Hansard — Thursday, October 18, 2007 a.m.

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY


CONTENTS

	Routine Proceedings
		Page


Introductions by Members		8617

Committee of the Whole House		8617
	Adult Guardianship and Planning Statutes Amendment Act, 2007 (Bill 29)
	L. Krog
	Hon. W. Oppal
	C. Trevena

Hon. J. van Dongen: I'm very pleased to introduce to the Legislature today, visiting us from Scotland, the Hon. Jim Mather, Minister for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism. With him are Martin Cronin, the consul general for the United Kingdom in Vancouver; Shauna Cranney, the secretary to the minister; Lorna Jack of Scottish Development International; and Stuart McLean, from the British embassy in Washington.

We had a great meeting this morning. They also met with the Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources and had a number of other meetings. I ask the House to please make them very welcome to British Columbia.

Hon. C. Richmond: I call committee on Bill 29, Adult Guardianship and Planning Statutes Amendment Act, 2007.

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 29; H. Bloy in the chair.

L. Krog: Dealing with section 1. I appreciate that because of the way the bill is drafted, this is somewhat complex.

Firstly, I want to thank the minister's staff for briefing me this morning on a couple of proposed amendments. I appreciate the heads-up, and I'm wondering if the minister would like to introduce them.

The Chair: Would the Attorney General like to introduce them now or when we get to them?

Hon. W. Oppal: Hon. Chair, I think it would be more appropriate when we get to that stage — it's section 45. We'll wait until we get there.

L. Krog: Section 1 of the Adult Guardianship Act as amended — and I'm referring to page 1 of the bill — talks about repealing the definition of "abuse" and substituting the following: "(b) damage or loss in respect of the adult's financial affairs." Damage or loss provides, it seems to me, quite a range of possibilities.

Damage arguably is a dollar, although de minimis non curat lex might apply. Or it could be $100,000. I'm just wondering if there are any court decisions the Attorney General is aware of that provide some guidance with respect to how our courts may interpret these particular words, unless the definition is further defined.

Hon. W. Oppal: There is no judicial authority on that issue. These are words in the old act, and they've been updated. That's basically what it is here.

L. Krog: Well, perhaps the Attorney could outline, in the sense…. Updated in what respect?

Hon. W. Oppal: They've been changed, in respect to adults' financial affairs, to "adult's financial affairs."

L. Krog: Over on page 2 in the definition section, it talks about "damage to or loss of assets" and "damage or loss in respect of the adult's financial affairs." Again, I'm wondering if there are any judicial interpretations in other jurisdictions that have provided some guidance with respect to this particular wording and, if not, what the Attorney General considers that phrase to mean.

Again, it seems to me we could be dealing with incredible trivialities or something quite significant. So when we talk about "damage or loss in respect of the adult's financial affairs," perhaps the Attorney General could provide some guidance as to what that actually is going to mean or whether it's been interpreted.

Hon. W. Oppal: There's no judicial authority that would assist us here. This change is there in order to put a more liberal interpretation on the words "financial affairs." That's simply the purpose of this wording.

L. Krog: I think the Attorney General is being quite witty this morning when he referred to a liberal interpretation, and I give him full credit for his wit so early in the morning.

Perhaps the real import of my question is…. When the Attorney General talks about liberal and damage or loss, again, what I'm driving at is…. The way I read this, in my own simple way, is that we could be talking about a very small amount of money, if you will, or we could be talking about a large amount. I'm just wondering: is there any intention, through regulation or some other means, to try to define what that might mean so that courts could be given guidance — as opposed to a bunch of poor plaintiffs around the province having to appear in front of judges and trying to determine what this section is going to mean?

Hon. W. Oppal: There is no intention here to restrict anyone's remedies as far as any subsequent legal action is concerned. As the words state: "'financial affairs'

includes an adult's business and property, and the conduct of the adult's legal affairs." It may well be that there'll be other facts and circumstances which would fall within the ambit of the words "financial affairs."

It's meant to offer a wide scope. Financial affairs may well involve things other than business or property, which are the words that are there right now.

L. Krog: The definition of neglect that we've just been dealing with strikes out "damage to or loss of assets," and substitutes "damage or loss in respect of the adult's financial affairs." We then go on to talk about self-neglect. It will be striking out "mental harm or substantial damage to or loss of assets," and substituting "mental harm or substantial damage or loss in respect of the adult's financial affairs."

I'm wondering what the reasoning is for the difference, if you will. In one we talk about damage or loss, and in the other section we talk about mental harm or substantial damage or loss. So it seems to me that what is being proposed is that the courts are going to say that if someone takes the dollar from you, it falls within the statute. But if you're doing it to yourself…. If you're wandering down the street handing out hundred-dollar bills, that may be substantial, but if you're handing out a loonie to every beggar on the street because you're a soft-hearted person in the early stages of dementia, that in fact, won't constitute self-neglect.

Hon. W. Oppal: Nothing has changed as far as the law is concerned. The words are meant to convey a more liberal, as I said earlier, approach to the term "financial affairs." It includes not only the business and property of an adult and the conduct of legal affairs, but it's meant to convey a wider approach. It may take into other things, but it doesn't change the import of the law. I should say the definitions are carried over from the old section — the old act.

L. Krog: I appreciate that, and the definitions are carried over. But again, I'm simply asking: why do we talk about damage? When it's neglect, we talk about damage or loss in respect to the adult's financial affairs, and when it comes to self-neglect, there is a different test, if you will. It talks about "substantial damage or loss."

Hon. W. Oppal: This is a carryover from the old act that was enacted in 1993. I'm really at a loss to enlighten the member as to why that was done in 1993. It's simply a carryover from that. The words themselves have been changed, but the meaning is still the same. That's all I can say.

L. Krog: I appreciate, how shall I say, his comments, but I'm almost hurt. I was looking for some advice from him in this matter, and some fairly liberal advice — if I may use his language from earlier this morning.

It seems to me that this is a distinction of some importance because what we're really saying is — and if the Attorney General would agree, I'm satisfied to move on — if it's self-neglect, it has to be substantial. But if it's abuse, if you will, by someone else, arguably, then it doesn't have to be substantial. I mean, the bill is before the House, and I'm just wondering: what's the intent behind that? What's the rationale for the different standard?

Hon. W. Oppal: The effect of the amendment is simply to change the definition, but I'm unable to enlighten the member as to why this was done in 1993, and the wording is carried over. I can't tell the member why the issues relating to neglect and self-neglect are different.

