1998/99 Legislative Session: 3rd Session, 36th Parliament
HANSARD


The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.


Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)


THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1999

Morning

Volume 16, Number 11


[ Page 13949 ]

The House met at 10:04 a.m.

Prayers.

Orders of the Day

Hon. M. Farnworth: I call Committee of Supply. For the information of the members, we will be debating the Ministry of Forests estimates.

[1005]

The House in Committee of Supply B; W. Hartley in the chair.

ESTIMATES: MINISTRY OF FORESTS
(continued)

On vote 34: ministry operations, $282,402,000 (continued).

G. Abbott: I want to spend at least a portion of this morning on fire protection issues. I'll begin by asking the minister to provide a general sense of the challenge that was faced last year with respect to combatting forest fires in British Columbia. Perhaps the minister has the final numbers with respect to the cost of fire protection last year in British Columbia. Can he provide that and, I guess, give us a sense of where his budget has gone in the current year with respect to preparedness and provision for fire protection as well?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Last year we ended up spending $151 million fighting fires, and we spent $42 million on preparedness. This year our budget for fire preparedness is $41.8 million, roughly the same.

G. Abbott: The casual observer would probably wonder why we are seeing a small reduction in the preparedness budget, based on the experience with fires in 1998.

Is there a reason why we wouldn't see an adjustment upward in the preparedness budget, given the experience of last year? I expect the answer is something about last year being an exceptional year, but we certainly do seem to get into runs of weather. There are some indications at this point that 1999 is apt to be a challenging year for fire protection as well. Do we have a sense of the adequacy of that $41.8 million?

[1010]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Last year we saw what was coming at us because of the dry weather, which hasn't been replicated so far this year. We saw it coming; we spent an extra $3.5 million. We move the budgets as necessary, to be prepared. Two years ago we underspent on the preparedness budget, because we didn't see the same problem coming. This year it's adequate. If we need more, we can always access contingencies. If we see the ratings go up and we feel that more needs to be spent on preparedness, we will do that.

G. Abbott: I've got a couple of questions. I know the minister has been visited by Bombardier Aerospace to try to sell the ministry on the merits of the Canadair 415 for firefighting. We can talk presently about the merits, or otherwise, of that advanced firefighting equipment.

One of the tables that's included in the promotional material is a comparison of interface fire losses between British Columbia and other provinces in Canada. The table in question shows B.C., on average, being somewhere up in the average loss of $1.35 billion and others being considerably less. Ontario -- at least in this table -- is shown at somewhere around $125 million losses on average. Is that table indicative of the information the ministry has with respect to losses from interface fires in other parts of Canada? Do we, for natural or physical reasons, have much higher fire losses on average than other areas?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I have a few pieces of information. First of all, we think that data is highly suspect. No one has $1.35 billion in losses. Our estimate of the interface losses is a million dollars in British Columbia -- a million dollars in interface losses, on average, to homes.

B.C. has 30 percent of the fires, due to high lightning frequency. If you compare Alberta or even much of Ontario -- a lot of southern Ontario is deforested or whatever -- British Columbia has more space covered by forests all over -- from border to border, from the 49th to the 60th parallel. As a result, we have the highest probability. We have more people living in the forest, in what you might call the interface, than other provinces. So you have to look at the situation in British Columbia.

[1015]

As I said, we estimate the losses to be $1 million. B.C. has 30 percent of all fires in Canada yet accounts for less than 5 percent of the total hectares burned. This year it was 1 percent in Canada. So it has 30 percent of the fires and 1 percent of the area burned.

G. Abbott: Could the minister also provide me with an average or at least a sense of what the value -- or, I guess, the volume -- is of the wood that we lose per year in British Columbia from forest fires?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: On average, it's 50,000 cubic metres. If you want to put a high-end value to it, if you chose $100, that's $5 million.

G. Abbott: Again, the amounts noted are substantially different than in the Bombardier presentation.

The final question I have with respect to that particular issue. . . . I'm sure the minister has had an opportunity to review the performance of the CL415 in relation to fire suppression activities. Does that particular machine have a possible value in British Columbia? I know they did the demonstration recently and certainly made the case that they can get more fire suppressant and water onto fires more quickly than the Martin Mars can. Can the minister give me a sense of what the view of the ministry is around that issue?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The CL415, from what we know now, is quite a good aircraft in fighting interface fires in some cases. We're studying it; we're asking ourselves whether or not we could justify using that aircraft. But in a lot of cases, helicopters will outfly and deliver more water than this aircraft. So for

[ Page 13950 ]

some circumstances, it's much better. It's a $26 million aircraft, and what you've got is their pitch. They're trying to sell their point of view, and we're trying to find out whether the business case justifies using this aircraft in B.C.

[1020]

J. Wilson: Was I correct in hearing the minister say that we lose approximately 50,000 cubic metres per year to fire?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: That's the average.

J. Wilson: Could the minister convert that to acres -- or hectares -- of land?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: We'll place a call and get somebody to bring back the actual figure of the number of hectares that burns every year.

J. Wilson: I was doing a little bit of mental math when the minister was speaking, and 50,000 metres of wood in the average forest out there would equate to about 200 to 250 acres of ground being all that we would lose each year, because most forest land will run around 200 metres per hectare. So the area, to me, would be extremely small, and most fires -- or a lot of fires -- that we see are in the hundreds of hectares. So I'm just wondering how you've estimated this volume of wood.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: We're going to get the figures for you, but I have to remind the member that a lot of land that burned in northern British Columbia was scrub, which you would hardly call metres of timber unless you wanted to calculate the stems on very small, inoperable and non-productive forests. A lot of the burned areas are grasslands, so you have to factor out the grasslands that have been burned. Our figures are in hectares burned, and I'll get the information and provide it to you.

G. Abbott: The government announced back on June 1 that the province had entered into a contractual relationship with Conair Aviation Ltd. to provide fire protection suppression services for some period of time. Now, there's nothing necessarily new in that; the minister can bring me up to date on this. But I think Conair has had some contracts in the past, at least on a year-to-year basis. What's new and different in the recently announced contract with Conair?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: What's new is that 80 percent of the consumer price index will be factored into rate increases. The contract is essentially the same, although we dropped one bird dog aircraft that had been in the contract for trial and is no longer needed. We found out what we needed to know about it, and it has been dropped.

G. Abbott: Do we have a five-year contract with Conair, then, with an 8 percent incremental adjustment every year? Is that what I heard? If not, could we correct the record?

