report. The ministry followed up with Knight Piésold and asked a lot of questions. The panel actually states, “For the first and only time during the design process, an undrained strength analysis was actually performed” at the instance of the ministry….

The ministry asked, when Amecwas the engineer of record, to explain their interpretation of the dam safety association guidelines. The ministry asked a lot of the same sorts of questions to BGC when they came in and became the engineer of record. But the panel concludes, as I said this morning, that you can only go so far as the regulator before you start getting into being the designer. The regulator cannot be the designer.

In terms of the specific issue of beaches, the way it would have worked is the regulators would have said to the company and/or the engineer of record: “Do you believe that the design of the dam, the way it is done, the way it is constructed right now, is sufficient to hold what is inside the TSF?” They engineer of record clearly answered yes.

I know this isn’t going to be a satisfactory answer to the member, but the one thing that I will point out to the member is that a disproportionate amount of discussion in this report around steepness, around the beaches and the need for beaches and around abutments, in fact, does not even relate to the perimeter embankment. I had to catch myself when I was reading through the report. I would get to a point where they were talking about these three things and then realize they’re not actually talking about the perimeter embankment.

There are many situations where they’re actually talking about the main embankment of the TSF, which did not fail. They seem to use that as an opportunity — the main embankment, that is — to talk about the management of the TSF so that government and others could learn from this analysis.

What the member has been talking about in terms of beaches…. We’ll have to go back to the report to make the determination, but I suspect that those comments around beaches were actually made in the context of the main embankment, not the perimeter embankment, which was the embankment that failed.

N. Macdonald: I think this is a really key point. The report does jump around but to be very, very clear, the area that failed needed to have a beach, and it didn’t. So beach is a factor in the area where the failure took place. The area that failed was pretty well the only place that did not have a buttress. The fact that there was no buttress…. The report is really clear. If there was a beach, no failure. If there was a buttress, no failure. If it was not as steep as it was, no failure. It’s really clear on all of those issues.

While the report jumps around to other parts of the Mount Polley facility, which is huge — the minister’s there; the minister knows this well — we are actually talking about where the failure took place. So in terms of responsibility…. I just want to come back to it, because it’s actually my main point.

When I was the principal of a school, I did not do the lesson plans for individual teachers. I didn’t do much of the work. That was their job. I was responsible for everything in the school.

[1355]

That’s what I’m saying when I say, ultimately…. While I take the minister’s point that it is not up to the ministry to design these facilities — there are professional civil engineers that would be doing the particular tailings ponds — but still, the responsibility of the minister is for setting suitable, rigorous regulatory systems. That’s the ministry’s responsibility and the minister’s public responsibility.

The minister is responsible for setting up systems so that the government knows, is aware of, what’s happening at mine sites, and the minister is responsible for effectively enforcing those rules. I think that’s the point that I’m making and where I’m going with it, just to be clear, because these conversations are actually the point that I’m making.

In 2006 the ministry was having a conversation on a problem with the beach. The lack of a beach is one of the things that caused the failure. If it was there, you’d have a 3.3 metre slip, but it wouldn’t have overtopped. Remember, what makes all of this as dramatic is not that slip; it’s the fact that it exposes a metre of water that is over a vast difference, and then it flows through.

We are actually talking about all of those issues — and not to lay blame. I take the minister’s point that it is important to let other organizations do that. But it is also
[ Page 7331 ]
important to understand, I think, that likely…. When I read the report, I think it says that one or all three of the things I just said need to be changed. There need to be changes. That’s how I read the report. When they say that we should have zero tolerance, I think it includes things that as a government we need to do better, clearly.

In 2006 the dam safety report says, “Hey, you’ve got a problem. Address it” — or aware of it, at least. In 2010 — this is on page 65 — there’s actually an order from the regulator, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, saying, “Hey, the beach is a problem. Fix it,” right? Then we go to page 72. This is the report. It cites BGC, which is then taking over, in July 2013. They talk about the lack of an above-water beach at Mount Polley.

The quote from the report says that the beach is necessary for stability no matter what, since Mount Polley was “effectively being operated as a water-retaining dam, with water…effectively in direct contact with the till core.” Just to be clear, in the report you’ve got the lack of the beach already cited, and MEM is aware of it in 2006. You have the Ministry of Energy and Mines in an inspection in 2010. That’s on page 65. And it was a requirement of the design.

I guess the question is: why is it still a problem after all of those years? Why does it continue to be an issue, understanding that it’s a critical thing not only for this facility but every other facility?

Hon. B. Bennett: There’s always a lot to respond to. I think it’s important for me to state that I agree with the opposition mining critic that there are things to be learned from the report aside from what caused the accident.

In the very first answer that I gave in question period when I was asked about this, back when we first came in — it seems like a year ago — a couple of months ago, I said that. I made that very clear. There’s no sense trying to hide behind: “This is the cause of the accident, and we’re not going to talk about anything else.” I’ve never taken that approach.

On the other hand, frankly, with all due respect, the member is wrong to stand up here and say that a cause of the accident — and check Hansard if you don’t think you said that — or the cause of the accident was dams or slope or water overtopping cracks — all those things.

[1400]

The panel report makes it really clear…. I quoted a bunch in the report this morning. They make it very clear that those things did not cause the accident. They did not cause the accident.

The dam was designed to sit on stable ground. They did not know the ground was not stable. Somebody made a mistake when the ground was examined originally. These next two investigations, when they arrive at conclusions, will probably find out who made that mistake. But the dam was designed to sit on stable ground.

These other factors — like the beaches, the steepness, the amount of water — are all things that we should learn from. I believe, given my conversations across the country with other ministers and with the Canadian Mining Association, that the whole industry and the country should learn from what the panel has said as it relates to overall risk, as it relates to the safety factor for a TSF.

At no place in the report does this panel actually say that this accident happened because there weren’t beaches, the dams were too steep or there was too much water. They make it, actually, quite clear that there is only one cause of the accident.

The member has asked me specifically: what was the follow-up to the 2006 order issued by the minister? Before I get into that, I’ll just remind the member and everyone that the panel stated very clearly they had considerable confidence in the regulator.

They said the regulators — and the contract inspectors, by the way — “are well qualified to perform their responsibilities.” They said that the geotechnical staff in the ministry was “among the best that it has encountered.” They said they were “favourably impressed by the skill and commitment of MEM’s geotechnical staff in carrying out their responsibilities.” They said further, on page 116, that B.C. has “a strong regulatory process and personnel.” They said that the MEM staff had “insightful questions for the designers.”

There is no evidence in this report that the regulator made mistakes which led to this accident. There is none. I am absolutely confident that that is the case.

I would, finally, point out to the member that on page 115, I think, the second paragraph down, it states: “On October 13, 2005, narrow beach widths were observed on the southwest side of the pond. On August 30, 2006, wide beach widths were observed, and MEM requested a specific specification for beach width.”

The company responded, quoting their engineer of record, Knight Piésold: “The tailings embankments have been designed to remain stable for any condition, and therefore there is not a ‘requirement’ for a minimum beach width in terms of embankment performance.” That is getting to what I have said on a few occasions here.

The regulator asked all the right questions. They got answers from engineers who believed that that dam sat on stable ground. I’m not faulting the engineers. I’m not blaming the engineers for that. They believed that that facility was built on stable ground, so they gave the answers. These embankments, the steepness, the beaches or lack of beaches — it’s all okay. The regulator relied on what the engineer of record said because the engineer of record designed the dam to sit on stable ground, thinking it was stable.

The Chair: I’d just like to remind the member that while your line of questioning isn’t necessarily out of order, try and make it more relevant to the estimates that are in consideration here.
[ Page 7332 ]

N. Macdonald: Okay. Now, you’re new to this. We’re actually going to spend the whole…. I think the minister knows we’ll spend the whole time. The relevance, of course, is that a large part of the budget deals with the ability to manage this resource properly.

[1405]

In fact, I just have to compliment the minister. Surprise, surprise. This could easily become a question of playing with quotes, and the minister isn’t doing that. I think that it’s useful.

I would point and just get staff to refer to page 137. There in the third paragraph it just talks about the point that I was making, which doesn’t necessarily diminish some of the points that the minister is making, which is that it’s not the primary factor. But if you read on page 137 in the third paragraph, it does lay out that these are the key pieces.

Just to be clear how this worked: “The root cause was an undetected flaw under the section that breached. But overly steep slopes on the embankment, neglected beaches, inadequate safety margins, ad hoc planning and the hefty volume of water behind the dam all contributed to making the failure much worse than it needed to be.”

Also, while it’s not the root cause, it is also true that had this not been there — even if that layer hadn’t been there — that dam, the way it was operated, could have also collapsed based on other factors. In fact, the report is really clear. There were multiple problems with the tailings facilities, right?

It almost overtopped in May, right? That’s something the report says. In the section where the break took place there were signs of erosion, but the report is clear that erosion wasn’t the trigger. But in other parts of the dam there was cracking and erosion.

I guess the point I’m making is that there is a repeated issue with the beach, yet it doesn’t seem to get taken care of. I think that’s an important lesson. What we are talking about is lessons.

As I said, in May 2014 the water…. And it’s semantics as to what “overtopping” means. It’s clear it didn’t flow over, right? But it is nevertheless described as overtopping, so I suspect that there was seepage. It might even mean that it’s just water that’s over top of an impervious layer. Nevertheless, it’s described as overtopping in a seepage flow.

At a time when there was zero freeboard, the mine was still operating and dumping into a tailings storage facility — a facility that was in danger of failing. From 2010 on, vast amounts of water are allowed to be stored at Mount Polley, even though throughout that period the Ministry of Energy and Mines has concerns about a structure that ultimately fails.

Again, we have it identified, or at least the ministry knows about it, in 2006. In 2010 there are directives to fix the problem. It’s talked about in 2013, and it’s a problem at the time of the collapse or very close to it. I guess, assuming that the Ministry of Energy and Mines wants to force companies to follow rules, maybe just an explanation of why they weren’t able to fix it. If that’s a question that’s not useful, maybe let’s step into how you would make a company do it and come back to that issue.

You did describe a process that is a cumbersome process, right? As I understand it, to impose a serious fine or possible jail sentence, you need to go to Crown counsel. First, you would, I presume, need to have your chief mine inspector convinced that there was a reason to do this. Then you would have to get Crown counsel to agree that there is a possibility of being successful. I think the test…. Since the minister is a lawyer, he would probably know this better. There is a test that’s a fairly high standard.

So if the minister wants to comment on a question that I’ve posed many times: how is it that the ministry knows about something and over a period of time isn’t able to deal with it and it’s a factor or at least a problem at the time of the collapse, if not the cause?

[1410]

Secondly, if it’s more useful, can we just describe the tool and expand on the tool that the minister described around the legal process that would force companies to do what the ministry knows or feels they should be doing?

Hon. B. Bennett: It’s interesting that probably lots of people in the public assume that a regulator of a mining industry is constantly, you know, at odds, wielding a big stick to keep these rascally and dastardly mining…. I’m not suggesting that the member is suggesting that in his question. I don’t think he is. But I think there is a general sense that you really have to go hard on these dastardly mining companies because they’re always looking for opportunities to break the rules and not do things properly.

There’s really no evidence of that. The fact that the Mount Polley disaster has happened once in the history of mining in this province, as far as we can tell, would be some indication that that isn’t the case. The fact that mining is the safest heavy industry in North America is another indication of how well those mines are typically managed.

In specific terms…. I think the panel had an expression. They called it the harsh illumination of hindsight. If the regulator, if the company, if the engineers, if the people who worked there had known that there was a banana peel underneath the perimeter embankment that, given enough weight on top of it, would come into play and would cause the catastrophic failure that it caused, certainly regulators would have taken different actions. Engineers would have taken different actions. Everybody would have taken different actions. But, as the panel stated, nobody knew.

The chair of the panel referred to it privately to me as the unknown. I’d never heard that expression before, but that’s what he called it. He called it the unknown. It isn’t
[ Page 7333 ]
even something you’re sort of aware of and you think you have managed. It’s something that isn’t even in your mental universe. You just don’t know that it’s there.

If ministry staff said: “We should put some more buttressing in here at some point. We should have beaches at some point. We may wish to see you address steepness at some point….” If they said those things, they said them all in the context of believing from the engineer of record that the dam that sat there was strong enough to hold the water and the tailings. Everybody believed that. The engineer of record obviously believed it. The company believed it. The regulator believed it. Everyone believed it.

Workers went back and forth across that perimeter embankment. There was a dozer parked there, about a D12, when I flew up there the first day on August 4, I guess, just right at the edge of where the breach happened. I met the father of the young guy who was driving it. Nobody thought there was a danger, a risk of this catastrophic failure. It goes back to the way our system works.

[1415]

Our regulators would have relied on the responses they got from all the really good questions that the regulator asked. Again, it’s all in the report. They basically say that the embankments that are there, the abutments that are there, are good enough, that there’s not too much water. I think one metre was the level to which they could take water.

I think what the member is trying to get at — at least, I hope it is — is that the process we had in place didn’t work. It only happened once in 150 years, but it happened. So clearly something didn’t function properly.

I could stand here and say: “I think the only thing that has to change is we need to make sure that preliminary investigations that lead to dam design are done more comprehensively in the future than they’ve been done in the past.” That would be a position that, as Mines minister, I think could be sustained by this report. But I don’t believe that, because the report also states that these other issues are important. In my view, anyway, not being a technical person but somebody who has the opportunity to lead change of regulations and standards and so forth, it goes to managing risk. It goes to the factor of safety.

We have this unknown under the ground. We are operating according to Canadian Dam Association standards, according to the Mines Act in the code, according to our regulations and regular inspections, even though you couldn’t have discovered this flaw by inspection. But it still happened.

To me, where we have to go with our changes is we have to actually reduce the overall risk and start somehow to find a way to reduce the likelihood that an accident — even a more modest accident, if you will — will not happen if there is an unknown there.