L. Krog: With respect to the definition of advance directive, it talks about having the same meaning as the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. I'm just wondering: why just take the same definition and use it? If this is a reform, why aren't we perhaps expanding the definition of advance directive?

The reason I raise that is this. There are many people who will not come into contact with persons who are in a position to draft such a document for them or provide a precedent for them, but may in fact have some very sincere beliefs around what they wish to see done in the end of days, if you will.

I'm just wondering if there is any intention to recognize, either through regulation or otherwise, perhaps a home-drawn document — not that I wish to encourage people to become their own lawyers or health care advisers.

I'm competent, but I've been diagnosed with cancer, so I draft something at home. It's fairly clear, obviously, but it may not constitute an advance directive within the meaning of the act. I'm just wondering if there's any way that will be recognized through regulation or otherwise.

Hon. W. Oppal: This really is done so as to achieve some type of consistency between this act and the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. It's there for consistency purposes. That's the reason.

L. Krog: Again, on page 2 in subsection (k) the "code of practice" referred to means "a published code of practice approved by the minister that establishes standards or sets guidelines respecting the exercise of powers or the performance of duties by a guardian."

Is there any draft or any proposal as to what that code of practice will look like? If the Attorney General could enlighten the House this morning along those lines.

Hon. W. Oppal: The code will have to be approved by the minister. The code would not be mandatory, although the failure to comply with it could be considered in a judicial review.

L. Krog: I'm wondering if the Attorney General could advise what the code would look like and what things are considered in terms of that code. We're going

to approve a bill this morning that allows a code of practice to be established, obviously. I simply want to know what is contemplated in terms of that code, in terms of its actual substance.

Hon. W. Oppal: It will be based on best practices as established by the Public Guardian and Trustee, and we will consult with stakeholders.

L. Krog: I'm sorry. I didn't catch the last remark. Consulting with the Public Guardian and Trustee and…?

L. Krog: The definition under (k) also includes "health care provider," which means "a person who is licensed, certified or registered under a prescribed Act to provide health care."

I'm just wondering what constitutes a prescribed act as opposed to a "qualified health care provider," which is further defined.

Hon. W. Oppal: It could be any act. It could be the act governing nurses. It could be the act governing medical practitioners. It could be an act governing other health care providers. It could be any number of acts that govern people who are providing health care.

L. Krog: So I take it that it will be whatever the executive council, in its wisdom, decides by way of regulation pursuant to this statute. Am I correct in that?

L. Krog: With respect to the definition of a qualified health care provider, it means "a medical practitioner or a member of a prescribed class of health care providers." I'm just wondering what the difference is between a health care provider, who is a person "licensed, certified or registered under a prescribed Act," and a qualified health care provider, meaning "a medical practitioner" — which is obviously a doctor — "or a member of a prescribed class of health care providers." Why the necessity for the different definitions?

Hon. W. Oppal: The qualified health care provider, by definition, means that the legislation would be wider than "a medical practitioner" — could be someone other than a medical practitioner.

L. Krog: I'm just wondering if the Attorney General could provide examples. Are we talking about naturopaths, chiropractors? What are we actually talking about?

Hon. W. Oppal: This will be decided in consultation with medical practitioners as to who fits within the definition of qualified health care provider.

L. Krog: The answer of the Attorney General does give me great pause for concern. Presently under the Patients Property Act, in order to have a committee appointed, one requires the opinions of two qualified medical practitioners — two doctors, two physicians, members of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

If I'm understanding what the Attorney General has just told me — that the assessments that are contemplated further on in the statute that are required in order to have an order appointing a guardian made by a court — those assessments could in fact then be made by persons other than doctors.

If that is the case, I do have some concerns, and I'd appreciate the Attorney General's comments on that.

Hon. W. Oppal: The present situation is that this decision can only be made by a doctor. But this section contemplates a wider scope so as to expand the definition and expand the persons who make that designation in the future. It allows for that to be done in the future — only if warranted.

L. Krog: I appreciate that your government, through this bill, may be contemplating a wider circle of people. But if passed, what this means is that in theory, any person who meets the definition of a qualified health care provider, which can be a prescribed class of health care providers — in theory, a chiropractor or a naturopath or an RN….

That's the way I read it, I need some reassurance from the Attorney General that, in fact, we're not going to have people whose ability to manage their own affairs is going to be taken away by someone who, with great respect, may certainly have a significant amount of training in their particular field but may not, in fact, be qualified to make decisions about a person's ability to manage their own affairs.

Hon. W. Oppal: The present situation is that only a medical practitioner can give that type of expert opinion or lend that type of expertise. What this definition section does is contemplate something in the future wherein by regulation, on the advice of medical practitioners, the definition may be expanded to include other health care professionals who are qualified to make that kind of assessment. That may not include a naturopath or anything of the sort that the member suggested.

L. Krog: That's my concern to the Attorney General. As someone who appreciates that perhaps we have overused physicians in circumstances where it's not necessary to do so, and arguably driven up the attendant cost to the health care system, I do have concerns that when a person's liberty, if you will, is being taken away from them, that it's going to potentially be taken away on the recommendations or the assessments of parties other than qualified physicians.

It's one thing to have a psychiatrist tell you you've got Alzheimer's and you're no longer qualified to manage your affairs. But what the government is asking the Legislature to do through this bill — the way it's worded, and based on what the Attorney General has

told me this morning — is essentially give cabinet, through regulation, the ability to decide who is a qualified health care provider, because it's a prescribed class of health care providers.

I'm not suggesting the government would do anything stupid, but in terms of the ability of the public through this House to comment on who those persons are going to be when you are dealing with a statute that has such significant repercussions for an individual, their property, the ability to manage their affairs, it just seems to me that it would be more appropriate for the government to provide at least a list of who they anticipated those persons would be.

I can understand that if you're living in a remote community in this province and were only going to have one physician readily available to provide an assessment and maybe you've got a registered nurse with significant experience dealing with geriatric patients, then that's perhaps something the public would find acceptable.

But the way the act is worded now, in theory, this qualified health care provider…. Both assessments could come from nurses or — and I appreciate the Attorney General doesn't contemplate doing this — naturopaths. It's literally anybody who meets the standard that is going to be set by cabinet without any ability for that to come back before this House before it's approved.

This is a concern I've been raising for the last two and a half years in this House. We pass statutes, and it's basically saying: "Trust me."