[1025]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: It's five years. If the CPI goes up, 80 percent of the CPI would be added. It's not an 8 percent increase in the budget. If CPI goes up 1 percent, the budget would go up 0.8 percent.

G. Abbott: Was there a particular reason why that contract was announced in the context of Conair's investment in the new aerospace facility, or was it simply coincidental? I don't know what the province has done in the past in terms of contracting for the services that are going to be provided by Conair. Have there been competitive bid arrangements in the past? How has it been done previously, and what's the significance of this contract at this point in time?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Traditionally, they would be bid out every five years. In this case, it was a direct negotiation as part of a larger package around the investments that Conair was making. One of the objectives was to keep the firefighting in British Columbia and to achieve the economic benefits that would be achieved by the expansion of Conair and keeping the firefighting contracts in British Columbia.

G. Abbott: What is the base figure for the value of this contract, assuming that it may grow over the five-year period? What is the base contract amount? Is it a figure that is based on hours in the air or actual use? Is there a sort of upset amount that is provided even if we had a remarkably rainy year?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: There's an upfront availability fee -- in other words, to have 11 aircraft standing, dedicated and ready to go. That budget is $3.8 million. When they fly, there is so much paid per hour, depending on the aircraft. The ministry's protection branch decides which aircraft and where they fly.

G. Abbott: When the ministry or the government openly tendered this particular function, how many companies in British Columbia would normally be expected to put tenders in on it?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: There are two or three which, on a peripheral basis, are in the business in some way. But Conair has always bid. They are the major contender and have been for many years.

G. Abbott: Would the two or three that are in the business in, as the minister describes it, a more peripheral way secure firefighting hours with the Ministry of Forests only when the available resources of Conair are exhausted?

[1030]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: To give you some perspective, there is no one that has air tankers. No one else has air tankers. If a bid were to come up, there might be people who might seek to secure tankers. But they would be unproven, at least in British Columbia, because they haven't operated in British Columbia. No other companies operate here. The contract that we have is based on prices from five years ago, so we submit that it is a reasonable contract.

G. Abbott: I think that answered the question. The base fee of $3.8 million for 11 aircraft on standby was reflective of the rate that was provided to the company five years ago. Is that right?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Yes, that's correct. It's the price of five years ago. It's had minor increases, again, around 80 percent of the consumer price index. That's a standard clause that's

[ Page 13951 ]

been in the contract. It's the feeling that we're getting prices from five years ago. Were it to be tendered today, we expect the prices would be up.

G. Abbott: I think I understood the minister's response around those who might provide supplemental fire protection. To use the example of the Martin Mars bomber that was used extensively in the Shuswap last year, is that a piece of equipment that would still come into play in firefighting in British Columbia? Or would it only come into play after the resources of Conair had been fully utilized?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The Martin Mars, as the member knows, carries huge amounts of water, and we only use it where we think the effect can be used. We'll use it or any other aircraft, if we think that's the aircraft that will achieve the results. It costs $11,000 an hour to run the Martin Mars, so we don't use it in a cavalier fashion -- ever.

G. Abbott: I appreciate the explanation, but I'd still like an answer to the question, which is: when and where could it be used? If a circumstance arises where, in the opinion of the fire protection branch, it's the right aircraft for the job, how does the use of that tie in with the contractual situation with Conair?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: It's really irrelevant to try to tie the two together. If the protection branch makes a determination that we need more water delivered in a concentrated amount, and the Martin Mars can do it, we can hire them at any time. There is nothing in the contract to stop us from doing that. The sole consideration is: what's the most effective way to fight the fire?

G. Abbott: That's the clarification that I was looking for -- that the contract does not constrain the ministry from bringing additional outside resources to bear in a situation where, in the ministry's view, those resources are needed. I gather that's what the minister has said. He can correct me subsequently if that's not the case, but I'm presuming at this point that it is.

[1035]

I think the shift in the structure of the ministry, where there was the creation of the independent fire protection branch. . . . I think it's five or six years ago, but again the minister can correct me on when the shift occurred. But we've now had several years' experience with an independent -- or separate, I should say -- fire protection branch. Can the minister, based on that experience, advise what, in his view, have been the strengths and weaknesses of that? Are there any changes contemplated in light of the experience of the last fire season? I'd appreciate the minister's general comments on that.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Here I can quote the ombudsman's report on the fire. He said that he was satisfied with the need for a central organization for resource distribution. He says: "Given the fire season that we had -- that MOF was faced with -- it's unlikely that resources could have been distributed as required in any other way." So we think the central organization is necessary; we think it's been validated. The criticism, that suits and ties in Victoria make the decision, is just not true. No tactical decisions are made in Victoria; they're all made in the field. Six of the ten managers are in the field; there are four in Victoria. That's with a total of 1,250 personnel. We flattened the organization, so the strength is that you get more effective distribution of resources by central planning.

As to the question of whether any changes are contemplated in light of last year's season, it's only housekeeping changes. There have not been any significant changes that we think should be made.

G. Abbott: I want to pass along to the minister a couple of the suggestions that have been made to me with respect to the relationship between the fire protection branch and the district offices. I expect that I probably am in receipt of thoughts and suggestions and comments that most ministry employees might be reluctant to express directly to the minister. So I hope that he can appreciate that these are, I think, constructive suggestions around the organization of the fire protection branch.

One is that when we have a situation like we had in the southern interior last year -- which, hopefully, is exceptional -- the resources of the fire protection branch are strained beyond the ability to deal with it all, and obviously the branch has to call on the resources of the district offices in order to cover off all the fires, and so on.

[1040]

One of the suggestions I heard, again from ministry personnel, was that because of the division in the ministry, most people in the district office had been disconnected from firefighting techniques, firefighting organization -- that kind of thing -- for some time and were therefore not as comfortable in assuming a fire protection role as they should be. I think the suggestion coming out of that was that there needed to be an ongoing process where ministry personnel were reacquainted -- or at least some key ministry personnel were updated -- on a regular basis with firefighting issues. Obviously, if you are a staff person and you're entirely preoccupied with the Forest Practices Code or with administrative concerns and suddenly you are asked to deal with a fire. . . . There seemed to be more of a disconnection there than probably the ministry would like to have. Again, I'm not advancing that to be provocative, but it was a suggestion that I heard. I would be interested in the minister's response to it.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Well, there's always a judgment call in these matters. I think the criticism is a worthwhile one to point to. The response is simply that in the past, fires and fire-related activities were often used as a reason why -- and perhaps rightfully why; perhaps not always, either -- we didn't achieve other goals. If you pull people off other programs, they don't achieve the goals, and it's because they're spending their time being prepared for or focusing on fire when they might want to be out doing something else. So there is an efficiency argument made that a stand-alone branch would always be ready and would not have to worry about other programs. Similarly, managers could achieve program goals by keeping dedicated staff.

