Hansard -- Wednesday, May 15, 2002 p.m. -- Vol. 8, No. 1 (HTML)

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.

Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY



CONTENTS

	Routine Proceedings
		Page

Introductions by Members		3471

Introduction and First Reading of Bills		3472
	Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2002 (Bill 54) Hon. G. Plant

Statements (Standing Order 25B)		3472
	Cruise ship industry in B.C. L. Mayencourt The Beachcombers television series H. Long Work of Elizabeth Fry societies E. Brenzinger

Oral Questions		3473
	Mental health services for Vancouver's North Shore and Powell River J. Kwan Hon. G. Cheema Mental health funding and services J. MacPhail Hon. G. Cheema Penalties for environmental offences W. McMahon Hon. J. Murray Working forest land base initiative W. Cobb Hon. S. Hagen New hospital for Abbotsford J. MacPhail Hon. G. Collins

Tabling Documents		3476
	Ombudsman annual report, 2001

Reports from Committees		3476
	Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills report

Second Reading of Bills		3477
	Environmental Assessment Act (Bill 38) (continued) J. Kwan Hon. S. Hagen

Committee of the Whole House		3482
	Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 46) J. MacPhail Hon. G. Plant

Reporting of Bills		3488
	Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 46)

Third Reading of Bills		3488
	Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 46)

Committee of the Whole House		3488
	Office for Children and Youth Act (Bill 43) J. MacPhail Hon. G. Plant V. Anderson K. Manhas

Reporting of Bills		3503
	Office for Children and Youth Act (Bill 43)

Third Reading of Bills		3503
	Office for Children and Youth Act (Bill 43)

Committee of the Whole House		3503
	Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 44) J. MacPhail Hon. K. Whittred

Report and Third Reading of Bills		3507
	Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 44)

Second Reading of Bills		3507
	Labour Relations Code Amendment Act, 2002 (Bill 42) Hon. G. Bruce J. Kwan J. MacPhail

Hon. G. Cheema: I would like to introduce a newlywed couple in this House today. Their names are Simmi and Janni Samra. They come from the great city of Surrey. I would like the House to make them welcome.

V. Anderson: Today I would like to have you join me in welcoming Angelle Desrochers-Rosner, who is very interested in educational activities and particularly early childhood development, and Debbie Desrochers-Fulton, vice-president of the parent advisory council for the Vancouver area.

R. Hawes: It is my pleasure today to introduce Archbishop Lazar Puhalo, who is the archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for North America. Just to show that he is not a one-track person, he's also a guest lecturer in quantum physics at the University of Utah. I'd like the House to make him very welcome.

I. Chong: Joining us in the gallery are two young people I've had the very great pleasure of working with this session. One is the assistant legislative assistant in my area. Her name is Ashley Spilak. The other is a young lady who has agreed to work for a co-op term in my constituency office, a very bright young lady. I hope that perhaps one day she'll be sitting in one of these seats. Would the House please welcome Lindsay McCrae as well.

R. Sultan: I would like to introduce two guests: Anne-Marie Kains, recently retired senior manager from Telus, and her spouse, Peter Kains, who's principal of a firm which brews the finest lager this side of Munich. Would the House please make them welcome.

Hon. G. Campbell: In the House this afternoon are 54 grades 4 and 5 students from École Jules Quesnel in my riding of Vancouver–Point Grey, just a few blocks from where I live. They're accompanied by their teacher, Ms. La Pierre, along with seven of their parents. They have had a tour of the Legislature, and they're here to enjoy question period. I hope we'll all make them welcome.

Hon. R. Thorpe: Joining us in the House today are Cindy Kauffman, Joe Lindgren and Phil Hochstein. They're here for a number of meetings with members of the House. Would the House please make them feel comfortable in Victoria.

D. Hayer: It gives me great pleasure to introduce 96 grade 4 students from Coyote Creek Elementary School in my riding of Surrey-Tynehead. With them are their teachers, Marcus Berndt and Kai Chin, and their parent volunteers who make these trips possible. Also among them is Marina Lynn Chartier, granddaughter of my very close friends Brenda Lee and Ross Bertnick. Would the House please make them very welcome.

B. Lekstrom: It's my privilege today to stand in the House and introduce a hard-working gentleman from British Columbia who is the president of EnerGreen Power Inc. He's worked for the last decade trying to produce an ethanol industry in our province and worked very hard in our region. There are a number of processes that can be used, certainly, whether utilizing wood waste or grain. I'd like the House to join me in welcoming Mr. Bill Vanderland.

Hon. G. Abbott: I'd like the House to welcome two former constituents who are in the gallery today: Tamara Schweeder and her father, Lloyd Schweeder. I ask the House to make them welcome.

L. Mayencourt: I would like to recognize in the gallery today Capt. Kent Rigbourn from the Royal Caribbean cruise ship the Radiance of the Seas, which is in Victoria's port today.

Also joining us in the visitors' gallery is John Hansen of the North West Cruise Ship Association. I'd ask that the House please make them welcome.

I'd also like to have the House recognize two very important people from my campaign: a gentleman by the name of Art Perret, who was my campaign manager, and his date for the day, Sheila Butt, who also worked on my campaign. It just seems like such a short time ago that we worked towards a year-ago anniversary. Thank you very much for that. Would the House please make them welcome.

Last but not least, my mother's in the House, and I wanted to have the House please make her feel very welcome: Wilma Palmer.

H. Long: It's a great privilege that I have two more — they're not my constituents; in fact, they're the constituents of Cariboo South — that are here today. I guess everybody's realized now that it's three people that I've had come to visit me in this House in the last year, so I'm really making a record.

I'd like to introduce those two people. One is Gloria de la Osa, and the other is Thomas Myers, who live at Shelling Lake in the Cariboo South riding. They're very dear friends. I fly into their place. They treat me right. They're great people. I'd like you to really give them a great welcome.

Hon. S. Hagen: On behalf of the member for North Island, I'd like to inform the House today that Sointula is proud to announce its 100th birthday celebration. This takes place over the three days of May 18, 19 and 20.

Sointula means place of harmony — we could maybe call this place Sointula — in the Finnish language. Founded in December of 1901, Sointula was sought out to be an island utopia. Bought from the provincial government, Malcolm Island was owned by the members of the Kalevan Kansa Colonisation Co. Ltd., which unfortunately dissolved after a few years of immense hardship.

Half the settlement dispersed to various locations after the breakup, but a few determined Finns still remain. Inspired by two of the colony's leaders, they continued their struggle for the utopian dream. To support the colony, the Finns supplied the people of Alert Bay and the Port McNeill logging camp with fresh fruit, vegetables and dairy products. They would deliver the products by rowing to the various coastal settlements and also rowing over to the mainland to cut hay for the island's cattle.

Even though it's been 100 years, the drive for harmony still remains. Sointula welcomes all members interested in attending the celebration and thanks the House for its time to make this special announcement.

Hon. G. Plant presented a message from Her Honour the Lieutenant-Governor: a bill intituled Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2002.

Hon. G. Plant: I move that the bill be introduced and read a first time now.

Hon. G. Plant: I'm pleased to introduce Bill 54, the Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), 2002. This omnibus bill amends a number of statutes. They are the Assessment Act, Constitution Act, Ecological Reserve Act, Greater Nanaimo Water District Act, Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District Act (1956), Greater Vancouver Water District Act (1924), Job Protection Act, Land Surveyors Act, Legislative Assembly Management Committee Act, Liquor Control and Licensing Act, Liquor Distribution Act, Local Government Act, Mental Health Act, Mineral Tenure Act, Mines Act, Motor Vehicle Act, Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act, Police Act, Protected Areas of British Columbia Act, Public Sector Employers Act, Public Sector Pension Plans Act, Public Service Labour Relations Act and the Social Service Tax Act.

I will elaborate on the nature of these amendments during the second reading of this bill.

I move that this bill be placed on orders of the day for second reading at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 54 introduced, read a first time and ordered to be placed on orders of the day for second reading at the next sitting of the House after today.

L. Mayencourt: As the fellow members of the Legislature know, the cruise ship industry in Vancouver is based in my riding of Vancouver-Burrard. We're very happy to have them there.

The cruise ship industry is a vibrant and growing part of our province's tourism sector, and it continues to be a vital contributor to B.C.'s economy. Each sailing grosses approximately $1.5 million. With close to 350 sailings a year, British Columbia can expect to generate over $580 million.

The cruise industry anticipates 2002 to be its twentieth consecutive year of growth. Even more encouraging is that port activities across Canada generate jobs. In fact, the Vancouver port reports that there are 27,500 direct jobs, 18,500 indirect and a further 15,600 induced jobs created. The cruise industry will provide $1.3 billion in wages to British Columbians in this year alone.

Another important note is that stakeholders in the cruise industry have taken a leadership role in the marine sector, introducing sound environmental practices and standards. The North West Cruise Ship Association spends over $100 million in ongoing programs. Updated data and new technology are a top priority, reflecting an environmentally sensitive approach to business. Pacific North West cruise line is establishing one of the finest and most environmentally sound sailing fleets on the oceans today, something that British Columbians and the people of my riding can be very excited about and proud of.

More and more people over the past decade have chosen to take a cruise as a way of experiencing the remarkable beauty of this corner of the world. Whether you're going from British Columbia to Alaska or to some other destination, a cruise is proving to be a safe and spectacular way to see British Columbia. I encourage all of us here to take a cruise to experience the beauty that British Columbia's cruise lines have to offer.

H. Long: I rise in the House today to speak about something that has contributed to the vitality of my riding over the last 30 years. The CBC television series, The Beachcombers, first aired in 1972, continued until 1991 and is still broadcast today. To refresh your memory, the series was a family adventure show. The main character was an immigrant beachcomber named Nick Adonidas, who was forever battling with his arch-rival, Relic, a bitter old beachcomber.

The original story began when Jesse, Nick's sidekick, made a bet with a friend that he could hitchhike down the west coast to South America. As it turned out, Jesse made it only as far as Gibsons. During its peak, The Beachcombers attracted two million viewers and was broadcast in more than 56 countries. Throughout those 19 years, the TV show contributed to the community spirit of the Sunshine Coast and has left a lasting legacy.

Beachcombers memories are continued by the existence of Gibsons's most prominent landmark, Molly's Reach. Recently, Telefilm Canada, a federally funded agency, turned down the request to support a new Beachcombers movie. Telefilm Canada has a budget to support Canadian productions. I am disappointed that they have decided this project did not meet the criteria.

The positive impact of this project would not only have been for the new family viewers, but most important, it would have been great news for Gibsons. When the news first spread that The Beachcombers movie was being discussed, Jackson Davies, who has spearheaded the production, said that people were stopping him on the street to express their excitement and anticipation of the upcoming movie. I hope Telefilm Canada takes the opportunity to consider the positive impact The Beachcombers has had on our community and for the families across Canada.

E. Brenzinger: I'd like to take this opportunity to acknowledge some of the work the Elizabeth Fry Society does and has done in encouraging reform at all levels of the criminal justice system as it affects women. National Elizabeth Fry Week ends on Mother's Day each year in order to draw attention to the fact that the majority of women who come into conflict with the law are mothers, most of them sole supporters of their families at the time of incarceration.

When mothers are sentenced to prison, they and their children are also sentenced to separation. Many women find this the most severe punishment. The first Canadian Elizabeth Fry Society was established in Vancouver in 1939 and has been working for over 60 years with female offenders and ameliorating the circumstances in which women live that lead to crime and incarceration.

Elizabeth Fry societies are, almost without exception across Canada, the only voice that speaks for women in prison or women struggling with the factors that lead to involvement in the criminal justice system. They have a long track record of providing programs and services that have been accepted across Canada.

They have developed the acceptance of schooling, addiction counselling and restitution to the community as part of their rehabilitative strategy for offenders and the first shelter for women of its kind, Sheena's Place, that enables homeless women to be housed with their children.

I'd like to thank the executive director, Shawn Bayes, for giving me the chance to visit Sheena's Place at their open house last Thursday, which is located in my riding of Surrey-Whalley. This facility exemplifies the commitment of the society to work with building safer communities and increased family capacity to enable children to have brighter futures.

J. Kwan: It's been two weeks since we asked the Minister of State for Mental Health about cuts to the North Shore branch of B.C.'s Schizophrenia Society. I remind the minister again that he told mental health patients he would not tolerate this cut. The Schizophrenia Society on the North Shore has still not heard from the minister. To the minister: when are they going to get their cheque?

Hon. G. Cheema: If the member is going to ask me the same question, then my answer is going to be the same. As we have said many times before, this government is committed to removing the politics from our health care system. We must allow our professionals the opportunity to fix the health care system. We will not micromanage the health care system from Victoria.

Mr. Speaker: The member for Vancouver–Mount Pleasant has a supplementary question.

J. Kwan: What the minister said was that he would not tolerate the cuts to mental health. The B.C. Schizophrenia Society has also lost its government funding for the respite services it provides to families on the North Shore. Respite services provide families a lifeline, giving them a chance to take a breather from providing a family member with full-time care.

To the Minister of State for Mental Health once again: when he finally does reinstate funding for the North Shore branch of the Schizophrenia Society, as he promised, will he also commit to giving back their funding for their respite program?

Hon. G. Cheema: The member opposite, who was the Minister of Health, made the following statements in 1998: "We work continuously on standards with…hospitals that provide services to mentally ill patients. We articulate those standards regularly, and we expect the hospitals to meet those standards…. There's no question that clear standards have to be met and set." That was in 1998.

Instead of doing what they said, the NDP micromanaged the health care system from Victoria. We will change that.

Hon. G. Cheema: We have given three-year goals and performance expectations to the health authorities. Those will be met.

Mr. Speaker: The member for Vancouver–Mount Pleasant has a further supplementary question.

J. Kwan: What the minister said was that he would not tolerate cuts to mental health funding. It's not just his words that count; his action is now needed. The minister says over and over again that he's increased funding for mental health. One would expect, then, that mental health services would be improved, not cut.

I would like to point the minister's attention to another severe cut he's made to mental health services. The mental health drop-in centre in Powell River has seen its funding cut by nearly 75 percent. This is going to make it very hard for the centre to keep its doors open. On top of that, the after-hours health care crisis line worker has been cut as well. To make matters even worse, Powell River's mental health outreach worker has been axed.

Why are Powell River's mental health services being wiped out if, as the minister claims, he's spending more money on mental health?

Hon. G. Cheema: It's amazing that $125 million is a cut for them. This year we are spending $10.4 billion on health care in this province. That's $1.1 billion more than last year. That's not a cut. This year we have allocated $17.8 million, new dollars, in the mental health plan: $15 million for the community services, $2 million for the community psych sessions. All these things will improve the mental health in this province.

As I said earlier, the NDP is afraid that we'll be successful. Patients will benefit. This takes time. This is the first time we have provided the equal distribution of funds across the province. We have given clear guidelines and clear performance outcomes, and they will be met, and patients will be improving.

J. MacPhail: It's simply not credible for the minister to stand up in the House and repeat that he's spending more money on mental health every time he's presented with evidence of mental health services being slashed around the province.

I guess the question is: if he's spending more money, where on earth is it going, and why are there critical mental health services being cut? The mental health community itself is bewildered and very concerned about the minister's rhetoric. They have told us that they've asked the minister to provide them with a detailed workplan outlining where the new mental health dollars that he keeps talking about are being spent so that they can get some answers. To date they have not heard a word from the minister.

Will the minister finally give the mental health community, the families, the patients and the residents themselves the answers they're looking for? Will he table the information that he talks about today?

Hon. G. Cheema: The only party which betrayed the mental health patients was the NDP. We made a promise during the campaign to spend…

Hon. G. Cheema: …and implement the mental health plan. We are spending $125 million, and we will also be spending an additional $138 million. Not a single patient will be displaced without a proper community-based program. Part of our plan is to spend $17.8 million this year. That will be spent on respite care, day hospital programs and specialized residential care. That will only improve the mental health care in this province.

J. MacPhail: This question is coming from the mental health community. It's coming this week from the mental health community. I expect that they listened very closely to the minister's answer and said they didn't get one piece of information. Every single one of the services that he listed that he was funding are cuts — cuts that they experience.

What the mental health community is asking is: tell us where the money you claim to be spending as a government is going. The Minister of State for Mental Health can't even do it. I expect the community will be saying: "We wonder whether there's any money being spent at all."

I ask the minister again: please explain why mental health patients are seeing their services cut when the minister claims to be expanding the services. Perhaps he has an explanation for the contradiction.

Hon. G. Cheema: The only contradiction is coming from the NDP. For ten years…

Hon. G. Cheema: …the mental health plan was announced three times by the NDP, and it was never implemented. We made the promise, and we are fulfilling that promise.

This member should understand that this is the first time in this province we have given clear guidelines and clear performance outcomes, and those must be met.

Mr. Speaker: Order, please. Order, please. The minister has the floor. Order. The minister has the floor.

Hon. G. Cheema: We have given equal distribution for funds across the province. In the past there was unequal distribution. We have corrected the mistakes of the past. We are correcting the mistakes of the NDP. We are giving the real meaning to mental health in this province.

W. McMahon: My question is to the Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection. In the New Era document the government committed to protecting B.C.'s environment. I understand that the minister is currently considering the implementation of administrative penalties to help deter and punish environmental offenders. Could the minister tell us how these penalties will help her ministry to protect the province's environment?

Hon. J. Murray: In order to protect the environment, the focus of this ministry is to set strong, enforceable standards and to ensure they're respected. In order to do that, we need a range of enforcement tools so that we can respond to the seriousness of the infraction.

What we have in most of our legislation right now is minor ticketing, which is small dollar amounts, and that's appropriate for a small infraction. The alternative is to file charges and actually take a proponent to court. That's appropriate in some serious infractions. The conservation officer service has requested that the ministry consider bringing in additional enforcement tools so that the ministry can deal with those issues that are neither the very small nor the very serious ones. That's what an administrative penalty would be.

We're looking at that now. We're developing principles. We're considering incorporating that into our legislative renewal and our regulatory renewal…

Mr. Speaker: The member for Columbia River–Revelstoke has a supplementary question.

W. McMahon: While British Columbians would certainly welcome new measures to protect the environment, there must be safeguards in place to prevent the possibility of abuse. To the Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection: what assurances can she provide that the process for levelling these new fines will be both clear and transparent?

