Official Report of

DEBATES OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(Hansard)

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 1992

Volume 4, Number 12

[ Page 2481 ]

The House met at 10:05 a.m.

Prayers.

Orders of the Day

Hon. G. Clark: I call committee on Bill 63, hon. Speaker.

HUMAN RIGHTS AMENDMENT ACT, 1992

The House in committee on Bill 63; D. Streifel in the chair.

On section 1.

V. Anderson: In section 1, they have changed the definition of age, and they have dealt with the definition of discrimination in other areas. I'm trying to decide which section it would come in -- 1 or 2 -- because it covers the changing of the word "sex" to "gender" as referred to in this bill. It seems to me that it would come in under section 1. I would like to move an amendment that all references in this bill to the term "sex" shall be deleted and the term "gender" substituted. I believe that comes under the definitions of section 1.

The Chair: Hon. member, it would appear that the amendment offered is beyond the scope of this section 1. Unless you could show the House how this ties into that section, the amendment would then be out of order.

V. Anderson: It was my understanding that in 1(b), where they're listing areas of discrimination.... Under those areas, I believe, is listed the word "sex" in a number of places; therefore this would be applicable to those definitions -- just changing the wording in the bill.

The Chair: Hon. member, with regret, the Chair is unable to sustain your argument; regrettably, the amendment is not in order.

C. Serwa: On section 1, I noted during the election campaign that the government campaigned on the pledge that they would be reducing the age of majority for voting to 18. Perhaps the minister could indicate why they are restricting it to 19 and why they do not go to 18 as they had pledged as an election promise.

Hon. A. Hagen: The issue of age of majority, or voting age, is under a different statute than the one we're debating, the amendment to the Human Rights Act.

[10:15]

Section 1 approved.

On section 2.

V. Anderson: In the discussion on section 2, I wonder if the minister might give some suggestion as to what "a bona fide and reasonable justification" may mean. I know that this is an insert, a new clause in the act. Therefore I was wondering about the implications of it.

Hon. A. Hagen: There are a number of instances where there are bona fide and reasonable justifications for denying a class of persons a service or right. Let me just take an obvious one. The Motor Vehicle Act clearly needs to deal with people with physical disabilities and is not going to grant a licence to a person who is blind or whose physical disabilities prevent that person from safely driving a vehicle on the road. That would be one of any number of examples. It does provide that scope of reasonable justification for denying some of those rights.

V. Anderson: In second reading we discussed the new inserts of family status and sexual orientation, and we are certainly in favour of those. But as we go through third reading I would be interested in having the minister elaborate a little more on the implications of them.

Hon. A. Hagen: I'm not sure what the question is that the member wishes to ask. If he would like to ask me a specific question, perhaps I can endeavour to respond.

V. Anderson: I know we've had questions raised about the meaning of family status, and I am wondering if the minister might explain the meaning and implications of this new phrase as it's applied in this section and other sections throughout the act.

Hon. A. Hagen: I think we all agreed in dealing with the principles of the bill that family status is a perceived and actual cause for discrimination. There is a fair amount of jurisprudence which gives us some scope around the concept of family status. I think what the member is seeking is how this might be interpreted. It is indeed interpreted by case law and also by the council. As I understand it, within the statute that this is amending there is a concept that the council has a broad scope in respect to definition. Family status, then, is something that will be subject to interpretation by the council.

Case law normally covers parent-child relationships, either by birth or adoption; it involves siblings, cousins.... It also provides a kind of strong argument where there may not be a formal relationship or a formal adoptive or blood tie, but where an adult is raising a child as the caring adult for that person. There's a broad interpretation in case law of family status that would provide the basis for interpretation of this new prohibition against discrimination.

E. Barnes: Just picking up on the comments by the member for Vancouver-Langara on family status, I wonder if he is attempting to get a definition for family, which the minister was suggesting has a wide range of 

[ Page 2482 ]

interpretations. There is one specific category that I would like the minister to just clarify for the committee, in terms of whether it would be included, and that's same-sex relationships. I suspect that it is not, but nonetheless, just for clarification, I'd like the minister to refer to that section in relation to how comprehensive it might be. I'm having some difficulty with the definitions myself, and I suspect that same-sex is not one of the categories that would be included under family status.

Hon. A. Hagen: These are very good questions. Let me phrase my response in two ways. First of all, it's my understanding that as we define, we limit, because definitions very often do, by their very nature, limit the interpretation. So let me come back to the role of the council to have the capacity for a broad definition. Second, the matter the member raises around the definition of family is currently before the courts. It is before the Supreme Court, as I understand it, in respect to that definition. These are some of the means by which the law, the jurisprudence, the case law, establishes interpretation of family status, or other definitions within our statutes.

At this point we have left the definition to the scope of the council, because it has broad powers. We also recognize that jurisprudence is a means by which those definitions are often assisted in being defined.

J. Dalton: I've listened with interest to the response of the minister to the question from the member for Vancouver-Burrard. It was a good one, and I'm glad that he asked it.

I have some concern that we are dealing with a piece of legislation.... This is law, even though, admittedly, it should have some flexibility to it.