Cabinet's going to make a decision by way of regulation. It's never going to get back here for open, public debate: "We promise we'll consult with stakeholders. We'll do the right thing. Trust us."

With the greatest respect to the Attorney General and to the executive council, if the shoe were on the other foot, and I was sitting over in the Attorney General's shoes today, I think the opposition would be screaming bloody murder, saying: "How dare you say 'just trust us?'"

We're perfectly capable of making the right decision. You're going to give us a blank cheque here this morning, thank you very much, and away we go.

My point to the Attorney General around this particular section is: if we are going to allow individuals other than doctors to provide the assessments that will essentially see a person lose their ability to make decisions about their own health care, lose the ability to make decisions about where they're going to live and — having looked through the rest of the statute — indeed, allow a guardian, once appointed, to physically move and restrain them, even…. I mean, enormous powers over the person, far more defined than has existed in the past.

It just seems to me that it might be appropriate to limit the class of people who get to make those kinds of assessments on which the courts are obviously going to — and have historically — place enormous reliance when making these decisions. Indeed, the court has to find that the opinions of two doctors are valid and appropriate.

It just seems to me that when you're allowing that to happen, it would be a great deal more comforting to the average member of the public to think that someone other than the naturopath and the registered nurse at the local health care clinic in my remote community is going to be able to say: "You know what? George" — or Sam or Sally or whatever — "is going to lose the ability to manage his affairs and his health and his person for potentially the rest of his days based on those two assessments."

I'd like to hear the Attorney General explain to me this morning why the opposition should support allowing the assessments of only two qualified health care providers, who may or may not be physicians, to make that kind of assessment.

Hon. W. Oppal: I fully understand the concern of the member opposite to ensure that decisions of this import are not made capriciously and by people who lack qualifications.

However, this definition section is put there in order to give some flexibility and some ambit to the section in the future. Any further definition of "a member of a prescribed class of health care providers" would have to meet a strict test. That would have to be done in consultation with the public trustee, with health care professionals and with stakeholders. These decisions will not be made capriciously.

You have to understand. We fully understand the significance of this act. We fully understand the concerns that were raised by the stakeholders, and as the member well knows, there was a fair amount of consultation with them. We're well aware of their concerns, and we're well aware to guard against decisions that are made without any kind of evidentiary basis, without any kind of sound medical basis. We're well aware of that.

Based on that, I can assure the member that when a further definition will be made as to who fits into the prescribed class of health care providers, that decision will not be made lightly. It will be made after extensive consultation with health care professionals, the public trustee and people of that ilk.

L. Krog: The section as proposed would read that: "Until the contrary is demonstrated, every adult is presumed to be capable of making decisions about the adult's personal care, health care and financial affairs." I'm just wondering what the purpose of this presumption is. That's what I'd like the Attorney General to explain.

Hon. W. Oppal: There is no substantive change made here as to the presumption of capacity since the act was passed in 1993. So the 1993 act that sets out the presumption…. That definition remains in effect today.

L. Krog: Section 4 is considerable, so I'm going to make very specific reference to the individual sections so we can make sure we're all on the same page.

On page 3 in the proposed section 4(1) it talks about: "A person may apply to the court for an order directing an adult to submit to an assessment of incapability if (a) the person has reason to believe that the adult is incapable of making decisions about that adult's personal care or health care, or of managing that adult's financial affairs."

That's a fairly broad opening — "has reason to believe" — and I would be concerned about the possibility of individuals wishing to take steps to obtain an appointment as personal guardian under the act or as property guardian for perhaps some improper motives.

It seems to me that if the section said, "If a person had reasonable and probable grounds or had some evidence…." But this just talks about saying the person has reason. I mean, if you catch a person who may be in the early stages of dementia but is quite capable in a very bad day, you arguably could have reason or have some evidence, but it's not really sufficient grounds to warrant the application.

I'm just wondering if perhaps it would be better to consider a somewhat more substantive test at that stage — in other words, some direction to the individual who may have legitimate concerns, let alone the individual who may, in fact, have some illegitimate motivation for pursuing this.

Hon. W. Oppal: I understand the concern expressed by the member opposite, but I'm sure that as a member of the bar, he's well aware of the current practice under the Patients Property Act. This really is based on the current practice as well as the provisions of part 2 of the 1993 act, which was unproclaimed.

This allows a court to order an adult to undergo an incapability assessment, but it should be remembered that the rights of an adult are safeguarded by the requirement for a court order. Procedural fairness will obviously be a part of any order that's made by a court, because it would presumably be based on a proper evidentiary basis.

I would expect that this section would be rarely used. This is an assessment-only section, and it doesn't make a person subject to guardianship.

The Chair: Member, will we go through section by section of this part? It goes on for a number of pages.

L. Krog: We can use that language in reference to it, if it makes it easier for Hansard and everyone else. Certainly, hon. Chair.

Again on section 4, on page 3 and over into page 4, I appreciate that it has to do with just getting an assessment done, but I'm just wondering about the issue of cost. The fact is that unless you have a system of full indemnification from someone who may be improperly motivated, the fact is that there won't be any sanction, if you will, against them.

I could be wrong, but I don't think there's anything in the act or, indeed, there is any regulation contemplated with respect to the act that might allow a person whose motives were illegitimate, if you will, to be punished if they brought on such an application for an assessment when, in fact, there wasn't good reason to do so.

Hon. W. Oppal: The point raised is a good one. That is, what do you do if an assessment application is brought on without any basis? While there is no provision in the act for costs, the fact is the Supreme Court has an inherent power, an inherent jurisdiction, to make an order for costs where an assessment application is ill-considered or has no basis.

L. Krog: I appreciate that that's the case, but I'm just wondering if any consideration was given to putting in a specific provision in relationship to the court's powers with respect to costs that was quite instructive. Courts obviously enjoy general jurisdiction, but judges prefer, in my experience, to have direction from the Legislature, if possible, rather than create law, if you will, by way of interpretation.

Hon. W. Oppal: The member opposite may take comfort in section 62.3, which states: "For any matter for which an application may be made under Part 2 or 2.1, or section 62.2 (2), the court may order that the costs of the application be paid from the property of the adult who is the subject of the application."

L. Krog: I'm sorry, hon. Chair, I didn't have a chance, because of the numbering, to flip to the correct section. That talks about coming out of the adult's property. My concern is the person who doesn't have good reason to do it, who gets to run up an expense for the proposed patient — if you will, to use the present language — when in fact it's not really legitimate to do so. The patient is stuck with the costs of having to defend themselves.