Hon. J. Murray: Clear and transparent is the kind of principle that we'll be considering. In thinking about how to do this, what we're considering is identifying a clear range of administrative penalties and then separating the administration of the penalty and the actual decision about the penalty amount from the conservation…

Hon. J. Murray: …officer who has been carrying out the enforcement process. That separation will ensure that it's a neutral administration of the consequence. We intend to level the playing field through this mechanism, and we intend to be more effective in protecting the environment.

W. Cobb: My question is to the Minister of Sustainable Resource Management. Notwithstanding the current softwood lumber dispute with the U.S., it is important for the province to continue making the changes that are necessary to improve the future of the forest industry. In the New Era document we committed to developing a working forest land base in order to provide greater stability to the many families who work in the industry. Can the minister provide us with an update on the working forest initiative?

Hon. S. Hagen: This government understands how important the forestry industry is not only to the people who are in the riding of Cariboo South but indeed to all of the people of British Columbia. At this time my ministry is continuing work on a comprehensive discussion paper on this important topic. I can inform the member that good progress is being made. We'll be ready with this discussion paper in the coming months.

W. Cobb: The working forest initiative could have a profound impact on the future of both my community and all British Columbians. Can the minister tell us what steps are being taken to ensure there will be consultation during that process?

Hon. S. Hagen: As the member knows, the previous government introduced legislation like the Forest Practices Code with no consultation. We all know the disastrous results. Not only was there no consultation…

Hon. S. Hagen: …but during the ten disastrous years of that government the economy of this province — including the forestry industry, the mining industry

and other industries — was driven into the ground. They were driven out of the province, investment was driven out of the province, and investment was not welcomed in the province.

I'm pleased to say that with regard to the consultations — the public consultations was the question — right now my staff are travelling with the results-based code committee to ensure that we have excellent coordination between the results-based code initiative and the working forest initiative.

J. MacPhail: The government has promised to build a new hospital in Abbotsford. They have received a petition from 8,000 Fraser Valley residents saying: "Do it now, and do it with public money." Instead of getting on with it, the government is wasting health care dollars trying to find a way to turn it over to the private sector. Two studies by respected accounting firms have said that it would be a very risky venture. To the Minister of Health Services.…

J. MacPhail: To the Minister of Health Services: will he rule out private sector involvement in this much-needed hospital and commit today that this hospital will be publicly financed and publicly owned?

Hon. G. Collins: If the member opposite felt so strongly about this hospital for the good people in Abbotsford, she could have followed through with public funding one of the 13 times her government announced the project.

Hon. G. Collins: When she was the Minister of Health, her government stuck so many spades in the ground that there's a little pile over there of announcements from the times that government stuck spades in the ground and said they were going to come through with the money.

Hon. G. Collins: …and we're going to do it in the most cost-effective and efficient way. Instead of just broken promises for 13 years, they're actually going to get a hospital.

Mr. Speaker: Hon. members, I have the honour to present the ombudsman's 2001 annual report.

B. Penner: I have the honour to present a report from the Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills. I move that the report be read and received.

Bill Pr401 ordered to be placed on orders of the day for second reading at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. G. Collins: I rise to inform the House of the status of progress of government business.

Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of this session, by unanimous consent and agreement, this House passed new standing orders to implement a fixed calendar. Created along with that was a new standing order 81.1, which provides for the process of time allocation to ensure an orderly passage of legislation and conclusion of government business.

In supporting the new process, I wish to advise the House of the status of the progress of government business. As of this afternoon, with the introduction of the Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 2), all legislation which is intended for passage in the spring sitting has been introduced and laid before the House.

There are two of those bills which government is intending to complete not this spring but rather in the fall. Those are Bill 16, the Community Care Facility Act, and Bill 47, the Business Corporations Act. As well, Mr. Speaker, there will be other bills that will be introduced before the end of the month, which will not pass this spring but will be debated in the fall sitting.

Negotiations and discussions with the opposition have been ongoing and will continue. We have offered and continue to offer the use of Committee A as a means to provide for additional opportunity to debate whatever bills members would like to debate. I will keep the House informed on the orderly progression of legislation in the days ahead.

J. Kwan: Yesterday we were engaging in second reading debate of Bill 38. I had adjourned debate. Just to recap a little bit in terms of where I had left off, I was outlining for the House the many strengths of the environmental assessment process as it exists now.

These included bringing scrutiny to projects; promoting sustainability for future developments; increasing awareness for public proponents; forcing stakeholders and proponents to address environmental issues and look towards stewardship and innovation; establishing and increasing the knowledge base for industry and government; providing for public consultation and participation; providing for good long-term investment for industry and the province with low costs to proponents, as the current process's average cost to proponents is less than 1 percent of capital costs; enabling legal enforcement; and establishing the opportunity for adaptive management, as proponents can learn from each other's experiences.

Many of these strengths will be weakened by Bill 38. Environmental assessment is supposed to be about looking at a project, determining potential impacts and then working towards mitigating those impacts. It is something we should be more than willing to do, but this government is bent on reducing the comprehensiveness that this process has been so recognized for.

The government claims that environmental assessment, as it exists now, is a barrier to having a good investment climate in the province. But the evidence shows that the environmental assessment process, as I have noted several times, accounts for less than 1 percent of a project's capital cost. It is a fundamental process to environmental responsibility and should not be weakened. There is no need to weaken it.

The bill only outlines the new process — which, by the way, gives far too much control to a development-driven minister when the process should be independent.

There are some significant changes that reflect the agenda of this government to allow development projects that impact the environment to go through with much more ease. These include exempting various types of mineral refining and smaller dams. This change is consistent with the government's agenda to exempt the mining industry from crucial requirements that serve simply to ensure responsibility, not act as barriers. Furthermore, it sets the stage for allowing independent power producers to establish without full review. This follows on the heels of an amendment to the Water Act, which will allow for stream diversions throughout the province.

J. Kwan: The member for Chilliwack is thumping his desk as though, somehow, not ensuring that there's proper process on environmental assessment is good for British Columbians.

J. Kwan: Mr. Speaker, if members of the House wish to join the debate, they're welcome to, but you know, members of this House should be concerned about what the impacts are of this bill, especially when it takes away the notion of consultation. It takes away what was previously in place that not only protects the environment but brings scrutiny to projects. It promotes sustainability for future developments. This is, after all, what the responsibility of this minister is all about: sustainable management. That's what this minister's supposed to do, but yet the criteria that need to go with that job in making sure that projects proceed in such a way that proper environmental assessments are done are being eroded. That's what's happening; it's therefore putting at risk the environment for the future and putting at risk sustainability for future developments. That's what Bill 38 will do.

I mentioned earlier the exemptions in the various types of mineral refining and smaller dams. The changes are consistent with the government's agenda to exempt the mining industry from crucial requirements that serve simply to ensure responsibility, not act as barriers. It sets the stage for allowing independent power producers to establish without review. That is not good for British Columbians. This follows on the heels of amendments to the Water Act, which will allow for stream diversions throughout the province. All of this is in complete contradiction to earlier statements made by the Minister of Sustainable Resource Management.

In estimates debate on March 7, the Minister of Sustainable Resource Management was asked if any areas currently assessed would no longer be under the new legislation. He responded: "The same types of projects

Then, there is the ability for the minister to waive the requirement for environmental assessment, if he sees no potential impact, without public consultation. This is a big concern, because we know this government is more about short-term investments and dollar signs than long-term investments in the sustainability of the economy and the environment.

The members of the House, I know, would like to purport that it's just the opposition who have these words to say, but that is not the case. I'd just like to quote on record some comments reported in the Vancouver Sun on May 10, 2002. Karen Campbell, who's with the West Coast Environmental Law Association — who, by the way, is also on the advisory committee that the minister has put together — was reported in the Vancouver Sun that she thinks the government's new process is too flexible. A direct quote from her: "I have real concerns about the new amounts of discretion this bill will allow. As I see it, it will enable some considerable political interference by the minister in the environmental assessment process in B.C."

The article then goes on to say: "However, Campbell said the number of beds in a ski resort or the size of such things as power developments won't matter under the new act." She states: "Regardless of whether it's 600 beds or 2,000 beds or a 200-megawatt facility or a 400-megawatt facility, those thresholds become irrelevant. Those thresholds are only an indication that the government is going to look at doing an environmental assessment. But they don't have to do it anymore." Then the article goes on to say:

The comments made in the Vancouver Sun by Karen Campbell are one aspect of what some community members think about Bill 38. In fact, the analysis that I provided to the House yesterday — primarily yesterday; some of it today as we resume debate — has been validated by other community members. Just this morning we received an analysis of Bill 38, the new Environmental Assessment Act, from the West Coast Environmental Law Association.

I'd like to put their analysis on the record because many of their points are consistent with the points that I had made yesterday. I want to put this on the record because I know that members from the government bench would like to say and often say that it's just the opposition — my colleague from Vancouver-Hastings and me — who have these points of view, but that is not true. The view that we share in this House is often shared by other people in the broader community as well.

In the instance around Bill 38, here's what West Coast Environmental Law has to say. The information that I'm now going to put on record was provided to us this morning from them.

I just want to pause from the document for a moment and comment on the issue of consultation. During the estimates I asked the minister about the environmental assessment advisory committee. The minister assured me that there was such a committee and that they would be consulted on such matters. Subsequent to that I asked the minister to provide the information. Just for the information of members of this House, I'd like to quote from the estimates debate, the commitment that the minister had said he would provide: "On the major reform to the environmental assessment process, who will be consulted and who has been consulted? Could the minister please advise? Does the minister have the names of these groups?"

That was the question I asked. The minister then advised that he would provide that information to the opposition. The opposition received the information, and I want to thank the minister for providing it. Here's what the information states:

And the terms of reference were attached to the document which was sent to the opposition.

I want to point out that this information was asked of the minister, and he did provide it. The information that was provided from the minister clearly indicated that the environmental assessment advisory committee assisted in the development of the act and continues to act as a standing advisory committee to the deputy minister of the environmental assessment office. Yet here today we have information from the West Coast Environmental Law Association , which was part of the membership of the environmental assessment advisory committee, and they've advised that the new act was developed in secret with no consultation whatsoever.

Just for the information of this House, I want to let you know who the membership of this environmental assessment advisory committee included: Jerry Lampert, the Business Council of B.C.; Alan Young, the B.C. Environmental Network; Pat Moss, the B.C. Environmental Network; Lloyd Manchester, B.C. Environmental Network; Lynn Bueckert, B.C. Federation of Labour; David Luff, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers; David Parker, Mining Association of B.C.; Ken Vance, Union of B.C. Municipalities; Dave Park, Vancouver Board of Trade; Karen Campbell, West Coast Environmental Law Association, who also made the comments in the Vancouver Sun around the detrimental impacts of Bill 38; Doug O'Mara, Canada West Ski Areas Association; Mark Angelo, Outdoor Recreation Council of B.C.; Glenda Ferris, Tahltan Technical Working Group; and Rick Krehbiel, First Nations Environmental Assessment Working Group.

The West Coast Environmental Law Association stated very clearly that there was no consultation. They have representation at the environmental assessment advisory committee. There is a huge discrepancy in terms of the information that's been sent to the opposition from the minister advising the opposition of the purpose and composition of the environmental assessment advisory committee. It's stated clearly in this document that was sent from the minister to us, to the opposition, that this advisory group assisted in the development of the act and continues to act as a standing advisory committee to the deputy minister of the environmental assessment office, when in fact the new act was developed in secret with no consultation whatsoever.

Let me carry on, aside from pointing out this huge discrepancy and the lack of consultation with the development of this act. Let me go on with the analysis that West Coast Environmental Law provided this morning to the opposition around Bill 38.

Hon. Speaker, I just have a couple of comments to close, but I understand that a member wishes to make an introduction, so I'm going to yield the floor to her.

Hon. S. Hawkins: I am absolutely delighted to introduce one of my favourite grade 7 classes from Kelowna. Visiting here in the precinct today is the grade 7 class from Kelowna Christian Elementary School. They're accompanied by Mr. Brent MacArthur, their teacher, and a whole bunch of parents to make sure that they are staying within their boundaries when they're here. I hope they have a great time. Would the House please join me in making them welcome.

J. Kwan: The information that I put on the record is from the West Coast Environmental Law Association. They have done an analysis of Bill 38, as has the opposition. The issues and concerns they have raised are very consistent with the concerns of the opposition that I brought to the House yesterday during second reading debate.

It isn't just the opposition who has these concerns, but it is the broader community as well. Yesterday I began my comments by quoting from a court decision around this. I think it is worthwhile to just look at the court decision on this issue. It was a court decision in Newfoundland. It was the Labrador Inuit Association v. Newfoundland, Minister of Environment and Labour in the Newfoundland Court of Appeal on September 22, 1997.

There are a couple of things that I think are worth repeating. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of that decision:

That was the decision from the Newfoundland Court of Appeal — the Labrador Inuit Association v. Newfoundland, Minister of Environment and Labour.

The courts have recognized the importance of environmental assessments and their role not only for the environment but economically as well. They recognize that it makes sense. It makes sense in the long run for people in this province and in this country. It's as simple as that.

For the government to jeopardize the process that the courts have recognized is, in my view, to jeopardize the environmental and economic sustainable future of British Columbia.

For the government to take away the requirement for consultation with the public and particularly the aboriginal community flies in the face of court decisions over the last number of years. The courts more and more have recognized the rights of aboriginal people — the rights to resources and to title of aboriginal people.

The courts have recognized that government must consult with aboriginal people on these matters. To exempt them, potentially, from this process is a confrontation that will yield, I am afraid, further court confrontations, further court fights — fights that, I would argue, the government of British Columbia cannot afford to proceed with. The best way to prevent that is to make sure that the rights of aboriginal peoples are respected, that they're honoured, that the process that they need to be involved in — in this instance, around environmental assessment and the role of public consultation — is not exempt from legislation.

We have a situation with Bill 38 that goes contrary to all of those things. It makes no sense whatsoever, Mr. Speaker. I don't know why government is so bent on doing away with environmental assessments in an independent manner, in a way that is economic. If you look at the average cost of environmental assessments,

as I've mentioned, it's 1 percent of the total capital expenditure. This is not a lot of money for people to invest in to make sure that there is environmental protection, to make sure that mitigation is done if it is necessary and to make sure, if at all possible, to eliminate the damage before it even starts.

That, to me, is what the environmental assessment is all about. That's what the Minister of Sustainable Resource Management ought to be focused on. That is what the Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection should be focused on. After all, it is her mandate, as the Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection, to make sure that the integrity of our environment is protected.

Yet we see before us Bill 38, which dismantles all of those key issues that would protect the environment and that would sustain the environment for future use for future generations, and we have not heard from the Minister of Water, Land and Air Protection on this matter. We have not heard from her, coming forward to say: "You know what? Wait a minute. Bill 38 is not good for the environment, and I, as the steward of protection for environment, will speak up and say that we need this minimal measure."

If we are to move forward on environmental assessment issues, we need to move forward in time with even better policies but not regress backwards in time by taking away the gains that were made and brought forward by the previous government in consultation with the environmental community, in consultation with industry. That's the future that we need: one that is built on consultation, one that is built on partnership, one that balances all things and doesn't skew the agenda of government one way so heavily that it jeopardizes the future of our environment for future generations.

Hon. S. Hagen: Having listened to the members opposite, I'd like to close debate and move second reading.

Hon. S. Hagen: I move that the bill be referred to a Committee of the Whole House to be considered at the next sitting of the House after today.

Bill 38, Environmental Assessment Act, read a second time and referred to a Committee of the Whole House for consideration at the next sitting of the House after today.

Hon. S. Hawkins: I'll try this again. In the precincts visiting us today, and I think I see them sitting here now, is one of my favourite grade 7 classes. They're from Kelowna Christian Elementary School, and they're accompanied by their teacher, Mr. Brent MacArthur, and a whole bunch of parents. I ask the House to give them a very warm welcome.

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 46; J. Weisbeck in the chair.

J. MacPhail: This is dealing with the Lobbyists Registration Act, which was debated last summer. The act that is being amended, prior to this amendment, read: "This act does not apply to any of the fol-

lowing persons when acting in their official capacity." Then it goes down to (d): "members of a municipal council, regional district board, improvement district board, school district board or other local government authority, persons on the staff of those members, or employees of a municipality, regional district, improvement district, school district or other local government authority."

Then this amendment adds to the exemption list: "employees of bodies representing municipal councils, regional district boards, improvement district boards, school district boards or other local government authorities." This has been the reason for, I guess, the lack of proclamation around this piece of legislation.

I'm wondering: were organizations like the Union of B.C. Municipalities or the B.C. School Trustees Association worried that if they talked to the government, they would have to register as a lobbyist? What's been the holdup?

Hon. G. Plant: This amendment is not actually the reason that it's taken some time to bring the act into force. This amendment does spring out of an identification of this issue when people were working on the implementation of the act.

The member has captured the essence of the amendment. Whereas the bill in its form as enacted last summer would have precluded the requirement to register for people who were members of a municipal council, for example, it did not extend to the organizations that represent municipal governments in their dealings with government, like the UBCM. This housekeeping amendment simply ensures that people who work for those umbrella organizations — like the UBCM or the regional municipal authorities, OMMA and the like, as well as the B.C. School Trustees Association, I think, and those sorts of organizations — will also be exempt from the requirement to register, which we think is quite consistent with the basic principle of exemption that already exists in the bill in section 2(1)(d), which the member quoted from in her question.

J. MacPhail: Are there any other impediments that prevent this bill from proceeding to be proclaimed?

Hon. G. Plant: One of the things that we started doing after the bill was enacted last summer was work with the information and privacy commissioner's office on things like the system that would be used for the registration scheme.

We thought that it would be a good idea to see if we could actually do the registry entirely electronically. I think the idea was received well, but there has been a delay in terms of designing the requirements for the system that would be used to support the registry. I believe that some of those delays are now behind us and that we are actually on the verge of doing an RFP for the system to support the registry. We are now, I hope, on track to have the act proclaimed very early in the fall.

J. MacPhail: The freedom-of-information and protection-of-privacy commissioner will be the registrar. I note in the estimates of the Ministry of Attorney General that there were no funds in his budget for the registry. Will there be funds in the FOIPP commissioner's budget for conducting the registry?

Hon. G. Plant: The Attorney General's ministry is going to pay for the cost of the system that I referred to in my last answer. The FOI commissioner's office will cover the cost of the staffing. There will also be a fee for registering. I'm told the registry will not be a 100 percent cost-recovery operation, but clearly the intent is to attempt to recover a significant portion of the cost of operating the registry from the fees that are charged for filing with the registry.

