Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

[ Page 11075 ]

The House met at 10:05 a.m.

Prayers.

Orders of the Day

NISGA'A FINAL AGREEMENT ACT

The Chair: We'll call the committee to order, members. Just before we get started, because of the unique nature of this bill, I have a short statement.

Today we're embarking on the committee stage of Bill 51, a bill to approve and give effect to the final agreement made between the Nisga'a, the government of Canada and the government of British Columbia. I wish to take this opportunity, in light of the unique form of the bill, to comment on the process to be used in committee debate.

The bill would approve the final agreement, which is attached as a schedule, and enacts ancillary legislation to conform with various aspects of the agreement. Similar types of bills have been passed at various times by the Canadian Parliament -- the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 1988 -- and by the U.K. Parliament: the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act, 1922; the Ottawa Agreements Act, 1932; the British North America Act, 1949; and the Canada Act, 1982. In all of these instances, the committee Chair had to consider the appropriate format and process for amendments to the bill.

It's a Crown prerogative to make agreements. The role of parliament is to debate, accept, reject or amend the bill, but subject to technical amendments, it cannot amend the agreement. On a proposed motion to amend the agreement during the Free Trade Agreement debate in the Canadian House of Commons in 1988, the Speaker ruled as follows: "I wish to remind the member that treaty-making power is within the prerogative of the Crown, and therefore the agreement itself cannot be amended." In Beauchesne's fifth edition, citation 778 states:

"When a bill is introduced to give effect to an Agreement and the Agreement is scheduled to the bill as a completed document, amendments cannot be made to the schedule. An amendment to the clauses of the bill for the purpose of withholding legislative effect from the document contained in the schedule is in order; also as are amendments to those clauses which deal with matters not determined by the document contained in the schedule."

It seems to the Chair that section 3 of the bill embodies the operative portion of the bill, and accordingly, by way of example, amendments which would have the effect of withholding legislative effect might, if otherwise in order, be moved to that section.

It's to be remembered that the committee stage of a bill does not provide an opportunity to recanvass all the arguments that were applicable at second reading, where the principle of the bill was under debate. During committee stage, debate must be strictly confined to the section which is before the committee. Likewise, debate on proposed amendments must be strictly relevant to the amendment as proposed. The agreement, while not amendable, except as provided for above, will be open to debate when the schedule is called, subject to the observations made with respect to section 3.

Thank you, members.

G. Wilson: Hon. Chair, I wonder if it might be possible for you to distribute a copy of what you've just read to us so that we can actually understand what you just said.

The Chair: Yes. We'd be happy to do that right away.

On section 1.

Hon. D. Lovick: Mr. Chairman, before we actually get to discussing the particular section, I would like to simply say I believe that what you just read out in terms of the operative rules for this debate are those understood by both me and my colleague, my counterpart, the opposition critic. We recognize and assume, then, that the majority of the debate on the Nisga'a final agreement will occur under section 3 of the bill.

I might, just for the benefit of those who are watching this debate, explain that the structure of the bill is rather unique, insofar as what we have is a bill consisting of some 11 substantive sections, and within that, section 3 of the bill is the treaty itself. Therefore our beginning debate will be talking about those things required to give the force of law and effect to the treaty itself. So people will be understandably forgiven if they're wondering: what is it you are talking about in sections 1, 2 and 4 and on?

Broadly considered, then, the bill consists of three sections. The first are called core provisions. Those core provisions, as I suggested earlier, ratify and give the force of law to the final agreement. They establish any powers that may be required by any person or body to fulfil obligations under the agreement. They establish in provincial law all of the obligations that apply to persons and bodies under the final agreement. These core provisions also make the final agreement binding on all persons and allow all persons to rely on the agreement. In addition, those core provisions confirm Nisga'a ownership of Nisga'a lands, and they address various administrative matters -- for example, the harvest agreement, the Judicial Review Procedure Act, etc. Those are the core provisions.

The next part, as I say, is the consequential amendments which are appended to this bill -- 59 sections in total. They are simply consequential amendments made to existing provincial laws as and when required. Their purposes are to ensure transparency, to give effect to specific commitments made in the final agreement and to preserve the application of certain provincial laws that apply to Nisga'a Indian bands -- for example, things like the Adoption Act and the Social Workers Act.

The last part of the bill in structural terms, of course, is clearly the most important part -- namely, section 3, which is the Nisga'a final agreement itself. That is, the treaty.

As I said, my colleague the opposition critic for Aboriginal Affairs and I have discussed this matter. I think we have an understanding that we will proceed in an orderly and logical form, so that people can indeed prepare and know when they should be here for debate and so forth. The bulk of

[ Page 11076 ]

[10:15]

The Chair: Very good. Then we shall proceed.

M. de Jong: Well, we are at last here, hon. Chair, at that point where we can embark on that detailed discussion of the bill. It's important, obviously, for a number of reasons. It's important, I think, in the context of the second reading debate that has just taken place. I wouldn't dare to try and summarize all that was said over the course of the past three or four weeks of debate, except to say that people who were watching or reading would, I think, exit that debate understanding that on the government side of the House there is a prevailing feeling that treaties are good, that this is a treaty -- in fact it's the first treaty -- and therefore it must be good, and that anyone questioning any aspect of this treaty is bad.

What emerges from that line of thinking and that approach to the subject is: why even have the debate we are going to embark upon now? Maybe the best argument I can think of in response to that is one that was raised yesterday by my colleague, the member for Richmond-Steveston. He reminded all members in this House of the challenges we face as we enact legislation on a daily basis in this chamber, of the difficulties we have in getting it right, of the necessity we often feel for having to revisit legislation and correct it, change it, alter it.

I picked out one of the bills that we dealt with earlier in this session, a miscellaneous. . . . In fact, the title of this bill was Statute Revision Correction and Miscellaneous Amendments Act. We dealt with the Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, the Family Relations Act, the Insurance Act, the Optometrists Act -- a whole series of pieces of legislation that at the time they were introduced were thought to be perfect. They went through a committee-level debate, and the government of the day -- whoever passed it -- thought they had it right. Presumably, it was with that in mind that they introduced and moved ahead with the legislation.

But they didn't get it right, and subsequent governments had to recognize that. In the case of Bill 20 in this legislative session, this government recognized that there had been mistakes made in all of those various statutes, and corrections needed and tinkering required. That won't be possible with this document. With these hundreds of pages, except in extraordinary circumstances, it will not be possible to change anything that emerges from the debate we are about to have, starting today.

It is important, I think, for us to keep that in mind as we move through the various sections of the bill and, ultimately, the chapters and clauses of the draft treaty itself. So as I consider the context within which we are going to have this discussion, I'm mindful of a couple of things. I'm mindful of something I heard the Premier say not so long ago. He said that not one word of this document will be changed. Now, I think he is assisted somewhat by the advice you offered to the chamber just a few moments ago, but his words were emphatic and specific: not one word of this document will be changed.

