[ Page 10125 ]

The House met at 10:05 a.m.

Prayers.

Petitions

Orders of the Day

LABOUR RELATIONS CODE AMENDMENT ACT, 1998
(continued)

On section 2, section 55.17.

Hon. D. Lovick: Before we begin our continued discussion on individual sections, if I might, let me just advise members opposite that we stood down, as I recall, two particular sections yesterday, both of which had amendments attached to them. I gave an assurance that we would run those by legislative counsel. That process is still continuing, so with the consent of members opposite, I would propose that we leave those sections stood down until perhaps this afternoon, and then we can deal with them. If that's acceptable, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we proceed in that way.

I believe we are now at section 55.17, and perhaps I should just explain very briefly what we are talking about here. We had a brief discussion yesterday on the matter of enabling and why enabling isn't formally defined. Maybe I could start by simply reiterating the point I made -- namely, that enabling is a well-known concept, but it doesn't have legal status as a terminology, if you will. Rather, the more formal terminology is special arrangements, and thus this section of the bill is about special arrangements.

This section has a very specific purpose -- namely, it requires that a trade union which allows for modification of its collective agreement in order to enable, as the language goes, a contractor to bid against non-union competitors for a specific project must make a similar arrangement with all other employers that may want similar treatment for the specific project. In the reality of a competitive environment, what happens is simply that unions will make a deal with the contractor and say: "Okay, we will shave our agreement somewhat in order that you can compete against those who are non-union contractors. In other words, we will make our contract less rich." The intention of this. . . . By the way, that's a practice that has gone on for about as long as unionized construction has occurred, I understand.

What can happen, though, is that unions and companies can make sweetheart deals. A union may have a particular contractor that it has a good working relationship with and can say: "Well, we'll give you guys a break, but we won't give the break to other contractors." What we do in this provision is simply say that if you establish a special enabling arrangement with one, then in order to have fair competition the same special arrangement must be offered to others. It simply guarantees fair competition. I think it's a good provision. I should also note that this is a direct recommendation from the Kelleher-Lanyon report, as my colleague across the way knows.

With that, I would suggest that section 55.17 makes eminent good sense, and I think it's defensible. But I'm certainly happy to answer questions about it.

C. Hansen: Actually, the very first point I had on this was to ask the minister to explain, for the benefit of all, the process of enabling, which he has done. I recognize that the process of enabling is something that has occurred in the construction industry for many years. I'm not sure that that necessarily makes it a process that we should be entrenching in our Labour Code. I think what it does is beg the question as to why enabling is necessary. What we are saying when a project is enabled is that the union collective agreement is not competitive. What it means is that the union workers who are working under that collective agreement are not able to get work or that their union is not able to get work for them -- the companies they work for are not able to successfully bid on contracts -- because their wage and benefit package under the collective agreement is too rich compared to the rest of the industry.

I think it's important to start looking at how collective agreements should work in a free economy as we have it. That's that the pressure on unions to come forward with realistic collective agreements is the level at which they can continue to maintain work for their members. If the collective agreements start to become too rich, then the economic pressures come to bear, and there is the incentive for compromises to take place. I think that is true in terms of most collective bargaining that goes on in North America, and it comes to the core of Bill 26 and why we are so opposed to it.

What it does is recognize that there is one particular form of union in this province which is becoming less competitive over the years, to the point where they've had a problem getting enough work for their members. As a result, they have seen the number of hours worked by their membership decreasing; they've seen their share of the construction industry decreasing. What that tells me is that this is a union that perhaps needs to rethink the objectives it has in its negotiating strategy. Instead, what we have is government coming in to say: "That's okay; we're going to prop you up; we're going to give you legislative support for these unrealistic collective agreements, rather than allowing those market forces to come to bear in order for you to secure work for your members."

The fact that they have collective agreements that do not allow them to compete for work means that they have to come in with some other process of enabling. This enabling is basically a process whereby the unions can subsidize the employer on the hourly wage of the workers on the site. So it's not the union agreeing to compromise the terms of the collective agreement; it's the union agreeing to subsidize, out of other funds that they have, the wage rates that are being paid to the workers on a project that is being bid. The face value of this amendment, which is to make sure that if they agree to subsidize or enable the wage rates in one particular company, they have to do it for all the companies that are bidding on that project. As far as that goes, that certainly seems like a

[ Page 10126 ]

The question that comes to my mind is: who ultimately pays for enabling? Unions are dependent on their membership fees, obviously -- to collect fees from their members. Then you have the union that obviously has some very significant funds available to them to enable projects. Specifically, they have what I believe are called market adjustment funds within the building trades union. Those market adjustment funds are built up by the work that they do which is not enabled. You have to come back and ask: who is that? Where do these market development funds get built up from? I would argue that these funds come primarily from public construction. I would like to ask the minister: how many provincial government projects are enabled? When the government goes out to tender a school, hospital or whatever other work is done in the construction sector, how many of the provincial government projects are enabled?

[10:15]

I want to point out, though, that the member's suggestion that enabling means nothing more than lower wages is not the case. Enabling can refer to a number of different things. For instance, it may be something like a no-strike, no-lockout clause. A given contractor on a given project may well say: "Look, I am prepared to pay a slightly higher wage bill than I might by going to another contractor. But I am happily prepared to do that if I can guarantee labour peace and stability for the duration of this particular project." That becomes a mechanism that they can use. So it isn't just wages.

I'm a little concerned. . . . I think the member and I simply have a philosophical difference on this one. If we are both representing our respective caucuses, then I think there is a difference between government and opposition on this one. I don't think that the competitive market, left entirely to itself, is necessarily always going to apportion benefits in a fair and just manner. The marketplace, by definition, has some pretty serious limitations and weaknesses, and one of them is in the realm of supply and demand when it refers to workers.

As I said the other day, in the history of labour there has always been a chronic oversupply of workers and underdemand for workers -- which, as we know, has a significant impact of downward pressure on workers. The only exceptions are those relatively rare instances throughout history when you have a buoyant, booming, wartime economy or something, where workers are able to increase their relative economic well-being in a society. But broadly considered, it's always a matter of insufficient demand and too much supply. That's the reality, and that's one of the reasons why trade unions developed. Workers simply said: "We have to protect ourselves against the vagaries of the marketplace."

To suggest that enabling somehow interferes with this mythical, magical, wonderful free market, I disagree. I think this is absolutely appropriate and necessary. Indeed, it seems to me this is an example of how, in a modern economy, trade unions -- and their employers for that matter -- have said, "Here is how we can maintain our market share without compromising our right to exist as a craft union entity" -- in other words, to maintain those highly skilled, specialized trades in construction.

