Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1992

Volume 6, Number 23

[ Page 4275 ]

The House met at 10:05 a.m.

Prayers.

Orders of the Day

Hon. G. Clark: Committee on Bill 84, hon. Speaker.

LABOUR RELATIONS CODE
(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 84; E. Barnes in the chair.

Section 9 approved.

On section 10.

G. Farrell-Collins: I notice the minister has come in, so I'll give him a chance to settle himself down a little bit and prepare for the debate.

We have some concerns about section 10. The first thing I'd like to address is the change to the gist of subsection (2)(a) that deals with unfairness in internal union affairs and trying to ensure that that doesn't occur. It states: "...if in doing so the trade union acts in a discriminatory manner...." I believe that it used to say -- fairly closely -- that if they acted in an unfair or unreasonable manner in that regard.... I think we need to address that. I would ask the minister if he could tell us the significance of that change. In my mind a discriminatory action deals with favouring one person over another, or imposing a penalty on one person as opposed to a group. That would be to discriminate one from the group; whereas there is a sense of fairness and reasonableness applied to individuals as well as to the collective. So I think there is a change there, and one could almost say that as long as you were not acting in a discriminatory manner, you could be unfair and unreasonable as long as it was to a group instead of to an individual. Perhaps we could get a clarification from the minister on the difference between those two sets of words and what he feels the need for the change was.

Hon. M. Sihota: Before I answer the question of the hon. member, I wish to put the House on notice that I want to reserve my right to bring forward a motion of privilege against the hon. member who just spoke, in regard to statements he made in the House on Tuesday morning, November 24, 1992. Therefore I am requesting that right be reserved, and I will put the hon. member on notice. He made some statements in the House wherein he indicated that on several occasions.... I think the word he used was "frequently"; I'm just trying to find the actual quote so that he knows exactly what I'm dealing with. It dealt with issues relating to the B.C. Federation of Labour and particularly with my suggestion to the hon. member....

G. Farrell-Collins: Point of order. If the minister chooses to move a motion of privilege, that's fine. Otherwise, I assume we're on section 10 of this bill and that we will stick with that. Once the minister has his motion of privilege in order and has it together, then perhaps he can bring it up at that time.

The Chair: If the minister wishes to advise the Chair of his desire to reserve his right for a matter which he wishes to clarify at a later time, that's fine; but he should then get back to the section.

Hon. M. Sihota: I'm doing precisely that: reserving my right to raise a matter of privilege. The hon. member should understand the rules better.

With regard to section 10, that deals with internal union affairs. It applies the principles of natural justice in respect of all matters dealing with the internal affairs of a trade union. As the hon. member knows, it is a section that we dealt with considerably during the course of committee stage on section 2.

G. Farrell-Collins: I'll repeat my question then, because I assume the minister was settling in and didn't hear it. The question is with regard to section 10(2)(a), which deals with the words: "...if in doing so the trade union acts in a discriminatory manner...." My understanding is that there used to be a reference in there to "unreasonable and unfair" instead of "discriminatory." I'm asking the minister why there was a need to change those words and what his interpretation is of the difference between them.

Hon. M. Sihota: Before I get into any interpretation of those words, perhaps the hon. member could lay out his case and explain why he thinks those changes are necessary.

G. Farrell-Collins: At this point I'm not proposing a change; the minster is proposing one. I did lay out the reasons for it. In my view, when one looks at the word "discriminatory," one's looking at segregating one person from a group and imposing a discipline, a rule or some sort of procedure on that person as opposed to the whole group. When one deals with the words "unfair and unreasonable," they apply to the whole group, not just segregating one from the whole. I think one can certainly act in an unfair and unreasonable manner with a whole group, yet not be discriminatory. The minister is making the changes. I'm asking him why he felt it was necessary to make those changes.

Hon. M. Sihota: The hon. member obviously is referring to the way in which matters were dealt with in the past, as opposed to the way in which they are being proposed to be dealt with in this legislation. In so doing he overlooks the fact that the test for internal union actions is being changed from being fair and reasonable in the opinion of the IRC to having trade unions adhere to principles of natural justice. I would suggest to the hon. member that those who have an understanding of natural justice would understand, when subsection (2) is read in concert with subsection (1), that we have 

[ Page 4276 ]

actually improved the situation and, accordingly, we do not see any need to change it.

[10:15]

L. Hanson: The minister has a legal background, and he could probably help us of lesser experience in that particular area if he would give an answer to a question. I know the minister doesn't want to deal with hypothetical situations, but what would the recourse be for the protection of the individual under the principle of natural justice in the case of a union demanding an employee be fired if membership were rescinded for crossing a picket line, a disagreement over some union policy -- or whatever the reason might be? What would that individual's rights be to appeal it? What process would they use? Can he explain the principles of natural justice and how they would apply under those circumstances?

Hon. M. Sihota: I appreciate the hon. member's patience. I just wanted to make sure there was at least one issue that I understood entirely.

With regard to the principles of natural justice, I think the hon. member's suggestion, if I may jump ahead, is that this somehow makes a situation different than the previous 5.1, which placed an absolute prohibition on a situation arising where a union could take an action that would result in an individual being out of work. I take it that the thrust of what you're trying to get at is that the previous legislation stated: "No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate the employment of an employee." If you're asking if that is now a possible result given the fact that 5.1 is gone and 10 is in, if that's really where you're headed in your line of questioning -- which I suspect you are -- then it is true. Your assertion would be correct that given the fact that the absolute prohibition that existed in 5.1 is now removed and section 10 is now in place, that which was prohibited under 5.1 in the past could potentially occur under 10.

You also asked me to outline the principles of natural justice and how they would apply to that type of situation. I don't have all of the quirks on natural justice here, but let me put it this way: the guiding variable with regard to natural justice is a tribunal -- in this case it would be the Labour Relations Board -- when assessing whether natural justice or procedural rights were provided to an individual. They would measure the degree to which those rights were accorded against the harm that may occur to an individual as a result of a decision made. Given the fact that the harm would be considerable -- i.e., a person could lose their job -- the normal practice is to require a high degree of attendance to the principles of natural justice. Therefore if the principles of natural justice have not been.... I was thinking of using the word "strictly, but I'm not sure if that would be the right word, because I don't want to be interpreted in the wrong way in future. A high standard would have to be met in terms of the application of natural justice given that kind of harm. If that high standard was not met, then the union would be required to accord those procedural rights -- natural justice -- that met that standard. Is that fair enough?