J. MacPhail: Do other jurisdictions that have a lobbyist registration, such as the federal government…? Let me ask it this way: is the Attorney General modelling the keeper of the registry after the federal jurisdiction?

Oh, sorry. I see confusion on the minister's face. I just want to clarify my comments. I meant: is the responsibility for this being under the freedom-of-information and protection-of-privacy commissioner — which I support — based on a model that exists elsewhere?

Hon. G. Plant: I believe we are the only jurisdiction in Canada that's using an information and privacy commissioner as the registrar for a lobbyist registration act.

J. MacPhail: This adds a section — section 15.1 — to the Offence Act. This section of the Offence Act deals with evidence admissible in a trial on a violation ticket. The amendment, as I understand it, allows a judge in a trial on a violation ticket to admit as evidence information that would not be admissible under the laws of evidence. The information can include oral or written testimony.

So, a question: given that this section, as it will now be amended, allows for some of the laws of evidence to be discounted or disregarded in trials regarding violation tickets, I would ask the Attorney General to provide examples of what type of oral and written testimony would be admissible under these circumstances in these trials.

Hon. G. Plant: First of all, I think we should get the rest of the section on the record. What the section does

say is that a justice hearing in the trial on a violation ticket may admit as evidence, whether or not it would be admissible under the laws of evidence, any oral or written testimony or any record or thing that the justice considers is (a) relevant to an issue in the trial, and (b) credible and trustworthy. It also says that a justice may not admit under subsection (1) anything that is privileged under the laws of evidence.

The two requirements — that is, the requirement that the testimony or the record or the thing be relevant to an issue in the trail, and that it be credible and trustworthy — are compendious statements of what I believe I'm correct in saying are increasingly the two basic principles of the law of evidence. That is, although law students probably spend almost as many or more countless hours as I did 20 years ago examining the entertaining and often important minutiae of the law of evidence, increasingly when evidence issues are taken to appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, you find that the judges at the appellate level say that really the most important things about evidence are that it be relevant, credible and trustworthy.

So I don't know that this departs massively from that trend. Of course, what is also important here is that if something is privileged under the law of evidence, then this process in this section would not allow a judge to override it. What that leaves are some of the areas of the law of evidence that are still important around the things like the proof of records and how you prove a document — whether you can prove a document with a photocopy or you require the original signature when you're asking a bank to prove that there were transactions in an account. There are some special rules in the law of evidence about how those things are allowed to be proven.

I think the basic thrust of 15.1 is to say that given that a trialable violation ticket is something that is, in the scheme of criminal or quasi-criminal process, not as serious a matter as most criminal matters, the justices hearing trials of those cases should have a slightly greater latitude to not be bound by the technical restrictions of some parts of the law of evidence and to focus more on whether the evidence that's being given is, by its nature, relevant, trustworthy and credible. I can't think of any other specific examples that would assist the member, but that's the thrust of the provision.

J. MacPhail: Well, a couple of questions flow from that, then, and these are layperson questions. How will the public understand what will be submitted under this new provision? Will the regulations detail that? Will there be a public education initiative accompanying that?

Hon. G. Plant: There won't be regulations here. In fact, the whole point of these amendments is to make this process more accessible to the public so that an average member of the public need not become an expert on the detailed technical rules around the law of evidence but can, in fact, come into a hearing room where there's to be a trial on a violation ticket and focus on the real issues without having to become a master of the law of evidence. It's actually intended to make the process of adjudication in the case of the trial of a violation ticket a little more accessible to the members of the public that want to contest their tickets.

J. MacPhail: What I'm trying to get at is: who will judge the accessibility? Will it be a person presenting himself or herself, and the judge will say, "Here's what's available to you"? Or does the judge assess credibility and work with the person presenting on that? Or will there be some sort of pamphlets or kit that we follow?

Hon. G. Plant: I'm contemplating the possibility of asking my ministry staff to prepare a brochure: "How to Defeat a Traffic Ticket in British Columbia." More seriously, the answer to the member's question is that the decision whether to admit evidence that is tendered in the trial of a violation ticket will be made by a justice hearing that trial. People will come into court. They will offer the evidence that they consider to be relevant, credible and trustworthy, which bears on the issues that they believe are the relevant issues in the case. The justice hearing the case will be the person who makes the decision guided by these two very important, strong principles that already exist in the law of evidence — let's only hear evidence that's relevant; let's not hear evidence that has nothing to do with the issues in front of us — and when someone offers evidence that doesn't have about it some aura of credibility or trustworthiness that will allow the justice to have some sense of confidence that the evidence is worth paying attention to….

For the member's interest, most of these proceedings are heard by judicial justices of the peace who have much experience, by the way, in dealing with lay litigants on these sorts of issues.

J. MacPhail: Well, then let me proceed. It's under the same section, but let me go to section 15.2 that deals with the procedures in a trial on a violation ticket. This provides that a judge hearing a trial "may adopt procedures that are conducive to justly and expeditiously determining the matter." It also provides that a prosecutor may prosecute by telephone or video conferencing. Have these two issues been discussed with the judges?

J. MacPhail: Will the judges, through their own workings, adopt procedures that are conducive…? Will it be up to them to decide what those procedures are? Are those procedures by prescription or by the case of the day?

Hon. G. Plant: The office of the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court would have the ability and, I think, the authority to develop a set of policies or practices or procedures that might guide the judicial justices of the peace. As we embark upon this, the starting point is that it will be the justices individually hearing these matters who will adopt the procedures that, in their view, are conducive to justly and expeditiously determining the matters that come before them.

I think probably what will happen is that the office of the Chief Judge will monitor the development and implementation of this. If it turns out the individual JJPs are finding that they are able to manage these proceedings in a way that, broadly speaking, is building public confidence, then the Chief Judge may just decide to leave it alone. Alternatively, if it looks as though there's a need over time to develop certain broad rules or procedures that will help provide consistency, then I'm sure the Chief Judge will step into that opportunity and do whatever is required.

J. MacPhail: Under the same section that provides for a prosecutor to either prosecute by video conferencing or by telephone, I assume it doesn't mean…. Well, what I interpret this to mean is that the actual court appearance doesn't take place by telephone or video conferencing, but the prosecutor's addition to the court appearance could be through video conferencing or telephone. Am I interpreting that correctly?

Hon. G. Plant: Well, there will still be a courtroom, and presumably the person who has received the violation ticket wants a hearing on the matter. But the prosecutor may not be in the room where the hearing is taking place. Under the provision that we have in front of us, the prosecutor may not be in the room but, rather, appearing by telephone or by video conferencing. You may see the prosecutor on the TV screen.

J. MacPhail: So the JP will be present in a hearing room, whether that be a courtroom or not. Is there any contemplation that the person accused of a violation could be allowed to use telephone conferencing or video conferencing? Or is that just available to the prosecutor?

Hon. G. Plant: It's not permitted by the provisions that we have in front of us now, but it's something we're open to looking at. While I don't want to take advantage of the opportunity to digress unnecessarily, in a different context there is at least one state of the United States that has now created a cybercourt where certain kinds of commercial civil litigation matters are dealt with without any actual appearance by anyone in any room except people communicating to the court by the Internet.

I think we should be open to these ideas while ensuring that as we take each step, we do so in a way that protects the interests of litigants, the public interest, in making sure that a trial is something that is seen and is open to the public. In this case we have not gone so far as to permit the accused or the person who has received the ticket to appear via video conference or by telephone. However, the idea is there, and we may pursue it down the road.

J. MacPhail: I'm moving to section 15.3, which is still under section 5 of the amendment act. This is: "Certificate evidence of prescribed violation ticket offence admissible."

As I interpret this section, it allows a law enforcement officer to provide testimony through a certificate. That certificate can be sent electronically and signed electronically. The person charged with the driving offence can ask that the law enforcement officer be physically present at the trial, and the court gets to decide whether it's necessary for the RCMP officer to appear before the court. That's how I'm interpreting this section. My question is: what criteria does the court use to determine whether it's necessary for the law enforcement officer to appear before the court? Is it up to the Chief Judge to set those parameters?

Hon. G. Plant: Fundamentally, the criteria are those set out in subsection (3) of what will become section 15.3, which is, to quote from the last words in that subsection, whether "in the opinion of the court cross-examination is necessary to determine a relevant issue before the court."

J. MacPhail: That would not be by — I use these words advisedly, as a layperson — a set of rules, because I know there are court rules. That would just be in the judgment of the judge at the time?

Hon. G. Plant: I should probably have been a little more elaborate in my last answer.

The intention of a provision like this, the starting point, is that justices or judges having this ability will have to decide on a case-by-case basis what the appropriate situation or circumstance is to require cross-examination to take place. As judicial justices of the peace or judges exercise this authority, there will be built up a body of experience — case law and all that stuff that lawyers like — that starts to guide people as to what are the kinds of cases where cross-examination is more likely to be permitted and what kinds of cases are less likely to be permitted.

In much of this work there are issues that are technical and are required to prove the ingredients of an offence which are hard to dispute, whereas there are also sometimes issues that do involve the exercise of judgment, say, by a police officer, where there may be real dispute about what happened. I expect that litigants who come in and ask for the right to cross-examine will be looking to start to draw those kinds of distinctions over time.

I'm also told that in the province of Quebec, where a similar process is in place and I think has been for

some time, the number of cases where cross-examination is ordered is on the order of or no more than 1 percent, so it doesn't happen very often.

J. MacPhail: One of the pieces of minimal feedback that's been received so far on this legislation is that the intent to streamline and expedite the process has a potential for lengthening the process. The basis is that there could be hearing with the police officer not present, then it be determined that the police officer should be present, and therefore there would be another court date to deal with this issue. I am cognizant of the comments that the Attorney General just made, but what is available to prevent this from becoming more costly and less effective?

Hon. G. Plant: The system has some experience already with the use of certificates as a way of proving matters that are relevant in a criminal case, including impaired driving cases and red light cameras. That's part of the answer to the member's question.

The possibility that in a particular case there may be two appearances and the risk that poses for increased cost is actually a burden that would be borne by the disputants more than by the system as a whole. While I recognize that there is the risk of an increased burden on some disputants, that's not, we think, going to translate into increased costs on the system as a whole.

What's being put in place here is a framework. Over time the framework will get life from its application. When I was thinking about this…. It's dangerous to give examples, but let me give you an example. There is an offence in the Motor Vehicle Act for whatever the offence is when you enter an intersection after, someone argues, the light had already turned amber or red. In some cases I think the expression of that offence introduces the element of judgment that says that you can enter the intersection if to stop would be dangerous because you might be being tailgated by someone. By its nature that particular offence may have elements of judgment or real dispute about what actually happened at an intersection that are quite different from the vast majority of these cases where there is simply no significant way of disputing the facts. The only reason that people engage in disputes now is because they're hoping that the system won't operate efficiently enough and that they'll be able to get off the offence because someone won't show up on the day of the hearing or one of those things.

Taking these things as a whole, I think we'll watch as this scheme gets put into place. I think we're going to see that it will save some dollars and that it will make the system generally more efficient and will give us the opportunity to devote those scarce dollars to the kinds of proceedings where there are real issues or where the proceeding is about something that is truly quite serious. We'll have the dollars available to dedicate to those kinds of cases, and there won't be any significant counter-cost, if you will, arising from the exercise of the right to cross-examine that people will apply for under this provision.

J. MacPhail: This is an interesting section, just reading it, on the face of it. It adds to the Offence Act a section called "Prosecution by an Enforcement Officer." This is how it reads. This section allows an enforcement officer to "exercise the powers and perform the functions of a prosecutor in relation to a violation ticket under the act whether or not he or she is a member of the Law Society of British Columbia."

I went to the Offence Act, and I didn't see a definition of enforcement officer. I'll just look here quickly again. Perhaps the Attorney General could say who this would be. Are we breaking new ground here? Oh, I see. Actually, what the act says — I knew that it didn't give me any clarity, really — is that it means "any person or persons designated as an enforcement officer under section 132." But it doesn't…. Section 132, I think, is just the regulation-setting. Perhaps it's just as easy for the…. Yeah, that's just the regulation-making section.

Hon. G. Plant: Most often we're talking about police officers. The appointment, apparently, is made under the Police Act. What we're talking about is a situation where a police officer would appear as an enforcement officer — in effect, as a prosecutor — to prosecute a ticket that would have been signed by another police officer.

J. MacPhail: Did the Attorney General say "another police officer"? My next question was going to be: is it possible for the RCMP officer or police officer who issued the violation ticket to also prosecute that person to whom they issued the ticket? Is that precluded? How would we know that that's precluded?

Hon. G. Plant: That question is an interesting one. In fact, it is before the courts in a proceeding right now. I think the case has been argued. We're just waiting for a decision on the issue that is engaged by the member's question.

J. MacPhail: Not being familiar with the court case…. What I'm trying to get at here is: does this act permit an enforcement officer who issues the violation ticket to also prosecute? On the face of this act, is that permitted?

Hon. G. Plant: The current practice is that it can take place. That current practice is sanctioned by this provision of the bill. The issue, I think, is whether that current practice is consistent with constitutional norms

around the right to fair trial. By saying that this is what is currently done and by saying that what is currently done is permitted by these provisions, I don't exhaust the issue around whether that is constitutionally permissible. That is the issue currently being litigated, or that has been litigated, but we're waiting for the decision.

J. MacPhail: I thought this was a new section. Perhaps what this new section is doing is confirming present practice. Is one possibility of a negative outcome of the court case — i.e., that…? I would assume the negative outcome of the court case would be that an enforcement officer who issues the ticket is not allowed to prosecute. Is there a possibility, then, that there would need to be a legislative solution to that, or is it too early to tell?

Hon. G. Plant: Well, in the event that the issue that is before the court is decided against the Crown, then we would no longer be able to have a situation where a police officer can effectively prosecute his or her own ticket. We would have to, in that situation, have someone act as a prosecutor and someone act as the informant or witness to the offence — two separate people.

At that point, however, the provision that's in front of us does come into play, because it allows for the possibility that the prosecutor could be somebody other than a fully qualified lawyer and allows us to continue to have, for example, police officers conducting prosecutions even though they may not be members of the Law Society.

J. MacPhail: Does the Law Society agree with this provision? Have they been consulted?

Hon. G. Plant: They have been consulted. I think they have expressed no difficulty.

Hon. G. Plant: I move the amendment to section 17 that is in the possession of the Clerk. This is an amendment to the proposed section 19.2. There are, in fact, three amendments.

Hon. G. Plant: I'd be happy to try to explain what that amendment does if the member is interested. I wonder if before we get there…. I don't mean to pre-empt the member's interests, but for the purpose of determining staff resources — I know the member has an interest in the pension issue; we'll deal with that — does the member have an interest in any of the other sections of the act once we get past the pension issue?

J. MacPhail: My only interest in this whole section is to explain the pension provisions. That's it. My next area of interest is the Sheriff Act.

Hon. G. Plant: Subsequent to the drafting of the bill and its introduction, I think, the chair of the pension board has said that the pension provisions that are included here need to be changed in substance to allow the board to determine the amount of the government contribution as opposed to having that amount fixed permanently in the bill.

In subsection (1)(b) we do state where we're starting from, which is the 22.2 percent of the active member's salary. I think what the amendments do then is say that if something comes along later which requires there to be a change, then the amendments permit the board to determine what the amount of the government contribution is.

J. MacPhail: A question to please explain the pension provisions. What, if any, changes arise in the pension provisions as a result of this legislation?

Hon. G. Plant: I'll try to answer. If I get it wrong, the good folks who are helping me will correct me, I'm sure.

The starting point is this. What we're doing here is introducing legislation that gives effect to the recommendations of the Judicial Compensation Committee. The committee is established under the Provincial Court Act as a result of a decision of, primarily, the Supreme Court of Canada and other courts that require there be a process for the determination of judicial compensation that has some measure of independence from government.

The latest round of this process resulted in the tabling of a report last August, I think, here in the Legislature. As the member may know, the statutory process effectively requires the Legislature to act to reject the recommendations of the committee. The Legislature did not do anything to reject the recommendations of the Judicial Compensation Committee in their report of

last year. As a result, those recommendations became binding on government. Really, the new pension scheme became accepted by this Legislature last summer.

It has been determined that we should give effect to some important aspects of that scheme in legislation. That's what these provisions do.

Among the changes that are important are these. The maximum benefit has been increased to 70 percent of the salary. I think the 70 percent is of the three years of highest earnings. In calculating the 70 percent, Canada Pension Plan benefits are not to be taken into account. There are also two forms of pension. There is a single life guaranteed ten-year option. Another option is a joint life pension where the pension amount would be reduced to 60 percent on the death of the member. Those are some of the highlights of changes that are being given legislative sanction here.

J. MacPhail: This is an amendment to the Sheriff Act. It's an addition to the court security section — section 6.1. It adds definitions to describe court, court facility, restricted zone, screen and weapon. That's section 6.1(1). Then section 6.1(3) allows the sheriff to screen people entering a court facility for weapons, allows the sheriff to seize weapons and allows the sheriff to evict a person from a restricted zone if the person is not authorized by the regulations to enter that restricted zone.

There is little change, if any, in actual practice being effected by these provisions. The kinds of things the member was talking about are things that have been done. What happened that caused government to believe that these amendments ought to be brought in is, I think, there was a judicial decision in another jurisdiction that called into question whether sheriffs had the authority to do this kind of work absent express legislative powers. In order to avoid similar questions arising in British Columbia, we decided we ought to bring forward the legislative authority so that that challenge cannot be made.

J. MacPhail: Then the only area of concern I have is the application of the definition for "restricted zone." I think that's what it is. Yes, it's the restricted zone. Who gets to determine what a restricted zone is? It says the definition is "part of a core facility designated by the regulations as a restricted zone."

Will that be a permanent designation, or will it be on an as-and-when-needed basis? I'm concerned about ensuring public access to courts.

Hon. G. Plant: The Attorney General has the authority to designate buildings or parts of facilities as restricted zones. I'm told that an example of the kind of place that might be encompassed by such regulations would be judicial chambers. I think the member is right, also, that it's possible that from time to time there could be a facility or part of a facility designated by the regulations as a restricted zone in order to accommodate the specific security issues that might arise in a particular case. But once that case has been dealt with, then the need for the restriction would no longer be there. Then it would be appropriate to remove the restriction in order to maintain public access.

