1992 Legislative Session: 1st Session, 35th Parliament
HANSARD
(Hansard)
MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1992
Afternoon Sitting
Volume 7, Number 8
[ Page 4473 ]
The House met at 2:06 p.m.
Prayers.
L. Fox: This afternoon we are very privileged to have in the gallery two individuals who have come from a little further west than the geographical centre of British Columbia: Mr. Gordon McFee, who has been the chairman of the regional district of Bulkley-Nechako for 21 years, and with him the administrator, Mr. Holger Burke. Please make them welcome.
D. Mitchell: It's a special day for me today. I have here visiting with me and in the public galleries two members of the executive of my constituency association. Would the House please welcome, from West Vancouver-Garibaldi, Mr. Terry Lester and Mr. Doug Westcott.
The Speaker: I recognize the hon. member for West Vancouver-Garibaldi.
D. Mitchell: I rise today on a point of personal privilege. It has become increasingly difficult if not impossible for me to effectively serve my constituents as a member of the Liberal caucus. In the best interests of my constituents, I have therefore decided that I must dissociate myself from the caucus at this time. Hon. Speaker, I would therefore ask you to make the necessary arrangements for me to serve as an independent Liberal member of this Legislative Assembly. Thank you.
The Speaker: Would you please provide the Chair with your statement. Thank you, hon. member.
COMMERCIAL FISHING BUYBACK PROGRAM
G. Wilson: My question is to the Premier. Can he tell us what involvement, if any, his government has had with the federal government with respect to the proposed $7 million buyback to retire commercial fishing vessels to alleviate the problem when the affected transfers to aboriginal fishermen occur in British Columbia?
Hon. M. Harcourt: I'll take that question on notice.
G. Wilson: I have a supplementary question to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs. In light of the Pearse report released today and federal minister Crosbie's response that outlines the $7 million buyback program announced in June and July, will the minister tell us whether he has availed himself of the information contained a report on impacts of the commercial fishing industry on relocation of the aboriginal fishery that was conducted for the federal government? Will the minister tell us if he's aware of this report?
Hon. A. Petter: I haven't had a chance to see the report that came out today, and I'm not sure what other report the member is referring to. Perhaps he could repeat the question.
G. Wilson: It's somewhat astounding that the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, given the crisis that exists with respect to the fisheries in British Columbia, would not be aware of the intensive fishing losses in the Fraser that have been reported by Peter Pearse. In fact, he recommends a $7 million pilot buyback project, which is referred to in the minister's response. If he is not aware of the impact of the commercial fishing industry of relocations to the aboriginal fishery, will the minister tell us what course he intends to take to protect the commercial fishing industry in the province? Because this report, documented for the federal minister, would indicate that in fact such a transfer will retire the commercial fishery.
The Speaker: Order, please. Hon. member, that refers to a report the minister said he is not aware of. It appears your question would refer to future government policy.
RACISM IN SCHOOLS
J. Tyabji: My question is for the Premier. As the Premier is no doubt aware, we see some very disturbing trends in Surrey with regard to hate propaganda and racism. What concrete steps is the Premier taking to prevent the spread of racism to young children in the Surrey schools?
Hon. M. Harcourt: I agree that the reports we've heard over the last little while of some major hate groups in this province recruiting in the high schools is indeed something that we should all be concerned about. I think that when you look at the number of steps our government has taken to make everyone feel welcome in this province, particularly the visible minorities in appointments to boards and commissions, the equity programs we're introducing, the changes and strengthening of the B.C. Council of Human Rights and other measures to bring about tolerance and understanding among British Columbians, that's the direction all of us should be going.
J. Tyabji: My question is again to the Premier. I'm not talking about general intentions; I'm talking about specific measures. As we speak, white supremacist literature is being disseminated in the schools of Surrey. What concrete steps is the Premier taking with those specific actions to prevent the spread of racism?
Hon. M. Harcourt: If the member is aware of illegal action, if she has evidence that criminal or other laws of this land are being broken, if she is prepared to make that evidence known, if there is libel or slander, if there are laws that are being consciously broken and she is aware of those illegalities, then she should make that information known to the proper authorities, and we will take action.
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J. Tyabji: I find it shameful for the Premier to put the onus on me. I'm asking him what steps he is taking.
The Speaker: Your question, hon. member.
J. Tyabji: My question is for the government members -- the Attorney General this time. Has the Attorney General seized this material to see if it falls within the confines of the legislation on hate literature?
Hon. C. Gabelmann: Every citizen, even if they are an MLA, has the responsibility, if they are aware of material that possibly violates the Criminal Code, to make sure that the appropriate policing authorities have a copy of that....
Interjections.
The Speaker: Order, please. Please permit the minister to answer the question.
[2:15]
Hon. C. Gabelmann: Every citizen, MLAs included, have a responsibility to ensure that the appropriate policing authorities are in possession of material that may well violate the Criminal Code. The procedures are clear and well established in our society. The police investigate, and they will, by the Crown counsel process, make some determinations as to whether or not charges should be laid. Those decisions will be made by the Crown counsel.
ICBC MANAGEMENT MOTIVATION CONTRACT
G. Farrell-Collins: My question is to the Minister of Consumer Services. We learned recently that this government has graduated from drinking straws and ice-breaking to breaking boards with its bare hands. Can the minister explain why, when drivers are being socked with 28 percent increases over two years, a $45,000 contract has been let by ICBC to a firm specializing in soft lights and soothing music for ICBC managers, who are also learning personal motivation by breaking boards with their bare hands?
Hon. M. Sihota: There clearly needs to be a management shakeup at ICBC. I think I've said that before publicly, and I'll say it again today. I believe that there was a consultant hired for three months to do a number of things, which included some rather imaginative techniques in terms of bringing about communication within management at the corporation.
I have asked for a review from the corporation as to the nature of the contract, the purpose of the contract, what was achieved during the course of the seminars that were held, and what's expected to be achieved in the days ahead. Once I get that information I'll be happy to share it with members of the House.
G. Farrell-Collins: Well, what's been achieved is a 9.5 percent rate increase. Now you may call that imaginative. The people in this province call it taxes. It appears that a separate contract of $58,000 has been let to Mr. Tarry Sandhu, whose resume includes a stint as a full-time partner in a furniture store run by the labour minister's immediate family. Will the minister table today the credentials of all other consultants who responded to the call for tender?
Hon. M. Sihota: I briefly reviewed that matter this morning at an ICBC board meeting. I guess the questions are both timely. I'm not too sure if the corporation asked for a series of tenders with respect to that consulting work for the brokers or not, but I'll find out that information. It's my understanding, however, that the corporation regularly receives a series of resumes. It did in this case. Somewhere along the line there was an interview called for, and a decision made by Robyn Allan to engage the individual raised in your question.
It's also my understanding that Ms. Allan made the decision not just on her own, but did not realize that the individual had any prior association with myself until after she had made the decision to hire the individual involved.
G. Farrell-Collins: Then perhaps the minister will commit, given some of the things that this gentleman has done, in having to have apologies extracted from the head of ICBC....
Considering all those things, if the minister becomes aware that this contract was not tendered, perhaps he will sever it right away. Will he give us that commitment?
Hon. M. Sihota: Personnel matters are at the discretion of management and the president of ICBC. When issues such as these come to my attention, obviously I'll talk to ICBC -- and I have, with regard to this issue.
With regard to any decisions on consulting contracts or the termination thereof, that determination will be made by the president of ICBC.
IRC VICE-CHAIRS
L. Hanson: I have a question for the Minister of Labour. As a result of a question on June 16 last, the minister said that the former vice-chairs of the Industrial Relations Council had decided to leave -- I believe the quotation was "by mutual agreement."
Will the minister now confirm that, in fact, all five vice-chairs were fired without cause? Can he explain why those vice-chairs were fired, when their contracts specifically stipulated they could be terminated for only for misconduct, which was never alleged?
Hon. M. Sihota: If the question is whether I can confirm that they were terminated, no, I cannot confirm that on the basis on which you raised the question. My recollection of the situation back in June was that they left by mutual agreement.
L. Hanson: I have a letter from one of the fired vice-chairs, Shelley Nitikman, who suggested that the
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government's severance cost for the IRC terminations will be in excess of $1 million.
Can the minister tell us how much it cost the taxpayers to fire these quasi-judicial appointments for purely political reasons? And can he confirm that the no-cut provisions in the vice-chairs' contracts were intended to protect the independence and impartiality of the adjudicators and to prevent precisely this kind of political interference?
Hon. M. Sihota: I'll risk the temptation and simply say that if the question deals with the quantum paid out for severance, we will be happy to provide the House with that information.
L. Hanson: Well, Ms. Nitikman says that appointees to quasi-judicial tribunals must be provided with some security of tenure, so that they can act independently without fear of being terminated or fired for making decisions that the government doesn't like. Can the minister confirm that none of the new vice-chairs have a no-cut clause in their contract to prevent them from being fired for any reason other than misconduct?
Hon. M. Sihota: Again, personnel matters and matters of contractual arrangements with those who are working with the Industrial Relations Council are dealt with through Mr. Lanyon's office. Mr. Lanyon negotiates the contractual provisions, and I have not made it a practice to have direct input into the contractual terms of the individuals involved, particularly those who have been hired in replacement. Those decisions are made between Mr. Lanyon and the individuals as a matter of personnel agreements. I'm not aware of whether or not they have "no-cut provisions," as you put it, hon. member.
PUBLIC SERVICE WAGES
F. Gingell: At the annual meeting of the B.C. Federation of Labour, the Premier stated that in order to have funding for wage increases, we'd have to take funding away from providing services. Does the Premier mean that he has imposed a wage freeze on public service salaries in order to protect service levels?
Hon. M. Harcourt: No, I never used that term: wage freeze.
F. Gingell: The Minister of Labour has stated that the Minster of Finance makes the decision as to whether or not there is money for wage increases. Has the Minister of Finance informed the Premier of how much money will be available for public service wage increases in the future?
Hon. M. Harcourt: That, of course, is a question involving future policy and future budgets. I'm sure the member is aware of that. Hon. Speaker, unlike the rapidly disintegrating opposition caucus, where the Opposition House Leader and Whip applauded one of their member's leaving, I can say that this government is of one mind: we are in difficult financial circumstances. We are balancing quite ably the desire of our taxpayers not to be overly burdened with taxes, while providing good public health, education and social services to our citizens and treating our employees fairly. There are tough negotiations coming up, but this government is of one mind, unlike -- as I can say, unfortunately -- the opposition.