L. Hanson: The minister has partially answered the question, I guess. Another question that might come from that is: where would the individual who felt that he had been wronged in some decision, whatever it may be, appeal for this right of natural justice? Would it be to the Labour Relations Board, the courts or an internal union committee?

Hon. M. Sihota: With regard to the denial of a procedural right, the application would go to the Labour Relations Board. That answer presupposes that there's no internal appeal provision within the union constitution. If there was, the board may say that they have to exhaust their appeal remedies with the union constitution first before they can appeal before the Labour Relations Board. Indeed, there have been cases under the principles of natural justice where a trier of fact outside of the constitution of -- let's say -- a trade union has said that you must exhaust your internal appeal remedies. For example, if you had a situation where an internal union body or whatever made a decision and an appeal under the union constitution was allowed to another level to reconsider the decision that was made below, and the person chose to go straight to the Labour Relations Board instead, the Labour Relations Board, in looking at the facts of that situation, may decide to exhaust their internal remedies first. There is case law with respect to natural justice that requires individuals to exhaust their internal remedies first.

My answer presupposed that there were no such remedies available. If all remedies have been exhausted and the individual still feels as if he has not been accorded respect under the principles of natural justice, then under that scenario he could also go to the Labour Relations Board. So under both scenarios, you could end up in front of the Labour Relations Board.

If you're thinking that the option to go to the Labour Relations Board is foreclosed, I would not read the section as foreclosing that option, as I understand natural justice. From a procedural point of view, I'm confident in expressing that opinion. In addition to that, I guess one always has the right, but it narrows. The opportunities narrow as you move up the chain of appeals. If you're not happy with the decision of the Labour Relations Board, you could, I suppose, seek a civil decision in the Supreme Court of British Columbia under the provisions of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, suggesting that the decision of the Labour Relations Board was wrong. The scope with which one can do that is, of course, narrowed. There is a narrowing effect as you move up the chain of appeals, but that's not to say the appeals are not available. Indeed, I would think that when the harm is the one we're talking about, the principles of natural justice would be applied diligently -- if I could put it that way -- by all the panels to make sure that the person is accorded all the procedural rights which they're entitled to.

[ Page 4277 ]

L. Hanson: That's very helpful. As I understood the minister, if there is an internal union appeal procedure, they would have to exhaust that appeal procedure, and then the Labour Relations Board would accept an application for a hearing on the difficulty that the individual was experiencing. Because, I guess, the reference to individual rights is removed from the purposes section of the legislation. It seems to me that the appeal procedure.... I don't get that same reading from reading the act as the minister does, but his experience in law and natural justice far exceeds mine, so I'll accept that that's the intent. Under those circumstances, we now know that the individual must exhaust their internal union appeal procedures, if there are any. If they do exhaust them and are not happy with the result, they can then appeal to the Labour Relations Board for a hearing on the issue.

The amendment that stands in my name on the order paper adds after subsection (2)(b) the following paragraph: "(c) for reasons which are unfair or unreasonable in the opinion of the Labour Relations Board." From what I just heard the minister suggest, it seems to me that that would be a fair and reasonable direction to the Labour Relations Board. My layman's interpretation of the principles of natural justice ensure that there is a procedural fairness but not necessarily the direction to the adjudication board that they should make a decision on the basis of fairness. I therefore move that amendment, Mr. Chair.

Hon. M. Sihota: We're trying to move away from a regime where the Labour Relations Board makes determinations as to whether or not a provision in a union constitution is fair or unreasonable. The reason for that is that generally speaking -- and I hope the hon. member opposite would agree with me -- trade unions are highly democratic organizations and....

Interjection.

Hon. M. Sihota: Well, they are, and I think some members opposite have been watching too many movies on TV with respect to trade unions. But they are among the most -- from my experience -- democratic institutions in society. Members elect their executive and have the ability to influence the constitution and bylaws of a union no more differently than members of a society have the ability to influence and make determinations as to the constitution and bylaws of a society.

It is felt that it's up to that membership base of a trade union or of any organization, in keeping with practice in that regard, to make determinations as to whether they think the constitution and the bylaws that they are governed under are fair and reasonable. There's enough parameter within those constitutions and bylaws to bring forward changes that may increase the standard of fairness and reasonableness. We would prefer that those matters be dealt with internally and that the membership have the opportunity to make their own determinations as to whether or not they're content with the constitution and bylaws of a trade union.

But we think that there must be some sort of overview flowing from the Labour Relations Board that basically says: "You set your own constitution and your own bylaws. Once you've set them, then when you wish to deal with matters of union discipline, matters in the constitution of a trade union or matters in relation to a membership in a trade union, we're going to watch over you to make sure that you accord to people the procedural rights that they're entitled to. If you do not treat people with the measure of respect that they're entitled to in terms of those rights -- the right to a hearing, the right to cross-examine, the right to know the case against them, for example, which are accepted as basic rights in our system of adjudication -- then the provisions of section 10 will kick in. But we're not going to have a father-knows-best approach with regard to internal constitutional provisions."

[10:30]

I don't know to what extent -- and I'll try to ascertain this -- the matters of trade union constitutions were considered in the past by the Labour Relations Board, but my suspicion would be that they'd be few and far between, because, generally speaking, those constitutions lay out fair and reasonable protections and provisions for their employees.

L. Hanson: I recognize that most unions are democratically run. I've had experience on both sides of that spectrum. They have been very democratic in their procedures and very democratic in their attitudes. I've also seen circumstances where they're not very democratic and quite the opposite is true. The same applies to employers; it isn't isolated to union organizations. As a matter of fact, it isn't isolated to any organization. There are organizations that are unfair regardless of the particular purpose for which they were formed.

Because there is that unfairness in the world from time to time, I would point out to the minister that even in the BCGEU contract just negotiated by his government there's a whistle-blowers' clause that gives protection to the individual who has raised an issue of concern, because it is thought that there's a possibility of some unfairness in the treatment of that individual. I would suggest to the minister that it is no more necessary in that contract -- or it is just as necessary in the Labour Relations Code -- to have this sort of protection than it is to have it in the union contract. For that reason, it was my understanding that if the natural justice provision gave individuals the right to a hearing under whatever process the union may have as its appeal process, they could then appeal to the Labour Relations Board for a decision as to whether the process had, in fact, given natural justice -- and so on.

I'm not suggesting, Mr. Minister, that that appeal to the Labour Relations Board should be guaranteed under any circumstances. The minister well knows, probably much better than most of us in this room, that it is possible some of the people involved in the decision to discipline a member may be the same ones who are hearing the appeal within the organization. It seems to me that the principle of justice is only fair if there is an appeal mechanism to that decision.