Hon. W. Oppal: I resort to what I said earlier about the court's inherent jurisdiction to make an order for costs where an application for assessment is ill-considered or there is no basis for it. I would also point out to the member that the court itself has a rule-making authority, and the Supreme Court amends its rules on a regular basis so as to make rules regarding the assessment of costs. So the court could do that on its own.

L. Krog: Section 4, part 5. If that language works for everybody, I think we'll try and carry on with that.

Section 4, part 5 is the new section allowing for the appointment of a personal guardian, property guardian or both. Again, this talks about the prescribed form by a qualified health care provider who assessed the adult using prescribed assessment procedures and describing the extent to which the adult is incapable of making decisions, etc.; a plan for the adult's guardianship prepared in the prescribed form; a copy of any representation agreement, etc.

Very specifically, it talks about the extent to which the adult is incapable, and we're obviously talking about degrees. Under the existing statute, as practised in B.C. — in the Patients Property Act, in any event — you're incapable, or you're capable. It's black or white, left or right, Liberal or New Democrat. But you can't be both. There's no gradation in between.

What I'm getting at is, is there some contemplation of some scale here? What's the point of having it unless you are going to allow for different types of care and control? Is it proposed that the court may, in fact, give a proposed guardian some limited direction with respect to management of someone's affairs and say: "All right. George is sort of capable, so we can't sell his house, but he can manage his bank account"?

Hon. W. Oppal: This section really would allow for a limited-scope guardianship. The term that's been used here, which I adopt, is "needs-based" — depending on the particular circumstances of each person. The point raised is a good one. Black or white? It may not be black or white. It may be grey. So it's needs-based. It's the best way to describe it.

L. Krog: With respect to section 4, part 5, it talks about prescribed assessment procedures, prescribed forms — all of those things. Again, I raise the same point I did earlier. I appreciate that sometimes it's difficult to have everything ready to flow when a statute is passed, but given that this matter has been the subject of…. Well, I can safely say it was years in the making when introduced in '93, and now we are in 2007.

There has been a lot of consultation and a lot of discussion, and I'm just wondering: do we have any idea what the prescribed assessment procedures or forms will look like?

Quite candidly, as the critic for this area, it would be appreciated to know exactly what the government is contemplating, because I'm sure the government is contemplating something. I think it would provide great comfort to the public to know what the government is contemplating in terms of the forms and the assessment and what it's going to look like. Is there any reason why the Attorney General couldn't enlighten me this morning a little more as to what we're talking about in terms of a prescribed assessment procedure?

Again, we're talking about qualified health care providers. If it's a physician now, I know the doctors….

I think it's a standard 30-page questionnaire. I've attended with my late father-in-law and watched him go through it. You're given a name and a colour — something at the start of it. You go through it, and at the end of it they rate your score and say whether you're getting worse or better.

I'm just wondering. Is that procedure already contemplated? Has there been discussion with the appropriate stakeholders in the medical community with respect to what that assessment procedure will look like?

Hon. W. Oppal: I think I can answer that quickly by saying that there will be consultation with the medical community, with relevant stakeholders, with the public trustee.

L. Krog: I do note that the requirement under section 4, part 5, with respect to what must accompany the application, talks about a plan for the adult's guardianship, a copy of any representation, power of attorney, etc. In addition, the application "includes an application for a personal guardian, a copy of any advance directive…."

I'm just wondering: why not, if included, the person's will, if any? That often reflects who they place trust in. It often raises issues around, perhaps, the disposition of specific items or bequests or articles in a will, which may or may not be available if a property guardian is appointed and in fact disposes of or somehow deals with the assets in a different way.

I'm just wondering: why wasn't the will included? It is such an important document. It's a document generally, but not always, prepared with the assistance or advice of a lawyer or a notary and represents some clear contemplation of a person about who they think is an appropriate and trusted individual in their lives, who will, in fact, be the executor or manager of their affairs upon their death.

Hon. W. Oppal: This does not preclude the examination of the will. But clearly, this legislation deals with decisions that are made during a person's lifetime — the current decisions that are relevant to that person's financial and other well-being.

L. Krog: I appreciate that it doesn't preclude that, but it is also, I think, a matter of some importance, particularly when it comes to personal effects. I mean, having been involved in a number of these situations where, quite innocently perhaps, committees, whether it's the Public Guardian and Trustee or an individual, have in fact disposed of items that may have limited monetary but significant personal or family value….

It just strikes me that a will is one of those documents that if it's not required to be placed before the court, then the court is not going to be able to make direction with respect to the property guardianship's terms, because we are contemplating, as the Attorney General said in his own remarks earlier, a needs-based assessment, in a sense, or a needs-based appointment.

It just strikes me that that is certainly something the government may wish to consider when it comes to this matter coming before the executive council, as to

including a review of a person's will — if known, if any — because it is an important document. I appreciate that it does represent a disposition on death, but it will relate to assets that exist in this person's life and may, in fact, have some incredible significance.

Hon. W. Oppal: I think the best way to describe it is that these are minimal requirements and these are factors that a court would consider in making its determination. I think that's perhaps the best way that I can put it. The court may have recourse to the documents that are set out in the legislation in order to make its determination.

L. Krog: Again, on section 4, part 5. It talks about the persons who must be served with the material and includes the spouse in part 5(3)(b): "the adult's spouse, unless the adult's marriage or marriage-like relationship has ended, and adult children, if any."

It then goes on in (5) to say: "A marriage-like relationship ends for the purposes of this section when the parties to the marriage-like relationship stop cohabiting with each other with the intention of ending the relationship."

Given that we are talking about a situation where one individual, by the time this gets before a court and if the application is successful, is clearly incapable and may have been incapable for a long period of time.

The applicant who's applying to take over someone's affairs and manage them and is perhaps a child who's adverse in interest to dad's common-law wife — who had no intention of ceasing cohabitation but was perhaps driven out of the home by violence and is no longer cohabiting, wants to remain together. But arguably, the applicant to be appointed guardian takes the position that in fact, dad intended to no longer cohabit. "Therefore, I don't have to serve her, in the circumstances."

I'm just wondering: is the Attorney General satisfied that that section is clear enough that it would require a mutual, if you will, decision of both parties — a mutual intention, as opposed to a singular intention of a person who may in fact be incapable?

