[ Page 10085 ]

Prayers.

L. Reid: I have a very dear friend visiting in the gallery today. She is Karen Legeer, from the riding of Surrey-White Rock. I would ask the House to please make her welcome.

Hon. H. Lali: Visiting us today in the precinct is Chuck Brewer and his family. They are from Merritt. Chuck is working on a justice centre for the Nicola Valley. Would the House please welcome Chuck Brewer and his family to Victoria.

J. Weisgerber: In the members' gallery is Sharlene Gevatkoff, my constituency assistant. She is joined by Louise Denis, my legislative assistant. Would everyone give them both a warm welcome.

R. Thorpe: Visiting today from Summerland is a student who goes to university at Royal Roads, Bryan Matthews. Would the House please make him welcome.

J. Sawicki: Today in the gallery I have two very special guests who are members of my family. They are my sister Anita and brother-in-law Ron Fownes. Anita is on a two-day holiday from her work with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, and Ron recently retired from the Ministry of Finance. It's great to see that they're still motivated to come down to the Legislature to listen to question period. Would the House please make them very welcome.

Oral Questions

COMPETITIVENESS OF FOREST INDUSTRY AND FOREST SECTOR JOBS

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: I've said before publicly that we expect at least the first two quarters of 1998 to be worse than 1997 -- no secret. It is unfortunate that West Fraser has experienced a loss. Their loss has been, in part, exacerbated by fires in Alberta, by the pulp markets and generally by the Asian markets. So there are reasons why West Fraser has been. . . . It is an indication of the state of the industry, and we have taken steps to do that, working with industry. You'll notice that the press release that West Fraser put out lauded the efforts of government and the companies working together to reduce costs.

The Speaker: The member for Shuswap on a first supplementary.

G. Abbott: The real cause of the current turmoil in the B.C. forest industry is the reckless policy adventures of this NDP government in the past seven years. Everything this government has done has undermined the competitive position of the B.C. forest industry: stumpage rates up to three times higher than any other province, a process-oriented Forest Practices Code -- which, by the minister's own admission, has unnecessarily penalized the forest industry by at least $1 billion in the past three years -- and the unadulterated ideological nonsense embodied in the jobs and timber accord.

Back in April, First Marathon Securities stated that B.C. companies trade at a 26 percent discount in relation to eastern companies on the basis of their price over book value. What does the Minister of Forests estimate the B.C. discount to be today?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The question is not whether or not the B.C. industry is having difficulties. It is. We admit that, and we've been working constructively to do what we can within our responsibility to take care of that. To suggest that the Forest Practices Code and the environmental values in there, which are supported by industry, are a reckless policy is irresponsible. For that member to suggest that it is irresponsible for us to increase stumpage rates and to collect it here in British Columbia, instead of letting Americans collect it, is irresponsible of that member.

I would submit that both policies -- our stumpage policies and our Forest Practices Code policies -- are responsible in that they protect British Columbians' income, they protect us from countervailing duties, and they protect us from international market boycotts.

R. Neufeld: Well, if there's anything irresponsible, it's this government's policies that have driven the forest industry right into the tank. That's the problem.

Hon. Speaker, it never rains but it pours. To the Minister of Forests: StatsCan has released. . . .

Interjections.

R. Neufeld: Just a minute, folks. StatsCan has released its April number for unemployment. . .

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order, hon. members.

[2:15]

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Hon. Speaker, we were told by industry that we had to take out some $600 million in costs -- $1 billion in total. They had responsibility for some. We took action jointly with industry to work on making changes in two areas that we can affect. One is unnecessary regulatory burden, which is the Forest Practices Code. We've done that; we've delivered on that. And we've delivered on the stumpage changes, which will bring about considerable savings, and that has been recognized by industry.

[ Page 10086 ]

The Speaker: First supplementary, the member for Peace River North.

R. Neufeld: The recovery, hon. Speaker, will happen right after the next election. That's when the recovery is going to start.

This past May 27, the Minister of Forests. . .

Interjections.

The Speaker: Hon. members, order, please.

R. Neufeld: . . .promised to release to this House a copy of the report on mill closure and job losses. Seven weeks later, we still do not have a copy of that report. When will the minister table a copy of that report in this House for the official opposition, as he promised to do?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: These members should be careful of what they quote back. I said I would consider releasing it. I explained to you. . . .

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order!

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Listen, and you might get it right. I explained to you that there are privacy considerations and that the information was collected on the understanding that it wouldn't be public information. I'm saying to you that the evidence is there. The StatsCan index is the one that we will measure job loss by. The members have information there.

Just the other day we gave a private briefing to the opposition Forests critic and the deputy critic, showed them the reports and said that this will not come out, because we can't release it; it's private information. So there's no dispute over the numbers. Unemployment is going up as the crisis in the forest industry and its markets deepens -- no problem.

C. Clark: There is a problem, a big problem in the forest industry. If the Forests minister would let the business community try and create jobs in the forest industry, there wouldn't be so many people out of work in British Columbia. On July 7 this minister received a letter from Graham Lea of the Truck Loggers Association, with some good suggestions. He asked the minister why, when he offered stumpage relief for the major licensees, he didn't extend that also to the small business licence holders. He said in his letter, quite rightly, that if they extend that stumpage relief to the small business loggers, they will create jobs in British Columbia. Can the minister tell us why he has ignored that advice and why he doesn't extend the relief to small business loggers, so that they can go out there and try and create the jobs that this government has failed to deliver on?

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order, members.

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: The letter from Mr. Lea was asking for a change in policy, which is to extend the stumpage relief to those people who are on fixed rates. The policy we brought in was such that we extended the relief to those people who were on the variable rate, whether they were big operators or small operators. So every small operator who was on the variable rate got the relief.

The Speaker: First supplementary, member for Port Moody-Burnaby Mountain.

C. Clark: I also have the letter from Mr. Lea, and it's not quite the way the minister likes to present Mr. Lea's views. I think, to be fair to Mr. Lea, that maybe I should quote from his letter. In it he says that: If the stumpage reduction is not extended to the small business program, there will be business hardship, breach of contract, reduced harvest levels, increased administrative costs, reduced economic activity and -- guess what -- reduced Crown revenue. Does the Minister of Forests plan to continue to ignore this advice? Does he plan to continue to preclude these small business loggers from being able to go out and create the jobs in the forest industry that he's promised to British Columbians and that he has consistently failed to deliver on?

Hon. D. Zirnhelt: Every new small business licence that comes out monthly will have the reduction in stumpage attached to it. The jobs will come from people bidding realistically, knowing what they know about the market, when we offer them. What I said is perfectly consistent. When we brought in stumpage increases, we didn't make those people that Mr. Lea is talking about pay the increase in stumpage. We didn't do that. We gave them the break and let their licences run out. What we said is fair: when we bring in a decrease, if you've opted for the fixed rate, you're stuck with it. You bid, and you opted for a variable rate or a fixed rate when you bid on it. So the policy is fair. We are taking additional steps to help the small business operators, in terms of making more wood available to them so they can create the jobs that we believe are possible under the accord.

EFFICACY OF PHOTO RADAR

Interjections.

The Speaker: Hon. members, order.

G. Plant: Today we learned that a second justice of the peace suspended photo radar ticket hearings because the law may be unconstitutional. The result has thrown thousands of tickets into limbo. My question is: will the Attorney General agree that now at last is the time to scrap photo radar?

Hon. U. Dosanjh: First of all, let me advise the House that the criminal justice branch has decided to appeal that particular case. The other justices of the peace are not bound by that decision. The justice of the peace that made that decision ignored the Supreme Court of British Columbia and higher authorities, and we are quite convinced that we will be successful in the appeal.

However, coming to the real issue of whether or not photo radar should be scrapped, it saves lives, it avoids crashes, it saves money. What is the hon. member's objection?

The Speaker: First supplementary, member for Richmond-Steveston.

[ Page 10087 ]

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I'm appalled that an hon. member of this House would say that a tool of law enforcement and public safety should be scrapped because they have some political-ideological objections to it.

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order, members.

RCMP COASTAL PATROL VESSEL

Will the Attorney General tell us why. . .

Interjections.

The Speaker: Order. Hon. members, we have to hear the question.

An Hon. Member: Faster than the ferries.

M. de Jong: Faster than the new ferry, perhaps.

. . .his ministry has decided not to fund the repairs to the Naden, which means that literally thousands of British Columbians are denied the policing services they deserve?

Hon. U. Dosanjh: I'll take that particular question on notice, because I'm not fully familiar with the details.

Tabling Documents

Petitions

A. Sanders: I rise to present a petition signed by 285 signatories from the riding of Okanagan-Vernon.

Orders of the Day

LABOUR RELATIONS CODE AMENDMENT ACT, 1998

[2:30]

On section 1.

Hon. D. Lovick: Mr. Chairman -- as my colleague opposite certainly knows, from some experience now, how the bill is structured -- there are two discrete sections. There is, however, a preliminary short section, which is largely a correction of past omissions. That's the first section. I suspect the meat of our debate will, of course, occur once we get past that first section.

I will simply note that the first section of the bill that stands outside the two predominant sections simply amends the current section 21 of the code to allow for a single-person bargaining unit of employees for a craft unit. That change is consistent with section 18 -- i.e., the "Acquisition of bargaining rights" -- which allows for the certification of a single-person bargaining unit of employees. The purpose, then, is simply to make this section of the code consistent with the other sections of the code. Indeed, it is the practice that there are a number of single-person bargaining units out there and significant numbers of those, also, within the craft union sector. Again, I think it's a fairly straightforward one.

I might just add one other comment that perhaps the members might appreciate knowing -- namely, that the code definition of a unit was changed originally in 1993 to allow for that certification. Section 21, however -- and this is our problem -- still requires "a group of employees" to be present before craft certification can be granted. This change, as I have indicated, simply makes the two sections of the code compatible and consistent.

The Chair: Before we get going, members, there's a steady hum in the room. Perhaps private conversations could be lightened or moved outside the chamber.

C. Hansen: I don't intend to dwell on this section at all, but I do want to clarify the ramifications for a single employee within a workplace who decides to try to form a certification for that one employee. Let's say you have a facility where you may have one janitor, for example, but now they're in a larger bargaining unit. Is there the potential that we could be setting up a fragmentation of some existing workplaces with single employees who decide that they should become an entity unto themselves?

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm advised that it's highly unlikely that there would be many people who would decide they wanted to be certified as a member of a single-person bargaining unit. It is perhaps more unlikely that unions would want to get people like that, simply because the cost of servicing a one-

[ Page 10088 ]

What I think is worth noting, perhaps, is that there are. . . . I can give the member some historical definition. Since the definition was changed in 1993, the board has granted 79 single-person certifications. That covers the period, by the way, from 1993 to '97. Twenty-five of those certifications were in 1997, and 20 of those were in health care -- i.e., nursing units. So that may be the preponderant one.

C. Hansen: Actually, the minister anticipated my next question somewhat, which is in regard to what types of industries are applying for this. I'm curious, in the case of health care. What it is about health care that drives single-person certifications? What are the particular employees within health care that are seeking these types of certifications?

Hon. D. Lovick: I gather that the new health regulations are the primary explanation. Various bodies will be created as part of the new health regime, as well, and those organizations' employers will have, say, one nurse working for them. That nurse, rather than having no protection or nobody to represent her, will therefore wish to be recognized, so she can then affiliate with the B.C. Nurses Union. That's the way it typically works, I gather.

C. Hansen: In terms of the other 54 certifications that have been granted over this time period, is there any commonality to those? I'm curious in particular about how many of those might come out of the craft unions that we have. I'll throw my next question into the same pot here, and that's whether or not the non-affiliation clauses drive some of these single-person certifications in the craft sector.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm not sure that there is a common pattern, but I am advised that a number of these go back to '92-93, and they apparently came from employees of the teachers' union who obviously fell outside of any other bargaining unit, or something.

Regarding the member's question about craft unions, the answer is none -- simply because until we make this change, they didn't have any legal right to get organized that way.

C. Hansen: I gather, then, that most of these single-person certifications have involved public sector employees. Is that what we can conclude from that response?

Hon. D. Lovick: I am advised that that is probably not the case.

Section 1 approved.

On section 2, section 55.1.

C. Hansen: I seek some guidance from the Chair on this. I would like to approach this section by first of all talking about the section as a whole and about the need to have a section embedded in the Labour Relations Code to deal specifically with the construction industry, which is what section 2 is. Secondly, without going into the details of any of the particular clauses that are being added, I'll go from there to a clause-by-clause review of section 2. I seek the guidance of the Chair on whether that's appropriate.

The Chair: Member, unfortunately, I have said that we will go seriatim on this process. What you're suggesting is contrary to normal practice. We're starting with section 55.1.

C. Hansen: I seek your guidance, then, in terms of what we are doing in section 2. It is introducing a total of 17 new sections that will be added to the Labour Relations Code, and this section constitutes a whole new part of the Labour Relations Code to deal with the construction industry. I'm seeking guidance in terms of when the appropriate time would be to discuss the advisability of entrenching that whole section into the Labour Relations Code. That's the guidance I'm seeking.

The Chair: Yes, member, that goes to the heart of the bill. That was decided at second reading. So we could go seriatim from section 55.1.

C. Hansen: In that case, I accept that ruling, and we can certainly plunge into some of the definitions in a direct way.

I want to start out by asking the minister about the second definition, and that's regarding the building trades employer. I'm just wondering if the minister intends to let the wording of that particular definition stand as it currently reads.

Hon. D. Lovick: I want to congratulate my colleague for his acumen and perspicacity, because he's absolutely correct: there is an error there. There's an amendment on the order paper in my name. . . . I'm sorry. It isn't on the order paper. My apologies.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Somebody says: "Another secret deal." I guess we were slow to catch it, but I want to table an amendment, if I might, Mr. Chairman. I'll simply read it into the record. I want to table and move this amendment -- namely, to amend the Labour Relations Code Amendment Act, 1998, to amend as follows:

[SECTION 2, in the proposed section 55.1, in the definition of "building trades employer" by deleting "employers in craft bargaining units" and substituting "employees in craft bargaining units."]

[2:45]

C. Hansen: This particular amendment is obviously one that's needed, and it's obviously one that we'll support, because the particular section doesn't make sense otherwise. But I must say that I know the time line that the authors of the initial report had in putting together their report, never mind the draft legislation that they attached to it. I was certainly very surprised when we saw Bill 26 tabled and I realized that the wording was virtually identical to the draft legislation that the authors of the report had tabled.

I just want to put on the record at this time that I am surprised that there wasn't a more. . . . Let me phrase this carefully; I certainly don't want to discredit the very fine legislative draftsmen that we have working for the provincial government. I was surprised that there wasn't a bit more work done on this legislation before it was tabled as Bill 26. I'm wondering if this is an appropriate question to ask the minister: why was it so important to go with the exact wording of the legislation as was drafted in the initial construction

[ Page 10089 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: Well, as I think the member knows, the wording is very close indeed; it isn't exact. Obviously there have been some minor changes, which we will see as we go through. I think it's worth noting that the construction industry review panel did excellent work. As the member knows full well, they're both highly trained, skilled lawyers with considerable experience in this area. They did, I think, good service by providing us with draft legislation. Ultimately, however, it becomes the ministry's responsibility, in working with legislative counsel, to make changes and do fine tuning to legislation. That's the explanation, if one. . . . I don't think there's anything more elaborate than that required. I think it's fairly straightforward.

If the member wants me to say mea culpa for the fact of two letters being misplaced and therefore requiring this amendment, that's fine. I will say mea culpa, but I don't think it's a large issue, nor do I think it's an indicator of any extra haste or a cavalier attitude toward the drafting of legislation. It's one of those things that you wouldn't even pick up in a computer word scan. You obviously wouldn't catch it, because "employers" and "employees" are both perfectly acceptable usages. I hope we'll all be gracious and say: "Right, we understand the need for the amendment" -- and move on.

C. Hansen: I'll allow the amendment to go, and then we can get back to the main section.

Amendment approved.

On section 2, section 55.1 as amended.

C. Hansen: Rather than going through these in alphabetical order as they're presented, I hope the minister won't mind if we jump around a bit. I'd like to plunge into the definition of ICI. Of all the definitions, I think this is the one that causes the most anxiety. I know that yesterday the minister, in his closing remarks on second reading, made some comments about defining the parameters of what ICI construction is. I'm wondering if the minister could elaborate on that definition for the benefit of the record.

Hon. D. Lovick: Let me start by simply giving a more extended answer, then, in fairness to the member. I think his question is indeed an enabling one that opens a necessary door. ICI construction is, as the member knows, defined as work performed in the industrial, commercial and institutional part of the construction industry. That much we're all clear on. The scope of this work is not defined in the legislation but is generally understood within the industry.

I understand that my colleagues here with me today. . . . I'm remiss, by the way -- my apologies. Mr. Pat Stanton is the principal person responsible for working on this legislation, and Mr. Don Cott, whom the members have met before, is Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour.

I'm advised by the experts and the people in my ministry, who know this full well, that ICI is also not defined in any other jurisdiction in the country in any more rigorous a way than we're doing here. The reason for that, I gather, is essentially a matter of saying that they would rather err on the side of there being some confusion in leaving it to the discretion of the boards. They would rather fetter the discrimination and, dare I say, the flexibility and the possibility for changing, as circumstances dictate over time, than try to provide some absolute and rigorous definition that will work for all time.

The board, then, in this approach. . . . Again I emphasize that in this approach and the approach taken by, I believe, every other jurisdiction in Canada, it is, rather, given the discretion and the authority to resolve any definitional concerns that might arise.

Let me, however, pick up where I began -- namely, that I think the member's question deserves a broader answer than just that. Let me just elaborate a little bit, if I might. Let me illustrate industrial, commercial and institutional first by means of examples. In industrial, what is meant, for example, is a minesite, a pulp mill, a warehouse. Commercial, for example, would be an office complex or a retail store. Institutional: the examples that come to mind would be schools, hospitals, courthouses.

The big question, as the member has hinted already in his query, is simply: what happens in mixed sites? How do you nail it down? And the more specific concern certainly registered by business -- and legitimately -- is residential versus commercial. . . . Their concern, as I read from what the public campaign has been -- and it's based on my conversations with representatives of the UDI and other business interests -- is simply whether this bill in fact provides a backdoor means to organize residential construction, to impose a master agreement and all of that on residential construction. We have, of course, said no. The argument is simply that this is intended for industrial, commercial and institutional. Residential is not included. The obvious question then becomes: "Well, what if there is a mixture?" I gave a brief answer to that yesterday, and I would just elaborate a little more by saying that as a general rule, common sense would prevail. The parties involved in building the project, I think, would more than likely have a consensus, a common view of what kind of project this is -- that is to say, whether the project was better defined as residential or as commercial. If you've got two storeys of commercial and 18 storeys of residential, the common sense rendition, would certainly be that it's residential; it's not commercial.

Where a dispute arises in the system that we are presenting here, of course, the Labour Relations Board would have to make a determination as to which collective agreement should be utilized for the particular project. That, as I say, seems to be the standard approach across the country. I think it works fairly well. I have no illusions, by the way -- and this is an answer I'll be giving in other parts of the bill too -- that past practices and history and knowledge of the industry will obviously have something to do with that. I think everybody knows that condominiums, for example, are residential, even if they have two storeys of commercial development. I don't think anybody should have any illusions that this is a way to suddenly say: "Aha! That kind of construction will now be considered ICI, because it's two storeys."

Does the member want me to repeat, for the record, the answer I gave yesterday in terms of my wrap-up about that kind of trigger point -- what I see as a necessary trigger point for the board?

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Sure, I would be happy to do that. What I said yesterday. . . . I'm sorry, I don't have the note. I think I was quoting some document that had been given to me by the ministry. What I said, essentially, was that the determinant is

[ Page 10090 ]

G. Plant: I want to join in, for a moment, the debate around this term "ICI construction". The minister admitted, in what I thought was a fairly startling admission to make, that the language is confusing. I can't imagine a better place to fix confusing language, when it has made it this far, than right here. It's not a good tenet of legislative craftsmanship to create confusion and then say that we will trust the common sense of people who are in adversarial positions to resolve the issue. It's not good legislative drafting, nor is it good public policy, with respect to this issue -- about which there is, admittedly, uncertainty and about which the minister admits that his current attempt at draftsmanship is confusing -- to say that it's all right because out there in the industry everybody knows what the answer to the problem is; everybody will know whether a project is commercial or residential. Of course, I am primarily speaking about mixed-use projects, which I think the minister quite rightly identifies as the primary source of the problem.

We have, in this definition, very open-ended and general language which is intended to describe something that is otherwise unknown to the law. It may be a term that exists in other jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions probably have their own approach, a different approach, to these issues, and they have presumably resolved the challenges that have arisen over time. It may be, to be fair to the minister, that some answers to this problem may be found when the Labour Relations Board has to wrestle with the problem and decides to look at the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions and says: "Here's how it has worked in other jurisdictions. We'll apply the same test here."

To deliberately embark on an exercise in draftsmanship, which the minister admits has elements of confusion about it. . . . To say, "What we're really doing is being vague; we are being deliberately open-ended, and we're going to let the Labour Relations Board resolve the problem," seems to me to be wrong-headed. I must admit, for a moment, that I'm a little bit sensitive. When I dared to suggest, in a piece of correspondence, that a residential construction project that had a substantial commercial component might fall under a master agreement, the minister took the time and trouble to say that I was deliberately and systemically misrepresenting this bill. Yet he stands up, talking about this definition, and says: "It's confusing." He says he doesn't want to solve the problem here. He says he's going to let the Labour Relations Board solve the problem. I'll tell you what I'm being told: almost any instance of mixed use will in fact give rise to arguments about whether the project falls in this sector.