[ Page 4278 ]

The Labour Relations Board, which may hear that appeal, will make a decision on whether or not there is merit to the appeal, and decide on the basis of that whether they are going to hear it or whether they are not going to hear it -- as I understand the system. With that in mind, if the Labour Relations Board does decide there are grounds to conduct a hearing into the issues, even though the process has been vetted once through whatever appeal system the union may have, our amendment would simply say that if you decided you wanted to hear it for reasons, they would make a decision or a judgment on the basis of "fair and reasonable" in their opinion. It doesn't give any direction other than that. I don't think it can be suggesting that it's biasing anything or doing anything other than ensuring that the principles of fair and reasonable are applied to that hearing process.

Hon. M. Sihota: In listening to the hon. member's comments, in what's clearly a very interesting debate, perhaps I was remiss in not focusing in on this point, and I will now. You talked about the requirements for fairness and reasonableness. Under the principles of natural justice, implicit in those provisions is a duty of fairness. So one should not assume that the concept of the duty of fairness is not in some way part of this section. Actually that theme runs throughout the natural justice jurisprudence, and therefore the duty of fairness is part of the thrust of the considerations as they relate to natural justice variables. Because it's a component, I'm not persuaded, therefore, that the amendment is required. There is a duty of fairness found in the notion of natural justice.

I have a case here which touches not so much on what the hon. member said during the course of his last comments but with respect to his previous cases. The case involved the Teamsters' union. It's a long extract, actually, but it dealt with this whole issue of employer and employee rights to terminate. With the indulgence of the House, I don't think it would hurt if I were just to read the extract from the case, because I think it puts these concerns of internal union affairs into some perspective:

"Flowing from the employer's right to carry on its business is the employer's right to discipline an employee for, amongst other things, failure to follow directions the employer may legally give to that person. Trade unions have obtained the right only to have the propriety of the employer's action against the employee determined after the fact by a third party.

"The relationship between a trade union and its members is fundamentally different. First, the relationship is not essentially adversarial; rather, the trade union is made up of its members. The members come together in circumstances governed by the trade union's constitution and bylaws to carry on the conduct of the trade union's affairs. Although trade unions in modern society now exercise considerable power which impacts on the public and on its members' access to work, trade unions remain essentially unincorporated, voluntary associations whose affairs are governed by their members in accordance with the constitution and bylaws, which form the contract between the members as to how they will conduct their affairs.

"Unions, as a conglomeration of members, have an independent interest, which reflects the interests of the majority of its members, to maintain union solidarity and thus to serve its members' interests, including obtaining...favourable conditions of employment and redressing any imbalance between the comparable strengths of an employer and its employees. A trade union remains largely an association which requires of its membership mutual reliance and a recognition by all members that they are associated in a common endeavour through their union to achieve certain goals in the workplace and in the community.

"Employees affected by an employer's decision to impose discipline for a certain act or omission have no input into that decision-making process. While an employee, through collective bargaining, may set out guidelines within which an employer may discipline, the employee is not part of the employer's disciplinary decision-making process. The employee does not sit, as of right, on the board of directors of the employer, nor sit in the management meetings associated with the decision to discipline. The employee is, largely, the object of the employer's decision to discipline.

"This state of affairs contrasts with the circumstances associated with the expulsion, suspension, or imposition of a penalty on a member by a trade union. In these disputes, the complainant is a member of the very association which is endeavouring to regulate his or her conduct, and which has taken action against the member about which the member complains. The member, through the internal trade union legislative process, participates in the formation of, and amendment to, the trade union's rules and policies.

"A trade union member's assessment of the importance of certain trade union principles and goals is reflected in the rules and policies of that trade union. The fact that a trade union member, in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the association, has input into the formation and application of the trade union's rules and policies markedly differentiates the relationship of a member to his or her trade union from that of an employee to his or her employer. Because these relationships are so very different, it follows that no assumption of parallel remedial jurisdiction ought to be inferred, particularly in the face of very significant different legislative provisions in the code."

I think that sets out the point I was trying to make earlier that certain matters are best left to internal affairs in terms of structure and rules and process, but there must be an overguard. That overguard is now placed in this legislation through the principles of natural justice under section 10.

L. Hanson: Could the minister just confirm that his understanding of the principles of natural justice ensure just as strongly that the decision-making process ensures fairness and reasonableness in its application? My understanding is that it ensured an opportunity for the individual to have a hearing in due process as opposed to the direction of fairness and reasonableness.

I certainly wouldn't argue that the unions do not or should not have the authority to make their own bylaws -- providing they're not against some of the protected principles that we live by in this society. I suspect that most of the bylaws are not that way. I don't think we're arguing that they should not have the right to draw up those bylaws.

[ Page 4279 ]

I think the minister will agree that under almost any process, whether it be from the employer side or from the union side of the equation, there has to be an appeal process. If the employer fires a unionized individual without cause, there are probably some grievance procedures in place that would ensure that the employer acts with some integrity and so on. The courts are another aspect. Individuals can appeal to the courts for a hearing as to the fairness or justification of a dismissal in an organized labour situation.

Obviously the minister is not in favour of the amendment. If the minister can confirm that the process that is in place would provide a guarantee of fairness and reasonableness, I would feel better about it. I'm not sure where it says in Bill 84 that there is an opportunity to appeal to the Labour Relations Board, but the minister has gone on record that if there is a decision by an appeal process in the union that the member feels is unfair, they do have the opportunity to have that reviewed by the Labour Relations Board to see if there is some substance to a claim for appeal.

[10:45]

To emphasize that, I mentioned earlier the contract just negotiated between this government and the British Columbia Government Employees' Union. I'll read from an article discussing it: "'Disclosure of information,' as it is referred to in the contract, is also known as 'whistle blowing,' after cases where civil servants blow the whistle on government ineptitude or wrongdoing, and usually pay a price for it." By the suggestion that they pay a price for it, that may be dismissal, transfer or whatever; and there is an appeal process to allow that to be vetted. "The contract attempts to protect such individuals. The employer and the union recognize that it is in the public interest for employees to be able to disclose information regarding breaches of a statute" or questions of danger to public health and safety without fear of being disciplined. That should also be part of the discipline procedure from the other side.

Will the minister give us his commitment that his understanding of the legislation is that the individual has the right to appeal through a union appeal procedure? And if the decision is not to the satisfaction of the individual, that individual would then have the right to have that case taken to the Labour Relations Board for their decision on, first of all, whether there was some substance to the appeal and, secondly, if so, to actually hear it. The principles of natural justice do not just guarantee that there is a procedure but also that there is a fairness and a reasonableness to the decisions that come from it. At least they are a reminder that natural justice should be one of the principles in the decision-making process.

