[ Page 1761 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Oral Questions

WCB surplus. Mr. Gabelmann –– 1761

Aids funding. Mr. Clark –– 1762

Mr. Cashore

Establishment of Ingenika reserve. Mr. Cashore –– 1763

Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 (Bill 19). Committee stage. (Hon. L. Hanson) –– 1763

Mr. D'Arcy

Mr. Sihota

Mr. G. Hanson

Mr. Williams

Ms. Edwards

Mr. Gabelmann

Mr. Guno

Mr. Lovick

Mr. Clark

Mr. Cashore

Mr. Rose

Ms. A. Hagen

The House met at 2:06 p.m.

Prayers.

HON. MR. ROGERS: Mr. Speaker, today we are joined on the floor of the House by a delegation from India, members of the Lok Sabha. They are accompanied by Senator Perrault and the High Commissioner to Canada, and of course His Excellency the Consul-General representing India in British Columbia. I will endeavour to read the names of the members who are here, and I apologize in advance for my mispronunciation.

The leader of the delegation is the Hon. B. Shankaranand, who is the Minister of Water Resources for India. He is accompanied by the Deputy Speaker, Dr. Durai. The others are members of the Houses of Parliament in India: Mr. Vajpayee, Mr. Deo, Mr. Basu and Mr. Manhar. I would ask the House to make them all feel very welcome.

Mr. Speaker, I would report to the members of the House that on their behalf you were able to host a very fine luncheon for these members today, and we would very much like to thank you for doing that. I would also advise you that they have a 3 o'clock airplane to catch, so they are waiting for question period and then are going to proceed on to visit the commercial activities that take place in Vancouver, especially in Vancouver South.

MR. SIHOTA: I don't want to frustrate the minister in his efforts to get us on to question period, which I'm sure he's looking forward to, but I do want to congratulate him for pronouncing those names pretty accurately.

In any event, Mr. Speaker, it's always a pleasure to introduce individuals in this House, and as a member of the IndoCanadian community, it's an extra-special privilege to be rising today in the House and welcoming these gentlemen to the chamber this afternoon. I would once again ask the House to join me in wishing them not only a good visit to the Legislature, but a good stay in Canada for the duration of their stay.

HON. MR. DUECK: Mr. Speaker, in the gallery today we have a friend of mine from Trail, British Columbia. He's not only a friend, he's a cousin of mine; he doesn't admit it, but he is. He's a businessman and president of the Social Credit constituency association: Walter Siemens. Would the House please make him welcome.

MR. D'ARCY: I wish also to welcome Walter Siemens to the House today. Also, I would like to introduce Don and Melissa Sperry in the gallery, who are visiting from the village of Warfield. The Sperrys are in town to witness an historical event: their old friend Paul Nicholson will be entering into a contractual obligation, saying "I do" very shortly, and they're here for that. I would like the House to join me in wishing Paul and his betrothed well, and in welcoming the Sperrys to Victoria as well.

HON. MR. REID: Mr. Speaker, I'd ask the House to make a special welcome today to Sister Pautler and 32 grade 7 students from the Cloverdale Catholic School.

MR. CHALMERS: In the south end of the great riding of Okanagan South is a small community known as Peachland. Because it's a growing community. there's a delegation drawn from the municipality of Peachland to have meetings here today. In your gallery. Mr. Speaker, we have His Worship Mayor George Waldo, Alderman Nick Oystryk and Alderman Willie Dobbin. I would ask the House to join me in making them welcome.

MR. JANSEN: In the House today is a good friend of ours and a frequent visitor to this House, Mr. Bill Coombes, president of Fraser Valley Broadcasters Ltd. Would you please make him welcome.

HON. MR. REID: In the House today, visiting from the fine community of Cranbrook is Mayor Jensen and his clerk administrator Mr. Tim Wood. They're here discussing the issues of that positive project called Fort Steele. Would the House please make these two gentlemen welcome.

Oral Questions

WCB SURPLUS

MR. GABELMANN: I have a question for the Minister of Labour and Consumer Services. In the last five years Workers' Compensation pensions have dropped by $4,475 annually. Does the government agree with the decision of the WCB to divert to the employers money that property belongs to workers, totalling S99 million, as announced a few days ago?

HON. L. HANSON: As I understand it, the assessment rates that are based on payroll are the rates that are supposed to reflect the compensation that is paid to those individuals who are injured in the workplace. Certainly the WCB is adequately funded, both in terms of its future liability and of its current liability, and the payments that are being made to employers are merely a reflection of adjusting the rates that apply to the payroll to the actual practice or the actual experience. The rates that are paid are paid by the employers, and when those rates are in excess of the cost of the disabilities or help that is given for people injured in the workplace, then I feel that it's only justified that not only the rates be reduced but that the surpluses be returned to those people who paid them.