I'm not comfortable with the idea that we should deliberately create problems in order to allow some tribunal to solve them. What that does is make good work for the lawyers, and it creates all kinds of uncertainty. Investors want to know ahead of time whether the rules are going to apply to this project: "Am I going to be under this collective agreement or not under it?" Here we are, deliberately setting out to draft a provision that is supposed to be open-ended and supposed to create problems for somebody else to solve. In that context, it's interesting to hear what the minister says near the conclusion of his remarks.

Interjection.

G. Plant: Is there an introduction or. . . ?

An Hon. Member: No, he's just trying to get you to sit down. Can you imagine?

G. Plant: I'll sit down -- after I say this. I want to make this other point.

During the course of his answer to my colleague's question a moment ago, he talked about a test for ICI, which he says enjoys some general currency. The test is whether the project is primarily residential, institutional or commercial. That might actually make some progress. I haven't thought about it much more than a minute or two, but that would be a step forward.

When we are creating a provision in the statute that is deliberately open-ended and the government is saying that it has an idea of what the provision is intended to achieve -- that is, there is a test that people will use, and the test for determining whether or not something is an ICI project is to ask the question of whether it is primarily institutional, commercial or industrial -- why don't we change the definition? Why don't we incorporate that test into the definition and add some of the certainty that I think even the minister -- and, heaven knows, even the Minister Responsible for Northern Development -- would probably think is a good thing? Certainty would be a good thing here. It seems to me that a provision which is deliberately open-ended will foster uncertainty, and that's unfortunate. I wonder if the minister -- whichever minister -- might comment further on those problems.

Hon. D. Miller: My understanding is that the definition is one that will suit the purposes of the bill. If there are issues that arise, normally with labour legislation. . . . Of course, the member is a lawyer, so he understands this. In fact, I think that has probably given rise to one of the biggest industries in Canada, which is lawyers interpreting legislation.

The principles in labour legislation are somewhat different in that these issues generally aren't determined in courts; they're determined, if there are differences, by the board. That system has served British Columbia and other jurisdictions fairly well.

[3:00]

Hon. D. Miller: Again, these terms are fairly common. We talk about, for example, the delivery of energy to various clusters, and we roughly define that as industrial, commercial or residential. If you want my exact definition of everything. . . . I worked in an industrial setting in a pulp mill for 17 years, so that's one example.

C. Hansen: The minister made the comment that. . . . He talked about the delivery of energy services. I think that was the only specific that he gave. That certainly isn't very far-reaching. Would he, for example, include hydro lines in this kind of thing -- high-power electrical? Is that what he would consider to be industrial?

[ Page 10091 ]

C. Hansen: We're certainly looking for a lot more detail as to how this term is going to be defined. I think those are rather vague words that the minister used to respond. To say that they could or could not. . . . I think what we're talking about is entrenching a whole new section into the Labour Relations Code to deal with the construction industry -- a whole new section to deal with ICI construction. There are some very, very big decisions that are going to weigh on whether or not projects are in this particular definition. In fact, even today I am aware of projects that are not being financed. They're projects that are ready to go ahead, but they are not being financed today because of the uncertainty as to what this definition entails. So I think it would be incumbent upon the minister to give us a more specific response when it comes to what constitutes industrial construction.

Hon. D. Miller: Again, as I indicated in a previous answer, it there are disputes. . . . I suppose it may be virtually impossible to sort of catalogue, if you like, everything that might fall within the industrial. Undoubtedly there would still be areas that you might miss. So in the normal course of events -- and I think this is the practice in other jurisdictions as well -- if there's a dispute with respect to the classification, the board would determine that.

C. Hansen: Therein lies part of the problem that we've got. Because there is so much uncertainty -- I think the Minister of Labour himself used the word "confusion" -- I think it would be irresponsible for us as a Legislature to go forward with a piece of legislation and then say: "Well, we're going to leave it the Labour Relations Board to give definition to this." Certainly, if we want to be able to allow some of these projects to go ahead and to secure financing, there's going to have to be a degree of certainty. I would perhaps ask the minister if he sees the industrial construction being. . . . Are we talking about the traditional definition of construction, which is essentially vertical construction? Could we at least sort out that one?

Hon. D. Miller: Again, I don't think it's fitting that I, standing in for the minister, try to identify every conceivable project that may fall into the industrial category, but rather to suggest that there is a common understanding in the construction sector with respect to what "industrial" means. Beyond that, if there are issues or disputes around particular projects, then that's the role of the board. While occasionally, throughout the history of labour relations and issues being referred to the board, disputes have arisen that sort of spill over into the public or the press, if you like, that system has worked quite well. I anticipate that it will work well in the future too.

C. Hansen: I wonder if we could get some indication as to when the Minister of Labour will be back in the chamber and available to answer some of these questions.

Hon. D. Miller: Well, I don't know if it's dissatisfaction with the quality of the answers, Mr. Chair, but I don't know that the answers the minister would give would be any different. We're trying to get through the bill. The minister has some other issues. I'm not certain exactly when he'll be back.

C. Hansen: I move that we rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion negatived on the following division:

YEAS -- 27
Sanders	C. Clark	Farrell-Collins
Abbott	Reid	Neufeld
Coell	Chong	Whittred
Jarvis	Anderson	Nettleton
Penner	Weisbeck	Nebbeling
Coleman	Stephens	Hansen
Thorpe	Symons	van Dongen
Barisoff	Dalton	Masi
McKinnon	J. Wilson	Weisgerber

NAYS -- 34
Evans	Zirnhelt	McGregor
Kwan	Hammell	Boone
Streifel	Pullinger	Lali
Orcherton	Stevenson	Calendino
Walsh	Randall	Gillespie
Robertson	Cashore	Conroy
Priddy	Petter	Miller
Dosanjh	MacPhail	Lovick
Farnworth	Waddell	Sihota
Smallwood	Sawicki	Bowbrick
Kasper	Doyle	Giesbrecht
	Janssen

Hon. D. Lovick: Let me just offer my apologies to members opposite for the misunderstanding here. I had to run out of the House. I was trying to signal to my colleague across the way who had the floor, but I had to depart for a moment to take a call. I'm sure it's no secret -- everybody knows -- that we're hopeful of making great progress on Nisga'a today, and therefore I had to go and talk with the Premier. At some point I will probably have to leave again, one hopes. But if so, I will certainly make sure that I advise.

What I'd like to do, if members are agreeable. . . . I chatted briefly with the Opposition House Leader and suggested that what we could do is perhaps carry on with the committee for the ten minutes that I will be away. Then we could come back and perhaps recess the House and have a ministerial statement or something like that. I'm not asking members to necessarily agree, but I do want them to know what happened. I want to offer my apologies that I wasn't able to make that clear.

I see the member for Richmond-Steveston here. If he wishes, I could respond to his points now or to the member for Vancouver-Quilchena's, if he prefers. What's the member's preference? I could do either.

Interjection.

[3:15]

Our position is essentially that the approach we are taking, which is consistent with other jurisdictions across the country, is the right one. I don't think it's a matter -- with the greatest deference, Mr. Chairman -- of being afraid to define

[ Page 10092 ]

My point, then, is that we don't spell it out in the legislation; we quite deliberately don't do so -- it's on purpose. In most cases the industry does indeed have a clear understanding of what ICI is. In my mind and from the advice I've been given, it's not likely to be a major issue. Where issues may arise, as in over mixed sites, like construction-residential -- I think I answered that question already -- or over whether bridges belong to ICI or to roadbuilding, then the Labour Relations Board will have to determine where the work does properly belong. I gave the guideline yesterday. I stand by the commitment that the key determinant -- the trigger point, if you like -- is primary: is it primarily X or primarily Y? Depending on the answer to that question, everything else follows.

The board would very likely call a hearing in the event of a dispute, a disagreement, and may well look at the experience elsewhere -- but, more particularly, in the area of our historical experience in roadbuilding in B.C. For instance, roadbuilding has never been part of ICI construction in this province. I know that what I'm saying now will become part of any Labour Relations Board judgment in the future; I'm very cognizant of that. Frankly, I would be absolutely amazed if anybody would take what some might regard as an ambiguity here and say: "Aha! That means a radical transformation is intended." It's absolutely the opposite. It would seem to me that what we now do with regard to roadbuilding and its relationship with ICI would be predominantly and essentially what would happen after this legislation.

I hope that clarification helps members opposite. I look forward to other questions.

G. Plant: I'm glad we've had the minister's response to my previous comments. Let me make two points about why the minister's approach is wrong. The minister says that the path they've chosen is deliberate. That, of course, is not an argument in favour of it; it's merely a statement that what we have here is not an accident. They have deliberately chosen to use terms which are general and may arguably, at least in some respects, be ambiguous. I would say they are potentially confusing. But let's put that to one side for a moment and say that I think that everyone reading this section would realize that the term "industrial" is a pretty open-ended term, the term "institutional" is probably even more open-ended, and the term "commercial" is pretty open-ended also.

My first point is this. The provisions of this bill that make special collective agreement arrangements for the ICI sector are going to change the law for a certain group of people, companies, organizations and activities. They are, one might say, at the heart of this bill. They are the subset of the total scheme of human society in British Columbia, which is the subject matter of this bill. Yet we don't really know, with any kind of precision, what they are. So we don't really know what we're legislating, in my respectful view, with the kind of clarify and certainty that you ought to have before you make laws. I don't think we actually know, with the requisite level of certainty, who we're talking about when we talk about the people who are affected by this bill. We don't know with any real certainty how big a group or how small a group of people it is. I think that's unfortunate.

I don't think that's the right way to legislate, particularly when we know, I think, that with a reasonable amount of goodwill and intelligence we could do better than that. To take the minister on good faith. . . . I think we could do better than that without tripping over the hurdle that he doesn't want to trip over, which is to create an artificial straitjacket that's too narrow, that's too tight. I agree that there are times and places where there has to be a little bit of give and take. Circumstances may change, and in some cases there needs to be, over time, just enough flexibility to allow the statute to grow and develop in some respects, rather than to become antiquated and outdated. It's a question of balance. I think that in this case the balance is struck far too much in the wrong direction.

Let me make this second point about why this is important. I've said this before in this Legislature when I've looked at bills and asked questions. The answers come back from the government -- a variation of the answer the minister gave: "Well, you know, generally speaking, we kind of know what we're talking about here. Everybody knows what the ICI sector is. Except, yeah, there may be some problems in this area called the mixed-use sector. But generally speaking, most people out there in the labour relations community know what we're talking about when we talk about ICI." Here's my answer to that. It's not an inflexible answer, but I think it's the right answer for this problem. We shouldn't make laws that way. Laws become important when people are at friction points; laws become important when people are disagreeing about what the law is; laws become important at the margins of certainty. If the minister were right that everybody knows what this group is. . . .

I'll say something that is slightly unfair, but I'll take that argument a few steps further. There is a certain group of people out there in society who build buildings, who without any legislation at all, might well be quite prepared to enter into collective agreements with the people who work for them, negotiated on their behalf by trade unions. We don't need the Labour Relations Code at all for a lot of people, because they're quite happy to regulate their affairs, as between employer and employee, in a way that gives effect to the broad consensus of society about the purpose of collective bargaining. But that's not what we're here for. We're here because there are in fact some people out there who wouldn't live their lives that way, so we need to have a Labour Relations Code in order to make law which gives certainty about rights, responsibilities and obligations. If we're going to do that, then I say you should try to make the law as clear and precise as is reasonable in the circumstances.

My point here is: it is no answer at all to the complaint about the definition to say: "It will be generally understood; trust me. Everybody out there knows." First of all, as the minister probably well knows, his answer is, in a legal sense -- and I say this with respect -- virtually irrelevant, as is my argument. It will ultimately be the Labour Relations Board that will decide these things, and I frankly doubt that they'll spend much time. . . .

An Hon. Member: Not just in a legal sense.

[ Page 10093 ]

I don't want to be confrontational about this point, because I want to come back and say that I listened as seriously as I could to the minister's attempt, which I think was a serious attempt, to respond to my concerns. He has left me with these problems. First of all, I still don't know who we're talking about when we're talking about the subject matter of this legislation. I suppose, to be precise, we are talking about the parts of the legislation that are specifically directed to ICI construction and collective bargaining. I still don't think I know, with the amount of certainty I should have, who it is we're talking about and what it is we're talking about. So I say, with respect, that to set out on a deliberate course of being uncertain is to take the wrong course. Lastly, his answer that, "Well, there is general broad consensus," is, with respect, the wrong answer.

Before I sit down, let me give one example of why I think it's the wrong answer. Earlier in this session we passed a bill introduced by the Minister of Environment, and it had to do with outdoor trails. It made changes to the law of occupier's liability for people who use trails in the wilderness that may happen to be on privately owned land. Now, there was a need to make those changes, because it's good public policy to try to encourage responsible use of the lands of British Columbia. In that bill there was a provision that specifically dealt with what happens when people trespass for criminal purposes and what happens when people go on others' property for criminal purposes. In fact, there's a whole body of common law around that; the courts have had to deal with these issues for many years. Yet what this act did was say that there may be some doubt out there. There may be some debate in the courts about what those rules are, so let's make it clearer in the act.

I think that is the way you go about it. I don't think you go about it by deliberately setting out to be unclear. So I invite the minister to tell me, for example, when he knows that there is a test out there for determining what is and what is not ICI, why it isn't in the bill. Surely the test, if the test is primarily one thing or the other, is hardly going to put the labour relations community of British Columbia into the kind of straitjacket that he wants to avoid.

[3:30]

The issue is that in this industry. . . . It's a mature, grown-up industry; it has huge experience. I think, quite frankly, that we treat it with less than the respect it deserves when we suggest that it perhaps doesn't have the ability to sort out these problems. I think it does. That's one.

Second, let me remind the member of the nature of an LRB hearing. An LRB hearing is designed to give all of those who come before it an opportunity to say: "Here's what our concerns are. These are the problems we perceive with the definition. This is why we believe, in the case of a definitional hearing, that this should or shouldn't be ICI." I made the point already that the board obviously will be guided by precedent, past practice, history and all of that.

Regarding the issue of the law, I'm not a lawyer. I have, however, had the benefit of some education. I've read my Montesquieu, among other things and other theorists, in terms of what the law ought to be. I accept the member's conclusion about being as clear and precise as possible in the circumstances. But one of the reasons we have courts and advocates and that dynamism of law is simply because nobody has ever been able to figure out precisely and with certainty what the answers are to difficult questions. That's the nature of law in our country and our society. I, for one, am tempted to say: "Thank goodness."

We have a disagreement perhaps, the member and I, and so be it. But it seems to me that in terms of our definition of ICI construction, we have done what is clear and reasonable with as much clarity as is reasonable in the circumstances. I've explained that. I don't know if I can do any more to give the member any greater comfort. But I appreciate the points he's making, just as I hope he appreciates my effort to clarify.

G. Plant: I'm going to pursue it one further time, because I think the minister has made another good point, but it's not good enough. Yes, we have courts because we can't ever get it absolutely right for all contingencies and all circumstances when we are drafting legislation. We need courts to work those things out. But what we don't need courts for, I'm convinced, or what we should use courts less for -- let me put it that way -- is as a place to make the hard decisions that we don't have the courage to make here.

[E. Walsh in the chair.]

The minister talks about the fact that we have courts out there because we can't resolve or foresee all of the problems. But that's not a reason for us not to try to do that here. It would, among other things, lighten the workload of the courts if, instead of creating empty vessels for the courts to fill, we said this is what we actually think the policy is, stated it as clearly and precisely as we can and then recognized that we will not be perfect.

What I don't get is why we would deliberately set out on a strategy where we know that most of the content of this definition will be decided by a tribunal. Let me say this, because I see the minister shaking his head. In part, I'm given conviction in my view in that regard by what the minister himself has said on a number of occasions about this point. To take the minister again at face value, I think that is the deliberate strategy -- that is, to take this very general term and let the Labour Relations Board figure out what it means. So I think that probably is the essence of our disagreement in this respect.

If that is the intention, then I don't see why that is good public policy, when we can in fact give that direction here. We ought to, because if we don't, then what we're doing is consigning a whole bunch of individuals -- workers and employers -- to the fate of having to hire their lawyers to go off and make arguments before the Labour Relations Board. We don't know the outcome of those disputes. When we have an opportunity here to avoid that problem, I think we should

[ Page 10094 ]

What we are doing instead is being asked to accept a definition which is deliberately open-ended, with the express purpose in mind of letting somebody else make the decisions. I won't go on at some length. The minister, even though he's not a lawyer, is knowledgable about politics and the law and, without any difficulty, could think of a range of judicial decisions -- very recent ones, including one affecting his ministry -- where the constitution-makers handed a very empty vessel to the courts. They have taken that vessel and made all kinds of decisions that have in fact limited our ability to make public policy in another important area.

Interjection.

G. Plant: Exactly.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think I knew, given the time, Madam Chair, that eventually the member opposite and I would start to say yes, we agree. The short answer to the member's question or to the concerns he expressed is essentially to say that we have a disagreement. We do, and I don't think there's any point in pretending otherwise. Let me offer le dernier cri -- you know, my last word -- on the subject of this particular definitional conundrum, at least as the member sees it.

The intention in the legislation is to give the guidelines, the public policy guidelines. Some will argue that they're too broad; others will probably argue that they're too specific. I don't agree at all that they're open-ended. I think, rather, that there is a huge degree of specificity. I think "industrial" means something, I think "commercial" means something, and I think "institutional" means something.

Moreover, what the guidelines effectively say to the industry is: "Within these guidelines, you guys go out and figure it out -- sort it out. If you can't do that, then go to the board. The board will adjudicate and make the decisions for you." That, I think, is a pretty tried and true model in our system, in our society. Quite frankly, I am not persuaded at all that it's deficient or inadequate. Therefore I'm quite comfortable standing with this approach to the definition. I hope that at least clarifies my position.

C. Hansen: I want to outline for the minister why it is so important that we get as much specificity as possible in this definition. If you take a company that is engaging in construction work that could possibly be defined or not defined as ICI. . . . Where you've got a company that's going to have to make that kind of judgment call at the start of a project, it's going to have to engage its employees on the basis of the collective agreement that applies to ICI or the collective agreement -- or lack of collective agreement -- that will apply to other sectors of construction.

So if you have a company that proceeds down the route of saying that the project is not ICI or that the component of the work involved is not ICI, then what they would be faced with is a case before the LRB that would be brought against them -- perhaps brought by the building trades unions, perhaps a specific craft union or possibly another party. They would find themselves before the LRB. That would be after the project has started. They're into the project, and they're already engaging their employees under a certain relationship. They get into the project, and then they find out that it's being challenged as to whether or not this is ICI work. They wind up before the Labour Relations Board -- a process that can take some time, as we know, because there is a backlog at the LRB.

But regardless of whether the backlog is cleaned up or not, you're going to wind up with an organization that's going to be faced with some very significant costs in terms of going before the LRB to defend the definition that they used and the action that they had taken. In the end, many months down the road, after they have incurred many dollars in terms of pay and benefits to their workers under what they had perceived to be the appropriate arrangement, they may find out sometime later that the LRB may rule that in fact it should have been ICI. Then you wind up that the company would have to retroactively make all those adjustments based on the master agreement that should have applied to ICI. We're talking about some months later, given the way that cases before the LRB are handled. I guess my question to the minister is: is this the scenario the construction industry in B.C. has to go through in developing a definition for ICI that is more specific than what we have in front of us today?

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm taking a little extra time on this to consult with officials, because I think it's a contentious issue. I therefore want to be very careful in how I answer, and I don't want to dismiss too casually the concerns the member is raising.

My personal feeling is that the case as outlined by the member opposite is somewhat overstated. However, in fairness, I would acknowledge that that could be so in a first case -- in the first one. The first time that the board has to grapple with this problem because of new legislation, it may be problematic in just that kind of way. That's a possibility. Once that's been adjudicated, however, two things happen. The first is that it becomes part of case law, obviously, and second, in that construction universe and the world of LRB decisions, other people in the industry will be looking very quickly at what happened there. They will say: "Wait a minute. So that's essentially the board's ruling. That's the way they look upon these problems."

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: A colleague offers me some good advice -- namely, that would be as well as taking into account the experience with jurisdictions in other parts of the country.

In fairness to the member, yes, I think it's possible that there could be a problem there, but it will be a problem that is very much at the front of the process, it seems to me, and will become a much diminished problem as the process unfolds.

[3:45]

The minister talks about the case that I presented and says that yes, this may well have to happen up front and that there have to be defining cases. I would like to ask the minis-

[ Page 10095 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm beginning to say to myself: "Don't be so kind. Don't be so willing to acknowledge that there may be validity to something somebody else says, because suddenly that tiny little piece becomes the thin edge of a very large wedge and -- ta-da -- the sky may soon be falling." I don't mean to be unkind, but I think there's that danger.

It's a highly unlikely scenario that the member presents. I'm willing to acknowledge it; I don't want to dismiss it categorically out of hand. That would be inconsiderate. What I will say, though, is that if there is anything like the kinds of problems with this legislation that the members opposite perceive there might be, then the board -- because it is not made up of intellectually challenged people -- will recognize that. Among its various abilities, the board has the power to publish materials, put on conferences, hold workshops and do those sorts of things. If indeed they are saying: "Look, there is a tremor going through the industry, and people aren't sure what the rules are. . . . " If the board perceives that, then I for one would be, frankly, very surprised if the board didn't rather quickly say: "Let's address this before it becomes a major problem. Let's put together some kind of policy paper. Let's maybe put on a conference for the ICI sector and grapple with the six major questions that the sector has."