It might not be glaciolacustrine clay and silt. It might be something else. I think where we will go with this…. It’s going to be an interesting and probably challenging exercise with the companies, with the industry — and they know; we’ve told them — and with First Nations.

We are going to have to look at the mining code, at all the regulations, at all of the policies and procedures. We are going to have to build in a greater factor of safety. We’re going to have to manage risk more conservatively. All of Canada is going to have to do this after Mount Polley.

That’s what I learned from this — not that people who worked in the Ministry of Energy and Mines shoulda, woulda, coulda. The panel says they did a good job. They knew what they were doing, and they did everything that they could do.

I want to focus on what we learned from this. I think the member does as well. That’s what I’m learning as a politician, as a generalist — which we all are, except for Ralph Sultan. We need to manage risk differently with these facilities, and we’re going to do that.

N. Macdonald: Well, the minister has been good about not just picking out certain elements and going after them, but trying to pick areas where there might be some agreement. I think what I hear the minister say is that we have to set up a system that allows for some unknowns — right? — which is the point that I think we would agree on.

Let’s focus on what we would agree on, because the actual outcome from this exercise that would be the most useful would be a realization. It doesn’t have to be publicly stated. If I was a politician, I wouldn’t publicly acknowledge it, because it’ll get thrown in your face.

There has to at least be a mindset to understand — I think that the minister does — that there’s a whole host of weaknesses that is shown in Mount Polley that could be the same in 123 other sites.

Now this is, like many organizations, one that works for the most part very, very well. But it has to come to place, and this is what the central focus of the report is. There has to be a zero tolerance for failure, and if there’s to be a zero tolerance, things have to change.

The minister describes it as 1 in 150, but the report’s pretty clear. Whether they’re major like this or minor, there are two more failures to be expected if we continue along the same line. So there has to be change. There are three areas that the ministry can change. They’re responsible for the rules. The minister has talked about a code review.

[1420]

That may be one way, and that may be appropriate. The minister understands and has started to…. I mean, one of the things you ordered, I think, has been very useful, where you’ve got the third-party verification. Many of the questions I have here are from that information, right? I don’t think all of that information was available to the ministry before. So that’s been useful. We need to improve there. We need to know what’s happening.
[ Page 7334 ]

Then there have to be effectively enforced rules. At some point the minister, I hope, will come back to explain the stick, ultimately, that he has to force companies to do what’s proper. Now, it is possible that the stick the minister has ultimately is with the fines that are for the engineering companies or the punishment on the engineering companies.

I just refer the minister to page 137 of the report. It says: “At the breach section” — so where the breach failed, where the failure took place, the water at that section; this is page 137 — “water was in direct contact with the upstream zone of the tailings.” The report says that it hurt dam stability. That’s what the report says. So no beach, then, was a problem. As I said, it was well known to the ministry from 2006.

I guess the question is, again…. I don’t understand how you have that period and it’s not an issue that’s resolved by the regulator. There’s clear discomfort from the ministry, but it’s never resolved. Remember that if it’s happening at Mount Polley, I think it’s fair to say that the same thing could be happening at 132 other tailings storage facilities. People live beneath some of these so we need to get it right, which is the central theme of the report.

The question, I guess, then, is: based on all of the things that the report says, what is the explanation for the inability to get Mount Polley to do what should have been done with the beach?

Hon. B. Bennett: There’s always something to be gained from these exchanges if you allow it to happen, and I do think that there’s an important discussion. Frankly, I’ve been wanting to have a discussion with the opposition about this and assumed that there would be more questions in question period about this and so on and so forth. But maybe question period is not the most constructive venue to have the discussion.

There are two things, two quite different things that the member has talked about in almost of all of his questions and that I’ve tried to respond to in all of my answers. One is: the go-forward, and what do we learn from this?

The member has focused, I think quite rightly, on compliance and enforcement. Is it good enough? Is it working? Can you bring the hammer down, as rarely as you might have to bring it down, frankly? But when you do need to, can you bring it down quickly, decisively, with a fine or whatever? I think the member has suggested that having to go to court and prosecute is certainly not as dexterous as administrative penalties, for example, that exist in some of the environmental legislation.

I agree. It’s one of the things that we will have to consider as we go forward — the whole compliance and enforcement piece. Are there better, more effective ways to change behaviour? I think we can agree on that one actually.

I do have to point out that the member quoted from page 137: “The panel’s analyses show that this had some influence on dam stability.” But you left out the last part of the sentence. It said: “…although it was not the dominant factor.”

[1425]

We can go round and round and round on the beach situation. There was too much water in that pond to build beaches, right? Clearly, we know water is a real…. For me, it’s at the top of the list in terms of what you manage differently with TSFs. You manage water differently. If there was too much water in the pond, in retrospect, given the unknown unknown….

If you want to be safer and increase the margin of risk, you have less water in TSFs. That’s basically what the panel said. We agree with that. We’re going to find ways through best available technologies and best available practices, through a code review and through the learnings that we’ll get from the other two investigations to figure out how to do that.

Water treatment. I mean, frankly, if we’re looking for examples, everybody’s talking about dry-stack tailings. That’s one of the ways you can manage tailings. But you can get the water out of your TSF and bring it to a fairly low level. You don’t get dry tailings, but if you’ve got acid-generating rock, you can keep the water on your tailings but not be using the TSF to store water. Many mine sites — I just visited one up in the Kamloops area — have a negative water balance. They’re looking for water. They put water into the TSF, and as quick as it goes in, they take it out, treat it and reuse it.

[D. Plecas in the chair.]

This particular mine site has a positive water balance. They’ve got water to deal with. They are going to have to discharge water. That’s part of what we are talking to the company about right now in terms of reopening. That’s, I think, one of the solutions in that case.

There are ways to enforce the rules today. I’ve read out the legislation, the regulations. You go to court. The fines are certainly large. There are administrative penalties under the Environmental Management Act. Remember that that legislation applies in this situation, and they don’t have to go to court. So there are ways to levy fines in that regard.

I get to this point in the discussion, though, and I can’t speculate any further on what mistakes were made. We know there were initial mistakes made way back when in the 1990s. Incidentally, there was water lapping on the dam in 1998 to 2000. That’s in the report.

Like I say, we can go round and round and round that. It doesn’t matter. There was water lapping against the dam in the ’90s, and there was water lapping against the dam after we were elected. To me, that’s not what we should be spending our time talking about.

The…. I lost my train of thought. Sorry. I looked at Adrian Dix. He was laughing, and I thought: “Oh my god, I hope he’s not laughing at me.”
[ Page 7335 ]

A. Dix: Not a chance.

Hon. B. Bennett: I apologize. I’m not supposed to use real names. You should have admonished me for that, hon. Chair.

The Chair: That’s okay, Minister.

Hon. B. Bennett: I withdraw.

These two investigations that are happening, I understand…. I don’t know a lot…. I mean, the CO service is cloak and dagger. They don’t talk to anybody. I don’t know what they’re doing, but they’re going into premises and taking records and obviously pretty serious about what they’re looking at. I don’t believe there’s a report that comes with that. I think they just come out and say: “We’re going to charge you, you and you.” So we’ll see where that goes.

The chief mines inspector’s report will be very, very comprehensive. Also, if there is culpability to be assigned, it will be assigned through that report. We’ll know a lot more then. We know the root cause, but what else? Were there other things that were being done wrong? At this point in time I can’t speculate.

N. Macdonald: I’ve broken it up into sections. I have no way of making the point with the minister without going back and pointing out what I feel were things that we would want to correct. I’m going to continue to do that with different examples.

What’s encouraging is, first, the tools. I looked for examples of where a minister ever did this — like close it. They have recently been used — the examples that you have used — with the two dams. The minister has used tools that I, frankly, didn’t see evidence of in the past.

For both you and I…. We know people — it’s not only this; it’s broader — that have died on mine sites in your riding and my riding. Despite the fact that this is one of the safest big industries, we’ve lost seven people.

[1430]

We have, in the past, with Sullivan…. I know the minister was deeply involved in that, as was I. We had some changes that came out of that, I think around enclosed spaces. But we also had a recommendation to toughen up on those that break rules. I didn’t find examples of where that happened. This is something that is important for me as the critic, and for the minister as well, to make sure that it isn’t business as usual, that there are changes.

Let’s just look at a second theme, which has to do with the steepness of the dam wall and the related issue of the lack of a complete buttress. Again, if the dam had been built as it was required to be built, it would not have failed the way it did.

When I toured that…. Of course, it was after it had happened. There were workers that can’t speak on the record, but they were certainly very clear that they had concerns around the lack of a buttress. They had concerns around the ad hoc nature of the building. They had concerns around the type of material used. The only worker that I really heard speak publicly was a former foreman, who had won the lottery and was no longer working there. He was on the news speaking pretty clearly that he had expressed views for two years.

Let’s go to the steepness, because here I think it is much clearer — the ministry’s responsibility. It’s not a subjective decision that, in my view, the engineer gets to make. The Ministry of Energy and Mines…. I’ll use the term “allowed,” but maybe the minister will have a different one.

Certainly, they were aware of and did not stop an angle of repose of 1.3H to 1V as the slope of the dam, even though they knew that they shouldn’t. The panel says on page 108 that they didn’t understand why the Ministry of Energy and Mines would allow that. The minister can check. I don’t think I’m mischaracterizing what is being said there. If the slope had the required angle of repose, the embankment would not have failed in the way that it did.

The Ministry of Energy and Mines knew there were problems with slope steepness but tolerated it or allowed it. Page 108 says that the steep embankment “pulled the trigger,” and a proper angle of repose for the slope would not have exposed the underlying structural weakness.

I guess the question is: how many other places is the Ministry of Energy and Mines, as regulator, allowing practice that it is clearly uncomfortable with? In the exchange, the ministry is very, very uncomfortable with the engineer’s interpretation of what the appropriate angle of repose is.

Hon. B. Bennett: We’re checking to see whether that individual was, in fact, interviewed by anybody from the ministry. I can tell you that many, many, many workers were interviewed both by the panel and certainly by the MEM — the chief mines inspector’s investigation that’s still ongoing — so I don’t think there was a lack of information and perspective in terms of post-accident.

[1435]

The question is perfectly legitimate, but it goes to whether the company was in compliance or not. I’ve already talked as much as I can, I think, about the regulator asking the right questions of the engineer of record and getting responses from the engineer of record — all of which I can find in the report. I’ve got good notes here.

The engineer of record says — and I paraphrase again: “It’s okay,” whether we were talking about the abutments or the beaches or the steepness, or even the amount of water. I can’t go beyond that, because you’re getting into territory where I’m going to start to guess whether the company was in compliance. I’m going to start to guess whether the engineer of record was responsible, and I can’t do that.
[ Page 7336 ]

N. Macdonald: I guess, just to put it in context, this is my understanding. There’s an interesting part in the report where there is one of these conversations that goes on that the minister referred to. I guess the point I would make is that it makes the case for how ineffective these conversations are.

Just to frame this — this is my understanding — the Mines Act creates the code. The code enshrines the Canadian Dam Association standards. An angle in those standards of 1.3H to 1V is not allowed, except during the construction stage. Okay? My understanding is that if the Mines Act creates the code, and the code talks about the Canadian Dam Association…. I think they’re actually called guidelines.

Even though they’re called guidelines, they are enshrined in the code, and the expectation is that that’s the standard. That’s a line you don’t cross. What’s interesting about this discussion, and I think it makes the point that there has to be more rigour rather than just discussions, is that you have in 2012, just to jump ahead….

In fact, this is on page 69. The report says that on September 19, 2012…. The ministry is communicating with Mount Polley, and the ministry is questioning the safety margins of the Mount Polley dam. It’s referring to the dam safety guidelines from 2007 and the fact that they require greater safety margins than are in place. They’re saying: “What’s going on here?”

Well, the gist of the conversation is…. The mine pushes back, saying: “Well, we’re in a preconstruction phase.” As the minister knows, the original design for the dam was changed regularly. I think 40 metres is added to the height, so it’s a tremendous amount of change. Mount Polley said that the construction phase is the whole time it’s operating until you shut it down, because you’re changing it all the time.

The ministry, I think quite correctly, says…. They didn’t say it’s ridiculous, but they certainly don’t agree with that view. But in 2012 they accept it. Then, in 2013, they come back and say: “No, it’s not acceptable. You’ve got to get this right.” It comes back to the question of: is there rigour to that?

Again, this isn’t, in my view, a matter of opinion. This is something that is laid out in the guidelines, which are in the code, which is empowered by the Mines Act. I don’t see how it’s a matter for discussion. I guess the question is: where is this rigid line?

In the end, the ministry has two hats. Maybe it doesn’t work. Maybe this is one of the bigger discussions. You have to be the booster for the industry, right? That’s your job as the minister, and that’s the job of the ministry. You’ve got to push these projects. But then, at the same time, you’ve got to be the hammer too. That, when you look at this, is where you don’t see the hammer.

The steepness is a good example of…. The rules seem rigid. It doesn’t seem like there’s an area where you can have different views. The angle of repose is laid out in what should be, to strictly adhere to rules…. The ministry recognizes it, enters into a debate that it concedes in 2012. Then, to prove that it shouldn’t have conceded in 2012, they come back in 2013 and then insist.

[1440]

Of course, when the failure takes place, it’s still not resolved. I guess I would ask the question: where is the ability to actually make rules that should be firmly applied? How do you make sure they’re actually applied?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m advised that the factor of safety at the breach area was calculated, actually, to be 1.58. If the regulator had insisted on a factor of safety of 1.5, it would have only affected the main embankment, not the perimeter embankment. This goes to that comment I made earlier about…. They switch back and forth on a regular basis between talking about the perimeter embankment and the main embankment.