If we said we didn't acknowledge enabling in any way, shape or form, it seems to me that we might effectively be driving a nail into the heart of craft unionism. I think there is a place for craft unionism. I agree that it has to be in a competitive environment. Craft unions ought not to have anything given to them; indeed, they need to compete. To say that enabling is somehow costing more money. . . . No, I'm sorry; that's not fair. I don't think the member said that. He's suggesting that what happens is that some projects will effectively subsidize others, and workers are therefore paying out of accumulated reserves or something for these enabling arrangements. That may be the case, but that's their choice. They obviously choose to do so because they think: "We want to continue to operate. We want to have successfully negotiated collective agreements, and this is the price we're prepared to pay." Again, I think the member and I simply have a disagreement. It seems to me that all this section does is say: "We're going to make sure that the mechanism of special arrangement is not used in a discriminatory fashion so that one employer will be treated disadvantageously from another." I think it's desirable, I think it's necessary, and I make no apology for this provision. I think it's absolutely the right one.

C. Hansen: I certainly don't want any of my remarks to be construed as attacking the concept of craft unions. The only thing that I take issue with is that craft unions should be expected to be competitive. They should be expected to evolve, to change and to serve their members into the future. But as organizations, as long as they've got the support of their membership, I support their existence -- and continued existence. Again, as I see it, there have been market forces that have really been very threatening to the concept of craft unions. My concern is that if they don't change, then their very existence is threatened. My concern with this bill is that we are in fact using government to prop up some of the inefficiencies that will allow them to continue without evolving. But that's not something that's specific to this particular amendment.

I wonder if the minister can tell me if there are any unions outside of the craft unions in British Columbia that use enabling provisions.

Hon. D. Lovick: I want to answer the question by beginning with a reference to a point I made before and will make for, I think, the third time -- namely, that the member's question reveals precisely why I think we do not confer legal status on the term "enabling." Rather, "special arrangements" is the terminology used. The lingo -- the terminology, the language -- in the workplace is "enabling," but it doesn't have legal status. The reason why is simply that enabling usually tends to belong to the construction industry. Special arrangements, though -- which is what I think the member's question opens the door to -- are commonplace. Any union working with any employer can sit down and say: "Look, here's our existing contract, but we've got a problem." An employer says: "Our competition across the street is driving us out of business, and we're not going to make it. So I am telling you, members of the union, that unless you cut me some slack, unless you give me some opportunities to change this contract, we're not going to be around." That happens all the time. In that sense, it's not called enabling but special arrangements, whereby unions respond to the realities of the marketplace. Those are as common as any contract out there. They happen all the time. I hope I've answered that question.

[ Page 10127 ]

But enabling, as we now see it, is a very expensive process for the craft unions; it requires an enormous infusion of funds. When you start to back up and look at where that infusion of funds comes from, it basically comes from the projects that are not enabled in this province. So you start looking at the projects that are not enabled, and where that research leads you to is primarily provincial government-funded projects. You wind up with projects that are operating under the fair-wage act. You start looking at the Vancouver Island Highway construction project. None of those projects are enabled, because they don't have to be. In those cases, they have a client -- namely, the provincial government -- that's prepared to pay the non-competitive rates that we have in the building trades contracts today, in the master collective agreements. So I would argue that what we have are non-competitive collective agreements that are being propped up in all kinds of ways by the provincial government today, not least of all by the fair-wage act. But now we have in Bill 26 a lot more of that propping up that's being offered by this government. If the minister wants to respond to that, I'd welcome it; otherwise I'll turn it over to my colleague.

The Chair: Before I recognize the minister, members, I really think this discussion is far beyond the scope of this particular section.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'll just make two very brief responses to the point the member makes. The first is to restate the point I made earlier -- that the enabling, or special arrangements, doesn't always mean wage rates. There are a number of other things that do not have a specific dollar figure attached to them -- like "no-strike, no-lockout." So to suggest that there are millions of dollars -- I believe that was the member's reference -- flowing out of the taxpayers' pockets or something is, quite frankly, not supportable.

Second, I think it's worth noting that the example the member gives as illustration of how the government is, in effect, propping up this artificially high-wage economy. . . . It ought to be noted that the fair-wage legislation, which has in fact been invoked for school construction and some other major projects, as well as for the Vancouver Island Highway project and the Highway Constructors agreement. . . . Those things are at a significantly lower rate of wage compensation than the master agreements. So we're not talking about propping up an artificially high one. Rather, we're talking about enabling that you could argue, just as convincingly perhaps, saves the taxpayers money.

So I just put those two points on the record as a kind of counterbalance to the points made by the member for Vancouver-Quilchena.

The Chair: The Chair suggests that members direct their comments to the particular section and not so much to the background of this discussion.

G. Plant: Well, hon. Chair, I certainly don't want to challenge that view. But I am personally looking at a provision in an act and being asked to approve it, and I think it's entirely legitimate to want to understand what it's trying to do. Sometimes that does involve putting the provision in context. Having said that, I have a more technical question, in any event.

[10:30]

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer would be that if indeed the parties have an enabling arrangement for the duration of a contract and then they want to renew for another three years, it's obviously at their discretion in terms of whether they want to establish the so-called special arrangements or enabling provisions for the new contract. I don't think there's a necessary connection -- that because something occurred in contract X, it will magically reappear three years later in contract Y. That would become part of another set of negotiations, it seems to me. Unless I'm missing the member's point, I think that's the answer.

Let me, if I might, just acknowledge. . . . I used to be the Chair of Committees and Deputy Speaker. The Chair gives us the cautionary note, quite rightly, and I'm sorry that perhaps I was not as alert as I should have been. To make the point, we aren't discussing here the concept of enabling and whether it is or is not a good idea. That's not what's at issue. In this section of the bill, we're talking about whether those arrangements which exist and are accepted ought to be extended to all as a matter of course -- in other words, whether or not it is desirable to have a special arrangement. I make that point simply to say that I think the larger debate about enabling and whether it should or should not be is indeed not at issue in this section. The Chair is quite right.

G. Plant: I don't know how you can even begin to answer that question without understanding whether enabling is a good thing. It's just like the issue with the jurisdictional assignments plan. We're making it mandatory, and therefore the question arises of whether or not the jurisdictional assignment plan is a good thing and, if it's a good thing, why it needs to made mandatory. The same kind of reasoning applies here, but we don't need to have that debate at the moment.

I think the minister is essentially saying that the parties who enter into special arrangements will be bound, generally speaking, by the three-year maximum limit on the term of the collective agreement that may result from the process of spe-

[ Page 10128 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: Yes, the member is correct that the three-year limitation has primacy, as it were, over the possibility of enabling in these special arrangements. He's right.