We are doing some training of district people now -- some training -- but we have to be careful not to overreact. Last year's fire was one in 450 years. I mean, the conditions of last year don't happen very often; it's on the order of once every 450 years. So to get prepared for that would burn up an awful lot of resources. But in fact, the fire behaviour was off the scale, and it was actually ten times greater than what is

[ Page 13952 ]

normally considered blowout conditions. It was ten times greater, so it's not surprising that there were people who weren't prepared. But I think the criticism has been noted. I certainly heard it. I heard it within the ministry directly to me, and our managers have heard that criticism. So when we investigate it, we say: "Well, people should spend some of their time being prepared for fire but certainly not at the risk of not delivering other program goals."

G. Abbott: The other observation I want to pass along is a related one. In fairness, I want to preface it, though, with this comment: during the Salmon Arm -- or Silver Creek -- fire, I had the opportunity and the privilege of attending briefings and seeing the area with ministry personnel, and so on. Clearly the fire protection branch people that were there were working their butts off. They were working exceptionally hard and were working exceptionally long hours, trying to deal with a catastrophic situation. There's no suggestion here that anybody was trying to give anything less than 100 percent of their ability and energy to this. I don't think that's true. The fatigue that they faced was remarkable.

[1045]

The suggestion, though, is. . . . Again, this is around how the situation developed in Salmon Arm particularly. There appeared -- at least, this is my understanding from some I spoke to -- to be a sense that in the initial period, when the fire hadn't yet got out of control, when it was still something that the district office had not yet been seized with. . . . As the minister knows, by ten days into the fire I guess, after it had taken off, virtually all the personnel in the district office were seized with the task of helping in different ways with the firefighting battle. Again, the suggestion was that earlier on, perhaps because of organizational issues -- structural issues -- there was more of a disconnect between the fire protection branch and the district office than people wanted or were comfortable with.

I don't know, frankly, how that can be overcome. Maybe it's inevitable that in those situations, there's a difficulty. And the minister is right: this was certainly an exceptional situation. But I'll pass along that observation as well: that there was, in the view of some, a disconnect between the district operations and the firefighting operations, at least until the point in time when the energies and thoughts of the district staff were pretty much devoted to the fire as the focus of their lives. But prior to that, there was at least a sense of some disconnect. Again, I don't know whether the ministry has heard this suggestion or concern as well and whether they have looked at some ways in which it might be overcome.

The Chair: The member for Surrey-Cloverdale rises.

B. McKinnon: I ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

B. McKinnon: I'd like to introduce students from Surrey Centre Elementary School to the House. I have 27 grades 4 and 5 students from my riding visiting here with their teacher, Mr. Zadeiks, and parents, and I ask that the House bid them welcome.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Since we don't know. . . . We're not going to name names here or anything else. But one of the phenomena that happens in firefighting is that while it's hard work, it's also very important; it's almost heroic work, some of it. I think there's a feeling on the part of some of the traditional staff that when we change and take that part of the work away from people. . . . They'd rather be fighting fires than following up on the Forest Practices Code, perhaps. But there's also overtime involved. It's been a source of overtime for people, and that may be the source of some of the concern. But in thinking that the fire might get out of hand and getting ready for the possibility, quite a few resources were spent.

You know, if it hadn't got away, we might have been open to criticism for having been too prepared in Salmon Arm. That's the flip side of it. You make a judgment as to dedicating personnel to it -- not bothering people whose regular job it is, but being ready. I think that part of the success in fighting that fire was the fact that we put in the dedicated resources to be ready. You can't do that kind of massive shift of resources without completely shifting the priorities for the district staff. They do have other work to do, and they should be doing that work.

[1050]

G. Abbott: I want to go now to some of the observations that were made by the ombudsman in his report on the Silver Creek fire. Before I actually go to the recommendations and observations, I would like to get the minister's view on an issue which is certainly of concern to me. The minister can advise me as to whether it's of concern to him as well. The Ministry of Forests, in my recollection, asked the ombudsman to undertake the review of this fire to see if there were any ways in which the effort could have been improved: responsiveness to the public, administrative fairness, compliance with fire management policy and process, defining scope of property loss and potential sources of compensation, and so on.

I think it's commendable that the ministry asked the ombudsman to undertake an independent, non-partisan review of what occurred there. One element that disturbs me, as the ombudsman notes on page 4 of his report, is this: "The risk management branch, Ministry of Finance, declined our request for copies of interview notes and other information that it obtained during its investigation of the Silver Creek fire." It goes on to say that the risk management branch claimed privilege over these documents, etc. I guess why this disturbs me is that I know the risk management branch was there; people knew they were there. I think people had an understanding that they were there to help people deal with the losses they had suffered during the fire.

Frankly, I don't understand why when one ministry asked the ombudsman, who is an impartial officer of this Legislature, to undertake a study, another ministry would not provide its cooperation in fully divulging, at least to the ombudsman -- it doesn't have to be to the public, but at least to the ombudsman -- the benefit of the information they gathered during the fire. I presume it was extensive, because I know they were very busy. I just want to lay that one on the table now. Why do we have the risk management branch withholding what could be important and critical information with respect to the fire? Obviously the aim here, in the public interest, was to come up with the best set of recommendations and the best package of information possible.

[1055]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The information that might be used by the risk management branch, or whatever, is information that

[ Page 13953 ]

they'd probably get from the Ministry of Forests. The Ministry of Forests has been extremely open about what they were doing and when they were doing it. We've learned that from past experience.

With respect to the review that was done, the deputy asked that a review be done by the auditor general and the ombudsman. The ombudsman said no, because they don't do it at the request of ministries, but that they would review the file. She concluded that she had enough letters of complaints that it warranted a review at the request of the public. The auditor general chose not to be involved, because they felt that one review was sufficient.

With respect to your concerns about the risk management branch's notes, or whatever, it would be the risk management branch and the minister responsible for that -- the Minister of Finance -- who would have to answer that. But we do understand that it was upon legal advice that they took the decisions they did take.