I might like to direct some remarks to the minister. The council is a tribunal that has to have some direction. We can't leave it open-ended and say to the council: "Well, it's up to you to make up your mind what a family is." That's going to cause a lot of consternation in the legal world, among others, I can assure you. Therefore I predict that this term "family status" is going to cause a lot of litigation, a lot of complaints and probably a lot of consternation to people such as landlords and others providing public service. Theoretically, we might envision a 500-person family descending upon an apartment dwelling. Obviously that sort of thing is unacceptable. Even though we may not be able to address this particular issue right now, "family status" must be more precisely dealt with than it is in this legislation.

Hon. A. Hagen: I happen to be one of those people who has an extended family. If I counted all of my relatives -- first cousins and second cousins -- it wouldn't get into 500, but it would get very large. The analogy that the member draws is not a very helpful one.

As we develop our human rights legislation, we look to other jurisdictions, to the experience of other jurisdictions and to case law. As we've noted, with this particular addition, we're in the middle of the pack, if you like. There are five or six other jurisdictions which have family-status.... Only a couple of them attempt to define it. If we define it, it does provide limits. There needs to be that flexibility, and it is defined in case law. The council is very cognizant of those kinds of parameters. It's our belief that as we move forward in including this in our human rights legislation, the scope of family will be interpreted in ways that relate to what we all understand the family to be. It's the job of the council and the courts to assist us in that regard. Having looked -- as we prepared this legislation -- at the jurisdictions which have had this particular clause in their human rights statutes for some time, I am satisfied that the process works very well in the interests of society and of those people whose rights we are protecting through this legislation.

C. Serwa: The definition that I'm looking for is not one of the new changes. For my information, what is the definition that is utilized for public facilities? What does it encompass, and what legal definition is used in this specific case?

Hon. A. Hagen: Hon. Chair, I believe that is outside the scope of the amendments. It has been a part of our statute for many years.

C. Serwa: While it is outside the scope, with the changes that are proposed, I think the clarification of "public facilities" is really quite in order. I would ask the minister to define public facilities. Obviously there is a wide range of facilities that the public has access to. Specifically, what is the definition that is utilized?

Hon. A. Hagen: The broad definition of "facilities" is services that are customarily available to the public in what we would normally call services. If you're going to a hotel or a restaurant, going to get a haircut or going to avail yourself of services that are normally available to the public, that is the scope of the intent, as I understand it.

C. Serwa: This appears to be a loosey-goosey type of definition that is utilized. Surely there must be a specific definition in law with respect to the definition of public facilities.

Hon. A. Hagen: I think I have indicated that this is outside the scope of the bill. I have attempted to a give the member some information. As with all legislation.... It is the council that interprets the act. This particular question is outside the scope of the bill that we're debating.

R. Neufeld: I have some concerns about the words "family status." I noticed that when you were explaining it you said -- and I think I've got your words correct -- "what we understand family status to be." Could the minister explain a little more in depth what she meant by that statement, so I can get a feeling from her as to what she interprets family status to be?

[ Page 2483 ]

Hon. A. Hagen: The term "family status" is defined in case law and jurisprudence. The nature of human rights legislation is to be guided by that law and that jurisprudence, and it will be guided in this instance as well, as case law and the decisions of the courts deal with some of these issues. There may also be other discussions that take place under other statutes then. This particular statute is dealing with the rights of people within the broad context of the laws of the land as they are developed by legislators and interpreted by the courts.

[10:30]

C. Tanner: On a point of order, the minister made a statement that when we're discussing this bill we cannot refer to another part of the act which we're amending. It is my understanding, and perhaps the Chairman could take the advice of his Law Clerk, that anything that relates to that particular amendment within the old act can be referred to in this discussion in committee. Could the Chairman take the advice of the Law Clerk on that point of view, please?

The Chair: I am advised that for the purposes of debate the reference would in fact be in order, but for the purposes of amendment it must be within the scope of the bill in front of us.

C. Tanner: The member who spoke previously wasn't making an amendment; he was asking for a definition which relates to the subject of which we're talking.

C. Serwa: Perhaps the minister could give me some examples for the requirement of the inclusion of family status in this particular amendment. I'm not aware of any specific examples, but there must be substantive reasons for including family status, and the minister has given sort of a broad definition and I note nothing that falls outside of that parameter. I would like some specific examples of why family status was required to be included.

Hon. A. Hagen: We have included family status in a number of amendments within the scope of the whole human rights bill. Because we are dealing with an amending bill and that always is a little bit more complicated, perhaps I can just read what the clause will say. As amended it very clearly deals with what we are trying to achieve. "No person without a bona fide and reasonable justification," -- which is new language -- "shall (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons with respect to any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public."

There are a number of current prohibitions that have been in the act for a long time, and we have added family status to them. So those are the broad categories that we're dealing with in this amendment.

C. Serwa: I rise again, no wiser as to the requirement of family status to be included here. I've asked the minister for specific reasons why family status is of significant concern and to be included in the amendment. I see it as a not really valid concern where there has been abuse of the generally viewed family status relationship, as in the definition that the minister had previously given. I would like to hear and understand the substantive reasons for the inclusion of family status.

Hon. A. Hagen: One of the references is to accommodation. In my previous answer to the hon. member, I referred to services such as hotels, restaurants and all of those areas. There are government services that may be involved. It could be that, in terms of services relating to credit, family status is not in and of itself a reason to deny credit. So the scope is as broad as the scope of services, facilities and accommodations that we have in our province.