With respect to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, I was going to alert him to a quote and ask him to comment on something attributed to him in the Globe and Mail, where he said: "Anyone opposed to Nisga'a is de facto opposed to treaties." The fact that the term "de facto" appears in the quote leads me to believe that it's accurate and can be attributed to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs. But beyond that, I don't have to challenge him with respect to the quote, because, in fairness, he repeated those words yesterday. He repeated those words in his summation, in his concluding remarks, and he was talking specifically, I think, about Nisga'a rights on Nisga'a land.

What I heard the minister say is that anyone that doesn't accept his notion of how those rights should be exercised is, in his mind, necessarily opposed to treaties. As we embark upon this debate -- which will take some time, hon. Chair -- I want to state that I reject that notion categorically.

There are people in this province who believe that the majority of any land transfer should occur at an individual level. There are certainly precedents for that, elsewhere in the world. That doesn't make them wrong. It is a different notion of the form a treaty might take, but it doesn't make them wrong. But it does in the mind of the minister and, I daresay, in the minds of this government. In the government's mind, to quarrel with or question any aspect, any clause, any provision of this weighty document places you in a camp they call anti-treaty, anti-Indian.

The government should know, as we embark upon this exercise, that we reject that. As we go through it, clause by clause, and highlight where we think the difficulties will lie, where we think this government has employed a strategy that is flawed, we will say that; we will make those points. But throughout, we will reject this notion, this myth, that the government is trying to concoct: that that somehow renders us less sympathetic or less willing to do what needs to be done to rectify this ongoing problem.

So I've made those comments, in an introductory way. The Premier is here; he has the chief negotiator beside him. The minister is here. I've timidly challenged some of the comments that the minister has made in the past and, more particularly, yesterday and in fairness would offer him an opportunity to respond.

Hon. G. Clark: I want to respond briefly to the member and to his remarks, because I have respect for the opposition Aboriginal Affairs critic and for the comments he's made from time to time in the House on aboriginal questions, among other things. However, I want to take exception to what he says and to suggest that his line today is an attempt -- a poor attempt, I think, but an attempt -- to pretend that the members of the opposition are in favour of treaties, because they know British Columbians are in favour of treaties. It's very easy to stand up and say: "Oh yes, we're all in favour of settling land claims. We just don't like this treaty." That somehow allows you to pretend to be liberal, in the sense of wanting reconciliation and justice, while hiding behind elements of this treaty that you think are unacceptable.

Reasonable people, including members of the opposition and perhaps members of the governing party, may disagree with sections of this treaty. That is appropriate; that is right; that is reasonable. It is reasonable for people not to agree with every line in this treaty, and I accept that. But having said that, the reason that -- i.e., saying that therefore the treaty is wrong and should be amended and has to be opposed -- is wrong is because it fails to grasp how treaties are made. It's easy to be

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Interjections.

Hon. G. Clark: It's six years of negotiations with three parties and 20 years with two parties. It is six years of negotiations with three parties, and $30 million has been spent on negotiations just by the aboriginal people. Trade-offs and negotiations were made all the way through, and concessions and compromises were made by all parties. So it's not surprising that reasonable people, looking at this now, would say: "Well, gee, I don't like this compromise that was made. I think they went too far here or there." That's understandable. But the challenge for the opposition is to say: "In total, were these compromises acceptable in moving us forward to reconciliation?" While I accept this notion that you could say that they're not acceptable and you must oppose it, by definition that puts an end to the treaty-making process as it has been designed.

Again, to be fair, the opposition could say: "Well, we disagree with the tripartite treaty-making process and the compromises and negotiations that take place." I understand that's a legitimate position, but I think the opposition should recognize that the failure to support this treaty is a condemnation of the process of treaty-making and the compromises that must be made by the representative groups to get an agreement. So it's sophistry to say: "Oh, we just don't like elements of it. We really are in favour of treaties, but we don't like elements of it. Therefore we would do it differently, and everything would be wonderful. Or individual parcels of land could go to individual Indians. That would be an idea." That is a legitimate idea, but that is not the treaty-making process that aboriginal people, the federal government or the provincial government has embarked upon. It is not the process. . . .

For members opposite to oppose this treaty, they are in effect saying that a different kind of treaty process. . . . The current treaty process would collapse, because the compromises that must be made by the parties at the table would not be made if this treaty were not accepted. In other words, after making all these compromises and having gotten to this table, if it is rejected now by this parliament, then you are saying to aboriginal people who are engaged in a treaty-making process that you cannot trust the provincial Crown to make compromises at the end of the day, because they do not have or command the support of parliament. You would end the current treaty process.

I'm not suggesting that there is not, if you will, a legitimate position by the members of the opposition that the current treaty process is flawed, that a different model needs to be pursued, that different parameters have to be pursued. By opposing this treaty, I say through the Chair to members opposite, they are opposed to this kind of treaty-making process. That is why it is unequivocal to me and, I think, to any objective observer that the whole process of negotiating treaties that we are embarking upon -- this is the first one. . . . In weighing the decision to oppose this treaty, the members opposite have consciously staked out a claim against treaty-making as we know it in British Columbia. There will be no treaties negotiated if this one fails. It will move into a court resolution process which will resolve the matter through third-party intervention over a period of time.

That is the difference. That is the point that we have been trying to make, and I try to make it with as much lack of confrontation as I'm capable of. I've tried to make it genuinely, and I've tried to understand the opposition's position, but I hope that members opposite will understand the government's position. We are not saying that you cannot oppose sections of this treaty and be reasonable people. We're not suggesting that people who oppose the Nisga'a treaty are racists -- or that all of them are racists. We're not suggesting that members of the opposition do not have reasonable positions. But we are saying that you cannot come in here at this eleventh hour and say that you're in favour of treaty-making but not this treaty, because that is sophistry. That will end the treaty-making process as we know it in British Columbia and will plunge us into a different process, which will be more confrontational and, I think, lead to a court-ordered resolution of this question rather than this kind of resolution.

[10:30]

M. de Jong: We're dealing with the Nisga'a final agreement, as indicated, and section 1. The difficulty I have with what the Premier has just said to this House is that I find the logic absurd. With the greatest respect, I find myself asking: if that process is in place, if responsibility falls to the executive branch of government to employ that process to seek a final settlement and if it must automatically follow, as the Premier suggests to this House, that what emerges from that process must necessarily enjoy the unanimous support of all members of this assembly, then why bring it here? Why bring it here if, at the end of the exercise, we are simply being told that any response other than a positive affirmation, a vote in the affirmative, somehow casts aspersions on the process by which the document has been created? Then what is the point?