G. Abbott: Regrettably, the report didn't arrive until a few days after the completion of the estimates of the Minister of Finance, or I certainly would have asked her for the reasons why notes and other information it obtained during its investigation of the Silver Creek fire were not provided to the ombudsman. I'll leave that aside, given that the Minister of Forests obviously can't speak for the Minister of Finance in this forum.

I want to go to some of the observations that were made by the ombudsman in his report. I'm not going to go through them all; I don't think we need to do an exhaustive discussion of these. But I do want to point to some of the observations made by the ombudsman and see what, if anything, has been undertaken by the Ministry of Forests, in particular the fire protection branch, to deal with them.

Let's begin on page 48, which is a discussion of the communication system. I'll quote from the ombudsman, about the middle of page 48. He says: "These communication problems are a real concern and should be acknowledged and addressed by the MOF. The ombudsman finds, therefore, that the communication that was in place to fight this fire appears to have been inadequate."

Could I get some response to that observation by the ombudsman and also on the final note he makes with respect to communications: "The MOF has acknowledged the communication difficulties that occurred during this fire and has given assurances that it will use this experience to improve its overall communications system." Can the minister advise what has been undertaken in the wake of this fire and this report? What improvements are we going to be seeing in this respect for coming years?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I didn't get your first question. I'm going to answer your second one and the question from the member for Cariboo North at this point, and then we'll come back.

With respect to the recommendation around communications, there was one repeater -- the purple repeater -- that wasn't functioning properly. We agree that all the repeaters need to be functioning. There are over 300 repeaters in the province. We've requested that the tech people look at this repeater and find out how it has not been working. We've had problems with this repeater for a long, long time. One expert told us that it's the physical structure of the mountains around it and some mineral deposits that are causing problems. If necessary, we'll have to move it. But it is only one repeater out of 300 and may never be needed for this kind of critical situation again -- we hope.

The loss from fires: the member for Cariboo North asked what the average loss is. In fact, we were wrong; we are actually better than we said. The average annual loss is 30,000 hectares per year. This is comprised of. . . . It's hectares. I think we gave a metric answer the first time. That was the problem; we gave a metric answer when it should have been in hectares. My own elbow told me there was something wrong at the same time, so the member and I. . . . I do have such good officials that I like to take them at their word. But we have checked. It's 30,000 hectares per year. This is comprised of 18,000 hectares per year of mature and immature timber and 12,300 hectares per year, on average, of grass and rock. I don't know how you would burn rock, but I guess it's scrub that finds its way into the cracks of rocks.

[1100]

The gross loss of timber is 1.2 million cubic metres, and that's before salvage -- an annual loss of 1.2 million cubic metres. About 10 percent of these losses is in the interface area. The year-to-year range of loss fluctuates widely. In '97, for example, it was only 2,640 hectares -- about one-fifteenth or so of what happened last year. In '98 it was a large amount, almost 30 times more: 77,781 hectares were lost to fire last year. In '97 it was 2,640 hectares.

G. Abbott: The numbers do make a whole lot more sense now with the hectares attached rather than cubic metres. If we use, then -- and I don't want to go all the way back here, but maybe we should for a minute. . . . If we have 1.2 million cubic metres lost per year, we're looking at, again, depending on the value one wants to attach to a cubic metre of wood. . . . If it's $10 a cubic metre, obviously we'd be looking at a $10 million loss. If it's $100 a cubic metre, it would be just over a $100 million loss per year. Obviously those are two extremes. The real figure would probably be somewhere in between. I guess it depends on the timber type and the value of the timber at a particular time. Can we put a little wrap on this by saying that's a fair kind of assessment of that?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The figure I gave was a loss before salvage. If it's pine, and the stumpage is 25 cents or 50 cents, it's not much. So it will vary. A lot of the fires are in inoperable areas, as witnessed by the fires last year in the north, where there's probably next to no salvage. In the case of Salmon Arm, much of it was salvaged, as you know. It didn't constitute a major loss, although it certainly was a loss in revenue. It was somewhat depreciated.

G. Abbott: The minister said he hadn't caught the first part of my question about communications. It was simply a reference to the observation of the ombudsman on page 48. I think the minister did answer that in his comments with respect to communications. I don't think there was anything that needed to be added. That was just the observation that the ombudsman makes -- that the communication that was in place to fight this fire appears to have been inadequate. I think the minister addressed that in his comments.

The second important area is the air operations boss. We find the discussion of that on pages 50 and 51 of the report.

[ Page 13954 ]

The first sentence is: "It seems clear from our review that an air operations boss should have been designated to coordinate the air support for the Silver Creek fire but was not so designated." Then it goes on to discuss some of the specific comments on which these observations were made, and near the top of page 51 states:

"The Silver Creek fire started on July 29. On August 13 the need for an air boss had still not, it appears, been adequately addressed."

Then down one paragraph:

"Given the incredible strain on resources over the course of this busy fire season, we do not doubt that the MOF was doing its best to fill this position. Nevertheless, the early requests for a designated air boss do not appear to have been filled. This deficiency must be addressed to ensure that the air operations boss is in place when requested and required."

[1105]

So that's the comment of the ombudsman with respect to the need for an air operations boss. I would welcome the minister's comments with respect to these observations and to what the ministry proposes to do to meet this particular recommendation in the future.

I. Chong: I request leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

I. Chong: Today we have visiting us five residents of Berwick House. It's a private residential care facility in the riding that I represent: Oak Bay-Gordon Head. Accompanying them is Ms. Kendra King, who is the coordinator at Berwick House, along with a co-op student from the University of Victoria who is now working at Berwick House. They've just completed an escorted tour of the precinct, and they're here to watch the very thrilling and exciting debates on the Ministry of Forests. I would ask the House to please make them very welcome.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: We have a little bit of trouble with this recommendation from the ombudsman, in the sense that we have an explanation and we kind of disagree with the conclusions a little bit. Under the restructuring across North America, the operations have been restructured under an incident coordinator, under which there are three bosses: there's an operations boss, there's a logistics boss, and there's a planning and finance boss. Those were all in place in this fire. Those three operations bosses will call for the experts they need. And they did call for air bosses, and they got more than one. There was a call for a specific air boss, and that request wasn't fulfilled, but there was more than one air boss put into the area. So we have a substantive sort of problem with the ombudsman's recommendation here.