C. Serwa: I'm certainly getting a definition of what constitutes something in the way of public facilities, and the minister has expanded on that. But again, hon. minister, where is a concrete example of family status as a concern in the denial of accommodation? Precisely what type of family status is the minister bringing in this substantive amendment for? That is the specific question.

Hon. A. Hagen: Perhaps the member could assist me by suggesting what should not be covered. I think that would be helpful.

C. Serwa: Were I government bringing this piece of legislation forward, I assure the Legislature that I would know why family status is included. I am asking the minister of the Crown -- a member of the executive branch of government -- why, specifically, family status was included. The minister appears to be completely unable to support the inclusion. Would the minister please provide even one example where family status -- in her definition, whatever that definition is.... We would like to hear it, because it apparently is different from the definition of family status that you gave a few questions ago. A specific example, hon. minister. You're the minister of the Crown responsible for this; your government is bringing in this legislation. It's up to you.

Hon. A. Hagen: Hon. Chair, the minister would really like to assist the member in the response to his question. I am somewhat confounded, having given him a definition under the Human Rights Act of what will be protected on the basis of family status: accommodations, services and facilities. It is, as is much of the Human Rights Act, very broad in its scope, because Human Rights does cover the rights of people to access to accommodation, services and facilities, as we broadly know them as citizens in this society.

If he has some specific concern about what might be covered that he feels should not be covered, I would be glad to try to respond. He really is not giving me the opportunity to deal with whatever his concern may be.

G. Wilson: I request leave to make an introduction.

[ Page 2484 ]

Leave granted.

G. Wilson: I would like to introduce over 50 students from Brooks Junior Secondary School. They have travelled here for the last few days from Powell River to learn how government works, with their teacher Ms. Diane Arkell. Would the House please make these students welcome.

C. Serwa: I'm still in pursuit of an evasive response. I believe that the public has the right to know. I notice that the hon. Minister of Municipal Affairs is going to bring forward a tedious and repetitious type of debate. The reality is that the minister refuses to provide the public or this Legislature with the rationale for the inclusion of family status. Specifically what aspect of family status is the minister bringing in in a very substantive amendment to the Human Rights Act?

Hon. R. Blencoe: A point of order. I have been listening to the questions from the hon. member for some time now. The minister has given answers and has asked for the member's concerns. The member is not being definitive. I would say that, under section 43 of standing orders, this member is now being tedious and repetitious. The minister has answered and has even asked the member for clarification. Reasonableness should now prevail.

The Chair: Your point of order is taken by the Chair. It would appear that the debate is in order at this time.

C. Serwa: It is of valid and vital concern. It is a matter that is of concern to the minister and government. It's certainly a public concern. That's what the legislation is all about. While it may appear tedious and repetitious, the point of the question is really quite in order. The minister has been most evasive in the enunciation of why family status is an inclusion in this substantive amendment to the act. It's a very straightforward, simple question, not requiring a great or profound answer. I merely ask for an example of where the rights that we're looking at and defining at the present time were denied because of family status. This is with respect to accommodation or entry into a restaurant or, as you have suggested, all public access facilities -- an example where this substantive amendment is required.

Hon. A. Hagen: I think it may be helpful with this line of questioning to look broadly at the issues around discrimination with respect to family status. We're looking at one particular clause now, but, as the members well know, we have included family status in a number of the amendments. Let me deal with some examples that may help the member in his quest. It's not my intent to deny him an answer, but I'm trying to get some idea what the cause of his concern is in respect to family status.

I think if we look, for instance, at access to housing, which is clearly something that is covered when we look at family status, then people may not be denied housing on the basis of family status. If we look at employment opportunities, then family status is one that shouldn't deny people opportunities for employment. If we're looking at the services that are available to the public, then family status should not deny people access to those services. All of us know that there are instances where people find that on the basis of their family status some of those rights may appear to be denied to them. This provides them with an opportunity to bring that matter to the Human Rights Council for mediation between the parties if that can assist in an understanding of the issue, or if necessary, take it through formal complaint and to a Human Rights Council hearing.

I'm not in any way attempting to confound the member in my response. I think in our second reading debate it was clearly understood by all of us that this particular addition deals with instances where families may find themselves discriminated against in society and provides them with an avenue for that to be addressed. I hope that that will assist the member in understanding why this particular addition has been made to the Human Rights Act: to assure that on the basis of family, people are not denied rights to accommodation, rights to service, rights to employment.

[10:45]

We dealt with the fact that there may be bona fide reasons to support family. We have family rates, for example, that are in support of family and should be. So that clause is designed to provide some of the reasonable framework for the statute to be interpreted.

C. Serwa: I certainly concur with and support the remarks of the minister. I don't think that any member in the Legislature will not support the remarks of the minister. I think that it's something that we all share in common. I simply lack a specific example where family status has in fact created a problem and the requirement for family status to be included in this particular piece of legislation. That's really the substance of my question, and I was looking for an example of that.

I appreciate that there are probably many other things that could have been included as well with an equal amount of right and concern, but with the inclusion of family status I'm not aware of any example where it has not permitted access. I'm looking for an example that will support the inclusion of this substantial change in the amendment. That's all.

Hon. A. Hagen: I would just note to the hon. member that his government brought in a change to the Residential Tenancy Act because of a concern about discrimination in housing for families. That's probably as good an example as I might use, because it's one that a former government recognized.