B. Barisoff: I ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

B. Barisoff: I'd like to introduce to the House today Cliff, Laura, Seth and Quinn Shiskin. Cliff and Laura are teachers from Kelowna. Would the House please make them welcome.

G. Plant: Let me pursue this one step further. Given the public policy reasons for allowing special arrangements to be made and accepting that for a moment, it's not clear to me why it is appropriate to impose the three-year limit. Again, that's not out there now; I think that would be the state of affairs. So the issue is: why, having accepted the idea of special arrangements, is it good public policy to limit the term of those arrangements to three years?

Hon. D. Lovick: Just to clarify, Mr. Chairman, when one enables, what one does, in effect, is amend the collective agreement. The term of the collective agreement still remains -- all right? So it isn't a matter of changing the term of the collective agreement. Rather, it's changing a part of that collective agreement, which has a given term.

G. Plant: I'm sorry for not, I think, understanding what the minister just said. It's not a matter of saying that the agreement in question is limited to the three-year term. Is it only a matter of saying that the special terms and conditions are subject to that limit? I'm trying to re-express what I think is my misapprehension of what the minister just said. Perhaps I could impose on the minister to try saying again what he just said, and I might get it this time.

Hon. D. Lovick: When one sets up a special arrangement, what one does is amend a contract or collective agreement. The terms of the collective agreement may be for two years. If one decides to have some kind of enabling arrangement -- some kind of special arrangement -- that will have no necessary conclusion. It doesn't, in short, go beyond the terms of that agreement, whatever that collective agreement happens to be.

I just -- if I might, to clarify -- also point out that, generally speaking, enabling agreements or special arrangements apply to particular projects rather than to a whole large collective agreement that's signed for a three-year term. Usually, it will be this: here is a short project, and we need to do something to make this project more viable, workable, etc; therefore we will set up a special arrangement. That's typically how it works, apparently.

[E. Walsh in the chair.]

G. Plant: In that scenario, the parties may be essentially buying in -- that's not the right phrase -- phasing in to an existing collective agreement and making a few changes to it, which are the special terms and conditions. If they are doing that, the collective agreement that they may be moving into may in fact be very near the end of its life if it is a master agreement in a particular craft. That, then, does in fact raise even more acutely the spectre of what I think could be unfairness, in the sense that an employer who is trying to sort out the costing for a project -- which may be a year or 18 months or, you know, the typical life span of a fairly significant project -- may be able to negotiate with the trade union some terms and conditions to modify the master agreement that would otherwise be in force.

But that would only have the life of, say, perhaps three or four months if we're in the last three or four months of the master agreement, after which it would be open season for the parties to -- as I understand the minister's take on this -- basically have to renegotiate a new agreement, or rather, in the case of the employer, to attempt to negotiate special arrangements that would apply to the new agreement that then, presumably and hopefully, would come on stream. So I see the spectre of an employer being given the opportunity to try and make a special arrangement that would suit the economic realities of the project in the way the minister has talked about from time to time -- achieving agreement with the union in that respect but having no real certainty, because the arrangement would expire in a matter of weeks or months. That doesn't seem to me to be a good result.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm not entirely sure that I understand where this goes. Presumably, if they agree three months before the end of the contract that some kind of special arrangement is desirable, they then would presumably agree to do the same for three months thereafter. If they start a new contract or a new enabling arrangement, and that is the basis of the wording by contract -- in other words, part of the deal of bidding on the contract, and that's what we're talking about here: bidding on contracts, essentially -- then the issue is simply to make sure that other competitors in the bidding process have the same opportunities. I hope I've answered the question.

G. Plant: I think that the last part of what the minister said is right in terms of the explanation of the objective of this. It may be that I'm just more of a skeptic. I actually can foresee the possibility where the union in question might agree to special terms and conditions, ostensibly to help the employer get the project in question, knowing that three months down the line the employer will be on the hook to the bank for a huge amount of indebtedness and will have a big hole in the ground and nothing much else to show for it. At that moment, because the master agreement has expired, the union can say: "We're sorry. We just don't think we can make those special terms and conditions anymore. We've got to go back up to the master agreement rates or, frankly, there's no deal." In terms of economic leverage, that's the point I'm making.

One way to deal with that problem, I suppose, would be for the employer to be able to sit down with the union at the time that the project is being bid on and say: "Look, this is the economic reality of this project. We need to negotiate special terms and conditions. The master agreement is going to expire in three or four or five months. Can we make an agreement, in effect, that when the master agreement comes up for renewal, you will accept those special terms and conditions?" In a sense, the parties agree to bind themselves some months down the road when the master agreement comes up. That would be one way of addressing the potential problem of economic leverage, if it presents. I wonder if the minister sees that as something that would be open to the parties.

[ Page 10129 ]

[10:45]

Re the economic leverage argument, I would just point out that, yes, there's certainly some leverage in this regard, as the member referred to. The other leverage, remember, is that the contractor says to the workers: "Look, you guys, you're on my books. Here's the reality of what we're facing. Don't try to jam me, because if you put me out of business, you're not going to help yourselves any." The old economic arguments in terms of labour-management obtain. Generally speaking, I think they serve us well.

Section 2, section 55.17 approved.

On section 2, section 55.18.

C. Hansen: Subsection 55.18(1) sets up a bargaining council for the trade unions. It starts out: "Trade unions representing employees in craft bargaining units in ICI construction must establish a bargaining council for the purposes of negotiating collective agreements." In the way this is worded, I think we all have a pretty good understanding of what the bargaining council is. But from a legislative point of view, we are not saying that it has to be the building trades unions. The wording here is just that they must establish a bargaining council. I wonder if the minister could explain why we would not specify the organization that everyone knows is eventually going to be that bargaining council.

Hon. D. Lovick: Two points. First, I make the very clear enunciation of the point that the Building Trades Council is different from the bargaining council. For example, the carpenters are not in the Building Trades Council, but they are in the bargaining council. The second point I would make is simply to refer the member to a document with which I know he's familiar -- namely, Kelleher-Lanyon. At page 20 in their report, I think, they provide a pretty good description of why this particular configuration is recommended and why, as they see it, that was the only possible way to solve this particular problem.

C. Hansen: In here we have a provision that just says that they must establish a bargaining council. We're talking about the trade unions representing employees in craft bargaining units. As we know, there are 21 recognized craft bargaining units, and there are about 15 trade unions currently that represent those 21 crafts. Does the minister anticipate that there will be some kind of formalized process whereby these 15 unions will have to vote to officially designate the Bargaining Council of B.C. Building Trades Unions as their bargaining agent under this particular section? If they have to have that kind of formalized process, is that something that would then be registered with the Labour Relations Board?