Hon. W. Oppal: I think the best way I can reply to that concern is that sub (3)(b) talks about "any other person that the court may direct." I think it would be like any other application now that's presently before the courts. When the court makes the inquiry with respect to all relevant persons being served, it will be incumbent upon the person who is making the application to prove to the court that all those persons who have a relevant stake or relevant part to play in whatever application may be before the courts has the onus of proving that those people have been served or have been notified.

L. Krog: I appreciate what the Attorney General is saying, but the point I'm trying to make is this. You may well have a party who is a long-term spouse who, as I've said, is driven from the home as a result of the increasing dementia or violence of a person who is going to be declared incapable, so to speak, and who is in fact incapable.

You may have the natural child, as I've said, anxious to get rid of stepmother off the scene. Let's face it. That's the person who's presumably going to go to some — we'll call them innocent — lawyer, and this innocent lawyer has no knowledge of the family except what his or her client tells them.

They'll say, "You know what? Well, I've got two siblings," or: "I'm the only child, and there's no one else to be served." "Is your father in a common-law relationship or a marriage-like relationship within the meaning of section 5, or does he have a spouse within the meaning of section 5(3)?" They'll honestly say, "No, he isn't," because that person takes the position.

I think the Attorney General understands my point. This may be something where the court will act based on the information available to it, but some person with what I will call illegitimate motives will be in a position to slide this application through, to ignore a common-law spouse who may have disappeared into a facility for battered women or whatever — just ignore them — when they may be a person whom the court would expect to hear from and want to hear from in all of the circumstances.

Hon. W. Oppal: I think the scenario that's been advanced by the speaker is an interesting one, but that doesn't differ from any situation that may now exist. What the member is really saying is: what do you do if someone perpetrates a fraud on the court? That's really what you're saying. What happens if someone commits a fraud by a material non-disclosure of something that ought to be disclosed to the court that isn't disclosed?

I'm not so sure that any kind of legislation can contemplate or can be put in place that would guard against unscrupulous acts of that sort that have been suggested by the member.

L. Krog: With respect to section 4 — we'll call it part 6 — on page 5, the mediation provision is a very interesting one. It provides that if there is a dispute about "(a) whether or not the adult who is the subject of the application needs a guardian, (b) who the proposed guardian should be, or (c) the adequacy of the plan for guardianship, a hearing under section 7" — and it's mandatory — "must not proceed unless mediation is conducted in accordance with the regulations, or unless the regulations permit otherwise."

"(2) The following must not be the subject of mediation under this section: (a) whether or not an adult is incapable; (b) the content of any written or oral comments submitted to the court by the Public Guardian and Trustee…; (c) any prescribed matter."

Again, that's a pretty big door, in my view, as to what's a prescribed matter. What is the act contemplating? And what sort of mediation are we talking about? Are we talking about a class of mediators who are recognized by the Law Society? For instance, are we talking about the mediators who do mediation for small claims trials now?

What exactly is contemplated by this? In other words, how is this going to look on the ground, and how is it going to work?

Hon. W. Oppal: The finite details as to who may qualify as a mediator and who would not qualify is something that still needs to be worked out.

The intent of the section is clear, and that is that applications must be referred to mediation if certain matters are in issue. That's really to prevent needless litigation from taking place, so that needless expenses aren't incurred by the parties.

The mediation procedures will be prescribed in the regulations. An appropriate model may be the family justice model, which contemplates a mediation. The necessity for mediation should be rarely used, I would think, because most guardianship applications are, as a rule, uncontested. At least, that's been my experience in the courts thus far.

The most common issue in these applications is who the guardian ought to be. That's been my experience, and I'm sure it's been the member's experience. Those are the issues that develop in applications of this sort.

L. Krog: In the same part it reads: "If a guardianship application is made…and there is a dispute…a hearing…must not proceed…." I'm just wondering: who determines that there must be mediation? Will it be done by way of a notice to mediate that is a requirement, or does the court get partway through the hearing and make the decision?

In other words, when you have a mandatory section that says it must not proceed, I want to know: what's the mechanism that stops it from proceeding, then? Is it the judge hearing the application, or is it a notice to mediate?

Hon. W. Oppal: Well, there are two ways of doing it. One is to put it in the rules by way of a notice to mediate. The second way of doing it is to have a judge order the same. I would think that the first alternative would be preferable to the second, and I say that as a cost-saving device.

L. Krog: I take it from the Attorney General's remarks that what's really contemplated here is that there won't be a restriction on it. Essentially, there are only going to be the two methods of doing it. The regulations themselves will be the guiding force in this.

In other words, we're not restricting a judge's ability to deal with an application, as a judge is entitled to do, having grand jurisdiction in all of this. But the regulation will allow for a prescribed mediation — I just want to understand this clearly — which would circumvent a judge.

In other words, if there's clearly a dispute before the application is heard and there's been a responding affidavit by one party who says, "You know what? I don't think my uncle is incapable," or whatever, then in theory, is it contemplated that the regulations will provide that if I serve a notice to mediate, that prevents it from getting to court? In other words, we can circumvent getting it in front of a judge and a judge having to consider it.

Hon. W. Oppal: The finite details have not been worked out, but I would suspect…. Well, it has to be mandatory mediation. Otherwise, we're running counter to the whole philosophical direction of where we're going as far as reform in the justice system is concerned.

We are, as the member well knows, moving towards a more solution-oriented, result-oriented system, wherein more mediation and more ADR are contemplated. I think that the message is clear from that, and that's the direction we're now taking.

L. Krog: In section 4, part 7, the persons who may attend a hearing of a guardianship application, it talks about "may attend" as opposed to "have to be" or "need to be given notice." It talks about "(d) any other person who files an appearance and whom the court agrees to hear."

I'm just trying to imagine who we are contemplating here — persons who may have some special relationship with the patient, so to speak, or family or interveners? Or is it just put in there to give us the widest possible jurisdiction?

Hon. W. Oppal: Obviously, this section is put there in the interests of justice so as to give the court or any other person hearing it the widest possible flexibility. There may be some person who may be affected by an order, and the interests of justice dictate that that person be heard and that person be there for the hearing of the application.

I think this is a good section. It guards against any kind of injustice wherein some person who may have a relevant stake and a relevant role to play in the proceedings may be excluded. This would guard against that type of misconduct and unfairness.