Hon. G. Plant: I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete with amendment.

Bill 46, Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 2002, reported complete with amendment.

Bill 46, Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 2002, read a third time and passed.

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 43; J. Weisbeck in the chair.

J. MacPhail: Much of my discussion here, I think, will be shaped by the second reading discussion we had around this legislation. It will be about the changes

that arise from the repeal of the Children's Commission Act, 1997 and the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, 1996. Some of my questions will be just generally about what evidence there is to support these changes. I mean by evidence the experience of either the children's commissioner or the child, youth and family advocate.

The first one is under "Definition." A youth is, under this new act, now defined as a person who is 16 years of age or older but is under 19 years of age. Under the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, a youth was defined as anyone who was 16 years of age or over but under 24 years of age and who was entitled to receive a designated service.

Now, the reason why that occurred, in my recollection — and some of this is from recollection rather than research, because I only had a certain amount of time to do the research — is that there was provision, particularly for a child in care, to have post-age-of-majority services that would have allowed for someone up to, I think, the age just before their twenty-fourth birthday to receive services as a child in care. I'm wondering whether my recollection on that is right.

Hon. G. Plant: The starting point of my answer is when we look at the Child, Family and Community Service Act, there's a definition there of youth. In that act, youth has the same definition as it does in the bill currently before us. That is, it's a person who is 16 years of age or over but who is under 19 years of age. The primary objective of the bill that's in front of us is to ensure that those people who can be or are receiving services from the Ministry of Children and Family Development are supported by the functions of the child and youth officer.

J. MacPhail: Yes, except I think that was amended by this government to reduce the…. The original Child, Family and Community Services Act did have it up to 24 for this reason: there were some children in care who were allowed post-majority-age services. My question is then: are there any post-majority services still being offered to children in care that will now perhaps be exempt from coverage under this legislation?

Hon. G. Plant: No, it's certainly not the intention to exclude that category of people from the responsibilities of the child and youth officer.

J. MacPhail: Is there any record from…? I'm sorry. Could the Attorney General introduce staff, please?

J. MacPhail: The Attorney General was out of the room when I said some of my questions will be based on experience and whether the changes support the…. I'm just wondering whether the Attorney General has any information about how many people older than 19 accessed the services of the child, youth and family advocate of last year. Maybe what I could do is ask the Attorney General or his staff, through him, whether the Youth in Care Network is a body that's been consulted on these changes.

Hon. G. Plant: Jane Morley consulted with the Youth in Care Network as part of the work that she did leading up to the report she prepared for government, which government accepted and which is largely the basis of the bill that is before us.

J. MacPhail: Is there any data available about the number of youth older than 19 that access services?

Hon. G. Plant: The member directed her question this way, as I recall: that is, services accessed of the child, youth and family advocate — right? We don't have the data here. Of course, the advocate reports as much to the member as she does to me, but we'll make an inquiry to see if there is a record kept of that information.

J. MacPhail: Here's my concern. There are changes that have occurred elsewhere in government that now…. A person who is not covered under the Child, Family and Community Service Act because he or she is older than 19 may also not be eligible for welfare and social assistance because of the rule, too, that you have to be separate and apart from your parents' home for, I think, a full two years. It's called the two-year independence requirement, introduced by the Ministry of Human Resources.

You could have a situation where a young person has no ability to go anywhere for assistance by virtue of the combination of these changes. A 20-year-old or a 21-year-old — up to the year 21 — could be found in that situation. It does seem to me to be a gap. There are lots of 19- and 20-year-olds who are full-functioning adults, well able to advocate on their own, and there are just as many who are not. So what do we do for those young people?

Hon. G. Plant: I think it would be possible to deflect much of the member's question by saying that the issues which she raises are issues that ought to be directed either at the Minister of Human Resources or at the Ministry of Children and Family Development. But jumping ahead for a moment to section 3, the functions of the child and youth officer are stated there, and they include in subsection 1(f) "services for youth and young adults during transition to adulthood."

I don't think the term "young adult" is defined, so it's possible that the very question the member is raising about whether or not there is adequate provision of services for people who fit within the category of individuals that she has described could be a subject of interest to the child and youth officer. The officer may

consider that it's his job or her job "to provide independent observations and advice to government about the state of services provided or funded by government to children and youth in British Columbia, including but not limited to the following: services for youth and young adults during transition to adulthood." The language there is not intended to be unduly restrictive. I think it's intended to, in fact, empower the officer to have some interest in that very issue if the officer considers that there is an issue there.

J. MacPhail: Yes, I'm cognizant that there's lots of overlap in debate around these issues because so much change is occurring. I'm also cognizant that time allocation will be brought in tomorrow, so I'm seizing the opportunity where I can to raise these very important matters.

Well, I'll take the Attorney General at his word, and as soon as the child and youth officer is appointed, I will meet with him or her to bring that to….

Hon. G. Plant: Only that I think I may now be able to answer a question the member asked earlier. In the 1999 annual report, I think, of the child, youth and family advocate, the advocate asked the question, "Who needs an advocate?" and said that in 1999 she received requests for service involving 2,710 children and youth from all regions of the province. Of that group, 2 percent were in the 19-to-24 age category.

J. MacPhail: I will, at the first opportunity, meet with the child and youth officer to ensure that that 2 percent has access to the services as well.

Hon. G. Plant: I move the amendment that has been tabled with the Clerk to section 2(3), which I suppose is something close to a typographical error.

J. MacPhail: This is the section that outlines the appointment procedure of a child and youth officer. The term is up to five years. Under the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, the advocate held the office for six years. Bill 43 restricts that term by one year. My concern is actually not about the reduction of the one year. I just want to put on record that I assume, giving the government the benefit of the doubt, that the five-year term is to make sure that it bridges over a four-year fixed government election cycle.

The reason why the six-year term was chosen for the child, youth and family advocate was so that the term would exceed one electoral cycle and therefore could not be used as a partisan appointment or affected by the election cycle. I just put it on record that if somehow the government of the day decides to change fixed-term elections, an amendment to this section should also flow with it so that the child and youth officer's term should exceed the election term by one year.

Hon. G. Plant: I understand the member's concern and the issue. She wanted to put the concern on record, and she has. I don't foresee that we're going to change the fixed-term election legislation. More fundamentally, I think the point is that if the person who holds this office has some security of tenure, then that builds the independence argument, which I know is of concern to the member.

J. MacPhail: Section 2(3)allows the Attorney General to make a contract containing mutually agreed terms and conditions with the child and youth officer. That's where the amendment came in. The Attorney General is making a commitment that the office of children and youth will operate at arm's length. I'm not sure he actually said that, but that was what I read into his words.

How does one go from mutually agreed terms to ensuring a level of independence? What does the Attorney General contemplate in terms of the content of terms and conditions? I'm being careful here, because I don't want to limit it to these items. But the ability to almost…. I say this with the greatest of respect. It would almost have to contain terms of provisions for permission for whistle-blowing.. I don't necessarily mean exactly whistle-blowing, but the ability to speak out without fear of any change in employment conditions.

Hon. G. Plant: The intention here is not to use subsection (3) as a vehicle for compromising the functions of the officer. This is an officer who will report to a minister of the Crown, and we are in an era now where we think public officials should have performance plans and service plans. Those sorts of things may be part of the contract that could be made under subsection (3).

I think I can give the member the assurance that those kinds of provisions would be there only to make sure that a person did in fact do the job that he or she would be hired to do. That is to hold government, particularly the Ministry of Children and Family Development, publicly to account for their success or failure in performing their own responsibilities.

J. MacPhail: Here's why I'm pursuing this, Mr. Chair. The Attorney General — always a person to choose his words carefully — appeared on Voice of B.C.

last August. The question to the Attorney General was: "You were talking about the possibility the government is going to change the system" — meaning the child, youth and family advocate. "My bottom-line question is: can you guarantee that at the end of that process there will still be an independent officer of the Legislature — independent from government — overseeing that and providing the same kind of scrutiny the auditor general does on financial matters?"

The Attorney General doesn't have to worry that I'm going to quarrel that he said something then and is doing something different now, but I want to use his words to get some sort of assurance here.

On the basis of that, I looked for an area under the act to discuss how one ensures that independence. This was the section that I could find, which would be the contract-making. There's nothing that frees up a person for independent thought more so than ensuring that their livelihood isn't at risk. Perhaps the Attorney General could suggest how that independence, as he advocated last year, will be assured through the contract. Or is there some other section that guarantees that?

Hon. G. Plant: I think the first thing is that what I said last fall — if the member has accurately quoted it — is what I would adhere to today and argue that this bill is consistent with those principles.

If anything, what was missing perhaps from what I said last fall is the fact that the child and youth officer is not the only person with responsibilities to assist in the oversight and accountability processes that we're talking about. There's also the ombudsman; there are the coroners and the public guardian and trustee. The intention behind section 2 of this bill is that this officer would be appointed for a term of sufficient duration to achieve the necessary degree of independence.

I think we are learning something, as government, about the need to ensure that we don't tie our hands unreasonably to long terms of office. There may, from time to time, be a need to see if we can take somebody on, on a shorter-term basis in some kinds of positions to make sure that they are doing the job we want them to do. But what is fundamental is that this job does, in fact, involve holding government to account through public scrutiny for the way in which it provides services to children, youth and their families.

I do think that the structure here is consistent with the principle that I spoke in favour of last fall, but I also think that the proof of these things is in the pudding. Over time we will see if this person does, in fact, have the courage to speak publicly and to hold government to account for its failures and its successes. That is really the acid test of independence, in my view. I understand the member's interest in the issue, and I support her interest in that issue. I think these provisions do, in fact, ensure that that principle of independence is respected.

J. MacPhail: Well, let me just put my concerns on record. As the Attorney General knows full well, I support the concept of an independent officer of the Legislature. Having said that, I also recognize that there are two of us and more of the government, so this is the direction we're going in. I am not in any way quarrelling that somehow the Attorney General is reversing his words from what he said last summer; I'm just putting them in context.

You see, under section 2(1), Mr. Chair, the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council…. In other words, the person is appointed at the pleasure of the Crown — i.e., cabinet — and can be appointed for a term of up to five years — up to five. I think the fact that that combination of up to five years, appointed by cabinet and also that the contract has to contain mutually agreed terms and conditions with the child and youth officer make the test extremely high for the Attorney General to guarantee that independence — the combination of those three factors.

The Attorney General remembers this from his days in opposition. The child, youth and family advocate made some pretty damning comments on the system and on the government of the day. Her independence allowed her to do that without fear of repercussion. This child and youth officer is replacing that function. I will watch with great interest the contract that comes as a result of section 2. Will the contract be made public?

Hon. G. Plant: The answer to that, I suppose, is that I don't know yet. I'm listening to the member's interest in the issue and understand the position of principle that she has on it. Of course, when we come to the point of entry into a contract, there are two parties. We'll have to deal with the interests of the person that we intend to appoint.

There may well be provisions of a contract where it might be difficult to make them public without compromising other legitimate interests of government, but in making that decision, I can assure the member that I will take her concerns and these basic principles into account.

J. MacPhail: Well, then let me add one more. I want to make sure that there are rigorous, rigorous parameters set around what constitutes a termination of the child and youth officer, because, again, it's by order-in-

council. It will be an unusual concept to have people who are hired at the pleasure of the Crown to also have rigorous terms and conditions of what constitutes just cause, so I offer that to the Attorney General.

Mr. Chair, I might also say that as we did vote at second reading in opposition to this legislation, I will be declaring my opposition to certain sections, in the interests of time, on division rather than division. This is a section to which my colleague from Vancouver–Mount Pleasant and I disagree and will be voting against on division.

V. Anderson: In the area of the officer being independent, one of the advantages for previous officers was that they were free to come before committees of the Legislature to comment and express their opinions and add advice. Would this person be free and able to do that if a committee of the Legislature so desired, or could they request to come before a committee of the Legislature to deal with topics that were of their concern?

Hon. G. Plant: I'm not in a position to disagree with the member's contention that that sort of appearance took place in the past. I have no recollection of either the advocate or the children's commissioner appearing in front of legislative committees. I think the primary tool for public scrutiny and transparency here is the reports that the officer will make, including the annual report and any special reports made as a result of the application of the provisions in section 8. I think my ability to answer the question is constrained by not yet knowing the context in which that might arise.

What we are doing, of course, is creating an office that will be filled by somebody whose very job will be to tell the public on a regular basis whether the Ministry of Children and Family Development and, indeed, government generally are in fact doing a good job of providing services to children at risk. I think that probably provides the necessary level of scrutiny, transparency and accountability to deal with the member's question. As to whether a specific context might arise where a committee of this Legislature would be assisted by a particular appearance by this officer, that may be something that we would have to deal with if, as and when the case arose.

J. MacPhail: Just prior to me voicing my dissent on division, I note that section 2(5) says that the officer may not serve for more than ten consecutive years. What's the intent behind that?

Hon. G. Plant: I think it's just there to ensure that on a relatively regular basis, maybe once a decade or thereabouts, we get a new person, fresh ideas, a fresh perspective on these issues. I don't think there's any particular magic to a particular number there. I think ten means that, consistent with subsection (1), you could conceivably have an officer serve two full terms. At that point, I think, the public interest would be served by a change of perspective.

J. MacPhail: This section deals with the functions of the child and youth officer. I'm assuming that this replaces section 4 — or corresponds to it, anyway — of the Children's Commission Act, which gave the commission's jurisdiction. It also corresponds to section 2 of the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act.

The role of the child and youth officer now, under section 3(1), is to "provide support to children, youth and their families in obtaining relevant services and to provide independent observations and advice to government about the state of services provided or funded by government to children and youth in British Columbia."

This is substantially different from the role of the children's commissioner, who had very specific responsibilities in investigating the death of a child "if the commission considers the investigation is necessary to determine the adequacy of services to the child or to examine public health and policy matters."

The children's commissioner could also make recommendations concerning any deaths or critical injuries that the commission investigates. He sets standards to be applied by prescribed ministries or agencies of the government to help ensure that their internal review processes be responsible to complaints about decisions concerning the provision of designated services to children. Then there was also the responsibility to monitor plans of care for children in continuing custody, to provide public education and to conduct research and collect data about services for children.

Also, section 2(c) of the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act allowed the office of the child, youth and family advocate "to provide information and advice to the government and communities…."

Under section 3(1), the child and youth officer's mandate is to provide observations and advice to government only. The community is not included. It goes to that question asked by the member for Vancouver-Langara. Where does the community get the observations and advice? Where does that connection happen, in order to find out information about the Ministry of Children and Family Development that used to be the role played by the advocate?

Hon. G. Plant: One of the things I should start the answer to this question with is to point out that the model we have in front of us in this bill is largely based on the Jane Morley report. That report is a public document. Some of the analysis of what's happened to the current functions of the Children's Commission and the advocate is set out in that report where she talks about the proposed future of those functions in, among other places, pages 53 and 54.

One of the things the analysis on those pages highlights is the extent to which there are already other places and other agencies — like the ombudsman, the coroner, the public guardian and trustee and the ministry itself — that have responsibility for the kinds of things that the member talked about in the first part of her question.

She asks where the community hears about or gets advice about these things. The fundamental job here is to hold government to account. The officer's responsibility is to do that, primarily, by monitoring how government does its job and reporting publicly on the officer's views about how government is doing its job or about government's successes or failures through the reports that the officer makes.

Of course, the officer, for the purpose of these functions, is expressly empowered to do things like promote and coordinate in communities the establishment of advocacy services for children, youth and their families. That certainly ought to engage the officer in the business of empowering communities to become able to advocate for their own interests. In subsection (2)(g) the bill expressly empowers the child and youth officer to provide advice to government and communities about the effectiveness, responsiveness and relevance of services for children, youth and their families.

J. MacPhail: Will the child and youth officer have his or her own budget — resources over which he or she will be in complete control?

J. MacPhail: Perhaps I could just ask a question here, as well, in terms of what the time line is for having the child and youth officer in place.

Hon. G. Plant: There are different sets of expectations and hopes. I'm confident that this officer position should be up and running sometime this fall.

J. MacPhail: Under 3(2)(c), it says that "in extraordinary circumstances" the role of the child and youth officer is to "advocate on behalf of individual children and youth to ensure that their views are heard and considered." In 1997, 162 children and youth contacted the child, youth and family advocate directly. In 1998 that number rose to 2,514. In 1999 it was 2,117 people who contacted the advocate directly for help. In the year 2000, 2,917 children and youth contacted the advocate directly. The question is: now where will those 2,000-plus children and youth be directed when they call the child and youth officer? What services replace the direct advocacy role formerly performed by the child, youth and family advocate?

Also, I would seek assistance through you, Mr. Chair. I'm reading down. Is that a problem for hearing?

Hon. G. Plant: Well, I think the provision that the member read, subparagraph (c), also has to be read in the context of the other provisions that surround it. Of course, one of them is that the child and youth officer is to provide information and advice to children, youth and their families about how to become effective self-advocates. We've already talked about the promotion and coordination in communities of the establishment of advocacy services for children, youth and their families. In addition to the fact that in extraordinary circumstances the officer can become an advocate on behalf of individual children, I think the officer has the broad task of encouraging people to become advocates for their own interests and communities to develop ways of becoming effective advocates for their interests.

I think it's also fair to say that we need to remember that this kind of advocacy is about giving or empowering children or youth or their families or giving them the opportunity to essentially go and knock on the door of the Minister of Children and Family Development and say, "Hey, you should be doing this for me," or: "This service should be provided in this way for us."

We are not going to effectively deliver the services that need to be delivered for children at risk in British Columbia until we reach a point where the minister and the ministry are able to respond effectively when people say: "Hey, you're not doing the job you should be doing on my behalf or on behalf of these people."

To the extent that this officer is there to essentially say, "No, ministry, you're not doing a job responding to people," and to the extent that the ministry starts to pick up or increases its ability to pick up on those signals, I think we are bridging the gap between the children at risk and the government that should be there to help them. Yet we are not putting in place here an advocate who will have continuous, broad-based individual advocacy responsibilities.

K. Manhas: In reference to section 3(1) where it reads, "The functions of the child and youth officer are to provide support to children, youth and their families in obtaining relevant services," it's my understanding from reading section 3(2)(c) that the office will only be able to undertake individual advocacy under extraordinary circumstances.