But back to the point that we're really on -- namely, the definition -- I think I have been pretty fulsome in my descriptions and explanations of why we have deliberately chosen this definition and this approach. It seems to me that enough has been said on that subject. But, of course, that's for the members to decide.

C. Hansen: In a comment he made a few minutes ago, the minister said that industrial means something, and he said that commercial means something. Could the minister explain to us what industrial means when he says it means something?

Hon. D. Lovick: The tautological response is: having to do with industry, of course. But I think the member means something else. Again, let me simply say to him what I did in the beginning. I gave the examples. I said, "Here are typical industrial projects," and I talked about a mine, a pulp mill and a warehouse. Those things qualify as industrial. I did the same for commercial. I said that an office complex or a new retail store is what we think of as commercial. I said that institutional refers to things like schools, courthouses and hospitals. I also gave him the extended example of roadbuilding and how that wasn't traditionally part of ICI. It seems to me that if you put all those things together, you're getting a pretty good definitional sense of just what ICI means. Beyond telling the member to leap into the lexicon, I don't know if I can do much more.

C. Hansen: If I can get to a specific example, would industrial include energy distribution?

Hon. D. Lovick: As I hear the member ask the question, Madam Chair, I am all the more convinced that our approach to the definition is the right one. This is where you have to rely on the expertise, knowledge and background of the industry and the board to make those determinations. Let me give him a little comfort, though. I can tell him that energy projects have not historically been ICI, nor have water mains, sewers and projects of that sort.

But again, there is a history. There is a corpus of material out there that everybody in the industry understands, though you and I may not because we don't work in the industry. As I said, I for one take considerable comfort that we don't need, frankly, to be condescending and say that they're a bunch of yokels and they can't sort these things out. These are sophisticated people, and they work with these issues all the time. I think they will be quite capable of sorting out those differences.

C. Hansen: The minister said earlier that common sense would prevail, that there are broad understandings as to what these terms mean. Now he says that as we understand ICI, generally they would not apply to energy, pipelines, sewers. So in putting those two thoughts together, I gather that ICI does not cover these sectors. Is that a fair interpretation?

Hon. D. Lovick: That is a fair interpretation of what I have said. I would emphasize again that what I was talking about is the historical record. That has been the record in British Columbia. As I also said earlier, it would seem to me that the board is obviously going to be guided very much by the fact of what the historical record is what the historical practice is, as well as perhaps looking at some other jurisdictions.

C. Hansen: I want to be careful not to put words in the minister's mouth. If I can draw a conclusion from what he has said, we are going to be driven by the traditional definitions of ICI. Traditionally, energy, pipe and sewer are not part of that. In fact, he also mentioned that roadbuilding is not part of that traditional definition. Therefore, when it comes to the LRB, they should rely on those kinds of traditional definitions, which would be exclusive of these sectors. Am I interpreting his comments fairly?

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer is yes.

C. Hansen: Earlier the minister said that bridge construction was in a somewhat grey area. I can't recall his exact words, but he said that it was debatable whether that fell under roadbuilding, which would not be ICI, or whether it fell under industrial. That's a pretty significant area. I wonder if the minister could give more clarity to those who subsequently have to interpret this.

Hon. D. Lovick: My colleague from Burnaby-Edmonds, who, as some members may know, is very knowledgable in the industry, was indeed a business agent for the operating engineers and therefore probably knows construction on the ground as well as most people in the province. He advises me that the pattern in roadbuilding and bridge construction in this province has always been that roadbuilding is excluded from the industrial but that the bridges, at least the big ones, have always in fact been considered to be part of industrial.

I would point out again that that's nice, as far as it goes. However, the question then becomes. . . . Given new construction developments and the modularized bridge construction and those tiny little things that you see on Island Highway projects and other places, where it's a span of maybe 40 feet or something like that, they seem to put them up in a matter of days. Who can say? I wouldn't presume to say that if it's 27 feet, it's going to be this, and if it's 32 feet, it will be something else.

[ Page 10096 ]

Again, we're still on definition. I come back to my point -- and I think this may be my last word for a wee while on this, at least on this piece of definition -- that we have deliberately chosen this definition. I have explained the reasons why. I think there is no better approach available to us. Point made.

C. Hansen: The minister said that the lack of definition is not problematic. I believe it is problematic. If you take the example of the construction of a bridge -- whether it's 40 feet or 400 feet or 27 feet or whatever that converts to in metric, if we want to be in the 1990s -- clearly you have companies that have to quote on those. You've got a tender call that goes out for the construction of a bridge, and the first question that gets asked is: what master collective agreement does this fall under? What are the wage rates that are going to have to be paid? If you're in a company and you're an estimator and you have to quote the construction costs for projects so that the company can bid on the project, it's clear that there have to be some fairly specific definitions. Maybe the minister could give us some indication as to what kind of a time line we're looking at that would result in some of the clarification for this type of issue that's going to come forward.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think I've answered the question already. That's why the board is given the discretion it has. That's why the board, as I said, would probably hold a policy conference or something to answer and to deal with those questions.

C. Hansen: If I can pursue that, is the minister anticipating that the Labour Relations Board will be proactive in coming up with a definition, or are they going to wait for a case to come before them that will become the basis upon which they give the ruling? Is the Labour Relations Board going to set out, at a very early opportunity to define this, without waiting for some company to come into the cross-hairs on a particular issue?

Hon. D. Lovick: It seems to me that it would make sense for the board to do that.

C. Hansen: We're talking about an issue that I think is of major concern. It's a question as to whether the minister is going to show some leadership in this area. Is the minister prepared to ask the Labour Relations Board to be proactive and to go out and seek clarification on this, rather than the situation that exists today -- that some company has to get caught in a case that may take some time and expense before there's a determination by the LRB?

Hon. D. Lovick: The board has the capacity to deal with problematic issues such as this. I've already said that I think they would be proactive. I also suspect that the board would be mindful of what has been said in the course of the debates surrounding Bill 26. They're certainly going to be looking at what extra responsibility it might confer on them.

But I want to emphasis that the board is not a piece of the government; it's not like a line ministry. It isn't the case that I would call the board the way I would a deputy minister and say: "I want you to do the following." It is at arm's length; it has quasi-judicial powers; it is separate and distinct from government -- as it should be because it makes rulings on difficult issues. It's supposed to be accurately and fairly representing the interests of both management and workers. Therefore for government to suddenly be in the process of saying to the board on a regular basis, "Do this; do that," is inappropriate, I think.

[4:00]

I don't want to get into a broad philosophical discussion on this, but does the minister not feel that it is more the responsibility of the Legislature to give direction and certainty than it is for the Labour Relations Board to try to anticipate what was meant by this chamber when passing wording that is as loose as what we have before us?

Hon. D. Lovick: I think we've already explored the notion of achieving certainty in legislation and have realized that that's somewhat illusory. The notion that somehow, by drafting legislation, the issue will be solved for all time is, frankly, a bit of a canard. It just isn't going to happen -- never has.

Secondly, creeping Americanism -- or whatever my colleague alludes to -- has been the status quo in this province for a long time and indeed in every province in Canada. All commissions and boards have been doing that kind of thing for years. That's their function; that's their role. Every jurisdiction in this country has said that that's a preferable method rather than presume that legislators have all the answers. Legislators give broad policy direction. Bureaucrats and professionals carry out those directions and refine, fine-tune and clarify them so that they are indeed workable.

C. Hansen: I want to refer back to Bill 44 from last year. Again, in the definitions section, we came up with some of the terms. In this particular bill there was a lack of definition of these sectors as well. If nothing else, I guess there are full marks for consistency. In Bill 44, the Labour Statutes Amendment Act, 1997, it had broken down the construction industry into seven subsectors.

We talked earlier about the pipeline subsector and the fact that it's distinct from ICI. We talked about the sewer and water main sector being distinct from ICI. We talked about the roadbuilding sector as being distinct. The one that I had not touched on, which I want to get the minister's assurance on, is the electrical power subsector. I gather from the minister's earlier comments that this is also not part of ICI. I am wondering if I can get that clarification from the minister.

Hon. D. Lovick: If the member is talking, Madam Chair, about Allied Hydro, then he's quite correct.

C. Hansen: No, what I'm talking about is the broad electrical power subsector, as was envisioned in the bill that was presented last year.

[ Page 10097 ]

C. Hansen: What we have been trying to do is get a more concise definition of what ICI is. Since we haven't been able to do that in a positive way of the minister telling us in specific terms what it is, what I'm trying to find out is what it is not. Last year the minister talked about these commonly understood, historical definitions as to how the construction industry is broken up. Last year we had a bill presented that took the entire construction industry and divided it into seven sectors, one of which was the electrical power subsector. That was, at that time, distinct from ICI. I'm assuming, given the minister's reference to us using these historical definitions, that electrical power is still excluded from ICI in the bill that has been presented to us this year.

Hon. D. Lovick: I am advised that the list the member refers to was developed largely in order that the bill, given its purposes, could capture what was referred to as the Allied Hydro projects. That was the purpose of it.

C. Hansen: I want to get the minister to give more clarity to how this ICI definition will be applied. If we start talking about. . . . The minister said that a building, for example, that is primarily residential would be considered residential. A building that is primarily commercial would be considered commercial. I'm wondering what he sees as the components of the building. If we start to think about a block in downtown Vancouver where they're going to come in and dig a parking lot and build it up, it's easy to see that that is in fact a project -- that is, one building. But in many other forms of construction we start to see various projects that in fact come together.

I'm wondering if the minister could give us some definition as to how this definition gets applied from project to project when they're perhaps adjacent to each other -- or components of projects.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the question is best answered by saying that those are the kinds of curious and, dare I say, peculiar circumstances which we can all envisage, we can all imagine, which will never be dealt with by having a one or two sentence definition or a concise definition, as the member was asking for. It just won't happen. It seems to me that the question the member asks is precisely the kind of question that would be addressed by the LRB being a bit proactive and saying: "Okay, how do we look at these things? Do we define a project as all on one lot? Or do we say that there are two or three bits and pieces of it -- components, to use the member's word -- that might be on different lots or might be staged in at different times?" You know, six months or a year later, all of those. . . . Again, we can think of a hundred variations on a theme.

Again, I think the member makes my point about why we're using the definition we are, why I think it's appropriate and why at some point we have to defer to the wisdom and the expertise of the board.

C. Hansen: Perhaps to clarify where I'm coming from on this, I'm not arguing that the definition, as it is contained in the act, is inappropriate. What I'm arguing is that I think it is a responsibility of the minister, during the course of this discussion, to give more specific definition to what it is. That's what I'm trying to get at. As I mentioned earlier, I'm not trying to move an amendment to this. In fact, quite frankly, I agree that it would be very difficult to entrench in statute a very precise definition of what ICI entails. But I do believe that it is important for the minister to give more direction to those who have to subsequently interpret this particular wording.

I know that last year, during the discussions that evolved around Bill 44 at the time, there was some concern about how the marine construction industry would be impacted by what was in Bill 44. I'm wondering if the minister could give us some explanation as to how marine construction might be impacted. It's my understanding that marine construction is in fact seen within the industry -- and has traditionally been seen -- as being its own separate subsector. And at the time of the Bill 44 discussion, there was some debate as to whether it should or should not be a separate subsector in the context of what was presented last year. So I'm wondering if the minister could enlighten us on that.

Hon. D. Lovick: I don't think it's the case that the components of industry, which the member referred to, represent a separate and distinct subsector. Rather, they saw themselves as being unique within the industrial sector. I think that's a more accurate characterization of how that works -- not a separate sector; but rather, they consider themselves to be unique within that subsector and therefore thought that they should be allowed the opportunity. And they did indeed go out on their own and have their own separate bargaining structures for a period of time.

C. Hansen: By that, is the minister saying that the marine trades are clearly within this ICI definition, then, as we have it before us? Is marine construction clearly within ICI construction? Is that what he was telling me in his previous comments? Or maybe I've misinterpreted it.

Hon. D. Lovick: No, we aren't saying that, Madam Chair, because we are not starting from the proposition that there is a separate sector called marine construction. Instead, we're saying that there's something called industrial and something called institutional, and that we think those would in fact cover the questions regarding marine as well as on land.

C. Hansen: I want to come back to this issue of roadbuilding. The minister was quite clear in stating that roadbuilding would be excluded. I want to get some certainty. Maybe that's wishful thinking, but at least some clear. . . .

Interjection.

C. Hansen: I know the minister has been dealing a lot with issues of certainty, wearing his other hat.

In terms of roadbuilding and bridge construction, I think we've got that clarified. But if we have a project that involves road construction and bridge construction. . . . Let's say it's a large bridge, not this 27-foot bridge we were talking about earlier. Is the work that is traditionally done by roadbuilders in this province separate from ICI? Can we, for example, single out the bridge construction in a highway construction project? Would bridge construction be a stand-alone project? Or would it be deemed to be part of one project? I guess the other question is. . . . I'll let the minister deal with that one, and I'll try to be more precise in the second one.

[ Page 10098 ]

C. Hansen: So in other words, if you had. . . . If we're thinking about construction that's being done by the province of British Columbia, that may be easy to do. Certainly the provincial government has control over how the tendering language is used. But if we start seeing the construction of a private road in B.C., is the minister saying that that depends on how it's tendered? If the tender goes out as a road construction project with all of its components, then it would fall under this roadbuilding definition. Is that appropriate? The minister is nodding his head, but I'll give him a chance to answer.

[4:15]

C. Hansen: We do want to be clear on this; we do want clarity. That's what this whole exercise is about.

The example I used was the construction of a private road, which would have a significant bridge as part of that. There are lots of examples in this province of the construction of private roads. The minister stated earlier, I gather -- or at least I drew from it -- that that depends on how the project is tendered. If it's tendered as just a bridge construction, then it may or may not fall under ICI as per our earlier conversation. If it is tendered as a road construction which may include a bridge as one project, then it does not fall under ICI construction. That's the clarification I'm looking for.

Hon. D. Lovick: If it is predominantly road, it would be outside ICI -- yes.

C. Hansen: I just wanted clarification in terms of. . . . Perhaps the minister could explain to us what other possible forms of horizontal construction, other than major bridge work that is a separate project unto itself. . . . In fact, I'm not even sure if you could argue that construction of major bridges is a horizontal project. I'm sure some would argue that that's a vertical project. But is there any other form of horizontal construction in British Columbia that would be captured under the definition of ICI?

Hon. D. Lovick: My officials, with their expertise, say that they can't think of any offhand, but they are reluctant to say that there is no such thing -- because there might be. But intuitively, the answer is no, we can't think of any.

C. Hansen: Some of my colleagues or I may come back to ICI construction -- specifically that definition. But I do want to move on to some of the other issues that we have before us.

In the act there are some areas for which there are no definitions presented. I want to raise them now. Procedurally, hon. Chair, I'm not sure, when it comes to definitions that are not presented, whether this is the section under which they should be discussed or if they should be discussed under the section in which the term is actually used. I'll just give an example, which may help the Chair in giving some advice on this -- or the minister. I'm not sure who to ask in this case. In section 2, section 55.17, the word "enabling" is used. To the best of my knowledge, enabling is not -- in this context, at least; in the context of construction -- used in any other labour code in Canada, if not in North America. It's a word that I'm not sure has a definition that is commonly understood. I'm wondering if the minister could explain why this particular section does not include a definition of enabling.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member's question, I take it, is asking why this legislation doesn't include a definition of enabling. Is that correct? The assumption, I am advised, is that the industry (a) does indeed understand it and (b) has been carrying out what are called enabling practices for a very long time. Therefore it was perceived that we didn't really require that definitional component here.

Madam Chair, I wonder -- with the indulgence of the member opposite -- if we might perhaps declare a brief recess. I would rather do that than vacate to go take a phone call. So if the member is willing, I would ask for a recess of ten minutes.

The Chair: If it's agreeable to the committee, we will recess for ten minutes and reconvene at 4:30 p.m.

The committee recessed from 4:20 p.m. to 4:33 p.m.

[E. Walsh in the chair.]

C. Hansen: As I mentioned before our break, we may well want to come back to ICI. We went on to talk about enabling. I was asking the minister why we don't see a definition for enabling in here, given that it is something that is really quite new and quite unique.

Hon. D. Lovick: I thank the member for the courtesy of allowing that recess.

The argument -- and I think I just touched on it briefly -- is essentially that we don't do it because it is a well-established practice in British Columbia. Everybody is indeed familiar with it; everybody in the industry is familiar with it. Therefore it was perceived that we simply didn't require that definition. I think that when we look at that particular section of the bill, one will discover that what it says is sufficient to remove any ambiguity or doubt; that's my hope, at least. Of course, as we know, that more properly belongs to that section of the bill rather than to a definition. But I hope that answer is helpful.

C. Hansen: Certainly we will, of course, deal with that in more detail when we get to that section.

I'd like to turn to the definition of "bargaining council." I've got no particular problem with the definition as it's worded, because it doesn't really say much other than " 'bargaining council' means the bargaining council established under section 55.18" -- which, of course, is the provision that says: "(1) Trade unions representing employees in craft bargaining units. . .must establish a bargaining council. . . ." I'm not sure whether this is the appropriate place to raise this or perhaps under section 55.18, but I'll take the minister's answer wherever in the debate he wishes to give it -- that is, why is it that we are spelling out a very specific organization on the employers' side, the Construction Labour Relations Association, but we are not specifying a very specific organization on the trade union side? I'm wondering if the minister could

[ Page 10099 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the short answer to the question, Madam Chair, is: because that definition is indeed provided under section 41 of the code. It says that this is deemed to be a council of trade unions. In terms of more specifics, I think the member is quite right that we could look at that when we get to that section rather than the definitions one.

C. Hansen: Certainly, as the minister indicated, we will pursue that when that time comes. But I think it does beg the question in terms of how labour codes have been implemented in other provinces. And it also indicates, under our existing Labour Code, that we do have a process by which bargaining councils can come together. But, of course, that's another whole argument that we have pursued in the hours that have passed, so there's no use revisiting that.

If I can turn to the definition of "construction industry" now, I understand that this is a definition that has been used for some time. In fact, I don't believe it's changed at all. If the minister was. . . . I have better wording to suggest. I'm not going to move it as an amendment, but I want to put it on the record as something that I think the ministry should consider in the future, because the definition as it is worded is somewhat confusing. It has been around for a long time, and I appreciate that there's probably some jurisprudence that has been built up around it. But in my opinion, this particular definition would be much clearer to those who are trying to read it -- in the interests of plain language, perhaps -- if it said: " 'construction industry' means the employers and employees engaged in construction work." Then give us a second definition for construction work, meaning the alteration, decoration, repair, demolition. . . . I think it's something that I would like to put on the record for the ministry to consider in case we are looking at a similar definition to be included in future regulations or whatever. I believe that has some merit. The minister may want to respond to that.

The other area that I'd like to talk about is. . . . When we talk about those, it does not include those employers and employees engaged in (a) delivering supplies and materials to a construction project or (b) routine maintenance work. Again, I appreciate the fact that there are some longstanding definitions as to where this is divided. My concern is whether or not there is any initiative underway at this time to change the jurisprudence that may be around those particular terms, specifically with regard to (b), in terms of routine maintenance work.

The specific case that I would like to ask the minister to comment on is highway maintenance. Highway maintenance in British Columbia is something that is done quite differently today that it was when this definition was implemented. I would just like the minister's assurance that that continues to be considered routine maintenance work for the purposes of this definition.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm familiar with the issue. Indeed, I met with the roadbuilders, just as I suspect my colleague across the way did. Therefore I know where the concern comes from. Our conclusion is essentially that what the highways maintenance contractors are worried about is simply whether this apparently new terminology for maintenance might in fact mean that work that they now do as roadbuilders would be considered industrial. Our answer to that is no. Routine maintenance is routine maintenance, whether it's done by the maintenance contractors under slightly different terms or whether it's the terminology we're using here. We've given them that assurance, just as I'm giving that to the member opposite. I don't think there's a problem.

C. Hansen: Maybe the minister was assuming that that came from the employers' side, but it is certainly of major interest to the B.C. Government Employees Union, which has most of these maintenance contracts. I'm sure they will be reassured by the minister's comments.

If I could move on to "craft bargaining unit," as we have it, it talks about. . . . I think the first part of this definition is quite clear. Then you get down to the last line, and it sort of throws an open-ended aspect into it at the very end of this definition. If I can just read this briefly: " 'craft bargaining unit' means a craft unit of employees recognized by the board under this Code or a unit or units in which employees, in the opinion of the board, belong to a craft. . . ." I think that is clear, although there are some other issues that I'll be raising there. Then it goes on to say: ". . .or group exercising technical or professional skills." I think that makes it much more open-ended than it might otherwise be perceived. I'm wondering if the minister could explain why that definition ends with this broadening to include just groups exercising technical or professional skills.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member's question has to do with what some would refer to as a two-pronged definition. Let me, if I can, clarify. The definition uses the two-pronged definition simply to ensure that the board has sufficient powers to make sure that all the contractors in union bargaining units get brought into the newly created ICI bargaining structure. That's the primary purpose. This would not have been needed if the board's approach on issuing "craft" certifications had been more consistent in the past. However, what can happen now -- and the member asked appropriately about jurisprudence -- is that a union can either apply for a craft certification under section 2, or apply for an "all-employee unit" under section 18. What can happen, then, is that a unit which is essentially composed of a single craft -- say, carpenters -- can be certified as an all-employee unit, since that is the only type of worker the contractor employs. Hence this definition, which simply allows the board to look at the "substance," or what I would call the reality of the bargaining unit. I think that probably clarifies it.