V. Anderson: One of the questions that's raised is in relation to having agreed on the change of age from 19 to 65, which opened it up at legal age of 19 to 65. Why was the question of age not included in this particular section? It's not in this section, and it is in other sections. Why was the age left out? Presumably, if you 

[ Page 2485 ]

discriminate on age in this particular section, that is an acceptable discrimination under the act.

Hon. A. Hagen: We probably are going to have a number of questions today about what has not been included. Although technically we're beyond the scope, I'll try to respond with brief answers that will assist the member.

With this particular clause, the issue of age involves a number of areas where we do need some further study. That's the reason it hasn't been included -- access to liquor stores, for example, and so on. We'll find that there are a number of issues that we want to do some more work and study and consultation on.

In the second reading debate, members noted frequently the importance of us working carefully as we bring forward changes to the human rights legislation, and I want to acknowledge that we need to do further work. The member and I have had some discussion around that over the past number of days, and those changes or those additions will certainly be ones that we'll be looking at as we proceed to improve our statute.

V. Anderson: It's just such discussion as we've been having that leads us to emphasize the question that there does need to be study and time to examine. The very speed with which the bill has been brought forward has not given the opposition the opportunity to do the kind of study and examination and research to compare this against other acts across the country, and also to delve into many of the legal implications that are being presented.

Although we agree in principle, we are, because of this lack of opportunity to delve into it in detail, really concerned about the haste with which it has moved forward. Even the minister has suggested that there are many items that need to be researched in the future, but we feel there are also items included in this bill that should have been researched before bringing it forward.

At this point, if I may, since I could not do it in the general sense, I would like to move the amendment: that the term "sex" in this section be changed to read "gender."

The Chair: Hon. member, if the amendment were accepted in this section, then this section would not be compatible with the main act, with the alterations. Regrettably, the amendment would be out of order.

R. Neufeld: When the minister talked about family status, I noticed that she mentioned accommodation and how it applies to accommodation, service and employment. Could you please expand a bit more for me on employment and how you would see that this would affect employment as family status?

Hon. A. Hagen: The fundamental principle of the act -- and we will be dealing with that in a later section, hon. member -- is that one cannot be denied employment on the basis of family status. It's the fundamental principle when we're looking at all of these. One's family status is not a reason for denying one an opportunity for employment, if one is qualified for the employment opportunity that is offered.

R. Neufeld: I do see some problems with this, and that is why I asked the question. Maybe it isn't so evident in the city or in large centres, but it's definitely evident in small communities, and specifically in municipalities. You could have a man and a woman who are married and are a family. The woman could be the superintendent of public works, and the man applies for a job. If he is given the job, it could cause an awful lot of problems in that community, because it would seem as though there is some favouritism. This is a little bit in reverse. We try in this section to get away from that, and I'm wondering how you respond to this in those smaller centres. It can even come into the government, where possibly members are elected and we hire their spouses. I'm sure the minister is aware that that causes some problems, politically and also with people.

Hon. A. Hagen: Hon. Chair, for all of our understanding, we are really looking at family status as it applies throughout the bill, and with your leave, I will try to deal with these issues broadly. The member has gone ahead to another section, but I'm happy to include it because we are discussing this issue now.

Yes, the family status clause does deal with members of the same family working in the same workplace. It really is a situational matter. This would certainly give people a right to employment. It would be up to the council, if a complaint came forward about a policy that said that only one member of a family might be hired, to look at confidentiality and other circumstances in relation to the employment. As I understand it, the blanket kind of prohibition, which would say that because of family status you might be denied an opportunity for employment, is now subject to review by the Human Rights Council as a result of this change in the legislation that we're proposing and that we're debating today.

C. Tanner: What happens in the circumstances that the minister has just outlined -- and there is such a case in my constituency -- where a husband and wife are working for the same organization and one of them subsequently becomes a supervisor of the other? What is the right of the person who's being supervised -- being both a spouse and having to work with fellow employees? Surely the organization for which those two people work has the right to organize their work in such a way that the spouse shouldn't be supervising the other person in the marriage during their work time.

[E. Barnes in the chair.]

Hon. A. Hagen: I'm going to answer this question, and then suggest that we move ahead, because at this stage of the game we are actually debating section 6 of the bill.

I think the member has answered his own question. There may be circumstances where the employment of 

[ Page 2486 ]

two spouses in the same place of employment can be accommodated by arrangements that are made with the employer, the intended employee or the actual employees. In the instance he cited, there might also be a bona fide reason for two members of a family not to be employed. Those are within the scope of the council to determine.

We are now debating another section, but I'd like to suggest that we should, in the good order of proceeding through committee stage clause by clause, see if section 2 is now ready to be passed, because we have moved beyond it quite a bit under the questioning of the last two or three comments from members.

The Chair: That point is well taken. I would hope that we can stick as closely as possible to the matters contained in each section.

D. Symons: It's unfortunate that the Chair has changed in the last few minutes, because I was going to ask for a clarification, a challenge, or something, to an earlier ruling of the Chair.

When we tried to bring forth an amendment on the use of the word "sex" in section 2, we had also tried to move this amendment, in a general sense, so that it would have affected all those usages of the word throughout the whole bill in section 1. We were denied that. I'm not quite clear as to why we can't, if our intent is that we are going to change it each time it appears in the bill so that it will be consistent throughout the bill. We tried to do it in one step, and we were denied that. Why are we not able to do it step by step?