If the office is not advocating for clients, exactly what types of support will the office be providing to children, youth and their families when they're trying to access relevant services?

Hon. G. Plant: My understanding is that this officer will primarily do what the advocate has been doing. That is, what I'm told the advocate has generally done when people come looking for help is give direction about where to go, who to call, what to do with that particular kind of thing or problem. It's not so much to become a representative of each individual child or youth that comes through the door but rather to be a conduit or to provide information and advice that

helps people represent or implement their own — do their own work in terms of getting access to services.

I don't think it's intended that there be a significant change in terms of what this officer will do compared to what the advocate has, as a matter of practice, actually been doing.

V. Anderson: I'm trying to clarify, through the Chair to the minister, in this same discussion…. If I hear rightly, I'd like to clarify that, on one hand, the minister is saying that the advocate will be checking that services are available to children and youth and are proper and well-run services and will be monitoring them so that they are well run. On the other hand, the advocate will be indicating that if….

Let me use an example where I've had young people come, and they have gone to the different parts of the ministries to get service. They were continually referred back to the other ministries. They bounced back and forth. Will the advocate step in at that point and say to the ministries either collectively or individually, who do not feel any of them cover the particular needs of this advocate, they will stand up for that person and find a way through for them when all else has failed?

Hon. G. Plant: If I understand the member's question properly, there's a distinction between, on the one hand, ensuring that the child's or the youth's voice is heard by the ministry and, on the other hand, being given the power to require the minister to do something.

This is an advocacy function. This is a transparency accountability function. The officer that we're proposing to create here is not being given any authority to compel the minister or the Ministry of Children and Family Development to deliver or provide a service to anybody.

V. Anderson: If I can give three different situations and ask the minister if, perhaps under the condition of extraordinary circumstances….

One is the case of a child of 12 or 13 years of age who has been taken into protection by the ministry and is discovering that nobody seems to be talking for that child. The parents aren't able to speak. The social workers aren't able to speak. The child is caught in between and, as part of being a self-advocate, comes to the officer as an advocate for that person.

On the other hand, a person — a youth perhaps — who is on parole and, again, is caught in between the systems. Does the officer here have a role? What is the role to help that youth? And is it proper for that youth to come to the advocate, or is it proper for the people in the community who would advise the child to say: "Well, you can go to the advocate because that's what this officer is for, as an advocate in extraordinary circumstances"? I'm wondering, in those cases….

Then there's the third one: the street youth. The street youth is trying to get off the street. They've gone to addiction services. They've gone to the other services that are there, but they're still left out on their own. They've tried every source. Can they come to this person, as an officer, to find help when everything else has failed? Those are three different scenarios that we face regularly almost every day in our offices.

Hon. G. Plant: I'm not going to be able to give an exact answer to each of those hypothetical but no doubt all-too-often repeated examples. What we're talking about here is a framework that gives the child and youth officer some basic functions and speaks about the way in which the officer can discharge those functions.

In some circumstances the officer's response to a particular situation may be simply to provide information to people about where they go to get a service if they are in a certain kind of situation; that is, it may be a referral, in effect. It may be that in some very unusual circumstances someone will present themselves to the officer, and the officer will see that this is an individual who has fallen between the cracks and that it really is the officer's duty to advocate on behalf of that individual child or youth to ensure that his or her perspective is heard and considered by the agencies that ought to be responsible for providing services to that person.

In other cases, the way in which the officer will assist the ministry to do its job better is simply by monitoring at a systemic level the way in which the services are or are not provided.

What's intended by section 3 and the other provisions of this bill is to create a toolkit that has some flexibility in it, that has some broad themes about it but also respects the fact that each situation will be unique and will require a different response or a different discharge of responsibility.

V. Anderson: That's helpful from the minister. I guess what I'm hearing from people and have been asked to try and clarify is what "extraordinary circumstances" means. When would one pick up this particular tool, and who would they give it to? What would be the purpose of the tool? What is the definition of extraordinary circumstances as it relates to this particular act and this particular situation?

Hon. G. Plant: The officer appointed under this act will to some extent define for themselves a role. They'll carve out the role as they perform the duties and tasks that will be assigned to them. The act contemplates the possibility that people can become effective self-advocates, and for those people, it seems to me unlikely that the officer would ever need to become an advocate on behalf of those individuals.

If someone comes along that can't become a self-advocate or can't be assisted by a community advocacy organization, for whatever reason, that in the view of the officer may well be the kind of extraordinary circumstances where the officer would say: "I will help you individually, and what I will help you do is ensure

that your views are heard and considered." That's the language of that provision, providing the voice on behalf of that child or youth who would not otherwise have the voice, either because they can't advocate for themselves or because there's no other agency or organization that could do it for them.

V. Anderson: If I can paraphrase it in my own understanding, the extraordinary circumstances are when all else fails. It's a fallback position for a child or a youth in those circumstances to move to, and I can accept that, if that's correct.

The other part of it is section 3(2)(d), which I find very encouraging: "promote and coordinate in communities the establishment of advocacy services for children, youth and their families." Could the minister explain what is envisioned by promoting services within the community of advocacy for children, and what is envisioned here if the officer is being hired? What is being placed before the officer as the fulfilment outline of this particular section?

Hon. G. Plant: I'm told this is a function that the child, youth and family advocate has had, so it has been brought in from that act into this bill, and that the child, youth and family advocate has discharged this responsibility over time by going out into communities working for groups of people with common interests, trying to provide them with information about how they can more effectively obtain access to the services that are needed and that kind of thing.

J. MacPhail: This is another section that troubles me, as well, and that I cannot support. Having said that, I want to ask the Attorney General to consider this: there will be children and youth who will be looking for advocacy services. The movement we've made in society has not eliminated the need for thousands of children to need advocacy. I'm asking the Attorney General to consider, at least as a transition until the rest of the system understands their role to ensure that people don't fall through the cracks, a help line of some sort, an independence-based help line for children and youth who need advocacy. The help line into the ministry will not serve that purpose.

Hon. G. Plant: Well, I'm sure the officer will read the transcript of this debate and decide how to discharge the functions. One of the things that I think is important, again, is to recognize that this is a broad framework of functions that actually contemplates the possibility that the officer, that any particular person holding the position, will find his or her own way of meeting those important responsibilities. If someone appointed to this position thought a 1-800 help line was a useful tool and the funds were available to support it, then that might well be something the officer would put in place.

J. MacPhail: I listened with interest to the Attorney General's reply to the Legislature's remarks around second reading. I noted with interest that he referred to the ombudsman, who could play a role in this in picking up advocacy responsibilities as they apply to children. In fact, the Morley report also refers to that. The Morley report, in a summary of findings under the ombudsman, says: "The ombudsman's current responsibility to respond to complaints about government services should be enhanced to ensure response to complaints about breaches of children's statutory rights and standards of care and service for children and youth."

The Attorney General said that would be an area that would be able to pick up the slack, so to speak, if there was any. I predict there will be. I note that the ombudsman released his 2001 annual report today, and the report reflects a pretty serious concern about ability to do the job as ombudsman because of lack of resources. I also note that the ombudsman's office budget is set for the next two years beyond this year, and there will be further cuts.

I suggest that with that evidence as current as today I cannot, nor can my colleague from Vancouver–Mount Pleasant, support this section, because it just can't stand on its own. There is a diminishing of resources elsewhere in the system that would, under ordinary circumstances, substitute for the diminished role of the child and youth officer.

J. MacPhail: Section 4 is nearly identical to section 19 of the Children's Commission Act, and it also corresponds with section 16 of the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act. Both deal with support — staff support, etc.

Under section 16 of the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act that is being repealed, the advocate did have the ability to make special reports to the Legislative Assembly outlining concerns about inadequate funding. There is no such provision under section 4 of Bill 43. Again, independence is always assured by not only making sure that guarantee of tenure is there but that there be adequate resources to carry out the functions. What avenues, under this legislation, does the child and youth officer have to discuss funding concerns?

Is the Attorney General somehow suggesting that the special report about systemic issues affecting children and youth in British Columbia could be interpreted to read that he or she could make special reports about the funding of his or her own office?

Hon. G. Plant: That's possible. Whether that is something that the officer wants to do will be up to the officer.

J. MacPhail: Yes, I fully understand that, but it is a provision that existed in the other legislation that doesn't here. I will assume that if indeed the issue of lack of proper resources to carry out one's mandate arises — because there is a specific mandate — the child and youth officer will be able to make special reports about funding concerns around her or his own office.

Hon. G. Plant: I don't want to take this debate to an unhelpful place, but I have to say that the provisions of sections 3, which the member opposes, are pretty broad.

In order to do the things that the child and youth officer is required to do, subsection (2)(h) of section 3 allows the officer to comment publicly on matters affecting children and youth. I would have thought that would be pretty broad and would encompass almost anything relevant to the provision of services by government to children and youth in British Columbia that the officer thought required him or her to comment on publicly.

J. MacPhail: Let me just say for the record why I raised this issue. It's because this act replaces the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act. In that act, because the person was an independent officer of the Legislature, there was a specific legislative provision that read:

I reiterate. That section, along with the fact that the child, youth and family advocate was an independent officer of the Legislature, allowed for the freedom to hold the government accountable for services provided to children and youth in this province. That provision under the old act is not repeated in the new act. Combined with the fact that the child and youth officer is an order-in-council appointee and this ability is missing, it required me to seek assurances that there was another avenue available to report that there may be inadequate funding and/or staff of her or his office specifically.

Hon. G. Plant: The provisions from the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act that the member referred to seem to me to be there largely because that office was in fact an officer of the Legislative Assembly and made sure that the advocate would have the ability to report to the Legislative Assembly if they weren't getting enough money from government. After all, the advocate reports to the Legislative Assembly. That structure makes good sense, given the fact that the advocate is an officer of the Legislature.

The member's fundamental question is whether or not this officer would be allowed to complain about their budget. I think there are all kinds of avenues in this act to allow the officer to complain publicly about his or her budget.

J. MacPhail: This section is called "Power to delegate." It permits the child and youth officer to delegate his or her powers of delegation, which means that someone hired or retained by the officer may acquire the officer's ability to delegate responsibilities to others. I note that section 23 of the Children's Commission Act prevented the officer from delegating his or her powers of delegation. I think that's different from the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, section 6. Yes, the advocate — under the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act — had the power to delegate.

Perhaps the minister could just, for my edification, explain why — and it is simply for information — the power for delegation flows from the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act. Is there anything that the children's commissioner had available, by holding all the power to herself or himself, that now is absent and may be missed?

Hon. G. Plant: The answer to the member's question is that when you look at the powers and the functions of the child and youth officer and ask the question whether there are any public policy reasons why any of those powers and functions could not be delegable, the only one that we think ought not to be delegable is that fundamental power of submitting an annual report. We want the officer to be personally responsible for that report. In terms of the functions around providing information and advice, doing the advocacy work, doing the work in communities, monitoring the service delivery and so on, that's work that staff or people in the office can provide and ought to provide.

The children's commissioner had almost quasi-judicial powers in relation to investigating deaths and responding to complaints. The children's commissioner was almost quasi-judicial as a complaint-resolving or complaint-adjudicating body. Those functions are not carried forward into this bill.

V. Anderson: I'm just trying to listen. As I listen and try and hear, it seems to me that unconsciously we have preconceived ideas of what the child advocate did before, and we have preconceived ideas of what the commissioner did before. What I hear the minister saying now — and I'd like to correct this, at least in some sense, if I'm on the right track — is that there were limitations to what those tasks did before. The new model is to give more flexibility to create new and creative responses and ways of responding that weren't there before. In one office, rather than in a person, there is the ability to have powers flow out so that a system can be created rather than just a function of a person. I'm

Hon. G. Plant: Well, I think the member is right that I'm trying not to put preconceived constraints around the way in which the child and youth officer would discharge his or her responsibilities. But I also do think it's important that we be clear that there are some changes here. The changes fall from the fact that when we asked Jane Morley to go and look at the universe of child and youth oversight processes and responsibilities across government, we discovered through her report that there is some overlap and some duplication. We have dealt with that by removing the overlap and duplication.

This officer does not have all of the functions that the Children's Commission had, because some of those functions are also the responsibility of the coroner or the ombudsman. We as government have decided that rather than have two or more different agencies or bodies doing the same thing, we should simplify and have only one body fundamentally responsible for investigating deaths of children in care. That body should be the coroner rather than the Children's Commission.

So there are some real changes in terms of the, I hope, clearer allocation of responsibility — a realignment of services — and, at the same time, making sure that this officer has a fairly broad ability to monitor and publicly report on the way in which the Ministry of Children and Family Development is doing its job.

The next point to make, which also has to be made in this context, is a point that I think I made in second reading debate. All of this has to be set against something that is more fundamental, which is the principle of ministerial accountability. This bill and the children's commissioner and the child, youth and family advocate…. None of those people provide the actual services that we're fundamentally talking about. Those services are provided by government, primarily through the Ministry of Children and Family Development.

What we're trying to do here is also recognize that the public interest is best protected by oversight mechanisms that respect the principle of ministerial accountability. As we move forward over time, the hope is that the public will acquire confidence that the Ministry of Children and Family Development is able to discharge its responsibilities in a way that meets the needs of children and youth so that a child who needs service from the ministry knows that if they contact the ministry, they have some degree of confidence that the ministry will do its job properly and provide that service. There will be less need for these oversight or backstop mechanisms.

We're not there yet, and that's why we're here creating this officer. In creating the officer, I do think it's important that we recognize that the responsibilities the officer will have are not, if you will, primary responsibilities. They're responsibilities that are engaged really only when the agency that is primarily responsible — that is, the ministry — doesn't do its job properly. What we're trying to do over the long haul is move towards a world in which the ministry is regarded by the public as able to do its job properly.

J. MacPhail: This is my final comment on this section, but it is in reply to what the Attorney General just said.

I think it's a very high bar that the Attorney General is setting for the minister responsible for children at risk. I say that knowing full well that I could take, as opposition, full advantage of saying that it's ministerial accountability. But the fact of the matter is that the protection of children was long debated in this province, and we arrived at an advocate for this reason. The community said: "It is as much a community responsibility as a government responsibility to keep our children free from risk and to protect the best interests of the child." That was the advocate's role.

It was the advocate's role to make sure that not only was the community fully armed, for lack of a better word, but that the advocate worked as a go-between between the community and government to ensure the best interests of the child.

I just fear, having been there myself and having failed in ministerial responsibility for holding all children free from risk, that it's a very, very high standard to set in this particular area. I would much prefer us to have had a debate about how the advocate could be better doing his or her job in ensuring the protection of children.

J. MacPhail: This section deals with investigations, and the act reads: "at the request of the Attorney General, the child and youth officer must undertake an investigation into any matter within the scope of this act." Then the act talks about making a confidential report of the results of an investigation.

I need to discuss that also within the scope of section 8, which we've referred to a bit. Let me put the question here, under section 6. This is the section, it seems to me…. There is no other section that deals with investigations, so I assume that all investigations must start with a request from the Attorney General. There is another section, section 8, that allows the child and youth officer to "make a special report to the Attorney General about systemic issues affecting children and youth in British Columbia."

I am curious to know…. Let me ask this: how does the Attorney General interpret those two sections coming together — as complementary or working at odds?

Hon. G. Plant: Well, I think they're complementary. One of the distinctions — maybe the primary distinction — between a special report under section 8 and an investigation under section 6 is that an investigation

has with it coercive and subpoena-like powers that are talked about in section 7. An investigation in this context is something that would be undertaken rarely, I would think. An investigation means that the child and youth officer has the power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, compel witnesses to give evidence on oath, and so on. Those are quite extraordinary powers, and I would think the power to undertake an investigation would not be one that would be exercised very often.

J. MacPhail: So I take it, then, that sections 6 and 7 have to be read together, but not 8. In other words….

Hon. G. Plant: I think the member's right. I mean, an investigation which is used in section 6 then leads into section 7, which says that for the purposes of an investigation — and that's an investigation under section 6 — the child and youth officer has the powers that I talked about. Then there are other things that flow from that. That's different from a special report about systemic issues affecting children and youth in British Columbia, which is section 8(3). I think there are clearly going to be circumstances and occasions where a report done as a result of an investigation will be made public. That's why section 6(2) is there — to permit such reports to be made public. If it is a special report about a systemic issue, that is a different kind of thing, I think.

J. MacPhail: Under section 6, "Investigations," will the public know when the Attorney General requests an investigation?

J. MacPhail: So I assume that we could see a situation where an investigation is requested and the public doesn't know, and a report might also not be made public about that same matter. Could the Attorney General say under what hypothetical circumstances that might occur?

Hon. G. Plant: Speaking purely hypothetically, I suppose it's possible that something that looks like a failure to discharge statutory responsibilities in a particular case that might engage the Attorney General's attention around requiring an investigation might conceivably, during the course of the investigation, start to look as though there was potentially criminal behaviour. In that circumstance, the officer might end up making a report that would be provided to the criminal justice branch or to the police, who would then undertake whatever investigation they thought appropriate. There's an example of a potential situation where both the fact the investigation had been requested and the report might remain confidential.

J. MacPhail: I understand, Mr. Chair, that we're also discussing, tangentially, section 7 here, but my question is related. Is it possible that the child and youth officer can conduct an investigation without receiving a request from the Attorney General?

J. MacPhail: All right, then I'll skip right down to…. I had a series of questions about the public being able to ask about an investigation. I take it if there's circumstances in which a person of the public wants an investigation, then they would go to the Attorney General with that request — I'm saying, for the Attorney General to consider. That's the avenue by which to invoke section 6?

Hon. G. Plant: Potentially, but I think in many of those cases, the person who has a question might approach the officer first. The officer might be able to undertake some kind of analysis, study or investigation with a small "i," I suppose, that would examine the issue and might lead to a report or some advice without having to embark upon the kind of process contemplated by sections 6 and 7. In other words, there may be other ways to satisfy the interest that the citizen has besides the investigation process.

J. MacPhail: Under 6(2) it is the Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether a report should be made public — this investigation by the child and youth officer. How does the Attorney General protect himself from being in a potential conflict of interest in this matter? I'm not necessarily saying a conflict of interest under our Members' Conflict of Interest Act, but a conflict of interest in discharging his responsibilities wherein the investigation report may be extremely critical of the government.