F. Gingell: The Premier did say that there is not going to be funding for wage increases. Would he please explain to this House and this province what the difference is between those words and a wage freeze?
SCHWINDT COMMISSION REPORT
A. Warnke: My question is for the Attorney-General. It concerns some aspects of the Schwindt commission report. The forest industry has made its opposition to the Schwindt commission report known, and indeed the mining industry has indicated likewise. Even in the Campbell River Courier there was an article that really attacked the Schwindt commission report very strongly.
Therefore, to the Attorney-General, why is there this discrepancy, this anomaly between the industry, which has apparently been consulted by the Schwindt commission, and the industry's response? Why is there some problem of finding a consensus here, or is the report more or less just there to lend legitimacy to the NDP's predetermined agenda?
Hon. C. Gabelmann: We are in the early stages of a three-month review of the Schwindt commission. We have asked industry and others in the community with an interest in resource-takings compensation to provide us with a reaction. They are in the middle of doing just that. We will continue to hear their advice and their recommendations and their commentary, and in due course the government will come to some conclusions, following that process.
BIG GAME HABITAT ENHANCEMENT
BY FOREST LAND BURNS
Hon. J. Cashore: On Tuesday last, I took a series of questions on notice from the opposition House Leader.
Question one: "Can the minister confirm that an international big game trophy organization called the Foundation for North American Wild Sheep pays the B.C. government $600,000 a year for range enhancement work. Does this include deliberate burns?"
In 1992 the foundation contributed $20,000 to northern British Columbia guides and outfitters for wildlife habitat enhancement. It contributed $5,000 to habitat enhancement work to be done by our Smithers office of the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks. Both projects prescribed burning to produce better range for grassland animals, especially wild sheep. The suggestion that the amount was $600,000 is incorrect.
Question 2. "Could the minister advise the House, in approximate terms, how many hectares of public land
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are being deliberately burned for so-called habitat enhancement programs?"
In 1992 approximately 28,000 hectares were burned for habitat enhancement. Approximately 16,000 hectares were on sites that had been previously managed under the prescribed fire program in northeastern British Columbia. Burning is a well-proven, cost-effective technique of improving habitat for a variety of wildlife. The burns are conducted as a cooperative undertaking, involving the Ministry of Forests, the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, the Guide-Outfitters' Association, the guide in whose area the burn will be conducted, contractors and the public.
Question 3. "The minister will be aware of media reports that a man charged with arson was still granted permits from the government to burn more than 22,000 hectares of forest land in northern B.C. Can the minister advise us, to his knowledge, if this individual received permits for these burns from the government because they are partially funded by such big game trophy outfits, such as the Foundation for North American Wild Sheep?
All permits for wildlife enhancement burns are issued by the Ministry of Forests on the basis of Ministry of Forests and Ministry of Environment criteria. A protocol agreement between Forests and Environment has been developed to establish each agency's role in planning prescribed fires. The agreement recognizes that Forests' staff are expert in the management of fire and that Environment staff are expert in the enhancement of wildlife habitat through the use of fire. Environment is responsible for the initial preparation of written plans and the submission of these plans to the Ministry of Forests and to evaluate the short-and long-term effects. Forests reviews the plans and determines if there would be any adverse effect to other values and, if the weather conditions are favourable, determines when it is safe to burn and authorizes the use of prescribed fire by Environment through the issuance of a burning permit. Environment may select an outfitter in whose area the burn is being conducted to participate. I think the following chronology is important to the question that was asked.
On May 17, 1985, the prescribed burn program in the Fort Nelson district was postponed due to very significant winds causing unsafe weather conditions. On May 21, 1985, several unauthorized fires were ignited north of the Alaska Highway in the vicinity of the subject's guiding area in the Fort Nelson forest district. These unauthorized fires were lit indiscriminately, without proper care and with no controls in place. These wildfires burned a total of 21,923 hectares and cost $610,600 to suppress. The fact that these fires may have been of benefit to wildlife does not offset the fact that they were deliberately set and were out of control, burning timber and a cabin.
[2:30]
In the fall of 1989, witnesses voluntarily came forward to give information regarding these unauthorized fires. The individual was charged in 1990 under the Criminal Code of Canada. After the individual was charged and up to the time of conviction, the subject was a representative of the guides association authorized by Environment to participate in two prescribed fires. While I recognize the principle that a charged person is deemed innocent until proven guilty, I believe that both the public interest and prudence would have dictated that this individual should not have been given this authority.
The Minister of Forests and I have instructed officials that the public interest must take precedence should a similar circumstance arise in the future.
L. Hanson tabled a document referred to in a question earlier today.
Hon. C. Gabelmann: Hon. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 84.
LABOUR RELATIONS CODE
(continued)
The House in committee on Bill 84; E. Barnes in the chair.
On the amendment to section 39.
C. Serwa: I rise to speak in support of the amendment put forward by my colleague with respect to the inclusion of the words "government supervised." In an earlier discussion the minister indicated that by regulation all votes would be government supervised. On Thursday the minister qualified his statement by indicating that only those votes dictated by the Labour Relations Board would be government supervised. Would the minister please elaborate on why he modified his position?
Hon. M. Sihota: First of all, there is no modification in the government's position. We've always said that either board-or ministry-directed votes would be supervised. With regard to strike or lockout matters, there's no need for government supervision. Those matters are internal to either the employer or the employees.
C. Serwa: It appears to me that this section deals with a number of issues in labour regulations that are internal or otherwise. In the interests of the will of the membership, it would appear sensible that all votes in this case should be government supervised, rather than allow the dictates of the top-driven union echelon to drive the decision as to whether they should go on strike or not. It seems to me that the fairness and balance for the rank-and-file union worker, in this particular situation, would be sustained with the opportunity of a government-supervised vote in all matters.
Hon. M. Sihota: The strike or lockout vote will be conducted by secret ballot. We feel that the parties ought to be able to determine the ground rules for conducting those secret ballots among themselves, and minimize the amount of government intervention in the
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disputes and in the vote-counting or monitoring process.
L. Hanson: Section 39(3) says: "A vote referred to in subsection (1) must be conducted in accordance with the regulations." If I understand the minister correctly, the regulations that he talked about the other day would only deal with votes ordered by the Labour Relations Board, as opposed to strike and lockout votes.
Hon. M. Sihota: Yes, that's correct.
L. Hanson: That's what I gathered from the minister's remarks on Thursday. I put the amendment in to have an opportunity to ask the minister why he thought there was a need for supervision in the case of ordered votes as opposed to strike or lockout votes.
Hon. M. Sihota: With respect to ordered votes, government has some responsibility in seeing that its orders are in fact being carried out. With regard to strike or lockout votes, the responsibility rests with the employer or the employee organization involved.
L. Hanson: I can appreciate that, and I can understand why the minister is saying that. But it seems to me that a vote that is a requirement as a result of the act is a vote that is ordered by the government and should have that same responsibility. I respect the minister's opinion that whether it is an employers' organization or a labour organization, they should have the right to conduct their internal business in whatever manner they see fair. It seems to me that the strike or lockout vote is ordered by the government, as it was in the last act.
Amendment negatived.
W. Hurd: There are a couple of points that the opposition wishes to canvass with respect to the voting under section 39. Perhaps the minister can say whether the employer would be entitled to have a scrutineer present to ensure the secrecy of the ballot in the event of a strike vote. We assume that would be permitted under the act. Or would there have to be some application made to the Labour Relations Board to ensure that a scrutineer for the employer was present?
Hon. M. Sihota: I take it the question is with regard to section 39. I'm a little confused here. I thought you had declared section 39 to have passed, hon. Chair.
The Chair: No, that's incorrect, hon. minister. We started the committee on the amendment, and we are now back to the section.
Hon. M. Sihota: The matter that the hon. member raises will be dealt with in regulations.
W. Hurd: I would assume that we'll get the same answer to the question of where these votes will take place. Is there a determined place for voting? Is it the union hall? Or am I to assume that we're going to deal with those types of things under regulations as well?
Hon. M. Sihota: With regard to the initial question, let me also say that there's no requirement for employers to be scrutineers. With regard to the second question, the point is relatively straightforward: the party involved, employer or union, will decide the location of the vote.
Sections 39 to 44 inclusive approved.
On section 45.
J. Tyabji: Hon. Chair, I'm in a very awkward position here in that I know there's some discussion to take place on section 45. I didn't realize the other sections were going to pass so quickly. If you could just give me a second to find the place here....
Hon. M. Sihota: The purpose of this section is to deal with what is known as the Paccar decision, hon. Chair. The Paccar decision was an interesting case because it dealt with the expiry of a collective agreement and then talked about the rights which accrued to an employer upon the expiry of the agreement. Essentially, there had been the view that although a collective agreement may have expired, it was always assumed the terms and conditions of the collective agreement would stay in force while the parties negotiated a new agreement. In 1991 the Supreme Court of Canada -- Supreme Court Reports, volume 2, page 983 -- dealt with this issue. For the record, it's important to see what the panel felt with regard to the decision. Let me just quote the comments of the panellists:
"In 1991 the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision in Paccar...reinstating the decision of the Industrial Relations Council which permitted an employer to unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment upon the expiry of a collective agreement, so long as the employer met its duty to bargain in good faith.
Although some employers have effected such unilateral changes, the practice is not widespread. This is probably due to the fact that employers recognize that a unilateral alteration of terms during collective bargaining puts the employees to an immediate election as to whether they will strike. An employer knows, therefore, that if the proposed changed terms are not acceptable to the majority of employees, the employees will have the lawful right to refuse to work under those changed terms.
"A number of arguments are advanced in support of an employer's right to unilaterally alter terms. First, such a right is consistent with the notion of residual management rights which prevail in the absence of a collective agreement. Second, a employer may strongly hold the view that the union negotiators are standing in the way of changed terms of employment which employees would be prepared to accept."
And then it goes on:
"We have recommended a provision in the legislation that would preclude a unilateral alteration to terms of employment during the renegotiation of a collective agreement. Our proposal would preserve an employer's
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right to suspend, transfer, lay off, discharge or discipline an employee for proper cause."