Hon. D. Lovick: The member is. . .I won't say entirely correct, because I didn't hear every nuance, but I think he's substantially correct. I just point out that a bargaining council already exists under section 41 of the code, and has been established by the Labour Relations Board. That bargaining council, to all intents and purposes, would shift over into the new configuration established in this legislation. The main difference is simply that there will have to be a new constitution drawn up, because the existing one -- again according to the Lanyon and Kelleher report -- doesn't work very well. There are some real problems with it. Therefore they have been mandated to draft a new constitution. That constitution must, in turn, be approved by the Labour Relations Board.

C. Hansen: What we are saying under subsection (2) is: "A bargaining council established under subsection (1) is deemed to be a council of trade unions established under section 41. . . ." Section 41 of the act today sets up a process by which a group of unions can establish a bargaining council. What we are doing here is pre-empting that whole process as it is set out in section 41, and we're saying that the bargaining council will be deemed to be a bargaining council for the purpose of 41, without that process underway. It comes back to: what is the new process? The process, as it's set out in subsection (1), is that the trade unions must establish a bargaining council. In subsection (2) it says: "A bargaining council established under subsection (1) is deemed to be. . ." the bargaining council. The word "establish" in both of these subsections carries a lot of weight but very little definition. I'm just wondering if the minister could elaborate on what the process is that these 15 trade unions have to go through in order to establish their bargaining council under this section.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the answer to the member's question, Madam Chair, is essentially found in the other sections, subsections (3) and (4) effectively, which I think gives us a clear illustration of the kind of process envisaged -- namely, that the board, given that it has the responsibility to approve the constitution and bylaws, may well have to provide direction to the council members in terms of what is required. As well, I would point out that we're not exactly starting from tabula rasa -- a blank slate. Rather, there is an existing council in place and, clearly, some literature and some experience invested therein. I think that will guide the building trades in terms of setting up the new council.

I would reiterate that the members of the council are being asked to work it out among themselves. As you'll see in subsection (4), there is a particular time line attached to that. We are effectively saying to them: "You had better solve your problems, because at some point, if you don't, the board will have to take on that role."

I don't think this will be problematic. The legislation has been bruited now for the better part of a year. I suspect that people know it's coming, and they recognize that their common interest in this is to settle the issue expeditiously. As I say, this should be pretty straightforward, it seems to me.

C. Hansen: I think we're making some assumptions; we're making a leap of faith. I think everybody who read the

[ Page 10130 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: If, indeed, according to section 55.18(2), the bargaining council established here will be deemed a bargaining council as defined in section 41, I think that that explicitly recognizes that the existing structure is the starting point.

I would also just remind the member of what the Kelleher-Lanyon report says. It's very, very clear in the report what they're recommending. The recommendations are very, very clear as well. Moreover, there is an appendix to the report that I'm sure the member will recall: "Principles Respecting the Trade Union Bargaining Structure Constitution." I don't think anybody who is going to be involved in drafting the constitution would presume, given that this legislation is in fact based on the report of the two experts in the field, that you can do so without obvious regard for what is said there.

My take, for what it's worth, is that this is not problematic. I think it's fairly straightforward, and the parties will, I suspect, be able to sort out whatever differences they have. I think that any questions they have, moreover, could be rather quickly answered by the board. But I'm certainly prepared to hear other concerns, if the members have them.

C. Hansen: The point I'm making is that this section implies that there is an element of choice, where everybody can assume and is operating under the assumption that this is going to be the existing bargaining council. But that's not what this legislation says. This legislation says that these 15 unions have the right to establish a bargaining council; it doesn't say it has to be the existing one. They have a process they can go through to establish a bargaining council. The point I want to make -- and which I will reiterate when we get down to section 55.2 -- is that, on the one hand, the unions have been given this flexibility to establish a bargaining council; on the other hand, when we get down to the employers' side, they're being told who their bargaining agent has to be. There's no element of choice at all. But we can deal with that when we get to that section.

Certainly the minister indicated that not all of the 15 craft unions are currently members of the B.C.-Yukon trades. Yet what we're saying is that they too have the right to be part of this decision-making process -- which I think begs for the question, when we get down to 55.2, why employers don't get the same kind of democratic rights to choose the organization to represent them.

The minister made reference to the appendix to the Kelleher-Lanyon report. In there, Kelleher and Lanyon set out the specific criteria by which the bargaining council for the trades should amend their constitution. It is a guideline. If they come to an agreement on how their constitution should be amended, then it still has to be approved by the board, as is provided in subsection 55.2(3).

But what Kelleher and Lanyon were very clear about is that. . . . There are principles they had set out in that appendix that the board should use to evaluate whether or not the constitution that was agreed to by the craft unions is one that the board should endorse. I would like the assurance of the minister that it is still the intention that the board should in fact follow those principles as set out in that appendix and that the board should not be approving a constitution that does not meet the terms and conditions of those principles as set out.

Hon. D. Lovick: I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that it is the intention of the legislation that those principles should be followed -- absolutely.

C. Hansen: In subsection 55.18(1), we talk about the trade unions representing employees in craft bargaining units in ICI construction. As we discussed last night, ICI construction is not something that has a very precise definition at this time. Certainly I think we made some great strides yesterday in narrowing the scope of what some people feared might be in that definition. But we certainly didn't come to any kind of a conclusive result.

If you read this legislation, it somewhat implies that this bargaining council cannot be established until we first of all have a clearer definition of what ICI construction is, thereby enabling those craft unions representing employees in those bargaining units to be part of this process of determining who that bargaining council should be. I'm wondering if the minister can tell us how quickly he anticipates that -- between the work of his ministry and the work of the board -- we are going to have a more precise definition of what ICI construction is, so that this section can be actioned.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm not entirely sure, but I accept the proposition that the definition is still too loose to be useful. It seems to me that the ICI knows what it is and that the participants in ICI know who they are and what their roles are. Having said that, I am perfectly prepared to acknowledge that if there is a need for somewhat greater definition, this may well be the initial chance for the board to begin that process of articulating in a more precise fashion what the definition is. I'm prepared to acknowledge that.

[11:00]

I understood from a briefing the ministry offered us on the day this legislation was introduced that the first attempt to give a more specific definition to ICI construction is going to come from the assistant deputy minister, Don Cott. I believe that at the time, Mr. Cott indicated that he would be assisted by another official in the ministry, Dan Cahill. The two of them were going to endeavour to work with the industry and the union movement and others that may be involved to try to arrive at some kind of consensus as to what ICI construction is, in detailed terms. As I understand it, if they couldn't come to a consensus, then it was going to have to go to the board for the board to give some kind of final determination. I'm just wondering if it's still the intention of the ministry to follow that kind of route in coming up with the direction that may be needed to implement this section.