Hon. G. Plant: That's why the officer reports to the Attorney General. The Attorney General has many responsibilities by convention, by statute and by constitutional convention that in fact involve the Attorney General being to some extent independent of government and having to give government advice it doesn't want to hear and to do things that would be perhaps more than ordinarily challenging. This is the kind of thing that the Attorney General, as a cabinet officer and as a person within our constitutional tradition, has experience doing.

J. MacPhail: Well, that has been my experience with the office of the Attorney General as well, but it will have to be exercised with a great deal of care in these circumstances — a great deal of care.

Will the ministry or the program that is the subject of an investigation — if it is the subject of an investigation — be able to look at the report, respond to it or have input guaranteed, or is it up to the child and youth officer to determine that?

J. MacPhail: In section 7(1)(c) it says that the officer can "compel witnesses to produce records and things." It struck me as unusual. Maybe it isn't.

Hon. G. Plant: It's a really offensive thing to me as a lawyer that someone could draft a bill that would actually use the word "thing." But that's pretty much it. It could be an object. I can imagine circumstances where the issue that is under consideration does in fact require that real evidence be, in effect, put on the record. So the officer would have the power to require someone to provide or produce a "thing" that might be relevant to an investigation.

It says here the child and youth officer will have "the same powers that the Supreme Court has for the trial of civil actions to do the following…."

I take it from that that the rules of natural justice apply then. Is that a given?

J. MacPhail: This is the section where annual and special reports are provided for. What would be the difference between an annual report…? I know what an annual report is.

Let me ask it this way: what is the thought behind the range of special reports that the child and youth officer may make? I ask it again in this context. It seems to me that the special reports are limited to systemic issues. So there would not be an ability to examine a particular case of a child falling through the cracks or whatever. What is the thought behind just providing for reports on systemic issues?

Hon. G. Plant: An example of this kind of report is a report the children's commissioner recently did on FAS. That might be a systemic issue in that the way in which government responds to FAS may be something that the child and youth officer thinks requires a special report — and other issues like that.

In relation to the challenge around individual cases, the fact that the officer has the ability to comment publicly on matters affecting children and youth might give the officer the ability to say something publicly about a specific case.

Of course, one of the other things that's relevant in this context is the role of the ombudsman around individual cases of administrative unfairness or failure to do the job that a particular government official should be doing.

J. MacPhail: This is the section that ensures that a child or youth in foster care or a group home, a facility or other place is given an opportunity to contact the child and youth officer and speak to the officer in confidence. This has some replication from the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, but there are some changes as well. It does say that under the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, a child or a youth — period — has the right to contact. Bill 43 limits the child or youth to a person who is in care. How will this limit the ability of a child to contact the child and youth officer?

Hon. G. Plant: I don't think there is any limitation on the ability of a child or youth to contact the officer. What this section speaks to is the ability to contact that officer in confidence. It does limit the category of people who can do that to a child or youth in care in a foster home, group home facility or other place. I think it's because the focus is on confidence and the need to ensure that someone who is in care can, in fact, have access to the officer in confidence. Those are the most pressing circumstances, I guess, where the need to contact the officer in confidence arises.

J. MacPhail: This is one area that I will be watching with interest as well. I hope that the intention of section 9 is not to narrow the scope of the ability of children or youth in the province to contact the child and youth officer. I do worry about a child and youth officer who is concerned about exercising her or his responsibilities with funding may limit her or his contact to just children and youth in care.

There are circumstances in which children are receiving designated services from the province but are not designated children in care. That occurs right now. I expect, given the direction of the Minister of Children and Family Development with his goal of reducing the number of children in care, that there will be children who are not in care but are receiving designated services.

I will watch carefully to ensure that this particular wording does not limit access of those children to the child and youth officer.

V. Anderson: Just for clarity, this is one case where I think, in the past, sometimes there are people in the community who thought of the officer as a particular person. In essence, there is an officer, but if I understand correctly, the duties of the officer can be delegated to other persons so that throughout the province there could be a group of delegated persons who can meet the needs of the child in confidence. It doesn't

have to be the one named person, representing the officer, that is the only person who can talk to children if they need to confide in somebody.

Hon. G. Plant: It is certainly the case that the officer has the ability to delegate powers, duties or functions so that someone who wants to contact the officer could, in fact, be contacting somebody who works in the office of the child and youth officer.

J. MacPhail: Noting the hour, I move that the committee recess until 6:35 p.m.

J. MacPhail: This is the section called "Child and Youth Officer's Access to Information." It corresponds to section 7 of the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act, and it corresponds to section 6 of the Children's Commission Act. It specifies when the officer has access to information under FOI.

I note that we're dealing with an amendment under section 12 that deals with FOI, but I wanted to ask the Attorney General a separate question from that. I will have more questions under section 12.

The Children's Commission Act protected information "that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a person who has made a report under section 14 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act." I'm curious. This protection is not included in Bill 43, so what safeguards are there for that previous protection under the Children's Commission Act?

Hon. G. Plant: The protection that I think the member is referring to is in subsection (2) of section 12 of the bill and will continue in the amended version of that subsection, assuming the amendment passes. We're going to get there, obviously, but it's actually in subsection (1) of the amendment.

J. MacPhail: I'm in receipt of a letter from the information and privacy commissioner that I'm sure the Attorney General has as well. Are the concerns raised in his letter addressed under section 12? If so, I will save my questions for then. Is it the Attorney General's view that his concerns have been addressed under the amendment?

Hon. G. Plant: Yes. I want to be sure that it's…. It may not be just in section 12, but yes, we received the same letter. I don't know what letter the member received, but we received the letter of May 8 from the commissioner, and we have attempted to address his concerns in the amendments. I'm given to understand we have succeeded in addressing them largely to his satisfaction.

J. MacPhail: I just want to put this on the record, if I may, because I met with the freedom-of-information and protection-of-privacy commissioner and commended him on his analysis of bills all the time. It was very helpful for us in opposition, not specifically on this issue. He did write to the Attorney General, who is now tabling an amendment to deal with those concerns.

The concerns raised by the office of the information and privacy commissioner are that there appears to be no specific incorporation through this bill of certain privacy standards that form the heart of fair information practices in part 3 of the act by which he is governed, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

Let me ask this question of the Attorney General. Does the amendment that is now called confidentiality and application of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act…? Is this the incorporation of section 3(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as requested by the commissioner?

Hon. G. Plant: Let me point out that in the bill, prior to its amendment in section 12(3), there is specific reference to some provisions of the FOI act. It says that despite section 12, those sections apply to the child and youth officer and any person acting for or under the direction of the child and youth officer.

That section is worded that way because, as the member knows, unless you expressly provide otherwise in a bill, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act is worded so that its provisions generally apply to all other legislation. What we propose doing in the amendment is removing that subsection (3) with its specific reference to a couple of sections of the act.

By doing that and not putting anything else in their place, this bill becomes generally subject to the FOI act — not just part 3 but the whole act. Of course, it gets a little bit more complicated, because in subsections (1) and (2) of the amendment, there are a couple of exceptions. But we've gone a little bit further, I think, than the commissioner expressly wanted.

J. MacPhail: Has the Attorney General's staff discussed this with the freedom-of-information commissioner and received his approval that this meets the test of his concerns?

J. MacPhail: This is a section entitled "Review of Act." It's a new section. It doesn't correspond to any section in either the Children's Commission Act or the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act. This section requires that the Attorney General conduct a review. Within five years of this act coming into force, the Attorney General must undertake a comprehensive review of this act. The legislation also specifies that the review will determine whether the functions of the child and youth officer are still required.

It's not a sunset clause, and it's not a sunrise clause. I take it that…. Well, let me just ask a series of questions and see whether I'm heading in the right direction. How will the review be conducted, and who will be responsible for the review?

Hon. G. Plant: Well, I think it will be up to the Attorney General of the day to determine how to conduct that review. It is the Attorney General's responsibility here to undertake it, but I assume that that responsibility could be discharged by any number of means. The fullness of time will determine which of those means is chosen. Of course, whatever means is chosen, the review is required to be comprehensive, because that is the language of the provision.

J. MacPhail: Who knows what will happen five years from now? Let me just put this into the mix for consideration as we…. I'm sure we'll all be reviewing the original Hansard debate on this. In Ontario it was just recently reported that the number of children…. Let me make sure I've got this accurate. The reported incidence of physical abuse of children doubled in Ontario between 1993 and 1998, over a five-year period. This was also, just to put it on the record, a period of huge change in the delivery of services to children and families in Ontario — huge change.

I certainly hope, given our discussion before supper, that somehow there may be a cure for these matters — no, actually that's not fair comment; nobody suggested that there was — but that ministerial accountability may prevail. Even in jurisdictions that have a quality of life and an economy that's booming, as Ontario did during that period of time, it does not in any way impede those who want to abuse children or harm children. That's what we learned from Ontario.

This section is key, in my view. It is key. I hope that the Attorney General, as part of his ongoing commitment or his legacy, will ensure that the review is very broadly based, that the consultation will involve as wide a range of stakeholders as is possible and that perhaps there can even be an opportunity for input into how the review will look as well as the criteria used to determine whether the office should stay or go.

J. MacPhail: I haven't actually had time to examine the amendment, so perhaps the Attorney General could explain it. It deletes the current section 15 of the proposed act and puts this new section in.

Hon. G. Plant: We'd had the discussion about how the bill has now been amended to give effect to a slightly different FOI regime. What these amendments to section 15 are intended to do is ensure that any records that were created by the Children's Commission and that were subject to the former regime around disclosure and privacy will continue to be subject to that regime — only those records. So it is truly transitional in that sense.

Section 15 has been amended to give effect to the transition principles that I've talked about arising out of our change to the basic confidentiality rules. If you look at subparagraph (e) of subsection (1), this rule, among others, will apply on the repeal of the Children's Commission Act — namely, that all records under the Children's Commission Act must be transferred to the child and youth officer who must apply to confidentiality provisions that govern records under the Children's Commission Act in respect of any records originally produced under that act.

Hon. G. Plant: I move the amendment to section 17 that is standing in my name with the Clerk:

J. MacPhail: I'm always nervous about where we change "ors." Perhaps the Attorney General could explain this one to ensure that the application of section 17 is clear.

Hon. G. Plant: Section 75 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act is a section that deals with confidentiality of information. It was originally our intention to replace paragraph (c) of section 75, which talked about reports under the Children's Commission Act, with reference to reports under sections 6(2) or 8 of the Office for Children and Youth Act. My understanding is that because of the changes we have made in section 11, that subparagraph is no longer required. That means that the basic confidentiality obligation that exists in section 75 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act prevails only in the first two instances — subparagraphs (a) and (b) of that act.

Hon. G. Plant: I move that section 3(1)(c.1), the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, be repealed.

J. MacPhail: Was the freedom-of-information and protection-of-privacy commissioner consulted on the amendment just passed, and did he…? I guess he would take into account the consequential amendment, but was he consulted on the amendment to the act, and what did he say?

Hon. G. Plant: In short, the commissioner was consulted, and he supports what we're doing here. I probably made the motion in a way that was technically correct, but we are changing — we have changed — what was intended by section 19. The general thrust of it — as I said earlier in respect of section 12, I think — is that we are moving, to some degree, into a regime where the basic rules of FOI apply here now as opposed to a special set of rules.

Hon. G. Plant: I move the committee rise and report the bill complete with amendments.

The House in Committee of the Whole (Section B) on Bill 44; J. Weisbeck in the chair.

J. MacPhail: We're now discussing the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Amendment Act, 2002.

There are some changes to the definitions — under section 1, the interpretation of health care. The one I'm particularly concerned about is section 1(a), which broadens the definition from "course of health care" to "a series or sequence of similar treatments or care administered to an adult over a period of time for a particular health problem…."

Hon. K. Whittred: First of all, before I answer the first question, I'd like to introduce the staff that are with me this evening. On my right here is Ann Marr, Gerrit Clements and Paul Bailey, who's sitting behind me.

To respond to the member's question, the previous act made reference to "course" in the definition of health care. It was difficult for people to know what that meant. This is to clarify it so that it is clear that it means a sequence of treatments. For example, if someone suffers from an illness, it means a sequence of things that might be in the course of that illness.

J. MacPhail: Let me ask this. This is the part where this defines, I think, under the act, when it's necessary to involve the substitute decision-maker. That's what flows from this — that there are times when the substitute decision-maker can give consent for a course of health care. And there are other times when consent is only needed once or whatever.

I assume this change flows from the minister's opening comments on second reading that there were operational difficulties with a health care provider having to seek approval every time a pill was administered. Am I correct in saying that this redefines the nature of health care that then allows a health care provider to repeat a service without having to go back to the decision-maker?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, the member is basically understanding that correctly.

Under the previous act it was cumbersome for health care professionals, because frequently they

would have to go back time and time again to get permission to administer what would be described as routine or minor care, such as a headache remedy. This allows the provision of a longer-term plan that can be given without having to go back for consent.

J. MacPhail: I'm wondering whether there was any consultation done with interested organizations or advocacy organizations around this change.

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, there was extensive consultation. In August 2001 the Ministry of Health Services drafted amendments to this particular act based on input that was received over the last two years from community groups, government agencies and service provider organizations.

These were organizations represented on the Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act planning group. I will describe the membership of that in a moment. This planning group actually went back to the mid-nineties. It's been in place for many, many years and meets, I understand, pretty much on a monthly basis to provide advice to the ministry and to the public guardian and trustee regarding the implementation of the act.

It has met regularly since the legislation was introduced to identify issues and to make recommendations. During December 2001 and January 2002 further consultation was undertaken. The content of the proposed amendments was presented to the planning group at a half-day session. In addition, organizations not represented on the committee such as the College of Physicians and Surgeons and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association were contacted for input. Feedback from the above associations and organizations resulted in modifications to the proposed amendments. With few exceptions, the changes represent the views of all of those contacted. In other words, there was close to consensus on the revisions to the amendments.

I would be happy to share the membership of that organization with the member if she wishes, but I rather think that she is familiar with that organization.

There were also a number of telephone conferences, Mr. Chair, that were conducted by staff between December 12, 2001, and January 25, 2002.

Section 1(b). This is a new section that actually allows for the health care provider to provide medical treatment included in the minor health care plan without having to seek consent from the designated decision-maker. It actually includes the minor health care plan in the definition and includes an expiry date of 12 months after consent to the plan has been given.

I'm asking specifically about this section, because everything else flows from this. Did the consultation group that the minister just spoke about understand that this was going to be part of the legislation and approve of that?

J. MacPhail: This limits the application from professional services, care or treatment — that's what the old act said — to the provision of psychiatric care or treatment. I'm wondering why the necessity of changing from "all professional services, care or treatment" down to just "psychiatric care or treatment." Why was this necessary?

Hon. K. Whittred: There had been some changes to the Mental Health Act, and this amendment simply brings this act in line with the Mental Health Act.

J. MacPhail: Is there any change for people receiving services in a designated facility under the Mental Health Act?

J. MacPhail: Another change under this section is to change sections 2(c) and 2(d). It repeals section 2(c) of the act, and then it adds a new section 2(d) that says the provision of professional services, care or treatment to a person for the purposes of sterilization for non-therapeutic reasons is now no longer applicable under this act.

Hon. K. Whittred: This was added to alert parties that the common law around sterilizations is in place and that this act does not affect non-therapeutic sterilization.

J. MacPhail: I want to make this clear. Section 3 adds that a health care provider must not provide health care under section 12, which is the section that's entitled "No emergency health care contrary to wishes." That's the section that we're dealing with. Then it says: "A health care provider must not provide health care under section 12 if the health care provider has reasonable grounds to believe that the person, while capable and after attaining 19 years of age, expressed an instruction or wish applicable to the circumstances to refuse consent to health care."

It goes on later to say that the determination has to be made on reasonable grounds. Under what reasonable grounds would this be determined?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, some examples of this provision would be a Jehovah's Witness who carries a card

that indicates that they do not wish to be given a blood transfusion. That would certainly be reasonable grounds to believe that the person does not wish to have blood.

Another would be a no intervention, no CPR order that the person may have indicated in a variety of ways. It might be a written order to the doctor, an indication to someone who might be coming in an ambulance. It would be an evident thing that would available to the provider.

J. MacPhail: There's also a section added. It's 12.2, "Emergency health care despite refusal." That's the title of it. This is a new section. It says that despite the decision made by the substitute decision-maker, guardian or representative to refuse health care to a person, health care may still be provided if section 12(1)(a) applies. Section 12(1)(a) says that health care may be provided if it is necessary to provide the health care without delay in order to preserve the adult's life, to prevent serious physical or mental harm, to alleviate severe pain, or if the substitute decision-maker, guardian or representative did not comply with their duties under this or any other act.

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, 12.1 refers to a longer sequence of events and is based on an individual's declared intent, and 12.2 is for an emergency service only. It's based on the Ontario experience. What it says is that if a person, let's suppose, is ill and the substitute decision-maker says, "I do not want CPR administered," it gives the medical practitioner the ability to intervene and say: "I believe that is a wrong decision, and if I administer this procedure, this person will lead a good and productive life." That is why it's only for emergency purposes.

Where does one find in the act what the duties of the substitute decision-maker, guardian or representative are?

Hon. K. Whittred: The duties of the temporary substitute decision-maker are found in section 19(1) of the act. Essentially, the person chosen to give substitute consent must consult with the adult, with a relative or friend of the adult who asks to assist and to comply to any instructions that the adult may have given.

J. MacPhail: Section 4 amends the bill so that now it provides that the health care provider can provide health care after consulting or making a reasonable effort to consult with the spouse, relative, friend or any other person who is reasonably available. It would be my premise that somehow this is making the section…. These changes, which are to a section called "Exception — major health care," add ambiguity by adding the phrases "making a reasonable effort" and that the consultation is with someone who is "reasonably available." Perhaps the minister could advise on what constitutes a reasonable effort. And what does the minister mean by someone who is reasonably available?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes. Reasonable means that the health care provider, who is given instruction to consult, must make every reasonable effort. Reasonable effort means that if he has knowledge that the individual's daughter, for example, is on holiday in the Bahamas and someone has left a number, he must try to contact the daughter. However, having done that, if he is still unable to make contact, he then has made reasonable effort to consult and would proceed with attending to the care of the individual.