That's the sort of reasoning behind the changes that are brought in with regard to section 45(2). We feel that it is important, as a matter of public policy, to have some continuity in an agreement once it is negotiated. Though it's expired, it ought not to unnaturally tilt the balance of power in favour of employers or against employees, and that it's probably in the interests of all that the status quo remain in place. Hence section 45(2) is a new section on top of the section that existed under previous legislation known as section 61.
G. Farrell-Collins: I'll perhaps yield to the member for Surrey-White Rock, who had a question.
[2:45]
W. Hurd: Perhaps the minister can explain the provision of section 45(2) in a little more detail. The interpretation on this side of the House is that the new provision has the effect of requiring the consent of the trade union before the employer can change the terms and conditions of employment after the expiry of the term of the collective agreement, which, as the minister explained, represents a significant change. The opposition is concerned about the limits this places on the employer when a collective agreement expires. We can understand the concern that the government might have about layoffs or other unfair provisions. What allowance has the government made in connection with the employer who may be in the position of not having a legal contract because of its expiry and having to secure the consent of the trade union on a whole range of issues that might affect the future and viability of the business?
Can the minister provide us with an explanation of whether the employer will have to go to the Labour Relations Board when a collective agreement has expired? Are we likely to see, in the view of the minister, a flurry of board activity in defining what the employer can and can't do when a collective agreement has expired or where there might be no meaningful progress on negotiations for a new agreement? This seems to us to be a hobbling provision in terms of the ability of the employer to carry on his business. I just wonder if the minister could expand on that concern.
Hon. M. Sihota: The member actually misunderstands the section. An employer who believes that a collective agreement should be altered but is unable to negotiate the change still has the option of requiring a final offer vote or invoking a lockout.
G. Farrell-Collins: Maybe the minister can correct me if I'm wrong. My understanding is that when you enter into a collective agreement, it has a beginning date and an expiration date. When it expires, that agreement is no longer in force. My understanding of section 45(2) is that it ends up extending this contract on an indefinite basis. If I were to rent a house or sign a lease on some property, I would assume that at the expiration of that lease or contract, there is no longer an agreement. As the person leasing the property, I would now be required to negotiate a new lease on that property. We see under 45(2) that once you've negotiated a contract, that collective agreement continues in perpetuity or until it's renegotiated despite the fact that there's a termination date on it. In reality we end up with no termination date on these collective agreements whatsoever.
There may be situations where for economic reasons.... I understand that's dealt with here. There may be reasons for a corporation to ask for concessions from an employee group in order to deal with the competitive nature of our economy. Shouldn't that employer have the same legal process at hand as any other person would have in any other type of contract when it expires?
Hon. M. Sihota: It's not for anyone to suggest that the contract would remain in perpetuity. It doesn't. This is just good human relations policy. That's all we're doing in this section. Quite often collective agreements expire but negotiations continue. It's generally accepted in most other jurisdictions in this country -- and it certainly had been in the case in British Columbia until recently -- that the old terms prevail until such time as they are altered by a collective agreement, strike or lockout. That's exactly what we're doing here: continuing a sound human relations policy with the appropriate rights given to management, which had been negotiated in the previous agreement, and rights that you could have by invoking the two steps which I indicated earlier to the member for Surrey-White Rock.
G. Farrell-Collins: My concern with it is that while it may be good human relations practice to try to maintain some sort of continuity from one contract to another while those contracts go on, and while no one ever likes to end up in a strike or lockout position, it does occur. No one likes to have discomfort or confrontation in the workplace, but the reality is that it occurs. The minister, of course, is aware of that.
The question here, however, is a balance in the relationship between the two. The minister -- by legislation, anyway -- in continuing the contract after the expiration date, is removing one of the economic levers once again. We have seen numerous economic levers removed from the business or management side and given to the labour side in this bill. This is another example of that imbalance and unfairness in this piece of legislation. Once again it removes one of the economic levers from the arsenal of the employer. Perhaps the minister can comment; I see him shaking his head.
Hon. M. Sihota: All it does is say that there must be some other act to terminate the agreement. If an employer is so anxious, as you suggest, to make the change, all he has to do is lock out people for a day.
W. Hurd: Can the minister confirm that section 45(2) appears to overturn a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Pavvst? I'm just interpreting the ruling that under law established in the Paccar case that a collective agreement could be termi-
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nated on its expiry date by either party, provided that the procedures set out in the collective agreement for its termination were followed. I wonder if the minister has reviewed any other jurisprudence in this particular area, which he might wish to share with the committee and which might allay concern that a decision of the Supreme Court is being overturned in connection with the language in this section of the act.
Hon. M. Sihota: I was reflecting on this over the weekend. Let me just say, hon. members, that I have no difficulty in answering questions. But if questions don't pick up on points that are made or are repetitious, at some point I'm going to have to make a decision to not answer the question and to just to hear a number of points and respond in a summary way at the end. I'm putting the opposition on notice that I intend to employ that practice starting this week.
I talked at length about the Paccar decision in the opening comments with regard to this section. I did it because it was important to put that on the record, but also because the Labour critic for the Liberal Party was outside the House, and I felt that I'd assist them -- sometimes it's difficult for us all to get in here when we have other obligations -- by talking a little about the section. Hon. member, I have already referred to that decision, the reasons for it and the reasons why we moved on it in light of that decision, and I would direct you to those comments in Hansard.
D. Symons: I'm just a little confused with subsection (3), in that it seems that subsection (2) says that when the termination comes into place, the contract carries forward to either the union or the employer until a strike or lockout. But in (3) it seems that the board can make a change in the conditions of the contract that has expired.
It says that "the board, after notice to the trade union...." It strikes me that they have to give notice to the trade union, and then the employer is ordered to increase or decrease a rate of pay or make some other change to the employment. It doesn't seem that there is any notification here where they authorize the board to speak to the employer, except to say what you have to do. It seems there has to be some consultation with the union, but no similar consultation with the employer, before they carry through with some ruling against that particular bargaining unit in relation to their expired contract.
What sort of instance can you see where subsection (3) would be used? In what cases would the board interfere in a contract that has expired if they haven't come to a new agreement? If the board is going to order an increase or decrease in the rates of pay or alter a term or condition of employment, where would the board enter in to do something of this sort?
Hon. M. Sihota: I can't think of a situation off the top of my head. This section has been in the legislation for quite some time, hon. member, and I'm sure it's there for the very purpose that you talk about. There must be some situation that arises where the board would like to have that authority.
Sections 45 to 49 inclusive approved.
On section 50.
G. Farrell-Collins: We intend to look at section 50 to some extent. I note with some interest that the old section 66(1.1) has been deleted. Perhaps the minister can comment on the reasons why, in his opinion, that was necessary. What is the purpose and intent of this change?
Hon. M. Sihota: It's good labour relations policy.
G. Farrell-Collins: I'll give the minister a minute. I don't know if he's consulting and trying to get up to speed on it. That's fine.
My feeling is, of course, if it is good labour relations policy.... Perhaps the minister could expound a little bit and do us the pleasure of informing us why he feels that it's good labour relations policy. What are the ramifications of this change? How will it improve the legislation that we have before us?
Hon. M. Sihota: The change in this section, hon. member, removes the opportunity for an employer to organize business affairs in such a way as to avoid collective bargaining responsibilities. Obviously we feel that good labour relations practice means that one ought not to seek avoidance strategies, but rather seek to fulfil obligations under a collective agreement. If the employer has gone out of business, the continuation of the collective agreement will not have an effect. We commented on that aspect of the issue earlier during section 36 or 37, I believe, on Thursday. It seems to me that an employer, as a matter of good labour relations policy, ought not to seek ways in which to avoid collective bargaining responsibilities. We're saying that once you've entered into a collective agreement, you're bound by those provisions and should treat your workers in accordance with the import of those agreements.
G. Farrell-Collins: Perhaps I can have the indulgence of the minister for a moment while I quote. I guess the problem here is that there were instances in the past where letters of understanding or agreements have been entered into at some time in history. The bargaining unit may become inactive for a long period of time. If the company gets up and running again, they're still bound by that old relationship, with no obvious intent to necessarily avoid collective bargaining. History rolled upon itself, and the company ended up in that type of situation.
I'm sure the minister is aware of the case in the Supreme Court of Canada in 1979 -- Bradburn v. Wentworth Hotel -- where the court commented on that. I'll quote from that decision, if I may, and then get the minister's comments. The court said:
"There are serious consequences for the participants in the field of labour relations were a court to construe the provisions of legislation in such a way as to cause the establishment of a perpetual collective agreement terminable only on the execution of a new collective agreement by the parties.
[ Page 4480 ]
"The scheme of labour relations under the act is founded on collective bargaining leading to a collective agreement and therefore to replacement agreements. Collective bargaining in turn is an activity in which the parties participate in the full realization of their respective economic positions and strengths, subject only to the limitations and boundaries imposed by the act. Consequently, collective agreements, which are of course creatures of statute, finding both their origin and their extent within the act, should reflect to these realities."
Essentially what we're dealing with here is that the minister, by making changes to this act, is setting up a provision whereby collective agreements continue on and have almost a life of their own, despite the fact that there's nobody participating in that agreement or that arrangement for prolonged periods of time. I wonder if that's realistic, first of all. Certainly there are scenarios where there's no intent to evade collective bargaining, but where merely a long time has passed, the corporation has changed, maybe management has changed, certainly the employment has changed, because it's not been active for some period of time. Does it not make good labour relations sense to start anew with a new corporation, new employees, a new bargaining unit perhaps and a new certification process? I would think that that would be the direction that the minister would be trying to go, certainly if we were looking at a proactive and a progressive piece of labour legislation.
[3:00]
Hon. M. Sihota: We've already dealt with double-breasting successor rights. Those two provisions were being used by employers in combination with this to avoid collective bargaining responsibilities. Those were the changes brought in with regard to Bill 19. The combination of the three provisions then allowed employers, particularly in the construction industry, to utilize this section to avoid their responsibility to their employees, effectively deunionize, set up a companion company overnight and get back into the field. This House has already frowned on that policy by agreeing with the changes with regard to successor rights and double-breasting. This would then complete the closure of that effort to avoid responsibility.