L. Krog: On section 4, part 8. This allows for the appointment of one or more guardians for an adult if the court is satisfied that "(a) the adult needs to make decisions respecting the adult's personal care, health care or financial affairs, (b) the adult is incapable…, (c) the adult needs, and will benefit from, the assistance and protection of a guardian, and (d) the needs of the adult would not be sufficiently met by alternative means of assistance."

I have been involved in a number of estate matters where there have been two executors or even more, and you get into estate matters that can become quite litigious when the parties can't agree. I'm just wondering. In the drafting of this, were other jurisdictions looked at, and is it the norm now that similar statutes allow for one or more, as opposed to simply one? If so, what's the rationale and what's the experience?

Hon. W. Oppal: This really is based primarily on the unproclaimed part 2 of the 1993 act. Again, it provides

flexibility for the decision-maker where one or more guardians are appropriate in the circumstances. It may be one of those cases where it's appropriate to have two. It gives the necessary flexibility to the court to make such an order where justice dictates that there be more than one.

L. Krog: In light of the provisions around the Representation Agreement Act, etc., I take it that we are talking about almost encouragement, if you will, of appointments of one person to act as property guardian and another person to act as personal guardian. Depending on the circumstances of the individual involved, if they're confined to a home in severe dementia, the management of property is a fairly simple affair, arguably, whereas the personal guardian may in fact have to spend a great deal of time making decisions around health care, medications, visiting, etc.

I just want to understand. Is that the hope and intent of this section as well — to encourage the appointment of two individuals, as opposed to combining them in one? A person who may make good financial decisions may not in fact be the most sympathetic person to make the right health care decisions.

Hon. W. Oppal: I'm not so sure that I can precisely answer all of the concerns raised by the member, but I can say this. This section is there to provide flexibility. It may be that it would be appropriate to have one person care for property needs, another one for financial needs.

It gives the decision-maker more flexibility so that the affairs can be managed in an effective manner. It may be that some person has the expertise to manage someone's real property in a particular way and another person may not have any knowledge of that. This section gives that type of flexibility in making the appropriate orders.

L. Krog: On section 4, part 9. That is the section that says: "If more than one guardian is appointed, the court may assign to each guardian (a) a different area of authority, or (b) all or part of the same authority."

It then talks about it in part (2). "If all or part of the same authority is assigned to more than one guardian, the guardians must act unanimously in exercising that authority unless the court (a) orders otherwise, or (b) appoints a guardian to act only as an alternate guardian and includes in the order…," etc.

It strikes me that if the court has granted the authority, potentially, to three persons or even four persons or five…. It's not likely to happen, but there is that potential under the legislation. And if the Attorney General agrees with my interpretation that it is possible to have two or more so that you perhaps have three, I'm just wondering: instead of a resort to the court and unanimity, does this section in fact preclude — and I believe it does — the simple possibility of a 2-to-1 vote?

Hon. W. Oppal: What's contemplated is that the act…. They make their decision unanimously. If they're not able to do that, then the court can order otherwise in order to meet the exigencies of the circumstances.

It just strikes me that the presumption is, arguably, going the wrong way. If I read this section correctly, I've got two guardians and they're both capable individuals. They've been appointed to be both personal guardians and property guardians, and they're both, within the common sense of the term, capable, trustworthy, honest and able to do it.

We'll call them Bob and Sally. Bob becomes ill and can't do it. Sally cannot continue to act, the way I read this section. Depending on the jurisdiction you're in, that may mean a substantial period of time before a court can make a different order.

I'm bringing to this an entirely rural perspective. You know, we don't necessarily have a judge in Nanaimo available every day and, certainly, in Campbell River or Pouce Coupe — I note I got the interest of one of the members of the House with that remark — or some other somewhat small and obscure community in the province.

It just strikes me that it should be the reverse. The presumption should be that the capable guardian can continue to act rather than everything coming to a full stop. And that's the way I read this section. Everything comes to a stop if you've got two or more guardians.

Hon. W. Oppal: I think the intent of the section is clear, and that is that where one person is unable to act, it guards against a remaining person acting precipitously to the detriment of others. However, it gives the court the jurisdiction to permit that person to proceed without the other.

It may well be that the person who's unable to act is unable to act by reason of permanent incapacity or some other physical concern that would prevent that person from acting. So this gives more flexibility so that appropriate orders can be made in those circumstances.

L. Krog: As much as I appreciate that it gives more flexibility, it also means that everything comes to a stop. Surely the whole point of having more than one party appointed is not just protection. I would have thought the logic behind it would be that if one guardian was unable, the interest of the patient would still be protected because they would have at least one capable guardian who could continue to make what might be an emergency medical decision or a significant financial decision in a collapsing market or anything of that nature.

One can contemplate — and I agree that it's not likely — a series of scenarios, the perfect storm. There's an immediate health care decision that has to be made, there is a significant financial decision that has to be made, and you're living in some rural community somewhere. You've got to find a lawyer, counsel, a judge available and get someone else appointed.

It just strikes me that that doesn't make a lot of sense. It would be far more sensible to have the remaining guardian in place able to make that decision and carry on acting until such time as the other guardian was capable again.

Hon. W. Oppal: The court can take that into consideration at the initial time of the making of the order. However, if an emergency situation arises, as one contemplated by the member, I find it difficult to accept that even in remote areas authority is not available.

We can now make orders by telephone. In fact, they're made by telephone. Warrants are obtained by telephone now. I would think that if there's something that requires immediate or urgent attention by the court, a simple telephone call to a court registry will address the issue.

I don't want to bore you with the details of my life. I recall being called out on weekends, often, for wiretap applications that had to be made. I spent lots of Saturdays and Sundays in courthouses when I was a member of the Supreme Court, making immediate orders for wiretap authorizations.

Those things are done immediately by a simple telephone. I understand the concern raised, though.

L. Krog: On section 4, part 10. It says — and it is mandatory — in subsection (2): "The court must not appoint the following persons as a guardian: (a) a person who has a conflict of interest with the adult." Then it goes on in subsection (3): "A person who, on the death of an adult, will be or might be a beneficiary of the adult's estate does not, for that reason, have a conflict of interest with the adult."

It strikes me that if you have an individual who is proposed as guardian of property, let alone personal guardian, and they are the beneficiary of the deceased's estate — the entire estate, for example, which might not be uncommon, as in the case of a parent and a child or a close relative or a friend or whatever — arguably, their financial interest is in ensuring that the patient's estate is as big as it can possibly be upon their death.