C. Hansen: Again, I don't want to put words in the minister's mouth, but I'm trying to understand his explanation. So what we're dealing with in terms of a craft bargaining unit is a craft as we now know it. We're not talking about a great expansion of crafts, but we're talking about the 15 craft units as we know them today. The sole purpose of these final words is to allow the board to designate a unit as a craft unit if all of the employees in that unit are members of what we currently know as one of the crafts.

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer adds: "or a number of the crafts." I would also point out that in section 21 of the existing code there is a definition of craft union, which in fact picks up that phraseology the member expressed a concern about: ". . .belong to a craft or group exercising technical or professional skills that distinguish it from the employees as a whole. . . ." So the same concept is, if you like, picked up here.

[4:45]

[ Page 10100 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer to the question is no.

C. Hansen: Thank you. Now I'm looking for the long answer, because again, if you come back to. . . . Okay, you have a union other than one of the traditional craft unions as we now know them. There are 15 craft unions today. There's certainly some speculation that in the future we may see a reduction in the number of unions within the building trades and that there may be some mergers and consolidations that are going to take place in the future. Certainly that's something that I think would be in the best interests of all concerned, especially the workers involved. But if we have bricklayers who are certified to a union other than the 15 unions as we now know them -- all they do is bricklaying -- they still have the prerogative of being certified as an industrial-style union. Is that what the minister is saying?

Hon. D. Lovick: The member is correct, yes. But he should also understand that the bricklayers could raid them to try to get them to become bricklayers rather than, you know, a wall-to-wall union. You won't even talk about internal politics, eh?

C. Hansen: Okay, I appreciate that clarification. Just to expand on that, if you had a worksite, an employer that has more than one trade involved -- so they are wall-to-wall, as we commonly refer to it -- the union has the opportunity to seek that certification. So if you have more than one trade, as we know it today, existing in that union, it is the provision by which it could be raided. Again, the minister may want to leave this to another section. I'm going down a road that's going to take us. . . . Actually, I'll do that; I'll save that for a later section.

But just to come back to this very specific definition of a craft bargaining unit, does the minister anticipate that this definition of craft bargaining unit would expand to include trades other than the 15 trades as we know them today?

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer to the question is yes, that is conceivable. It's worth noting, however, that this would be created by ITAC, the Industry Training and Apprenticeship Commission, and then the determination would have to be that that is indeed a craft connected with construction. So there would be, if you like, a two-stage. . . . But, yes, it's quite conceivable that there could be another craft.

C. Hansen: In other words, ITAC would come forward with a recommendation to the minister, I assume, to say that for the purposes of this section of the Labour Relations Code, a new craft would be added. I'm just wondering what they. . . . Certainly ITAC is going to wind up designating new crafts or new trades in all kinds of areas. But the fact that a new craft is developed for the purposes of this section of the Labour Code -- is that up to ITAC, or is that the minister's prerogative or the LRB's prerogative? If the minister could explain that.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member's correct that ITAC would make a recommendation, and their recommendation would be simply that job X would be designated as a trade or a craft or whatever. Then the minister's responsibility, of course, is to take that to cabinet and get the appropriate order-in-council or other mechanism to make it law.

C. Hansen: Do I take it from that, that it will include, as part of the interpretation -- the regs that may come out of this particular section of the LRB -- a listing of very specific crafts that would be included? Is that a fair assumption? If the minister says that by something that's going to get taken to cabinet in the future to add a craft through order-in-council. . . . Is that to amend a regulation that we will wind up seeing come forth as a result of this legislation being implemented?

Hon. D. Lovick: I was just afraid that I was once again getting more information than one needs and was going to be miles away from the question that the member was asking.

The legislation that we're discussing is not designating any crafts or anything like that. That's quite separate and distinct from what we're doing. It is conceivable, however, that ITAC may do so, and the determination, of course, has to be whether that craft fits into the industrial sector. In terms of whether it would be a new craft and therefore a new union, what would more likely happen is that the new craft, something brand-new, would probably affiliate with an existing union -- plumbers, pipefitters, whatever -- that seems to be in that trade but is somewhat different. I think that is the more likely scenario rather than it being a brand-new, authentic and different craft.

C. Hansen: It's my understanding that the Labour Relations Board has been quite reluctant to expand the number of crafts that we currently have. I think I referred to the 15 craft unions that we have, but I understand that within those 15 craft unions there are about 21 crafts per se. I gather that for ITAC to designate a new craft is not something that's anticipated at that point. Is that a fair question? It's something that would be quite unusual and perhaps unforeseen.

Hon. D. Lovick: With all due respect, Madam Chair, I don't think it's related to this legislation, but I don't mind saying that in my opinion, no, it isn't anticipated.

C. Hansen: That's helpful. As the minister well knows, there are lots of people who will read language into this and feel threatened by it, and I think the minister's words are reassuring in that regard.

If I can move on to another section here, and that's. . . . I see again, with regard to a section that's not included, a definition that's not included in here: a contract administration fee, which we find in section 55.24. It's the contract administration fees that can be assessed by the CLRA against companies that fall within ICI craft bargaining but choose not to be members of the CLRA. I wonder if the minister feels that there is currently a definition that is commonly understood as to what a contract administration fee entails.

Hon. D. Lovick: I am not sure that I can give the member the answer that, yes indeed, there is a standard workable

[ Page 10101 ]

C. Hansen: At some point I do want to deal with the kinds of interpretations that are left to the board. Perhaps I'll come back to that after we've covered a couple of these other examples of things that are going to have to go to the board.

Under "project collective agreement," it actually develops a tripartite collective agreement. Traditionally, what we have seen is that collective agreements are between trade unions and the employers, or groups of unions and employer bargaining groups. In this definition we've brought a third party into this collective agreement, and that's the project owner or owners. I'm wondering if the minister could explain why we are coming up with this brand-new approach to collective bargaining as a tripartite arrangement rather than a bipartite arrangement.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm advised that the answer to that is simply that in a number of particular projects, there is ample evidence and experience to show that sometimes the owner wants to stay in the management of the project. For example, they may become anxious about costs that they perceive to be skyrocketing or if things aren't. . . . I guess it's like building a house. As the work unfolds, we all say, "Wait a minute; that's not quite what I had in mind," even though we thought the blueprints were clear. That's an anecdotal example, but that may clarify it somewhat. An example in ICI would be something like the convention centre, where a number of people are building the thing. I don't imagine that the people involved in that project are willing to effectively sign over all those -- for want of a better term -- management responsibilities or opportunities to their general contractor or whoever. That's essentially why this is here.

C. Hansen: This is going down a very different road from any that we have travelled before in this province in terms of collective bargaining. I wonder if the minister could give us any examples -- outside of British Columbia, perhaps -- of where there is this kind of tripartite agreement in place.

Hon. D. Lovick: It's not a well-travelled road perhaps, but it isn't unique and different. This is what happened in Expo 86, I gather; that's the way it was done. I understand, moreover, that other jurisdictions. . . . Ontario, for example, has recently established a mechanism very similar to this.

C. Hansen: Isn't the more logical route for the project owner to have a contract with the employer, the companies that are employing the workforce, and then the employer in turn has the contract with the employees? Through this wording, you're going to wind up with this tripartite arrangement that's going to wind up with a relationship -- in a labour context, an industrial relations context -- between the trade union and the project owner, as a direct relationship in that three-way partnership. That sounds quite bizarre. I'm wondering if the minister could explain how the Labour Relations Board, for example, might deal with a collective agreement of that nature.

Hon. D. Lovick: I don't think, Madam Chair, I can presume to answer the question of how the LRB might deal with that kind of agreement or arrangement. I suspect that they will do so adroitly and effectively and all of that.

I just want to make one point, though, in answer to the member's query -- namely, I think we should not lose sight of the fact that this definition is in here to talk about a very particular field of construction. When we talk about project agreements, I want to remind the member -- I'm sure that he knows this -- that we are talking about major projects, projects that are deemed to be unique, projects having significant economic importance that are therefore governed by particular and unique arrangements and structures, for want of a better term. I don't think it's a case of saying: "My gosh, because we accommodate that very special and distinct piece of the industry, then all the rules governing labour relations in the province are somehow going to change," or "We're embarking on dangerous territory." I don't think he meant to say that, but I'm saying it just to give him the reassurance that that isn't indeed the intention.

[5:00]

I do want to ask about the definition of unionized construction employer. In here, under subsection (a), we have a change from what we saw last year. In fact, this is a definition that appeared last year in Bill 44, the bill that was not proceeded with. In Bill 44 there was one very significant difference in what constituted a unionized construction employer. Subsection (a) said ". . .under an order of the board made under this Part or Part 3." What we have in Bill 26, which is presented to us today, is exactly the same definition that was presented last year, except that the words "under an order of the board" have been removed. I'm wondering if the minister could tell us the significance of that.

Hon. D. Lovick: My eyes light up when I discover something here that I knew nothing about.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Not a nice thing to say.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Look, I haven't even responded to the member's comment about the absence of construction activity, because the answer is pretty obvious. All one needs to do is really look around a bit, and they'll see a great deal going on even where the member lives -- downtown Vancouver, for heaven's sake. But we'll let that slide.

The answer to the question. . . . It's a fair question, but it's difficult to grapple with questions that say, "Well, there was old legislation here which isn't on the table anymore, so why is the new legislation not using what was in the old legislation?" -- especially when the old legislation is something that members opposite said: "Sure glad you got rid of that."

Having said that, I'll now answer the question. The orders referred to in the old legislation, it's worth noting, were creations of the board at that time. That particular language was required, given the context of Bill 44. If you take away the

[ Page 10102 ]

C. Hansen: I want to ask the minister about the two definitions together: the unionized construction employee and the unionized construction employer. The concern I have is that you have a circular definition. First of all, a unionized construction employee means "an employee who is employed by a unionized construction employer," etc. Then if you come down to unionized construction employer, it means "an employer with respect to whom a trade union has established the right to bargain collectively on behalf of unionized construction employees. . . ." I don't pretend to be a legal draftsperson, but my understanding is that that can become problematic in that each definition is dependent on the other definition. You can never come to a conclusive definition with regard to what one of them is, because it's always dependent on the other definition. I'm wondering if the minister shares my concern that this could become problematic in the future.

Hon. D. Lovick: The definitions, as in all definitions, are offered with a view to essentially creating a code to simplify the text, so that one doesn't have to repeat everything over and over again. That's the nature of a definition, and definitions are always in code. Perhaps indeed -- and this is more semantic than legal, semantics is something I used to know something about in another life -- you can argue convincingly that all definitions are circular, that they ultimately define the world in terms of themselves.

Let me just offer a suggestion and give a counterexample. If you were asked to define "Canadian flag," how could you not define it except in terms of Canada and Canadian? And it's so with this. If you're talking about a unionized construction employee, to understand that you have to make reference to employers. An employee doesn't function unless there's an employer to relate to. No, I don't share the member's concerns, and I hope that in that slightly less than articulate presentation, I may have explained why.

[W. Hartley in the chair.]

C. Hansen: The term that's defined in here, unionized construction employer, does not appear anywhere in the legislation. I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us why we have this definition here.

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer is that it is contained in the legislation. It's contained in the other definition, but that's rather childish so I won't say that.

I'm not sure the member is right; he may be right. But again, to round out and give clarification to one definition, you need the other. That's probably the short answer.

C. Hansen: Certainly if the minister can come up with another place where it is used. . . . It may have been my reading; I was trying to read over this too quickly. In fact, going back to the amendment we put through earlier that talked about the trade union representing employers, I must confess that I read that many times before it jumped out at me. It may well be that the definition is in fact used somewhere, but I didn't read it in my review.

Interjection.

C. Hansen: Oh, the minister says he has an example, so I would be pleased to accept that.

Hon. D. Lovick: It's section 55.2(1): "CLRA is authorized to bargain on behalf of all unionized construction employers," etc., etc. I'm sure the member will take comfort from knowing that's there.

C. Hansen: If I could move back to the definition of building trades employer, I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us how an employer deals with being both a building trades employer and a non-building trades employer. If you start looking at the definition of building trades employer as we have it, it says it means "a unionized construction employer that has a bargaining relationship with a trade union representing employees in craft bargaining units in ICI construction." Hon. Chair, I wonder if the minister could explain where that definition gets limited, because you will have an employer who potentially -- in many cases, in fact -- will be both a building trades employer and a non-building trades employer perhaps on the same day and perhaps with the same employee. I wonder if the minister could give some parameters to that.

Hon. D. Lovick: We're perplexed, because I'm not sure what the problem is that the member is addressing. I'd ask him if he would mind perhaps elucidating.

C. Hansen: Maybe I'll approach that from a different direction. If the minister could clarify that it is in fact only employers that have to have a craft certification with the building trades union that get caught under this definition. . . . If he could give us that assurance, that might help clarify this for us.

Hon. D. Lovick: I believe that's precisely what the definition says, it seems to me. Indeed, that's the one we amended because we had employers mixed up with employees. So yes, I think I can give the member that assurance.

Hon. Chair, noting the hour, I would like to move, by agreement, that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Ministerial Statement

NISGA'A NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT

Hon. Speaker, I think it's very clear that British Columbians want us to get on with the job of resolving land claims. In the history of our province, this event today is our most significant step forward and the clearest proof of our determination to end a history of injustice and divided communities. It shows that we can build a future of certainty and a future of opportunity from a past of uncertainty and dependency.

[ Page 10103 ]

[5:15]

I commend this agreement to all members. I encourage them to understand it and to see it for what it is: a way to reconcile our communities and to resolve the conflicts and the great disparities we have had between us. It represents the beginning of new economic and social opportunities for all British Columbians and the beginning of the end of the Indian Act administration of British Columbia -- something I'm sure all of us will welcome.

I want to express here, hon. Speaker, our sincere appreciation to the dedicated members of the Kitimat-Skeena regional advisory committee, the Skeena treaty advisory committee and the provincial Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee. These British Columbians have been an important part of the province's team, and we thank them very much for their advice and their counsel.

I am pleased to advise the House that I have instructed my deputy and the province's chief negotiator to provide a briefing to opposition members as soon as is practicable. Today we're also commencing an intensive series of briefing and information sessions at the local, regional and provincial levels on this historic document. There remains, of course, much to be done in the coming weeks and months, but I would like to take this opportunity now to thank the provincial negotiators for their hard work and their dedication in reaching this final agreement. It has been 29 months since the agreement-in-principle was reached, and for a lot of that time the negotiators have been away from home and families, working on behalf of all British Columbians to reach this agreement. I think we ought to acknowledge that dedication and that commitment.

Hon. Speaker, I want to scare everybody who is watching this and deviate ever so briefly from my prepared script just to say that I think it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the fact that I am very much a new kid in this particular show. I want to acknowledge the presence of three other Ministers of Aboriginal Affairs now sitting in this chamber -- all of whom, it seems to me, can take some credit for advancing us to the point where we're doing this very historic and important thing today: the member for Peace River South, the member for Coquitlam-Maillardville and the Minister of Advanced Education.

I want to thank you, hon. Speaker, and thank all members of the House for this opportunity. I look forward to the time in the very near future when I will be able to tell the House that we are prepared to have the document initialled by ministers as the next step in our ratification process.

G. Campbell: Hon. Speaker, I want to start today by expressing our appreciation to the people who have been involved in this process to date, particularly our appreciation and respect for the Nisga'a people, who have spent so much time and so much effort trying to come to a resolution, to a conclusion, of these treaty negotiations. I think their tenacity is well known to all of us, and they are to be congratulated for that characteristic.

As I stand today, I am compelled to remind the minister and everyone in the chamber that the road to reconciliation does not start with a broken promise. The minister made a point of congratulating and saying thanks to the provincial Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee, who have pointed out again today that they feel that the government has betrayed the agreement that it laid before them and the people of British Columbia -- that they would be involved in all aspects of this treaty prior to a final agreement being announced.

I don't believe that you have a major ceremony and have the Premier go up and announce a major event and claim a final agreement without having met that obligation. Yet today one of the major representatives of the Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee has written to the Prime Minister of Canada -- and I assume she will write to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs as well -- pointing out that the chapters of the agreement, which were supposed to be made available to at least the province's own Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee, would be made available prior to a final agreement being announced. That has not taken place. Maybe half of the chapters of the so-called final agreement have been presented to that Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee.

The Premier called me on the phone this afternoon to express the fact that this treaty was in fact a reflection of the agreement-in-principle that was entered into, as the minister mentioned, 29 months ago -- 400 or 500 pages of information -- which clearly has to go to all British Columbians for full review and which, I would have thought, would have gone to the Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee before an official announcement was made of the sort that we've had today. There are a number of concerns that were reflected in the agreement-in-principle. Those concerns may well not have been dealt with. We don't know until we see the final agreement. We're looking forward to seeing that 400-to-500-page final agreement.

Let me say that I believe British Columbians want to resolve these treaty issues in a way that's satisfactory to all British Columbians for the long term, to provide certainty and confidence for people of all backgrounds in all parts of this province. I don't know today whether that is the case with this agreement or not. But I can tell you that if in fact this agreement reflects the agreement-in-principle, there is a large gap that we're going to have to bridge. Maybe the 400-to-500-page agreement will do that; we certainly don't know today.

But this is so important to all of us British Columbians, aboriginal and non-aboriginal alike, that I want the minister to know, and I would like you to know, hon. Speaker, that we will work diligently and review that treaty page by page, clause by clause, to ensure that it does reflect the values and principles that this country and this province have been built upon in the past. Fundamental in those values is the principle of equality -- that we all have equal opportunity, have equal

[ Page 10104 ]

We look forward to reviewing the document in detail. We look forward to an open public discussion. I would hope that the government, those who are proponents for the agreement, recognize that all British Columbians who are participating in this discussion, this debate, are doing so with goodwill. They are doing so to find the long-term resolution. They are doing so to be sure that in the long term the reconciliation that the minister spoke about is there for all of us -- not just in this generation, but in the next generation and in the generation that follows. I believe that the way to build that reconciliation is to make sure that the treaty, as a document, reflects the fundamental principles that our society, our community, has been built upon in the past. It will thrive on those principles in the future.

So we look forward to the review. I would like the minister to know that we will not shirk from our responsibility on this side of the House. We will review; we will debate; we will offer suggestions; we will make recommendations for improvements if they are needed. I am sure that many members of the province's Treaty Negotiation Advisory Committee will do the same. I would hope, as we go out and as the government goes out on its information program, that it gives voice to all of the concerns, so that as we do move forward -- if we do move forward with this treaty and if it does in fact move to the resolution that the minister is hoping it moves to -- it will reflect the best that all British Columbians have to offer, the best principles that we built this province on in the past. Those are the goals that I believe we must all strive for in this chamber, and we will do that.

I believe British Columbians want treaties that work, treaties that reflect the principles that this country and this province have been built upon. I am convinced that the only thing worse than no Nisga'a treaty will be a bad Nisga'a treaty that is not a Nisga'a treaty we can hold up and use as an example for the future.

So we look forward, hon. Speaker, to the full briefing from the minister. We look forward to the full treaty, the full documentation, being presented before the Legislature and equally important, before the people of British Columbia in an honest, straightforward manner. The true debate, which should have taken place in years past, has an opportunity to begin today so that we can move forward with confidence and competence toward the opportunity to establish for British Columbians, non-aboriginal and aboriginal alike, the kind of future they all deserve -- a future that's based on equality for all British Columbians regardless of where they live and regardless of their background.

[5:30]

Leave granted.

J. Weisgerber: My first thought on this is to try and imagine the emotion that exists today in the Nass Valley. I was there when the province joined the negotiations, and I had a sense then of the tremendous amount of emotion that runs in that community. I know that as things have developed, that has very much been a part of the community and the experience of that community not only over the last 25 years but in fact over a period of 100 years and more.

I want to start by commending the Nisga'a, first of all, for their determination. It seems to me that they set a course very early on to negotiate a resolution to land claims. They persevered, and they did it with an enormous amount of dignity. I think we all should recognize the importance of that in this process that we're engaged in here in British Columbia.

I have no question that most British Columbians support the resolution of land claims. I feel privileged to have had some small part in bringing British Columbia into that process after almost 100 years of denial. We don't have the benefit of the final documents, and there are going to continue to be concerns around that document. Particularly post-Delgamuukw, many people are rightfully concerned about the issue of certainty and certainty language. It has been a critical issue since the negotiation was first initialled; it has become more important post-Delgamuukw.

The question of land quantum in the face of the overlap claims, particularly by those of the Gitanyow, continues to be an issue -- perhaps even a cloud that hangs over the agreement. The question has to be: where do we go from here? The minister made reference to an intensive series of briefing and information sessions, which suggests to me that the deal now is in fact done and will be put to the three parties for ratification.

I think it's important to recognize that British Columbia will, in part as a result of the recommendations by the select standing committee, put this issue to a free vote in the Legislature. I want to commend the members of that committee, both on the government side and on the opposition side, for at least moving forward to allow members to speak individually and to vote individually on that issue. It will be interesting to see the result of that exercise.

The Nisga'a will hold a referendum. Many people have suggested that referendums are inappropriate, that they're wrong -- except for the case of the Nisga'a. I still haven't been able to wrap my mind around that, and perhaps I never will.