This opposition believes that elements of this document are unconstitutional. That issue is being litigated. The government takes a differing view of the matter; we understand that. But surely the Premier wouldn't ask members of an opposition, who legitimately and genuinely believe a bill that has been introduced into this chamber to be unconstitutional, to vote in favour of that bill simply by virtue of the process that gave rise to its birth. But that is what the Premier is asking us, and I find that absurd. Recognizing the position the government takes in terms of sponsoring this piece of legislation, I find the logic employed by the Premier absurd.

Hon. G. Clark: Well, look, perhaps I wasn't very clear -- I don't think I was -- on this point. Clearly it is your right, even your obligation, to oppose this treaty should you feel that in its totality it is unacceptable to you and your view of where we should go.

The question is not whether or not you must support this; the question is being honest about the consequences of not supporting the treaty. This is the distinction we're making. I'm not for a minute trying to criticize the opposition's right to oppose the treaty, as they are doing. It's clearly legitimate; there are legitimate reasons for criticizing elements of the treaty; it is their right. It is on the consequences of not supporting the treaty that we disagree. It is the consequences of not supporting the treaty which are profound and significant, and that is where I find the opposition's position offensive. It's not about their right to oppose; it's their saying that they can

[ Page 11078 ]

I'm not quarrelling with your right to oppose the treaty. I say, through the Chair, to all members: they clearly have the ability, the right and even the obligation to oppose the treaty if they feel so strongly about it. But it is not without significant consequence. That is what I find, frankly, offensive -- that members opposite can say: "Well, there are no consequences of this; we can just simply go back and renegotiate something else." Clearly, to oppose this has significant consequences to the entire treaty-making process.

G. Plant: I wanted to rise a few minutes ago to speak in response to the Premier's first point about what was somehow the fundamental problem with what the opposition was doing. However, having heard the member for Matsqui, the Premier -- and I say this as fairly and objectively as I can -- came up with an entirely different rationale for saying why the opposition is somehow wrong.

Let's explore the first reason. The first reason given was that a fundamental attack on the treaty -- that is, opposition to the treaty, at the end of the day -- was an attack on the process. What is logically absurd about the Premier's position -- and this is to make, slightly differently, the point that my colleague from Matsqui made -- is this: the Premier's position is that (a) if you have a process and (b) if parties negotiate, (c) any outcome is therefore acceptable. That is, you cannot challenge the outcome fundamentally without undermining the process.

What the Premier could add to that debate, to that discussion, which I think would help all of us who have to grapple with this, is. . . . He could add this: the province does not enter treaty negotiations blind; it does not enter them without some idea of what it wishes to accomplish. In fact, if the provincial negotiators are at the table with anything, they are at the table with instructions from their political masters, the government.

I have a feeling, although I have no knowledge of what those instructions are, that if we were to have before us those instructions on some fundamental points -- and let's be clear that for me the fundamental point is self-government -- we would, between government and opposition, disagree fundamentally on those instructions. That is what causes the problem. The province, the government, the NDP, have said that negotiators often negotiate a treaty with instructions that I think we disagree with. That necessarily opens up the possibility that no matter how long the process, no matter how much is spent, no matter how much the investment of lives and tears and joy, the outcome may in fact be -- at least from the perspective of people who disagree with the premises -- fundamentally flawed.

For the Premier to say, therefore, that you cannot question this treaty without undermining the process -- that is, or, to put it another way, that because there is a process, any result is therefore the only result that can be accepted -- is, I think, to engage in an exercise in logic which my friend from Matsqui has described quite accurately as being absurd.

The second point has to do with the consequences of all of this, and that's the Premier's second point. His concern is not about the fact that we are challenging the process. The second time he rises, he says: "No, no. My concern is that if you attack this treaty, it will have consequences for the treaty process going forward. No one would negotiate with us." Well, let's make sure we understand, again, that there is something at the very beginning of that train of reasoning which undermines the strength of the Premier's position. He says, in effect: "What aboriginal group would negotiate with a province that didn't have a mandate?"

In fact, what we're doing is challenging the outcome after the fact and therefore undermining the ability of the province to negotiate. There is in fact a pretty easy way of fixing that: get a mandate that works. Get a mandate going forward where you can say conclusively that you have support. In fact, if you don't have a mandate that has support, then the whole process is going to fail.

So it doesn't work, either, to say that the fundamental problem with our objection is that we are not taking the consequences of all this seriously. I say with respect that while the Premier might think he's being objective and fair, to make that kind of a comment is. . . . I acknowledge that he would like to try to be objective and fair for as long as he can possibly do it. But that kind of comment is demeaning, because it suggests that people who oppose the treaty don't take the process seriously, don't understand the consequences. Well, I suspect that people who oppose this treaty are as concerned and worried about the consequences of this not working as is the government.

It is interesting to begin this debate with some of these general observations. I have to say that one of the things that has been the most disturbing to me over the course of the last six months is the fact that the government's response to those who raise questions about this treaty is, sooner or later -- and frankly, it is usually sooner -- to question the motives of those who challenge the treaty. Now, I respect that this is politics, and we're up against a government that is all about politics, but it is even more interesting to me that it only took about ten minutes into this debate before somebody questioned the motives of some other party in this debate. People who read Hansard are going to find out who that was. It wasn't the opposition that stood up and challenged the motives of the government for doing this; it was in fact the government.

We will find out, and we will have a nice, interesting debate over the course of days about the details of all this. But I think it is deeply illustrative of a problem with this process, which the Premier would seek to defend, that on virtually the first occasion he has to speak in this debate about this treaty in this context, he resorts almost instantly to the tactic of challenging, attacking and undermining the motives of those who dare to question.

Hon. G. Clark: Well, I'd simply say that through this debate we will not let go unchallenged pious comments from members of the opposition which betray six months of rhetoric. When opposition members say things like "race-based government" and "hot buttons" and words like that to try to exploit this issue for partisan gain, and they say that for months -- including the Leader of the Opposition -- and then come in here and say, "Oh, we're all in favour of settling treaties, just not this treaty," and "We're nice people too, and we're reasonable. . . ." That simply cannot go unchallenged, because -- and this is what we started this discussion with -- the consequences of what members opposite are saying and have done over the last three months, including oppose this treaty, are to say that we will not have treaties. This is the premise that the Aboriginal Affairs critic pointed out to try to refute that point, by saying they want treaties. And it is the premise of all of my remarks to say this: you have a legitimate position opposing the treaty; but do not pretend, please, that somehow you can have a treaty after taking all of the rhetoric

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J. Weisgerber: I too want to join in this debate, particularly because I think I have a personal stake in it. I hope not many people would challenge my commitment to treaty-making. I have staked a good deal of my own personal credibility on treaty-making and the need for treaty-making. I continue to believe in the need for treaty-making, but I also believe that treaties can be voted against, that treaties can be overturned if necessary.