The Chair: The ruling, however, was made on that matter and, as you appreciate, it does stand.

D. Symons: I am not sure of the rules on this, but is it possible to challenge the Chair's ruling?

The Chair: Hon. member, it is not possible to challenge the Chair. In the past it has been, but not under the current standing orders.

Section 2 approved.

On section 3.

R. Neufeld: Section 3: discrimination in the purchase of property prohibited on the basis of sexual orientation. Do I understand correctly that family status is not included in there, or is it? Maybe it's just an oversight on my part. Could you clarify that for me?

[11:00]

Hon. A. Hagen: The member is correct: family status is not included in this particular clause that we're looking at. We have some further research that we need to do on that particular inclusion, so the decision has been made that it is not subject to the amendments at this time.

R. Neufeld: Obviously, then, our concern about family status is founded. If you include it in the section before, but you don't want to include it in this one.... Could you maybe expand a little bit more for us so that we can understand why it wouldn't be? What rationale was used not to include family status in this part of it?

Hon. A. Hagen: I really think I've responded as far as a can. It is not a subject for our debate at this time. I indicated to the member that we have reason to want to do some additional research and consultation around that matter. That's an appropriate response for a matter that is not before us in the amending bill. Again, as I've indicated to members opposite and to this Legislature, we are looking at some amendments to the Human Rights Act. Although future policy is for government, I've tried to indicate in a general way -- because of the interest in this legislation and our concern as a House that it be as inclusive as possible -- that further work needs to be done, based on research and consultation, as we all agree.

R. Neufeld: I appreciate that response from the minister. Maybe that will just add to what both opposition parties have been saying about the speed in passing this bill: introducing it in the House on Monday, wanting to put it through committee on Tuesday, ending up on second reading on Wednesday and now, on Thursday, being on third reading. We on this side of the House have some concerns and have not had proper time to get into each one of these sections to find out just what the government is doing. It works both ways. I'm glad to see that the minister realizes that there has to be some study done on some of this. Maybe we should be doing a little bit of study on this bill. Let's put it out to the people to see whether they really agree with it.

Hon. A. Hagen: I want to make a comment, which is again part of how we as a House are working through a very important piece of legislation. The scope of work that a government does is very broad. I'm delighted at the interest that members have shown in this legislation. We have begun what we know is an important part of human rights education.

If I may, because I didn't do so at the start of this debate, I would like to introduce the officials who are with me. We sometimes get into things without doing that. First of all, I'd like to introduce Mariann Burka, who is the administrator of the Human Rights Council. If I can editorialize for a moment, every time we talk about education and understanding the bill and the act and mediation and so on, her eyes light up, because that's part of the work that the council does. Peter Owen, from legislative services, is the executive director of my ministry. These people are listening very carefully to the debate and the discussion that's going on. I know that it will inform the whole House.

I appreciate the comments of the member on those issues.

Section 3 approved.

On section 4.

[ Page 2487 ]

V. Anderson: It is a very important bill, and the discussion is appropriate. There is frustration on all sides that we can't discuss it the way we should in this forum. The minister has indicated, both privately and publicly, that we will be moving ahead with further examination. Perhaps further examination of the Human Rights Act might be put to a legislative committee so people can be involved in the discussion and in learning and in clarification before we come to this stage. That would make it much better for everyone and would perhaps give us some indication that changing terminology such as sex and gender, for instance, will be coming forth. Although it doesn't happen today, the assurance that these kinds of things will be happening would be helpful, so that we might facilitate this important undertaking.

An area of concern that I have in this particular section is with regard to discrimination in tenancy premises, which has been experienced by many people. They have been not accepted for tenancy, and sometimes openly so, because of their source of income -- for instance, GAIN payments. Some landlords say that if you're on GAIN, then there must be something wrong with you; therefore you're not allowed. This happens a great deal to single parents.

I would like to move an amendment, which has already been presented, to section 4.5(1)(b), by inserting the words "source of income" after the words "sexual orientation."

On the amendment.

V. Anderson: With many of the people who I have had to relate to, I have found that one of their grave difficulties in finding accommodation is this question of source of income. Many of them have had to lie about it in order to get accommodation, and they were not very happy about that. Not only did they have difficulty getting accommodation in the first place but, because of their source of income, there was continual pressure on them whenever any difficulty arose -- which was not their fault in most cases -- and this was a continual source of harassment for them. In the past there has not been a good way to deal with it. This would be a logical insertion here to protect these people, many of whom are single parents and single-parent women.

Hon. A. Hagen: I'd like to respond to both the earlier comments of the member and the specific amendment. Certainly his comments around processes by which we can continue to work on this legislation are well taken, around the ways in which the whole Legislature, which has supported this bill, can assist with amendments coming forward.

The particular amendment that the member proposes is one that we will not be supporting at this time, because it requires some further work on behalf of the government in planning for that amendment. But I take the comments of the member around the work of the House towards improvements of the bill, and of the statute generally, as being ones that we all need to continue with.

Amendment negatived.

On section 4.

R. Neufeld: I notice in this section -- and correct me if I'm wrong, Madam Minister -- that some residential properties will be made exempt for people over a certain age. Is it correct that this act allows for that?