G. Abbott: Given that the ombudsman appears to devote quite a lot of attention to this particular question, I do want to explore just a little more why the ministry has a problem with the concept, which appears to be guiding the ombudsman here, of an overall air boss. Now, the minister has mentioned that there were air bosses, which I presume are people directing the helicopters, people directing the Martin Mars bomber and perhaps the miscellaneous aircraft that were attached. But the ombudsman obviously feels strongly enough about this that he's devoted an entire section to the need for one, I presume, overarching air boss who is coordinating the whole thing. So I think that in fairness to the ombudsman, we need a bit more discussion about why it is that the concept of a strong overall air boss is not one the ministry is endorsing.

[1110]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: This is a call by management, and I guess there's a case. . . . We agree with the general point that's made: there should be somebody in charge of the air operations. Sometimes you need more than one. It is not automatic that you have an air boss when you set up the teams.

Some people think that the bosses should be there whether you need them or not. That is a call made by the overall operations coordinator. The incident coordinator has to make the call as to what personnel they need in the management structure. So rather than having a bureaucratic structure that has an air boss in place at all times, this is a judgment call that's made: if you need an air boss, you bring him in. That's what was done in this case -- and more than one.

The concept of coordination. . . . I'm not sure what the ombudsman thinks could have been done better in fighting the fire, in the end. It's not about management structures; the ombudsman's the ombudsman -- they aren't management experts. They have a concern; they've heard from some personnel who think that it's better to manage it with a full-time air boss.

It's a judgment call. In the view of senior management, you don't have those bureaucratic structures in place all the time, but you put them in place on a needs basis.

G. Abbott: I want to move to the issue of the width of fireguards, the discussion of which we find on pages 54 to 56. The ombudsman goes to some length to discuss this and looks at how it's done in California, I guess it is, and looks at some of the considerations that come into play in another jurisdiction in determining the width of a fireguard. At the end of that discussion, the ombudsman is not definitive in his observations. He says:

"The ombudsman does not have the expertise to determine what the ideal size of the fireguards ought to have been for the Silver Creek fire. As can be seen from the excerpt set out above, there are general guidelines for determining fireguard width. The actual width will depend on a myriad of factors. The ombudsman is satisfied, however, that this is obviously an important issue that needed to be raised in this report. After considering the pertinent material, the MOF should develop guidelines on determining fireguard width."

I don't want to prompt a great technical debate here, but perhaps we will. I have absolutely no expertise in this, I'm sad to say. Let me just frame the question in this way. We knew in early August, after a long period of drought in the Shuswap area and indeed throughout the southern interior, that we had a potentially catastrophic fire situation. We knew we had a fire that was in a location that was very difficult to deal with and that was proving to be troublesome to extinguish because of bug-killed wood and a number of other natural factors that were occurring. Given that, the question that really flows from the ombudsman's report is: given the climatic situation, given the physical situation, given the possibility of more adverse weather, what guided the decision to go a blade and a half in width on the provision of the fireguard?

[1115]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Some of this may have to do with the understanding of the ombudsman as to the nature of fire-

[ Page 13955 ]

guards and what they are. The fireguard is not the bladed trail. That's not the fireguard; that's the line. That's the perimeter of the fireguard. The fireguard isn't completed until the back-burning has happened. The fireguard is the back-burned area, including the trail. It's a decision taken by the fire boss as to what should be done. I've given you the figures on how much is burned every year, and we think we do a darned good job here in British Columbia.

I'm going to give you our formal response to this recommendation by the ombudsman. In fact, we don't agree at all with this recommendation. I want to qualify that a bit. The guard widths are really subject to the topography, the fuel types, the slope, the soil stability and a number of other factors. Our guards are built to the same standard, using the same criteria as used in the United States and across Canada.

The ombudsman's report has included an interesting table. The ministry is studying this table, and, if appropriate, we'll include it in our training materials. However, as an example, over the last ten years we've constructed guards on approximately 30,000 fires, with a high rate of success. So we must be doing something right. But we'll study that report and, if necessary, adapt our training accordingly.

G. Abbott: I'm glad the ministry's looking at this. I'm always reassured when people tell me that unpleasant events won't be repeated for another 250 or 450 years. Unfortunately, I find that some of them are repeated more frequently than that. I do want to see us prepared as best we can be for things that shouldn't happen often, like major floods or major fires. We do seem to get them more often than we like -- or they may reappear in another location sooner than we anticipate. I think this is an important issue, around the guards. Again, I'm speaking from a standpoint of almost unblemished ignorance about how to deal with this and only, I guess, attempting to interpret what's being said here from a commonsense perspective.

In looking at the issue -- and the minister's agreed that they're going to look at this a little bit more. . . . Can the minister assure me that there is nothing in the code or any other regulation that would prevent a fire boss or the Ministry of Forests from exercising the discretion to -- if they wish -- put in a larger-bladed guard if they thought it was appropriate? In short, do the constraints that might be imposed by the code all get set aside in the event of a fire? Is there pretty much complete discretion on the part of the fire bosses?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Yes, firefighting prevails over code requirements. So we don't go through any kind of evaluation process and apply for a permit to build a fireguard, as some kind of a trail. I want to say to the member that there is pressure from contractors who think it would be better to have a wider trail. Some managers think, given unlimited resources, that we should blade wider trails. But two cat-blades' width would be twice the amount of money paid out to do it and have questionable value. There's tremendous debris. There's going to be twice the debris.

I think there's a caution put out here about what's going to be cost-effective. I don't think there's been evidence provided that it would be more cost-effective to do it a different way. Again, we're always willing to look at it, because if somebody can prove that we're wrong, well, we'd better change.

[1120]

G. Abbott: We had a little bit of a discussion about aircraft earlier, in a different context. One of the recommendations of the ombudsman is on page 59. It's recommendation 10: "Type of Aircraft Used. The MOF has acknowledged the need for a thorough review concerning the type of aircraft used for initial attack and support action on larger fires."

Can the ministry lay out for us perhaps in a little bit more detail the scope of their review and the kinds of issues they are looking at, prompted by the experience with the Salmon Arm fire? For example, the report goes into some discussion around the problems associated with refuelling the Martin Mars and having to return to base on Vancouver Island and that sort of thing. Are those -- the refuelling issues and provision-of-aircraft issues -- part of the review? Perhaps the minister can lay out for me at this point the scope of that review, how it's proceeding and when we're likely to see some conclusions from it.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Sometimes we have to use what aircraft are available, whether they're ideal or not or whether you can get them in. But we've finished our original look at this recommendation, and for training purposes, we've listed the characteristics and capabilities of all types of aircraft.