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer is yes, Madam Chair.

[ Page 10131 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: I'll just draw the member's attention to subsection (4), in which the time lines are specified. We're hopeful, obviously, that this will happen sooner rather than later -- to coin a phrase -- but there is a protection here to make sure that this doesn't go on and on and on.

C. Hansen: I guess my concern there is that I think we're talking about two very different things -- two very different time lines. I would argue that before this section can even be proclaimed, to start the clock ticking on the time lines in subsection (4), first of all, we have to have this clarification of what ICI construction is. Basically, once this particular section is proclaimed, then this time line starts and where the trade unions have to, among themselves. . . . They have 60 days after this section comes into force to revise their constitutions on their own before they go to the board. If they can't change them on their own within 60 days of this section coming into force, then it goes to the board, obviously, for that final determination within 150 days. But that's not the issue I'm raising.

The issue I'm raising is determining which trade unions are or are not affected by this section. To do that, first of all we have to have this process complete in terms of what ICI construction is. So my question is not on the time for revising the constitution. Rather, my question is on the time that is going to be targeted for Mr. Cott and Mr. Cahill to come up with a more concise definition of ICI construction and then subsequently on how much time the Labour Relations Board -- I appreciate that it may not be as easy for the minister to answer on their behalf -- may need should Mr. Cott and Mr. Cahill not be able to come up with a consensus on that definition.

Hon. D. Lovick: I have a couple of points. Going back to first principles, as it were, I do not share the member's view that this is a large problem, quite frankly. I just don't think it is. I think there is a considerable consensus already in place, albeit there may be some minor glitches and problems to be sorted out. That's point one. Point two is that although I can't give the member a definitive answer in terms of saying that Cott and Cahill will have a report and that it will be done on August 28 or something like that, what I can say is that certainly the instruction given by me is that if this is significant legislation, which we think it is. . . Again, I want to emphasize that I don't think it's hugely big or radical. I think it's pretty straightforward and minor, frankly, albeit important. We are obviously encouraging them to proceed as expeditiously as possible, and I'm sure they will do so.

Nailing down what they may have to. . . . I appreciate the fact that the member said that this "may be a problem" rather than it "is a problem." I appreciate that recognition on his part. Once that is established, then I think the other issues to be sorted out are, frankly, rather a narrow compass. So again, I think the problem is not nearly as large as some might suggest. But I appreciate the point the member is making in wanting some guidance that this is not going to be hanging out there for ever. I give him as much assurance as I can that that is not our intention and that rather the plan is to proceed as expeditiously as possible.

C. Hansen: In that case, could the minister give me some assurance that this section would not be proclaimed until that work is completed?

Hon. D. Lovick: No, I can't, simply because proclamation is effectively what enables that process to unfold. One can be doing some of the preliminary work even as we speak; that's true. But the statutory mandate to do this is conferred by the legislation. The proclamation, as the member knows as well as I, is the last part of creating legislation. So that has to happen, I think, before the other things can happen. Thus I can't give him that assurance.

C. Hansen: In that case, could the minister assure us that it is the intention of this section that the trade unions affected are in fact only the 15 craft trade unions and that the definition of ICI, which we talked about at length yesterday, will not draw into that definition any other unions than the 15 existing building trades unions, as we know them?

Hon. D. Lovick: The assurance I can give the member is that the current craft unions in the current bargaining council will be in this one. Whether I can say that for all time those are the only players. . . . Again, the nature of the industry is to be dynamic, and some particular craft union -- I can't give a specific example offhand -- may well want to go to the LRB at some point and say: "Look, all we do is ICI, and we have been left out." Or this will be a new trade, conceivably, that develops at some point and says: "ICI is all we do, and therefore we ought to be a signatory to and a participant in this particular council." I don't think so, frankly. . . . Or, as my deputy points out to me, there may be fewer craft unions -- other than the 15-- as this thing develops. But broadly, the member is correct. I think it's probably going to be those 15.

That reminds me, Madam Chair, that I've been remiss and ought to have shared with my colleagues. . . . I think they know the persons who are accompanying me here today. But in case they don't, on my left is Patrick Stanton, who was here yesterday. Patrick is a policy adviser in our labour policy branch. Marg Arthur, on my right is, of course, the deputy minister.

C. Hansen: I think what the minister said is probably as important to defining ICI as anything we went through yesterday. Certainly I would be very concerned if ICI construction was defined over the course of the next few months to encompass unions other than members of the existing council. I understand that there are a couple of unions more than the building trades as we know them today, because of their current makeup. But certainly I think that when those who are starting to look at the definitions of ICI and to be concerned as to whether or not their particular union may be drawn into this process, the minister's words would give some reassurance to that.

In section 55.18 there is a difference. . . . The wording is comparable in this particular section and in section 55.2, which deals with the Construction Labour Relations Association. On the one hand, the section we're dealing with now is setting up the bargaining council for the trade union side, and section 55.2 is the bargaining council for the employers' side. They parallel each other fairly closely, except for one difference that's in the section about the CLRA. There is a subsection -- 55.2(4) -- that reads: "When the constitution and bylaws are approved by the board they are deemed to be a decision of the board." It's interesting to note that there is no comparable phrase like that under section 55.18, which we're dealing with now. I'm wondering if the minister could explain the significance of that.

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer to the question is simply that because we have the reference to section 41 in the existing

[ Page 10132 ]

C. Hansen: Does the minister feel that in the provisions we are implementing there is any provision for the trade unions to change their bargaining council down the road? Once it's established, is it in perpetuity? Or is there the ability on the part of the bargaining council at some point in the future to change their bargaining council, as it is set up in this section?

Hon. D. Lovick: Madam Chair, I think we recognize that the constitution obviously is a document that will guide, one presumes, for some period of time. Constitutions, like any kind of legislation, however, are ultimately changeable, given the consent of the parties. It is quite conceivable, I guess, that the bargaining council may well decide -- for reasons that elude me, but there may be some good reason why, as they perceive it -- that they want to change their constitution. If they did so, of course, it would be subject to precisely the same guidelines and so forth that are enunciated in this legislation and would again ultimately, you know, have to be vetted by the Labour Relations Board.

I just point out, given that we're asking this question in relation to the CLRA and how comparable they are, that the same thing precisely could happen there. There may be a quite different CLRA at the end of the day, given that all those companies are now going to effectively discover that the CLRA is their bargaining agent. Therefore I suspect a number of them are going to say: "Right, we want to get in there and have some say in how that place operates, because we're not entirely happy with its past history."