Hon. A. Hagen: Encompassed in these amendments are some sections from the Residential Tenancy Act that were passed by the last government, where there is a reference to the Human Rights Act. What we've done is to move those sections into the Human Rights Act, so that the reference is clear and right there. These clauses around family status or age, relating to people with disabilities or people who are living in social housing that's specifically built for seniors and so on, are now moved from the Residential Tenancy Act into this legislation. This is where we find them in this particular clause.

R. Neufeld: So these are the exact regulations that come out of the Residential Tenancy Act, and they're just transferred over here.

D. Symons: I have some concerns about section 5(2)(b)(i). In here it mentions that if the space is a rental unit in residential premises in which every -- and it's the word "every" that concerns me -- unit is reserved for rental basically for seniors.... My concern is that there may be a seniors' place that decides they want to have a little bit of a mix by having some families with young children around, so that they don't ghettoize themselves. This would seem to preclude them doing something like that and having a mix in there. You would suddenly open it up to everybody, and they wouldn't be able to keep their senior status and still have this mix for that sort of arrangement. Does this preclude what I'm suggesting? Once you open it to one unit bringing in a family so there would be children in this area as well, then suddenly every unit in there would be covered by this act, and they wouldn't be allowed to maintain that sort of arrangement.

Hon. A. Hagen: I think the member is talking about some choices that people make around accommodation and where they choose to live. This particular clause comes from the Residential Tenancy Act, and it relates to a broad range of social policy where housing is established specifically for our senior population. People make some choices in terms of where they choose to live in respect to that, as I understand it.

D. Symons: Hon. Chair, I still really didn't hear an answer to my concern. If they allow one unit, a few units or even half the units to have a fifty-fifty mix, is this going to mean that they would not be able to maintain that ratio? Once they don't have "every unit," they are now subject to the act, which means that all units would not be allowed to be discriminated against by age, for instance.

[ Page 2488 ]

Hon. A. Hagen: Yes. If the housing is opened up to children, then it obviously doesn't come under this particular clause of the act.

Sections 4 and 5 approved.

On section 6.

V. Anderson: I'd like the minister to comment on two items in section 6, which are different here than in some of the other sections. Two of the items that are referred to here are "marital status" as against "family status." I was wondering what the distinction is between "marital status" and "family status" in the act.

Also, one of the items contained here is the item of political belief. That's not an item that is necessarily contained in other sections. So those two items: marital as against family status and the meaning of "political belief."

Hon. A. Hagen: I think it has always been helpful for people who may be following the debate to put this in the context of the act. We are talking about discrimination in respect to employment. Marital status relates to whether a person is married, divorced, living common-law, those kinds of family statuses we've had considerable discussion about. We've added family status to what was in the statute. Marital status, as the member well knows, was in the statute, so we've added family status to this as well.

[11:15]

V. Anderson: Could the minister comment about the question on political belief? I think it's a very interesting one. It is worthy for people to note that it is there and understand what it means in the act.

Hon. A. Hagen: I'm glad the member is helping to expand people's knowledge and understanding of what is in the act. As I say, every time we do that, people have that understanding. It has been in the act since its inception, and it simply states -- although it's not a subject for our debate today, because it's not something we're amending, it's there -- that one may not be discriminated against in respect to employment because of one's political belief. That is a statement that I'll make as some information that people now have as a result of the member having raised the query.

U. Dosanjh: I just want to say something on the issue of family status that has been raised by the members with respect to this section and others. I think it's very clear, as the minister has just said, that when we talk about marital status, we talk about persons being single, married, divorced or widowed. But when we talk about family status that brings all kinds of other combinations and permutations into play that we can have of a family. For example, you can have a single mother who is not married, has never been married, has ten children or one child; or a person who has never been married or was married common-law; or a person who was married in terms of another faith without going through proper legal channels and has a family. I think all of those issues are brought into play when we use the term "family status." Therefore it is not an unnecessary use of a word in this context; it's a very important inclusive step in extending protection to areas where none existed before.

P. Dueck: Discriminate against employment.... Let's say a religious order, a Catholic school, needed a secretary and found one who is absolutely opposed to the Catholic religion or any other religious order. Would that be discrimination under this section?

Hon. A. Hagen: I'd like to refer the member to a section of the Human Rights Act that we're not debating but that he would need as a reference point here. It's section 19: "a charitable, philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or social organization or corporation that is not operated for profit...." So it comes under a broad rubric of what we might call exemptions. I think that if the member referred to that particular clause he would have the part of the statute that relates to the question that he has asked.

Sections 6 to 10 inclusive approved.

On section 11.

R. Neufeld: Subsection (2)(c)(ii) states: "adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program if the evidence at the hearing has disclosed that the person engaged in a pattern or practice that contravenes this Act,..." I have some fears that this -- although the government is going to work on an employment equity program -- allows the council to dictate to private companies as to whether they will have to implement an employment equity program. In that area I think it does quite widely allow them to do that.

Hon. A. Hagen: One of the goals of human rights is to provide a means for dealing with systemic discrimination that may exist against any of the classes named in the act. This is a clause that enables the council to provide guidance and direction in that regard. I want to emphasize, though, the importance here of education and of working these things out in a collaborative way. I think the member suggests that this is a kind of Big Brother approach or something of that nature. I don't think that in practice that is the result. There are instances where systemic discrimination occurs, and the act clearly provides -- and this bill through its amendment -- that the council may make a ruling or may order the person who contravened this act to do one of the following. The member has just read that they may in fact ask that that particular offender, if you like, or person who has acted in contravention of the act, adopt an employment equity program or other special programs, if the evidence at the hearing has disclosed that the person engaged in a pattern or practice in contravention of this act. Remember that there are broad classifications within this act that say that we may not discriminate in respect to employment. Systemic discrimination in respect to employment is 

[ Page 2489 ]

clearly something that this statute deals with, and where there are remedies available if an employer does that.