L. Stephens: Individual rights within the union -- how are they protected?

L. Hanson: The member has asked a question about individual rights within the union and how they are protected. I guess I could answer that for the minister. Each of the unions has a constitution, and in the constitutions there are procedures and so on to ensure the individual's rights, to a degree depending on the wording. Some are very detailed and some not quite so detailed. Most contracts include a closed or union shop provision, and the circumstances that the amendment would relate to are where a member disagrees with the application of some union policies or maybe even disagrees with some of the union leadership. There is a process that ensures there is a fair and reasonable hearing and that the decision is based on fairness and reasonableness.

Hon. M. Sihota: I appreciate the hon. member's demonstration of his skill in being able to talk while I was out of the House for a moment. I stepped out basically to go to the library to pick out a book on administrative law and to look at the provisions on natural justice, because I thought it might just help in terms of the debate.

I don't want the hon. member to get me wrong in terms of what I've had to say. If the suggestion is that the Labour Relations Board ought to have jurisdiction to look at a constitution and determine whether or not its bylaws or constitutional provisions are fair and reasonable, and the question is whether or not natural justice would allow it to do that, then the answer is no, it would not. If, on the other hand, the question is whether or not there is an obligation on the part of a union to be fair with respect to the application of the rules of natural justice, then the answer is yes.

In the duty of fairness, you could strictly adhere to every procedural right. You could give someone, on the face of it, the right to a hearing; and on the face of it they have given reason. You may have given both sides the opportunity to express their opinions, so that it appears on the face of it as a legitimate process, but in reality it is not. If the board had fundamentally made up its mind before it heard a case with regard to removal of an individual and there was evidence of that, or if there was evidence of bias on the part of a panel, then it would seem to me that the rules of natural justice would kick in to redirect another hearing.

I did find the quote that I was looking for, in terms of.... It's amazing how some of your skills from law school never leave you. I want to quote from what is stated to be the duty to act fairly, and that may attend to your concern. I'm quoting from the Canadian Encyclopedic Digest: Western Third Edition, item 64. The reason I'm doing this, quite honestly, is that I appreciate that there are times, as I've said lots of times in this debate, that I do not wish to send strong signals to the board which fetter their discretion; but I must confess that I feel strongly that the principles of natural justice must be applied well with regard to these types of matters, particularly when there is a lot at stake. I'm very consciously taking some liberty here in saying that on the record and in reading this material. Let me quote:

"In some recent English decisions it has been suggested that the rules of natural justice have a content with relation to all statutory decision-making powers and that their application does not depend on classification of the function in issue as judicial or quasi-judicial as opposed to administrative."

Let me pause there. There is a whole galaxy of law that looks at whether or not a tribunal in fact is administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial, and the rights to natural 

[ Page 4280 ]

justice take on a different complexion, depending on whether it's administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial. I know of no decisions in terms of how they have classified a labour relations board, but I'd be surprised if it was simply administrative, because I think it has a judicial quality to it.

"This notion of generally applicable natural justice principles or, as it has been commonly described, the duty to act fairly, finds some support in the following dictum of Lord Loreburn in the seminal decision of Bd. of Education v. Rice: 'In such cases...they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything.' While Canadian courts have unequivocally recognized that all statutory decision-making powers must be exercised in good faith, there has so far been only limited recognition of a notion of procedural fairness irrespective of the function being performed. However, on occasion, the courts have been prepared to hold that certain decision-makers, exercising purely administrative functions, may be obliged to comply with...the procedural obligations which usually bind only judicial or quasi-judicial decision-makers."

There is that kind of duty of fairness that I think runs through.... It's not so much to give the board the ability to comment on the constitution of a trade union, but rather to make sure that the process, which may have been strictly respected, was not a sham process. There must be some fairness and a duty to listen to both sides in a legitimate and meaningful way. I think that those with concerns in that regard would probably find some comfort in that notion as it is developed under our strictures of administrative law.

L. Hanson: To put it on record, as well as for the information of the minister, there's no suggestion that we think the Labour Relations Board should have the right to review the bylaws of the union. There are many laws in Canada that would keep the bylaws of an organization respectful of the Charter of Rights and other things -- on discrimination and so on -- that we have come to accept as part of society. So there's nothing in my remarks that would suggest we want that procedure to be vetted by the Labour Relations Board.

This is the last question I have. Could the minister confirm that in the case of a difficulty the individual would have the right to an appeal, under whatever appeal process there is within the constitution of the union, and then would have the right to appeal to the Labour Relations Board for, I would suspect, something like a preliminary hearing to see if there is substance in the appeal for a review? The Labour Relations Board would then have the jurisdiction and the right to hear the case if they felt there was a reason to hear it. Failing that and wanting a further opportunity to appeal, the individual could appeal to the courts of British Columbia for a final decision. Is that the minister's understanding?

Hon. M. Sihota: That's generally true, but let me give you more particulars. Someone would have to make an application under section 10, and then the provisions of section 14 would be triggered with regard to an inquiry. Then the board would have the latitude to make whatever determinations it wants under section 14. If the aggrieved person is still not content with the findings under section 14, in theory they have an opportunity to go to the courts; but as I said earlier on, the scope of that right is significantly reduced after the Labour Relations Board has made its decision.

[11:00]

Amendment negatived on the following division:

On section 10.

G. Farrell-Collins: I listened with some interest to the debate that preceded the defeat of the amendment.

I'll just wait until the backbenchers leave, and then we can proceed.

The Chair: Would the members please leave quietly so that the committee may proceed.

G. Farrell-Collins: We always seem to have that little interlude after a vote, and that's fine.

I have been listening with extreme interest to statements by the minister and the member for Okanagan-Vernon, and I have been doing a bit of reading myself. I guess what we're looking for here and what it comes down to is a clarification by the minister -- a very clear statement from the minister -- that in his mind natural justice would include references to fairness and reasonableness. I think that was what he was trying to say when he was going through his documentation and reading from his encyclopedia. Perhaps if he would like to make that extremely clear for us, we can move on to other things.

Hon. M. Sihota: I referred to the duty of fairness in a particular context when I quoted from the CED. I think that statement was clear enough, hon. Chair.

[ Page 4281 ]

G. Farrell-Collins: We're merely trying to secure from the minister some assurances that the reason behind the change he has brought forward is not to exclude fairness and reasonableness from the section as such. His argument seems to be that the reference to natural justice includes both of those. He cited one ruling in particular that would lead us to believe that's his intent. I guess what we're trying to achieve from the minister is a much more definitive statement that would clearly state that that's the case, so we can have that assurance. If he chooses not to do that, then I suppose we're going to have to request that those words be reinserted into the bill and that it be stated very clearly in the actual legislation itself.