J. MacPhail: Further on this section, a section dealing with "Exception — major health care," there is another change. I'm at 14(4). In cases where a substitute decision-maker gives or refuses consent for health care, the care provider must now inform the spouse, relative or friend of that decision to refuse or give health care services. Subsection (4) of the original act simply says that the health care provider must tell the spouse, relative or friend certain things, once a designated decision-maker has been chosen. Now the health care provider need only inform the spouse, relative or friend if the designated decision-maker has given or refused consent. That's the change.

So my question that flows from that is: will spouses or friends or relatives still be provided with information about the patient even if the designated decision-maker has not given or has refused consent for medical services? How broad is the circle for information-sharing?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes. Actually, in this section it is (4)(a)(iii) that is the really significant item, the decision to give or refuse substitute consent. That is an addition, and it means that the individual must be informed of the decision to either give or refuse substitute consent. That was a drafting error that was omitted from the previous document.

J. MacPhail: This is the section dealing with the authority of a temporary substitute decision-maker. It actually removes a qualification; a 21-day limit no longer applies. It adds that the authority is limited in scope by section 9(2), which states: "Consent to health care applies only to the specific health care that an adult has consented to."

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, this section brings it in line with what is practised for capable patients. Under the act prior to the amendment, it meant that every 21 days the health care provider would have to go through the entire process of declaring the individual not to be competent to naming a substitute decision-maker and so on, going through the entire process.

This eliminates that process, but it says that 21 days prior to any health care being administered, that process will have to be applied.

J. MacPhail: Carrying on, there's a new section added that says if the health care provider has reasonable grounds to believe that the adult receiving health care services may be capable of giving or refusing consent, then the health care provider must again determine the ability of the adult requiring care. I think what flows from this is that then the substitute decision-maker is gone, and we're back to having the capable adult make those decisions.

How would the health care provider determine reasonable grounds? What would be the indications of that? Are there tests in law around that?

Hon. K. Whittred: The answer to her question about whether or not there are tests in law is no. However, there are the obvious examples that would come to mind. For example, if someone has been comatose and regains consciousness, that would certainly be an indication that the person is capable — or someone with a fluctuating mental illness that is maybe brought under control. I think those are the kinds of examples that are addressed.

J. MacPhail: Section 6 adds a new subsection to the act called 5.2(b), which says the board may…. This is the request for review section, so we're dealing with the review board here. This new section says that the board may "…without notice to the parties to the review, a hearing or receipt or consideration of evidence other than the request document" — that the decision is confirmed….

Could the minister please explain the purpose of that section? How will that impact on other parties to the review or the hearing?

Hon. K. Whittred: It was unclear in the act, and there was, in fact, conflicting legal opinions about whether or not the board had jurisdiction over minor health care. This clarifies the situation. It's now clear that the board does have jurisdiction, but it can be a summary procedure rather than a full hearing.

J. MacPhail: This section talks about when a hearing has to be held, etc. There's a new section. It says that if the decision for review raises a public policy question or concerns the obtaining of consent for health care, then a decision cannot be confirmed as section 5.1(b) allows — which allows the board to make a decision — but must be put to a hearing.

What would be the range of questions of public policy that might invoke this section?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, this would be a situation where a particular health care procedure might be somewhat controversial in the minds of certain advocacy groups. ECT, I think, would be a good example. If that concern was raised, then the board would have to meet and rule on that provision.

J. MacPhail: There's also a new section added to deal with review board hearings. It says that decisions of the board to confirm a decision, or the decision to not include certain parties to the review or to provide them with a written notice of the review cannot be questioned, reviewed or brought to a judicial review.

What happens if there's a spouse that wants to be of the part of the review, but the board decided under their powers that he or she would not be party to the review? Does that person have any recourse available? What is the recourse for them to find out the outcome and the process of the review?

Hon. K. Whittred: That particular section only deals with minor health care. It only refers to minor health care.

J. MacPhail: My last question under this section is that previously, an appeal automatically consisted of a hearing unless there was a question of law. Now we're seeing under this new act that there would not be a hearing at all unless a court orders one. What will an appeal consist of? What brought about this change?

Hon. K. Whittred: This section is to bring the act in line with what normally happens with the Court of Appeal. The court normally looks at the record of decision of the lower court. It looks at the documentation and normally does not have a hearing itself.

J. MacPhail: This section deals with collection of personal information. There are three sections under there: collection of personal information, disclosure of information to prescribed advocacy organization and confidentiality.

These three sections are the subject of a letter sent to the Minister of State for Intermediate, Long Term and Home Care dated May 13 from the information and privacy commissioner. Basically, the letter brings to the minister's attention a possible conflict that may arise out of section 8 of this bill, affecting sections 33(1) to (3) of the act. There may be a conflict between those

three sections and sections 32 and 33 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

Has the minister had an opportunity to address this inconsistency or address any of the concerns raised by the freedom-of-information commissioner?

Hon. K. Whittred: Yes, we have spoken with the commissioner's staff. They are satisfied with our explanation of the bill. The FOI act is in fact a much narrower act. It deals with public bodies. This act applies to independent health care professionals, such as physicians.

J. MacPhail: Just for the record, the minister is saying that the concerns raised by the freedom-of-information commissioner in his May 13 letter to the minister have been addressed and that the freedom-of-information commissioner has stated that he's satisfied.

Hon. K. Whittred: I move the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.

Bill 44, Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Amendment Act, 2002, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

Creating a healthy labour relations climate is an important part of our government's overall goal of encouraging employees and employers to develop healthy workplace relationships that lead to good, sustainable jobs. This bill, Bill 42, is all about increasing employment for British Columbians by making sure that B.C. businesses are economically viable. Nine years of poor economic performance and increased global competition have undermined British Columbia's ability to attract and maintain viable businesses that employ our people.

Our new era is about liberating our economy and minimizing undue government intervention in people's lives. It's about giving employees and employers the tools they need to foster better working relationships and safe, healthy, dynamic workplaces. It's about giving working women and men the safeguards and incentives they need to participate fully and equally in the competitive global economy in which we all work and live.

In our discussions with business people, trade unions, employees and other British Columbians, three things have been clear. We must ensure that our province's Labour Code is applied in ways that reflect fundamental principles that are now duties under the code. We must ensure that employees' freedom of choice in union representation is an informed choice through unions' and employers' communication with the employees, communication without coercion or intimidation. We must change the way we do labour relations in British Columbia in order to rebuild our economy and create more high-quality jobs for our people. These are the goals of this bill.

We balance these changes with a commitment to consider other changes through a special advisory committee under section 3 of the Labour Code. This bill makes two important changes to the Labour Relations Code. These changes, like other legislative changes I've introduced in this House, are designed to help restore economic growth and prosperity in this province, to strike a balance and to be fair-minded.

First, this bill adds consistency, certainty and fairness to the system by requiring the Labour Relations Board and others to interpret and apply the code in keeping with eight stated principles. These principles include, amongst others, recognizing the rights and obligations of employers, employees and unions; fostering employment in economically viable businesses; and encouraging cooperative participation between employers and trade unions.

Second, this bill clarifies the rights of employers to communicate with employees and will provide for the development of a process of communication that can be used by both employers and unions.

This bill follows through on commitments to obtain sustainable jobs. It takes into account the input we received when we consulted with employers, employees and other interested British Columbians.

The B.C. Labour Relations Code governs all aspects of collective bargaining in provincially regulated workplaces. This includes how employees gain or terminate union representation, how unions and bargaining associations represent their members, how employers and unions bargain and resolve contract disputes, and the rules for strikes, lockouts and picketing.

In March of this year I released a discussion paper review of labour relations in B.C. The discussion paper set out changes to the code that the industrial relations community had suggested to government. One of

those suggestions was a section 3 advisory committee to review possible changes. A total of 58 written responses were received from business and labour organizations, employers, unions, bargaining associations and individuals. In addition, we received more than 400 comments on the discussion papers via the Internet discussion forum. The result is a bill that adds consistency, certainty and fairness to labour relations, restores the right to communicate and makes sure Labour Relations Board resources are well used.

In 1992 a committee of special advisers reviewed the Industrial Relations Act. The committee said that the purposes that were laid out in the code formed the governing principles of the legislation, but the code required the board to have no more than a regard for these principles. LRB decisions have said the board must be mindful of the purposes. They've described the purposes as a useful policy tool.

What we are saying with this bill is that the principles on which the legislation is based are not just a policy tool or a guideline. They are a substantive part of the code, and they must be treated that way. So this bill changes the introductory provisions of the code to give the Labour Relations Board clear direction that it has a duty to consider the stated principles in its decisions. Other persons who exercise powers and perform duties under the code have been given the same direction.

For that reason, the purposes section has been renamed "Duties under this Code." We have not amended the six existing principles. To the six we add two more principles: a recognition of all rights and obligations, and fostering the employment of workers in economically viable businesses.

Employer and trade union rights and obligations are mentioned in various sections of the code already. The people who are most affected by what happens at the Labour Relations Board are employees — for example, the right to choose union representation and the obligation to not engage in illegal picketing. But employee rights are mentioned as they apply to trade union membership and participation in union activities. By recognizing the rights and obligations of employees, employers and trade unions under the code, we ensure recognition of the balance that is so essential in labour relations. We are adding a clear recognition of the rights and obligations of employers, trade unions and employees.

We added another duty to the code: fostering the employment of workers in economically viable businesses. This will ensure that the importance of fostering employment in economically viable businesses will be a factor in future Labour Relations Board decisions. It will also be a factor in the decisions of others who exercise powers and perform duties under the code. Labour relations is sometimes said to be about sharing the pie, but of course first you need a pie to share. We spoke to a number of trade unions over the past month. They all recognized that employment for their members requires a better economy.

An economically viable business is one that attracts investment, increases productivity and technological change, and invests in its workers and employees through training. And profitability is necessary. It preserves businesses, expands businesses and creates new businesses, all of which result in more employment. Good jobs that pay good wages depend on a competitive business being there in the first place. You can't have collective bargaining if you don't have the jobs there. That's a fundamental truth that both unions and employers understand.

From now on, economic viability will be one — it will be one — of the eight factors that need to be applied when decisions are made under the Labour Code. This clear direction adds consistency, certainty and fairness in proceedings and decisions of the Labour Relations Board and others. All of these will help attract investment and jobs to British Columbia. It will give employers, employees and trade unions the tools they need to build healthy enterprises that can compete on a world scale.

In 1993 the Labour Code was amended to read, "Nothing in this code deprives a person of the freedom to communicate to an employee," but in recent years sections of the code have been found to deprive a person of this right. Today's legislation clarifies the right to communicate that was introduced in 1993.

Regulations will be developed through consultation with the industrial relations community to allow both the employer and the union a formal process to communicate with employees before a vote for certification or decertification takes place. These regulations will focus on ensuring it is a fair meeting — equal opportunity for the employer and the union to discuss but not debate. It will be facilitated by a neutral moderator such as an industrial relations officer.

This would occur in that ten-day window from when the majority of employees have indicated by a 45 percent majority that they would like the opportunity to certify and that has gone to the board, and the board has ordered a vote. At that point there are ten days before that vote can be held. During that ten-day window, either the union or the employer may ask that the Labour Relations Board — or instruct a labour relations officer — attend to conduct such a meeting.

Freedom to communicate is not a blank cheque, and for this reason, intimidation and coercion are specifically prohibited. We believe this change will reduce the potential for unfair labour practices.

Finally, this bill will assist with the internal streamlining of the Labour Relations Board. It does this by removing the legal requirement to have two separate associate chairs and by giving the LRB chair discretion in providing certain services. The Labour Relations Board will have the ability to introduce fees in certain areas. Based on a fair approach, this change will allow the Labour Relations Board to put resources where they are needed — in building a positive labour relations climate in British Columbia.

Paul Weiler was the first chair of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board from 1973 to '78. He's

now at Harvard. In his book, Governing the Workplace, written in 1990, he concludes that the employment relationship makes a "huge difference to productivity and competitiveness." That's what these changes are all about: recognizing the rights of employees, employers and trade unions in a workplace that enables a business to grow and create new jobs.

Employees, employers and unions all have rights that must be balanced and protected, and this bill helps achieve that. This bill is a first step toward reform of labour relations in British Columbia. It is a step that unions and employers have begun — mills that the IWA and the employers have worked hard to remain competitive in the marketplace, hotels that the owner and the unions have worked hard to keep open. The United Steelworkers of America have done the same. Film industry unions have worked with producers and studios to generate a billion-dollar business in this province. Let's have the code and the board keep pace with these efforts. We've acted quickly in areas that are straightforward and need quick action to help revitalize our economy.

I'm also establishing a special advisory committee under section 3 of the code. This was raised by the unions. Leaders like Dave Haggard of the IWA, Ken Neumann of the Steelworkers, Marie Decaire of local 40 and Brooke Sundin of the United Food and Commercial Workers asked me in different meetings to establish a committee of special advisers if we were to consider changes to the Labour Code.

We've made two important changes at this time. Further changes will result from the consultation that each of those union leaders has suggested to me through the process of a section 3 committee. We are committed to creating a modern workplace environment where employees and employers can develop cooperative and productive relationships to succeed in today's economy. This bill is one step in that direction, and I look forward to more in the future.

J. Kwan: If you listened to the minister's words, you would have thought that the old Labour Relations Code was set out to destroy business, that it was set out to hamper economic activities. You would think that the code itself was specifically designed to do that, but when you look at the purposes of the code and when you actually look at the words that were written in the act, you will see a different picture.

I want to begin with the purposes of the code and putting what it states on record. The Labour Relations Code, "Purposes of the code," section 2(1):

Then section 2(2) goes on to say: "The board must exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed on it under this Code having regard to the purposes set out in subsection (1)."

The purposes of the code are explicit in the act to guide the board in the performance of its duties. What it must do is ensure there is proper practice and fair practice of labour relations in the workplace for both the employee and the employer. It is aimed to resolve disputes more expeditiously and minimize them as well, and of course, it is to protect the interest of the public during these disputes. That's what the purpose of the code was under the Labour Relations Code.

Perhaps the minister should read again the title of this bill and the act that he has just introduced. It is not an employers' bill of rights. The Labour Relations Code is supposed to be a code that sets the parameters for constructive relations between workers and their employers. The purposes of the Labour Relations Code as it exists now speak to that.

The purpose of the code should not be just about ensuring business profitability. It should be about ensuring that the combined efforts of the employer and the employee produce benefits for both sides, because when it works for the employer it also works for the employee, and vice versa. The code is supposed to ensure that there are benefits for both sides. When there is a conflict, the code is there to assist them in working it out. That's the purpose of the code.

The underlying message in these amendments to the code that the minister has introduced is that the very existence of a union in the workplace is somehow counterproductive and that union memberships hinder profit. The minister knows better or at least should know better. In a hundred years of industrial relations, the right to organize has never been a detriment to profit — far from it — but limiting this right has been. Protracted strikes and lockouts hurt everyone.

This bill takes the role of the Labour Relations Board in a new and, quite frankly, inappropriate direction. It says that the duty of the board is to consider the future economic viability of a business and to determine the rights of the workers both when organizing and bargaining as they relate to that viability.

For a government that wants to take a hands-off approach to business, this is indeed a strange turn of events. Does the government really want businesses to open up their books to the Labour Relations Board during an organizing drive or at the bargaining table? Does the government want to step in and tell busi-

nesses when their labour relations practices or bargaining tactics are affecting their profit margin?

I'm sure there are some who still subscribe to that nineteenth-century view that the workers and the owners of the means of production should share equally in the ownership and operation of a business, but I'm just a bit surprised that it is this government that has taken up this cause.

We on this side, my colleague from Vancouver-Hastings and I, accept the market economy. We accept that risk should be rewarded, but we demand that workers should be treated fairly.

Hon. Speaker, I've just been given a note from a member in the House, so I'll yield the floor to the member to make an introduction.

D. Hayer: Tonight I would like to introduce my constituency assistant, Shareen Lal. She helps my constituency office to run smoothly and efficiently. I thank her for all the work. She's visiting here for a CA training program. Would the House please make her welcome.

J. Kwan: Just before I yielded the floor to the member to make an introduction, I was stating that we on this side of the House, my colleague from Vancouver-Hastings and I, accept the market economy. We accept that risk should be rewarded, but we demand that workers be treated fairly.

We believe that the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining are best exercised by equals — equals who can find agreement without the state poking its nose into the economic decisions of free and independent economic players. By giving the employer the ability to interfere in organizing, this bill is explicitly recognizing and enhancing the power imbalance between worker and employer.

Looking at the current code, it says that a person has the freedom to communicate a statement of fact regarding a business. I want to be very clear about what the current code says. I'm going to read that section into the record. "Right to communicate, section 8: Nothing in this code deprives a person of the freedom to communicate to an employee a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business."

What does Bill 42 do? It changes "fact" to "views." I want to read that into the record, because I want the exact wording to be recorded here. Section 8 of Bill 42 reads: "Right to communicate, section 8: Subject to the regulations, a person has the freedom to express his or her views on any matter, including matters relating to an employer, a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union, provided the person does not use intimidation or coercion."

There are a couple of key words that have been deleted in Bill 42 in reference to the employee's right to communicate a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business. What Bill 42 does with this change under section 8 is allow for the notion of fact to become views. How does the dictionary define view? It says a view is an opinion or judgment coloured by the feelings or biases of its holder. Or maybe flip through the thesaurus, and you get: opinion, sentiment, feeling, impression, reaction, notion, idea, thought, attitude, stance, posture, position, assumption, presumption, conclusion, judgment, personal judgment, general belief, prevailing belief, common belief, ethos or — my personal favourite — mystique.

Just how this will add certainty and clarity to the determinations of the Labour Relations Board is anyone's guess. Perhaps a crystal ball will be provided to the arbitrators. Instead of reasoned, factual discussion, the code will allow for views to be the basis of communication. The employer gets to say that, in their view, union members would be bad for business. Join the union, and there will be fewer jobs. No facts need to be presented, just the employers' view. That does not enhance communication. It will not protect the democratic right of workers to organize. It will not make for a stable, productive and skilled workforce.

The minister says: "Don't worry. No coercion or intimidation will be allowed." The minister doesn't get it. Unorganized workers do not sit as equals at the employer's table. That's why the Labour Relations Code exists: to protect the rights of workers and employers without either having an advantage over the other.

The way in which the minister spoke about the issue around right to communication…. He said: "Restore the right to communicate." That language implies that there was no such right. The minister is wrong in making such a statement. The existing code provides for that right already as it stands. What it does is require that the information passed on be factual, not just some view, not just some statement, not in accordance with the thesaurus definition of a view. That could mean anything from personal judgment to common beliefs, mystique, an attitude, an impression, a feeling, a sentiment. It's none of those, but something that is factual so that information shared is valid.