The federal government -- I don't know what they're going to do. They may simply approve it at the cabinet level. They may bring it to Parliament, with some limited debate. We saw, I think, a shameful lack of debate in Ottawa around the settlement of the Northwest Territories agreements, with limits on members, closure on the debate -- on an important debate that I think received far less than it was due in Ottawa originally.

In closing, I want to assure my constituents and all British Columbians that I'll examine the document very carefully when it becomes available. Today I want to join the Nisga'a in recognizing the achievement of a goal that was set generations ago. It's an important day for them and an important day for all British Columbians.

G. Wilson: I seek leave to respond to the ministerial statement.

Leave granted.

G. Wilson: It is at all times an honour and a privilege to stand in this House, but on this occasion it is particularly an

[ Page 10105 ]

I think that we as British Columbians must recognize that this agreement has the potential to be the dawning of a new era in British Columbia. It is puzzling to me, frankly, when I hear those who would stand and comment and say that we have to make sure that this agreement enshrines the values of the past. The values of the past are those values that denied aboriginal people their rights; it denied them the right to vote. It was the values of the past that talked about assimilating aboriginal people, that made them a faceless people in Canada -- people who were governed under the Indian Act as second-class citizens, if indeed citizens at all. It puzzles me when I hear people say, in what must be the most tremendously emotional time in the Nass: "We are going to examine this to make sure that entrenchment of past principles and past values exist in a modern treaty."

I have not seen the final language of this document, as I believe no member of this Legislative Assembly has. There are going to be very difficult issues to be addressed within that text, as I'm sure all of us will agree, because the Nisga'a are but one first nation represented in British Columbia. This is but one treaty among many that must be negotiated if we are to have final settlement on this outstanding issue. It is most important that we do put in place a treaty that represents the aspirations, needs and desires of the Nisga'a people, of the people of British Columbia and indeed of the people of Canada. I hope that in looking at the text of this, we can in fact embrace it wholly and fully, so that we can move forward to make sure that what is put in place today will provide us the opportunity to provide for other first nations a similar reconciliation on the past grievances that are now before us.

I want to say in closing that in my time in the Nass and the time I have spent with the Nisga'a people, they have been a most generous, most hospitable people who have demonstrated, as has been said before, tremendous determination, patience and courage. It is indeed a courageous time to move forward and say that we will build new relationships, new opportunities and a new society. Perhaps this is in fact the dawning of a new day in British Columbia, when all of us -- first nations, non-first nations, new immigrants and those like myself who are of many generations born in Canada -- can stand together and live together knowing that while we are different and we celebrate our differences, we are indeed equal in our differences and that the laws provide for those differences so that we may all prosper and future generations may succeed.

The Speaker: I thank all members for their contributions.

Hon. J. MacPhail: I move that the House at its rising stand recessed until 6:35 p.m. and thereafter sit until adjournment.

Motion approved.

The House recessed from 5:40 p.m. to 6:39 p.m.

[The Speaker in the chair.]

Hon. D. Lovick: I call committee on Bill 26, the Labour Relations Code Amendment Act.

LABOUR RELATIONS CODE AMENDMENT ACT, 1998
(continued)

On section 2, section 55.1 as amended (continued).

C. Hansen: Before we broke earlier in this discussion, one of the things that I had made reference to was the fact that the term "unionized construction employer" had not been used elsewhere. After the assistant deputy minister came up with a reference to it, I went back and thought, "Now, why didn't I see that one?" and I realized that I had misspoken. The term that was not used anywhere else was "unionized construction employee." I guess it teaches me a lesson about trying to read at this distance without putting on my reading glasses.

It struck me as strange that we would have that definition in there. As best I know -- and I've gone to double-check -- that term does not appear anywhere in the legislation. I have an amendment prepared to delete that particular definition. I'm not sure whether the minister feels that that would be acceptable or useful, or whether or not the fact that it is there and is not used anywhere else in the legislation presents a problem. What I would have proposed is to delete that definition and then delete the reference to it in the other definition, to get over this problem of the circular definition that existed before. I don't know if that would help clean up the legislation or whether the minister feels that the legislation achieves what it wants to achieve in the way that it's worded today. So I ask him that.

Hon. D. Lovick: Working on the assumption that a mistake is possible on the first iteration and therefore it may be possible on the second, and that there may indeed be a reference to that in here, I'm very reluctant to entertain that kind of amendment -- also, as the member quite rightly points out, whether it would be useful. . . . And I'm not sure it really advances anything. So it seems to me that we make amendments if and only if there is some compelling reason to do so. My suggestion is that we probably don't need such an amendment.

C. Hansen: I will accept that and let the record stand with the correction in terms of the term that I have been referring to.

I do want to come back to the definition of "building trades employer." I want to ask the minister how a union would go from being a wall-to-wall certification to a building trade certification. I understand the process to become. . . . If there is a newly certified workplace, upon application to the Labour Relations Board it would apply to either wall-to-wall or building trades. I'm wondering if the minister could explain whether he envisions that there would ever be a time when a union would request that its certification be shifted from being a wall-to-wall to a craft certification or vice versa.

Hon. D. Lovick: It is quite possible to be a wall-to-wall union but to be organized on a building trades or craft union basis. It's what's referred to in the trade as a polyparty one. You might have a polyparty or multiparty. . . . You know, three trade unions will go and get the certification or the

[ Page 10106 ]

C. Hansen: Just to clarify that, you wind up with three craft unions, for example, on one worksite, and they have organized all of the employees on that worksite, but they've organized them along craft lines. I understand that. On the other hand, you will wind up with a wall-to-wall union that could have multiple trades all under the one wall-to-wall union. I also understand the provision that's in Bill 26 to allow for the raid period of July and August, so that you could have a craft union or a group of craft unions that may come in to raid a wall-to-wall union. On the other hand, you could also have a wall-to-wall union come in to raid the craft unions that may collectively be on a particular job site. The provisions are there.

My question is: what would happen if you had a craft union that was certified on a wall-to-wall basis and it wished to shift that to become a craft certification, or if, on the other hand, you had a craft union that wished to switch to a wall-to-wall certification? I'm wondering if there is anything that would allow that to happen. If so, what would be the process for it?

[6:45]

C. Hansen: We have cases today where craft unions have organized on a wall-to-wall basis. I believe the carpenters have several wall-to-wall certifications. Do I gather from what the minister is saying that there is no process by which they could transfer those certifications to a craft certification?

Hon. D. Lovick: The only way one can be a craft union is if the only people you represent are those who belong to that craft. The moment you attempt to say, "We represent others beyond," then you are no longer just a craft union. That's the short answer.

C. Hansen: This may be a hypothetical situation, but if we had a situation where, say, the carpenters unions, with one of their wall-to-wall certifications, wound up with only one craft left at that particular worksite. . . . I gather from what the minister said that there is still no process by which they could wind up transferring that certification from one form to the other as far as the LRB is concerned.

Hon. D. Lovick: What would happen in that circumstance is that the union would have to go before the Labour Relations Board and say: "We are no longer a wall-to-wall union. Rather, we are a craft union again, because the only people we represent. . . ." Or, conversely, they'd say: "We're no longer a craft union, because now the only thing we do is wall to wall." Clearly they have to be who they claim to be in the eyes of the Labour Relations Board.

C. Hansen: I gather that that situation would result in a formal hearing by the Labour Relations Board, with a determination that would come forth either requiring them to remain as a wall-to-wall union or allowing them to transfer into the other designation. Is that the process?

Hon. D. Lovick: They would need to get a variance of their certification, in effect, simply to say: "We are no longer who we claimed to be before, and therefore we need to make sure we're right with the law in terms of the board's determination."

C. Hansen: I guess what I'm trying to clarify is that there are lots of other parties to that particular decision. It's not just, say, the executive officers of the union making an application. There's obviously the workforce, the members themselves who are affected. There's the employer who is affected, and there may be other parties who would wish to become part of that decision. My question is whether or not it would require a formalized hearing of the LRB and not just simply a letter request that goes in from the union saying, "Oh, by the way, we want to get changed," and somebody does a little bookkeeping entry to make that transition.

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer is probably yes. What would happen is that they would make an application to the board, and the board would determine if there was anybody else who contested what they were saying at that point. In that regard, yes, there would be a formal hearing required.

C. Hansen: Earlier this afternoon, I'd been talking about the definition of construction industry and the desirability of splitting that definition. I want to elaborate a bit more, because in retrospect, I probably wasn't clear in how I had set that out. In the definition of ICI construction in this legislation, it says that ICI construction "means construction work performed within the industrial, commercial and institutional components. . . ." The term "construction work" is not defined anywhere.

What we have is the definition for construction industry, and that was what led me to the suggestion that we split the definition of construction industry to say that construction industry means the employers and employees engaged in construction work, and then have a second definition for construction work which says that construction work means the alteration, decoration, etc. Rather than moving that as a formal amendment, if the minister could give me some assurance that construction work is the work done within the construction industry as per that, I'd be happy with the minister's assurance on that.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm pleased to give the member the assurance that construction work is indeed work done within the construction industry.

C. Hansen: I was also reviewing our discussion with regard to project collective agreements and this tripartite issue I'd raised earlier. I do want to put forward a formal amendment that I think may help clarify this. I have not shared this with the minister earlier, but it is one he might be prepared to

[ Page 10107 ]

[" 'project collective agreement' means a collective agreement negotiated among a trade union or unions and an employer or employer bargaining agent, and which may also have as a party to the agreement a project owner or project owners, that is to be effective during the term of a project."]

C. Hansen: I don't know if the minister would entertain that. My concern now is that we have a definition that basically puts in a requirement that it be a tripartite agreement. There may be cases where that's desirable, but in the same vein, I think there may be lots of cases in which it is not desirable, and this language would at least give the minister that option. It's the minister who controls what gets designated as a project collective agreement. This would, I think, give the minister a bit more power to determine whether or not a bipartite or tripartite collective agreement is in the best interests of making that project successful.

Hon. D. Lovick: I appreciate the amendment and the point made in the amendment. The member is obviously concerned that our definition as written would seem, as he sees it at least, to demand agreement among three distinct parties. Our legal opinion, based on consultation with legislative counsel and so forth, is that it is not the case. It could indeed be two of the three. I look at the words in the legislation and in the amendment, and I see the point that the member is making. But as I say, I am advised that we don't need that. Indeed, it is understood that what we have here is sufficient to make the point that the member raises. But if he wants to try it again, I'm perfectly prepared to hear the point.

Amendment negatived on division.

C. Hansen: The minister's comments were basically to the effect that his interpretation of this section is that it does not require a tripartite agreement. His interpretation is that it could be an agreement simply between the employer and the trade union in this situation. My question is: at whose discretion would that be?

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the answer to that question is simply to have a look at the definition of collective agreement within the existing Labour Code. I think you'll discover that the concerns you have registered are indeed dealt with in that definition.

Section 2, section 55.1 as amended approved on division.

On section 2, section 55.11.

C. Hansen: This is the purposes section. It's actually interesting to compare this to the purposes section we had in Bill 44. There has been a lot of discussion in this chamber about the parallels between Bill 44 and Bill 26. Not to revisit them at length, but I do want to point out that the purposes section between the two bills as they were presented are very similar. In fact, they're very closely worded, with a few exceptions. In Bill 44 as it was presented last year, it says: "In addition to the purposes referred to in section 2, the purposes of this Part are to (a) achieve industrial stability and orderly collective bargaining in the construction industry. . . ." When we come back to Bill 26, what we find is exactly the same wording, except we no longer have any industrial stability as an objective of this legislation. I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us why it was deemed appropriate to remove the words "industrial stability" from the purposes section of this legislation.

Hon. D. Lovick: I have two answers to that question, Mr. Chairman. Number one is that it was indeed the panel's recommendation that we make that change. Number two is that what Bill 44 -- I think we should remember -- attempted to do was talk about the entire construction industry, whereas Bill 26 is focused on the subset of ICI, as we know. Therefore I guess the assumption is that. . . . When it talks about industrial stability, it's not talking about industrial, commercial and institutional. It's talking about the construction industry. I'm sure the member would agree with me. The question is: how can we make that claim if indeed we're only talking about a subset? So I think that's -- dare I say? -- the commonsense response.

C. Hansen: That runs somewhat contrary to a lot of the themes that have been coming out of the communications around Bill 26, in that we were somehow supposed to believe that there was instability in sections of the construction industry, in the ICI sector, and that somehow Bill 26 was going to come in like the white knight and solve the problems of this instability. Yet in the purposes section, what we see is them taking out the instability as an objective. I would like to ask the minister: what is it about Bill 26 that achieves this purpose?

Interjection.

The Chair: Continue, member.

C. Hansen: Just to clarify for the minister, in Bill 26 what we have in the way it is worded today is: "In addition to the purposes referred to in section 2, the purposes of this Part are to (a) achieve orderly collective bargaining in the construction industry. . . ." I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us what it is about Bill 26 that enhances orderly collective bargaining in the construction industry.

[7:00]

The point I would make, though, is that when we talk about a purposes section and we begin to have a debate about, "Well, why are we saying this? What are the purposes?" it seems to me that it takes us directly into the philosophy of the bill -- i.e., what we had the debate about in second reading. Given that this House has already voted on second reading and has approved the principle of the bill, it seems to me that that debate, quite frankly, is unnecessary. I make that point not to be confrontational or anything but simply to remind members that. . . .

When we talk about legislative reform, one of the suggestions -- those who have studied the area of legislative reform

[ Page 10108 ]

The Chair: The Chair would also like to agree that procedurally the minister is quite correct.

C. Hansen: I just want to point out that when the minister talks about the purposes section being a section which has been used in the past to debate bills at length, he knows of which he speaks. But I have no intention of getting into a long debate on any of these sections and certainly not under this section. I certainly have no intention of reintroducing second reading debate; that's obviously behind us.

But I think what's different about this particular purposes section is that it's divided into three parts. The principle of the bill, as it was presented in second reading, really spoke to only one of those three parts. I don't think that two of these purposes subsections are part of the principle of the bill; there's only one. I would argue that. . . .

Just to put on the record the three aspects that have been set out as purposes, the first is to "achieve orderly collective bargaining in the construction industry," the second one is to "establish a labour relations environment conducive to skills development in the construction industry," and the third is to "facilitate the implementation of multi-employer and multi-trade collective bargaining for craft bargaining units within ICI construction."

I would say that what this bill is all about, as it has been presented and as we have debated it in second reading, is only subsection (c). The reason I would like to put some questions to the minister on this is because if there is something in this bill that addresses purpose (b), I'd like to know where it is. I don't see it; I don't see anything in this legislation that addresses skills development. Hon. Chair, I guess I would like the reassurance of the minister that there isn't some hidden meaning in the context of Bill 26 that somehow, through a back door, brings us into a whole skills development regime and that may not be apparent in a surface reading of this legislation. Perhaps the minister could address the issue of skills development.

Hon. D. Lovick: I think the member is absolutely right to raise that question. Frankly, I am one of those who was dismayed that we did not talk about anything like that in the course of second reading debate and indeed in the course of all those amendments. As the member will recall, my wrap-up of second reading was done rather sooner than I had planned, and I cobbled together my notes rather quickly, rather than having time to prepare at great length.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Well, I know. . . . The member said I had a hundred hours to get ready, and she's quite right, except that I was expecting that they were going to carry on for a while, because it seemed they were in the mood.

In any event, my point is simply that there is, I think, an important part of this bill, this legislation -- let's call it sub rosa or something; it's not formally written in, but it's there -- and it's an issue that, frankly, is contentious and controversial. I am quite prepared to stand up and say that I accept the proposition that I'm about to articulate now. The proposition is just this: that craft union companies have a considerably better record of training and apprenticeship opportunities than the non-traditional unions do, let alone the non-union companies. That's just a fact of life, and the evidence is overwhelming. If members want me to bring in some specific evidence, I can.

I believe it was -- and I'll ask my colleagues here to help me -- the Iron Workers Union that sent me some material covering the period of roughly the last ten years. That particular union can point to the fact of having produced something like 200 different apprenticeships: people who've come into the trade, have learned the trade, have taken the training and, at the end of that period of working for that given company, have suddenly gotten an apprenticeship and a trade -- journeyman qualifications they can take with them anywhere in the world. They see a future for themselves: "Hey look, I went and got this trade. I got educated, and I've got the experience. Now I am a true participant within the labour force." Alas, you can't say the same about others. For instance -- and here's the Iron Workers Union's submission -- the ICBA employers, in that same period of ten years, were able to point to a total of only two apprentices.

Insofar as this legislation says that there is a place for craft union construction in this province and that we are going to say that those contractors who wish to be organized on a craft union basis, who can take part in a process of getting a master agreement and who don't have to worry about what I referred to as empty certification -- namely, that you go through the process of your members saying, "We want to be part of a union," but by the time you become members of the union, the project is over, and you never have a chance to sign a collective agreement. . . . On that basis this government is saying: "Let's do something to repair that loophole within the Labour Code, give those workers -- and those companies, for that matter -- an opportunity to sign collective agreements and thereby increase the likelihood of people becoming trained, properly qualified apprentices."

The tragedy of the construction industry today -- in my opinion, at least; I recognize that there are differences of opinion here -- is that it is in danger of becoming deskilled, where people who work in the industry for some of the wall-to-wall unions, or for some of the non-unions or the non-traditional unions, may in fact discover that even after having worked in the industry for ten years, they have one skill only -- and that's framing or something. They've never learned anything else, and they're therefore vulnerable and don't have the basis for a career in the future.

What I'm prepared to acknowledge is that by making these changes, by encouraging the existence of craft unions and the craft union option in the ICI part of the construction industry, we are thereby doing exactly what we say here -- namely, establishing a labour relations environment conducive to skills development in the construction industry. I think that's absolutely appropriate.

Further, I think my colleague across the way probably also attended what was called the construction 101 seminar with the building trades representatives. He will know the rather proud record they have of taking young people fresh out of high school and encouraging them to commit themselves to the construction industry, to learning a trade, to acquiring those special skills and then having a trade that's

[ Page 10109 ]

I don't apologize for any of that. It seems desirable to me that a highly skilled workforce, as its reward for its skills and its dedication, has decent wages and decent working conditions and the possibility for pensions, and so forth, at the end of the working career. That's the kind of workforce I would like to see in this province. I'm prepared to acknowledge, of course, that there are others who are willing to say -- and the marketplace will ultimately determine this -- that we don't need those skilled trades, that we can do it on a deskilled basis or with a different approach and that craft unions are not the only possibility.

There are non-traditional unions or in some cases no unions at all, and I'm prepared to acknowledge that they too have their right to be in the marketplace. But from my perspective, I want to encourage the craft union sector to continue. One of the things they do is ensure that those skills are indeed passed on and that we have a highly skilled, highly effective workforce. That's a somewhat longer answer than the member anticipated, I'm sure, but I wanted to get on the record why I think the bill does indeed do what it says and why that purpose is appropriate.

C. Hansen: Certainly the minister made reference to the meetings that a group of us from the official opposition caucus had with the building trades unions. It was a very informative day and time well spent on our part. The minister mentioned the pride that the building trades unions have in their apprenticeship programs, and I acknowledge that 100 percent. I also acknowledge the very fine work that the building trades unions are doing in terms of benefit programs and rehab programs. I recognized that day how proud they are of those programs, and justifiably so.

Where I have a concern is with regard to whether or not it's the direction of this government to look to the craft unions to continue to train or to be part of our apprenticeship training program or the central core of that program. My question to the minister would be: does he accept the recommendations in the Kelleher-Lanyon report with regard to what they call training and equity-related issues?

Hon. D. Lovick: I appreciate the question. If the member is asking me whether I accept the recommendations of Kelleher-Lanyon in the areas that go beyond the code itself -- in terms of what we ought to be doing towards improving the labour relations climate in the province, talking about R and D, talking about increasing productivity and all of those sorts of things -- yes indeed, I endorse them. I am happy to advise the member that when the report was first tabled, I focused on that, and I said that I think the recommendations vis-à-vis the construction industry, ICI, were very much dealing with the status quo. But the other recommendations we're talking about, a workforce of the future and how we ensure that we modernize and improve effectiveness so that the industry will continue to thrive in the future when technologies and skill development change. . . . In short, yes, I do. I accept that recommendation.

[7:15]

My other concern is that when we start looking at the models that we have in terms of training, apprenticeships, in British Columbia, those too have to change. We have to see them evolve for this modern workplace and to meet the demands of the marketplace, as the minister indicated earlier. Certainly in terms of Kelleher-Lanyon, how I read their recommendations is that these are issues that should be addressed by ITAC. ITAC has been set up with very broad support, I think, from both the trade union movement and the business community in this province. There are a lot of people who are very anxiously watching this very young child start to grow and spread its wings, and I think there's great hope by all parties in terms of the role that ITAC will play in allowing our training programs and apprenticeship programs to evolve and to meet the needs of a modern economy. I think there are a lot of people who are anxiously hoping that it stays on that course and does not get sidetracked, which is a discussion that we had during the estimates of the Ministry of Labour. In the Kelleher-Lanyon report, the theme that I see coming through in terms of training issues is that it is not something to be addressed in the Labour Code, but rather it is something to be addressed by ITAC. ITAC was set up to do this. Let's let it flourish; let's let it do that job.

I would like the assurance of the minister that despite the words that happen to be in this "Purposes" section, the real driving force behind the future of apprenticeship training in British Columbia is, in fact, going to be ITAC.

Hon. D. Lovick: I don't disagree with the point made by the member. But similarly, as I just outlined a few moments ago, I would say that this legislation, de facto producing a climate in which people are more likely to get that kind of training is, it seems to me, almost self-evident. Therefore it is perfectly legitimate for that to be in the "Purposes" section. But the member's conclusion in terms of ITAC's responsibility -- certainly I accept that. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I think we are now in danger of revisiting second reading debate, as my colleague acknowledges.