Hon. M. Sihota: Far be it from me to tell the opposition what it wishes to do in terms of its options in the House. I'm just telling the hon. member that there is a duty of fairness found in the principles of natural justice. I've referred to it, and I've explained how it applies. The hon. member can refer to Hansard. I'm sure he will get adequate comfort from what I've said.

G. Farrell-Collins: I don't understand why the minister is so leery of making a clear statement in this House. We tend to skirt around the issues. He tends to try and give the impression that he's saying something when, in reality, he's not.

For the better clarification of the general public and members of this House, we're just asking the minister if, in his mind, that is the intent in bringing forth this legislation. It is his legislation, and he is the person making this change by taking out the words "reasonable and fair" and putting in "discriminatory." The previous reference to natural justice includes both of those things. If his intent isn't to erode the sense of reasonableness and fairness in the bill, then I would say that he should be very willing to stand up and state that it is his intent not to erode those two provisions and that his intent is that they are included in the reference to natural justice.

All we're asking for is a clear statement by the minister -- one that can be referred to for posterity, I suppose -- in order to know what he did or didn't intend. I don't think it's too much to ask for a straight answer from the minister, one way or the other. Either he's choosing to do this without knowingly eroding those rights -- but, in fact, that's the effect -- or he wants to make a very clear statement that reasonableness and fairness are included in his definition of natural justice and in the definition of natural justice as it applies to this bill. We're just looking for a straight answer. We're not trying to be combative or argumentative. We're just asking the minister to clearly state what the intention is.

Hon. M. Sihota: Those with an elementary understanding of natural justice would understand that the principles of natural justice include a duty to be fair. I have placed it within the context of an extract of a case that I have recited to this House, and that makes the point abundantly clear.

G. Farrell-Collins: Then I assume that's the clear statement we have from the minister: the reference to natural justice in this section does in fact include a duty to be fair and reasonable. With that, I assume that's his intent: in his mind and in the mind of the general public, there's no need to put those extra words in there, because it's clearly defined within natural justice. That's the intent of the minister.

Hon. M. Sihota: The hon. member should not put words in my mouth. I have, in my own words, made a statement in the House, and that statement is clear. The hon. member was not in the House when it was made. He can take the opportunity to review Hansard. When he has reviewed Hansard, I'm sure he will find that there's appropriate comfort to those who are concerned about whether or not the notion of fairness is to be found in the principles of natural justice.

G. Farrell-Collins: The minister is getting testy already, and it's only 11:15 a.m. We've got a long way to go today.

I'm not trying to put words in the minister's mouth; I'm asking the minister to say those words himself. There's a point to it. I was in the House when he made reference to the case in point, and he used it as an example. He made reference to the word "fairness." All I'm saying is that my understanding -- and, I think, the general understanding of this House -- is that the minister is stating that a duty to be fair and reasonable is included in what natural justice means. In his opinion, that is the intent of this bill. I don't see a problem with that. I'm not trying to put words in the minister's mouth; I'm merely quoting what he said and asking him if that was his intent.

J. Tyabji: I'm happy to enter the debate today after having watched the exchange in the House so far this morning. I'd like to ask the minister if, with his legal background, he is aware of the significance of removing words from a piece of legislation?

Hon. M. Sihota: Yes.

J. Tyabji: Given that the minister, with his personal legal background, is aware of the significance of removing words from legislation, could he explain to us why he has removed two words with regard to unfairness and unreasonableness? If his intention is that the principles of natural justice include fairness and reasonableness, then why aren't they in the act?

[11:15]

Hon. M. Sihota: This section of this legislation places a new element into labour relations in this province. With regard to the review of internal union matters, it places an obligation to respect the principles of natural justice in disputes relating to matters that deal with the constitution of, discipline by and membership in a trade union. It is a new way of doing things. It is different from the previous section. It employs different standards and brings in different legal notions than has been the case in the past.

[ Page 4282 ]

The new legal standards and notions that have been placed in this provision require principles of natural justice to be applied. That means that there is a duty to give a hearing and a duty to make sure that oral or written submissions are provided. It means that there must be notice and that the rules with respect to standing must be respected. It means that consideration has to be given as to whether or not there should be reasons for decisions and whether or not hearings should be open or closed. It means there should be provisions and opportunities provided for contrary evidence to be presented and for an individual to be cross-examined. It means that an individual must be given the opportunity to know the case they have to face. It means that the expectation is that there must not be a bias by the adjudicator with regard to these issues. It means that there is a duty to act fairly on the bases that I have already indicated. That's what natural justice means, hon. member.

So it's not a case of simply removing two words from previous legislation and leaving it at that; it's a matter of injecting into our system of examining internal union affairs a new system of procedural rights that are made clear. Given the fact that there are dynamic changes in laws as laws are developed, we have used the principles of natural justice so that as laws and jurisprudence in relation to natural justice evolve, that evolution is inevitably picked up by this legislation without requiring further amendments to the legislation.

It's in that context that the hon. member must consider the comments she makes. If she understands what natural justice means, I'm sure she would agree with me that there is a standard found in this legislation that is materially different from the considerations and the standards in previous legislation. I would encourage the hon. member to sit back and look at what we're talking about here -- i.e., natural justice -- and remove the obsession on two words which are not necessary, given the fact that we have moved to a new regime.

J. Tyabji: I think the hon. minister has given me an excellent opening with regard to the new regime. I think it is the new regime that is causing the people of B.C. so much anxiety with regard to this legislation and the direction in which it's trying to take the province.

Hon. Chair, there are a number of points raised by the minister. I think the minister, when he talks about the new way of doing things, "different standards" and "new legal notions," whatever this means -- notions hopefully not meaning the same kinds of notions we find in a sewing basket, but actually different legal notions with regard to how we approach the labour code.... It is precisely because this minister will not stand up in the House and define the actions of a union with regard to fairness and reasonableness.... We understand the principles of natural justice. That's on one side. It's wonderful to hear the minister stand up in the House and elaborate this point, that point and the other point about natural justice. We all agree with natural justice, but there's another issue.