Right now I suppose you could have an agreement for one year and ten months, and because it's not within a two-year period, you could have the same situation that you refer to. We've decided, as a matter of public policy, that it ought to be a decision of the employees to terminate the contract, not just an artificial time period, particularly in the light of what the committee clearly saw were abuses -- with which I would concur -- when you combine successor rights, double-breasting and the two-year clause. The House, having agreed to the first two going, must now, as a sort of logical progression, agree to this provision being deleted.
G. Farrell-Collins: This is certainly, I guess, the third step in the process, as the minister described it. Given what we've done before and what this House has passed already, despite objections from this side.... Is there no way the minister can achieve that intent without bringing in this type of change? Is there no way we can target merely those organizations that are genuinely trying to avoid collective agreements, and avoid hitting those where that was not the general overall intent?
Hon. M. Sihota: No, we looked at that issue, and it seems to me we have to just close off the loophole entirely.
J. Tyabji: As I've been following this, I guess the one thing that remains in my mind is: does the minister think that it's in the best interests of the people involved -- the employees and the employers -- to end up with a collective agreement that hasn't been active for two years? I understand the minister has given us some rationale for this section. But I still don't understand how it can be in their best interests to have a collective agreement that hasn't been used or hasn't been active.
Hon. M. Sihota: If a company has wound down but not sort of ceased operations, and if there is a material change in the fiscal situation of the company that then allows it to breathe life back in, it would seem to me that good labour relations would mean the parties would have to get together and perhaps talk about adjustments to the collective agreement, so as to ensure that the company remained profitable and the employees remained employed. So I would leave it up to the parties, as part of the tenor of this legislation to encourage people to work their differences through, to try to do that.
J. Tyabji: If we have a collective agreement that hasn't been used for two years, then I'm assuming the wages would be frozen at something that, by the time the collective agreement becomes active again, is two years behind the rate of inflation and cost of living and that kind of thing. From the point of view of the employees, first of all, by the time the collective agreement is reactivated, the wages should reflect the increased cost of living and the added inflation. In that sense I can see that it wouldn't be to the employees' benefit to accept it. In the other scenario, if the minister argues that they want that collective agreement, they start from a base minimum. If there are good labour relations between the employer and the employees, to have more than that base minimum may be beyond the employer's ability to pay, and the collective agreement may actually be a hindrance to the number of employees who would be hired. Can the minister explain this?
Hon. M. Sihota: It's not as if I don't understand the hon. member's point. The other day the member for Okanagan-Vernon talked about, I believe, his own company, which has been on the shelf for 14 years. He may want to reactivate it one of these days, when he goes back to the occupation that I'm sure he so longs to be in. I said to him that it was certainly not an invalid point that he raised, more, I think, because of the perception of it than the reality; and I undertook in the House to sort of consider those issues in a subsequent review of the legislation. If there's some unknown hardship or unintended hardship that may be flowing
[ Page 4481 ]
here, I'd be happy to advise the House that we would consider that for subsequent discussion. So in the same spirit as I made that comment, I make this comment today.
J. Tyabji: Just a point of clarification. I wonder if the minister could let me know: if we had a scenario where there was a company and a certain bargaining unit hadn't been active for a couple of years -- say there had been a layoff because they couldn't afford it. Maybe it's in the resource industry. It becomes active again, but it requires 20 people to service this particular aspect of, let's say, a plywood plant that hadn't been active for a while, and the one known part of the equation is that you know you need 20 people. But let's say that because of the economy, the market or whatever it was, the wages in the collective agreement precluded 20 people working there. So we can understand that if the collective agreement, because of the wage level, was precluding people working there, and if the collective agreement does not terminate, say, two years into it, if it's not active, would the minister agree then that it would actually be the collective agreement that would be denying people jobs in that sector if the number of employees was fixed? However, if the collective agreement could expire, if it hadn't been used, then maybe they could renegotiate something so at least there'd be the 20 jobs.
Hon. M. Sihota: Well, the reality of the experience is that they'd negotiate in any event to make those changes in that kind of fact pattern, and we would leave it up to the parties to work it through, knowing that the collective agreement was there. That's exactly what happens. No union is going to sort of callously enforce a provision so as to deny employment to its members. That's counter to the whole purpose and intent of a trade union. I don't think the concern is as salient or as real, based on experience, as you would suggest.
With that said, I'd like to move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.
Motion approved.
The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.
The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit later in the day.
The Speaker: With the agreement of the House, we will now recess the House for 45 minutes. I invite all members to join us in the rotunda for the seventh annual British Columbia Ceremony of Lights.
The House recessed at 3:10 p.m.
The House resumed at 4:15 p.m.
Hon. M. Sihota: Hon. Speaker, may I have leave to make an introduction?
Leave granted.
Hon. M. Sihota: Thank you. In the spirit of things, I appreciate that from my colleagues.
Joining us in the gallery for the first time in his life is my little son, Rajan, who is visiting the Legislature today to witness the ceremony that we were all part of. Joining him is my daughter Karina, who of course is a regular here. Seated next to her is her friend Hayley Basaraba, who is in grade 1 with her at Rockheights Elementary School; my wife, Jessie; Tara Basaraba; and Tasha Basaraba. Would all members please join me in giving them a warm welcome.
Committee on Bill 84.
LABOUR RELATIONS CODE
(continued)
The House in committee on Bill 84; E. Barnes in the chair.
On section 50.
G. Farrell-Collins: We're back after our little break. We were discussing, to some extent, the third part of the decertification process.
I notice the minister's family in the gallery. I won't introduce them, but if he wishes to do so, that would be fine.
Hon. M. Sihota: I already have.
G. Farrell-Collins: We were dealing, to some extent, with some of the provisions and changes to this section, particularly the removal of what used to be section 66(1.1) that dealt with the termination of a collective agreement after some period of inactivity. We were asking the minister for his comments particularly with regard to the length of time and whether he thought that was a problem. I don't recall the minister's exact comments.
The question to the minister was: is there no other way that we could stop companies from skirting around their obligations to negotiate collectively with their employees, yet at the same time give us some sort of practical process to ensure that when there were legitimate reasons for this lengthy termination of bargaining between a group of employees and an employer, due to the fact that there weren't any employees in the bargaining unit...? Is there not some way that we can have a balance in that regard without going with the full force of what has been planned here?
Hon. M. Sihota: As I was saying prior to the break, there is no other way in which you could deal with this dimension of the problem. If there is, and the hon. member has a suggestion, obviously we'd take it under consideration. As I said the other day, we will subsequently look at some options should there be any unintended consequences or hardship.
If there are problems -- and I think the member for Okanagan West raised the example of a company that had wound down and then tried to revive itself -- we
[ Page 4482 ]
believe that they can and ought to be resolved between the union and the employer. Accordingly, we would leave it up to those parties to make the appropriate adjustments in an agreement.
G. Farrell-Collins: I guess what I'm looking for is a slightly different scenario, with the same goals in mind, whereby, as we've done in numerous other sections in this code, we give the board some discretion to determine appropriateness and to use their practical decision-making abilities and good judgment to try and facilitate a good labour relations climate. The minister spoke about that on numerous occasions. Is there not some way where we can allow some discretion on behalf of the board in cases where the intent certainly is not to evade collective bargaining with the employees in a bargaining unit but rather that some time has elapsed for natural reasons and there really is no bargaining unit there to speak of? A union has been certified to represent that employer's employees, if there are any, but that may have lapsed over a number of years. Is there no provision that would allow the board to take some discretion in making that type of decision, to ensure that while the goals of this section are attained, we're not trampling into an area where we shouldn't transgress?
Hon. M. Sihota: As I said earlier, all these sections are tied in with section 52 -- the successor rights and the provision dealing with double-breasting. As we've taken out those provisions, we're closing the circle by dealing with this issue.
Let's not forget that this section was brought in because of the voluntary recognition provisions, where a voluntary recognition of a union in the previous administration with regard to Bill 19 was injected in this provision, so that in cases of a voluntary recognition, there would be a conclusion of an agreement. All we're really trying to do is deal with the problem now -- having dealt with successor rights and double-breasting -- to complete the circle, particularly in recognition of that history of voluntary recognition provisions.
J. Tyabji: My understanding from what the minister said is that this is one part of a three-part process. You've got your successor rights, double-breasting, then this provision that doesn't allow.... Let's say that these collective agreements don't get stale, even if there are no employees there. What I don't really understand is why that's necessary, why it couldn't be a two-part process. I don't understand why this is needed. It seems to me that having this in here leaves us open to a situation where you have a collective agreement that's completely irrelevant to the current situation -- I mean, a collective agreement that could be two years old.
I use the example of new-technology companies, and we know that one sector of the economy that this bill is aimed at starting to organize is that of new technologies. In that you'd have collective agreements that would be changing dramatically based on how a company would restructure to meet new technologies, and you would have collective agreements having to be tailored accordingly. What I'm wondering is: is this such a necessary part of this three-part plan that it has to be in there? Could the minister explain that? Because I haven't really understood. The minister says that this is closing the loop, and I don't understand how it closes the loop. I don't know how this is necessary. I understand the other two, but I don't understand this one.
Hon. M. Sihota: Well, apart from all the arguments I just put forward in terms of voluntary recognition and so on, maybe I can put it this way. Section 52(8) of the old legislation allowed for an employer to apply for cancellation of the certification of a trade union "on the ground that the employer has not, during the two years immediately preceding the application, employed any person as an employee of the bargaining unit," and allowed the council to then make a determination -- the Labour Relations Board, or the Industrial Relations Council at the time. With that section now going, and with this section here, we've now chosen to delete this section in the cases of voluntary recognition.
To deal with the fact pattern that you've put forward, let me say two things. If there is a change in the circumstances of the company, we believe that matter ought to be resolved between the parties -- management and labour working out the differences between them. We've allowed that to happen by removing this provision. It forces them to discuss issues in the kind of fact pattern you referred to. As I've said before, the tenor of this legislation is to encourage the parties to work out their differences, and this seeks to do that. In addition to that, if there are any unattended consequences, I suppose we could deal with them later.
J. Tyabji: If the intention of this section is to allow them to work out their differences, then automatically we're saying that as soon as the employer and the employee sit down, they're in a negotiating process. If that's the intent of this section, I'd say that you're going in the wrong direction. If they have to sit down at the table to negotiate, why would you give them a collective agreement that's a couple of years old as a starting point? Why would not let them, using the standards of labour relations as outlined in this bill, start from scratch? I don't understand. If the minister is going to say that it's still part of the three-part plan, I still don't understand how that would work out in this particular example.