Again, the answer to the question is that human beings make laws and create constitutions, and ultimately those things are and must be amendable. The only question is how difficult it is to amend them and to make sure that principles of natural justice and so forth are not violated in the process of amendment. That's what the protection is here, in saying that the constitution ultimately is subject to approval by the board.

C. Hansen: I think the point that is important is that here we have a bargaining council that is being set up. The Labour Relations Board ultimately has the overseer role to ensure that it meets the terms set out by Kelleher and Lanyon, as the minister explained earlier.

But I think it also doesn't specify in the language that we have here that it has to be any one particular organization as we now know it. I don't see anything in this legislation that wouldn't prevent the Labour Relations Board at some point 20 years from now, if this legislation is still intact, coming back to say that they have the authority to recognize a different bargaining council. There's nothing in this legislation that is restricting it to the bargaining council that exists today. They in fact would have the power to recognize a different bargaining council if it had the majority support of the trade unions involved. The point that I think has to be made is that on the employers' side, they don't have similar kinds of ability. That latitude is not given to the Labour Relations Board. We'll deal with that when we get to that section.

[11:15]

[To add the words "for those craft bargaining units" after the words "for the purposes of negotiating collective agreements."]

On the amendment.

Hon. D. Lovick: With all due deference to the member opposite, I do not think there is any need for this amendment. It's pretty clear that a trade union can't negotiate agreements for others; it can only negotiate agreements for those who have certification and who they represent.

The member is quite correct when he says that he believes that this is indeed the intent of the legislation. I would say yes. The justification he gives for the amendment is indeed the intent of the legislation, but the existing language, it seems to me, is very clear indeed: "Trade unions representing employees in craft bargaining units in ICI construction must establish a bargaining council for the purposes of negotiating collective agreements." Obviously, the only people they are going to be negotiating collective agreements for are those craft bargaining units within ICI construction whom they represent.

If we were to allow that kind of amendment, it seems to me that we could repeat it again and again and again and say: "Well, just in case it isn't clear, let me say it again." Frankly, I think that's all the amendment is doing. I'm sure it's well intentioned, but again, in my considered opinion, it's absolutely redundant. We simply don't need to say it. I hope my words will give the member comfort that that is indeed the clear intention of the legislation as written.

C. Hansen: I'll give the minister a very specific example that I think speaks to the need for this amendment, and that's the current situation we have at the Carpenters Union. The Carpenters Union has both craft certifications and wall-to-wall certifications. If you read the existing language, it could possibly be construed, because the Carpenters Union is a trade union representing employees in craft bargaining units, that this bargaining council will therefore capture the negotiations for their collective agreements, which could be construed to include the wall-to-wall units.

My understanding is that within the building trades, there is some anxiety on the part of the other unions about the fact that the carpenters have gone to some wall-to-wall certifications. My concern would be that this bargaining council would wind up with the power and the authority to bargain on behalf of the carpenters -- not just for their craft bargaining units but for their wall-to-wall certifications as well. That's what's behind the amendment. I would like the minister's comments on that.

Hon. D. Lovick: My reading, and that of my officials, is that the constitution will grapple with the whole large ques-

[ Page 10133 ]

I appreciate the point being made by the member, but again, I don't think it's compelling. I don't think it is of itself sufficient to justify an amendment of the kind he proposes.

Amendment negatived on division.

C. Hansen: Before I leave this very specific issue, I would like to get a clarification from the minister, based on the wording we are now left with, that this wording is not intended to affect the bargaining rights of the Carpenters Union when it comes to their wall-to-wall certification.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member is quite correct.

C. Hansen: I just have one last point for clarification. When we talk about the constitution, does the minister feel that there is a need in the constitution to provide for the ability of the building trades councils to disband their bargaining unit at some point? Where are the rights of the trade union members to in fact disband or to de-accredit, if that's the word, their bargaining council at some point in the future?

Hon. D. Lovick: Because this body is indeed a council under section 41 of the act, then section 42 of the act also obtains. Section 42 refers to the dissolution of councils of trade unions. I would also refer the member to the appendix to Lanyon-Kelleher, in which they talk about, in point 9, withdrawing from the bargaining council and suggesting that that should be mandated by the board.

Section 2, section 55.18 approved on division.

On section 2, section 55.19.

C. Hansen: This section gives the bargaining council, which we have just allowed to be established under the previous section, the authority to negotiate and bind its members to a project collective agreement. As we discussed yesterday, the minister has the power to allow for project collective agreements. Could the minister advise us whether or not the employees involved would have the right to ratify any such collective agreements that may be negotiated by this bargaining council?

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the answer to that question is that again, this will probably be determined by the constitution that the participants establish. It's worth noting that I don't think that any organization that functions on the basis of an entirely top-down structure and says, "We are going to do these things on your behalf without consulting with you in any way, shape or form," is going to have a very long or healthy existence.

In terms of how the individual workers within an individual craft union and so forth sort that out, that's very much their choice. Some unions, as I'm sure the member from Quilchena knows full well, take some pride in being mavericks. Everything must be decided on the floor by the workers, and they meet on a regular basis. Others perhaps tend to be more deferential to their leadership. But again, I would make the point that that is essentially their choice; that's their argument. I think I've answered that question.

C. Hansen: This section reads: "In addition to its other powers under this Part, the bargaining council has the authority. . . ." This may seem like the obvious answer to this question, but I do want to put it on the record: what are the other powers? If we're talking about the other powers as set up and established in just section 55.18, I think that's probably the logical answer, but I would just like the minister's assurance that we're not talking about any other powers in addition to that.

Hon. D. Lovick: The reason for the delay in answering, Madam Chair. . . . I'm just wondering whether the question is asking something more than appears to at first glance. I'm always very cautious about that.

I think section 55.18 is indeed the answer. The member is quite correct. What I was thinking about and was just chatting with my officials about is whether the fact that a union, and thereby a council of unions, which has some obligation to fair representation of its membership, would in fact would be construed as another power. I don't think it is. That's a given. So to the member's question: no, I don't think there's anything beyond section 55.18.