The perimeter embankment was already deemed to be at 1.58, and I’m advised that the member might be mixing up the 1.3H to 1V slope with the factor of safety of 1.3. I think in the briefing maybe there was a conversation about that. Because you’ve got the 1.3H to 1V ratio slope, and you’ve got a factor of safety at 1.3, they…. It’s purely coincidental that those numbers happen to be 1.3. They’re not the same. They’re not measuring the same things there. That’s a technical answer that comes directly from the chief geotechnical engineer for the ministry.

I should respond to the member’s comments about the dynamic of…. I think you were talking about the Mines Minister, really, as much as the Mines Ministry. The dynamic is, as the member suggested, that it is in the best interests of the province to have mines built and operated in a safe, environmentally responsible way because of the jobs that are created and the amount of money. People work in the mines. The fact is that these mines are often located out in rural areas where it is tough to find good jobs, and people have to leave. Young people have to go to the oil patch or go to the city.

I think we all agree. Maybe we don’t, but we probably all agree that, overall, it’s good to have mining done in the right way, in a safe way, in a responsible way. So yes, we — me in particular…. I do support new mines in the province, but at the same time I sign off on environmental certificates relating to mines. I’m the minister in charge of the ministry that is, in part — not totally, because the Minister of Environment is very involved in mining — the regulator.

That is true, but that has been the case forever, I think, in this province and elsewhere. I don’t say this trying to make a partisan point or anything but to prove my point, I guess. In the report, I noted in my notes that between 1998 and 2000 water directly contacted the embankments in several places. In 1997-98 the ministry prompted a Knight Piésold response. “It is unlikely that any significant pore pressure development will occur in these ma-
[ Page 7337 ]
terials during construction” of the main embankment.

That was in ’97-98. That goes to the GLU. The observational method was formally invoked in the year 2000. I don’t think there’s been any change in that dynamic in terms of ministries of the provincial government agreeing that mines, if they’re done properly, are a good thing and also being the regulator.

I think you will not be able to demonstrate with any credible evidence that the accident at Mount Polley happened because I, as minister, or the ministry or the government or the Premier are supporters of more mining.

[1445]

N. Macdonald: Coming back to the steepness of the embankment. I would have to go back and check whether it’s the embankment that is the main embankment or it is the area where it fell. Still, steepness is a factor in the collapsed area and is identified by the report. Nevertheless, it makes the case that you have a conversation where you have a strict standard that is described within the code, and you have a debate going on where the ministry moves and changes its position in one case.

Remember, the argument is actually around what the construction phase is, right? The mine argued that the construction phase was this whole extended period of several decades until the mine closed. And the ministry, I think quite correctly, is saying: “That’s not the case. It’s not, and we don’t accept it.” That is part of the dynamic that is taking place.

By the way, we did talk about question period before. It is impossible to have any sort of discussion like this in question period, as the minister knows.

Let’s look at the buttress. The dam needed a buttress but was not required to have one by the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Now, had the buttress been in place, that would have prevented the failure. The report is very clear on that. On page 77 it says it was “belatedly recognized in stage 10 just days before the breach — the final instance of too little, too late,” when they were required to build the buttress.

When I was at Mount Polley a lot of the workers were talking about the lack of a buttress, and they all had theories for why it had been so slow in being built. Just to explain, there was a buttress around the vast majority of this huge tailings facility, but in the area where the collapse took place, at its base it had not been built up with a buttress to support what was a very steep and high embankment. So the lack of a buttress was a problem.

When did the Ministry of Energy and Mines know that a buttress was absolutely needed?

Hon. B. Bennett: Just a bit of a circle back on the steepness issue that the member was asking about. I don’t know if I made it clear that the 1.58 number is a stronger factor of safety than 1.3. That 1.58 actually applied to the perimeter embankment. That’s the factor of safety that was applied there. It actually had a higher factor of safety than the main embankment. It wasn’t that it had a 1.3. It didn’t. It actually had 1.58.

What follows from that is that everyone…. And it says so in the report. I can find the quotes. I’ve got them in my notes. Everyone — being the company, the regulator and the engineers of record — all assumed that the perimeter embankment was probably the most stable, safest part of the whole TSF. I’m sure the member has read that in the report.

It turns out that wasn’t the case because of the unknown. But in terms of where the focus was, by the company and by the engineers of record and even by the regulator, it largely was on the main embankment. I don’t know if that helps the member out. But everyone agreed that that was the case.

It’s anecdotal, but the day after the accident one of the engineers associated with the design and initial construction, in the 1990s, of this TSF was in either Europe or Russia. They phoned him and told him what happened, and they told him where it happened.

[1450]

His response was, “That’s impossible. It’s impossible that the perimeter embankment could have collapsed the way it did,” basing his opinion on the foundation being stable. Again, in hindsight, why didn’t everyone know that there was unstable ground underneath the perimeter embankment? They didn’t know because they didn’t know.

N. Macdonald: Well, I guess the point with the previous conversation or the discussion was simply as an example of the conversations the minister says are taking place. It’s a conversation that wouldn’t give anyone any confidence that the ministry is asserting itself, even to ensure that rules were being followed.

Simply, that conversation, the fact that they are accepting in 2012 that the construction phase is until you shut it down…. Then in 2013 you’re coming back and saying: “No, that’s not right. Forget it. You’ve got to do it the way we say.” That’s how I read those pages.

Again, I referred the member to the various pages, and you can go back and look at it. It’s not worth getting stuck on that particular point. But I think it is important to look at a lot of these background pieces. The report, I think, laments the tolerance for things that the ministry is uncomfortable with, and the lack of rigour is potentially systemwide.

I’m just going to jump to something that’s more current: the dam safety inspections and the dam safety reports. It appears that there are many mines that either have not had a dam safety inspection or a dam safety report done, or the documents are not available on line.

This is happening in a period where from 2004 to 2011 there was only one geotechnical inspector at the ministry, a vacancy in your geotechnical engineering position from 2007 to 2009, no manager of geotechnical engineer-
[ Page 7338 ]
ing from 2008 to 2009 to 2011, a reduction in the government’s number of government-licensed science officers from 2009 to 2014 of 15 percent, and reductions in the number of licensed professionals employed by the government by 25 percent since 2001.

It seems to be the ministry, I guess, didn’t have enough staff to perform the annual dam safety inspections or…. I think every five years there’s a dam safety review.

I think the mines that we identified, or that we got from the information that the ministry has posted, would be Blackdome, where they’re requiring a dam safety review. New Carolin mine — DSR was supposed to be done in 2009. They feel that there may not be sufficient information to do it.

Giant Nickel tailings facility — the dam safety review and water management strategy is supposed to be done for 2015. Goldstream — the dam safety review was recommended in 2008, but it hasn’t been done. Jumbo Good Friday — the dam safety review was scheduled in 2011 but was never done.

Kemess South — no formal dam safety review done for the tailings storage facility. Ministry of Energy and Mines signed off on the geotechnical review board’s decision to allow the company to forgo producing the dam safety review until 2016.

Lawyers Chenney — no annual inspection since 1996. The dam safety review was recommended to happen as soon as possible. Max Moly, near my area — the dam safety review was recommended for as soon as possible.

Mosquito Creek — there’s no dam safety inspection submitted. Again, why is that allowed? Nickel Plate — it recommends a dam safety review be done as soon as possible. Silvana mine — again, the same thing. Taurus Gold — no dam safety inspection or dam safety review, although, hopefully, one is coming.

There are at least 12 mines that are either recommended to have a dam safety review done, were previously recommended but never completed, or that are lacking completely in having an annual dam safety inspection.

[1455]

I guess it’s possible that some of these simply haven’t been posted, or they’re in the process of being completed. Is there a time frame for the completing of these inspections and reviews?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’ll commit to providing the member with something in writing that will give him a status report on dam safety inspections. I didn’t write down all the names of the locations that the member mentioned, but I did certainly note that there were more locations than there should be. It seems like our numbers don’t jive. We’re currently going to gather up the most recent status for dam safety inspections, and we’ll figure out whether the member’s list maybe might be a tad shorter.

I should also point out that the member mentioned these dam safety inspections in the context of ministry staff. Ministry staff don’t do these inspections, right? The engineers do the inspections. The member is quite correct that the regulator requires the inspections be done.

I know that there are certain situations where you’ve got a dam with a very low consequence classification, maybe, perhaps very little or no water, no real risk. The company has been out of business for many years, maybe, and they need some time to get it done. That could be one of the circumstances, but, in any case, we’ll provide the member with a written update on where we do not have dam safety inspection reports back and when we would expect them.

N. Macdonald: Since you just mentioned the risk category, there are currently at least four mines that have been recommended by either the original engineer who performed the annual dam safety inspection or else the third-party reviewer to review the classification of these dams and mines.

The mines. Allen mine: the recommendation is to review the low classification. HB Mine: review the low classification. They think that it should be significant or very high. QR dam and Samatosum again….

I guess the question is: how many mines or dams in the province is the minister and his ministry currently informed of whose risk status needs to be reviewed? Is there a time frame in place for when these classification reviews will be completed?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’d be interested in knowing…. The member has referred to “they” a number of times in terms of somebody saying that something should be done or not done. I’d kind of like to know who the “they” is. If the member wants to….

N. Macdonald: I apologize. That’s one of the reasons I tried to tell you what I meant when I said “the report.” In my mind, I know what I’m talking about, but it’s a bit difficult for the minister.

[1500]

The “they” I’m referring to is the information that came from the review that was done following the third-party look at the dam safety inspections, right? The minister ordered all the dam safety inspections. That information then went to third-party reviewers, who went through and reviewed it, and then they put the information on line. So what this is, is simply picking pieces…. I think there are in the neighbourhood of 30 or 40 mines that have issues that are raised, and what I’ve tried to do is have them clumped together so that it would be easier to answer.

Hon. B. Bennett: I’ll do the best I can to respond. I don’t have the Hatch report with me, but I am advised that where there were any shortcomings or any issues at all identified — and they would be identified, actually, by
[ Page 7339 ]
the engineers working for the companies that own these TSFs — that would have been noted in the Hatch report.

We have been in touch with all of the mine managers of the mines that have these issues and have commitments from every single one of them that whatever the issues are, they are being addressed. Of course, we’ll follow that up and make sure that they are addressed.

I can’t give you names of projects off the top of my head, but I can tell you that when I ordered everyone who owns a TSF in the province to go and examine that TSF and figure out whether or not they had any issues around the kinds of unstable materials that exist at Mount Polley, there was a very, very good response. There were some who were slow, and there were some who responded that their engineers indicated there were issues. Again, I’m advised that the mine managers have committed to fixing everything that needs to be fixed at those sites.

On the dam safety inspection piece of it, we’ll have to track down if there are companies out there who have not actually done this dam safety inspection. That was supposed to have been put in by December 1, 2014, as opposed to the dam safety review, which is a five-year exercise. I think you’ve distinguished between the two types of activities.

I will find out and get back to the member on who has not put in a dam safety inspection and why — if, in fact, there are some.

The Chair: If members are in agreement, perhaps we might take a five-minute break.

The committee recessed from 3:04 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

[D. Plecas in the chair.]

N. Macdonald: I guess the next question is…. Maybe the minister can explain the consequences for a mine for not submitting an annual dam safety inspection or performing a dam safety review in the required five years. Now, this is presuming…. The minister spoke to me during the break and said that there might be explanations for all of the identified cases where the mines haven’t turned in dam safety inspections or dam safety reviews. If that’s the case, then we can make it hypothetical. What are the penalties if the requirements are not met?

Hon. B. Bennett: During the break, I was able to pick the collective brain of some senior MEM staff. It would appear there aren’t nearly as many TSFs out there that we don’t have annual dam safety inspection reports for. Again, we’re going to provide the member with that information, so he’ll know the actual number.

Further to that, I was advised that we’ve actually heard from every single…. I said mine manager before, but every single company that has a TSF out there has either provided us with everything that we need to have comfort or they have committed to providing that. There is no issue at this point in terms of any company metaphorically thumbing their nose at the ministry and saying: “Well, we’re not going to provide you with an annual report. We’re just not going to do it.”

As the member said, it’s a fair question to ask even on a hypothetical basis. What if they did? What I’m advised is that the ministry could successfully obtain an injunction from the court, mandating that the company provide whatever materials — whether it’s an inspection report or something else. Then, of course, if the company didn’t, within a narrow time frame, our legislation allows us to go to court and prosecute. The company would then be subject to those fines that I talked about earlier — the maximum of up to $100,000, plus the per diem of a maximum of, I think, $5,000 a day.

Those are the legal methods that the ministry has to enforce in this kind of a situation.

N. Macdonald: Maybe just to stick on this point for a while, it seems an incredibly cumbersome tool for the minister. I take the point that it probably in this case wouldn’t be needed. Is there any less cumbersome tool that the minister has, understanding that maybe these facilities are not operating so that’s not a tool? Other than going through the court system, is there something that one could more immediately do to get these DSRs turned in when they’re supposed to?

I guess the other question is: would it in any way be normal for mines to continue working if they hadn’t turned in their DSIs? Is that something that one would tolerate? Or would there be a very quick move to have a conversation and, if the conversation wasn’t something the minister was happy with, to shut it down until the DSI was in?

[1520]

Hon. B. Bennett: If the mine is operating, as I mentioned earlier, the chief mines inspector has the authority to shut the mine down. They can do that. We’ve done that a couple of times over the past few years.

If the mine is not operating, obviously, if you found an actor out there — and we haven’t — that just didn’t want to comply with what they were being requested to do, then we would take them to court and ask for the injunction to force them, or just prosecute.

I tried to get at this earlier in one of my other answers. No one should think that because the staff in the Ministry of Energy and Mines have a professional relationship with the industry — where they communicate regularly and where they ask industry to do certain things and don’t hit them over the head with a stick on a regular basis — that that system doesn’t work on the basis of what happened at Mount Polley.