Hon. M. Sihota: Let me try it this way, so it directly answers your question. I suppose the parties need something to work from, and the existing collective agreement gives them that. That's the first comment I'd make.
The second comment I'd make is that if the company has not been in operation for two years and wishes to recommence operations, they are going to have to sit down and negotiate given the changes that have occurred, and so they will. This provision makes it clear that they must not avoid their collective bargaining responsibilities, but do what I've just said they must. In
[ Page 4483 ]
other words, we encourage them to have the will necessary to conclude an agreement.
W. Hurd: I need one point of clarification on the minister's remarks. Assuming that a collective agreement has not been in place for a two-year period and there was a proposal for the company's ownership to change hands, but the new owners were interested in undertaking a number of changes at the plant or place of work, is the minister suggesting that it would be incumbent upon the prospective purchaser to enter discussions with both the company and the union representatives in an attempt to work out any concessions or changes in the agreement that might be required for the purchase to proceed?
Hon. M. Sihota: That deals with successor issues. The House has already approved the successor provisions.
Section 50 approved.
On section 51.
G. Farrell-Collins: I have a quick question for the minister on section 51. My understanding of the act that's before us is that some of the data collection analysis that was formerly done by the board is not going to take place anymore. I think that was in the purposes section, section 2. Section 51 still calls for copies of the collective agreements to be filed. Does the minister still feel that it's important to have an accurate database for comparing the terms and conditions of employment across the spectrum? Is there some provision where he plans to do that now or perhaps in the future?
Hon. M. Sihota: With regard to the information, the ministry will continue to collect the information per se. It was that way prior to 1987. We see no reason why the ministry cannot continue to do that. I would think that the members opposite would welcome this section, because it would allow the member from Richmond, the Attorney General critic opposite, to get hold of the BCGEU agreement which he so longs to read.
[4:30]
G. Farrell-Collins: This would be helpful too, because the last day that question was raised in the House, the phone call to the registrar indicated that even as of that date the agreement had not been filed. When the BCGEU was contacted, we were advised to contact the Minister of Finance to obtain a copy of the BCGEU agreement. I subsequently learned that the Minister of Labour had in fact given a copy to a member of the press, and that's where we finally obtained a copy of it -- not through the normal much-vaunted process that the minister describes, but rather through the much more practical method of contacts and leaks, I suppose. It seems to be the way it's working.
Aside from that, I have no problem with section 51 being there. The question is that if the intent in section 51 is to gather this information, I guess I go back to how this relates to section 2, which removed the purpose of the Labour Relations Board to obtain a body of information and to give access to that. The minister says that the ministry is now going to be doing all of that, instead of the board. As long as the same work is being done, I don't see any problem with that.
Hon. M. Sihota: Well, remember there is a Ministry of Labour Act, which also provides some direction to do this. Let me also say to the member with respect to the BCGEU agreement, that I will always wish he had asked the question in the House, but next time he goes for a power lunch at the Keg, he can just sort of whip in to the fifth floor at 1019 Wharf Street....
The Chair: Order, hon. Minister. Interesting sideline, but on section 52, please
Hon. M. Sihota: That may have been just a slightly colourful way of making the point that on the fifth floor of the Ministry of Labour we do have a library where most of these collective agreements are filed; and I understand the BCGEU agreement has been sitting there.
G. Farrell-Collins: I'll heed his advice; and I might also make note that the Keg doesn't support this bill either.
J. Tyabji: I am almost tempted to ask if it's parliamentary procedure to do free advertising in the House.
The Chair: No, it's not, hon. member. Please proceed.
J. Tyabji: Just a note for the minister that the English grammarians are watching us, and we have in section 51 a preposition that is actually inappropriately used. We have: "...within 30 days after its execution...." I believe it should be, "...within 30 days of its execution...," because otherwise you'd have to have a comma. Anyway, I'm just pointing this out because when we were in the definitions section, we hit the possessive, and it should have been a plural possessive. Here again we've got the wrong preposition. I don't know if you want to clean that up, but I think it actually reads a little bit differently than it's intended right now.
Section 51 approved.
On section 52.
Hon. M. Sihota: Given those last comments, I would have thought that the astute opposition would have caught on to this; but I have an amendment with respect to section 52. It deals with grammatical and other problems. If you found a spelling error in there, I'd appreciate it.
I have an amendment to section 52. The amendment is to delete the proposed subsection (1), and substitute the following:
[ Page 4484 ]
"An extraprovincial company for which a trade union has been certified as a bargaining agent for a unit of employees of that company shall, within 5 days of the certification, appoint a person resident in British Columbia with authority to bargain collectively to
(a) conclude a collective agreement with the trade union, and
(b) sign the agreement on behalf of the company."
On the amendment.
Hon. M. Sihota: The purpose of this is that if the original language was read -- which interestingly has been in the legislation for some 20 years -- it assumed that there must be a collective agreement concluded within five days. Of course, that would not be possible in most cases, and hence, to correct that error, we've just brought forward this amendment.
Amendment approved.
Section 52 as amended approved.
On section 53.
L. Stephens: In section 53(3) and in relation to this consultation committee, would it be fair to say that the effect of section 53(3) would be to make the committees mandatory?
Hon. M. Sihota: Yes.
L. Stephens: Section 53(4) specifically relates to workplace issues and "to respond and adapt to changes in the economy." Could the minister give some clarification on what effect that would have, and on what issues they would be able to form their committee to talk about?
Hon. M. Sihota: You're correct. Section 53(4) is a significant provision which sets out the purposes of the consultative committee process. It's there to promote cooperative resolution of workplace issues and to respond to changes in the economy. We have not defined economy. We have provided a guideline through section 53(4) and have given the parties the appropriate scope to deal with issues.
In dealing with those issues, hon. member, the parties must be mindful of section 2 of the code, the purposes section, which encourages cooperative participation between employers and trade unions in resolving workplace issues and in adapting to changes in the economy. That's the way that section is worded as well.
So it's a new provision which tries to do that which we said is absolutely essential: i.e., to bring about an attitudinal shift in British Columbia with regard to the confrontational kind of relationship that labour-management has had in the past and to try to bring about that change by deeming these provisions to be in a contract and encouraging the parties to meet once every two months to try to deal with issues that will help them respond to changes in what is clearly a dynamic economy.
L. Stephens: Many companies have these kinds of committees, and they address the issues that affect both the employer and the employee. A lot of them have drug training, upgrading programs and this sort of thing. I would like some clarification, Mr. Minister, if these are the things that you're talking about, and whether or not those consultations would extend to financial considerations and financial management decisions.
Hon. M. Sihota: Let me put it this way. In the submissions we have received -- and I don't think this is surprising -- employers expressed a strong desire to work with employees to resolve issues. Unions expressed the same. It's amazing how frequently, when you meet with parties, they express a desire to be able to work through their differences and to make adjustments. Words such as "competitiveness" and "productivity" are issues that come up in employer vocabulary, which unions sometimes shudder at. However, I think it's important that the parties deal with issues of competitiveness and productivity. I've said that and have indeed faced some criticism from some for using that type of language. But I stand behind it. I think it's important to be able to deal with those kinds of issues.
During the course of discussion, it is possible that one of the parties may wish to talk about the fiscal implications of proceeding with certain changes. I would not discourage the parties from doing that. Obviously I would encourage that them to use their discretion as to when they want to do that, and I'm sure they will. But I would assume that those kinds of discussions are within the contemplation of this section.
L. Stephens: In subsection (5) it says that the mediation division will act on joint request if some of these issues that you've just spoken about cannot be resolved. If the facilitator isn't able to work out a situation, what recourse do the parties have to some kind of resolution?
Hon. M. Sihota: I think these sections we're talking about are some of the most important sections in this legislation, because this Legislature is saying very explicitly to the parties that we want a fundamental shift in attitude, away from confrontation and the adversarial relationship. In order to foster that, it is also important that we do something that we have not done adequately in the past, and some would argue we have not done at all in the past: namely, to engage in preventive mediation, to deal with issues before they become issues as we have historically known them. So on a preventive basis it's to give the parties through this legislation, the direction and the signal that we wish to encourage them to work out their differences. In order to assist them, we have put in 53(5), which will allow the mediation division to appoint a facilitator to assist the parties in resolving their differences. This is not, however, a section with consequence should that process fail; it's rather a section saying that this is, from a public policy viewpoint, a direction we think the parties ought to be moving in, and we will provide the
[ Page 4485 ]
resources necessary for them to resolve issues on a preventive basis. I think it's important that the word "prevention" be underlined, hon. member, because really what we're trying to do is prevent those kinds of hard-edged relationships that have so frequently developed here in British Columbia from developing. We're trying to cure the problem before it becomes a problem, through preventive mediation.
So no, there is no real consequence if the parties fail, but by doing this we're also injecting a new level of interaction that wasn't there, and hopefully that will get the ball rolling. I'm not too sure if the purpose is served by having a hammer hanging over the heads of the parties. I would like to think that they know what the consequences are if they can't resolve issues on a preventive basis, and so we're making sort of a goodwill gesture. We're encouraging the parties, through this goodwill signal in the legislation, to resolve their differences.
L. Stephens: I can appreciate the difficulties that arise in situations like this and the need for resolution, and I think mediation and cooperation are ways to resolve some of these conflicts. However, as you know, those are sometimes not possible, and because this particular clause in 53 requires that this consultation committee be mandatory, it would seem to me that there has to be a mechanism for some kind of resolution. Under 53(5), which has the appointment of a facilitator, would section 76 and the special mediator have anything to do? Again I'll ask what mechanism there is if the parties involved are not able to come to some kind of resolution.
Hon. M. Sihota: The fact of the matter is that the parties have to live with one another. Because they have to live with one another, they know full well that the consequence of their not being able to conclude matters in a preventive way just paves the path for some of the acrimony that we've seen in British Columbia in the past. By putting in the facilitator provisions, we provide an opportunity to give them professional assistance in resolving some of the difficulties that they may have. We're prepared to put a measure of faith in that facilitation process to bring about a resolution.