C. Hansen: This section, when it's read in conjunction with the definition of what a project collective agreement is, could be read to construe that the bargaining council has the power to negotiate project agreements regardless of whether or not it has been approved by the minister. The section that we have with regard to the minister's approval, section 55.15, talks about major project collective agreements. Section 55.15(1) specifically says: "One or more persons who wish to engage in a major project in. . .construction. . .may apply to the minister for the right to bargain collectively. . . ." In this section, section 55.19, we have wording that says: ". . .the bargaining council has the authority to negotiate and bind its members to a project collective agreement." The inference is that this does not require the minister's involvement at all to say whether or not this is a project agreement. So I'm wondering if the minister could explain whether or not it is the interpretation that this bargaining council does not need the minister's concurrence as to what constitutes a project in this case.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'd just refer the member to section 55.15 and the heading of the section. When the minister's involvement is required is under the heading of "Major project collective agreements" -- with the emphasis on the adjective "major." Other ones, with the agreement of the parties, can certainly establish project agreements. Yes -- if that's what the member is asking, that's the short answer.

C. Hansen: I guess, then, the concern that I have is that we have the ability, under this section for the bargaining council on behalf of the trade unions. . . . It gives them the authority to negotiate and bind its members to project collective agreements. Yet we do not see similar language when it comes to the employers' bargaining council. Does that then imply that these project agreements would be negotiated by the bargaining council on the union side but with individual employers on the employers' side?

[11:30]

[ Page 10134 ]

The issue, though, and the problem that we're setting out to fix here, is that currently the bargaining council, as constituted in section 41 of the act, can enter into a project agreement only when all the trades agree. In other words, they need unanimity, and unanimity, quite frankly, is elusive and obviously difficult -- sometimes just impossible -- to achieve. The result, of course, is that the trades, as well as the contractors, have therefore missed out on some important projects that they thought they could have bid on and been successful in a competitive bid. What we're doing is simply saying that in this instance, the majority interest ought to prevail and that one union ought not to have veto power, in effect, when it can hurt all the trades. That's the reason for it.

C. Hansen: Coming back to the definition of project collective agreement, it says: ". . .a collective agreement negotiated among a trade union or unions, an employer or employer bargaining agent and a project owner or project owners. . . ." Just to clarify, then, there is nothing in here that will prevent an individual union and an individual employer from negotiating a project collective agreement under the terms of this legislation.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member is correct, if I understand his question -- namely, whether an individual union or an individual company doing craft union ICI work would be able to set up its own deal. They could do so only if they get the approval of their respective bodies -- the CLRA on the one hand and the bargaining council on the other. That is precisely the case. Some have argued, as the member knows, that there are a couple of craft unions that have said: "Look, we were doing quite nicely out there, and this legislation has dragged us into" -- I'm putting it in their words -- "a structure that, frankly, we'd rather not have." What Lanyon and Kelleher have said and I have accepted is that given the amazingly integrated nature of ICI construction -- and construction, for that matter -- we have decided to impose that broader structure. In other words, there is the CLRA and there is a bargaining council, and all of the affected craft unions and the companies doing ICI work will fall within that structure.

The answer to the member's question is: yes indeed, there are certain kinds of agreements that would normally have occurred or that would have been made between one craft union and one contractor, which would no longer be allowed without going through the process of responding to the larger representative bodies.

Section 2, section 55.19 approved on division.

On section 2, section 55.2.

C. Hansen: If you take the logic that was presented with regard to section 55.18, which basically is to establish the requirement that the trade unions involved establish a bargaining council. . . . What we have in 55.2 is a different approach. We touched on this earlier, but I did want to come back to this. What we have in 55.2 is government, through legislation, telling employers who they must have as their bargaining agent. In this case, they have specified that an organization known as the Construction Labour Relations Association must become the bargaining agent on behalf of all construction employers who operate in the ICI craft sector. My question to the minister is: why did they decide that the CLRA was the organization that should be anointed by government legislation in this way? I know that part of the minister's response may be that it is in the Kelleher-Lanyon report, and I don't accept that as an answer. I think the minister must have some rationale that goes behind just the fact that somebody told him to do it.

Hon. D. Lovick: I am very tempted to say: well, who is telling the member opposite to say what he is saying on this one? But I'm not going to do that, because we have been cordial throughout, and I for one appreciate it very much. I think that people are much better served, frankly, by a debate such as this rather than name-calling and so forth. So I commend the opposition member for the approach that has been taken thus far.

I'm happy to answer the question. I am not prepared, however, to yield ground instantly and say that no reference to Kelleher-Lanyon will be allowed, because it seems to me that they do provide a very cogent and effective argument as to why the CLRA. . . . I refer the member to page 21 and following in terms of their report. I think it is a good argument, but let me, from my own perspective, articulate albeit briefly what I think the case is. I might point out, by the way, that we have had some discussion of this issue already. We covered a bit of this ground in the definition section, and some of the answers have already been presented. But let me try again.

The CLRA has been named as the employer bargaining agent for craft bargaining units in ICI. That has been done primarily because it is currently the major employer group in the field. It is without question the major group in the field, and currently it represents about 350 employers out of 700 to 800 union employers that might be active in ICI work. That's the first point.

Obviously, given that background and long history, the CLRA has considerable experience. As well, I will note, it's a democratic organization. People may not always like it, and there have been internal battles within the CLRA just as there have been even within caucuses, dare I say -- perish the thought! But the reality is that it is a democratic organization in which majority rules. It has a fair constitution, and it has bylaws by which it must operate. Those are transparent; those are obvious. Demonstrable violations of constitution and bylaws can be addressed. So I think it has that dimension of legitimacy. The members of the CLRA will determine the approach that the organization will take to future bargaining. Those companies that are not part of the CLRA now, but will indeed be governed by CLRA agreements, will have the opportunity to become active members of the association should they so choose, and they can shape the organization accordingly. I think the democratic structure is in place, and that ought to protect any abuse of power and so forth.

Also, I would note that the panel has recommended that the CLRA's constitution be considered and approved by the board before the CLRA becomes the new agent under these new provisions of the act. For example, one of the recommen-

[ Page 10135 ]

I've had that conversation with CLR. I'm sorry, I should say CLRA. I always mix up the two; I'm not sure which version to use -- Construction Labour Relations or Construction Labour Relations Association. In any event, I've made that very clear to the CLRA executive that Lanyon and Kelleher made very clear that it's not going to be business as usual. You can't carry on doing what you've done. You probably will have an influx of membership, and it's safe to say that those new members in some cases will perceive themselves to be dragged kicking and screaming into the new structure. There is some past history, frankly, and some pretty major divisions within the CLRA, but everybody now recognizes clearly that they're going to be joined together and are going to have to learn to work with each other and do so by setting up a structure they can all live with.

That's the short answer in terms of the CLRA and why it has been chosen and why, moreover, I think it will work fairly well. I would note again, though, that the board is there to ultimately protect all the members, all of the participants, and to ensure that the CLRA constitution is fair and that all members are treated equitably and justly rather than there being any kind of discrimination against new members versus old members and so forth. The conclusion to all of that, it seems to me, is that the mechanism recommended by Kelleher and Lanyon is the right one. I see no reason whatsoever why it shouldn't work very well.