I know why we’re having this discussion. We’re having it because of the accident at Mount Polley. We should have the discussion. The critic is doing his job, and I’m
[ Page 7340 ]
not critical of him. It’s a good discussion. But I think there might be a temptation to look at the relationship between MEM staff and the industry as being somehow — I’ve seen the word used — too cozy. Critics have said that of the ministry.

The relationship has developed between the regulator and the industry. For well over 100 years this relationship has been developing. It’s interesting because my little ministry is responsible for health and safety in the mining industry. There are 30,000 people who work in the mining industry in this province. You look at the size of my little ministry, and then you look at the size of WorkSafe B.C.

We’re safe. The mining industry is the safest heavy industry in the province. We’re safe, generally speaking. We’re able to accomplish that through this ministry because of the approach that has developed over the last 100 years between this ministry and the industry.

Are there risks to that kind of a relationship? I think there always are. I think you can’t get too close to the industry. I certainly don’t get the sense that the chief mines inspector or the geotechnical engineers or the safety inspectors…. I know most of them. I’ve been around long enough to get to know them. They’re not that cozy with the industry.

But they have the kind of relationship where they drive up to the mine site and go in — either the mine manager’s office or somebody else who works there that will have the information. They lay down the rules, remind people of what needs to happen and say: “You know, you’re going to need to fix this, you’re going need to fix that, and I’ll give you a couple weeks to do it.” If they don’t do it, they issue an order.

I believe that relationship and that approach to compliance and enforcement has stood the test of time, based on the fact that the industry is so safe and based on the fact that… Yes, we have some tailings occasionally leaking, and water, out of some TSFs, and we need to get to zero. I accept that.

But we don’t have Mount Polleys happening. It’s happened once. While it happened, and we can’t let it happen again, it isn’t a reason to suddenly, fundamentally change the way we have worked on and delivered the compliance and enforcement piece or the worker safety piece through the ministry.

[1525]

It actually has worked extremely well over the years. What I think we need to do now is we need to do more than tweaking. I wouldn’t suggest “tweaking” is the right word, but we need to build on the way we’ve done things on the past. We may need to consider additional enforcement tools. I acknowledged that earlier; I’ll acknowledge it again.

We definitely need to take the dam safety association guidelines and follow the advice of the panel and look at those guidelines. We need to bring some of them into the code, specifically — not by reference but actually prescribe the standards. I will say that the advice I’ve gotten from the staff is that those dam safety association guidelines are at the minimum standards.

We’re never satisfied with just those standards. Staff always pushes companies to achieve a higher standard than those guidelines. But as the panel said, you’d be better off if you brought some of them right into your code in a prescriptive way and said “thou shalt.” So we’ll do some of that. We’ll figure out through the code review where we need to do that and where we don’t.

The point I wanted to make, really, is that I don’t think that we should totally turn over, uproot or change fundamentally the way that the ministry approaches C and E at this point. I think there’s improvements that can be made. We’ll learn from this report. We’ll learn from these two investigations that are taking place. But generally, it actually works very, very well.

N. Macdonald: I guess a couple of things. First off, the amount of information that’s being put on the Internet. I just want to say to the minister that that’s a positive step.

A lot of the work that I do as critic…. Critics are always laymen. Although there are interns that are very helpful and we have staff, you are often dealing with a sort of complex procedure if information isn’t as readily available as possible. So those moves have been positive.

I just want to spend a bit of time with the dam safety inspections. According to the guidelines, my understanding is that with facilities that have been identified as high risk, there are requirements for the type of person that the ministry would use to look at those dam safety inspections. And I guess the question is, rather than the specifics on that: can you describe which staff, or the process, that you have for taking in a dam safety inspection and judging whether it’s adequate or not?

The process that you went through this time was to get a third-party engineer to look at it. My presumption is you’re not going to do that every year. So internally, how do you do that on a year to year basis and be assured that the dam safety inspections that are taking place and the dam safety reports done every five years are of a quality that is acceptable to the people of British Columbia?

Hon. B. Bennett: I can describe the process in place today and the process that was in place since I became minister.

[M. Morris in the chair.]

I can’t with any great certainty describe how it’s been done over the past ten, 20, 30, 40, 50 years. What I can tell the member is that right now when a dam safety inspection report comes in, it’s reviewed by geotechnical staff. It’s followed up if warranted. If it’s an operating mine, it’s almost always warranted.

[1530]

Someone will go out in the summer and actually walk the mine site, walk the TSF. So there is geotechnical staff that looks at the report and provides an opinion to managers.

I’m advised that during those periods of time when…. I think there was one year in particular where the ministry was unable to find a geotechnical engineer to work full-time on staff. The advice I have is that in that situation — and frankly, any time — the ministry would have gone out and found geotechnical engineer contractors to have come in and reviewed these dam safety inspection reports.

But I will not be able to commit to the member that every single dam safety inspection report ever filed with the Ministry of Energy and Mines, even over the last ten years or 15 years, was reviewed. I can tell him that certainly over the last two years they have been. Going back a number of years, I think they would have been, but I can’t commit to that. I wasn’t there

N. Macdonald: I won’t spend long on this, but I’m just curious. With the third-party engineers, some of them went on site and others didn’t. I don’t know the percentage, and I don’t think it’s important. But my assumption was that staff would be looking at reports. Is that how it works? They get the written documents, and they look through it and see if it looks correct to them? Or is this something where, just like with the third-party engineers, on occasion they would go on site? If they do, what would trigger going on site or not going on site?

Hon. B. Bennett: Is this question kind of in the context of the most recent annual dam safety inspection reports?

N. Macdonald: Just in general within the ministry. I know what the third party did. Some went, and some didn’t.

Hon. B. Bennett: The member indicated that his question isn’t necessarily limited to the most recent dam safety inspections that we ordered to be done by December 1, 2014, and then vetted by independent engineers. It’s broader than that. It goes to: how does the ministry typically review and act upon these annual inspection reports?

My advice on that is, again, that geotechnical staff would look at the reports. There’s an ongoing regime of inspections of all of the operating mines. When the inspector or inspectors go out to that particular mine site, they would have in hand the annual dam safety inspection report, and for anything in the report that was relevant, they would ask questions and get some assurance that things were being done that were supposed to be done that were listed in the annual report.

I don’t know if that comes close to answering the question or not.

N. Macdonald: That’s good, thanks.

I just want to come back to the report and look at a third theme. This would be around the material used and the amount of material used at Mount Polley in the construction. This is a vast project. I know the minister likely saw it before the collapse, but I saw it only after the failure in one section. It is a vast, vast structure that has been built.

Again, these questions relate to things that are within the report that deal with the material used and both the quality and the amount of material that was available to use.

[1535]

Now, the panel said in the report that economics shouldn’t trump safety in the future. On page 75 in the report, in two places, the panel raises concerns with the material used for the dam. It is not only the limited amount of material that is available; it is also the quality of the material. In both cases — and this is editorializing, because it doesn’t say it in the report — it looks like the cheaper option was taken for the company.

When I’m talking about the amount of material, I’m talking, of course, about the decision to just use tailings rather than quarrying for additional material. The implication for the quality of the material would be that for some sections of the dam, a finer quality was needed than was available and was used. For the slope, normally in the buttressing, one would have used larger material than they had available.

Did the Ministry of Energy and Mines approve the material used for the downstream slope and for the dam core, or is this something that is completely at the responsibility of the engineer?

Hon. B. Bennett: The engineer of record would approve all things related to the expansion of the dam, maintenance of the dam. Any sort of work, whether that be buttresses or beaches or adding to the height of the dam, would be approved by and designed by the engineer of record. That would include the kinds of materials that were being used. It would include a decision referenced in the report that the member just quoted, where the company….

Materials seem to be scarce for dam construction, is basically what the panel said, at times, the inference being that the company was using equipment and so forth to mine and produce, rather than hauling for purposes of dam construction. That sort of question, I can’t answer. Did that really happen? How big a problem was that?

I think in these two reports, or at least in these two investigations that are taking place…. I hope that is a question that is answered in some very specific and meaningful way.

All I can say is that the panel thought that was an issue. We’ll find out what the investigations say about that. But it all goes back to the engineer of record and their opin-
[ Page 7342 ]
ion on what is in compliance, what is not in compliance, what is safe and what is not safe. The engineers of record at this mine site consistently, over the years, starting in 1995 through 2014, always indicated in response to questions from MEM staff that what they were doing, overall, was safe and responsible.

Again, I’m not defending those engineers, but, on the basis of their understanding of what was in the foundation, they clearly believed that the height of the dam, the steepness of the dam, the lack of beaches, the buttresses — all of it — were in compliance and, in fact, were safe based on their understanding of the foundation of the dam. We won’t really know whether there was more to that story until these other investigations are done.

N. Macdonald: The minister, in many, many areas, has indicated an openness to go and revisit some of the practice. I think it’s essential that that happened, clearly.

I’ll just refer to page 64, “Stage 6 design.” There are again difficulties identified by the engineer of record around access to materials when using only mine waste. It meant that the buttress was not constructed as designed. The buttress was five metres below its design and short of its design extent. In fact, there was no buttress where the dam failed at Mount Polley. Had there been a dam, then there wouldn’t have been that failure.

[1540]

I guess it’s something that maybe the minister has answered, but again, the question, I think for most people, would be: why was Mount Polley not required by the ministry to quarry to get the material? Obviously, using mine waste…. It’s bound to be a cheaper option for the company, but it was, I think, equally obvious that at the time it created a substandard dam.

I guess a couple things. First, because it’s a bit of a repeat of what I’ve already asked: if the minister’s answer is that this is for the engineer of record, could he then move into a description of the acts that are going to be used or possibly used to the end of these investigations?

What sort of acts are…? It’s the Mines Act, the various environmental acts. What is the outcome for the engineering company? Presumably, if the minister is saying that this is all on the engineering company, then at the end of these investigations, presumably there’s a possibility that we’re going to see charges under a variety of acts.

If that’s where the minister is going, could he then go to the next stage and just describe what the possibilities are, understanding that we still have, likely, an extended period of investigation to go?

Hon. B. Bennett: Well, I’d start by pointing out that on the page that the member referenced, in terms of buttressing: “None of these buttressing considerations pertained to the perimeter embankment.” That’s one of those situations, again, where the section that you’re quoting was in reference to the main embankment, not the perimeter embankment that failed. The whole discussion around buttressing is interesting, but if it doesn’t relate to the perimeter embankment, it’s kind of irrelevant in terms of the failure.

I would also say that I’m not…. When I say to the member that the engineer of record is responsible for design, construction, maintenance, expansion of a dam at a TSF, not only is that the truth; the panel report makes it very, very clear that that is the case. An engineer of record would have to provide I think it’s called an as-built plan to the company. The engineer of record says: “We need to raise the height of this dam. There’s going to be more water in there.” The engineer of record would have to do the as-built plan.

What the regulator would do is ensure that as that as-built plan is used to do whatever the construction is, the company is actually doing it according to what the engineer of record has said they must do. That’s the job of the regulator. It isn’t the job of the regulator to design the construction or say: “Oh, you should use that material instead of that material.” That’s the job of the engineer of record.

That’s the way it works not just in mining but in all of our economic endeavours. That is the way it works generally. It leads us to the place that the member was asking about at the end of his question: what’s going to happen? How are we going to ensure that if…? I think the member mentioned that the engineers might be responsible for some of this.

[1545]

I have to be exceedingly careful in how I talk about this, and I can’t surmise what might happen. But I can tell the member one thing for sure. The Professional Engineers and Geoscientists Association is conducting its own investigation. When an engineer puts his or her seal on an as-built plan or on a design for a TSF, there is a lot of obligation and accountability and liability that goes along with that stamp.

I’ve said this publicly, and I believe it is certainly the case that before this episode of Mount Polley is behind the province, and it will be a few years, that there will be legal actions between all kinds of different parties. I hope that the Crown, frankly, doesn’t have to be involved in them, but we may have to be.

No one is going to want to acknowledge the liability for having missed that GLU. No one is going to want to acknowledge liability if, in fact, one of these other investigations turns out that they weren’t in compliance. They weren’t doing the things they said they were doing or that we had asked them to do as a ministry.

I think that ultimately, a court of law will determine who has liability, and the parties involved will probably end up suing each other to determine who is going to pay what part of the total cost here.

N. Macdonald: Well, I guess two things. First with the buttress. The area that is along the main embankment
[ Page 7343 ]
was too short. It should have been five metres higher. That’s my understanding. It was five metres below its design, okay. From the quizzical look from the deputy minister, maybe I wasn’t explaining it.

So along the main buttress it should have been higher, but it also talks about the extent. It should have gone all the way around the base of the whole structure. There was no buttress. There was no buttress where it collapsed.

When we were there, people were talking about the fact that they had cleared that area, and their intention was to come in and do the buttressing. But it always was slower than it should have been, and the reason it was slower is because of a lack of material. So what it comes back to, again and again, is the lack of material.

Now, that’s the cheap option. My understanding is that Mount Polley was quarrying and was given permission no longer to do that. Maybe the ministry didn’t do that, but somebody allowed them to stop quarrying and to simply use a limited supply of tailings, which weren’t the perfect material to be using. I guess that’s my understanding from the report, and the report is pretty clear on that.

The second point, around the need for some explanation of what’s a possibility for either the company or for the engineers, is that while the minister talks about the responsibility of these businesses to do the work properly, this is still a regulatory structure that the minister is responsible for.

The premise the minister is putting forward is that the fear of that penalty will drive the proper behaviour, yet I think what you see from Mount Polley is that the proper behaviour consistently did not take place, right? Now, it would be one thing if the minister could point to an example in the past where there was a steep penalty that would change behaviour. I couldn’t find it, but then again, maybe, as the minister would say, there haven’t been a lot of Mount Polleys. In any case, I can’t find that example of a strong penalty that would change behaviour.

The question I have for the minister is: going forward, without speculating as to whether somebody is guilty or not, what sort of penalties are we talking about? If we’re talking about $100,000 for operations that are $600 million and $700 million, you are not changing behaviour. What sort of penalties, what sort of acts are we talking about that would provide penalties that are severe enough to influence behaviour?