Now, if the fire distance changes by one mile, that may change the optimization of the use of aircraft. You might have to get a different aircraft if you want to be most effective. There are new aircraft coming in all the time. Just yesterday someone came in with a helicopter with a bigger bucket. We have to adapt all the time. What we've done is to develop a complex matrix that can be used to make decisions about what is the most effective one. I would say to the member that if. . . . I know he was talking to a former Forests minister yesterday, and they were talking about whether he'd seen the fire centre. I'd really encourage a look at the fire centre in Kamloops, because there you can see how they use their computers and the tracking devices where they know where all the aircraft are in North America. The decision is to bring in the right aircraft at the right time.

Decisions are made when an aircraft is in mid-flight. A decision can be made on an aircraft going to fight a fire in the Clearwater area out of Williams Lake. They can make a decision halfway and go to Quesnel, because it's faster to bring in another aircraft that's in the air to fight a lightning blaze somewhere. We have been getting maximum use by using a very sophisticated logistical program. I would really encourage you to take some time this summer to look at what's happening in the case of the fire centre in Quesnel, so that you could see how they would use this matrix.

J. Dalton: I just want to inquire of the minister on something dealing with the Silver Creek fire. Last August 9, if my memory serves me correctly, I started to receive daily fire reports of the Salmon Arm fire at my constituency office. They came from the Ministry of Finance. They started, I think, the same day that the Premier went up there to declare a state of emergency. If I also recall correctly, they ended a week later on August 16, the day when supposedly the fire was under control.

[1125]

The first thing I'm curious about is why my office was receiving these daily reports. I asked my colleagues, and no one seemed to have any recollection of getting them. Secondly, why did they come from the Ministry of Finance? I would

[ Page 13956 ]

have thought that they would have at least come from the Ministry of Forests, which was responsible, I presume, for the firefighting exercise. I would add that I passed the entire package that I got on to the ombudsman for their reaction, but I saw nothing in the report as to why these daily reports were sent to my office. Perhaps the minister could give some explanation.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Well, I have two answers. One: I have no idea why Finance would fax it out. But if you want to give me a copy, we'll track it down and find out why the Ministry of Finance did it. It might just be their fax that was used. We don't know here. We'll find out.

But let me say that when you have a state of emergency. . . . The eyes of the world -- or certainly of North America -- were on the Salmon Arm fire. There was huge interest. As an MLA, I think you might have been asked, "What's going on?" because it was on the news every night for a long period of time. My instruction to the fire people was: make sure you put enough effort into communicating with the public of British Columbia as to what's going on there. There were accusations that we weren't spending money; there were accusations that we were using the wrong aircraft. Those accusations weren't true, so we said that we had to explain to people just what we were doing to deal with that emergency -- because it was a significant emergency.

If you want to provide us with a copy -- if you can remember -- we'll get you an answer.

J. Dalton: As a follow-up to that -- and then I'll allow my colleague to continue. . . . Actually, I sent the entire package to the ombudsman, and I didn't keep a copy. Perhaps they still have it. The package was a very thick one, and I didn't want to waste all the paper in my photocopy machine to keep a copy. But I'll certainly try and follow up because it was a curious issue at the time. I must say that I'm sure the people of West Vancouver-Capilano had some sympathy and concern for the residents of Salmon Arm, but I don't know that my constituents needed to be kept up on a daily basis as to the progress of the firefighting exercise in the Silver Creek area. I think that somebody probably pushed the wrong fax button, quite frankly, and I happened to be on the list.

G. Abbott: Back to the recommendations of the ombudsman. We have touched on this a little bit, but I do want to note it, as it is a recommendation of the ombudsman as well. It's recommendation No. 8: "Central Control of Operations Versus Local Decision-making." It's on page 58. "While the ombudsman is satisfied of the importance of a central organization for resource allocation, there appears to be a need for discussions to take place with a view to ascertaining whether the system requires improvement. These discussions are occurring." Now, I presume that when I posed the question earlier on in this discussion about the connection or interrelationship between the district office and the fire protection branch, probably this was what the minister was talking about -- what the ombudsman refers to as central control versus local decision-making. Can the minister tell me, further to recommendation No. 8, how the discussions are proceeding? Have conclusions been drawn about how the balance here can be improved?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: You said recommendation No. 8. Can you give me the page number?

G. Abbott: Page 58.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: As I'm getting the answer, I just want to respond to a previous question about how and why they would come from Finance. The communications for the fire, when there is an emergency, are handled by CPCS, and that's under the auspices of Finance. So Finance was using the communications division -- CPCS -- and that's why it came from Finance.

[1130]

We think there are some examples. We encouraged people to submit complaints that they had to the ombudsman. There were a couple of incidents where a couple of orders for equipment were delayed 24 hours. Now, we move 60 tonnes of equipment and thousands of pumps and thousands of metres of hose, so there's a lot being moved. We move it by aircraft and other ways. There were a couple of cases where there was a 24-hour delay. If you did a study of it, we would suggest that in spite of the fact that you do have some mistakes and some inefficiencies that happen, you've got more equipment available across the province. The previous method was to have all the equipment available in all the offices standing by and not being used. What we have here is a better line of equipment and a better distribution in a much more efficient way, in spite of the inefficiencies. You know, there's a step backwards here, but we made a lot of steps forward by having centralized decision-making and distribution of firefighting equipment.

G. Abbott: Just so we can put paid to this particular observation or recommendation, one would understand from the suggestion that these discussions are occurring, that the ministry was looking at ways in which the expertise and the energy of district staff could perhaps be more effectively plugged in to the central fire protection branch efforts. Has that been done? Or is that sort of an ongoing process in the ministry?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: In the normal course of adjusting to a new organizational structure, we're doing three things. One is that there's training at the district level; that's happening. Then we've developed a very friendly memorandum of understanding between the district operations and the fire protection branch that will say: "Okay, these are the things that the district can do to help the firefighting effort." The third thing we're doing is encouraging staff at staff meetings to come up with complaints and deal with them at the district level. So if there's a complaint, we deal with it on the ground in the district.