[10:45]

I think the problem here goes to the fact that when the agreement-in-principle was tabled, the province basically said: "No changes to this. This is the agreement. We're not going to contemplate any changes." A number of thoughtful people, I believe, had anticipated an opportunity to examine the agreement-in-principle and to put forward arguments for change, and that those changes would have at least had an opportunity to be considered.

That didn't happen, with the exception of certainty language. Between the time that the agreement-in-principle came down and the final agreement was drafted, the Delgamuukw decision -- the last decision from the Supreme Court -- demonstrated absolutely without question that the language with respect to certainty in the agreement-in-principle was flawed. The parties went back and renegotiated. I thought first of all that it demonstrated that if certainty language can be changed, surely there should then have been an opportunity for the parties to have taken other issues, perhaps issues that were key to British Columbians -- and I'm talking about self-government -- and gone back and reconsidered self-government. But there was an absolute unwillingness by the province -- or an apparent unwillingness by the province -- to even consider this issue of self-government.

As a representative for the people of Peace River South, who voted overwhelmingly against the Charlottetown accord, who as part of the Charlottetown accord objected to this notion of a third order of government and who now see it being brought in by the back door. . . . Quite honestly, I don't believe -- and the Premier can correct me, as I'm sure he would not hesitate to do -- that the province drove this issue of the inherent right to self-government. I am absolutely convinced that this is another case of the arrogance of Ottawa in determining that they, having failed in the Charlottetown accord to achieve this third order of government, will simply decide to implement it treaty by treaty. The province rolled over on this issue. The province had an absolutely solid model in Sechelt, with delegated government -- with basically all of the powers that the Nisga'a enjoy, but delegated by legislation. I believe that the province had every opportunity, even as late as post-agreement-in-principle, to go back and look at that issue.

The province failed to do that, and I'm going to vote against the bill as I did in second reading, because I think that the issue of the third order of government is fundamental not only to Nisga'a but to the way we operate as a society. That doesn't mean that I'm against treaties. I don't think it diminishes by one iota my commitment to treaty-making. Nor do I believe, if the province were to reject this agreement and go back and say, "On the basis of self-government we've got to renegotiate," that the Nisga'a would walk away either.

But I can't leave it unchallenged, because the Premier, in his challenge to the opposition, didn't talk about anyone particular in the opposition, but he indeed appeared quite willing to tar all of us with the same brush. Perhaps we're happy to be tarred that way, but nonetheless I took those criticisms to apply to us collectively and individually, and I simply can't accept that.

Hon. G. Clark: I just want to make a few, if I could, corrections for the record -- or disagreements with the member for the record. First of all, the agreement-in-principle was discussed extensively in British Columbia -- in fact, for a couple of years. We sent out thousands of copies. We had a parliamentary committee travelling the province and explicitly looking at these questions, including the question of the Nisga'a agreement-in-principle. I think it's wrong to say that there was no discussion of it; there was discussion. It was the subject of an election campaign, and it came up from time to time.

That member, who was then leader of the Reform Party, took a very definitive position on it. So did I, and so did the Leader of the Opposition. So we did have a testing of that question, although I certainly acknowledge it not being the primary or salient issue in the election campaign in most places. But it was a subject of the debate.

Interjection.

Hon. G. Clark: Yeah, it was in Parksville to some extent. It was in the member's constituency in some places, actually, and it came up from time to time on talk shows, etc. So it was debated during the campaign.

We never said that not a word would be changed. Chief Joe Gosnell said that and said it repeatedly during the two-year period. The government's position was, in fact, the opposite: that we would take the agreement-in-principle, listen to people, travel around the province and make some changes. Many changes were made between the agreement-in-principle and the final agreement.

Finally, on the question of certainty, which is a specific example the member raised, he's just factually wrong. There was no language uncertainty in the agreement-in-principle. The agreement-in-principle said that the precise legal language to use to achieve certainty would have to be worked out in the final agreement. That was a source of an inordinate amount of time, including cabinet time and debate at the table, etc., on how to craft language which met a certainty test. I'm very pleased to say that I think even the opposition, in this

[ Page 11080 ]

Finally, I just simply say this: this is our position. I recognize the opposition's different views. This is not a third order of government; we don't accept that. We accept that there are self-government provisions in this agreement. This, again, is where there is a disagreement with that member, with respect -- perhaps a reasonable one. It is my judgment, I'd say, that there will not be treaties negotiated in 1999 that do not contain self-government provisions. While it is true that the province has a mandate, it is also true that the federal government has a mandate and the aboriginal groups have mandates, and they all must come to agreement. It is not simply a unilateral position.

If you want treaties, you cannot simply take unilateral positions on some of these issues and expect them to prevail in a tripartite arrangement. The province does have bottom lines, and I grant you that. They're unequivocal on things like tax. That was driven by the provincial government: the fact that Nisga'a would pay tax. That was something that didn't come from the federal government; in fact, they opposed it initially. It didn't come from the aboriginal people, clearly. That was a provincial government thing. It's legitimate to say that the. . . . The member opposite, the critic for the Attorney General, made precisely the right point. I agree with this: the instructions the province gave on these questions would have been different had members opposite been giving those instructions. There is a fundamental disagreement on those questions.

The question is: if different instructions had been given, would a different outcome have happened? I suggest that the answer to that is no, because it's a tripartite negotiation and because, at least at this stage of the game, if different instructions were given, then all the evidence suggests that aboriginal people would choose the courts as the means for resolution rather than through the negotiated process.

While I completely respect the member and his position on this, as he knows, and I understand his commitment on the question of treaty-making, the consequences of his current position would, in my judgment, drive this question of resolution of land claims into the court system. That is legitimate but, I think, is not something that is in the public interests of British Columbians.

J. Weisgerber: I'm not going to extend a long debate; I don't think it would be productive. But again, the Premier having challenged some of my statements, I have to challenge at least one of his, just to keep the score.

If indeed the federal government opposed the taxation agreements in Nisga'a, having just come out of the Yukon negotiations, where there were only two parties and where the taxation was ratcheted up much more quickly than here in British Columbia. . . . In the Yukon the federal government negotiated an agreement where all Yukon Indians would start paying taxes three years after the umbrella agreement was signed. Now, if indeed the federal government was reluctant on taxes, one would have to assume it was the Indians in the Yukon who demanded that they had to pay taxes within three years. I don't think you believe that or I believe it, so it's patently clear that the federal government was driving taxation with the Yukon Indians -- and driving it, I expect, at least as hard as the province was here in Nisga'a. So let's keep the record straight.