[1550]

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m always picking up pieces from the previous…. Well, maybe from the member’s preamble, I guess, is what I’m responding to.

I think the member means to say waste rock and not tailings. I don’t believe the mining company….

N. Macdonald: I mean waste rock; you’re right. Not tailings, waste rock.

Hon. B. Bennett: Okay, so they’re not using tailings to build abutments.

The member asked whether there are any examples of the ministry taking — my word, “harsh” — action to somebody that’s not doing what they’re supposed to be doing. I said earlier today that we’ve actually closed two mines. We’ve shut them down. They were not happy about that, but it was necessary to get their attention and to get them to do the right thing. That’s pretty serious. About as serious as it gets is to shut the operation down. They can no longer mine. They can no longer produce. They no longer have anything to sell.

In terms of the kind of penalty — the range of penalties, fines, etc. that could come from the investigations that are ongoing — there’s quite a broad range of penalties. I’ve talked about the penalties under the Mines Act, $100,000 maximum plus $5,000 a day. But there are lots of other penalties that certainly have the potential of applying in this situation under the environmental legislation. I don’t have it in front of me, but there’s one that refers to a penalty of $1 million a day that could be levied against a company or an individual that’s responsible for the release of contaminants into the environment.

Under our legislation, there are jail sentences available in this case. Under the environmental legislation…. I can get more detail for the member from the Ministry of Environment, but under their legislation, in addition to very, very steep fines, there are also jail sentences available.

When the time comes and we find out who is responsible — whether it’s an individual, a series of individuals; whether it’s a company; whether it’s a series of companies — there are penalties. There will be penalties levied if the wrongdoers are identified in these investigations.

N. Macdonald: The minister has said that he’ll send along this information. It doesn’t have to be done in any quick way.

I’m just curious. The underlying premise is that there are going to be penalties that will actually change behaviour. If it’s a cheaper option to stop quarrying and simply use waste rock and the Ministry of Energy and Mines is not prescribing something to be done in a particular way, then it goes to reason, if a mistake is made and either the engineering firm or the mining company is responsible, that there be a serious enough penalty.

Now, the minister has said… It’s just recently that there have been two mines that have been shut down. Of course, the Mount Polley is, to all extent and purposes, shut down, so that could be a penalty applied. If it’s the engineers, they have…. Some of the engineers are no longer employed by Mount Polley. So I look forward to more information on what possible penalties there are.

As I said, on page 61 of the report, the first paragraph describes the slope of the Mount Polley tailings storage facility — in this case, the Boundary dam — as steeper
[ Page 7344 ]
than planned. The report says that the explanation is related to the decision to use solely mined waste rather than the quarried material.

In the permitting process — and here again, I don’t completely understand it, so maybe take some time here — is there ever a time where, when changes like this take place, the ministry is asked, through the permitting process or changes to the permitting process, whether it’s appropriate or not?

Here I’m not so much focused on whether this particular place was the place that failed or not. But just to understand, things like the type of material used, whether it’s appropriate or not — does the ministry ever get asked those sorts of questions in the permitting process?

[1555]

I think the permit, and maybe the minister could correct me here, was changed many times. And I know in the briefing the deputy minister said, I think, how many times. I don’t remember. Maybe the minister can give me that number: how many changes there were to M-200 and whether something like this would be part of amendments to the permitting.

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m advised that it is not unusual. In fact, it would be unusual for a mining company to not be applying to change their mine plan, and even their TSF, on a fairly regular basis. They do have to apply before they make any changes that could be characterized as a fundamental change from the original mine plan.

Again, this question has been asked, in a different forum, several different times. The ministry is not responsible to tell the mining company what kind of rock they use to build buttresses. They don’t get into that level of detail.

Incidentally, just for the member’s edification, the waste rock is exactly the same as the rock out of a quarry. It’s exactly the same stuff. I think the member’s point is probably more around quantity, that they could have quarried to get more rock than what they were being supplied from waste rock.

In any case, it is the job of the engineer of record to determine whether they need those buttresses and how those buttresses will be built. It’s the job of the engineer of record to determine whether the dam has the right slope, the right steepness, if it is safe. It’s the engineer of record’s job to determine if the dam is designed and constructed in a way that will hold the amount of water and the amount of tailings that’s in the facility.

[1600]

I quote from page 116. “The engineer is responsible for the overall performance of the structure as well as the interpretation of site conditions. The regulator has to rely on the expertise and the professionalism of the engineer of record, as the regulator is not the designer.”

This is obviously a hard line to draw. When you’re in opposition and you’re trying to find responsibility, and politics being a partisan business…. This is not a personal criticism of the member; he’s doing his job. But it would be useful to the Opposition if the regulator had, in fact, not done something that it should have done.

As the panel stated, in so many different places in the report, it’s the obligation of the designer, as the engineer of record, to recognize the potential failure modes. Potential failure modes could be all the things the member has referenced in addition to the actual cause of the accident. They’re all potential failure modes. It is the obligation, so says the report, of the designer to recognize those potential failure modes.

This is another quote: “The panel considers that a line must be maintained between a designer and regulator. It is axiomatic that a regulator cannot regulate its own activities. Were it to usurp the role of the designer, it would usurp its own role.” I said that not nearly as well earlier today.

The regulator can go to a certain point. The regulator can and, in this case, did ask all of the relevant, smart, probing questions about the foundation, about the steepness, about the beaches, about the buttresses, about the amount of water. In this report there are all kinds of examples of the regulator asking all those good questions.

When the engineer of record comes back and provides evidence or professional opinion that how things are being done — what is there and what’s in existence in terms of the TSF — is, in fact, in compliance and based on their design — which, of course, didn’t take into account the unstable materials — it’s safe.

The steepness is okay. The lack of buttressing, any lack of beaches, the amount of water — it’s all okay, based on what the engineer of record said.

The member is getting at that relationship between the engineer of record and the regulator. Again, the panel said the regulator did everything it should do as a good regulator. In fact, it distinguished itself in this case. They said the regulator was one of the better sets of regulators that it had ever encountered doing this kind of work.

I think we agree on this, actually. I intend to focus my time and energy going forward, after estimates are over, on: what do we learn from this? How do we improve the situation? How do we address the unknown unknowns by decreasing the level of risk and by increasing the factor of safety? How do we do that through regulation oversight in the future? That’s the lesson I think we have to learn.

N. Macdonald: I think, going forward, that’s important. In fact, behaviour has changed. You’ve talked about shutting down a mine that was operating with a tailings pond in a situation where it was overflowing, right?

It’s important to remember, with Mount Polley, that while the trigger for this particular event was that GLU layer, it’s also clear that it could also have failed in May from overtopping. It could also have failed because of the erosion within the dam itself. It is broader than just one issue — as the minister, I know, recognizes.
[ Page 7345 ]

In terms of the quality of the rock, it is the quality of the rock that is talked about here. When I was at the minesite, workers talked about the quarrying getting riprap, a bigger rock for use in the buttress, as well as, of course, the quantity of the rock, which limited the steepness of the slope as well as the buttressing.

[1605]

I want to move on, with the time that we have, to the fourth theme, which is related to the measuring devices used. Piezometers, as the minister knows, measure water pressure within the dam structure and can provide important information on the structural integrity of the dam. The observation method depends upon information from instruments such as piezometers, as I understand it.

On page 78 of the report it reads the following: “As of August 2014 there were a total of 64 operating piezometers and 52 non-operating piezometers.” Piezometers provide important data about what is happening inside a dam. In the part of the dam that collapsed, 13 piezometers were not working and only nine were.

I guess the question is: is this ratio of non-operating instrumentation likely the same across the province? And does the ministry view these devices as important or essential to the safe operating of a tailings storage facility?

Hon. B. Bennett: First of all, on page 57 the panel stated that “an important milestone was that the observational method was formally invoked as the basis for design.” That was in the year 2000. It was an approach to design that was taken very, very early on in the life of this mine. The panel has made the point that there were so many lifts, there was so much construction happening around this TSF that the observational method was not the best way to approach this, because of all the construction and the fact that piezometers were destroyed and so forth.

I think it comes down to…. I mean, it’s the same issue that the member has raised all day, which is that if the engineer of record is satisfied with what is happening with that TSF and answers the good questions from the regulator about the status of the dam, the regulator accepts what the engineer of record says. The engineer of record at that time, based on what I read in the report, indicated that none of the potential failure modes that we have discussed here today were of a severe enough nature to cause the regulator to shut the mine down or order something more, something different, I guess, to happen.

Clearly, in retrospect, the engineer of record probably wishes that he or she could take that advice back. But all the regulator can do is take the advice of the engineer of record on all of these matters in terms of the integrity of the dam at that TSF. That includes the number of piezometers that are there and the method by which the engineers of record have decided that they’re going to monitor the condition of that dam.

Where the regulator sees issues that they want to bring to the attention of the engineer of record, they do that. They did that, and it’s recorded in the report, several parts of the report. They ask the questions. Again, when they get the answer that everything is okay, there really is not much that the regulator can do at that point.

N. Macdonald: I mean, I have to assume that the piezometers are important, that they’re there for a reason. Again, I think most people would look at the number of piezometers that don’t work, the number that are not working in the area where the failure took place, and just be surprised by that. Now, I’ll acknowledge that whether those piezometers were there or not…. I don’t know that that would make any difference to what actually happened, and I’m not sure if the report is clear on that.

[1610]

But it is indicative of a sloppiness in some area. Whoever is responsible for it or not, it speaks to a sloppiness. The minister will know, in terms of piezometers within his own ministry — in this case, B.C. Hydro — it’s a technology that they use. It’s a technology that they deal with very differently.

Because I represent Revelstoke, of course, I’m dealing with people that run these dams. They have piezometers within all of their structures. Remember that Revelstoke dam is, for the most part, not completely different than the structures that you have in some of these tailings ponds, right? Most of Revelstoke is, as the minister knows, an earth-filled dam with only a certain part of it cement, but they have the piezometers all through it. The gentleman in Revelstoke with his BlackBerry would receive, within ten minutes, notification if a piezometer went out.

The organizations that take seriously the importance of keeping structures upright, where they take seriously the zero tolerance for failure, don’t allow their instrumentation to go to a situation where, of a total of 64 operating piezometers and 52 non-operating…. You’re well over 40 percent. You’re approaching a failure rate that I think most people would look at and would say is unacceptable.

The observational method…. In the conversation the minister and I had, I was pretty clear to him. I didn’t completely understand what the observational method entailed. Maybe the minister can define that for the record. Then could the minister give me the other options for methods? If not the observational method, then what are the other methods that one would use in monitoring a tailings storage facility?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m going to give the first part of the answer and then sit down and take some advice on the second part of the answer.

Talking about the number of piezometers that worked and didn’t work is like talking about the buttressing, the steepness, the amount of water, the beaches — all interesting, and there are lessons to be learned, certainly, from it, but none of that caused the accident.
[ Page 7346 ]

I’m advised by the geotechnical staff in the ministry that the number of piezometers being damaged and being replaced at Mount Polley was actually fairly typical of an operating mine. There’s a huge distinction between building a hydro dam that’s going to be in place for 100 years and never essentially change and the dam at a TSF in an operating mine where the height is being raised on a regular basis, they’re bolstering it in terms of buttresses. There’s construction activity happening at a TSF like the one at Mount Polley on a daily basis.

There isn’t that sort of ongoing activity at a hydro dam, so it’s no surprise that you stick 1,000 piezometers into a hydro dam and they probably last for a long time and probably provide quality information. There’s that piece of it.

I will be able to in a couple of minutes, but I can’t define the observational method. I think the member and I probably both understand it. It’s probably just as simple as what it seems like. I’m going to get some advice on that and provide that explanation, and also the second part or the third part of the question, which is: if it’s not the observational method, how else could this company and these engineers have been managing the situation?

[1615]

Sorry for the delay. I will read to the member what my staff indicates the observational method means. The observational method is generally defined as:

“In geotechnical engineering, during the construction of earth structures…the observational method is the continuous, managed and integrated process of design, construction control, monitoring and review, enabling appropriate, previously defined modifications to be incorporated during or after construction. All these aspects must be demonstrably robust. The objective is to achieve greater overall economy without compromising safety.”

It’s a really good question: what’s the alternative to the so-called observational method? I would assume that most mining and engineering companies would utilize that approach once the mine is built. However, my staff have pointed out that in the recommendations under 9.4, which deals with best available practices, there is a reference by the panel to quantitative performance objectives.

One of the things that the company could have done or the engineers could have done that wouldn’t be part of an observational method would have been to go back and review all the records to determine, like the panel did, whether enough investigation had been done originally to determine what’s under the foundation. They could have done that. You can do that by reviewing your records. Many companies have done that in the last six months.

They didn’t do that. I suppose no one suspected these unstable materials, so there was no reason, I guess, for them to do that and no reason for the regulator to order them to do that and no reason for the engineers to go back and look at their records, unless they had some suspicion that there was movement, some inclination from these piezometers that there had been a shudder in the dam, that there was something, triggered: “Oh, we’d better go back and look and make sure that there isn’t something unstable.” There’s no evidence that anything like that happened.

To the recommendations under best available practices, these qualitative performance objectives, we are going to, through our code review, work with the industry and First Nations and the engineering association to try to determine whether there are some benchmarking or regular performance objectives that can be, first of all, built into the legislation so that we can assign these objectives to a permit. Then once you have the legislative authority to create them, you would put them as part of the permit.

You get a permit to build the mine. Part of that permit would contain these performance objectives. Over time the company would have to provide evidence that they had checked certain things. I’m not technical enough — and I apologize to the member — to be very specific about this.

[1620]

You’d have more ongoing obligation in the permit itself for the company and its engineers to report on the performance of that TSF on a regular basis, the theory being — based on what the panel has said — that that ongoing obligation to report the performance — that the TSF is performing according to the way it’s supposed to — could, potentially, give you a signal that something wasn’t right.