G. Abbott: The observation and recommendation on page 58, as well -- No. 9 -- is on hours of work for heavy-equipment operators and ground crews. I'll quote the observation here: "The ombudsman is satisfied that safety concerns prevented the use of heavy equipment and ground crews at night during the early stages of this fire. The ombudsman also finds that early start times were ordered by the overhead team prior to August 5 but not necessarily implemented effectively." Could I hear the ministry's view with respect to that observation, and whether there is anything that can be done in the way of policies and procedures to improve the situation?

[ Page 13957 ]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: We're looking for our considered response. We have them numbered somewhat differently -- `by recommendation, actually, because that's how we're doing it.

[1135]

I just want to point out, because this is germane here -- talking about working at night. . . . In British Columbia last year we had about 65,000 fire-days. That was 730,000 hours of people fighting fires, and there was not a single fatality in British Columbia, despite the horrific conditions that people were working under. In the Salmon Arm fire alone there were 130,000 firefighter hours, and they worked with only one time-loss accident. It was a twisted knee. It was an incredible feat of putting people to work safely. In contrast there were 184 firefighters killed in fires in the U.S., Mexico and other countries. Some of our recommendations push the edge of safe working conditions, and so on.

Having given that as background, the answer that we have is that we would like to clear up some misconceptions that are here. The crews on a fire start when the fire boss orders them to. The fire boss is extremely careful that he does not work those crews to exhaustion. They normally work a 12-hour day on a fire like this. In fact, in the first few days, they may be working more than 12 hours. Our review of the time sheets show that these young firefighters worked extremely long hours, and only somebody who is in good physical condition and is well trained could put in those kinds of hours.

I believe that what the ombuds is talking about here is some notes from a fire supervisor saying that he would like the crews earlier in the morning. Somebody higher up on the fire overruled the request that they start that early, because their hours were becoming extremely long. This is an administrative detail. We're going to, however, take the ombudsman's recommendation and make sure that there is no confusion about what time the crews are supposed to start. We'll make sure that the senior officer makes that decision. Again, I want to say that nobody should harbour the misconception that these crews did not work hard under absolutely gruesome conditions. In fact, in this fire and every other fire in the province, these young people -- mostly university students who are well trained and highly physically fit -- put their lives on the line for people in the province and did an outstanding job and did it safely.

G. Abbott: I'm sorry if we're not coordinating exactly with the ministry's response here. The trouble is that they're laid out in three different areas. But we'll get through it, no doubt. We're almost there in terms of completing this, anyway.

Recommendation No. 13, on page 59 of the report, is about use of heavy equipment. I'll just quote the ombudsman here: "The ombudsman is of the opinion that the current preorganization system for the deployment of heavy equipment can be improved. The ombudsman endorses the recommendation of the Garnet fire review that the MOF revisit its policies and procedures used to identify and qualify manpower and equipment resources that can be hired locally to fight fires." I invite the ministry's response to that suggestion.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I know the concern. I meet many people who say: "I could have been out there. I wasn't logging; it was too hot. I could have been out there fighting fires." We're going to treat heavy equipment -- bulldozers, in particular -- like we treat aircraft. But it's a massive undertaking. We're going to try to do better about knowing the location and the listing of the machinery that might be available. As you can appreciate, that will be quite an undertaking. But because we agree with the ombudsman's recommendation, or the recommendation on the Garnet fire, we are going to move toward having people trained ahead of time.

[1140]

The downside is that if you want a job, you're going to have to be certified. You can't just arrive on the scene and say: "I've got a cat and I can fight fire." The implication here is that you have to use local equipment. But for safety reasons, people have to be trained. We don't want the first person killed in a fire in several years to be somebody operating equipment without training. We're going to make attempts to follow up on that recommendation, and we've been working on it.

G. Abbott: Is the expectation that the new organization for deployment and registration of that heavy equipment will be in place for the '99 fire season?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I'm informed that it will take three or four years to do this, and it's because you have to inspect the equipment. You've got to know that the tracks aren't going to come off -- all that sort of thing. You know, you can't risk having inadequate equipment. It has to be done carefully. In my inquiries into this, I'm not satisfied that except in isolated cases, where you've had a piece of equipment that might have done the job -- where you've had a fire boss that trucked something into Lillooet from Kamloops because it was known to be suitable and available and the training had been done, then somebody said that over in the next valley there was a piece of equipment sitting there. . . . Well, that might or might not be known. We've got to have a system that's reliable. That's what we're going to concentrate on: devising a system that works. Obviously, in the training, we will be attempting to make sure that people remain knowledgable about the existence of local equipment.

G. Abbott: As the ministry proceeds to get that registry of equipment in place over the next year or two or three, I'm presuming that they will get the system in place first in those areas of the province with the highest fire risk and then proceed backward from there. Is that a fair assumption?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: We believe Kamloops is the first. Well, it is. Kamloops will be the first region, because that's where the greatest risk is. But very shortly we'll be working through all the fire centres.

G. Abbott: No. 14 on page 59 is "Deactivation of Logging Roads," and this gets us into all kinds of complexities not associated with firefighting. Here's the ombudsman's observation: "While the ombudsman agrees that it is not feasible nor desirable to maintain all old logging roads in the province, the ombudsman is of the opinion that the MOF should revisit its policy in relation to the deactivation of main logging roads in areas designated as extreme fire hazard to ensure that these roads are readily accessible for any future firefighting efforts." Is there any sort of process or procedure underway to define those important roads from a firefighting perspective? Is the recommendation proceeding?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: There may be different views here, because we are looking at this in a preliminary way. Different

[ Page 13958 ]

sections of the ministry may have different views. I'm going to offer you the protection branch's view of things. They don't think it's feasible, because the number of roads is tremendous and the cost of maintaining them is tremendous. There are other good reasons for putting them to bed. The reactivation would be at very extensive cost.

[1145]

The ombudsman limited his recommendations to those areas designated as extreme fire-hazard areas. In a given summer, almost the entire southern half of the province could be designated -- in some summers, the whole province. As a result, the protection branch is not actually recommending that this would in any way be a justifiable use, but the request for funds. . . . The request is to revisit it. There are all kinds of requests to revisit the maintenance of logging roads, for recreation and tourism use, from salvagers and so on. The ministry will take this into account as one of the demands on Forest Service roads, as we go through the road review process. It'll be covered off, and we will have the various views made available to the team that's looking at the options.

G. Abbott: Thank you.

Just a final question here around the summary of recommendation No. 6 on page 61: "The MOF keep the general public reasonably informed of decisions made regarding tactics or problems that arise when the public is voicing concerns. For example, the ombudsman believes that the public should have been provided with an explanation for the reduced air activity on July 31, August 1 and August 2."