G. Wilson: It's a privilege to enter into this debate. I want at the outset, under the definitions section -- section 1, which is what we are actually debating, believe it or not. . . . For those who are observing this debate or who may be reading this debate, I think it is interesting to note and important for British Columbians to understand that how it reads is: " 'Nisga'a Final Agreement' means the Nisga'a Final Agreement among the Nisga'a Nation, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada and Her Majesty the Queen in right of British Columbia. . . ."

The first point that I think needs to be established is that, as we in this chamber go into a lengthy debate, and probably a more detailed debate under section 3 of the act, it is important for the people of British Columbia to recognize that only one of three parties is actually engaged in this debate in this chamber. It's important, because having been involved to the extent that I have been in the treaty negotiation process -- not so much with Nisga'a, but certainly more directly in what is happening in the Sechelts. . . . It's important for observers to understand that even if all of us in this chamber agreed that there were matters included within this treaty that were quite wrong -- that were quite unacceptable in their language and content -- for us to think that we could in some unilateral way amend it and then have the other parties accede to our amendment would be, I think, quite foolish.

To try and get three parties, each with a vested interest, to come together and finalize an agreement is a huge task, and it is a particularly difficult task when one of the three parties -- the federal government -- holds in their hands 90 percent of the cards in terms of cash dollars. I think that British Columbians have to recognize that it is the federal government, not the province of British Columbia, that has held that cash ace, that trump card. It is the federal government that ultimately, in negotiation, will modify or amend that in that process, if the language in agreements is not to their liking. I think it is important that we don't get too carried away with what our powers as a province are to actually drive that agenda. We must also recognize that the fiduciary obligation for aboriginal people in Canada rests exclusively with the federal government, not the province of British Columbia, and that is by the constitution. So I think we have to keep this debate in perspective with respect to what role the province has been able to play in being able to drive the provincial portion of the agenda and make sure that those matters are included in these treaties.

When we get into the debate, particularly on the fishery. . . . I'll flag right now the matter of commercial allocation, which is driven by the federal government, not by this province. There are serious concerns there, and there are issues that need to be driven and discussed.

What I want to know from the side opposite, in this first part of what will be my three comments on this section, is the extent to which we -- and therefore the people of British Columbia -- are going to be enlightened on the positions that were taken on these critical issues by those three parties. In understanding why the final language is as it is, it is important for people to know what the agendas were of the other agencies sitting at that table. Without that knowledge, it would seem that somehow much of what is in this treaty is, at very best, arbitrary, and if not arbitrary, certainly suspect in its wisdom. I know for a fact -- because I've been involved in this process -- that there are many issues that drive a final resolution. The people of British Columbia deserve to know how we got to where we are. I'm hoping that that information will be forthcoming, and I'd like to know from the side opposite whether or not we're likely to have that enlightenment.

[ Page 11081 ]

[11:00]

G. Wilson: I think it is also important as we enter into this debate, for those who choose to follow it or to read it later, to recognize the constraints that existed within the negotiation process as a result of the "mandates," if I can put it that way, of the three parties that were at the table. In the finalization of the agreement -- what we are going to be talking about in detail under section 3 -- it is interesting to me. . . .

I come back to the comments that were made by the member for Peace River South about how we had a proven form of self-government with the Sechelts. It is interesting that the distinction, I think, and I don't want to put words into that member's mouth. . . . But I think the distinction that the member was making, because the powers are very similar, is that one -- the Sechelts, through the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act -- is delegated and the other is not delegated.

Yet I notice in the language, in the definition, that it says this agreement "is given effect by an Act of Canada." One would assume that if you are giving effect to self-government through an act of Canada, where the fiduciary obligation and responsibility rests with the federal government, effectively what you are doing in that act of Canada is delegating self-government powers. I would like to know whether I'm right or wrong on that question.

Hon. G. Clark: The member comes to a very interesting point, a point not without some significance. On this question of delegation or non-delegation, you may note that the Nisga'a final agreement is really silent on the question. It does not say delegation explicitly -- which is. . .some criticism -- as the Sechelt form does at the moment; nor does it say that there are inherent rights in the agreement.

So what we have here is an attempt to codify rights under section 35 and in effect assert that they are neither inherent nor delegated but that they flow from section 35. In the interpretations of this, of course, one can easily interpret -- as the member just has -- from some of the language that the powers flow through acts of the federal Parliament, for example -- which implies that these are delegated powers. It is not a simple question either way in the Nisga'a treaty.

I say as a layperson, though, and for anybody watching this debate -- if there are four people watching the chambers -- that it's a very abstract kind of concept -- at least, it is for the average person, and it certainly is for me -- about whether municipal-style powers flow through delegation from the provincial government or whether they flow through rights under section 35 of the constitution. In practical terms, what difference does it make, provided there is the Charter of Rights and that rules of general application apply, and due process and codified rules within the agreement?

On a practical level, these are essentially municipal-style governments. We get into this sort of dancing on the head of the pin about whether they're delegated or not. In a sense, I just don't. . . . I know that for some people this is a very significant issue, and I understand that and am not trying to belittle it. But in terms of the average person on the ground, I'm not sure it's as big an issue as some scholars would indicate, for the Nisga'a final agreement does neither delegation nor affirmation of inherency in the agreement. It simply states the treaty rights under section 35 of the constitution.

G. Wilson: I guess I would differ with the Premier on the extent of the importance of this particular section on language. I think it goes to the heart of what many concerns are with respect to the constitutionality of the provisions on governance. For those who aren't interested in constitutional matters, I suppose it has no relevance; but for those who believe there has to be some order in the distribution and the delegation of powers and the authorities granted to people within the governance of the country, I think it is important.

I don't necessarily disagree with the matter of the codification of rights; in fact, I agree with that. But it is interesting that if it is given effect by an act of Canada, singularly, without an act being mirrored in British Columbia, as was the case with the Sechelts, then it seems to me that it provides greater certainty that the extent of powers are those anticipated under section 35 of the existing Constitution Act and, in fact, greater comfort to those people who are concerned that somehow this is some backdoor amendment to the Canadian Constitution Act. It would make clear, in this first language, the fact that it's given effect by an act of Canada and that in later sections they talk about the rights and provisions of the act under sections 25 and 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act. I think it would give -- in my mind, anyway -- comfort to anybody who thinks that somehow this is a backdoor amendment.

Now, the last point I had on this issue is because. . . . Section 35(3), of course, talks about: "For greater certainty, in subsection (1) 'treaty rights' includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired." I think that that's the salient point. What I find interesting -- and perhaps, as this debate unfolds, we'll get more illumination on it. . . . As the member for Powell River-Sunshine Coast, I am excited by the prospect of an AIP with the Sechelts -- hopefully, very soon; we're very close. I am concerned because the governance model that has existed there for 12 years unchallenged, uncontested, without anybody suggesting that there's some inherently unconstitutional framework to it. . . . In terms of the right of non-aboriginal people who are living on aboriginal lands to have access to election or stand for office, it is precisely the same as the language that exists in Nisga'a. And that language in Nisga'a is being challenged in court.