N. Macdonald: This is the part that I’ve never understood — why it wasn’t this way in the first place. There are lots of things that…. Whether the ministry knew about it or didn’t know about it, that’s…. I guess, part of the case I’m making is that you knew about it. You should have done something. And you’ve been saying: “Well, no. That’s the engineer’s issue.”

The regular reporting. It implies that the ministry would do something with that information. If that’s the method you’re moving to…. On page 77, the report does say that the observational method used at Mount Polley was ineffective, and they gave explanations, including the size of the structure. I guess the question is: was the ministry aware of the ineffective instrumentation monitoring at Mount Polley?

There’s a whole bunch of things that come up. We know about the cracking. We know about the overtopping or the near overtopping back in May. But did the ministry know that much of the instrumentation was not working? And does the ministry…? Well, let’s stop with that. I always give the minister a series of questions, but let’s just give one question. Did the ministry know that most of the instrumentation at Mount Polley was not working? Not most — 40 percent.

Hon. B. Bennett: I’ll get the succinct answer for the member in terms of the question: did inspectors know
[ Page 7347 ]
how many piezometers were functioning and how many weren’t? We don’t know the specific answer to it right now, but we’ll get that for the member and provide it to him.

I am advised that when a piezometer stops working, they don’t pull it out. They just leave it there. The fact that they had a bunch of piezometers not working would, in part, be explained by the fact that you just leave them there. You don’t go digging around and pull them out. But we’ll get the rest of the answer for the member.

N. Macdonald: That actually might make sense and explain quite a bit, which I guess would lead to other questions that we’ll come to in a minute. I’m also going to be looking at other mines that were addressed in that third-party review where the piezometers weren’t necessarily working.

Before we leave this, though, does the Ministry of Energy and Mines, then, still accept the observation method at other remaining tailing storage facilities? The minister sort of speculated that they might be looking at a different system, but are we moving away from this system altogether if there are the same sorts of conditions as what were found at Mount Polley?

[1625]

Hon. B. Bennett: As near as we can tell, the observational method is here to stay. In terms of this context, I don’t mean to be cheeky, but you’re always going to have to observe how much water is in the pond. Even with constant construction happening, as was the case with Mount Polley, you’re probably also going to continue to use piezometers because it’s just the sensible, cautious thing to do. You’re always going to have observations being made by engineers and employees of the mining company.

Unfortunately, I think the report leaves the impression that the “observational method” is some kind of a discrete approach to monitoring a TSF and that there are other discrete, very different — categorically different — approaches to monitoring TSFs that would be called something else. My advice is that that’s probably not the case, that the observational method went wrong in this case because there was this unknown and there was no way to observe it.

Building these quantitative performance objectives into permits will reduce the risk, will increase the factor of safety. One of the issues the panel mentioned was the multiple engineers of record that worked on this project. I think there were, maybe, four. That might be wrong. I think it was four.

In any case, they came, and they went. There’s always a transition period, you know, when the new engineer of record takes over. If you had quantitative performance objectives built into your permit, you could ensure that the new engineer of record is following along seamlessly with the observations, essentially, that are being made by the outgoing engineer.

This is a learning for me, honestly. Reading the report as many times as I have, I was left with the impression that the observational method is some sort of discrete method that is very different from other methods. Based on the advice I’m getting now, I actually don’t think that’s the case. I think it’s probably shades of black and white and gray.

You’re always going to use the observational method, but there are other practices and other, better technologies that you can apply to a situation to reduce the risk.

That’s the best answer I can provide under the circumstances.

N. Macdonald: I think that’s pretty good. As I was clear with the minister in the briefing, I don’t fully understand what is meant. It seemed a bit too obvious, what I thought it was, but maybe that’s all it is. You just look at instruments and you look at what’s going on.

Just to stay with this issue, in Mount Polley, as I said, there was an issue with broken instrumentation. The minister has said that potentially these are broken during the construction phase in an anticipated way and are simply left there.

I will just note that in the 2006 Dam Safety Review and then reiterated in 2009 and 2010 in the dam safety inspections, they noted the broken instrumentation, as if to say, in my reading, bringing attention to Mount Polley: “You’ve got to fix these.” Rather than simply having been trampled and we’re going to put in new ones, my read of that is they’re saying: “Hey, you’ve got to get working on that.”

They became a condition in Mount Polley’s permit in 2011. The piezometers were a condition in Mount Polley’s permit in 2011. That’s five years from when broken instrumentation was listed as an outstanding issue to when it finally became required for the Mount Polley Mining Corporation to address the issue, and still they did not seem to address it by the time the dam failed.

From the dam safety inspection reports released in 2014, we see issues with instruments in other mines as well. In Endako, instrumentation replacement has been an outstanding recommendation since 2009.

[1630]

[J. Martin in the chair.]

So that’s Endako. The tailings pond there has seen movement since 2008, 2009.

The need to check the piezometers — whether checking for maintenance or for faulty instruments, it wasn’t clear in the documents I read. But that is noted at the Goldstream, Highland Valley Copper, Jumbo, Gold Valley and Premier gold site mines. The need to install instruments, in general, is noted at QR mine. The fact is that they have no slope monitoring instruments, and that is seen as a problem. They also said in the third-party re-
[ Page 7348 ]
ports that piezometers need to be put in Quinsam coal mine, Huckleberry, New Carolin mine, the Endako mine and the Samatosum mine. This is, of course, all the TSFs.

The question that I have is: is there a legal requirement on how many instruments there need to be within a structure? Is it within the guidelines, or is this again something that engineers have the freedom to decide whether it’s needed or not?

The Chair: Minister.

Hon. B. Bennett: Thank you, hon. Chair. Welcome to the party.

I think what the member is describing in terms of how many piezometers, where you put them, are they always required, is there a minimum number required, goes to a best practice. I don’t believe that there is a regulation which states how many piezometers you have to have in every TSF or anything like that. Every single TSF is so different. Many of them have natural contours. Many of them have two or three natural contours, so there’s only one dam at the one end of the valley and that’s where the pond is. Obviously, you wouldn’t put as many piezometers if there’s bedrock that’s holding back the tailings and the water.

It does go to the panel’s recommendation about best practices. I do think that that sort of issue will be canvassed when the code review is done, as we look at what the best practices are that maybe weren’t being used at Mount Polley. In addition to the best available technologies, one of the recommendations was best available practices.

I think in terms of engineers assessing the risk in a given situation with a given TSF, there should be some best practice that is laid out for those engineers. Whether it’s through the engineering profession and their legislation or whether it’s through mining legislation, I don’t think it really matters. But there should be some direction that companies and engineering firms must agree to adopt these best practices.

Obviously, it would include not just specifically piezometers but everything about the observational method that goes to what you can do to ensure that the structure is safe. Again, the unknown is you’ve got to go all the way back to the beginning when the original investigation was done of the foundation materials to address that.

But all those other things that we have discussed today — all would benefit from, perhaps, some more best practices that might even be prescribed to some extent. We’re fully prepared to consider more prescription in the regulations.

It was recommended that, as I said earlier…. I think the panel likes the idea of taking some of those Canadian dam safety guidelines and, instead of incorporating them generally, would actually put them in and make them a little more prescriptive. We’re going to look at all of that. We have to do that in the context of what’s reasonable and practical for the industry, but we definitely are open-minded to that.

[1635]

N. Macdonald: What’s interesting about this is that, of course, this is information that, as the critic, I never would normally have. It’s, in fact, information that I don’t think the ministry would normally be as aware of because you went through the third-party process. This is all information I’m picking up from the third-party process.

Now, I presume that, as engineers…. This is a whole host of different engineers, right? AMEC may be doing one mine. It’s all different companies. There’s a number of these companies that are addressing the piezometer issue and highlighting the fact that the facilities that they’re inspecting…. They’re looking over the information. They’re saying: “Hey, you have no piezometers. You don’t have enough, or they’re not working the way that they should.” I presume that these are professionals that are saying that they needed to be here.

I guess the question I have is, given that this information is presented in this way as a one-off, what is the plan for the minister going forward — to duplicate that sort of a process, not necessarily in exactly the same way but so that we have the information and it’s public and you get the same sort of feedback that you’ve gone through? Are you going to replicate the process year after year until you feel you’re at a place where the public has confidence again in what is going on with these tailings storage facilities? Or do you see a different sort of a process that we’d get to approximately the same place?

Then we’ll come back to the piezometer questions.

Hon. B. Bennett: Well, I think the government is going to have to respond to the Mount Polley disaster and the report and the two investigations in a way where everyone — the interested public, the industry, First Nations people and First Nations leaders, the opposition — has some comfort that we’ve learned something from this horrible experience.

As I said a minute ago, I think that we’re not there yet. We have to wait for these other two investigations. It’ll take at least a year to review the mining code. We do this occasionally. It’s a very challenging and time-consuming and expensive effort because we involve the industry. Industry has to find people that’ll sit on this committee on a regular basis. It’s exhaustive. I mean, the mining code is like the forest practices code used to be — maybe not that thick, but it’s pretty thick. And the unions. Sorry, I forgot to mention that unions participate in this, and we’re adding First Nations to this now. That’ll be an exhaustive exercise.

Through that exercise, they will make recommendations to government about how we could change the code to incorporate best practices that would be intended to prevent this kind of…. I don’t know if it’s systemic. The
[ Page 7349 ]
member’s looked at information that we put on the website. It has indicated that a number of different TSFs lack piezometers. I don’t know the numbers, the ratio and so forth. I don’t know if it’s a systemic issue, but it’s obviously an issue for multiple TSFs.

We would hope that an established best practice built into the code would be such that you wouldn’t have companies not implementing the use of piezometers where they should be. Their engineers ought to make sure that they are doing that. I think there’s a positive way to respond to the need. Again, I’m not sure that there’s a systemic lack of piezometers out there. I guess we’ll do an examination and figure that out.

[1640]

I wanted to say, in terms of information, when the accident happened, what I discovered, as minister, was that in fact we were not capable of locating relevant information, especially if it involved large quantities of information, and getting that information out to the public, to First Nations, to the media. It was an issue of old, old systems. A lot of our systems aren’t even electronic. We have remedied that to a very large extent now. But it was a pretty old-fashioned way of doing business.

So when people — people being the media and the opposition and critics — surmise that we’re holding things back and we’re taking so long to provide information, a good deal of that, most of that actually, was that we have prehistoric methods of storing information in this ministry, and we needed to address that. Again, we have.

We are committed to providing a lot more information, getting it up on the Internet, so people that care about this stuff can go and look and poke around and see what they can find. August 4 was when the accident happened. It’s the middle of April. For a small little ministry whose resources have been very much focused on Mount Polley and a few other things, I think the staff have done well to get as much done as they have.

N. Macdonald: I think the minister has answered this question, but just to be clear. If the minister is looking at things that may be addressed in the future, the question is if there is or would be anticipating a legal requirement or a regulatory requirement on how many instruments and whether they need to be replaced if damaged — what sort of time frame between a piezometer, which is needed, going down and being replaced. How does a mining operation decide how many instruments have to be installed in an area and where?

Those are questions that…. I think it’s an interesting question as well. So those two. I’ll give the minister a chance to respond.

Hon. B. Bennett: The prescription of piezometers.

N. Macdonald: Yeah, are you going to be prescriptive? Are you going to lay out rules and timelines if one goes down and things like that? Is that where you’re going to go with this?

Hon. B. Bennett: I think the question is: will we prescribe the number of piezometers required in any given situation, and will we also prescribe the sort of care and maintenance and replacement of those piezometers if one goes down? “Within 30 days thou shalt replace that piezometer.”

No. I can’t see the value in trying to be that prescriptive. Every single mine is different. Every single TSF is different. I think that what we have to do is we have to establish best practices for the mining industry and their engineers.

The engineers. Despite what happened at Mount Polley, I have great faith in the engineering profession. If they have a best practice that is law, that is in a regulation, they will be able to make a judgment as to how many piezometers you need in a given situation and what a safe level is if a half-dozen of them suddenly get destroyed in some construction work — how long it should take to replace them. There has to be some reliance on engineers to make these decisions, or we will bring the industry to a standstill, in my view.

N. Macdonald: Maybe we’ll just spend a moment on the erosion channels, which I guess is sort of the fifth theme. There were erosion channels within the dam structure, and there was cracking on the dam face at Mount Polley. Now, most of this, to be clear, was not in the area that failed.

[1645]

In the report it does show pictures of some evidence of channeling in the area that failed. But the panel was really clear. They didn’t think that was a significant factor in the failure. Nevertheless, it is something that one would not want to see in Mount Polley or in any of the 123 structures the minister is responsible for.

I guess the question is: was the minister aware of the internal erosion at Mount Polley? Was there any specific action of the ministry that took place, thinking that if you did that with Mount Polley, you would be doing the same thing with the remaining 123 tailings storage facilities? So just a sense as to whether the ministry is looking at these sorts of issues in its tailings storage facilities.

Hon. B. Bennett: The way that the process works in Canada — in B.C. and also in the rest of the country — is that the mining company would report to the inspectors anything untoward about the TSF. It happens all the time. The reason we know about leakage of water from a TSF, regardless of how minor it is, is because these companies report it voluntarily.

It’s a bit of an aside, but in response to the member’s comment earlier, I don’t believe it’s because of fear of fines. I believe it’s because in today’s world these com-
[ Page 7350 ]
panies fear the wrath of the public far more than they do fines. They need social licence to operate, and they do not want to be known as rogues, as companies that don’t care about the environment, as companies that have regular accidents happening on their worksite.

They truly don’t. They have shareholders from all over the world. Most of those shareholders live in Toronto and New York and London — big cities where they care about having an investment in a company that operates properly. I actually do think there is a lot of pressure on companies to operate properly, and they do typically report.