I will put this example to the minister. In this House, with regard to individual members' privilege, in order for them to be breaching that privilege in voting on a piece of legislation, it has to be proven that they have a pecuniary interest in that legislation - the individual member has to benefit personally from the bill. That is the case in this act -- and I'm happy to see the minister is actually paying attention. In this bill we see that "discriminatory" has the same impact as "pecuniary," in that if a union acts to every member of the union in a blanket manner that could be deemed unreasonable or unfair -- for example, let's say that the members feel that an increase in their union dues is beyond the increase that they personally feel is fair or reasonable -- we on the opposition side do not feel that this minister has provided for that. The principles of natural justice are not something arbitrary or in any way judgmental enough to say: "The principles of natural justice deem that increase in union dues to be discriminatory." We've limited it to "discriminatory." We're talking about natural justice, which is just a guideline. Natural justice is like the DOS system of a computer. It's a framework through which we build things, but in terms of what we're hanging on that framework, we're only hanging "discriminatory" and not "unfair or unreasonable."

In my opinion, there are members in this House who should not be voting on sections of this bill, because as members of a union they will be benefiting from it. However, the standing orders don't allow for that. So just as we have pecuniary interests in the House, we also have a difference in terms of discriminatory provisions and blanket provisions, which is fairness and reasonableness.

Hon. M. Sihota: This new principle of natural justice being injected into the legislation seems to be lost on the official opposition. The standards -- the world -- have changed. The hon. member used the example of a....

Interjection.

Hon. M. Sihota: The hon. member heckles about union dues, so let's talk about union dues, because it shows an appalling and pathetic lack of understanding of how unions work. In most cases, for those who understand the trade union movement, dues are set at conventions where the membership makes a decision with regard to dues. Often those are highly controversial decisions, as any time one imposes a due may be. The point is that the decisions are made at a convention where the membership is present; the membership elects delegates to a convention and the delegates make the decision with regard to dues. If one understands the trade union movement, one would come to understand that setting dues -- which the hon. member wants me to deal with -- is done in a highly open and democratic way. There ought not to be any concern there.

In addition to that, the legislation makes reference to the fact that the union cannot act in a discriminatory manner in imposing a penalty on a member. That should give the hon. member some comfort, because you cannot function in a way that discriminates one member against another. Section 10 is a considerable improvement, hon. member, over the previous section 

[ Page 4283 ]

5, and represents a new and progressive way of dealing with internal union matters. It reflects the fact that unions are a positive institution in our society and that they should be allowed to function without undue interference. But it also means that now, when the Labour Relations Board looks at procedural matters under the provisions of natural justice, it looks at unions and union activity with a better set of glasses on. It interprets the activities of a union in terms of procedural rights with a set of glasses through which everything must be read -- the glasses being ones which demand the application of natural justice.

It is discomforting, to put it politely, that the opposition doesn't seem to recognize an improvement in the law when it's sitting right before them.

F. Gingell: I would presume from the description that you just gave that, clearly, discrimination by the union against a particular member would also be barred by the requirement for the union to act in a manner of natural justice. So if you have seen fit to leave in the requirement that the union does not act in a discriminatory manner -- you feel that it is necessary for it to be there to give people the comfort that they won't be treated unfairly -- I really do fail to understand why you have a problem with leaving in the words "fair and reasonable."

All of us in British Columbia look to this new bill with some concern, as you can understand, and it seems to me that it behooves the government to do everything they can to quell and quieten those fears that people in British Columbia have through lack of definition, lack of clarity and lack of certainty. As you have so clearly enunciated that all these things are covered by the term "natural justice," it seems to me appropriate that if you are going to deal specifically with discrimination -- and we are pleased about that -- then you should also allow those words to be left in the legislation so that the comfort that could be there is in fact there.

Hon. M. Sihota: The principle of natural justice subsumes a duty of fairness. Included within the principle -- the umbrella -- of natural justice is a duty to be fair, hon. member. Therefore the introduction of the notion or the principle of natural justice in this provision broadens the issue and the power from just a test of fairness and reasonableness -- i.e., there is a new set of powers, principles, applications and standards that are caught under the notion of natural justice in the form of procedural rights which are now being allocated in this section. Rather than being worried for some remarkably peculiar reason, as the opposition is, it ought to be congratulating the government for bringing forward a provision with regard to natural justice which provides a broader set of procedural rights in the context of union affairs.

So it's an improvement on the status quo, hon. member. It injects new elements and considerations that weren't there, and it brings into direct play the principles of natural justice. So I am perplexed at the perplexity of the opposition in somehow thinking that this section erodes the state of the world. Rather, it improves upon it; it provides a broader umbrella. I would hope that the opposition, having heard that, would finally come to the realization that this is a positive and progressive change in legislation which they ought to be applauding and not questioning.

[11:30]

F. Gingell: I'm really sorry if I indicated that we are not in favour of the principles of natural justice. We certainly are. We're just trying to offer suggestions that will improve it.

The government has seen fit to require a specific clause in section 10(2)(a) to ensure that a union does not act in a discriminatory manner against any of its members. Surely that particular matter would also be covered by the requirement to act according to the principles of natural justice. So I'd be most interested to hear from the minister why he feels it is necessary for the discrimination clause to be in there in section 10(2)(a) if that is also covered under section 10(1), requiring them to abide by the principles of natural justice.

Hon. M. Sihota: Because section 10(2)(a) could conceivably deal with situations that aren't covered by section 10(1).

F. Gingell: I wonder if the minister was considering recasting section 10 so the principles of natural justice will apply to sections 10(1), 10(2) and 10(3). Because it is in section 10(1), it will only focus on the issues in section 10(1).

Hon. M. Sihota: Section 10(1) deals with the application of natural justice relating to a person's membership in a trade union. Section 10(2) then further amplifies on that point and deals with other attributes of membership in a trade union. I would assume that when someone is interpreting these provisions, they will read them as a whole, recognizing the usual rules of statutory interpretation. There are reasons why the section is divided, but when involved in statutory interpretation a trier of fact reads the clause that is in debate and must also consider it in the context of the balance of the clause.

C. Serwa: In speaking to section 10, I'd like to go back to the concept of natural justice. It's my understanding that it's a procedure and a process to ensure fairness in that aspect, but it's not the ultimate objective of the process to be fair or to be reasonable. Those are two subtly different areas. Natural justice ensures the right of the individual. I compliment the minister on the inclusion of the reference to natural justice. But the baseline of fairness and reasonableness is an abstract one in this particular piece of legislation, with removal....

I would have appreciated the consideration of the minister to incorporate the amendment proposed by my hon. colleague from Okanagan-Vernon, on the basis that it should, in fact, have some reference base to some 

[ Page 4284 ]

other body. The minister went on at considerable length, talking about the constitution and bylaws of unions. I make reference to this because, ultimately, we have to be very concerned about the rights of the individual in the union in this particular section. It is a very important section for the process and for the rights of the individual.