In other words, from a mental perspective, the beneficiary of the estate has a vested interest in ensuring the most sizeable possible estate, as opposed to expending the moneys during the patient's lifetime to provide a superlative level of care that might, if expended to provide that wonderful level of care and companionship, exhaust the resources of the patient. So they die, as the standard joke goes, owing everything on credit cards and having no assets — the ultimate joke.

I think the Attorney General gets my point around this. I would argue that the section, when it talks about that person…. When you say you can't appoint a person who has a conflict and then go on to say that a person who might be a beneficiary does not have a conflict of interest, you're telling the courts: "Look, even though this person is going to inherit the entire estate, they don't have a conflict."

Yet that person, who may be the son who didn't have the greatest relationship with the father or the mother and who's entirely self-interested, is going to work their darnedest to build up an estate at the expense of dear old mom or dad, who's sitting away in a home somewhere not getting the appropriate amount of care.

I'm just wondering if the Attorney General can comment on my point around that issue, because I think it is important.

Hon. W. Oppal: The court would consider all of those at the time of the making of the initial order. It may well be that the beneficiary who may be appointed is one person who could discharge his or her duties without any apparent conflict and, while they may be in a position of theoretical conflict, can discharge the duties without prejudice to the estate.

Keep in mind that section 21 sets out the fiduciary duties, a fiduciary relationship that exists in these circumstances.

This is an order that may be made where it would be in the interests of justice, and by that I mean the interest of the estate. It gives the court the necessary flexibility to appoint that person, notwithstanding that he or she may have an inherent conflict by virtue of the fact that he or she is a beneficiary.

In other words, they could discharge their duties in spite of the fact that they are a beneficiary.

L. Krog: Section 4, part 11, is the section allowing for the appointment of a temporary property guardian. In relation to that application, subsection (2) provides that an assessment of the adult's incapability by a qualified health care provider is not required.

We have a situation where there is arguably some kind of emergency that requires the protection of the individual, whether it's their health or their property, and this says that it's a direction, again, to the court. An assessment is not, in fact, required. Yet I can't imagine a circumstance where the application would be made or required unless there was some evidence that the proposed patient, if you will, was incapable of making a decision or managing their affairs.

I'm just wondering what the point is of not at least allowing for one assessment to be done. I mean, there must be some kind of evidence, obviously, that would encourage or inspire the Public Guardian and Trustee to bring on the application. I'm just wondering why the legislation doesn't require at least one assessment.

Hon. W. Oppal: These temporary property guardian appointment provisions under subsection (11) are obviously contemplated where there is an urgent need for the same. I can see where there is a case of a wasting

asset, a case of property being removed, or property disappearing or property being encumbered…. In those circumstances, the appointment of a temporary guardian may be necessary.

We obviously have considered the advice of the Public Guardian and Trustee, and his office advises that this section will rarely be used — only where active management is contemplated or required in the particular circumstances.

This is a good section because what it does is allow for a temporary emergent situation to be addressed before a permanent situation, a permanent position, is put in place.

L. Krog: Section 4, part 12, says that unless the court otherwise orders, all of the instruments are terminated, such as a power of attorney. I take it wisely that the intention of this section is to allow for the fact that a person may slip in or out of incapability and a temporary order may be made.

As I understand the section, then, if I have appointed someone my power of attorney, their termination…. If the court decides in the circumstances that it will continue, if I'm capable, again, then that appointment would in fact be revived. That's the way I understand that section. I just wanted to be clear on that.

Hon. W. Oppal: This really provides for flexibility where there already are agreements in place, and as the words say: "Unless the court orders otherwise, if a personal guardian is appointed for an adult, any provisions respecting personal care or health care within a representation agreement or an advance directive made by the adult are terminated."

But it goes on to state that upon the appointment of a property guardian, general powers of attorney…. Unless the court orders otherwise, enduring powers of attorney representation agreements terminate.

Now, there's a discretion on the part of the court that provides the necessary flexibility that may be appropriate to separate the responsibility with respect to different aspects of property and to respect an adult's preplanned wishes as much as possible. I think that's the best way I can answer that concern.

L. Krog: On section 4, part 14, the provision under "General Prohibitions" reads: "(1) A guardian must not make or change a will for the adult for whom the guardian is acting, and any will or change that is made for an adult by his or her guardian has no force or effect."

I'm interested to know, and I look to the Attorney General for guidance here…. I wasn't aware that anyone could change a person's will under any circumstances. I'm just wondering why this provision is included. As I understand it, the law has always been that only a capable adult person can, in fact, draw up a will in British Columbia.

Hon. W. Oppal: Well, I think this is the ultimate form of protection against any kind of abuse. It really confirms in statutory provisions that a guardian can't do that. We know that a guardian can't do that, but this puts in clear statutory language that that type of conduct…. A guardian taking the position of changing a will, will not be able to do that. We know that as a rule that can't be done, but this simply puts the prohibition in statutory form.

L. Krog: On section 4, part 16, on page 10. This is the section that outlines the powers of the personal guardian, and it says:

I certainly appreciate, having been involved with a number of individuals who were obviously incapable of managing their affairs, that it's very nice to have these powers. But these are a pretty dramatic description of the sort of authority that one would normally see granted to a state, to a police force.

One appreciates that we're dealing with people who have been declared incapable, and it's all intended to be in their best interests. But once the court has made the order — and that's what we're talking about — you could then move an individual to any place and decide where they live — any place. You could take them from Fort St. John and move them down to Vancouver for the convenience of the personal guardian. You can decide who they should have contact with or associate with.

Those are extremely important decisions that each one of us as an individual makes day in and day out. It is one of our most personal rights. I don't have to sit and listen to someone. I can move over. I can leave the room. But what this statute is saying is that the person, once appointed, can do that.

For example, let's say that I am a person who has been a close friend of the patient. We have been friends for 50 and 60 years. Indeed, you're most often going to be dealing with individuals who are very elderly under this statute. I don't get along with George's son. George has been my buddy for 60 years, but George's son doesn't like me. But you know what? I'm one of the only people that George still recognizes, and when I talk to George, it brings back memories and gives him some pleasure in his day.

This says that once George's son has been appointed, George's son can cut me off entirely and has full authority without restriction, as I read it, to cut me out of my best friend's life. I just want to hear from the Attorney General whether my interpretation is correct.

Hon. W. Oppal: I understand the point raised here by the member. Keep in mind that these are plenary powers that are given — sub (1) to sub (8). But that doesn't give carte blanche to anybody to move a person around where it would not be in the best interests of that person or, to put it another way, where it would be against the best interests of that person to be moved.