What would happen is that it would get reported. Occasionally, employees will report it, and they can do that. It’ll get reported, and the ministry will respond and ensure that the company has a plan to address whatever the deficiency is, whether it’s piezometers or something else — cracks, erosion, whatever it might be.

Typically what happens is that the company’s engineers go and review what it is, and they make a professional assessment. I’ve learned over the past eight months that it is not that easy to trust your own eyes when you’re looking at a TSF and trying to determine if there’s some kind of a flaw in a dam. There are things that look like cracks that look dangerous that are not. I discovered that. There are things happening that you can’t even notice that are dangerous. It takes an engineer to determine those things.

So when erosion or cracks or really anything untoward goes on, it gets reported. We record it. We make sure there’s a plan to fix it. When the inspection happens — because there’s a written record of it — the inspector will actually go to the site and make sure that whatever was supposed to have been done was done.

N. Macdonald: This is a list of dams that don’t have or need to update their OMS — as the minister knows, that’s the operations maintenance surveillance manual — and don’t have EPPs, the emergency preparedness plans. These documents are supposed to be posted in the “Dam Safety Inspections — 2014” section of the bconthemove.com website, which is, as I say, much appreciated.

[1650]

At Alwin mine there’s no OMS, EPP or even the dam safety review they’re supposed to have. Bullmoose mine, no OMS; New Carolin, Ladner Creek, no OMS or EPP. You don’t mind if I use the acronyms, I’m sure. Craigmont, no OMS, EPP. Elkview, they need to update their OMS. Goldstream, no OMS, EPP despite the requirement for that. The Quintette, no OMS. And Silvana, no OMS.

The ministry has started to release their dam safety inspection reports on line, as the minister knows, for the year 2014. These are the mines that are lacking an OMS or EPP. I guess the question is: is the ministry in possession of these, and if they are, why are they not posted on line?

Hon. B. Bennett: The fact that any member of the public can go on line and look at all of this information and make a determination, as the member has, about deficiencies is, I think, a signal and proof that the system that we have is actually working. This is all reported by the company and their engineers.

I said earlier that we have a commitment from the owners of all of these TSFs that whatever deficiencies there are, whatever’s outstanding, are being addressed. We will follow up with those companies to make sure that things are being addressed.

Again, all the information that we have posted comes to us voluntarily from the companies that own the TSFs and their engineers. They have to provide us with not only an assurance that they’re going to meet these deficiencies, but if there’s some level of complexity to what it is they need to do, they’ll have to provide us with a plan on how they’re going to do that.

I’m advised, again, that we have heard from every owner, that there is no one who has simply said: “We’re not going to tell you what’s going on at our TSF.” Again, I think the system is working, and we will continue to work with all these owners of TSFs and make sure that they all provide the documentation that they are obligated to provide.

N. Macdonald: I think there’s no question that elements of what the minister says are quite accurate. In terms of the fact that these things are now on line, I think that’s a really positive step. I could not ask these questions and do my job if that site was not there. That’s where we got the information, and the information, of course, came from the third-party review of the dam safety inspections.

Just so that I understand, is it the case that these operations would actually be lacking an OMS or EPP? Is that the case, that they don’t have them? Is it possible there are mines that are operating or tailings storage facilities that don’t have OMSs and EPPs? Is that possible?

Hon. B. Bennett: In terms of the roughly 125 TSFs that are out there in the province, the vast, vast, vast majority of them are not operating mines. There’s, in most cases, nothing happening on the site. In fact, we wrote letters to owners of what we thought were TSFs, and some of the letters came back: “We don’t have a TSF anymore. We’re completely closed, and the site is remediated, and there is no TSF there anymore.” I mentioned that to the member earlier.

They would have had to have had all of the appropriate documentation required to operate, so I think it’s fair to say that they once had everything that they’re supposed to have now. But because of how long some of these TSFs have been around and the absolute lack of risk associated with many of them — I mean, there is just no risk with many of them — it is probable, even, that the companies have not kept their documentation up to date. They need to do that. They still have TSFs. They’re still live TSFs.
[ Page 7351 ]

Even though there isn’t any risk, they still have an obligation to provide us with those documents. The member has noticed that some of that documentation hasn’t been provided. We’ve asked for it. We’ll get it.

The Chair: At this point we’ll take a five-minute recess.

The committee recessed from 4:55 p.m. to 5 p.m.

[J. Martin in the chair.]

N. Macdonald: The sixth theme that I’ll look at is just water. I think the minister understands that in this mine and in other mines, excess water is a particular problem. It was contained in a structure that wasn’t properly designed, maintained or operated as a water-retaining dam, really, and it caused all sorts of problems.

On page 83 the report talks about a 2009 Mount Polley mining company report, looking at the water issue. It decides to apply to discharge water into Hazeltine Creek. So the Mount Polley mining company applies to government for permission. But it takes, in my understanding, four years for government to give permission for a treatment plant, which would be started, I think, in September 2014 — that they were going to start construction.

The water was a known problem. The government allowed increased mining activity — tailings predictably more, and water as well. On page 87 it says: “It is not clear to the panel why it took so long to design and implement a water treatment strategy that would provide for a significant reduction in the amount of surplus water,” and that Mount Polley Mining Corporation was “aware of the water surplus issue at the start of phase 2.”

The government knew as well, so why was that water-permitting process allowed to take so long? I understand it’s an environment issue, but, at the same time, it impacted not only this mine but other mines that are the responsibility of this ministry.

That’s the question. Why did that problem take so long to resolve itself? In fact, it was resolved too late to make a difference in the failure of the dam.

Hon. B. Bennett: I think the best way to answer this is to walk through the steps of the process. The engineer of record would design the dam originally. The engineer of record — at the time, a different engineer of record but a qualified engineer — would provide advice to the company about the nature of the dam and how steep it can be, what abutments it needed, what beaches it needed and all of those kinds of things.

[1705]

We would rely on the engineer of record to tell us that the dam is safe and that what is being proposed in terms of adding to the dam is also safe. We would ask lots of questions. But, again, if we got answers back like the ones that were quoted in the panel report, we would rely on the engineer of record’s advice on the matter.

My ministry deals with the geotechnical, physical part of the TSF. We are responsible for telling the operator they can’t allow the water to go above one metre from the top of the dam. That did happen once in the life of this mine, and it happened in recent history. The member has referenced that episode.

Our jurisdiction is to deal with how the dam is built and maintained and expanded. So as the company came forward and applied for permits to expand or raise the height of the dam, which is not an unusual thing in the mining industry…. TSFs are never built originally to be the size that they’re going to be by the time the mine is out of business. It is very common for dams to be raised in height.

They would apply. Our engineers would examine the engineer of record’s opinion on how to do this and whether it was safe. A decision would be made to either award a permit or ask for more clarification, more information on the height of the dam. As long as the company kept the water from surpassing or going any closer than one metre from the top of the dam, they would be in compliance.

Why did the company not discharge water from the TSF? That is not a question that I can answer. They get their water discharge permits from the Ministry of Environment.

It is exceedingly difficult, I think, and should be exceedingly difficult, to get a permit to discharge what’s known as wastewater from a TSF into the environment, particularly if it’s untreated — even if, as the CEO of this company said, he would drink the water.

Even then, it’s still very difficult to get that discharge permit, and they hadn’t. It didn’t cause the accident, no matter how much water was in there. The panel is clear that that’s not what caused the accident, but it did exacerbate the negative impact from the accident.

I think that the panel’s point here is that first of all, you’ve got more risk if you have more water, so you need less water. That risk cuts two ways. The risk goes to whether the dam might fail, but it also goes to: what will the impact be if there is some kind of a breach?

We’re very much in favour of finding best practices and best available technologies that will allow us to have less water in TSFs and therefore reduce the risk. One of the solutions to having less water in TSFs is, frankly, the discharge of water into the environment. That is something that the member will have to discuss with the Minister of Environment.

N. Macdonald: In June 2013, BGC was urging the establishment of the beach. Really, the reason they were doing that is the amount of water that was in the facility. They said that the Mount Polley tailings dam is effectively being operated as a water-retaining dam — something it was never designed to be.
[ Page 7352 ]

It is correct to say that there are implications to putting water into Hazeltine, into the environment. Those are things that the Ministry of Environment would have to consider.

But there does seem to be a disconnect over a four-year period where the Ministry of Energy and Mines would be aware of the fact that the tailings wall, the dam walls continued to go up and up in a manner that has been described in the report as barely keeping ahead of the water issue.

[1710]

The report does say that they’re surprised that there was no plan in place to deal with what was a predictable problem. The ministry allowed the mine to continue to operate and to produce waste into a facility that was having difficulty keeping up.

The minister mentioned Bralorne and the fact that it was shut down in 2014. There is a similar issue there. Bralorne mines actually started to treat their water. That’s my understanding. They set up a water treatment facility to treat and then release water because there was too much water in Bralorne’s tailings storage facility. Did the Ministry of Energy and Mines know that that was happening?

Hon. B. Bennett: I hope this is what the member is looking for. We were, of course, aware that Bralorne was out of compliance in terms of how much water was in their TSF. We knew that because they reported it to us. Once again, it’s another example, as counterintuitive as it might be to some people, of how it actually works. They reported it. We looked at the situation.

It’s a complicated situation because a lot of the water that ends up in their TSF comes from the underground workings. It’s a tremendously wet place underground. They have to keep the water pumped out in order to operate the mine, so they continuously pump that water out from underground, and it goes into the TSF.

When it got too high, we had to make a decision as to what to do about it, and the statutory decision-maker made a decision that they should shut down. That, obviously, removes the capacity for the company to earn money to pay for whatever it is that government wants them to do. That was unfortunate for them, but it was necessary, in the ministry’s view, to shut them down and order them to get the level of their tailings storage facility — the water level — down and to figure out a way to manage that water differently so that it didn’t go back up again.

They were shut down until they got back into compliance — in terms of the water levels in their TSF. They may have…. I don’t think I’ve got anything else that can illuminate the situation. We shut them down. They got back into compliance and were allowed to open up again.

N. Macdonald: There are a number…. It is not just Mount Polley but here. There are parts of this that I don’t fully understand. Perhaps I’m missing part of the story. With Bralorne, in December of 2014 they were shut down. Subsequently they have been allowed to operate again. Presumably, they’re going to raise the tailings dam — but maybe that’s not the case — to deal with the water issue.

What was strange to me is that they set up a water treatment facility to treat and then release the water. They were shut down because the Ministry of Environment hadn’t given them a permit to treat and release tailings ponds water, so they were ordered to cease discharge, but water had been a problem there for a while. In 2012 they had to get an emergency discharge allowance to avoid overtopping.

[1715]

I guess the question is, given that these can be complex issues: is every facility required to design their tailings ponds to accommodate a timely release of water in an emergency situation? Is that part of the EPP that is required? I’ve only seen two examples, so maybe it’s not something that is too much of a problem. I don’t know how broad a problem it is, but we see with Mount Polley the near overtopping in May. We see here a near overtopping at another mine. Is there a requirement, then, to structure these facilities so that they can, in an emergency, accommodate the timely release of water?

Hon. B. Bennett: There is a process in place that actually works. There are always exceptions, and there are always going to be exceptions. It rains some years more than it does other years. The best-laid plans of mice and men and all that.

The ministry certainly is going to take some advice from the panel. I can tell you — and I’ve said this already — in terms of reducing the amount of water that’s associated with TSFs across the province, it’s just a general rule that the panel makes very clear, and they’re obviously right. The less water you have, the less risk you have. It puts pressure on the dam wall. If there is an accident, it makes a bigger mess.

That is going to be a theme that we’ll take forward with the code review. I’m sure that through the best available technologies and best practices, we will find a way for there to be less water on the sites that have a positive water balance.

I was advised that this mine, the Bralorne, is not actually operating yet. It still is not operating. I want the member to know that, in fact, they are increasing the height of their dam.

What we would want from improved regulations and standards in a case like this would be for the company to be able to operate without getting into a situation, on even a periodic basis, where they have to apply for emergency discharge. In this case, the Interior Health Authority made it clear that they could discharge into the local creek without any impact on human health at all. But it isn’t always that way.
[ Page 7353 ]

I think what we have to do is look at these kinds of outliers — like the Bralorne situation, like Mount Polley — and learn about why they are outliers, how it developed over the years that the risk factor increased, and put in place regulations, standards, policy, best practices that will prevent us from going there.

N. Macdonald: The ten million cubic metres of water was not only a danger to the structure itself; it was the cause of the damage, I think it’s fair to say. The release of 14 million cubic metres of tailings would have been less, in a more or less proportional way, to the reduction of water. There would be very little movement without the ten million cubic meters of water.

As soon as the water exited, the escape of tailings ceased. On page 75 of the report it highlights the absence of an adequate water balance or water treatment strategy. Why would the Ministry of Energy and Mines allow Mount Polley to operate with no water plan?

It seems that in areas where it is predictable that there are going to be these issues…. I think the ministry would know right away where these areas are and which mines would be affected. Why would there not be insistence on a water treatment strategy or a water balance that is not going to cause problems such as this?

[1720]

Hon. B. Bennett: It’s another question, like most of the questions…. No fault of the critic, but it’s a question in hindsight. The member has hypothesized about if the TSF hadn’t failed so dramatically because of the banana peel that was unknown to everybody. It could or would likely have failed because of overtopping or cracks or that the beaches weren’t in or that the dam wasn’t thick enough at the bottom or that the abutments weren’t there.

If you want to hypothesize about what-ifs, and I don’t usually like to, nobody knew about the problem, right? Nobody knew that the unstable layer was there. The regulator, the engineers, the company were all moving towards water treatment. They were all moving towards dealing, actually, with all of the issues that the panel pointed out.

I think the panel says this. Ironically, when the accident happened, there actually was a plan in place that would have addressed everything. Nobody knew that on August the 4th the banana peel would become slick and the dam would fail the way it did.