The minister knows as well as I do of unions that are autocratic, and he is also familiar with unions which may in fact be criminal. I think that all of us here clearly understand that the virtues and perhaps some of the less desirable characteristics in individuals are spread and evenly distributed, no matter where we may be in society. So in this particular situation we have the assurance of a process -- that assurance is called natural justice -- but we do not have any assurance of fairness or reasonableness.

Hon. M. Sihota: I thank the hon. member for his comments. It's unfortunate that he wasn't here during the course of an earlier exchange between the member for Okanagan-Vernon and me, when he put forward his amendment and I dealt with these issues.

Let me just say this. You are correct when you suggest that the rules of natural justice provide for procedural rights -- and I've consciously used that word throughout my discussion in the House this morning -- as opposed to substantive rights. I take it that you're making a case with regard to the inclusion of substantive rights in the power of review.

We've obviously chosen not to do that, and that was after some reflection. As I said earlier this morning, I guess at the end of the day the threshold determination was whether it was acceptable to allow the membership of a trade union -- in what are, as I argued this morning, very democratic organizations -- to have input on the drafting of a constitution and bylaws, and the substantive rights that are accorded within that context. As I said, the purpose of these changes was to reflect the view that unions are positive institutions in society that would operate without undue influence with regard to those types of substantive safeguards. It is up to the membership to make those determinations. However, there needs to be an overview in the hands of the Labour Relations Board, not just with respect to narrow procedural rights, but with respect to the principles of natural justice as they relate to those procedural rights. One would diminish the argument if one did not recognize that procedural rights can be very stringent, depending on the harm with regard to natural justice.

I also took the time during the debate this morning to make reference to the Rocky Zantolas decision, which was a decision involving the Teamsters regarding the interpretation of fairness and reasonableness. I pointed out that section of the decision, which I believe was made in 1989, and quoted at length how the Labour Relations Board dealt with the interaction of the democratic rights of members within the context of setting the constitution and bylaws versus what I would argue are now procedural rights.

I'm not diminishing the hon. member's point. If the thrust of his argument is that this provision provides an individual with procedural rights as opposed to substantive rights, then he's correct. But it should also be noted that the extent of those individual rights that are accorded on principles of natural justice, from a procedural point of view, are actually remarkable, and in that sense this is a significant improvement on the law.

The only other point that I make in defence of this section is to point out to the hon. member that this was a unanimous provision. I know that the panel put its mind to the kinds of issues that are being dealt with and also to the view that civil proceedings in court are not a realistic alternative to those who feel aggrieved by a decision of their union. We have chosen to structure it in this manner in order to give, as I said earlier, the limited powers that are provided here -- both to the Labour Relations Board and the courts -- and the scope of limitations narrows as you move up the chain of appeals.

Those are my comments, and it's unfortunate -- because I have enjoyed the debate I've had with the hon. member throughout this review of the legislation -- that he wasn't here this morning to hear in detail the quote that I gave from the legislation. But I am confident that he will take the time later today to read it all and to be totally persuaded by my argument.

C. Serwa: I in fact was here, hon. Chair. It was a fairly lengthy quote, and it would take some time and some reading to actually digest that lengthy quote.

In a perfect world I would have a great deal more comfort in this particular section, but the minister knows full well that it is not a perfect world. I have indicated that not all unions are democratic in nature. In fact, like other organizations, they become top-heavy, and all the efforts and energies are directed often from the top down rather from the bottom up.

In many cases they work like democracies in Third World countries, so I think that I have to get a concession from the minister that in some cases they are autocratic, and in some cases they are criminal. The concern that I have is for the rights of the individual union member who really doesn't have a great deal of options.

The minister indicates that they have a hand in determining the constitution and bylaws, but that isn't an actual reality. At some point in the early history that was a reality, but certainly when you talk about our large unions at the present time, that is not a viable option.

The minister makes significant weight of the argument that this was a unanimous decision. I have to counter that again and remind the minister that big unions, big government and big business are treating organized workers as pawns. It's a bit of a chess game. When you make reference to the weighty, honest remarks that there was consensus and unanimous agreement, I know and the minister knows that there was a great deal of horse trading -- I get this and you get that -- in order to establish priorities. So there was some give and take. I'm suggesting that the interest of the organized worker was not given very high consideration. When we talk about fairness and reasonableness, 

[ Page 4285 ]

that is clearly not available in some situations. All of us here wish that it was clearly available, but it is not.

Some sort of a balancing force has to be available in this section to ensure that there are some options. The minister has focused on a long list of appeal procedures that may be followed up to the Supreme Court. But while they are technically available, they are realistically completely unaffordable for the individual union member, and that is something that the minister has to bear the burden of.

There is also the reality that a union member who is a thorn under the saddle blanket of a union is without any form of protection and is subject to dismissal from the union, the loss of employment and the loss of employment opportunities. We've all heard of blacklists and the potential for the exchange of blacklists. It is my understanding that, whether it is above the surface or under the surface, it does occur. Surely the government and the minister designing this legislation have to clearly understand that it is fundamentally for the little people. It's for the rank and file, ordinary members of the union; it's not for that major organism, which is the union itself. I think this is a point in the history of the development of unions at which we have to look at a fourth party, the upper echelons of a union, its management and organization and administration. The rank and file are almost separate. The minister has to recognize that that is a natural event which is occurring as we get greater and greater numbers and the central network gets stronger and more established. I'm concerned about trampling over the rights of individuals in society.

I would have a great deal of personal difficulty, hon. Chair, in joining an organization with a constitution and bylaws which I couldn't live with. But the reality is that eating is a powerful habit. The minister found that out when he spent a month on the GAIN program to see what it was really like. Eating is a powerful habit. So we start to sell ourselves because of our responsibility for our families and for our future, and so perhaps we join unions in the hope of better opportunities. But the reality is that through the constitution and bylaws we're selling some of the rights and freedoms that have been firmly established in Canada.

[11:45]

A fair question to the minister: if we don't have any reference to the substantive element in treatment, does the Charter of Rights and Freedoms enable an individual in a union to have access to a human rights tribunal, or does the union prevent that type of opportunity from existing?

Hon. M. Sihota: The answer to the question is: yes, under certain circumstances one would have access to the provisions of the Human Rights Act. So that's there.

Secondly, with regard to the opening comments the hon. member made with respect to criminal activity, I think he's been watching too many movies. Certainly his description of unions and some of the sort of imagery that comes out is, I think, found more in Hollywood than in British Columbia.