The ombudsman wasn't criticizing the reduced air activity. He reviews that and accepts that it was necessary to reduce it during that period but is certainly embracing the notion that there was a lot of public concern around why there was reduced air activity at that point in time. I can certainly attest to the fact that the volume of calls to my office -- and, I'm sure, to the Ministry of Forests and so on -- went way up at that point in time. So this is an interesting challenge that's posed here. Does the minister have any suggestions on how it can be achieved?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Well, I have my observations from the handling of the communications around the fire. There was quite a bit of discussion when I was up there. Knowing what it's like to deal with the media, we actually had to divert some resources -- not away from fighting the fires, but to communicating with the public and concentrating on effectiveness around that job, particularly at the Silver Creek fire. A lot was done. The argument is that you could always do more.

The question is: can you use the media to get out your message about what you're doing? We found that sometimes news is a little bit short; they were waiting for the next wind to blow up. So it was helpful, in the case of the Silver Creek fire, to have information available on the types of aircraft. We occupied quite a bit of time -- at the appropriate time, when there was no news -- on just what the different types of aircraft can do. We're developing some videos about the respective use of the types of aircraft and different techniques. So we're working on that.

We did an extensive media relations effort with the information officers. We did it right from the very first day. There were 22 information updates on the toll-free number during this fire. The web site was kept up to date. We established our own dedicated FM radio station, broadcasting on 911 during the fire and giving fire status reports and updates. We established additional lines to the emergency operations centre and information team members. We arranged for a community meeting for the residents of Silver Creek. The ombudsman has stated in his report: "We have found that the information, for the most part, was provided in a timely and appropriate manner." However, during the fast-developing fire, we were required to give out information on more than 600 fires at that particular time.

We will, however, continue to review our information systems and procedures and do everything possible to make sure that the information is up to date, relevant and timely. It's a matter of how many resources. . . . I certainly would not have argued that we should have brought another information officer in to help, in the case of the Silver Creek fire. I think there were two personnel working this file, and they were busy. It was my comment that I didn't think any more resources should be devoted.

[1150]

I think we do a good job on fire information. Yes, you can always do better, and we will see if there's something more that can be done here. We're quite open to advice, because quite frankly, this firefighting outfit has got a reputation to maintain. They are, and want to remain, the best in the world. We want the public to know that.

G. Abbott: That, I think, concludes my questions with respect to fire protection, and I thank the minister's staff for responding to the questions that my colleagues and I had with respect to fire protection. I look forward to the suggestions that have been made being translated into reality and providing even better fire protection for the citizens of British Columbia in the future.

If we could, with your patience and forbearance, one of my colleagues has a question with respect to a local, regional issue on Louisiana-Pacific. . . .

An Hon. Member: And Empire Valley too.

G. Abbott: Yeah, we probably won't have time to do that before lunch. But if we can go into that and do as much as we can before lunch. . . . Are you available after lunch?

An Hon. Member: No.

G. Abbott: So if we could start it now for five minutes or so, then we'll continue with it after. Is that acceptable?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: That would be acceptable.

I just have to correct the record on a couple of matters regarding the fire. First of all, with respect to what I said about the access to contingency. . .I want the record to be clear that the ministry has the statutory authority under the Forest Act to spend, in any year, what's needed to fight fires in the province. On fire preparedness, the budget is set at $41.86 million, and that provides for our infrastructure. Our direct fire budget of $35.98 million is supplemented, as required, by the statutory authority. That's how that breaks down.

Just another small item: I did get information yesterday on discussions about the AAC. I inadvertently provided the information on TFL 8, in response to the question on AAC

[ Page 13959 ]

increases on TFL 3. So the correct information is that TFL 3 is held by Slocan Forest Products in the Arrow forest district. The chief forester increased the AAC from 65,000 cubic metres per year to 80,000 cubic metres per year, effective July 1, 1998. A large area of second growth which regenerated following fires in the early part of the century is now reaching harvestable age. This was a significant factor in supporting the new AAC. The AAC also includes the partition of 4,000 cubic metres per year, and that allows the addition of 1,860 hectares of difficult-to-harvest areas. Alternative harvesting systems, such as low-pressure ground systems and aerial and long-line cable systems, are used there. That corrects the record on that.

R. Neufeld: I appreciate that this is a bit out of order -- to the minister -- so if I could have his assurance that if he doesn't have the answers at his fingertips, which he may have, he will respond to me with the answers. I just want to know: were any special considerations, either financial or anything like that, given to Louisiana-Pacific Corp. to encourage them to come to the northeast and build the four projected plants that they have? Did government do anything to try and attract them, maybe by way of tax breaks or financial assistance or infrastructure or anything of that magnitude?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I was just checking, and my memory was correct. LP had two pieces of business happening. One was their plan for development of bidding on licence. The other thing was the pulp mill; there was a job protection plan put in place for the pulp mill. There's no connection between the two. There were no special considerations given. The only factors around and surrounding the licence were those that were advertised in the advertisement. Normal licensing, normal awarding practices, no sweetening of the package, no concessions. . . .

[1155]

R. Neufeld: Just another issue. Again, this has to do with the Empire Valley Ranch deal. Just a few quick questions. Has any portion or asset acquired by the province in the Empire Valley Ranch deal been disposed of or traded away since the deal was completed?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I don't have that information here. Do you want to give me your questions? I'll get you the answers. I'd have to ask the Minister of Environment what that is.

R. Neufeld: I just have a couple more quick ones that will be on the record. Then I'd appreciate it if, as the minister confirmed, he would get back to me. Can the minister tell me again -- and I'm sure he won't have this figure in the back of his head -- how many cubic metres have been harvested so far on the lands that were traded away in the Fort St. John area for the Empire Valley Ranch deal? I'd like to know the coniferous volume, the deciduous volume and the estimated stumpage value of both of those. If the minister could get that. . . . I don't imagine he has that.

My last question is in regard to silviculture on the lands in the Fort St. John area as it relates to the Empire Valley Ranch deal. Can the minister tell me whether any silviculture obligations have taken place in regard to that deal in Fort St. John?

The Chair: Minister, noting the time.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The member is right; I don't have that information here. We'll get it and provide it to you.

Noting the time, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

Committee of Supply B, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. I. Waddell moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:58 a.m.


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