Shared information that is not based on facts does not bring balance to a labour workforce in an employer-employee relationship. It does not enhance the employer-employee relationship.

The minister — and I heard the Liberal MLAs thumping their desks as well — suggests that somehow the existing Labour Code is bad for B.C. economically and that it drives away investment in British Columbia. Let's just go to the facts for one moment, because that is the view of the minister. Make no mistake about it. I believe that's the view of all the Liberal

MLAs. It is their feeling, their sentiment, their posture, their position, their attitude, their personal judgment. There's mystique, I would say, associated with that. That is their conclusion. That's their presumption.

Let's just go to the facts for one moment. Here's what a study done by McMaster University found on union organizing in B.C. between 1997 and 1999. Fact: in 20 percent of the cases employees were fired for union activity. Fact: in 50 percent of the cases employers hired anti-union consultants. Fact: in 25 percent of the cases employers formed anti-union employee committees. Fact: in 33 percent of the cases the employer threatened to close if the employees unionized. In 14.5 percent of the cases employers offered bribes to gain votes against the union. In 20 percent of the cases employers distributed anti-union leaflets at the worksite.

These are facts. It was a study that was done by McMaster University on union organizing in British Columbia between 1997 and 1999.

I want to also highlight another study from the management consulting firm of KPMG that clearly shows B.C. is already the most cost-competitive jurisdiction in the Pacific Northwest. There is a full article outlining the work that was done by KPMG and its findings. It addresses the issues of economic viability and economic investment that the minister mentioned and, of course, for British Columbia — what the facts are with respect to the Labour Relations Code as it currently stands and how it has impacted investment issues.

I'll go to that in a moment because I want to put that whole article on the record. The facts that I've highlighted are not my opinions. This is information that's been provided through studies — studies not done by me but by other individuals. Those are the facts.

The minister seems to believe that free speech can be regulated, that employers will only try to voice their opinion, factual or not, during the ten-day window between sign-up and the certification vote. I don't believe the minister is naïve. I think the minister knows full well that anti-union employers will not respect the right of workers to decide for themselves when union membership is in their best interest. I think he knows full well that workers who feel they are being coerced or intimidated will have to weigh their need to keep their jobs or to continue to provide for themselves and their families against complaining to the Labour Relations Board. I think he knows full well that many workers will choose silence to unemployment.

The message this bill sends is indeed discouraging. It sends the message that union membership is not in the best interest of the workers. It sends the message that employers know what is in the best interest of their employees. It substitutes bias, prejudice and views for reasoned, informed discussion. It turns the clock back on collective bargaining and the right to organize to the early part of the last century when innuendo, rumour and outright lies passed for acceptable employer tactics to oppose the union.

The analysis around this is longstanding. In fact, the issue around the right to communicate was dealt with even in the court system. In the current code the Labour Relations Board had crafted a thoughtful and balanced approach to employer speech. Employers were entitled to communicate with their employees about the employer's business. In communicating with employees about the business, the employer was limited to expressing reasonably held views. This meant the employers were not entitled to lie. This approach was based on the longstanding recognition that employees are not on an equal footing with the employers.

It is a truism of workplaces that employees are subject to influence and pressure that can distort employee free choice. That truism has long been recognized in labour relations and was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The truism has been ignored, and the board's carefully balanced approach has been abandoned. The government is now requiring the board to turn a blind eye to the pervasive influence of employers over their employees. Employers can now talk with employees about anything. When they do so, it appears that they are allowed to lie, to not necessarily provide factual information, unless the effect of the lies can be proven to be coercive or intimidating. Then it is okay for the government.

Not so long ago my colleague from Vancouver-Hastings and I raised in this House the published labour relations strategy of Sodexho. Their internal manual instructed managers on how to deal with union organizing attempts, and it justified using misleading information and threats — not overtly, mind you. Just call the workers in and have a chat about how much better off they are without the union. Nothing formal — just a suggestion. Bill 42 legitimizes it, it accepts it, and it promotes it. Last week we heard of this same company seeking to undermine the right of workers to freely choose bargaining agents by attempting to co-opt a union into a sweetheart deal.

Those are the real tactics of some of the employers. Those are the tactics this bill legitimizes. Those are the tactics that should have no part in a modern-day economy that promotes and respects the skills, energy and commitment that workers and employers bring to the job.

In a mere two pages this bill sends a drastic message — a message that says employers know best, employers are more important than workers, and the rights of business trump the democratic rights of workers.

Earlier I touched on the notion of profitability. If you listen to the comments of the minister, you would think that because of the Labour Relations Code in B.C. we would be uncompetitive in other jurisdictions in terms of cost. Let me just share some factual information with members of this House.

This was an article published in the Times Colonist dated May 14, 2002. It headlines: "Changes to Labour

Code Misguided, Unjustified." It's written by David Fairey. Let me just quote the article in which he highlights some of the facts that are going on around this issue:

This article, as I said, was written by David Fairey. He's a labour economist and a labour relations consultant. He's done his homework by looking at research to see what the research says. Not research he did himself, because one might argue that perhaps he's biased, but the research that he cited in his article was a study done by KPMG, a well-respected firm that does a variety of different work, including such a study of an international comparison of business costs in 85 cities. Canada was found to have the lowest cost, and B.C., in comparison to seven main cities, has a significant cost advantage overall — seven of the U.S. west coast cities included in this study.

That's something, hon. Speaker, because if you thought about and believed the words of the minister, then you have to ask the question: how could that be? How could it be that a study done by an independent group actually shows that B.C. is highly competitive? And not just highly competitive when compared to other major cities. For B.C. seven cities were surveyed: Vancouver, Victoria, Chilliwack, Kamloops, Nanaimo, Prince George and Kelowna — a fair range in terms of regional representation. Compared to other west coast cities, we were found to be more competitive than they were.

The central issue was around labour costs. If you think that the minister says that because of our Labour Relations Code, the economy of British Columbia is in the tank, and if you think what he says is true, then this study can't be true. It cannot be right. Yet that's the information that we have before us. Maybe it speaks to the power of — I guess — blind personal beliefs, irre-

The facts tell you otherwise and provide different information than what your beliefs are. In our society that is a challenge. We, as legislators, face a challenge as well. We sometimes, I think, need to and should admit that we might be wrong — that our beliefs might be wrong, especially when factual information is presented to us and it indicates otherwise.

This would be a good time for the minister to perhaps take some time to review the study. Go to the website, perhaps, of KPMG and take a look at the information and say: "Well, gee, the information challenges my own beliefs."

The situation, of course…. I know some believe that now in the year 2002, perhaps we don't need unions. I must admit I've heard people say that. They've said to me: "Times have changed. It wasn't like the old days, you know, where employees were completely abused in every way that you can imagine. So, there is no need for a union now because times have changed."

And I have to say yes, times have changed, and maybe some of the labour relations issues are not as obvious in terms of violations of labour rights as they used to be. Maybe it wasn't as brutal in some sense — some workers of the past that I've heard stories about — and that may be the case.

I can even tell you, in my own family's personal experience, where my mother…. When we first came here back in 1975, we needed some financial support from somewhere. Both my parents — in fact, my entire family — didn't speak any English. My father — he's retired now; both my parents are retired now — was a tailor by trade. That's what he used to do, but because he lacked the language skill, he needed to go and get ESL training. My mother, being the pillar of strength that she is, went out into the labour force to work for the first time in her life. Formerly, when we were in Hong Kong, she stayed home and took care of the six of us. I can tell you, even just the one of me was a handful for my mom. It was quite something.

When we came here, we were faced with an enormous challenge. We didn't know anything. We didn't have very much support. So my mom went out into the workforce. She worked as a farmworker. I recall this, when I was nine. My mother would get up at 4 o'clock in the morning, and she'd be out of the house at 4:30 a.m. She took a bus, and it would take her to a farm where she would do field work — planting, picking strawberries, whatever it was. She would come home at around 8 o'clock at night — working ten, 12, sometimes 14 hours. She got paid $10 a day.

I know that back in 1975 money was worth a lot more than it is now. You might think $10 a day may be a lot of money for 1975, but not for ten, 12, 14 hours a day. My parents didn't know any labour relations issues, employment standards or any such thing — didn't know. She worked under those conditions for a long period of time. That's how we survived. She supported a family of eight in that way.

You have to say: well, gee, do we really need a labour relations code to ensure that fair employment practices are in place? In the farmwork community, as an example, should someone be there to tell the workers about their rights, to organize them, to make sure their rights are protected? Should they have that right? Should that be allowed in the fair, competitive way?

We didn't know anything then, and nobody came around to tell us anything. I can tell you for sure that if my mom was told: "You know what? Perhaps you should organize because your rights are being violated…. And not just yours, because all the other workers were as well. But if you do, your employer can come and say to you: 'You know, you could lose your job. You could have the farm shut down.'" Whether that's factual information or not, it doesn't matter. Someone could actually, in theory, go and do that.

I bet you dollars to doughnuts that my mother would have said: "I don't want to unionize. I don't want to, because I have a family of eight. We need to support them. I need to support them, and that's the only way I know how." She'd be very intimidated and very scared at the possibility that she might lose her job.

I know this is hypothetical, but I use it as an example to point out and illustrate what it means to make sure that in the Labour Relations Code on the section that talks about the right to communicate, people's right to communicate is fully protected for both the employers and the employees, and the information that is to be communicated must be factual. It can't be just some belief someone has or some personal view that could distort reality.

It cannot be that. We cannot let that happen, but this is what we have today before us under Bill 42. Some would say that under the Labour Relations Code right now, it's too easy for people to go and organize: "It's too easy, so what are you complaining about? Work conditions are so much better than they were before." Well is it? Is it that much easier? I just want to use one example to highlight the point: the McDonald's at Squamish.

They made labour history when they voted 55 percent in favour of unionizing back in August 1998. They made history. In March 1999 a mediator released a non-binding settlement package. The members were to vote on this, as it was to be their first collective agreement. It was recognized that the deal had some shortcomings, particularly on monetary issues. It was also recognized that the deal addressed the employees' wishes for dignity in the workplace and a right to fair treatment.

The details of the deal were not disclosed. It wasn't reported in the paper. I mean past practices to sort of establish the history, if you will, around the practices of the employer. It was confirmed that the union had previously won an anti-harassment policy and the application of seniority in the layoffs, recalls and job postings in the workplace, just to sort of give you a sense of the practices that might have been in place then. That first collective agreement was deemed to be a good start, in

that now the workers would have some legal rights in the workplace no other employees at McDonald's have. That's a step ahead, and it was recognized.

Before long, the employer challenged the unionization of the worksite at every step of the way imaginable. They brought the matter back to the LRB, and the Labour Relations Board looked at the matter and threw the challenge out. Then the employer appealed the decision. At every step of the way the employer tried to stop and block the unionization of McDonald's at Squamish.

It was recognized that the employer put a lot of resources into doing this by hiring lawyers and the whole works. And you know what? Do you know what the employees at McDonald's in Squamish were seeking in terms of monetary support? Ten cents more. It was 10 cents more than what they were earning — from $7.15 to $7.25. It's not a lot of money, 10 cents' worth of wage increase.

In any event, the history is now before us, because that McDonald's has decertified. It decertified because a bunch of new workers came in. The certification vote was taken again, and they decertified. There's a history there, and the process of what happened there has been recorded, has been reviewed and studied. The decertification took place, and it was reported in the Vancouver Sun on July 3, 1999.

Skipping over the comment about how the owner was not available for comment: "Kellahan then said, 'The union will not seek to reorganize the restaurant again unless it is asked by the restaurant workers.'" She goes on to say: "We did not go seeking them out. They came to us."

Then skipping down a little bit again, the article continues by saying: "But some who did not comment said they fear McDonald's would sooner close the restaurant than operate with a union. One of the workers wouldn't say how he voted but indicated the union had improved the way workers are treated at the McDonald's."

Then it goes on to talk a little bit more about the decertification. That's some of the history around the McDonald's situation.

The going belief and the belief that the minister would have you think is that it is very easy to go and unionize, and that there are no problems in the workplace when unionization is being sought by workers. Again, the facts tell you otherwise. The reality of what's going on out there for the workers tells you a different story. In this instance there were issues, and that's why the workers sought unionization. At every step of the way the employer tried to stop it.

This article was written by Mark Leier, who is a professor at Simon Fraser University in labour history. He's also written books on a variety of different issues, particularly in relation to labour issues. I very much appreciate this article, because the minister and the Liberal MLAs would have you believe that somehow organizing is easy and should be discouraged as much as possible.

In reality, in the real place out there in the workforce, in the community, there is a different story to be told. The stories that need and deserve to be heard are the workers' stories. They need to be heard — and the employers' too. I don't fault the voice of employers to be heard, but there must be a balance. There must be a balance on both sides so that both sets of rights are protected. That's what the Labour Relations Code is there to do.

For the minister to bring forward Bill 42, that skews the rights of one side against the other and particularly on the side of the people who have the power, who hold the power…. It is shameful for the government to do that. It speaks clearly to what this government values, and that is that they value the rights of employers over the rights of employees. I thought we had moved beyond that. I truly did.

I thought we had moved beyond 1975 when we first came here, when the rights of my mother were completely denied. We didn't even know any better. We did not know any better. We did it because we needed to survive. Make no mistake about that. That's what we did.

But you know what? In my adult life — when I was a younger person, my mom will tell you, I was occupied with other things — when I entered the workforce in a much more serious manner, although I started working when I was in grade 7, I started to understand social and economic inequities, marginalized communities, marginalized individuals and the challenges they face. In a country and a province as great as ours that promotes democracy, that values democracy, that wants to move beyond the dark ages, it really did make me proud to be a Canadian.

I didn't realize that when I was growing up. I did not realize that, but now I do know why. That's what brought me into the work I do now. I started first as an advocate in the downtown east side community, then as a city councillor and now to this place. My only hope and dream is to work toward addressing inequities in our society, wherever that may be.

Here we have a situation where a minister of the Liberal government of the day is introducing a Labour Relations Code Amendment Act that attacks workers and creates an imbalance within the workplace against employees, and not just any employees but against, I would assume, the most marginalized employees, as was highlighted in the articles I quoted.

Who are the people who are going to be faced with most of the discrimination and the unscrupulous employers? Young people, I suspect. Women, I suspect. Immigrants, I suspect. Whatever nationality, they are the people who will perhaps face the greatest challenge. Why would a government want to bring forward a piece of legislation that will make their lives even harder? Why would we?

We are a country, a province, built on multiculturalism, fairness, equality and on social and economic justice. Let those principles and philosophy go and ripple through all the legislation that government brings forward, including the Labour Relations Code Amendment Act. We can do no less, and we should do no less. The government members need to check themselves when they provide information that is nothing more than their own personal beliefs. When they look at the facts on the issues of economics and fairness, the story tells you something different. Make a decision based on facts.

I challenge the Liberal MLAs to do their homework, to do their research, to come into this House and debate on the basis of factual information — also, to check…. I think that we in this chamber all have this. I do. I hope it's true that we all have this. Deep inside each and every one of us, I think we do have a fundamental belief in fairness.

Check in there to see if it's there, and use that strength in this House. Defend the people, the workers of our community. Do not pit them against the employers. Do not take away their rights. Do not tip the balance scales against the employees. Make sure that employees share the same rights as employers. That's what we're looking for under the Labour Relations Code Amendment Act, and it is not in Bill 42.

J. MacPhail: I rise to join my colleague the member for Vancouver–Mount Pleasant in opposing Bill 42 amendments to the Labour Relations Code.

I was very interested in hearing the remarks of my colleague. The area of labour relations is not one that she and I have discussed at length over the course of our history together, and I thought her perspective, as a young person and a person who was a new Canadian in an early part of her life, was extremely interesting. I found it moving at times but extremely informative to examine the view of someone such as my colleague from Vancouver–Mount Pleasant about the role of unionization in this province.

I know that many in the chamber were busy with other activities — fair enough — but it would be worth

reading tomorrow when you've got time. It's a perspective to which we should be trying to move in this province. Young, professional, a new Canadian at an early part in her life — it's exactly that kind of point of view that we as British Columbians should be trying to embrace.

Mr. Speaker, I want to start with one comment, and then I think I might have to adjourn debate. I was at an event a couple of weeks ago with one of my old colleagues, Fred Randall, who used to be the MLA for Burnaby-Edmonds. Some of my colleagues here, such as the member for Burnaby-Willingdon, were there as well. Fred Randall is extremely ill. We wish him all the best. I know he's extremely ill, and he's in Seattle now looking for alternate treatment for his cancer.

There was Fred. We were at an event honouring him at the Burnaby association for advanced community living, I think it was.

Everybody was there to honour him from both sides of the House, and business people, union people, community people, doctors, lawyers. Fred, as only Fred could, stood up. He's losing his hair, and he'sbloated from the medicine he has to take, but he was immaculately dressed. He stood up and said: "You know, it seems that this province now hates unions. I just want to tell you I love unions."

Then he began to give this very, very heartfelt address about how his position in the union movement was allowing him to be present at the association for progressive community living, opening up a house that they were going to name Fred Randall House for people with disabilities. He went on to epitomize how the work of unions joining with employers, with professionals, with community organizations was exactly the model on which we should base our society, as only Fred Randall could say with such simplicity.

Anyway, Mr. Speaker, I have many thoughts to offer on this, but noting the hour, I would move adjournment of debate on Bill 42.


	YEAS — 60

Coell	Hogg	L. Reid
Hawkins	Whittred	Cheema
Hansen	J. Reid	Bruce
Santori	Barisoff	Nettleton
Roddick	Masi	Lee
Thorpe	Hagen	Murray
Plant	Campbell	Collins
Clark	Bond	de Jong
Nebbeling	Stephens	Neufeld
Coleman	Chong	Penner
Jarvis	Anderson	Orr
Harris	Nuraney	Brenzinger
Long	Chutter	Mayencourt
Johnston	Hayer	Christensen
Krueger	McMahon	Bray
Les	Locke	Nijjar
Wong	Bloy	MacKay
Cobb	K. Stewart	Lekstrom
Sultan	Hamilton	Hawes
Kerr	Manhas	Hunter

	NAYS — 2

MacPhail		Kwan