I think it’s fair to hypothesize that if that accident hadn’t happened, in fact the company, the engineers, the regulator would have worked together to put in place water treatment, additional water discharge so that they changed the water balance there, and you would have had much, much less water in the TSF.

In hindsight, they didn’t move quickly enough, but that’s in hindsight. Nobody knew that there was this problem. It goes again….

I hope this isn’t a dead horse that I’m beating. I think it’s important. It goes again to the overall sort of learning from this episode that I take, which is that we have to look at the factor of safety, and we have to increase it. We have to look at the risk, especially the risk of things that you haven’t accounted for, the unknown unknowns, and you have to decrease that risk through different kinds of approaches and policies.

N. Macdonald: I think the minister is on the right track. I mean, we could quibble about…. I think it’s pretty clear in the report. It says that there are many things that could have caused the same result.

But the fact is that if the minister is moving in the direction of building to accommodate some unseen risk, then that’s a movement in the right direction, which is what the minister is saying, right? You have to anticipate that there are things in there that you don’t know about. But that does mean that you have to have more….

Interjection.

N. Macdonald: The minister is saying he didn’t say that. Am I accurate in saying that, Minister?

Hon. B. Bennett: Yeah.

N. Macdonald: So there is a need, then, for some pretty substantial change.

In February 2011, KP, the engineer of record for Mount Polley, sent a letter to Mount Polley, cc’ing the Ministry of Energy and Mines. It drew attention, to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, that it was no longer the engineer of record at Mount Polley, and it said: “The embankments and the overall tailings impoundment are getting large, and it is extremely important that they be monitored, constructed and operated properly to prevent problems in the future.”

In an August 8, 2014, release, KP says: “The original work they did was built to accommodate a significantly lower water volume.”

I guess the question I have to the original letter is: what formal response did the Ministry of Energy and Mines have to this 2011 warning from the engineer of record of a tailings facility that held tens of millions of cubic metres of liquefied mine tailings and water deemed unsafe to release into the environment?

[1725]

Hon. B. Bennett: To the best of my recollection, and I remember when that letter came to light, my advice at the time was that when an engineer of record on a big mine site like that is about to change, the outgoing engineer of record would, as a matter of practice, send a letter to the company, cc it to the chief mines inspector and point out all of the things you should focus on as the new engineer
[ Page 7354 ]
of record, and: “By the way, Chief Mines Inspector, this is what we think.”

There’s a CYA component to that in terms of legal liability. I’m not blaming the engineering company. I’m sure any company going out after having the responsibility for an operation like that and turning it over to a different engineering firm…. You would want to make sure that you’ve done your best to effect a very smooth and safe transition. That’s the nature of the letter.

I would suggest to you that the mine’s staff would have already been aware of everything that was in the letter. I remember, actually, asking the chief mines inspector at the time: “Do you get letters like that on a regular basis, when engineers of record change?” The answer was: “Yes. That’s a very standard letter that these companies will send when they’re being changed out.”

The ministry staff would have been aware. They were there on a regular basis. There were ministry officials around that mine site on a regular basis.

You don’t want to get misled by how many geotechnical engineers there were in any given year and how many of these annual inspections took place, because staff from the ministry are actually on these mine sites for many other reasons, health and safety being some of them, and those staff have very broad duties and go out and walk around. They’re aware of how high the dam is getting and how much water is in it, etc.

Certainly, the staff would have been aware. If there was anything in the letter that they didn’t know, they would have followed up on it and investigated it. I’m not aware that there was any reason to do that.

N. Macdonald: Gerald MacBurney, a foreman who worked on the Mount Polley tailings pond, says he had “warned of a disaster in the making for two years” prior to the Mount Polley failure.” He said that “management kept building the dam higher but ignored his requests to shore up the dam with enough rock to make it safe.”

Now, when he said he warned, I don’t know who he warned. But was the ministry at any time aware that these workers had these concerns which are, of course, both related to environmental as well as worker safety?

The second part of it is, I guess, broader. Is there a way that the Ministry of Energy and Mines would ever know if workers had concerns at any site? Is there a formal way of them coming through the union? The minister has talked about relationships and conversations. Is there a formal or informal way that that information could come through to the ministry that’s responsible as the regulator?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m not aware that the plural fits in this circumstance, as I am aware of this one man, who, I believe — I could be wrong — may have been let go at the mine.

N. Macdonald: Yeah, he won the lottery.

Hon. B. Bennett: Oh, he’s the guy that won the lottery?

N. Macdonald: He won the lottery. He left.

Hon. B. Bennett: Okay. Well then, I was wrong about that. I guess he’s then…. If he won the lottery…. I met him a couple of times in Likely.

There was — there is — a lot of opportunity for workers at a mine site to both advise the company and the inspectors. There’s a committee of ministry, union and company representatives — health and safety committee — at every single mine site, so there are ministry people, as I said earlier, coming and going on the mine site on a very regular basis. It would be quite easy for somebody to have pulled somebody aside and told them what their concern was.

[1730]

Again, if that happened, the ministry person would report it to the appropriate authority within the ministry. The ministry would go check the situation out and would….

If the engineer of record said, “It’s not dangerous; it is built according to its design; it is not too steep; there is not too much water in it; the beach situation is okay, as is the abutment situation, based on what we know of the foundation,” there wouldn’t be a reason for the ministry to suddenly take them to court or shut them down because, again, they’re relying on the engineer of record.

I think there is a way for employees to make complaints to the ministry. I think it’s not that hard to do. I think there’s a way for employees of the mine to state opinions, but I think that you shouldn’t….

I don’t know that you’re suggesting this, but the reaction of the ministry should not be to suddenly issue an order or close the mining operation down because there is somebody who has an opinion that something is dangerous. The reaction of the ministry should be: “Well, there’s somebody who worked in the ministry, and we’d better go back and check and make sure that what he is concerned about is not actually a concern.”

I can’t tell you that he actually spoke to the ministry, so I don’t really know whether that ever happened. Again, we’re on hypotheticals, but I’m confident that if people in my ministry knew there was that kind of serious concern, they would have taken a good look at it.

N. Macdonald: We had talked about question period earlier, and of course we had to do questions when we came back, but there’s no way you can have a discussion on any of this in a sensible way, I don’t think, in question period. Maybe that’s true of more than just this issue.

[P. Pimm in the chair.]

I just want to revisit one of the questions and give the minister an opportunity to answer it. There are still, I think, another 100 documents that we’ve yet to see, but
[ Page 7355 ]
in the documents that were released, there’s the conversation that we highlighted back in that question period.

On May 28, 2014, Andrew Witte, an engineer with AMEC, wrote to his colleague, Dmitri Ostritchenko, and this is what he said:

“If they are not removing water, then they are operating in direct contravention of the EPP that the ministry expects. That’s a dangerous game to play, and we need to make sure that our ass is covered by telling them to pump water out of the tailings storage facility. We cannot blankly support the ‘just keep operating in the danger zone’ attitude. Remember, if they lose the dam, then they can’t operate the mine anyways.”

Now, as the minister pointed out in question period, that was not an exchange between the ministry and the engineers. It was within the group of engineers. And I guess the question is: is there any mechanism that the ministry would learn about the concerns, learn about the nature of this sort of exchange? I mean, you’re not getting their e-mails, but what’s the trigger or the obligation or the opportunity for the ministry to be aware of that sort of attitude being expressed by engineers?

I mean, when you read it, I think anybody in the public would say: “Wow, that’s what’s going on? You have people taking those risks, rolling the dice, and especially when they ultimately fail in such a spectacular way.” I guess the question is: how do you know? What’s the mechanism for knowing that that’s going on?

[1735]

Hon. B. Bennett: We did not know about the communications between the two engineers. That’s my advice — that we had no idea that this exchange of opinion was taking place.

I said earlier that the Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of B.C. are doing their own work in terms of examining the role of the engineers in this situation, and they will be making recommendations, I think, that could involve legislative change. Certainly, they’ll be making some recommendations that are going to change best practices for that industry.

If MEM had known that engineers had that concern, there would have been immediate investigation and immediate action taken by the ministry. I’ve talked a lot today about the extent to which the regulator has to rely on the expertise of the engineer of record. The regulator also relies on the professional integrity of the engineer of record.

I don’t know whether there’s an issue of integrity. The investigation that’s taking place, I guess, will probably sort that out. But certainly, if an engineer had a concern such as the ones that were expressed in that e-mail…. It’s extremely shocking and disappointing that that opinion was not shared with the regulator. There will be, I’m sure, more to come on that issue.

N. Macdonald: We’re coming to the end of my time pretty soon. There are just a couple of issues that I want to touch on that are separate from this.

I guess one is not quite separate from this. It’s just with Red Chris. Are there any plans to do anything different with the tailings storage facility there? I’ve had letters, as I think the minister has, with a number of suggestions as to what could be done differently or what needs to be done differently. Just, with a very quick answer, is there any suggestion that something different would be done at Red Chris based upon the experience at Mount Polley?

Hon. B. Bennett: Red Chris and the oversight of the development of that mine at the very, very late stages, after Mount Polley, was different. The company, to its credit, took it upon itself to pay for the hiring of some environmental expertise that worked for the Tahltan, as opposed to working for the company. That environmental expertise got involved in an assessment of the tailings storage facility and reported back — I think that report is public — to both the company and to the Tahltan Central Council about their findings. The company has responded and is working away on addressing any concerns that were raised.

There is an independent engineering panel that oversees the engineer of record at Red Chris. It’s not unique. It’s the new approach that we’ve ordered, but they were already doing it in that case.

You also have — and you wanted a short answer, but I think it’s important — a fairly different physical situation in terms of the TSF. You’ve got two very high contours on either side of this long, narrow TSF that will never require a dam, will never require a piezometer, aren’t going anywhere — bedrock.

[1740]

It’s a valley, so it runs downhill, like all valleys. You’ll have a steeper dam at the one end and a very small dam at the other end. Completely different circumstances with a different additional level of oversight, to the point where the Tahltan Central Council has approved of the design of the TSF and supports the mine doing its interim operations at this point.

N. Macdonald: To jump around, part of my experience from Sullivan was there was a recommendation on toughening up regulations or penalties for regulations. It just came out of the fact that there were two code violations, albeit fairly minor, and they probably didn’t have serious implications for what took place.

This goes way back to 2006, Sullivan. It’s just that there was a recommendation, but it never went anywhere. As my job as critic…. I don’t know if we’ll sit in the fall, but I guess what I would ask for from the minister is a briefing from staff on where you continue to go as you work on new rules, code changes, the various elements that you’re working on to make the changes that this report points to. That’s one thing I would ask. You don’t have to answer it right away. If you could make a commitment in that case.
[ Page 7356 ]

I just want to come to Greenhills. There were three separate incidents causing a total of eight injuries. I have really no idea whether these were in the same facilities or anything else. I don’t need a full report on it now. I guess there is still an investigation going on. Some sort of a time frame.

Then in terms of the other accidents, as you can characterize it, are they actually related in any way? Are we talking about completely different buildings? Do you see a pattern of problems? And is there a place where, as critic, I could get information on that sort of an issue?

Hon. B. Bennett: Very quickly, on the Sullivan disaster, a truly heart-wrenching disaster…. Four people died — just unbelievable circumstances. I was minister then. I jumped on an airplane and flew up there. It was an unprecedented cause of death, from what I can tell. The only thing similar that I’ve heard of is when somebody died at the coast when they went into a tanker and they got into an oxygen-depleted circumstance.

There was no gas, nothing poisonous. It was an oxygen-depleted atmosphere. It was such that those victims immediately…. As soon as the first guy knelt down to check the water, he passed out. Somebody with an oxygen mask could have pulled him out easily, and he would have been okay.

This happened subsequently. It happened four times. I actually believe there was a tremendous amount learned from that. I remember that former chief inspector Fred Hermann investigated that accident, and I’d be happy to commit to getting you information on that and what was learned and what has changed since then.

Greenhills has had…. You said three. I can certainly remember two of them. They’re two completely separate buildings, facilities. One of them is still being investigated. What I think we can do is provide the information to you that we’re able to legally provide. On the other incidents, for the one that’s being investigated now, you have to wait until the investigation is done before the chief mines inspector could report out on that.

N. Macdonald: I think the point on Sullivan was simply that with the recommendations, it didn’t feel like anything came from it. As critic, I have the opportunity to watch more carefully as we go through Mount Polley. When I was talking about the briefing in the fall…. Not on Sullivan, because actually there were enclosed-space changes that were made, but there weren’t changes on the penalties for things. It was just used as an example of…. I want to follow up to make sure that there’s progress.

[1745]

In terms of Mount Polley, I guess I’d just look for briefings — and I don’t think the minister would have a problem with that — in perhaps the early fall as to where we are now with the changes that are coming after Mount Polley.

With Copper Mountain, there was a spill; with Greenhills, the accident. Just a suggestion to the minister. One of the things CP does with me, both when I was mayor and as the MLA, is that a staff member, when there is an incident, phones up right away, not to say anything more than: “This has happened, and you should be aware.” I don’t know if there’s some way of doing that, but that is something that I think would pay off for the ministry as well as, obviously, for the critic trying to do their work.

The only other question I have before I think we wrap it up is just on Swansea — the two deaths that took place at Swansea. At what point is that investigation going to be completed?

Hon. B. Bennett: I’m advised that the investigation will take “a number of months,” and then it will go to Crown counsel, and they will determine whether charges can be laid.

I would like to thank my critic and say that my ministry got a 40 percent budget lift, that we have six mines operating that weren’t operating in 2011, that we have 21 percent of the exploration investment in the country here in this province, that mining is a great success story for the province. It’s a great employer of people around the province, including in the member’s riding. I understand why we didn’t talk about all that stuff.

Mount Polley is very, very important, and I get that. But I am proud to be the minister responsible for mining, and I think, generally speaking, it is a good industry and an important industry in the province.

Noting the time, hon. Chair, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The committee rose at 5:47 p.m.

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