Our experience of the past year in terms of our involvement in some of these issues has been that when we do get involved on a preventive basis -- and we clearly do not get involved often enough -- we can resolve issues. Let me just give you an example. Now that the Lafarge dispute has been resolved, I was totally persuaded that given the nature of that dispute, had there been some preventive work going on in advance of the issue arising, we probably would not have had that labour dispute. Some will argue that if we were able to do that with regard to the longstanding Fording dispute, there was some opportunity there as well. I'm not going to comment on that any further. You can't force people to cooperate, hon. member, but you can show them the way, and that's what we're trying to do with this section.
[4:45]
L. Stephens: Thank you, minister. I have one final question on subsections (3) and (4). Would this particular piece of legislation give the unions the right to open the collective agreement during its term, to negotiate any issues relating to the workplace or any employee who is bound by that agreement?
Hon. M. Sihota: The only way an agreement can be reopened during the term of the agreement is by the mutual agreement of the parties. It would not give the union an opportunity to reopen the agreement unilaterally and change its terms. That would have to be by mutual consent.
G. Farrell-Collins: I understand that the member for Langley has brought up some of the points in this section that we have concerns about. I guess it's more about intent than anything else. I think everyone agrees that it's good to have discussions with people and to consult and get as broad a range of consensus as one can for making changes. However, I think we've perhaps gone a little too far under section 53 by imposing upon the employer and the union that they must get together and discuss these things when either side wants to do it.
There have been concerns presented to me by people in the business community who have some problems with this section. They see the demand to sit and meet, particularly with regard to the content of those meetings, for the purpose of discussing "issues relating to the workplace that affect the parties or any employee bound by the agreement," as meaning anything. In this case I am specifically addressing the concerns put forth by a number of business people. That's a wide range of things that a company has to deal with.
If at the instigation of their employee group -- the union -- they must sit down and discuss virtually any issue that pertains to the operation of that business, they have a lot of concerns. It's not that they wouldn't want to deal with the union and their employees on a consultative basis to garner some input and perhaps a level of understanding with the employees, but rather that they have a number of strategic planning issues within their corporation that are perhaps quite secretive or pertinent to the market-share positioning of that company in an aggressive nature towards competition, or perhaps in a defensive position towards competition. To have representatives of the trade union coming forth and demanding to negotiate or discuss those issues puts them in a very awkward position. They may not wish to discuss a number of strategic issues that relate to the corporation with that employee group or trade union, because the trade union may well represent employees in the competition, and they may not feel comfortable with that sort of arrangement. Certainly as it relates to technological change -- I know that's part of it -- and as it relates to positioning or strategic alliances, the types of things that go on within a corporation on an ongoing basis and are fundamental to the survival of companies these days, where they have to be very quick to react and many times have to take either aggressive or defensive postures, depending on what the competition is doing.... They feel very uncomfort-
[ Page 4486 ]
able discussing those types of things with a trade union which also represents employees in the opposing group.
If there is a fear of some of the changes that will have to be made within that trade union, whether it's cuts to positions or some concessions or flexibility they're looking for, there may be some very strong conflicting interest on behalf of the trade union and the employer. Those are issues that the corporation may not wish to have discussed in an open manner. Their concern is that they could always go to the discussion table and not discuss it -- not do anything -- but that tends to create an unharmonious relationship with the employees. I think their concerns are real and well-founded. Maybe not in all cases, but certainly in some cases, employers simply do not want to discuss certain issues with the trade union that represents their employees because they're matters of corporate security.
Hon. M. Sihota: Those are interesting comments. When you're trying to bring about a fundamental change in attitude, sometimes old attitudes die hard. It is true that people sometimes may want to keep their cards closer to their vest than they're used to, and it is true -- and I can reflect on experience -- that there may be some validity in doing that, to be honest with you about it, but generally speaking, I think that proceeding with this section makes a lot of sense for all the reasons that you spoke to at the beginning.
We will obviously watch this section with a great degree of care, because it sends a signal. It has to be considered in the context of other initiatives, such as Pacific Institute, job retraining programs, and so on. If companies are unnecessarily reluctant to embrace this, we'd have to send a different type of signal than if it was inappropriately used by other parties to secure information that is legitimately a management right, if I can put it that way. We'll watch the progress with regard to this section. It's one of the most exciting provisions of the bill, and we'll watch how it evolves over time.
G. Farrell-Collins: While I think the goal of having better working relationships between employees and employers is a laudable one, I don't think it can be enforced or legislated. I don't think this type of legislation is going to achieve that type of result. In fact, I would argue that it will most likely do the opposite. It will probably end up putting the employees and employers in a confrontational position. The union could come to the employer and say that they wish to discuss such and such an issue under section 53 of the Labour Relations Act, and the employer must speak with the union. Conversely, the employer could tell the trade union that they wish to discuss elements of the collective agreement; under section 53 of the Labour Code, they could force them to come to the negotiating or discussion table. That sends the wrong signal to the employers and the trade union. It sets the wrong atmosphere to have to use legislation to force the other group to the table for discussion. I can't imagine how a trade union or an employer forcing the other group to the table by use of legislation is going to be conducive to good discussions. In my mind, it would just force the opposing group that didn't want to be there or didn't want to be discussing those issues to just clam up. As one might say that sometimes people do not bargain in good faith, well, they certainly won't be discussing in good faith -- if I can use that parallel.
While I see what the minister is trying to do and I think it's important that those types of discussions take place, I would argue that most progressive employers, wherever it's possible or feasible, wherever it makes sense for the betterment of the corporation or the working environment, will want to deal with their employees in this fashion. But there may be issues that cannot be addressed. There may be issues that the employer group -- or the union, for that matter -- doesn't want addressed in this fashion, and to force them to do this, to have to actually take them to the Labour Relations Board and say, "We want to file a complaint under section 53 of the Labour Relations Code to force our employer to come to the table, or to force our union to come to the table, and start to discuss some of these things," I think is heading off in a direction that's going to be nothing but counterproductive. While I think the goals are laudable, the process is very, very flawed.
The minister makes reference to the Pacific Institute, which I understand businesses are having second thoughts about because of the application of this bill, but in my mind, the ways to achieve those goals is through education. They say you're supposed to educate, legislate and then regulate, in that order. If you can't achieve something by education, then you bring in legislation. I would suggest that it makes a lot more sense to try, through some of the other means that the government is perhaps trying to use, to bring about that education on both the union side and the management side. So I would ask the minister: does he not feel that there's a good chance that this section could end up being counterproductive to some of the goals that the government is very logically trying to achieve?
Hon. M. Sihota: Surely you don't think I'm going to agree. No, I don't agree with you, and I'll tell you why. As I said earlier in response to the member for Langley, it is true that you can't force people to cooperate; you can only point them in the right direction -- I think that's the way I paraphrased it. And that's all this section does. It sends a very strong legislative signal that we want to see a new relationship being worked at.
I guess that any time you propose change, there are those who are going to wonder about the extent and the impact of that change. I think some of the concerns that you lay on the floor of this House are concerns that at this point are not of such a weight as to warrant a reconsideration of section 53. We've said to the parties that they must have these committees, and indeed the board could order the establishment of the committee. We've also said that we want the parties to work out their differences, and that mediation is available to do that. But that's as far as we've gone. We haven't said, for example, that you must disclose financial information.
[ Page 4487 ]
That's up to the party -- the employer, for example -- to decide.
G. Farrell-Collins: In listening to the minister's comments, I had to pick up on two words. He said: "...whenever you impose change." While it's certainly within the prerogative of the government to impose a piece of legislation on the province -- he would say that they're not imposing it; they're bringing it forward in a constructive manner -- the reality is that section 53 does impose change, and it imposes more than just change: it imposes a structure in law that requires people to sit down and talk, to negotiate, or to discuss various issues. In the mid-term of a collective agreement this....
Interjection.
G. Farrell-Collins: If the member wishes to enter into the debate, I will be more than glad to hear his comments.
The Chair: Order, hon. member. Please address the Chair.
G. Farrell-Collins: Thank you, hon. Chair. I would hope that the member would choose to stand up and address the Chair also and to engage in the debate. Otherwise, perhaps he can keep his comments to himself.
Hon. Chair, the....
D. Streifel: Settle down, you desk-thumper.
The Chair: Order, please. We've been doing very well so far, hon. members. Let's keep that in mind.
G. Farrell-Collins: Again, if we can get back on track, section 53 does more than just impose change. It imposes a structure upon people to ensure that some sort of discussion process takes place -- not just to point them in the right direction, as the minister says, but to put it into legislation and to provide recourse to the Labour Relations Board in the event that it's not complied with. That's much more than just pointing someone in the right direction. I would say that pointing someone in the right direction is making a policy statement. Pointing someone in the right direction is bringing about some sort of public relations campaign that would encourage employers and unions as representatives of employees to engage in that type of discussion, and for the minister to speak to these various groups and say: "We really need to do this. We need to have you people participate more in a process and to have this discussion take place." That's pointing people in the right direction. That's leading the horse to water, but this is trying to make the horse drink. And if the horse doesn't want to drink, there's not a lot you can do about it.
So perhaps the minister has good intentions. While the government may have good intentions in bringing in this type of section, the way to achieve these goals is through education. It's through dealing with employers and employee groups to ensure that this type of discussion takes place in a constructive manner and not through recourse to the Labour Relations Board to invoke section 53 on one or more of the parties. As I say, I think that is a good intention, but it does not require legislation.
[5:00]
I would ask the minister quite strongly to reconsider section 53, because I believe it will be regressive, and that it will cause more disruptions than good relations. I would ask the minister to reconsider that provision and to make some changes. I understand that my colleague is actually going to stand up and participate.
D. Streifel: I agree with the hon. Labour critic on education, and that's one of the reasons I stand here.
When I spoke on this labour bill in second reading, one of the sections I flagged as being the most important to me -- in my former life I was an organizer as well as a negotiator of many collective agreements -- and as being very important to a new era of labour relations in British Columbia. The hon. member suggests that this may be interfering in some form or another, or forcing two parties to come together in order to resolve their differences; I suggest that that's perhaps part of the reason for this clause. It's a natural extension of the way labour relations have evolved in this century, not only in North America but in Europe as well. There was a time during the Industrial Revolution when a company in parts of Britain couldn't operate or function properly because of the numerous wildcat strikes and interferences within the workday world. As a result of that, we end up with a grievance procedure in a collective agreement, which is mandatory. Every collective agreement in Canada has a grievance procedure in it to bring parties together to solve their differences, and it works very well. We have very few incidents of daily labour disputes on a wildcat basis.