As the member for Powell River-Sunshine Coast, I hope that during this debate we'll find out, when we get a Sechelt AIP, whether or not that is going to be dragged into court and equal opposition is going to be made to the provision of the Sechelt treaty because of the similarity in language in the governance model that is granted.

[ Page 11082 ]

Interjection.

Hon. G. Clark: Yes, it's exactly the same as a template; you're right. On these questions, they will be very, very similar indeed, so they will be subject, I assume, to opposition criticism, which is their prerogative.

I want to just give the comfort the member asked for. Under section 35 of the Constitution Act, it is unequivocal that this protects treaty rights and those that may be acquired by treaty. So aboriginal people have legal rights and constitutional rights that they have the right to assert in court. The courts would therefore codify those rights in some fashion. "Delegated/inherent" is a moot point in some respects. All we have done is codify, by agreement, those rights in this treaty, and they are therefore protected by section 35 of the constitution, exactly as was contemplated by the framers of the constitution in the early 1980s. The provision is there for such treaties to be made, and the courts have instructed the province to negotiate such treaties. So we have simply tried to avoid some of the semantic questions that keep coming up in these areas and agree that the rights are those laid out in the treaty and therefore protected by section 35 of the constitution.

G. Wilson: My last point. Because under section 1(a) it says that the agreement is given effect by an act of Canada, I have constituents who have expressed concern that sometime after this debate has concluded, there is going to be a debate in the Commons and that the Commons is going to pass an act of Canada which will give effect to this treaty. They're concerned that there may be provisions for amendments to be made in the interim, between our accepting in this House and the act of Canada, so that what the act of Canada puts into effect is something other than what we're debating here. I'm not certain how that could happen, but it's been an expressed concern. I would like to get some level of assurance from the government that there cannot be any kind of change or amendment in between the passage in this House and the final resolution in Ottawa.

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer, to allay the member's concerns, is simply that it can't happen. I would just remind him that at the initialling ceremony, the point was made that each of the parties would indeed take the agreement to its respective jurisdiction and make recommendations accordingly. So I don't think there is a problem -- I know there isn't.

The Chair: The Premier on this point.

Hon. G. Clark: I just want to give even more comfort. Two things. Obviously we will not proclaim the legislation until we're satisfied that the federal legislation is entirely consistent with this. Secondly, the agreement at the end of the day has to be signed, and we won't sign unless they're completely ad idem in the agreement. So we can give people absolute comfort that there cannot be amendments made after this is passed which will somehow change the effect of this agreement.

J. Weisgerber: I find this debate taking kind of an interesting turn, given the seating arrangements of myself and my friend from Powell River-Sunshine Coast. I sometimes think it might be more traditional if he were to find a seat across the way, and then we could carry on our debate back and forth.

Interjection.

J. Weisgerber: He says: "After the next election." Maybe that's an indication of things to come.

But to get back to it, I can't believe that my friend or anyone else can't clearly understand the difference between delegated authority for a municipal style of government and powers given to the Nisga'a by the federal government and enshrined in the constitution under section 35 -- and unchangeable as a result of that.

I was involved with the Sechelt self-government, and I think it was a very, very successful first venture into aboriginal self-government. But to suggest that it's perfect. . . . It's far from perfect, and the problems that are evolving at Musqueam point out the shortcomings in the Sechelt government. In Sechelt there are a large number of leaseholders who have no voice in the government that sets their leases, sets their taxes and collects their taxes.

[11:15]

G. Campbell: I'd just like to go back to the initial premise that the Premier tried to make -- that is, that those of us on this side of the House who have concerns about this treaty are not for treaties. Frankly, it's an insult to all of us on this side of the House that this individual thinks that he's the only person who has concerns for treaties, particularly in view of the fact that he seems to have forgotten that those of us who do stand in this House have a responsibility and an obligation to act on behalf of all the people of British Columbia.

[ Page 11083 ]

There is no legitimacy for the mandate that this government has tried to impose on its negotiating committee and now on the people of British Columbia. Let's remember the fact that when we talk about three parties at the table -- the Nisga'a, the provincial government and the federal government -- at least two of those parties are supposed to represent the people of British Columbia. The Premier claims that this was a major issue in the last election. It was not. And if it was a major issue in the last election, I would suggest to the government that although they have -- I agree and know and live the fact -- more seats in this House than the opposition, they had fewer votes than the opposition. And they certainly had fewer votes than the opposition to this treaty -- 39 percent. Even with that 39 percent, the undertaking by this government was that they would, as the Premier said earlier today, consult with the people of British Columbia. They would consult; they would go out with the agreement-in-principle. They would have a parliamentary committee of all parties, they would listen, and they would respond. What happened with that? I can recall the Premier standing in his place in this House and undertaking that every recommendation from the Aboriginal Affairs Committee on the Nisga'a treaty would be dealt with explicitly by the government -- majority report or minority report. That did not take place.

I remember the Premier saying to the people of British Columbia: "You don't have to worry." In fairness to the Premier, he said: "Look, we don't really know everything we're talking about here, so we will get some experts to come in on a treaty negotiation advisory committee who will give us information on every chapter of this treaty before it is presented to us to initial." The Premier broke his word to the people of British Columbia with regard to that. So today we sit here with the people of British Columbia saying, by 60 percent, that they want a say. They may want treaties, the Premier may even find that he has support for this treaty, but they want a say. They know this is a fundamental change in the way that this province is going to be governed. They want to have treaties. The Premier is correct about that: we want treaties; the government wants treaties. Frankly, it's insulting to the people of this province to say that unless you embrace "my treaty," as the Premier has called it -- the Glen Clark treaty -- then you don't care about treaties. That is simply wrong. The fact of the matter is that if we want to build the road to reconciliation, which we've heard about, we have to include all the people of this province. We have to reach out to them.

I can recall that after the Charlottetown referendum the Premier was one of the people who said: "Yes, it was wrong. We made a mistake." It was one of those times when he decided he was going to go and walk around and talk to the people of the province again about where he went wrong. This is exactly the same thing we're facing here.

I think that the most important thing we can do in this discussion, in this committee debate, is to have, hopefully, the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs come forward with some factual information, with some real background, instead of having severed blank pieces of paper that say this is how we got where we are. Let's include the people; let's use this Legislature as a place to open up the debate and provide people with the facts, with all the information. Let's remember that if we're truly going to have a treaty process that works for all British Columbians, then the important thing is not for 75 legislators to be included; it's important to have four million British Columbians included. Ask them to be part of the solution.