R. Neufeld: I appreciate that explanation, and it does make my fears a little larger in that it does allow the council to do that. I'm not one who would like to see anyone put down. I agree with a lot of the human rights legislation, but when this type of power is given to a council, I think it could cause an awful lot of problems later on down the road. We can't see it now, but I am sure there are areas that could cause some problems just because of the council having that ability.

The other part of the section that I have some problems with is (d)(iii), and that's removing the limit of $2,000; in fact, it removes the limit altogether. Although I agree that that section must be there, I don't agree that it should remove the limit altogether, because this just makes more work for the legal field, to be quite honest. What is the limit going to be in the end, and what fears are we going to instil in the business community or anyone who may discriminate against someone, unknowingly at times, but who according to this act is guilty?

If you go into a court of law, the limits could be $2,000 today, but they could be $50,000 within a few years. What happens, in legal terms, is that the lawyers will go back to what has taken place in cases before, and that's the parameter, the level where they come from: "Well, that happened over there, and this case is much the same, and that person received $50,000, so that's what we're going to fight this one on." And pretty soon we've made employment for a lot of lawyers, legal aid could be involved, and the costs could be quite horrendous. I don't quite know how you put a limit -- what you design as a limit -- but I'm sure there should be a limit, and I have some real difficulty with that, Madam Minister.

R. Chisholm: I ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

R. Chisholm: Visiting with us today is a group of students from Chilliwack Christian School in Chilliwack. Sixteen students and their teacher Mr. Brouwer are seated in the gallery this morning. Would the House please join me in making them most welcome in this precinct of Victoria.

Hon. A. Hagen: I want to return to the question. It's a very good question, and one that I asked. We researched it very carefully as we looked at this amendment.

There currently is a ceiling on the level of general damages. Perhaps I could just provide a bit of information here. The Human Rights Council has the authority now, under this same clause that we're debating, to order a restitution, for instance, if someone has been discriminated against. Back wages and things of that nature are part of the settlement, if we come to a complaint. The issue of general damages is one where most jurisdictions have no limit.

Your point is well taken. It's not the desire of government, and it's not the desire of the council to have their work be something that, as you say, provides jobs for lawyers. It is in fact for people's legitimate complaints, pain and suffering to be addressed.

Let me tell you what we found in our research and the reason that we have set no limit. In practice there are no limits in other jurisdictions, and we have some considerable jurisprudence, as they say, that tells us what the outcome of that has been. The highest award that we found is quite a modest one, I think we would all agree. I believe it was $7,500, which is significantly higher than the current limit. That's the highest; we also know that's the range. The intent of taking away the limit is to say that there has to be some award to the complainant that is related to the pain, the suffering and the indignity. And there has to be some pain, I think, to the person who has to pay the award that is related to it as well. This allows some discretion on the part of the council in terms of what that award might be.

But again I want to emphasize that in all the work the council does, what happens in other jurisdictions -- the case law, the jurisprudence -- provides a framework. Although the member has the same concerns that I had around this, I'm reassured that we are really looking at some flexibility that has been offered to the council, and we are keeping it within the scope of the council, dealing in what's often a relatively supportive way with the indignity or offence that has been done against a complainant, and there being something that realistically says to the person who has offended human rights: there's a cost to you for that, not just in restitution but in damages that you have to pay. I think practice will bear out that the decision we have taken not to put a limit is a reasonable one that won't in any way result in the kind of concerns that you have. We have researched it very thoroughly and carefully with those very questions in mind.

J. Dalton: I certainly don't have any quarrel with the removal of the $2,000 limit, and I did make that statement when we debated this in second reading. However, I would like to make the observation that I have the feeling that to, in effect, make the sky the limit here is going to perhaps discourage some people from raising complaints, because they may very well feel that they need legal advice or need to have a lawyer to accompany them when they appear before a board of inquiry. I would point out to the minister that a board of inquiry is one person, so it would tend to be a very informal hearing and people would feel comfortable. I can't see that people would necessarily feel comfortable if they cared to act as their own counsel. Very often if I'm giving legal advice to people.... I always caution them that they're getting what they pay for. In my case I charge nothing; therefore they know what they're getting.

[11:30]

Interjection.

[ Page 2490 ]

J. Dalton: I can't charge any more, because I don't have a licence to practise at this time.

However, the point I'm making is that in a relatively informal environment such as a board of inquiry.... It's not a court of law, even though it does have some of the same powers and can accept evidence and hear arguments. Of course, lawyers will appear before a board of inquiry, and we don't quarrel with that. But I am saying that removing the limit may actually have an adverse affect. People may feel that they should seek legal advice.

I see one of our legal friends has left the House, so perhaps I'm safe in making a comment about my former profession. Lawyers will tend to seize upon opportunities, not necessarily to advance their own cause, but certainly if there's a dollar or two to be made in it, then there are some lawyers, as in any other profession, who will take advantage of that. That's not necessarily a wrong thing. In any other profession, I'm sure there are a few of similar nature. That's not a criticism of the legal profession.