C. Hansen: Frankly, I think we've dwelt on this longer than I had anticipated. Let me close this section -- if we can allow the vote. But I just want to put on the record that we do not feel that this legislation does anything to enhance the order to collective bargaining that we have in the construction industry. We feel, as I think has been outlined adequately in second reading, that quite the opposite will occur. Also, we do not feel that skills development is achieved by the legislation; in fact, it will be achieved by the work of ITAC if it is allowed to grow and develop in the way that I think everybody is hoping that it will. Having put that on the record, hon. Chair, I'd be prepared to allow this vote.

Section 2, section 55.11 approved on division.

On section 2, section 55.12.

C. Hansen: This is a very short section that has some very broad ramifications. I will just put it on the record: "For the

[ Page 10110 ]

On the other hand, what we have in July and August is the time of year when there is the greatest number of workers on a worksite. If you think about the whole philosophy behind a raid, it should be the rights of the individual workers to choose, through the appropriate democratic principles, the union they wish to represent them. By definition, I would say that the workers that have the most at stake are those who are the long-term stable workers in that worksite. If you have a worksite that doubles in size during July and August, the temporary workers that come in for that particular period of time don't necessarily have any long-term attachment to that employer. They don't have any long-term security at stake, because they're hired for a very short term. I wonder if the minister could explain why we are going to July and August rather than perhaps to a specific month of the year that is sort of a compromise between those two extremes and to a process that would result in those workers who have that long-term attachment -- and who have the most at stake and the most to lose -- having that democratic right to change unions should they so desire. Could the minister explain why we have chosen July and August?

Hon. D. Lovick: Well, what the member explained in his opening comment was, effectively, to simply reiterate why we're doing this. The fact is that that's when more people are indeed working at a job site. The provision, simply stated, is intended to deal with a perceived problem that some employers -- as well as trade unions, for that matter -- concurrently structure the time frame of the collective agreement to appear when nobody, or relatively few people, are working. Obviously you can see advantages to unions that don't want anybody else in there -- in other words, they're happy with the contract, and they don't want to be raided -- and in the same way to employers who say: "Wait a minute. We're very happy with this comfortable relationship we have. Why should we open that up?" Therefore, when you have a rather small workforce that is probably more analogous to a company union, as the phrase goes, and they've been there forever, their seniority is well-established and their security -- given they are the hard core of employees -- is more or less guaranteed, they quite conceivably will see the world through different lenses than might people who are only going to be working in the summer months.

Understandably, then, employers -- or unions, for that matter, as I said -- would perhaps want to say: "We should not be restricted in terms of when the raiding period will be." We're arguing, however, that the larger number of workers obviously is a better indication of what the workforce is. The greater number of people, surely, should have the right to choose. Long-term employees of the kind the member referred to are conceivably much more comfortable and better off and don't see any great reason to change their circumstance. They're happy with whatever the union arrangement may be, and the arrangement may well be that people with seniority are doing very nicely, thank you very much, and people who have been long-term employees are doing very nicely, thank you, but God help the people who are just entering the workforce. Remember, those individuals, that minority who are doing very nicely, can enjoy a wonderful position of comfort and happiness but perhaps at the expense of a whole bunch of other people who, as the member points out, have not that long attachment to the workforce

What we're trying to do is to simply say: "Let the majority determine." If indeed the business is designed in such a way that in the summer months in construction, when most of the activity is, the workforce is this big. . . . Let the record show he illustrates approximately 18 inches. When the workforce is that big, surely that is. . . . [Laughter.] I see people laughing, and. . . .

Interjections.

Hon. D. Lovick: There's a problem with how much is "that big" -- right? I know. As the Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture said, "Is it true that bigger is better?" -- in the advertising campaign we all know about. I digress, Mr. Chairman.

My suggestion is simply that we think this better captures the reality of the workplace. The problem is -- as again the member quite effectively pointed out -- that the status quo is simply not acceptable. Individuals are not, in many cases, being given an opportunity to be consulted, to have any say in the matter as to who should be the union of record.

As well, I would just make this point. Questions concerning the appropriateness of which employees ought to determine and whether somebody who's a short-term employee, like a summer student. . . . Those kinds of questions will ultimately be left to the determination of the Labour Relations Board, which, I think, is appropriate.

C. Hansen: In other words, what the minister is saying is that when the LRB has to determine whether or not a successful raid has taken place, they will also be looking at the support that is there from differing types of employees -- whether they're part-time workers or term employees and that type of thing. Is the minister then saying that it would require a majority of workers who have a more significant attachment to that workplace? How would the LRB look at and evaluate the workforce, to determine whether or not there had been a successful raid?

Hon. D. Lovick: I understand that what the LRB would typically take into account would be when the date of application was, how many people were working at that point and what length of attachment to that particular workforce they had. I think that is a commonsense rendition, and I suspect the member wouldn't have difficulty with that -- as I don't.

C. Hansen: I'll admit that I'm learning something here. For example, would the LRB not take into consideration a signature from a summer student who had started in May, and the application for raid occurred, say, at the end of July? What are the parameters that the LRB would use today in evaluating that type of decision?

[ Page 10111 ]

G. Plant: I'm worrying about something here too, because I thought in essence that was sort of the whole point about moving the raiding period. You move it into the time of year where there's going to be an influx of employees. Is the minister saying that the practice of the LRB is essentially to discount memberships on the basis of a criterion that he refers to as "attachment to the firm"? I freely admit that I'm not an expert on this. I thought that a membership card was a membership card was a membership card.

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer to the question is yes. And let me, if I might, just explain why. . . . By the way, I'm not saying that this would necessarily be the case; I'm saying that it's a plausible scenario. If an employer who is about to be raided in July or August suddenly expands the workforce by a factor of 100 people because there is a vote about to be held in terms of. . . . If the LRB looks at that and hears evidence to say, "We have never had a workforce that big; these people are obviously being hired for one purpose and one purpose only -- namely, to vote against this particular certification application," then it would seem to me a perfectly legitimate conclusion, given that there is some evidence adduced, for the LRB to say: "Sorry, these people in fact don't have legitimacy, as it were." In that sense, the member is quite right. Yes, the length of attachment to the workforce can be a legitimate criterion.

[7:30]

The answer to my last question made the point that the LRB could essentially set aside what might look, from a distance, like an attempt on the part of an employer to frustrate a raid. Could the LRB apply the same logic the other way around -- which is to say that if 100 or so employees are hired and it turns out that in fact they have appeared on the worksite for the purpose of ensuring that there is a change in bargaining unit. . . ? In other words, on the Monday the project kicks into high gear, on the Tuesday there are 100 new employees acquired, and on the Wednesday the employer discovers that in fact they're all members of a particular union -- he didn't know it, and he's in the middle of a raid. Would the criterion of attachment still work, so that the LRB could say: "I'm sorry. You 100 new employees haven't been around long enough, and your vote doesn't count"?

Hon. D. Lovick: Theoretically yes, indeed, that would be the case -- as it should be. What is fair for one should be fair to the other. I have no difficulty with that. I would just point out, though. . . . I'm sure the member will appreciate it, because I think he saw the difficulty of the scenario as he crafted it -- namely, that the employer is the one who says: "I need X number of workers, and I am going to go out and hire those workers." I can't think of too many workplaces in the universe where an employer can say: "Right, I'm going to hire all those workers, and I know that they all want to join union X or union Y." I 'm being a little playful, but it seems to me that it's a highly, highly unlikely scenario. The conclusion and the construct the member presents are absolutely legitimate, and I hope I've answered the question.

G. Plant: I think the minister is right to put the construct into some attempt at local reality, if I can call it that. But part of that is, of course -- at least, according to my recollection of the panel report -- that there is a shortage of skilled construction workers in British Columbia. To pick up the scenario again, it's summer, projects are kicking into high gear -- in fact, the pool of available workers may be relatively small. . . . If it were to happen -- Lord knows I'd be the last person to suggest that this is so -- that that pool was essentially a group of individuals who were all carrying around a number of union cards, then I suspect that there may be just a hint more reality to the risk, if you will, from the employer's perspective than the minister's recitation of the facts would suggest. Having said that, recognizing that. . . . I suppose I would suggest that that is part of the reason why the government is moving the raiding period: to move it into a period when there are going to be some more workers on site and that is perhaps the fertile season for challenging existing certifications.

So we are actually relatively close to some of the policy reasons behind this change. If I'm wrong, I'm sure the minister will correct me.

Hon. D. Lovick: I have a number of points. Number one is that the scenario the member sketches out could happen now. In other words, an employer needs X number of workers, and, alas and alack, they all happen to be skilled trades -- only those people who have that kind of qualification. That could happen now.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Yeah, exactly, and the raiding period wouldn't be in the summer. But the construct, if you like, that the member began to build -- that scenario would obtain and could obtain right now. That's number one.

Number two, the board ultimately has the determination to establish -- just as we did when we talked about the employer stacking the decks -- whether the union might have done the same thing in some way, shape or form, and to respond accordingly. I think that probably answers the question.

G. Plant: Well, that's helpful.

The issue I want to move on to now is, I think, fairly described under the general heading of transition. There are employers out there, of course, that have collective agreements that already have raiding periods built into them. Some of those agreements have perhaps just been entered into, and the raiding period may not take effect until next winter. Can

[ Page 10112 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: I appreciate the member's question. I understand that the only way to do this, to make it -- dare I say? -- violation-proof is to say that effective the legislation, then the raiding period. The primary reason for that is just that if people know that if you had an existing agreement in place, you could escape this for a certain period of time. . . . It is not unheard of in the industry, apparently, for people to have various agreements signed, sealed and delivered in the desk drawer and to pull them out as they need them. I understand that to protect against that is the reason why there isn't, if you like, a transition period where we say: "We will accept your existing contract until it runs out, and then we'll accept the new one. That's the logic, I'm told.

G. Plant: So to run out a couple of examples, if the legislation were enacted and were to come into effect as of the end of July, would we then be in a raid period for the next month?

Hon. D. Lovick: First, let me refer the member to the existing code, section 19(2). In anticipation of this kind of problem, there is a stipulation particularly that "an application for certification may not be made within 22 months of a previous application under that subsection if the previous application resulted in a decision by the board on the merits of the application." That's obviously anticipating the fact that somebody would say: "Well, we didn't succeed this time. But, hey, guess what: they've changed the rules, and now we have an opportunity. So let's go again." My assumption, quite frankly, in introducing this legislation -- and indeed, I think I said so to somebody or other who asked the question -- is that we're not producing the legislation so that somebody gets a second kick at the can just because of the legislation. That seems to me unfair. I think that's blatantly discriminatory, and I would not want any part of that. I hope that answers the member's question.

G. Plant: I think it may, but let me just see if I can create a hypothetical example. That is, someone has recently -- last month perhaps or a couple of months ago -- experienced a raid that would ordinarily be caught or protected, depending on your perspective, by the 22-month provision that's in section 19(2). There is no intention here to subject the employer who just had that experience to another raid period within the 22-month period. Have I explained that in a way that makes sense to the minister?

Hon. D. Lovick: I can't give the member the comfort that 22 months would be the window. What I can do, though, is say that next July or August would be the period, once this is invoked.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Ah, I'm sorry. I've had a clarification that the 22 months refers specifically to the same union coming back -- which, I guess, is a subset, as it were. But the answer more particularly to the member's question is that what the legislation says here is that these months are deemed to be the raiding period -- yeah, it does obtain. I guess it's quite conceivable that somebody who had an unsuccessful raid -- a company, for example, that weathered the storm or whatever of a raid -- would conceivably be subject to another raid in July and August of the coming year.

G. Plant: What would happen, then -- and this is informational, really. . . . I'm trying to now imagine the scenario of the employer that, under the existing collective agreement, is subject to a raid, say next January or February. Let's assume that the legislation doesn't come into effect now until September 1. Does that mean that the employer would be subject to the raid in January or February and then again in July or August? Or if the bill comes into effect as of September 1, does that mean that, essentially, the existing agreed-upon raid period is replaced by the July-August raid period?

[7:45]

G. Plant: Given the hypothetical example that we've talked about, this might be as good a time as any to ask the minister what the government's intention is with respect to proclamation and implementation of the timetable.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm looking perplexed, Mr. Chairman, because I suddenly realized that I can't turn to either of these guys for assistance. I have no idea.

An Hon. Member: Who are you going to call?

Hon. D. Lovick: Yeah, "Who are you going to call?" somebody asks.

I'm struggling a little bit with this, because I'm trying to think whether there are any compelling reasons why one would treat this legislation differently from other pieces of legislation. Off the top, I can't, frankly, think of any. So my guesstimate is that one wouldn't do anything to delay it; but, similarly, one wouldn't do anything to expedite it. That's probably the best I can do, because, frankly, that's all I know at the moment. I guess the decision regarding proclamation is ultimately a cabinet one. It's a strategic political choice.

G. Plant: I fully appreciate the magical mysteriousness of that aspect of the process. But, of course, when one has a bill that requires almost no regulations in order to give it effect, then proclamation, as a practical matter, is less complicated. I think that the way the bill works -- and, of course, we're not there yet. . . . But the general approach to transitional issues in the bill, as I recall, is to lead them to regulation. I think we may come across a few places where regulations are going to be an aspect of the implementation process here. One way of asking the question, I suppose, for the second time -- and it will probably be the last time -- is: does the government have all it needs in place in order to roll this thing out, or is it really just one step at a time, and the government's intention is to move forward to implement the bill with reasonable expedition?

Hon. D. Lovick: My assumption is that yes, indeed, government has sufficient. . .to proceed with reasonable expedition. There may well be some caveats or cautionary notes there that I'm not aware of at this point, but my sense is that, yes, they could. The only cautionary note that comes to my mind is simply that discussion I had with the member's colleague somewhat earlier -- namely, whether the Labour Relations Board might have to do some educational work or something like that. I could see that as perhaps grounds for delay. But beyond that, no, I don't see any reason.

C. Hansen: In the construction industry review panel report, they made a recommendation that a trade union mak-

[ Page 10113 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer is yes, a raid is indeed an application for certification and therefore must, by the logic we have outlined, demonstrate evidence of what's called "fresh support."

C. Hansen: Can the minister give us the assurance that the form that they will be pursuing is the form that was -- the format, perhaps, not the specific document. . . ? Let me rephrase this. Is the minister accepting the recommendation that was put forward by the panel, in terms of fresh evidence?

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm pleased to answer in the affirmative: yes, we are accepting that recommendation. As the member knows, what is requisite here is a regulation, though. We need to pass the legislation first. Following that, then we do the regulation to assert the requirement for fresh support.

C. Hansen: Does the minister anticipate that this regulation will come into effect at the same time that these relevant sections would come into effect?

Hon. D. Lovick: My officials -- the member for Richmond-Steveston will appreciate -- effectively quoted me the UBC motto. It's a trick question, right? The UBC motto, for those who aren't aware, is tuum est -- it's up to you. The answer therefore, I'm happy to say -- given l'état c'est moi and all that -- is yes, absolutely so.

G. Plant: I've been thinking about the raid issue again. One further scenario occurred to me. When we went back and the minister very helpfully referred me to section 19(2), which I guess you could call the 22-month protection window, I think we may have ended up talking about the employer who was perhaps successfully raided in May, June or something like that. But for employers and, I imagine, for employees in some cases, a raid could be a fairly disruptive experience. Of course, raids are not always successful.

Under the sort of general umbrella of wanting to know whether the intention here is really to move entirely to a new regime of an annual raid period that takes place in July and August, what would happen in a situation where perhaps an employer within the last few months had a raid campaign going on that was unsuccessful? Again, let's take the hypothetical situation of the legislation coming into force after the end of August. Would that employer nonetheless be entitled to wait until next July-August -- assuming that the raid period in the collective agreement was April, February or something like that? Is that how the minister sees it unrolling?

Hon. D. Lovick: Given that. . . . If they turn down that application for a raid in July and August in the subsequent year, you know, then that would effectively mean that the employees would be deprived of an opportunity for two years. So on that basis, I think it's safe to say, yeah. At least I say with certain comfort that, yes indeed, July-August would be the period -- and legitimately, in my mind.

Section 2, section 55.12 approved on division.

On section 2, section 55.13.

C. Hansen: This particular section sets out that the collective agreements in the construction industry must be for a term of not more than three years. It seems to run somewhat contrary to some of the stated purposes of this legislation, which is to achieve greater stability and other variations on that, which have been noted in the minister's speech and in various other communications documents that have come out. I just wonder why the minister would choose to include this section, to limit it to three years, when in fact collective agreements of longer than three years would add to the stability, and shorter agreements add to the instability -- if the minister could elaborate.

Hon. D. Lovick: The short answer to the member is twofold, really. Number one, the three-year term is a panel recommendation, and number two, there is apparently a historical precedent for three-year terms. Beyond that, I must confess, it's essentially about judgment calls, whether it should be one year or five years, two years or eight years or three. Ultimately, one simply weighs and considers all the possible scenarios and says: "This seems to be the best of all possible worlds. This is the compromise position."

The assumption, I guess, is that shorter than three years, as the member quite correctly points out and as I think most of us would say, is perhaps unstable. Of course, the longer the contract, one could argue theoretically, the more stability would accrue. The difficulty -- and here's where we had to struggle -- is whether it's reasonable to assume that people signing an agreement for more than three years are indeed going to be effectively protected. Given the pace and rapidity of technological change and given the fact that things like the value of the dollar, for example, have been known to be on the proverbial roller-coaster recently, will their best interests be protected?

What is the compromise? What is a reasonable term of agreement to tie workers to and tie employers to? This is obviously much more in the realm of political determination, let's call it, or -- dare I say it? -- philosophically or maybe even ideologically driven. If you are dealing with a bunch of workers who have been up against it for any conceivable period of time and in a depressed economy, which certainly happens all too frequently, then to suddenly have an opportunity for full-time employment at some reasonable rate of return and be told, "We will guarantee you five years at that rate of return," is an incredibly attractive proposition at the time.

Two years later, if we happen to have a full-employment kind of economy or at least the closest thing to it that Canadian society has had for 40 years, and if workers' skills and what workers have to offer are in demand, that five-year contract perhaps looks pretty awful. It could look very awful indeed. What may happen is that the wage rate may go up hugely in that short period if one has some kind of significant economic boom. If the supply-and-demand calculus shifts so that workers with skills are in demand, whereas before they were a dime a dozen, then what can theoretically happen is that workers who may have signed on to a deal in year one will discover by year three that they are in effect losing.

At the end of the five years, they will be very indignant, and they will have lost big-time. One of the things that will happen in macroeconomic terms is that workers will say: "All

[ Page 10114 ]

I'm not going to pretend that we have some kind of magic bullet and that this is the only possibility. But the conclusion, the calculus at the end of the day, was that three years is indeed probably the right amount. We think that will ensure that employees have a more or less regular opportunity to review their collective agreement circumstances on a more or less periodic basis. We accept that there are different circumstances. Project agreements, for example, may well be better designed for the duration of a project, even though that might be longer than three years.

[8:00]

C. Hansen: The minister raised a couple of points that I want to respond to. He raised the question: what is the right number of years, the right term? At one point I think he talked about how you approach this issue philosophically. I would like to put it to the minister that philosophically it is the collective bargaining process that should decide the term of the agreement. It's not up to big government to come in and tell workers and unions how long their collective agreements should be in place. Right now we've got a process under the Labour Relations Code that allows that to be determined in collective bargaining. I think it harkens back to a lot of the themes we have been pushing -- that the principles of collective bargaining are being sacrificed in this bill. This is one more classic example of that.

I would like to ask the minister what is wrong in the current system that we have. What's the problem that we're fixing here? We have a Labour Relations Code that basically allows the union and the employer, through a collective bargaining process, to determine -- among other things, obviously -- the term of the collective agreement. Where is the problem that we're trying to fix with this, and why should we have big government come in and impose these collective agreements of a maximum of three years?

Hon. D. Lovick: Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, what we are attempting to do is come up with what we think is the appropriate compromise. Given that the huge majority of collective agreements in this province are two to three years, we thought three years was an appropriate compromise. Again, the member may want to disagree.

Regarding the issue of collective bargaining and the fact that we say, by legislation, that three years is the term, I think that whether that is an interference with individuals' rights to free and fair collective bargaining is debatable, to say the least. Remember that there were those who argued the case that indentured servitude was free choice by individuals. Remember all those kids that came over to Canada and worked on the farms for years and years.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member for Powell River-Sunshine Coast says: "That's stretching it." I'm not sure, and I'll tell you why: because their families thought it was a good deal. They really did, because they were desperate. They thought it was a good deal, and they thought it was perfectly legitimate to give their kids an opportunity in the New World, hoping that they would be able to go on and do bigger and better. . .etc., etc.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Yes, some did, but God knows what price they paid. Like -- what? -- ten years on average. The reality is. . . .

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Thank you, member for Shuswap, for reminding me.

The issue, I guess, is simply that for free and fair collective bargaining to work in any kind of pure and absolute form, it must assume and presume equality on both sides. I would, as an academic with a little knowledge of labour history, suggest to members opposite -- and I think they know already -- that there have been relatively few occasions in the history of this country -- or any country, for that matter -- when that equality has in any way been even remotely close, let alone when it favoured workers. There have been peaks in an economic cycle when workers have been in a wonderful bargaining position, but the consistent across-the-board pattern in terms of supply and demand for labour has always been in favour of employers. I think that's a fact; I just don't think that's debatable, frankly.