This government to date has been afraid to do that. I think it's something that would add legitimacy to the process. It would add legitimacy to the treaty, and it would give us a real opportunity to move forward, positively and constructively. I hope that we can do that. As we go through this committee discussion and ask questions of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, I trust that he will be forthcoming.

And let's not pretend that this is a municipal style of government. Let's be honest and have the government say: "Yes, this is really what's happening. This is what we believe. You disagree." Let's at least get the information on the table. Then maybe the people of British Columbia will have a better understanding of the road ahead and a better understanding of whether this is a treaty that should be supported or rejected.

M. de Jong: When we began on this rather wide-ranging discussion, hon. Chair. . . . Let me try to bring closure in this way and move on to some other things that I would like to canvass as part of this section.

If the submission is that by virtue of one's opposition to this treaty, one is necessarily condemning the treaty process and signalling an opposition to the process we presently use to negotiate treaties, I reject that. The logic of that argument, I would suggest, is revealed. . . . The embodiment of that illogic is the member for Peace River South, who is the subject of a motion that the Premier put on the order paper, congratulating him for his contributions to the treaty-making process. He is opposed to this treaty, and surely -- he needs no defending -- the Premier, who is the author of this motion on the order paper, is not suggesting that he is worthy of congratulations and in the very next breath says that by virtue of his opposition to this treaty, he must therefore be opposed to the process that he helped create. So I reject that notion and have from the moment the Premier first started peddling that line to British Columbians.

Yesterday we talked about the Premier's commitment to the notion that not one word of this document will be changed. I heard the Attorney General yesterday, with words that may or may not come back to haunt the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, guarantee us that all of our questions would be answerable during this debate, all of the uncertainties that have been the subject of public questions will reveal themselves to us via either the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs or the Premier. We'll see about that.

I would like now, hon. Chair, to. . . . In a few moments I'm going to have some questions about the treaty implementation committee. One of the broad themes that we'll talk about during these discussions is the cost of the document itself. I think that's relevant for us as we go through chapter and clause of the treaty. People want to know what the provincial cost is.

Interjection.

M. de Jong: The Premier says it's not relevant. I say it is, hon. Chair. British Columbians want to know, at the end of the

[ Page 11084 ]

I know that a great many of these documents were sent out to British Columbians. The minister may have this information more readily than the Premier, and I'll understand that. I think thousands of them were sent out. The minister may be able to confirm that. As we've referred to the public debate. This is the "Nisga'a Final Agreement," the bound copy that was produced with the blue cover.

The question I want to know. . . . We are dealing with a bill, and we have, as part of the bill, two schedules -- or a number of schedules, actually. I want to know, because I haven't had the time to go through it chapter and verse: is what's in here precisely what's in Bill 51?

Hon. D. Lovick: As nearly as I can make out, the member showed me a copy of the Nisga'a Final Agreement and appendices and a copy of the bill that are under his desk, and he asks whether they are the same as the other document -- namely, the bound copy of the "Nisga'a Final Agreement." One part, yes. Obviously the bill itself is not part of that bound document, and the appendices, too, are not part of that bound document. But the Nisga'a Final Agreement, as defined in the bill, also embraces the appendices that the member referred to. In other words, there are no different texts, if that's what he's worried about.

Hon. G. Clark: There are a few technical changes, I think, between the bound copy and the actual act. I'm advised that there is no substantive difference. What we should provide for the members are the technical or minor changes that were made between the bound copy and the actual text that is in the act. As I understand it, there's probably a dozen or so language changes which are not material, not substantive, but different from the legal text as opposed to the final agreement text. We'll provide them for the members. I say genuinely that I don't think the member will find any big, earth-shattering changes or anything substantive, but we'll certainly provide that for the member.

M. de Jong: My immediate response to the Premier is: I'll be the judge of that. But let's give the minister a chance. I heard a different answer from the Premier than I heard from the minister.

Hon. D. Lovick: The document before the House is the bill that the member has been issued, not the published document that we used to tell people who had questions about the treaty. . . . That's simply a technical matter. It's a different form of presenting the information. If the member's looking for something sinister -- "Aha! They're hiding something in the other document" -- that's simply not the case. I give him my absolute assurance that's not the case.

[11:30]

I just want to make sure that I've heard this correctly. We're in the committee level of debate, and opposition members are hearing for the first time that there are differences in text between what is in this blue-bound copy that has been sent out to British Columbians and what's in the bill. We're hearing that for the first time.

G. Plant: And the two ministers don't seem to agree.

M. de Jong: The Minister of Aboriginal Affairs seems to place a different level of import on that than the Premier. All I want to know is: what are the differences?

Hon. G. Clark: Obviously that's no problem. For example, in the blue copy it says "Royal British Columbia" and left out the word "Museum." Then in the bill, the legislative counsel corrected that. There are commas. Yes, the bill is the document before the House. There are some drafting -- commas and punctuation, you know -- changes that were made in the transfer. There are some language changes. That's been public, as I understand, on the Internet. We published the changes. If the members opposite don't have them, we'll provide them for them. I just want to give the. . . . There's no smoking gun; there are no big changes. As always is the case in the drafting of the bill, we make sure it's as accurate as possible. They're on the Internet, I think -- the changes.

M. de Jong: So we're dealing with a document that is going to attract constitutional-level import. The Premier today in the committee-level debate is saying: "There are some textual problems like. . . . But we fixed them, so don't worry about it."

Interjection.

M. de Jong: And the minister is saying, "We'll give you a document," which leads me, hon. Chair, to draw the conclusion that there is a document that they can give us, but they've chosen not to give it to us or anyone else until now. I just want to confirm that that's the case.

G. Plant: Well, I must admit that I'm not at all surprised that the government is running away from this issue as fast as it can, because I recall in fact at one point the Premier saying early on in this. . . . In response to people questioning, "Well, what's the future of this agreement now that it has been signed? Will people have the opportunity to change it?" the Premier in fact did say not one word of this agreement will be changed.

Now, as someone in the opposition looking at the question of whether or not we were going to be able to embark here, for example, on a process where we could perhaps discuss changes, I was struck by the Premier's insistence on that point. It is, I think, important what a document of this magnitude says and whether it is accurate. I just want to be absolutely certain that the document that British Columbians have been sent, that we were given, that British Columbians were given, that my constituents have been given -- they've come to my office, and they want the "Nisga'a Final Agreement," the document that the Premier waved in the air and said, "Not one word of this will be changed" -- isn't in fact the same as the bill.