Thirdly, let me reiterate that generally speaking, the experience has been that they are very democratic organizations.

Fourthly, let me point out that if a union acts contrary to the interests of its membership, either the leadership can be replaced through the provisions of the constitution or employees have the ultimate right to decertify from that union and either remain as a non-unionized workforce or seek the assistance of other unions.

I think that the case I referred to earlier on bears reconsideration. It says:

"Unions, as a conglomeration of members, have an independent interest, which reflects the interests of the majority of its members to maintain union solidarity and thus to serve its members' interests, including obtaining employment obtaining favourable conditions of employment and redressing any imbalance between the comparable strengths of an employer and its employees. A trade union remains largely an association which requires of its membership mutual reliance and a recognition by all members that they are associated in a common endeavour through their union to achieve certain goals in the workplace and in the community."

It said earlier on:

"The relationship between a...union and its membership is...not essentially adversarial, but rather, the trade union is made up of its members. The members come together in circumstances governed by the trade union's constitution and bylaws to carry on the conduct of the trade union's affairs."

Let's not lose sight of the basic fact here that a trade union is not a demon that comes into the workplace and subsumes the workers. Rather, it is an entity into which the workers themselves breathe life, and it is their breath that gives it that life. It's a reflection of....

Interjections.

Hon. M. Sihota: I'm sorry that I woke the Liberals again. It's just amazing how incapable they are of following an intellectual argument but how flippant they can be from time to time.

If I may continue to deal with the more effective opposition in this House, the fact of the matter is....

The Chair: Would the minister please take his seat. The hon. member for Fort Langley-Aldergrove on a point of order.

G. Farrell-Collins: On a point of order, it's merely the relevancy of the minister's comments to the debate. We're just in shock that he has actually said something intelligent. That's what woke us up.

The Chair: Order, hon. member. That is not a valid point of order, and you should refrain from intervening on those matters.

Hon. members, the debate has been rather free-flowing this morning, without any unfriendly comments from either side, and I would hope that we can manage to make it for the next eight minutes without any unfair comment. Would the minister please continue.

[ Page 4286 ]

Hon. M. Sihota: Thank you, hon. Chair. The truth does hurt, though.

With regard to unions, a union is a reflection of its membership base. If its leadership is acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory or unfair way, then it would seem to me that if any of the events that I referred to earlier were to occur -- for example, decertification -- then the same result that would happen to a government if it behaved that way would occur to that leadership. I think we have to accept that in a modern society, the kind of thug image that has sort of grown up out of movies based in Chicago is just not the fact.

It's like any other provision in this legislation. A measure of good faith is found in the legislation, and obviously if parties behave in a fashion so as to question that faith and in a way that is not responsible, then it's always the prerogative of government to make corrections. But I think it's fair to say that in the give-and-take of this legislation -- because it was developed essentially by labour and business themselves and not so much by this government imposing its own views on those parties -- both employers and individual employees did rather well by the inclusion of these provisions in the legislation, which I would suggest, as I have suggested earlier, are a marked improvement over what was there before.

C. Serwa: Perhaps I do have a vivid imagination, but I think I also have a fairly realistic appraisal of human nature. Fundamentally, since this section deals with the internal workings of a union -- and the rights of an individual are paramount in my mind -- it appears to me that the rights of the individual are diminished greatly, if not eliminated, in this section. I recognize that the union and the union elite -- if I can use that reference -- are there to ensure that the collective survives and that the strength of the collective is there. In doing so, even globally in society, people fall through the cracks. So I really do understand that, and while I lament it, that's reality.

In this particular case, though, it appears to me that while the minister has assured -- and correctly; I applaud the minister -- the inclusion of natural justice, the substantive elements of that natural justice and the type of discipline on the constitution and bylaws are not there. The tendency of unions will be to construct the constitution and bylaws to ensure survival of the entity at the expense of the individual rights of the worker. I have a great deal of difficulty with that, because originally the purpose of the unions were to ensure that the rights and privileges and opportunities of the individual worker were recognized, and that was a purpose of the gathering-together.

It appears to me that now it has flipped over, and the individual is a "pawn," like in a chess game. I think the direction that the legislation is taking us is totally inappropriate, because it fails to recognize the origins of unions and the requirement for unions. Primarily, it's for the individual member. Clearly we have a situation where the rights of the individual are being vanquished again.

Individual rights to me, and perhaps to the party I happen to represent, are in the fore. This section diminishes them. In the purposes of this legislation, we've seen other areas that have been diminished: the reference to free market economy as a sense of responsibility. In this section we're again talking about responsibility -- not only the responsibility of the individual member in the union, but we have to be talking about the responsibility -- I can't say the word responsibility enough -- of the union towards its membership.

I've talked about human nature, and I've listened to members on the government side with an almost absolute paranoia of what happens with power and influence. When I hear the members talk about international or multinational companies, it's almost synonymous with a form of evilness. Yet in this particular case we have international unions and multinational unions, and we have a paradox where they are deemed to be appropriate. I have a great deal of concern where, on the one hand, we have a government that opposes largeness and, on the other hand, says it's great and okay on the part of the unions.

I sympathize with their concerns when they talk about multinational corporations and the corporation's responsibility to itself rather than to individuals in the country. I understand that. I have concerns along that line as well. But I also have great concerns about the responsibility of very large unions to the rank and file membership. The reality is that individuals have very little influence. There are many techniques, whether through psychologists, through appearance or through some force or perhaps implied force, such as the implied loss of union membership and the loss of ability to continue to gain a meaningful living in society. I have a great deal of difficulty with that.

We have seen this legislation which denies public interest. This legislation denies the requirement for consideration and responsibility for public safety.

Hon. G. Clark: Oh, come on!

C. Serwa: Absolutely. Free speech was vanquished yesterday, and today fairness and reasonableness seems to bite the dust as well.

The members on the government side individually...

Interjections.

The Chair: Order, hon. members. The member who has the floor should not be interrupted. Please proceed, hon. member.

C. Serwa: ...have a good sense of fairness and justice. I have no difficulty with the awareness of that in the quiet discussions we have in the buildings, but I see a subjugation of that sense of fairness and justice not only in the drafting of the legislation but also in the collective workings of this government. I suspect some greater influence is at work here.

The Chair: Hon. member, you are straying somewhat from section 10. I would remind the member....

[ Page 4287 ]

C. Serwa: I see a greater influence on the drafting of this section, hon. Chair. When the members talk about fairness, reasonableness and the rights of the individual and the little person in society, it is not being attended to.

Noticing the lateness of the hour, I move that the committee rise, report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. G. Clark moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 12 noon.

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