MR. GABELMANN: I wonder if the minister wouldn't agree with me that the $99 million surplus was generated as a result of the cuts in pensions and as a result of the cut from 13 to 8 weeks for reassessment periods, and that adjudicators are now working with higher caseloads. In fact, workers who are being injured are not being served nearly as well as they were before and aren't receiving the compensation they are properly entitled to. That's the reason why there is a $99 million surplus, I wonder if the minister wouldn't agree with that.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, no, I would not agree with that. The Workers' Compensation Board has a considerable surplus still on hand. That was only a distribution of a portion of the surplus. and certainly the rest of the surplus is still there. We will be studying the compensation and so on as I get further into that responsibility. but my answer to that question is no.

[ Page 1762 ]

[2:15]

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Speaker, I'm sure that every MLA in this House who does constituency work is aware of workers who have been injured on the job and who in some cases have lost their homes, and in two or three cases that I know in fact have lost their families and their marriages, as a result of not being able to get properly compensated by the Workers' Compensation Board. The record is a disaster out there, and the clear decision of both government and the current administration of the WCB is to divert money away from injured workers and to put it into the hands of the employers — who are causing these injuries, for the most part.

I just want to try to ask the minister in a serious way: will he not direct the commissioners to look at properly funding workers who are injured in this province and diverting the money that is now in surplus to that cause instead of back to the employers?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, the workers' compensation system that we have in British Columbia is the best in Canada, bar none. The proof of that is in the numbers of people that come looking at our system. As the member suggests, there are cases where compensation is not provided. I'd certainly be prepared to look into any one, but the Workers' Compensation Board has been given the mandate of adjudicating claims as they relate to injuries in the workplace.

AIDS FUNDING

MR. CLARK: A question to the Minister of Health. The minister's announcement on AIDS prevention today contains a number of worthwhile elements, very clearly, but it really does nothing to build on the base that has been established at the community level by AIDS Vancouver. Why not reorder the funding priorities to provide financial support for the expertise of AIDS Vancouver? I mean, wouldn't that inexpensive move to utilize those volunteers be more cost-effective?

HON. MR. DUECK: To make a statement that we are not doing a job, that it would be better served in AIDS Vancouver, is completely erroneous. They're providing a function that is worthwhile, and I have no objection to them doing that. So does the arthritis society, so does the cancer society, so do six or 12 others.

Providing care in this province to the people who are ill is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, and we're doing exactly that. We're not duplicating. They have a society; they are doing certain things for the people that are sick from this dreadful disease. However, we are in it in a much bigger way — provincially, not just for one city. For us to sit back and say that they will do the job that the Ministry of Health is responsible for is just not correct.

Furthermore, as far as the funding is concerned, we never at any time agreed to fund this society. We agreed to give them bridge funding, which we did, at $30,000. This was extended once for the end of June — another $15,000. It was very clearly understood that these were the moneys they would receive and no more, and that's where we're at at this time.

MR. CLARK: It's ironic. This is clearly a case where the private sector can do better than the government. The minister, in turning down the AIDS Vancouver request, stated in the House last week that there wasn't enough money available, yet now he's spending over a million dollars. Clearly there seems to be some duplication, particularly with respect to the AIDS hotline. Would the minister explain why his ministry is spending money on high-priced bureaucrats to man a hotline which is now manned by hundreds of volunteers in Vancouver?

HON. MR. DUECK: To say that the private sector is not involved is again completely wrong. If the member had done any homework at all he would know that this is not the case, because all homemaker services are contracted out by the ministry — in other words, we contract so many hours — and that's what we're using to provide for AIDS Vancouver, as well as any other person who fits that criterion. They get every possible assistance that anyone else in the province receives if they are ill. No different, no more, no less. I shouldn't say no more — much, much more, because it costs more, and we're quite willing to provide those funds. We don't say that because you have a certain illness, you only qualify for X number of dollars. We say that when someone gets sick, they get all the help possible from every source that's available to us.