C. Hansen: There is a whole range of issues that come out of the minister's remarks. I'll deal with one very small one, which I think we can probably deal with quickly, but I do want it on the record. When we were talking about the bargaining council on the union side, the minister was quite emphatic in stating that he expected that the board would follow appendix A, the principles that should be respected in the redrafting of the building trades constitution. I would just like the assurance of the minister that it is his expectation that the board will similarly follow the recommendations in appendix B of Kelleher-Lanyon regarding the principles that should be followed for revising the CLRA constitution and that the board should not give its blessing to a new constitution until such time as they're confident that those principles had been adhered to. I'm just wondering if the minister can give me that assurance.

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer is yes.

C. Hansen: I think that the issue that is important in terms of the way this legislation is worded is that, as the minister mentioned, there is likely to be an influx of new members who are going to be forced into the CLRA. If you had a process set up that was similar to the process in section 55.18, where it is the membership itself that must establish a bargaining agent, what you would have coming out of that process is a new membership influx. If you forced all the unions to have a bargaining agent, you would then wind up with a process by which those employers would have the right to choose their bargaining agent.

Looking at the reality of the situation today and the current membership of the CLRA, I have no doubt that a majority of the employers who would be forced into that bargaining relationship would in fact probably choose the CLRA. As the minister mentioned, it is the only significant game in town. I would take issue with the fact that. . . . I would state that this is the wrong direction to go in the first place, but since we're walking down this path, I would say that the least the government could do is allow those organizations the democratic right to choose their association.

[11:45]

But I think a more natural process would have been to allow the CLRA to go forward and sell itself to a membership base. Rather than having that organization forced on them through a statutory requirement, which is what we're doing, you would have an organization that would have to go out and earn the respect and the right to represent those members. You know, I'm not sure that we're going to get anywhere by going back and forth on this, because I can see that the minister's mind is made up on this. But certainly I want to put on the record that we feel it is a wrong approach.

Also, hon. Chair, I want to come back to our issue that we raised under section 55.18, regarding the need to define ICI construction. In the case of section 55.18, when we're talking about essentially five unions. . . . The minister assured us that the definition of ICI, as he currently understands it, is not envisioned to reach tentacles beyond those existing 15 unions unless there's some future change. But in this case, when we're starting to talk about the employers, it really is very much going to be like pinning jelly to the wall when you try to come up with a list of employers who are going to be affected by this.

Certainly you're talking about potentially. . . . Oh, I think the minister's numbers were about 350 employers out there who are doing ICI construction work with craft unions and who are not now members of the CLRA. You know, I'm sure the minister today cannot give me a precise number -- can't tell me whether it's 340, 360, 400 or 300. The reason he can't give me a precise answer to that question is because we don't have a precise definition of what ICI construction is at this point.

I would like the assurance of the minister, before the clock starts ticking on this 60-day provision, that before this section is proclaimed we will in fact be able to give some assurance to employers in British Columbia, so that they can determine whether they are or are not caught within this ICI construction web.

Hon. D. Lovick: My answer earlier, Madam Chair, about proclamation obtains here. But what I will say, simply, is that I'm not as sure as the member is that it is as urgent or as pressing an issue. But if indeed that clarification is required, I'm absolutely confident that the board will ensure that it is provided, as I've also said earlier.

C. Hansen: But I think what's important. . . . I think at another section here -- it's right here, the very next section

[ Page 10136 ]

Clearly, if we don't have a precise definition as to what ICI construction is when this section is proclaimed, then we're going to be going through a process of revising constitutions of the CLRA. We're going to be denying the right of participation by companies that will be caught or potentially could get caught in that web down the road. That's why, hon. Chair, I feel the minister should give us some assurance that this section would not be proclaimed until we have a bit more certainty with regard to the definition.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think I have given the member all the assurances I can in this regard. If they're not sufficient, I'm sorry. But I, quite frankly, can't make any other commitment beyond that without committing to do something that I may not be able to deliver, and I simply won't do that. Again I would make the point that I do not think there is as much (a) confusion and (b) problem with the definition of ICI construction as the member has said. But I recognize the legitimacy of his concerns and his right to express them, and I want to assure him that they have indeed been duly noted.

C. Hansen: In this section, first of all we have subsection (1), which says: "CLRA is authorized to bargain on behalf of all unionized construction employers. . .within ICI construction." Subsection (2) then says: "Subsection (1) has no effect until the constitution and bylaws of CLRA are approved by the board." As we know, that's a process that could take some time. My question to the minister is: what happens to collective bargaining in the interim?

Hon. D. Lovick: The current CLRA agreement is in effect. The structures we have today will continue until the new ones take effect. The system is still functioning. We think it will be better with the legislation, but it doesn't mean that everything stops now until the new legislation is in place. Rather, things continue.

C. Hansen: I guess that's not my reading of the language that's in this bill. What it says here is: "(1) CLRA is authorized to bargain. . . ." That's the whole intent of subsection (1). There's no intent other than to give the CLRA the authorization to bargain. Subsection (2) says: "Subsection (1) has no effect until the constitution and bylaws of CLRA are approved by the board." I don't see any other interpretation of that other than that the CLRA is unable to bargain until such time as the constitution and bylaws have been revised and approved by the Board. Currently, the CLRA is in the middle of bargaining with the unions involved. I believe their contracts were up on April 30, if my memory serves me right. So they are in the middle of a whole slew of contract negotiations now, some of which are progressing, and most of which are not progressing because the unions are waiting for Bill 26 to be passed and implemented. I think they feel that will strengthen their bargaining position. My concern would be that once this particular section is proclaimed, then any bargaining that is done by the CLRA will have absolutely no legal stature at all until such time as the board approves it's new constitution.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member raises a question that I think is a generic question. We could ask this about any legislation: what happens in terms of a transitional period? The short answer is that this legislation is not taking away existing rights until such time as the new one comes in. It isn't saying that because we have something new on the books and until we proclaim it, we're taking away your existing rights. The CLRA will continue to do what it does; contracts will continue to be negotiated. The particular broader, new thing we're talking about, which this legislation creates, is the master agreement for all ICI construction on a craft union basis. That will not, obviously, happen until the legislation is passed and proclaimed. But that's new; that's not something that already occurs. What the CLRA now does, they will continue to do. I think that's the answer to that particular question.

Noting the hour, Madam Chair, I move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. D. Lovick moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:57 a.m.

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