C. Hansen: I will try to bring us back onto the topic here. Certainly the minister's last few comments were on-topic. That was the peaks and valleys of economics cycles -- but that cuts both ways. Long agreements can work to the advantage of the employers and to the advantage of employees. It's not like it's a one-way street at all. Hon. Chair, to the minister: why is it, then, that this government has chosen to bring this in just for the construction industry? If the minister stands by these noble words that he has spoken about how important it is that they not be longer than three years, why just bring it in for the construction industry?

Hon. D. Lovick: Well, a couple of answers to the question, Mr. Chairman. Look, I have no illusions that we are going to resolve this and that everybody will say: "Oh yeah, I heard the minister say that these are the reasons for the three years, so by gosh, I'm persuaded" -- end of debate. No, I have no illusions about that. At some point one simply has to say: "This is why we take this position." Members opposite can say: "Right, and we disagree. We think you're wrong. It's too short or it's too long." We'll disagree, and we'll get on with it.

Back to the question. The specific question has to do, one, with the historical pattern -- simply that this is the pattern in this industry especially. Number two, back to the. . . .

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: It is, yeah. The pattern in construction is two-to-three-year agreements.

Number two is, again, what we've referred to on many occasions as the unique nature of the construction industry -- that typically workers do not have an attachment to a single employer at a single worksite.

[ Page 10115 ]

On a more technical question, I note that section 55.13 makes reference to sections 55.15 and 55.26, which we have not yet got to but which we will get to. Then in subsection 55.13(2) it says: "Despite subsection (1), a project collective agreement may be for a term that ends when the project is completed." I think that begs a couple of questions. If this is subject to section 55.26, which essentially says it must be a three-year term . . . . It doesn't say "more than three years," which is the language here. It says it has to be for three years and stipulates May 1.

I wonder what the thinking is that would suggest that a construction industry collective agreement may in fact be for a shorter duration. In other words, I understand that what you're attempting to do in the negotiation with the ICI work that's being done through the CLRA is. . . . They're going to have three-year collective agreements. That's the norm. Now, we can argue why it's that. . . .

Interjection.

G. Wilson: You're right; we're not going to agree on that.

In fact, hon. Chair, I would say that this section has been craftily worded. It's virtually unamendable -- to have an amendment that's in order. I found that out, having tried to find a way to amend this that is in order. It's virtually unamendable -- which was skilfully done, if that was the intent. If not, whoever did it should make note.

I'm curious to know why there is that distinction. I'm also curious to know, under subsection 55.13(2). . . . If in fact you have a four-year construction program, would that allow for a collective agreement that exceeds the three-year period?

Hon. D. Lovick: I asked this question myself in the early days of looking at this bill and said: well, why do we do that? So let me just answer. What we say in the general construction provision in division 1 or division 2 to the companies that may be smaller is "not more than three years." In other words, you may well discover that for your particular circumstances, a one-year contract is suitable. What we do in ICI, though, is three years, largely because that's essentially a matter of scale. As you know, we said from the beginning that we were trying to encourage some stability and so forth within that particular sector of the industry. That sector, as you know, tends to be larger. It's not small contractors, for the most part, in ICI. We thought that three years was suitable there, whereas we wanted to give a little more freedom of choice to the smaller operators in terms of "not more than three years" within the general construction sector. So that's the answer. Again, I'd make the point I made earlier that this too may be debatable, and we may have differences of opinion. But for what it's worth, that's the logic that lies behind this.

G. Wilson: Well, I was tempted to actually try to move an amendment to it, but I find that the language makes it almost unamendable, which is clever.

However, section 55.13(2) says: "Despite subsection (1), a project collective agreement may be for a term that ends when the project is completed." To be sure, the vast majority of projects are completed prior to three years. However, there are large-scale projects that may be built over a four- or five-year period. So I'm assuming that this does not preclude a collective agreement that is even a CLRA-negotiated agreement to actually extend beyond a three-year term. Or does it mean that if it is ICI and CLRA-negotiated and it's a longer term, there has to be a renegotiation midway through the term of the construction program?

Hon. D. Lovick: Project agreements typically. . . . The terms of the project will determine themselves, for example, what wage compensation or something is. But the basic construct of a project agreement is that the life of the project is the entire contract period covered. The agreement dies with the project. I think that's the important point.

G. Wilson: Just to be clear, then, my last question is with respect to the notion of master agreements. We talk about establishing provincial standards, which I understand we're attempting to do here, so that we eliminate the vagaries of on-site collective bargaining and some of the problems. We're trying to find certainty with respect to the language. It's assumed, however, that there may be collective agreements that are in force with a particular union that might then move toward construction on that project and might negotiate terms and conditions that are different, as a result of the project agreement, from what may be seen as a CLRA and ICI agreement in general. Is that correct?

Hon. D. Lovick: Mr. Chairman, I'm a little bit confused, because I was trying to connect it with this section. Rather, we're talking about the project agreements section -- right?

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer is yes, absolutely. In terms of project agreements, they could be quite different. Again, it's usually by agreement of the parties and because of the fact that this will be a project where they may have a wage differential because everybody is working to make it happen within a limited time frame or something. There are all kinds of reasons why they might decide to deviate from a normal master agreement.

J. Dalton: I just want to take a particular look as well -- as the previous member did -- at something in subsection 55.13(2). We know that by definition a project collective agreement must logically be used for the term of the project; that could be two days or five years. We know, as well, that when we get to section 55.15, there may be an application to the minister dealing with this. Logically, again, it will be for the duration of the project.

[8:15]

[ Page 10116 ]

Section 2, section 55.13 approved.

On section 2, section 55.14.

C. Hansen: On this particular section, I would like to start by proposing an amendment to this, if I may. The amendment I'm proposing to section 55.14 is:

[To delete the words "as a result of the employer having recognized the trade union as the agent to bargain collectively on behalf of a unit of employees."]

On the amendment.

C. Hansen: Hon. Chair, my rationale for putting forward this amendment is that I think it encompasses the intent of the free vote or the support that would have to be evidenced by the workers involved. We support that general concept. I think the amendment would strengthen it, and it would go a long way to addressing some of the other concerns we have raised in the past and certainly during second reading. I would welcome the minister's support for the amendment.

Hon. D. Lovick: What we are going to do is have a look at the amendment and check the wording and see whether it is indeed workable. This seems to me a wonderfully exquisite opportunity to suggest a brief recess of the committee. I would do so, if I may. Shall we say seven to eight minutes or something like that?

The committee recessed from 8:19 p.m. to 8:28 p.m.

[W. Hartley in the chair.]

Hon. D. Lovick: I want to thank the member for the amendment and for sharing a copy of it with me. After some examination of it, I can't accept it, simply because it seems to me that intentionally or not, what this amendment would do is take away the right of the workers affected by the agreement to have a say in it. The intention of the legislation, effectively, is to ensure that workers have a say in these voluntary recognition agreements signed between the union and the employer. That's why we asked for the process of ratification. By taking out the particular clause here, we're effectively allowing the two parties, if you will, to make a deal exclusive of the workers and what the legitimate concerns of the workers are. So on that basis, then, I simply can't accept it.

C. Hansen: Perhaps I should have spoken to the amendment in a bit more detail, because the minister may be reading something other than what I have amended here. Specifically, the words that I am deleting are "as a result of the employer having recognized the trade union as the agent to bargain collectively on behalf of a unit of employees." The wording that we would be left with is the following: "On or after the date this section comes into force, a collective agreement entered into by a trade union and a construction employer has no effect until. . . " a ratification takes place. What we're saying is that this would not apply just to that limited number of collective agreements but, rather, would apply broadly.

This comes back to a theme that we have talked about consistently, and that is the right of workers to have a say in deciding on a collective agreement by a vote and a secret ballot. What we're saying is that there should be a ratification vote not just for collective agreements as a result of voluntary recognized trade unions; in fact, there should be a ratification vote for all collective agreements, regardless of whether or not they're a result of a voluntary recognition or not.

[8:30]

Largely because, as I say, this does not obtain in other parts of the code or other places in the code, we're therefore very reluctant to make this unique for this one particular sector of the industry. In that sense, then, no, we don't accept the amendment.

C. Hansen: This begs the question. . . . The same argument applies to the section as it is worded. What you're doing is bringing in a provision for a ratification vote in the case of voluntarily recognized collective agreements in the construction industry. It doesn't apply to any other sector in our economy. It doesn't apply to any other collective agreement that's voluntarily recognized under the Labour Code. I think the argument that the minister made has some validity, but it's not relevant to the amendment. It's relevant to the main section, as he has presented it in Bill 26.

Hon. D. Lovick: The essential difference is simply that normally employers freely choose the union they wish. When we talk about voluntary recognition, what we're essentially talking about is the employer choosing a union. That's the difference.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Oh -- I meant that employees freely choose the union in a normal certification and collective bargaining arrangement. Voluntary recognition is, as I say, quite different from that; therefore that's why we subject that to ratification.

C. Hansen: Hon. Chair, this would apply, as well, for example, where you have a remedial certification. In a remedial certification, you've got no evidence of broad support for the certification. We don't want to get into the argument as to whether remedial certifications or the way we approach them are good or bad. Certainly the amendment that I have put forward now would also encompass remedial

[ Page 10117 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: The member may well choose to argue that, and that's his absolute right. But I don't accept the amendment, for reasons I attempted to elucidate. I will just remind him that remedial certifications, by definition, are when the process has gone awry; something has happened that ought not to have happened. I don't accept the amendment.

G. Plant: I want to come back to one other point that the minister made in his first explanation of the rationale for why he was rejecting the amendment. I don't want to misstate his reasons, but it had something to do with the importance of ensuring, in the context of voluntary recognition agreements, that the agreement represents the wishes of the employees. That is, he's arguing from the perspective of the importance of the recognition of the wishes of the employees in this particular context and suggesting that the way you test that, as the section provides, is to have a ratification vote.

It seems to me that if we are interested in ensuring that we have the wishes of the employees, then we should have those wishes -- both with respect to the selection of the union that the employees belong to and with the selection of, or the terms of, the particular collective agreement at issue. That's why a ratification vote on the agreement makes sense, I say, for both voluntary recognition agreement situations and for other situations. What I'm saying is: I accept the minister's rationale for defending the provision, but I don't think it prevents him from supporting the amendment. Rather, I think it argues in favour of the amendment. If, as the minister says, the reason we're doing ratification votes in voluntary agreement cases is because we want to identify the wishes of the employees, I'm not sure why we shouldn't do the same thing in the case of other agreements. That is what the amendment would do.

My question to the minister is: how is it that the rationale that works so well for him in one respect doesn't apparently allow him to support the amendment?

Hon. D. Lovick: Two points, Mr. Chairman. Number one is that we don't do this for other agreements in the code, so we are conferring kind of an unique quality on it. But more importantly -- and I apologize for being a little obtuse here -- on reflection, it seems to be pretty clear that what we're looking at doing with this amendment is changing the intent of the section. We're going much beyond what's intended here -- voluntary recognition agreements -- and we're expanding the section much beyond that. I would suggest, therefore, that the amendment is out of order. There may be some other part in the bill where the member wants to present some similar argument, but this is not the right place to do so. It is indeed out of order.

C. Hansen: I gather that the amendment stands. It's been substantially debated. I think we've made our case on both sides, and I'm prepared to allow the vote to be put on it.

Amendment negatived on the following division:

YEAS -- 22
Sanders	de Jong	Plant
Abbott	Reid	Chong
Whittred	Jarvis	Anderson
Nettleton	Penner	Weisbeck
Hawkins	Coleman	Stephens
Hansen	Thorpe	Symons
Barisoff	Dalton	Masi
	J. Wilson

 

YEAS -- 34
Evans	Zirnhelt	McGregor
Kwan	Hammell	Boone
Streifel	Pullinger	Lali
Orcherton	Stevenson	Calendino
Walsh	Randall	Gillespie
Robertson	Cashore	Conroy
Priddy	Petter	Miller
Dosanjh	MacPhail	Lovick
Farnworth	Waddell	Sihota
Smallwood	Sawicki	Bowbrick
Kasper	Doyle	Giesbrecht
	Janssen

G. Plant: Still dealing with the process for the ratification of voluntarily recognized collective agreements, the way this works is that unless a certain procedure is followed, the statute says that the collective agreement has no effect. What does that mean in terms of the employment relationship between an employer and employees in a situation where the two criteria have not been met? What does it mean to say that the agreement has no effect? What would be the terms and conditions of employment in such a situation?

[8:45]

[E. Gillespie in the chair.]

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer to that in all cases such as this is, essentially: whatever circumstances obtained before the signing of the agreement. That's what is automatically in place until such time as something new comes into place. It could be no agreement in this case -- right?

G. Plant: In which case it's a free-for-all. I guess the question is whether it's in anybody's best interests to essentially leave the employees without any terms and conditions of employment. I want to be sure I'm understanding the implications of this. I'm not sure what the rate of pay would be for employees in such a situation. Is the minister able to shed any further light on that? Or is it really sort of "let anarchy prevail"?

Hon. D. Lovick: I thank the member for his question. My colleague here is giving me some information that may clarify this matter. The agreement that is signed is still something under which workers and employers can function. The important point is that it doesn't have any standing under the Labour Code. In other words, the conditions that have ostensibly been agreed to by the parties can function. They can operate quite comfortably, as it were, but they don't have

[ Page 10118 ]

G. Plant: I think that the minister may essentially be qualifying in some way the words "has no effect," to say that what that means is that such an agreement has no effect for the purposes of whatever statutory rights and responsibilities may exist under the Labour Relations Code, but that in other respects it may still have some effect. I'm not sure that I'm able to elucidate that distinction. But it's the minister that's drawing it, so perhaps he could do that for me.

Interjection.

G. Plant: Well, I'm trying to draw a distinction that I think emerges from what the minister has said. What I think the minister means, among other things, is that the parties to such an agreement could not go to the Labour Relations Board to enforce -- I don't know -- unfair labour practices or some provisions of the code that would apply when there's a regime of a collective agreement in place, but that in other respects -- that is, for purposes outside the Labour Relations Code -- the agreement may still have some effect. I'm trying to make some sense of the distinction in light of the language that's being used.

Hon. D. Lovick: The member's observation is quite correct, Madam Chair. He's right.

C. Hansen: I have an amendment that I would like to move, which I think might address some of these problems. I gave a copy to the minister earlier, and I believe the Clerk has a signed copy.

The amendment is to change the wording. The wording as we have it now is: "On or after the date this section comes into force, a collective agreement entered into by a trade union. . .has no effect. . . . " The way it's worded in the act is somewhat ambiguous, I believe, because it can be read in two very different ways. It can be read that any collective agreement that was in existence is null and void as of the date that this section comes into place. Or it could be read in the context of a collective agreement entered into at a date some time in the future. I believe that the amendment I am proposing clarifies this. It would read:

[A collective agreement entered into on or after the date this section comes into force, by a trade union and a construction employer as a result of the employer having recognized the trade union as the agent to bargain collectively on behalf of a unit of employees has no effect until. . . .]

On the amendment.

C. Hansen: I think that brings some clarity to this. It allows for the negotiation of collective agreements, with this section in mind. The agreements that already exist would not be declared null and void. You're not going to wind up with groups of employees who are suddenly going to find themselves totally without a collective agreement, or at least without the enforcement of a collective agreement by way of the Labour Relations Board. You wind up with some certainty being brought into this.

Frankly, I think this is something that should be of concern to all of the unions that are operating in the construction industry, because clearly, there are collective agreements that exist today that involve craft unions. There are collective agreements that exist today involving industrial-style unions. What this says is: "Let's bring clarity to this thing so that the collective agreement is one that is entered into after the section comes into force" -- which means that those that currently exist, when they are up for renegotiation, obviously would have to be renegotiated in the context of this section and this provision that is going to require the ratification vote. I certainly feel that it improves the legislation and brings that kind of clarity. I would ask for the minister's support for it.

Hon. D. Lovick: Madam Chair, there are a number of answers one could adduce at this point. Let me just give the shortest one, rather than get involved in a long debate that isn't going to take us anywhere. I am advised that, in preparing the legislation, we considered the possibility of making a change of precisely the kind the member refers to. Legislative counsel advises that our wording is better and achieves what we want it to better. Therefore we are sticking with that language and not accepting the amendment.

C. Hansen: But the existing language will basically say that at the point when the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council proclaims this section, there is going to be a whole slew of collective agreements -- which have been freely negotiated, involving all kinds of different unions -- that suddenly are going to, as it says here, have no effect. The minister explained earlier that this meant that it would have no effect before the LRB. But, in fact, that is the arbitrator of issues involving collective agreements. So if you have a collective agreement that has absolutely no effect in terms of the Labour Relations Board, what good is it? It's not an enforceable collective agreement. I would argue that this is something that puts workers at risk from the time this section is proclaimed until such time as the ratification vote can take place. I wonder why the minister would put workers at risk in this manner.

Hon. D. Lovick: Madam Chair, the more I hear about this, the more I'm prepared to acknowledge that perhaps there's some validity to this that I hadn't thought of before. So with the member's permission, I'm agreeing to stand this down. We'll come back and have another look at it -- okay? I thank the member for his input; I appreciate it.

The Chair: We are standing down section 2, section 55.14 for the time being and moving on, then, to section 55.15.

On section 2, section 55.15.

C. Hansen: This is a section, if I can find the right page and the right bill. . . . We don't want to be talking about Bill 44, do we? I guess I would like to ask the minister specifically about subsection (3) which says: "If the minister allows the establishment of a project collective agreement under this section, the collective agreement negotiated by the parties for that project takes precedence over all other collective agreements." I'm wondering if the minister sees a provision for a ratification vote in this section, where you've got a collective agreement negotiated, as we have learned earlier, by potentially three parties: the project owner, the project employer and the trade unions. Yet the one party that potentially could be eliminated from this process is the workers themselves, in terms of agreeing to terms and conditions of a collective agreement that may be imposed by this section. I'm wondering if the minister could explain why a ratification vote would not be included in this kind of a provision.

Hon. D. Lovick: The nature of agreements such as this is that these are negotiated before there are employees. That's typically the way a major project works.

[ Page 10119 ]

[9:00]

Our sense is that this particular provision will very likely rarely be utilized, but we recognize from past experience that having provisions for major projects and major project collective agreements seems to be a good idea -- therefore this provision.

C. Hansen: The minister's comments about no employees almost indicates that he may be envisioning that this would only happen in the case of a closed-shop model. Would this not lend itself to a union shop model as well as to a closed-shop model? The minister certainly wouldn't want to put that kind of restriction on it in the language he uses in Hansard. Is it just. . . ? My question to the minister is: could this not apply to employers that would be coming into a major project that would be union shop employers?

Hon. D. Lovick: It is not the case that projects of this sort must be union shop or unionized construction alone. Traditionally, however, that is indeed the case. The unionized contractors do this, and part of the deal that is made before the workers actually begin working or are on the job, before the work begins, is: "We will give you this kind of agreement; we will give you this kind of stability." That's the exercise, and they have the power to do that as union contractors. I think that is probably the historical development in major project agreements of this sort.

C. Hansen: On the subject of existing projects, will they continue? Will projects that currently exist where there are collective agreements continue, or will they be required to fall under the provisions of this section?

Hon. D. Lovick: Our take is that, first of all, there is nothing in the works that would be captured by this. That's my first point. Second, our take is that projects of this sort will almost inevitably involve only ICI projects. That's our take, simply because they're the only kind likely to qualify for having the scale, if you will, and the requisite need for changing agreements and being able to deliver changing agreements. Let me be more specific, if I might. A major project agreement in ICI, for example, would allow or could allow for opting out of certain provisions of the industry standard agreement. That would be the payment, if you will, for getting that larger contract for the major project. That would be the incentive, I guess, to have the major project. They would be able to offer that they are prepared to opt out and give a better deal in order to ensure that this project will continue to completion. As we know in some others. . . . For example, one of the agreements in highway construction projects or, in the past, in the dams built in this province under W.A.C. Bennett. . . . "No strike, no lockout" was the standard provision in those kinds of project agreements. That's an illustration of what we envisage here.

C. Hansen: The approach that's been taken in Ontario, at least. . . . I can't speak for all the provinces, but I understand that Ontario has a provision for these kinds of major project agreements. But it doesn't require the minister's involvement; it doesn't require that the Minister of Labour be sort of the arbitrator of what is or is not. I would like the minister to explain why this is a power that should be given to the minister.

Hon. D. Lovick: A primary caution is to ensure that project agreements are not put forward as a means to circumvent the Labour Code. We're not sure about Ontario, but our understanding in terms of the other jurisdictions that have something like this -- namely, Alberta, Newfoundland and New Brunswick -- is that it is either the minister or the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council who has that discretionary power. That, again, is simply to ensure two things: (1) that the agreement isn't designed simply to circumvent the existing labour legislation and (2) that it is indeed of major economic significance -- as it ought to be to trigger this kind of development.

C. Hansen: I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us the criteria he would follow in his capacity as Minister of Labour with regard to this particular section.

Hon. D. Lovick: We're truly in the realm of speculation as this point, Madam Chair. I haven't put my mind to that. It would seem to me that it would essentially be a matter of the proponents coming up with some idea that obviously satisfied the criteria that I've just enunciated. I gave an example earlier of something like the Vancouver Trade and Convention Centre. That's the kind of thing I could see where people would say: "Yes, this is exciting and significant and is going to change the economic reality for a large proportion of the population in the region of the province and it is sufficiently important, given its linkages with transportation networks and everything else, that we want to make sure that it proceeds apace and that we don't have any glitches, predicaments or problems along the way." That's the kind of thing I could see that might well fall into the ambit of a major project. But beyond that, no, I haven't put my mind to it at all. So I can't be more specific and say, "Yeah, I've got five in mind," or something like that.