As well, many collective agreements that I've negotiated and that I'm used to dealing with -- and many of the collective agreements that members are familiar with -- contain provisions for joint labour-management committees. This is an attempt to get together in order to solve and resolve problems before they become major concerns and reasons for dispute.
As well, in collective agreements and in labour codes, we have provisions that require collective bargaining. Individuals get together to collectively bargain, to air their differences, to progress or change -- and it's mandatory that they get together to collectively bargain in British Columbia. It has been for a number of years. So I would suggest that this section 53 is a natural extension of a cooperative method that's been worked, tried and true, within workers' compensation rules, and that requires the formation of a safety committee, a joint labour-management committee, which gets together to discuss safety issues prior to them becoming a major problem.
So we see that that all evolves and develops into a new form of labour relations within section 53. I would admit to some of my colleagues left behind in another life that it may be somewhat frightening, because it
[ Page 4488 ]
appears to take some of the drive or leverage away from a particular union, or it may say to the company that it cannot be quite so secretive any longer about the real concerns.
As a matter of fact, I've had personal experience with a clause very similar to that with a company I was negotiating a renewal collective agreement with. It had to do with a situation which had come up that was a distinct violation of the collective agreement, and the only way to resolve it was through either a joint labour-management committee meeting or a grievance and arbitration procedure. It had to do with the base economic needs of that company to educate their employees on changing products in a very quickly changing world of retail hardware and paint and building supplies. We came together under just such a provision as this to determine that these product knowledge meetings would be attended by the employees and by management for the purpose of education and attaining knowledge of new products coming on, to then help the business progress, therefore supplying more employment and a much more workable and less antagonistic atmosphere within the workplace.
On those grounds I support this clause very strongly, and I ask the hon. Labour critic to just review the criticisms in the light of how a grievance procedure works, and how collective bargaining, joint labour-management committees and safety committees within the workforce work. They've all been successful, and I believe this is just another step in bringing forward that success. I don't read anything in this clause that requires companies to divulge secure information or information that would be detrimental to their operations. In fact, this might be the forum in which they would say in some confidence with their union, as it's not.... I'll say I've never heard of information of an espionage-type situation leak out of meetings such as this.
But a company may be able to come forward and say: "This is why we're having difficulty with this. We've got concerns about our competition, and we need these changes, these methods, to help us compete." I encourage the hon. opposition critic to really rethink the opposition in light of those other consultative clauses in other parts of collective agreements, codes and safety regulations that actually do work.
G. Farrell-Collins: I welcome the comments from the member opposite, because I know he has wide experience in the labour and labour organization movements, and I take great care in listening to what he has to say.
However, I think that in many ways many of the comments he made and some of the comments I made would be parallel in their goal. I would agree with many -- not all, but many -- of the things the member said with regard to the objectives of this type of section -- the idea of having ongoing consultation that is voluntary, that takes place from both sides and where there's participation and comments brought forward on a voluntary basis. That is the only way that you are going to have constructive discussions. When it's voluntary, when both sides see that there is some interest in them being at that table discussing these types of things, it's the only way you're going to have open dialogue. That's the only way it's going to happen.
This bill, however, goes beyond that. In fact, it puts into legislation a mechanism whereby if one side doesn't feel it's in their best interests to be involved in that process, the other party to the agreement can go to the Labour Relations Board and seek a ruling under section 53 to force the other party into those discussions. That would be anything but productive; in fact, I think it would be counterproductive and against the types of things that the member just commented on. It would, in fact, encourage people.... If I owned a company and felt that it was against my interest, or if I was an employee in a bargaining unit and felt that it was against my interest, to be negotiating or discussing this type of thing in the middle of a collective agreement, I would be loath to enter into a discussion unless I knew that there was somehow going to be a benefit for both parties.
I can tell you that if somebody took me to the Labour Relations Board and demanded under section 53 that I come to the table and discuss those things, the last thing I would be when I arrived at that table -- whether I was from management or from the union -- is cooperative. I wouldn't be cooperative or consultative. I wouldn't be progressive; I wouldn't be forward-thinking. I'd probably be pretty upset, and I would probably be intransigent.
That is likely what we're going to see happen with this type of provision. This goes well beyond safety agreements or safety issues; safety issues are clearly to the benefit of the employee and the employer, because they pay insurance premiums. I know that back in the hinterland a long time ago there was extreme negligence of safety by many corporations. But I think that, for the most part, the structure we have in place tries to deal with that fairly progressively.
Safety is in the interest of both the employers and the employees, and I think that's well understood. No one has to be forced to go to the table to discuss safety issues anymore. I would certainly hope not, anyway. This is different, though; this deals with a wide range of issues. In fact, it's limitless; there are no parameters. Really, any matter that relates to the workplace that may affect either of the parties is grounds for a ruling under section 53 of the new Labour Relations Code.
I think that is the wrong way to go about it. While the goals of the member are laudable and, as I say, I share many of those goals, I don't see where the benefit is going to come by somebody invoking section 53 of the Labour Code to try to achieve them. I would ask the minister and perhaps the member also to respond to that. Are there no other ways to achieve that type of thing?
I mentioned a couple of types of education and some things that could be done by the government, by the minister and certainly by members of the caucus -- with his background, the minister would be able to go out and speak to both sides, and certainly this member would be able to speak to both sides, labour and management -- to try to achieve those results. I think that's the way we get this type of structure and this type
[ Page 4489 ]
of attitude in place. But you cannot legislate someone's attitude.
You are not going to achieve the goals that you are honestly trying to achieve by using citations and rulings under section 53 of this code. It's going to be counterproductive. It's going to sour the relationship between the two parties, and it's not going to achieve what you're trying to achieve.
D. Streifel: It's unfortunate that the Labour critic would prejudge the outcome of any type of meeting between two parties. It appears that the hon. Labour critic has a habit of doing this. He has stated that he would be intransigent, unchanging and unwilling to co-operate within any type of forum of discussion to resolve disputes.
I feel that's unfortunate, in that again the hon. Labour critic doesn't understand the workings of the Workers' Compensation Act, when he said that anybody would come forward to discuss safety issues.
Well, that's not the purpose of section 53, because that's already covered under the Workers' Compensation Act, whereby it is mandatory to meet and discuss safety issues. Again to educate the hon. Labour critic, it's very difficult to get management parties together to discuss genuine safety issues in 1992. We wouldn't think it would be, but it is. Again, I stand in strong support of this particular clause in this most modern piece of labour legislation, as an indication of the cooperative atmosphere that will pervade the labour movement when Bill 84 is finally passed.
G. Farrell-Collins: All I can say is: "Wow!" In this round I will have to disagree with a good deal of what the hon. member said. First of all, when he quoted me or made reference to some of the comments I made, I certainly did not say that I would be intransigent and unwilling to discuss issues in any form of discussion.
Interjection.
G. Farrell-Collins: Perhaps the member listens with biased ears. What was said, quite clearly, was that if I was forced to a table to discuss issues I did not wish to discuss or felt would threaten me, as an employee or employer.... That is not the type of arrangement that's conducive to good discussion.
H. Giesbrecht: That's not what he said.
G. Farrell-Collins: All I can say is that the member should perhaps read Hansard. I think that if the vast majority of people -- most people -- were forced to the discussion table, they simply would be in the right frame of mind.
The member talks about educating me. I would suggest that perhaps he should spend more time educating the general public as to the benefits of the type of consultation that he'd like to see arrived at by this bill and deal with it in that manner. In all honestly and sincerity, the only way you are going to achieve cooperation, discussion and understanding among various groups is if they both want to be there. If you force people to sit down to discuss, you will not get much production out of them. The only way you're going to get good, solid cooperation in a labour relations climate -- the types of things the member is talking about -- is if both parties wish to be there.
[5:15]
I would say that this is a prime example of where a government is more or less doing what it can instead of the minimum of what it should. In fact, there should be a collective effort on behalf of government and the opposition to encourage discussion as a productive means to resolve disputes well before they occur. They should not deal with legislating and forcing people by application to the Labour Relations Board or making rulings under section 53 to force people to the table to discuss things they have no interest in discussing, perhaps because they're not educated.
J. Tyabji: I have a couple of questions for the minister. The first question regards the comments made by his colleague for Mission-Kent. I wasn't planning to raise one of the comments made, but I would like to ask the minister about it. Section 53 actually makes businesses more competitive, because it is a good initiative. Does the minister agree?
Hon. M. Sihota: Yes.
J. Tyabji: I'm happy to hear that the minister thinks section 53 makes a business more competitive. The opposition feels very strongly that the opposite is true. Would the minister please share with the House exactly how section 53 could make a business more competitive?
Hon. M. Sihota: I think that competitiveness is enhanced when the parties work together. We're trying to encourage the parties to work together in a meaningful and constructive way. I think that when you get employers and employees sitting down together, on a preventive basis, talking about how to deal with workplace issues, they can and should properly arrive at determinations that will enhance the quality of life at the worksite. Inevitably, if people feel good about coming to work, they produce better. If changes outside the realm of collective bargaining are made in the workplace that are designed to make people feel better about the institutions they live and work in, then productivity is enhanced.
Let me just give you two examples from my own experience. ICBC....
Interjections.
Hon. M. Sihota: Maybe I'll talk about B.C. Hydro first.
We've started the practice, for example, of having the president of ICBC meet regularly with the president of the union -- outside the realm of collective bargaining but in the spirit of this section -- to try to work on workplace issues. It has assisted in terms of bringing about some changes in the workplace that would seem
[ Page 4490 ]
to all of us to be small but have gone a long way to improving morale. Sometimes it doesn't take a lot.
Let me give you another example within the Ministry of Labour. Most recently, as the minister responsible, I met with some of the personnel that deal with the employment standards branch and posed a question to them in terms of what changes we could make that could have an immediate and discernible effect on the quality of their lives at work, given the government's fiscal resources. They came up with a number of very good suggestions -- simple things, like making sure that when we give a tax number to a employer, that employer is also given a pamphlet that talks about the Employment Standards Act. It doesn't cost any more to add to that mailing, but it's an important piece of information that would assist them and perhaps reduce some of our inquiries. We are also doing little things, like taking steps to reduce the number of calls that are wrongly placed to the Ministry of Labour when people are really trying to find out information about UIC. We make sure they can understand exactly what each ministry is responsible for.