As well, this section has to be read in conjunction with sections 19 and 20, which set out the general powers, contemplating making decisions that are based on the best interests of a person. If it's contrary to the best interests of a person to be moved from Fort St. John to Dawson Creek or from Fort St. John to Kelowna, then obviously, that would not be in the spirit of the legislation. In fact, when the initial order is made, there can be an order preventing that kind of move from being made.

C. Trevena: I'm very interested in this section. As my colleague from Nanaimo has raised, it's very broad.

The Attorney has just said that it is in the best interests and it's what is determined to be the best interests, but if we have a guardian for a person, who is it that's determining the best interests? Is it the guardian, or is it someone else? If it's someone else, how does that play into this section?

Hon. W. Oppal: The fundamental basis of this legislation is that the personal guardian must act in the best interests of the person involved. The concern is a legitimate one, but the court has an overriding power to determine what is in the best interests and what isn't in the best interests.

Keep in mind that there is a fiduciary duty here that's imposed on a person who is appointed as a guardian under this legislation. If a particular move from one jurisdiction to another is against the best interests, this is a matter that can be clearly remedied by bringing it to, first of all, the guardian. If the guardian doesn't comply with it, the court is there for that purpose, and that's really the contemplation and the intent of this section.

C. Trevena: I'm still a little troubled. I've had cases that come through my constituency office where there's been a person who's been moved out of one jurisdiction to another, and it has deeply troubled part of their family. These cases are very complicated.

Taking it to the courts is a level that most people don't want to have to do. If we're talking of a scenario, which my colleague from Nanaimo has suggested that we are, where we have one person who has moved out of a jurisdiction…. He may be on his own. He may be totally reliant on his son. Who at that stage would take it to the court? How would this proceed?

There is a huge responsibility here on behalf of the guardian for people who are very dependent. If the guardian is working on his or her own, there would be nobody to take it to court, and one would hope the court would be the last place to take it.

Hon. W. Oppal: Section 20 sets out what the duties of a guardian are. The practical quandaries or the practical considerations that have been raised by the member are good in that, from a logistical position, from a logistical consideration, I can say this. The usual scenario is that the aggrieved party or a person who is in a position to argue that the interests of the person involved are not being cared for or are being compromised…. Then that person or any other person could take the matter back to the court and have the appropriate decisions made.

These are not really difficult decisions to make, and I've seen these happen before in court, where one set of relatives will disagree with the care that's been given to the person. In those circumstances sometimes it's a difficult task of the court to sort out what is in the best interests of the person. Sometimes there's a conflict in the evidence, and of course, that's the difficult duty of the judge to sort all of those things out.

Keep in mind that there is a clear, concise duty on the part of the guardian, under section 20, that is set out, and a fiduciary duty that's imposed on that person to ensure that all things that are done are done in the best interests of the person involved.

This is an act that received a lot of attention, and we had meetings with a lot of different people, a lot of interest groups who raised very legitimate concerns. We have attempted, and the drafters have attempted, to address all of those issues that have been raised. I don't know if I've gone on here too long or if I've answered the question.

I'm not trying to jump ahead here, but when you go to the expression of the term "best interests" set out in section 20 — and we'll deal with this more fully when we get there — it strikes me that that relates only to personal health care decisions and pre-expressed wishes regarding health care as opposed….

I would, as my friend has pointed out, argue that the term "best interests" applies only to that and that therefore, when it comes to making the decision around deciding whether the adult should have contact or associate

with another person, that just falls under "General duties" in section 19, where a guardian must act honestly and in good faith, exercise diligent care, foster independence, etc.

My reading of section 16 is that there is no provision to give standing to an individual to bring on an application. To go back to my example, I'm George's best friend. I don't see anything in here that allows me, once the decision has been made, to go to court and ask for an order that allows me to have contact with my best friend.

We are dealing with a situation where the personal guardian has been appointed. As George's best friend, there would not be, I would suggest to the Attorney General, any necessity for me to be given notice of the application or to be informed or even to have any knowledge of the court application, because I'm just a friend. Now, I may be one of ten friends or 20 or 30, but I don't get notice of the application, and I don't know that George's son, who's never liked me, is going to turn around and do this — cut off my relationship with my best friend.

So that's my point. I don't see anything in here that allows me, as George's best friend, to go to court and ask for an order allowing me to have that continued contact, which is, in fact, if it was placed in front of a judge, a situation where a judge would say: "This would clearly be a good thing for George." Everyone would agree. The nurses say, the doctors will say that when I spend some time with George, he's a lot happier. He's getting some pleasure out of life.

I'm concerned that I don't see anything in here that enables me, as an affected party who's only doing this for George's best interests, to have any ability to go to court and ask the court to allow me to continue that relationship.

Hon. W. Oppal: Well, there are two concerns raised here. The first is whether the plenary powers set out in section 16 only deal with the health care as a best interest of the person. I have to, with respect, disagree with that because section 19 of the act deals with considerations other than health care. Personal care, property matters — those are all contemplated in that. As well, the overall relationship of a fiduciary indicates that it goes well beyond the contemplation of health care.

As far as the second issue raised by the member — that is, the question of standing — section 62.2 states: "Nothing in this Act (a) limits the inherent jurisdiction of the court to act in a parens patriae capacity, or (b) deprives a person of the right to ask a court to exercise that jurisdiction." So it allows a person, and the words "a person" necessarily mean anyone who has a legitimate interest, to come before the court and ask for standing.

L. Krog: I hope that the Attorney General's remarks never have to be read out in a courtroom to convince a judge in question that that, in fact, is the intent of the legislation. When the Attorney General talks about the fiduciary duty, the reference to fiduciary duty to an adult is in section 4, part 21. It says that a "property guardian has a fiduciary duty," but that property guardian is not the person who will be making decisions about these other matters, which are strictly related to a personal guardian.

I need to understand where in the statute the Attorney General is finding that the personal guardian has a fiduciary duty.

Hon. W. Oppal: Section 20 deals with decisions of a personal nature — duties of a personal guardian. Section 21 deals with the duties of a property guardian, which contemplates a fiduciary duty.

L. Krog: Noting the hour, I would move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee of the Whole (Section B), having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hansard Services publishes transcripts both in print and on the Internet.
Chamber debates are broadcast on television and webcast on the Internet.
Question Period podcasts are available on the Internet.