Perhaps the Premier could just tell us, remind us of the occasion on which -- in order to ensure that there was no uncertainty, in order to ensure that no one reading this was in any way confused by a clause that might not have made sense, in order to comply with his undertaking to British Columbians, to in effect, ensure that we would all be properly

[ Page 11085 ]

Hon. G. Clark: Hon. Chair, this is a silly argument. The members know it. The bill before the House is the bill before the House; that's what we're debating. We're not debating. . . . Obviously in any document of this size there are some language changes. They've been published on the Internet. I'm shocked that members of the opposition, who are, I assume, studying these questions, haven't seen that. We're not hiding anything. They're minor changes. You're trying to make something out of nothing. There's nothing there. It's a bill before the House, and we're dealing with it. It's the same as that, with some minor language changes, which are published. We've already put that out, and we'll give them to you if you don't have them. But it's not relevant; it's not significant; it's not relevant before the House. We have a bill before the House. That's what we're debating. Debate the bill.

M. de Jong: Well, I'm going to take some issue with what the Premier said. I'm going to go to one of the differences that I did notice, because it relates to what I think is a fairly significant part of the agreement. That is the definition of Nisga'a lands that is included on page 12. Presumably, the Premier and the minister would agree that in reading this particular document it's important that one have a sound understanding of how that term is to be defined. Do the Premier and the minister agree with that?

Hon. G. Clark: I just want to confirm that that was phony indignation we had earlier, because now the member is pointing out minor changes that were made. So he did know there were changes, and all those theatrics were just theatrics. Why don't we try to have an honest debate here? Let's just have a discussion here, instead of trying to make specious points.

I would suggest, hon. Chair, that when we go through the schedule to the bill seriatim, that would be the appropriate place to have a discussion on the various sections. He can ask all those questions at that time. I'd be happy to answer them. If he wants to do that now, I'm prepared to do that now, but I thought we had an agreement that we would canvass the entire treaty document seriatim, and he can go through line by line and ask questions, including questions about definitional changes or language changes or comma changes that were made between the blue text and the bill.

M. de Jong: In ten minutes we've gone from "They're identical" to "There might be some typographical errors" to "Well, if there are some typographical errors, we can probably discuss that better at a different stage in this debate." All we're trying to establish at the outset is (a) the accuracy of the document that British Columbians have been provided with over the past number of months at great expense, and (b) whether it has changed in any appreciable way in terms of what appears before this Legislature in the bill.

I asked the Premier whether he thought the definition of Nisga'a lands was a significant provision in this bill. He is saying that all of these changes -- and I located a couple; there may be more. . . . We'll know that if and when the government provides confirmation of what they have located. I've asked him whether he believes a problem with the definition of Nisga'a lands falls into the category of typographical error or is something more substantive. I say the latter.

Hon. G. Clark: Absolutely not; it's not a substantial difference. It was a clerical error. That is all these essentially were. There is no material difference in the substance of the report or in the agreement between the parties.

M. de Jong: On the same point, the Premier is alerting British Columbians to the existence of the Internet web site and the fact that they can consult that resource as a means of verifying the accuracy of the document. I am unaware of any posting to that Internet site which indicates that changes have been made from this document to what is presently before the House.

Hon. G. Clark: We'll just check. My advice was that it's on the Internet, but again these are so minor and generally trivial changes that it's not significant.

M. de Jong: Let's test the Premier's theory, because on page 12 of the blue-bound volume the definition of Nisga'a lands appears, and in the bill that's before the House these words are apparently added: ". . .and includes additions under paragraphs 9 or 11 of the Lands Chapter." Well, we have an agreement built around the establishment of Nisga'a lands, and the definition from one document to the next is substantively different -- and the Premier says that's not important. I must confess, again, that I find that absurd.

Hon. G. Clark: Let's deal with that very point. Look at 9 and 11. The title is: "Additions to Nisga'a Lands." That's the substance. In the definition, inadvertently they did not put additions to Nisga'a land under the definition of Nisga'a land, so they simply said, "includes. . .9 or 11" -- additions to Nisga'a land -- in the definitions. There's no substantive change to the document. The substantive part is sections 9 and 11. It has always been there, but in the definitions, they missed adding that as part of the definitions. It makes no material difference whatsoever to the treaty.

G. Plant: Let me just say this to the Premier through you, hon. Chair. Not everybody is going to want to be as generous in their interpretation of this agreement as the Premier -- or, for that matter, me. I understand that the Premier doesn't want to admit that this is any kind of significant change. I'm tempted to ask the Premier why the change was made at all. I mean, either it was significant or it wasn't. If it was a change made to the agreement -- to change the definition of Nisga'a lands in the first pages of the agreement. . . . If that wasn't material, then why was it made at all?

It probably was made because someone thought it was important enough to make the change. And if someone thought it was important enough to make the change, someone is going to make an argument somewhere else in this document that there's something wrong with a provision in this document because it hasn't been drafted properly or because it's been drafted in a way that allows someone to make that argument. People have obviously spent a lot of time doing the best they can to draft this document.

We can argue about whether or not the changes that have been made between the blue agreement that British Columbians have and the white document that is tabled in the House are significant. The point that I think has to be acknowledged is that in fact the two documents are different. In the context of something as important and permanent as a treaty, it is, frankly, a little bit surprising to me that there wasn't some care taken by this government to say: "Oh, by the way, let us make sure everyone knows that we're actually changing this docu-

[ Page 11086 ]

Hon. G. Clark: First of all, for the record, the blue document the member holds was reprinted in early December, and I'm advised that all the changes were made, so the bill is entirely consistent with the blue document as reprinted. An errata was published with the changes and inserted into all the documents that were previously published and not put out. This is commonplace; it's an errata. It means there were some minor drafting errors in that, which have been corrected. The most important point here is that it's corrected for the bill before the House, which may not be. . . . You know, members could say that maybe there's a comma error still in the bill. Well, maybe there is. This is a very commonplace question. People are only human, and we do the best we can. As long as there's no substantive change in the treaty. . . . Nor does it make any difference to those who are reading that blue copy.

[11:45]

"Point two," said the minister, "is that the document, the treaty -- we're talking about some 250 pages and all of that -- will not be sent out to anybody as part of an information campaign until it is in the final form. I think the member would agree with me that it would be, quite frankly, a little irresponsible to send out 250 pages and then discover that you have 15 typos and have to reprint it and do it over again, or something. I think everybody would agree that we can wait a few weeks until we have that."

Well, they didn't wait a few weeks. I'm not content -- not that I think the government cares whether I'm content or not -- proceeding with this debate, particularly given the hour, until we know exactly what changes have been made between the document that I was initially provided with and the bill that has been tabled in the House. If there has been a subsequent document produced, I didn't get it, and I'm going to suggest that we recess to provide the government with an opportunity to provide confirmation of those changes.

The Chair: Member, the motion would be that we rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

M. de Jong: Well, we can rise and report progress, sure.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. G. Clark moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:49 a.m.

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