Talking to employees in a consultative way about things like that, as is suggested under section 53, is a small example of the kinds of things that can happen. Obviously the section is designed to deal with more substantive issues than that, but the importance of those issues ought not to be overlooked in terms of trying to improve the quality of life that people enjoy at the worksite. So those kinds of consultative plans, adjustment plans would be appropriate issues to discuss under this section.
J. Tyabji: I find it very interesting that the minister's idea of how section 53 makes business more competitive is some kind of nebulous quality of life argument that gives him a warm and fuzzy feeling.
Having said that, I notice that of the two examples the minister provided to the House, one is a Crown corporation and the other is a ministry of government. I don't know the last time the minister checked, but ministries of government don't actually have to be competitive in the global market, and Crown corporations pretty well go whether they're making money or not. Perhaps my question should be: has this minister ever actually run a business? If he has, maybe that business would be a good example. If he hasn't run a business.... I'm not referring to a law practice; I'm talking about an actual, competitive.... Let's say, for example, a plywood plant, a winery or something where you have to market a product. I'm not talking about a professional service; I'm talking about actual competitive marketing strategies and having to compete in the global market.
Interjection.
J. Tyabji: Yes, I have had some experience in that. This is why I'm saying that I can't understand. Maybe the minister can help me with this. Let's imagine for a minute that we have a winery in the Okanagan, there are 25 employees and they've got a small management. Now we've got free trade, we're going into NAFTA and we've got the global economy, and everybody knows that the small and medium-sized businesses will have to be very competitive in order to compete globally -- especially those that are out of the Agriculture ministry.
Could the minister explain, if he's going to be consistent, how this quality of life provision in section 53 makes these businesses more competitive, how a winery with 25 employees in the Okanagan in terms of day-to-day functioning -- other than the employees feeling better, because those employees might be feeling good just having a collective agreement.... But now this minister wants to make it a compulsory provision and legislate a committee. How is that going to make that winery more competitive than it already is?
H. Giesbrecht: I'd like to make a few comments on section 53, or at least make an attempt at drawing it back to the issue at hand here. The issue would simply seem to be that we would try to give workers and management an opportunity to talk and, by dialoguing, solve some of the problems that arise in the workplace. The opposition seems to suggest that they do not want to provide workers and management with that opportunity, and I find that somewhat difficult to understand. They also don't want the government to show any leadership by providing the opportunity to have that kind of ongoing dialogue about things that happened in the workplace.
I happen to have some experience, because in my previous life there was a section in the collective agreement that provided for just those kinds of opportunities. Although they weren't a smashing success, they generally did provide an opportunity to talk about issues that were of concern to people and thereby set a better tone for the kind of negotiations that might be coming on as the collective agreement wound down.
The climate in a labour dispute is set long before negotiations begin, and that's something that has to be understood. Long before the climate is poisoned by whatever went on before, long before people go on strike, there are things that have happened in the workplace that lead to that. The attempt here is to deal with that. The only time groups talk is at the bargaining table. This is a kind of adversarial role, and it would make a lot of sense to get the two groups together once in a while to talk about general things. Sure, it might start out as talking about the latest baseball scores, but ultimately somebody is going to address an issue which they are concerned about in the workplace, and then some positive results can take place.
The problems, of course, can be resolved through ongoing discussions. We're not talking about once-in-a-while meetings, but some regular discussions. Maybe people will get together and prepare an agenda -- things that are of concern to both sides. Management might have some concern; labour might have some concern. And they would get together and talk about them.
If you're going to make workers feel a part of the operation, if you're going to make companies competitive, there has to be some dialogue in terms of what the problems are for management and what the problems are for the people who work. That needs to take place
[ Page 4491 ]
regularly, and it needs to take place long before collective agreements are signed. Most of the solutions that they will come up with will not be formal. There might be nothing signed off, nothing formally agreed to, but at least both sides will understand where they are and then be able to deal with that when negotiations begin.
Without an attempt to deal with that, without an attempt to turn labour relations in this province around, who's ultimately going to end up paying for it all? In every job action there are third parties that bear the brunt of it, and by doing this the government is making an attempt at minimizing some of those costs and some of those negative impacts.
True, you can't force people to have meaningful dialogue. But you can provide the opportunity. If they don't avail themselves of that opportunity, then, if nothing else, we would find out where the resistance to a new labour relations climate in B.C. really comes from. And maybe that is the ultimate fear of the opposition.
The enlightened on both management and labour will use the opportunity. There will be some resisting. There will be some who will say -- as the Labour critic has said -- that if they're forced into a meeting, they will sit and glare at each other. People will get tired of that very quickly. Human beings, being reasonable, will ultimately get down to the task at hand. We want the parties to engage in some discussion to communicate their concerns, and that's what section 53 does. If one side decides to scuttle the plan, there likely won't be much success; if both of them see the light, then section 53 will have a very significant and positive impact on the labour relations climate in B.C. I would suggest that the opposition give it a chance, because if it doesn't work, what have we lost? If it does work, we've certainly gained something.
K. Jones: I noticed a little discrepancy between two parts of this section. Subsection (2) states: "...the parties consult regularly during the term of the agreement...." That's where a collective agreement is being negotiated. Where a collective agreement is in place already but does not contain the provisions for this committee -- this joint consultation -- you have a requirement that they shall meet once every two months. Could you explain why these are different?
[5:30]
Hon. M. Sihota: The first allows the parties to agree among themselves how regular they should be. In that regard the two provisions may not necessarily be different. As you note, the second provision deals with a situation where there is no provision contained in the agreement; therefore we've defined "regularly" for them.
K. Jones: I guess that's appropriate. It tells one group of people under a collective agreement that they have to meet every two months -- very rigid and fixed. Another group can meet once a month; they can meet once every six months. That's regular. It's open to them to make their own agreements. I find that the second section, the one where an imposed regulation is put in this legislation, is not productive in bringing the parties together, because it makes them meet even if there isn't a purpose for meeting. It's an imposition. Surely the minister may want to reconsider that aspect. Make it match the other section. Have it state that they shall meet regularly. It's much more conducive to the purposes that the minister is trying to achieve.
Hon. M. Sihota: That's an interesting comment. We'll watch how collective agreements work through these provisions, and if it's not sufficiently regular, we can always make an amendment indicating how frequently they should meet. I take it that you agree with the section that this type of consultation should happen, but you would like to make sure it's frequent. I accept the thrust of the point you're making.
K. Jones: There's no question about it. We believe that there's a need for consultation, and in many places it works very well. It's not that we need it in the form of legislation, though. I don't think putting it in this bill will make the intended purpose work one iota better. It has to come as an agreement between the parties. It works really well when the parties voluntarily come together.
I'd like to ask about another aspect of it. The wording in subsection (5) is that a facilitator can be brought into play when a joint request is brought forward. It doesn't seem that there's much likelihood that that would occur. The only reason you would be calling for a facilitator would be when one of the two parties wasn't prepared to go further with the issue. Therefore it is totally non-productive to bring in a situation where it's a joint request. Could you explain why you're using a joint request?
Hon. M. Sihota: It's interesting, because your comments may clash in some way with what some others said in the House. Yes, we thought about that. It's joint because the whole purpose of preventive mediation is to try to encourage the parties to work together. And if they're going to take this step under subsection (5), it ought to be on a joint basis, as opposed to simply one party making their request or demanding it.
K. Jones: Thank you, hon. minister. I just wanted to get an explanation of your reasoning behind it, because it does seem that there may be some underlying reason for the facilitator being put in there. It's almost as if it wouldn't work, and therefore it would probably lead to other things. I'm not quite sure what those other things will be.
In many work situations we have safety committees and special committees to consider technological change and other special circumstances that come up. We have special joint committees established either through a collective agreement arrangement or an agreement by both parties to meet and work on these issues. Is this legislation going to supersede those committees?
Hon. M. Sihota: No, it will complement them.
[ Page 4492 ]
K. Jones: From my experience, we've had joint safety committees and joint work-related committees. They tended to end up placing much less emphasis on safety and spending less time on work issues, to the point where very little went on in those meetings. They started off with a lot of very good ideas, but it gradually came to the point where nobody really wanted to go to the meetings. People from both sides had other activities that were more important, and eventually the purpose in the legislation to have these meetings was lost.
There has to be a basic purpose for a meeting, a purpose that does not conflict with the safety aspects of the meeting. We have a very clear need to have a set time for safety meetings, and those meetings need to be clearly separated from anything like this so that there is a designated focus on the issues of safety. I get the impression from the minister's comment that he is disagreeing with that concept.
Hon. M. Sihota: No, not at all. I think there's a place for those committees. I think those health, safety and tech-change committees will complement, and be in parallel with, the spirit, the intent and indeed the actual provisions of section 53.
K. Jones: Going into subsection (4), hon. Chairman, I'd like the minister to clarify for us the phrase "to foster the development of work-related skills." Does that mean training? Does that mean personal development?
Hon. M. Sihota: We will leave it to the parties to make their own determinations as to how they would define the scope of subsection (4), and then we will watch with care how they do that. Hopefully they will do it within the full spirit of section 53.
K. Jones: Hon. Chairman, I feel that that was not a complete response to my question; I think my question needs a much more definitive response. To the minister: does "development of work-related skills" mean personal development and training?
Hon. M. Sihota: It may if the parties deem it to mean that.
K. Jones: Going to the next part of that same subsection of section 53, does "promote workplace productivity" mean layoffs?
Hon. M. Sihota: Again it will be up to the parties to determine how they wish to define the scope of section 53.
K. Jones: If, as you have indicated, these items are included in this consultative process, could you tell us how you separate the items that would be in this consultative process from those that should be considered under collective bargaining?
Hon. M. Sihota: This provision is a part of the collective bargaining process, so it would be incorporated into a collective agreement as a part of that process, if there's mutual agreement of the parties.
K. Jones: I move the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.
The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.
The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.
Hon. M. Sihota moved adjournment of the House.
Motion approved.
The House adjourned at 5:42 p.m.
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