When you say we haven't got enough funds, maybe that's one reason, because we spend between $5 million and $6 million a year on AIDS right now. So you can't accuse us of not spending money. We do more for AIDS than any province in Canada. We're the first in many areas when it comes to AIDS. We've got a viral culture-testing clinic going up now which should be open on July I –– I visited that this morning. We've got a dental clinic for AIDS that's going to be operating very soon. We've got St. Paul's Hospital looking after all the sick who come down with AIDS. We're doing research work. All our health units are providing information for AIDS. We're doing a package that's going out to schools for all the 10 to 12. One film has gone out already for the Grade 12 graduating class. We're now providing free film to all people who wish to view it — whether it's a society or an individual. You can have free film — anyone at all; it's being offered in all the Video One agencies.

I don't think you can accuse us of not doing our share. I think we do our share plus more.

MR. CLARK: It's all well and good for the minister to say those things, and we agree, but the question is, can it be more effective? Can it be even more cost-effective as well? In New York city, community-based agencies receive five times as many phone calls for AIDS information as do government departments. Before deciding to establish a department hotline, a government hotline, did the minister do any study on the degree to which those in high-risk categories in other jurisdictions are willing to trust a government department over a community agency?

HON. MR. DUECK: Another study? If I did all the royal commissions and studies that the opposition members ask for, I wouldn't get any work done. I'd be spending all my time and money doing studies.

Another thing that perhaps you don't remember or don't know: our phone line was established a year and a half ago. It is so busy that we're contemplating expanding that area. So

[ Page 1763 ]

there's room for what AIDS Vancouver is doing and what we're doing. We're not cutting into their business. As a matter of fact, why should we? We are all operating for the same cause or for the same purpose, and that is to help the victims who unfortunately have this disease.

MR. CASHORE: A supplemental, Mr. Speaker. The minister's comments last week about "their own kind" indicated a homophobic attitude on the part of the minister. Aren't these biases the real reason AIDS Vancouver is not being included in this program?

HON. MR. DUECK: I think I made a very clear explanation of that the other day. Perhaps you were not in the House at the time, so you can look it up in Hansard.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INGENIKA RESERVE

MR. CASHORE: I have a question for the Minister of Intergovernmental Relations. The minister visited Ingenika by jet last week, and action from provincial and federal governments is obviously long overdue. The minister and I and the member for Prince George North (Mrs. Boone) were all shaken and shocked by what we saw there. Will the minister make a commitment today that the government will transfer the Crown lands at Ingenika so that a reserve can be established in a location chosen by the Ingenika?

HON. MR. ROGERS: I didn't visit it by jet: I went by propeller airplane. I'm glad you could go by jet.

We made the offer to the federal Department of Indian Affairs four months ago. It's up to them to take it up. It is sitting on the minister's desk. He's going to be in Victoria or Vancouver next week, and I'm going to try to push him again on it. We think it's long overdue that these people would receive land at Ingenika Point to make a reserve. However, it is not clear whether they want to settle there or in some areas a little farther away. That's only one of a number of complicated issues that have come about as a result of this resettlement, but we had offered that land months ago to the federal government for inclusion as a federal Indian reserve.

MR. CASHORE: A supplemental, Mr. Speaker. In view of the conditions being as shocking as the minister has recognized, and in view of the continuing neglect of the people by governments, will the minister table a specific timetable for consultations with the people of Ingenika and the federal government?

HON. MR. ROGERS: I met with the people. I'm meeting with the minister. I'm going to meet with the people from B.C. Hydro because I believe they have some responsibility in these actions. A specific timetable: I plan to be back to Ingenika or back in there within the next 30 days to have some results. The problem was only brought to our attention in January of this year. I was asked by the chief in May to come and visit. He asked me not to visit until June because of the conditions. He said he wanted to have me come and visit in June.

I'm rather curious to know a whole bunch of details of how this particular Indian band managed to fall through the cracks of the social nets that we have. It's not completely clear to me why the federal government has built a health facility on what is not federal government property for this community. There is no explanation as to how they could justify funding part of it and not recognize it as an Indian community. It is an Indian community; the people have lived there more or less for the past 18 years, or some people have been settled there for the last 18 years. It has fallen between the stools.

I talked to the regional director for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and he tells me there's a bureaucratic rule in Ottawa saying they are not to add any more Indian reserves. I think they have to make an exception in Ingenika, because I don't think it's setting a precedent. Quite frankly, I think that's a one-off situation that is different from almost every other native land claim — or native problem in the province. It's exclusive from a land claim.

There are about another six or seven inquiries I have made, and I would hope to have an answer by the middle of this week. Perhaps by the time my estimates come around I'll be able to give you a lot more detail. I'm certainly not going to rest on it.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987
(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

On section 62 as amended.

MR. D'ARCY: Mr. Chairman, I'm glad to see both you and the minister back from what I hope was a pleasant weekend.