C. Hansen: The minister will have to forgive me for being a little bit skeptical when it comes to how this section may be implemented. I would just like the minister's assurance that in whatever criteria he develops in his interpretation of applying this section, certainly the question of what unions are involved, and whether they are industrial-style unions or craft unions, would not be a factor in his decision as to what would constitute a major project.

Hon. D. Lovick: I would think that the nature of the union -- or what union, more specifically -- would probably be a distant consideration. It would seem to me that the dollar value, the importance of the project and things of that sort -- as well as the requisite qualification of a workforce, what kinds of things we are building and might be doing, and who

[ Page 10120 ]

The example I would offer would be something like the Vancouver Island Highway project, where other firms, non-union firms, were certainly allowed to participate in that. They had to buy into that major project agreement -- something governed, essentially, by fair-wage legislation and so forth. They had to join a union for the duration of the contract, but it certainly wasn't a closed shop or anything like that. The recent history would demonstrate that the criteria that were established in terms of setting up a project like that were fair and legitimate and indeed balanced, it seems to me.

C. Hansen: Subsection (2) reads: "An application under subsection (1) must be in the form and contain the information required by the minister." I gather from the minister's comments that there has really been no work done on what information may be required by the minister in this regard. Once this legislation passes, are we at stage one of trying to develop that kind of information -- the forms that may be required?

Hon. D. Lovick: The answer to this, I think, is largely commonsensical -- namely, that obviously, if somebody comes to a minister, any minister, with a project, there are going to be a number of questions like: "How long is it going to go on? How many people might be employed? What disruptions do you see?" -- a number of questions of that sort. I think that's the reason why that particular stipulation is there.

G. Plant: Just so I understand how the provision works, it's entirely possible that the minister's requirements as to form and information might vary from application to application -- that is, there is not going to be a prescribed form, necessarily, under the regulations here. It's more a matter of, shall we say, ministerial discretion major project application by major project application. Is that how the minister. . . ? That's how I read the section. Is that correct?

Hon. D. Lovick: The member is quite correct.

G. Plant: I guess what I mean is only to sort of observe the breadth of the minister's discretion in this regard. The minister is essentially given the power to make such enquiries as he or she may consider appropriate in the circumstances and then to exercise a fairly broadly expressed discretion as to whether a particular project is the kind of project which the minister is prepared to give this status to. It's pretty open-ended power. Am I reading it generally correctly?

Hon. D. Lovick: Yes, the member is quite right.

Section 2, section 55.15 approved.

On section 2, section 55.16.

C. Hansen: This is the section that entrenches the jurisdictional assignment plan in our legislation for the first time. I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us why it is seen to be necessary to entrench the jurisdictional assignment plan in our legislation for the first time. The jurisdictional assignment plan has been in operation for a number of years now, and it's been operating without provision in statute. I'm wondering if the minister could tell us why it is felt to be necessary to bring it into the Labour Code.

[9:15]

C. Hansen: There's one very small change -- I guess it was one of three very minor changes that were brought into the legislation from the draft legislation that was in the Kelleher-Lanyon report -- and that's in subsection (3). I'm wondering if the minister could explain to us why this change was deemed to be necessary, when there are so many others that seem to be even more glaring that were not actioned. It reads: "In making a decision respecting assignments and distribution of work, the umpire must consider. . . ." And in the original wording it said: ". . .the umpire will consider. . . ." Given how few amendments there were, it was obviously one of significance, and I'm wondering why it was deemed to be important.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: I overheard my colleague the Minister of Advanced Education -- who, as we know, has a pretty solid legal background -- say "standard drafting language."

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: Is it new? Ah, new standard drafting language.

My information is simply that legislative counsel has said, "This is the language we require," so that's the reason for the change.

C. Hansen: We've all learned a little bit tonight, thanks to my colleague from Richmond-Steveston.

I want to introduce an amendment to this section. It's specifically regarding subsection (2). It currently reads: "On or after the date this section comes into force, the provisions of the plan are deemed to be a part of every collective agreement negotiated by an employer and a trade union for a craft bargaining unit in the construction industry." My amendment reads:

[By adding after the words, "in the construction industry" add the words "where such employer is certified for two or more craft bargaining units"]

C. Hansen: Just to speak to that for a moment, what we have in this provision is a jurisdictional dispute process that allows for two craft unions to sort out who in fact should be doing the work. I don't want to get into the lengthy debate about why this begs the question of the rationale behind Bill 26. We've spoken at length about why this kind of jurisdictional dispute is part of the instability that we have and have

[ Page 10121 ]

What my amendment speaks to is the fact that this particular section addresses jurisdictional disputes between crafts where there is more than one craft. The purpose of my amendment is to say that it should only apply to an employer that has more than one craft. If you've only got one craft, there is not the potential for that employer to be faced with a jurisdictional dispute. So therefore, when it comes down to issues such as who should pay for this process and who should be forced into this process, it's logical that it should involve those who need the process to sort out their jurisdictional disputes. It doesn't seem to me that an employer that has only one craft would have a requirement for a dispute resolution system.

[E. Walsh in the chair.]

Hon. D. Lovick: The member makes a perfectly valid point, if what he premised his conclusion on was absolutely correct. The problem is that that's not the case, simply because it is possible to have a construction site where you have four different employers, each with its particular representatives of a particular craft. The disputes, then, can be between those four different employers and their workers just as they can be between different craft unions. That's why the amendment is not acceptable. But it's a perfectly legitimate question to raise, and I thank the member for doing it.

Amendment negatived on division.

C. Hansen: On the main section, if I can jump down to the bottom to subsection (7), where we talk about the reasonable fees that must be paid, I wonder if the minister could elaborate on who defines what is reasonable in this context.

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm not sure that I heard the member's question correctly. Perhaps I didn't, because it seems self-evident that the answer to the question I heard is that the people who will decide will be the trustees of the plan. Perhaps there's something more to the question. I'm sorry, I don't mean to be patronizing. If I am, I apologize.

The member may like to know that the current plan that operates is apparently 1.5 cents per hour worked. That's what governs the industry at the moment in terms of the reasonable fees.

C. Hansen: What I'm going to do is put an amendment forward on this section, and then perhaps we can pursue some of these issues in the context of the amendment. The amendment that I'm proposing is to delete the word "employer" and to substitute thereafter the words "trade union."

On the amendment.

C. Hansen: What we currently have is wording that says: "An employer that is a party to a collective agreement referred to in subsection (2) must promptly pay to the trustees of the plan any reasonable fees established by the trustees." Here we've got a plan that is being set up to resolve jurisdictional disputes between differing unions.

Just to give a specific case that is recent history. . . . There's a case involving the glaziers union and the Iron Workers Union over the construction of a large office complex in Burnaby. The work was assigned to the glaziers union, and it was the Iron Workers Union that contested whether or not in fact that was work that should have been given to the ironworkers. The hapless victim in this whole process was the employer. The employer had to initiate the work to one of the craft unions. In the opinion of the employer, it was work that should go to the glaziers, so that's how he set up the project -- for the glaziers to do this work.

This went to the Labour Relations Board, which was, I guess, a very substantive hearing. It took a considerable amount of time. In the end, this dispute that was really between these two craft unions over who should do the work. . . . In the end, if it had been determined by the umpire of the jurisdictional assignment plan -- not the Labour Relations Board -- that this in fact should have been work done by the ironworkers, then the employer would have been liable for back wages to the ironworkers from the point that that project started. The employer is very much a victim in these things, when it comes down to the disputes that are really between two unions.

The purpose of my amendment is to say that in this process it's not the employer that should have to pay for that process. It's the union that should have to pay for that process, if they're sorting out the jurisdictional disputes between those two unions. I know that one of the things the minister is maybe wanting to stand up and say is that under the current jurisdictional assignment plan it is the employers that pay, but there's an important distinction here, and that's that the current jurisdictional assignment plan is a voluntary process -- which the minister himself said a few moments ago. Under our Labour Relations Code, we are forcing employers and unions to be part of this process. Now what you're doing is saying that it is the employer that should pay for that process of sorting out these disputes between unions. Therefore, if the minister could explain the rationale behind the wording that's proposed -- or, alternately, just indicate that he'll accept all our amendments -- we'll get on with the other sections.

Hon. D. Lovick: I know I could make life so much more easy and simple if I would just agree; that's obviously the case, Madam Chair.

I guess I'm tempted to invoke the classic, small-c conservative response and say that this is the way it's always been done -- so why change it now? That is indeed the case. The reason for having a plan is to prevent precisely the kind of circumstance that the member referred to earlier. Indeed, I understand that one of the parties involved in that dispute had opted out of the plan. That may indeed have something to do with it. We're talking about a plan that we think is very clearly in the employer's interest to have in place. Obviously, if we're having an unhappy worksite and people are threatening to shut it down because somebody is claiming that another person is doing the work that rightly belongs to him or her, that's certainly not helping the employer. Indeed, it is costing that individual or that corporation money.

We think it's absolutely legitimate. As I say, this system has, I think, worked very well. To quote another line that members are fond of using: "If it ain't broke, why fix it?" I don't think this one's broke; I don't think it needs fixing. Therefore I don't think the amendment is necessary, and I shan't accept it.

G. Plant: Picking up the minister's logic, which I must admit I like to do, what ain't broke here, of course, arguably is the fact that the existing jurisdictional dispute arrangements

[ Page 10122 ]

It probably would be a bit of a healthy deterrent, one might think, to trade unions -- to encourage them to continue to be responsible in contending that there are jurisdictional issues -- if in fact they were to have to bear the costs associated with the invocation of the process. In fact, we do that in lots of other places in the legal system. We make sure that the people who are invoking the process are, at the end of the day, the people who have to pay for it.

[9:30]

I listened to the minister's explanation of the rationale for leaving this in place, and I'm not persuaded. I'd like to leave it on the basis that I'll give the minister one more opportunity to try and explain to me why, other than the argument about the force of inertia, under this new regime it is fair -- that is, that the right balance is the balance that says employers have to pay, as opposed to trade unions.

Hon. D. Lovick: Not too many minutes ago, the member and I exchanged some Latin. So I'm going to begin by reminding him that I know he is animal rationis capax -- being capable of reason. I'm now going to give him the short, concise, quintessential reason why this is as it is, and I know he will be persuaded thereupon. The reason, essentially, is that it is the manager or the employer who decides which workers will do which jobs; they're the ones who assign workers. They therefore, in the event of a dispute, have created the problem.

It surely follows, therefore, that if they are the ones who create the problem and the ones who will benefit from the resolution or solution to the problem, then logically they ought to pay for the plan which ideally will preclude disputes of this sort and will solve those problems. I think that's a perfectly logical explanation. I'm sure the member will say, "Thank you -- I appreciate you clarifying it for me, minister," and we can now move on to the next section. Let's see.

G. Plant: Well, I think we have an amendment on the floor. So I have to say, with some regret, that I am unable to give the minister the assurance that he wants and that -- and I think this is something he has said already this evening -- this is going to be one of those occasions when we will just have to disagree.

C. Hansen: I just want to add to my colleague's comments. The minister was talking about logic, and I just have to say that it was very twisted logic. With that, I regret that the minister won't accept our amendment, but we can deal with it.

Amendment negatived.

Some Hon. Members: On division.

C. Hansen: In subsection 55.16(2). . . . First of all, this is a plan. I want to refer, first of all, to the definition that's in here under "plan": " 'plan' means the plan for resolving work assignment and other jurisdictional issues established by CLRA and the BC and Yukon Territory Building and Construction Trades Council." Yet the only other place in this bill where we talk about the CLRA is in division 2, which talks about ICI collective bargaining specifically.

What we have is a plan that currently exists, that has been set up between those two organizations. Yet this particular section is the section that applies to the entire construction industry, not just the ICI sector. I recognize that the CLRA is being given some very special powers, which, of course, we will discuss when we get to that section. But in here we have a plan that they say specifically has to be the CLRA and the Building Trades Council. I'm wondering if the minister can explain why it is that we are entrenching in legislation a plan that is specifically administered by those two bodies. Why would we give it to those two bodies, rather than set up the mechanism by which employers can choose and trade unions that are affected can choose the organizations they wish to have the administration responsibility of this?

Hon. D. Lovick: I thank the member for his question. I have a number of answers, starting with the most prosaic: the existing plan works. Second, the plan that works has indeed been developed by those two parties over some time; they have considerable experience. Third, jurisdictional assignment plans refer only to the craft union sector of the industry. You don't have jurisdictional disputes between anybody but craft unions. The BCYBT and the CLRA are the people who, by definition, work within the craft union sector of the industry and therefore have the most expertise and the most knowledge. For those reasons, they are the logical keepers of that process.

Finally, I would point out that I don't think one needs to be in any way concerned about this. The normal adversarial relationship between employers and workers obtains, given that the CLRA represents companies and the BCYBT is workers, unions. The creative tension that frequently exists in that environment will certainly be there. It isn't the case, then, that CLRA contractors have anything to gain by setting up a jurisdictional assignment plan that might hurt somebody who isn't part of the CLRA. Similarly, I can't imagine the circumstance in which BCYBT would do anything to create a jurisdictional assignment plan that would not be helpful to all craft union workers, whatever kind of worksite they happen to be on.

C. Hansen: I accept the minister's rationale with regard to the Building Trades Council, but the same rationale does not apply to the CLRA. As the minister said, all of the craft unions are or will be, as a result of this, part of the Building Trades Council.

But the case of the employer side does not follow. As a result of Bill 26, those companies that are organized on a craft

[ Page 10123 ]

We're talking about companies in the residential construction industry, for example, that may well get caught up in this, yet you say that this act doesn't have an impact on residential. You've got employers outside the ICI sector who are now going to be forced into this particular jurisdictional assignment plan administered by the CLRA. Why wouldn't the minister set up a process whereby the employers affected by this have the right to choose who they wish to have administer the plan on their behalf? Why is this being handed specifically to one particular organization known as the Construction Labour Relations Association?

Hon. D. Lovick: My goodness, the member seems almost to be working himself into high dudgeon, and I don't quite understand why.

Interjection.

Hon. D. Lovick: I've heard the same cautionary note, but there's no reason to be concerned about this. Let me remind the member that other employers have in fact bought into the CLRA plan because it works. It's a good one and has been around for a long time -- a CLRA and union one. It works. There's nothing really new under the sun in this stuff. This is pretty straightforward: you work out a good working relationship in terms of solving jurisdictional disputes, and you get the people with the most expertise to do it.

The primary reason -- or another primary reason; I think I've given three or four already -- for suggesting the CLRA is that they do have considerable experience, as I've already said. They also have experience in the past where these plans were developed -- outside ICI construction. What we obviously wanted in setting up a jurisdictional assignment plan that would cover the industry for craft unions, not just ICI, was somebody. . . . And you need to do that, obviously, because there are craft unions working in areas other than the ICI sectors -- like roadbuilding, for example.

What you want is somebody (a) with that experience and (b) with that knowledge of something that's already in place. Why start over, creating an extra burden on people and saying: "Right. Now we want you all to establish some kind of association where you go out and then are given this mammoth task of starting from scratch to build a jurisdictional assignment plan"? Why not take what's there? As I've already said, I can't understand why anybody would be concerned about that.

It isn't as if we're conferring power on this body that's going to do all kinds of nasty things to other employers. If I'm missing something and the member has some scenario he wants to share with me to show that this may be somehow injuriously affecting other employers who employ craft union workers, please share it with me. I sure can't see anything like that now, and therefore I am frankly amazed that we're having this debate about this relatively simple matter.

G. Plant: I listened to the minister's answer with interest, because I heard him saying, essentially, what a great thing this jurisdictional assignment plan is. Why, it's so great that a number of employers have already bought into it. That's how the minister answered my colleague's question about the fact that other employers are going to have to now be part of the CLRA plan. I want to go back to a more fundamental question about section 55.16 generally.

If this jurisdictional assignment plan is so great, why impose it? Why not let all the employers flock to it? Why not let free collective bargaining decide the issue? Why impose this regime? If it has the merits that the minister attributes to it, then let those merits speak for themselves. Let the plan sell itself. The minister's answer to my colleague's question about subsection (2) seems to me, with respect, to be a pretty good statement of the reasons why you should not have this section in the bill in the first place.

I'm at a loss to understand why we need this further imposition or further constraint on collective bargaining. Perhaps the minister could answer that more fundamental question: if this thing is so great, why does it have to become imposed on the entire construction industry?

[9:45]

I would also clarify a point I made just a moment ago, Madam Chair, because if I misled, I didn't mean to -- namely, about who runs the plan. It isn't the CLRA that runs the plan specifically; rather, it's the trustees chosen by the CLRA, as well as the workers and their council. I'll just offer that clarification, if I might.

G. Plant: I understand the minister's lack of desire to enter into the debate about why it's necessary to impose this. It does strike me, as you go through the details of this bill. . . . It's interesting in a number of ways that a bill that I think is supposed to be about free collective bargaining has, in some respects, so many provisions in it that in fact constrain free collective bargaining. But since we're not going to have that debate, I certainly won't pursue that issue.

One question, though, that is perhaps more technical has to do with the definition of the word "plan," which we've looked at already. A plan is defined as a particular plan and as the plan for resolving work assignment and other jurisdictional issues established by the CLRA and the Building Trades Council. Later, we're going to get to division 2, where there are specific provisions about the Construction Labour Relations Association. It's given new authority, but that authority doesn't take effect until the new constitution and bylaws of the CLRA are approved by the board. What I'm not clear on is the plan we're talking about now. Is it the plan that is currently in effect, or is it a plan that will come into effect after the CLRA reinvents itself? If it's the latter, what do we do in the meantime? And if it's the former, what happens when the CLRA reconstitutes itself?

Hon. D. Lovick: The current plan is now in effect.

G. Plant: I think what the minister meant to say is that the plan which is now in effect is the plan which will apply in

[ Page 10124 ]

Hon. D. Lovick: Yes.

C. Hansen: I want to go to subsection (6), where it says: "A trade union must not establish picket lines or engage in a strike because of the employer's or umpire's assignment of work, and a local union must not institute or post picket lines for jurisdictional purposes." I wonder if the minister could explain to us why we have this distinction between a trade union on the one hand, and a local union, on the other hand.

Hon. D. Lovick: The reason is simply that frequently you will discover that a given trade union will have locals of the union based in various geographical areas. What can happen then is that the Carpenters Union, for instance -- local whatever in Nanaimo -- will see a project being carried out in Nanaimo, and a significant number of the people working as certified carpenters on that project will be from other than the Nanaimo local. So the local union, then -- that's what it means: the local union -- is also enjoined, if you will, from disrupting that work by the jurisdictional assignment plan. It's simply an extra protection. It's not just for possible disputes between one union and another, one craft and another; it's also for different locals within a given trade union, a given craft. I hope I've explained that.

G. Plant: I think I'm getting this. Let me just see if I am, by asking about one aspect of the difference between the two halves of the section. In the first half, the trade union can't engage in a strike; that's one of the prohibitions. That's not a prohibition that applies in respect of the second half -- that is, the local union. The reason that would be so is because the local union is not in this case actually doing the work on the job site which is at issue. Am I beginning to understand the distinction?

Hon. D. Lovick: I'm beginning to appreciate this. I think the member is, indeed, and I thank him for the elucidation. Maybe we ought to do this on a more regular basis. This is a nice way to establish precisely what we're talking about. Thank you.

C. Hansen: I certainly think the way it is presented is somewhat tortured. Maybe we can just clarify it with this question: are there any circumstances in which it is envisioned that a trade union or a local union or any union would be entitled to post picket lines in the case of a jurisdictional dispute?

Hon. D. Lovick: There are no circumstances that we can envisage in which that would happen, and were something like that to happen, it would be an illegal strike. It would be a violation of the agreement.

G. Plant: We'll continue the education process here. I hope this is not being overly technical. What is the difference between, on the one hand, establishing picket lines and, on the other hand, instituting and posting picket lines? The section in its two halves again uses two different terms to describe what I think is intended to be generally the same activity. I'm not sure why there would be a difference in terminology. When we're speaking of the trade union, we don't want people to establish picket lines, but when we're speaking of the local union, we don't want them to institute or post picket lines.

Some lawyers reading this would argue that since the Legislature in its infinite wisdom is using different words, there is a presumption that it must be intending different things.

Hon. D. Lovick: I appreciate the point made by the member. The answer is another word, but it essentially means the same, and I am going to extend an invitation to the member opposite: if he wishes to suggest an amendment whereby we make them equivalent -- use "establish" in both instances here -- that would be acceptable. In other words, the amendment would say that we would delete the word "institute" and replace it with "establish" in that usage.

G. Plant: I appreciate the minister's willingness to make the change. I must admit that my thinking had reached as far as identifying what looked like a problem, and I was hoping that perhaps there was an explanation of why it wasn't the problem. I wonder if we could simply stand that provision down. We may come back tomorrow morning with a written amendment that gives effect to the minister's suggestion.

Hon. D. Lovick: Yes, I'm certainly prepared to do that, Madam Chair. I think I'll just give a caveat that because there's something else we're looking at already, I'll run that one by legislative counsel too, just in case there is some peculiar circumstance why they want the word "institute." We don't know; I certainly don't know.

With that, noting the hour, I would move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to it again.

Hon. D. Lovick moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 9:58 p.m.

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