In this context of a board of inquiry, I feel that a monetary limit, perhaps $50,000.... The minister, I believe, made that comment in other jurisprudence.... That might not be an unreasonable figure to include in this.

I would also suggest to the minister that if there is a really serious complaint that warrants unlimited damages, maybe hundreds of thousands of dollars, that's where courts of law should be used. We could then get out of the board of inquiry and seek appropriate remedies in the normal court context. That's an observation that I have. But, as I said, I'm not quarrelling with the removal of the $2,000. There may be a built-in danger here of not providing some ceiling, which could be significant -- $30,000 or $50,000. But having no ceiling may not actually carry out the effect that the minister has in mind with this amendment.

Hon. A. Hagen: I thank the hon. member for supporting those ceilings. Let me repeat that the practice is quite different from what he has suggested. In fact, what we have found in our research is that by virtue of there being not just a slap on the wrist, which is the $2,000 ceiling, in jurisdictions where that doesn't exist, there is an incentive to settle. That is the goal of the council. Its goal is not to have things go to full-blown hearings, not to have things go to the point where there needs to be an extensive process, but to encourage the parties to understand that they have offended, and that they should deal with that through mediation, through negotiation, where there could be a voluntary settlement that is a part of that negotiated agreement. There is also a danger. I personally would not want to see the Council of Human Rights become an Americanized sort of thing, where the ceiling actually becomes the floor.

Let me just repeat that we have other jurisdictions that have not had a ceiling -- a number of jurisdictions. There's a good deal of indication that those ceilings are reasonable, flexible, and are incentives to settle. I'm very satisfied that the move we've taken provides in fact the penalty that is reasonable for the indignity or the discrimination that has taken place, but keeps it within that kind of scope that encourages settlement, which is what the council is more and more moving to have as one of the mainstays of the work that it does on behalf of those people who bring complaints to it.

V. Anderson: I've spoken to this one before, and as the minister already knows, I am satisfied to support the cancellation of the $2,000, and indicate that there are other items that need to be considered here besides the financial one which has been mentioned. The clauses in this section that indicate compensation for persons for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, or any one of them.... These tend to be things that have already happened to people. These are present and past. It seems to me that one of the concerns we need to have in mind is what is going to happen to people because of the consequences of the situation in which they have found themselves.

I think of a person who perhaps has had to change jobs because of the circumstances, and even though they got their salary back, they're then left without a job. They maybe even felt that they had to move to a new community. It may be that their friends have turned against them because they have been upset and disturbed, and they have to re-establish themselves in friendship and community. So there is a time ahead, after this is all over, that they need to readjust and have the opportunity, and sometimes the resources, in order to readjust. I would hope that at some point there will be an inclusion in this to take into account future projections and needs that will come about as a result of what is contained here already. I leave that for the minister's consideration.

Hon. A. Hagen: The Chairman is doing an admirable job in letting us talk about aspects of the Human Rights Act that are not being amended.

In addition to the general damages, the council has the power to "compensate the person discriminated against for all, or a part the board determines, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred, by the contravention." Some of the issues that the member speaks to around the implications to a person's life caused by loss of employment and possibly having to move -- those kinds of things -- are now within the capacity of the council to make rulings on regarding recompensing in dollar terms. The general damages are intended to provide -- and, with the ceiling having been lifted, hopefully to provide more realistically, in dollar terms -- for what has happened to people.

I think some members spoke about their recollections of people who are members of visible minorities. We all recognize that once one has experienced discrimination, it is part of a person's life memory. Minimizing those things in our society is the responsibility of all of us. We can't compensate people for those life memories in dollar terms; we have to compensate by changing the way in which our society does things. That's what we're talking about through human rights legislation and the education that goes along with it.

[ Page 2491 ]

Section 11 approved on the following division:

[11:45]

On section 12.

R. Neufeld: I have some trouble with section 12 also, and maybe an explanation from the minister will clarify it. It states that it is not discrimination or a contravention of this act to plan, advertise, adopt or implement an employment equity program. Is this not a form of reverse discrimination?

I agree that we have to be careful about discrimination, and I'm not saying that we should, but it does allow reverse discrimination. It is getting almost to the point where it discriminates against what we're trying to do. It acts negatively on what we're trying to do in the act, which is to look after everyone of whatever race, colour, creed, orientation or family status. All of a sudden we say this is not discrimination. Can you explain why?

Hon. A. Hagen: The fundamental principle of human rights legislation is the amelioration of disadvantaged groups and process to deal with discrimination. When we are looking at this particular part of the bill, we have provided a means by which employers may develop employment equity programs whose goal is to deal with the amelioration of conditions of individuals who are disadvantaged because of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, physical or mental disability, or sex. We have stated that if there are those disadvantages, a program that would reasonably help to remove those discriminations may go forward.

Furthermore, the council is available to provide advice and counsel to employers who may wish to have an employment equity program reviewed so that it is consistent with the principles of the human rights legislation that we have in the province.

Sections 12 to 17 inclusive approved.

Title approved.

Hon. A. Hagen: Hon. Chair, I move that the committee rise and report the bill complete without amendment.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; the Speaker in the chair.

Bill 63, Human Rights Amendment Act, 1992, reported complete without amendment, read a third time and passed.

Hon. G. Clark moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:51 a.m.

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