Mr. Chairman, I'm speaking in opposition to section 62, and I have some questions and concerns to direct to the minister and to the government. I suppose a major concern is this presumption that the government and the minister have that they and the commissioner's office — and I emphasize the commissioner's office. rather than the individuals who may be staffing that office — to be empowered under section 62 of this act are going to know everything and act in every positive way in what the government describes as the public interest. It's quite clear to anyone who has ever studied this particular government — the Socred government of today — or indeed any government in Canada, that the public interest is always merely a euphemism used by politicians to describe what those politicians think is best on whatever issue on whatever day.

[2:30]

Mr. Chairman, in our society the courts or quasi-judicial bodies have resolved many disputes over the years. For those decisions to be effective, the court or the quasi-judicial body or the judges who were involved had to have credibility with those to whom their judgments were being applied. Naturally, people don't always like the decision of the courts; in fact, sometimes both parties do not like the decision of the courts or quasi-judicial bodies. But the fact is that for the rule of law to be effective — and we are discussing a law: major changes in the laws of British Columbia here, with section 62

[ Page 1764 ]

in particular — the method of application and the method of resolving disputes must be credible.

I think that the minister or anyone else who raises the names of the commissioner or any of the staff is in fact obscuring the issue. The issue is whether or not the office itself and the legislation around it is credible. I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that this particular section, if not indeed the entire bill, is simply not credible with the overwhelming majority of the public — even those parts of the public who generally support the government.

We all know that in any aspect of our society, the authorities — whether it be the police or game wardens or park wardens or the Coast Guard; whoever it is — can only govern, can only enforce laws, with the consent of those who are being policed. It is becoming increasingly clear that British Columbians do not particularly consent to the notions that are put forth under section 62 of Bill 19. Mr. Chairman, I'm not singling out trade union leaders or trade union members. I'm not singling out management, necessarily, or certain parts of management or certain industries. The fact is that the average British Columbian, whatever their position, however they earn their living, simply is not finding this particular act and this particular section credible.

Mr. Chairman, we do not want anything coming through this House, forced on the public of B.C. by the Socred majority, that's going to result in production losses anywhere in the economy of British Columbia. The last ten or 15 years have seen major production gains in British Columbia, both in quantity and quality, in industry after industry. We all like to boast in this House about how well-endowed British Columbia is in our natural resources, but the fact is that our natural resources — particularly our hydroelectric power, our mineral resources and our forest resources — are extremely expensive to extract. They're extremely expensive to develop.

We're only competitive in this province because our workforce and our management force have been highly innovative, and have been highly productive. Those largely technological and managerial innovations did not come about by agreement at contract time, they came about in an ongoing way — sometimes rather painfully — during the lifetime of contracts. One of the reasons that the United States was so insistent that there be either a tariff or a stumpage increase, for instance, on our Canadian wood products was the very high productivity of the industry in British Columbia, despite the fact that it's incredibly expensive to get wood out of the bush and into the mills.

Mr. Chairman, you might ask: "How does section 62 relate to that?" It relates to that because that kind of productivity innovation that saw that evolution over the last 15 years — indeed, I think it's not just over the past 15 years, but probably over the life of the industry in B.C. — is because in general there has been an ongoing cooperation between people who work in the industry and the owners and managers. No one in British Columbia wants to see technological and managerial change resisted rather than adapted. That, I fear, will happen, not might happen, under the imposition of section 62.

Speakers across the way, especially the minister, have stated that in 1973 a major new labour act came in, so why can't the Socred government in 1987 do the same thing'? I state quite clearly that this is different than 1973. Nineteen seventy-three was not a throwing out of everything that was before and a bringing in of something entirely new. It was simply a codification and an updating of past and existing practice seen in the practical realities of the early 1970s. It demonstrably did not throw out the lessons and judicial decisions of the past; it simply discarded what was archaic and non-productive to harmonious production, and reflected the reality of the day. Section 62 in Bill 19 does not do that; it goes far beyond that. It throws out — casts to the wind — what was there before and brings in an entirely new set of rules, an entirely new way of doing things. So there really is not a parallel between section 62 of Bill 19 and the changes and additions made to existing labour legislation back in the early seventies.

Under the various labour acts that are in place in British Columbia but that will be replaced by Bill 19 if the government insists on thrusting ahead with it, particularly with section 62, B.C.'s labour force acquired a much-deserved reputation for innovation and adaptability. It is noted that even in recession, B.C. construction workers and B.C. manufacturing techniques are in worldwide demand. I cannot understand why the government wants to hammer away at success. Lester Pearson always used to say that the successful practice and administration of government was the skilful use of blunt instruments. The government is taking unto itself a series of blunt instruments that nobody has confidence in them to use skillfully, instruments that formerly were out there to be used by the courts and quasi-judicial rulings. As I said earlier, those rulings were not always liked, but the system of making those rulings, and those who made those rulings, were always respected. I don't believe that section 62 is going to bring into force and office a system which is going to be respected; and if the system and the office are not respected, the rulings, however correct they may be in some cases, are not going to be respected either.

The Socred government says they want to free labour and management; they want to bring democracy into the workplace. To try to do that under section 62 is, I think, a total and ultimate fantasy. What the government is really doing with this section is fettering labour and management. Why on earth would anyone in the workplace, during the length of a contract — especially at contract time but even during the length of a contract — make concessions, make modifications, make adaptations to the realities of changing technologies, changing markets, changing demands? Why would anyone in their right mind — either way, management or labour — even if they wanted to make adaptations, make those concessions if they knew that those concessions after they had been made could well be used as a benchmark for an arbitration of a contract dispute under section 62? Why would anyone want to work closely together during the length of a contract? Why would anyone want to make concessions at contract time, knowing full well that in the event that a dispute — a dispute in the sense of a work stoppage — should develop, all the concessions that had been made and all the adaptations would simply be accepted as the status quo in terms of an arbitration'?

Section 62 removes any incentive for cooperation and concessions that already existed there and naturally existed there within the workplace on an ongoing basis. That is what successful industrial relations are. It is ongoing cooperation in the best interests of working conditions and of quality and quantity of production.

Let's throw out, completely disregard, whether or not the IRC — I know it is going to quickly be dubbed the "irk" — will be fair, because the fairness will always be a subjective

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judgment, in any event, something like beauty, art or even obscenity. The point is that the IRC under any staffing regime will not be seen as fair or even-handed. That is the bottom line of my objection to section 62. Any law, any part of a law, must not be seen by the public to be an ass. The law must be respected. Taxpaying British Columbians do not respect section 62.

MR. SIHOTA: This is actually, apart from a bit of an outburst on Thursday, the first opportunity I have really had to talk about section 62 in its broad terms. I am heading towards a number of questions to the minister at the end of this.

The section is — I think every speaker has said this somewhat inconsistent with the government's stated job of getting government off the backs of people. It is quite to the contrary of that, in that it brings about a massive amount of intervention in labour relations matters. It clearly has, as I call it, a La Guardia approach — you know, when you have all these airplanes lining up to get in. It seems like section 62 is much the same way, in that there are seven or eight things that can be done, and they are all stacked up one after the other waiting to come in and land on and impose upon the collective agreement or the negotiation process.

It's a far departure for a government that believes in getting government off the backs of people. It's a far departure for a government that philosophically, I would think, would agree with freedom of contract — the ability of individuals to contract on their own. And it's a far-flung approach for a government that I always thought believed that parties ought to decide amongst themselves as to what economic injury they want to inflict on the other with a view towards resolving an industrial conflict, as opposed to the government deciding.

[2:45]

There is no doubt that the public interest clause, as it appears in this section, is the one that I would consider to be the most notorious and one of the most troublesome, apart from the extensive powers given to the commissioner to intervene during the course of disputes, simply because "the public interest" — as the member who spoke before me indicated — is such a difficult term to define. It's very difficult to get a handle on what public interest is. I think it is fair to say that historically all sorts of fine things or not-so fine things have been done in the name of the "public interest." It strikes me that the usage of that type of vocabulary within this type of section allows for a misuse of powers under the act. I don't think that's good with respect to dealing with industrial disputes.

Over the weekend I was reading — and I believe someone else may have quoted from it — a report from the British Columbia Business Council which talks about the number of industrial disputes in the province and the extent to which it has fallen over the last couple of years. I just want to quote from its conclusion. After it cites the number of disputes in the province and the extent to which it has dropped, it says: "These positive developments mean that a poor reputation for labour relations may in part be more a reflection of poor public relations than of reality. Business, labour, government and the media must attempt to give unexaggerated reports of existing problems, and work to build on the present trend of conflict reduction." I found that to be interesting, because I think that there clearly is a perception out there that we have wide industrial strife in British Columbia. That perception being the case results in people thinking that that's the reality. As the council pointed out in that report, there is quite a difference between what is perceived to be the case and what is really the case.

It may well be that the public doesn't understand the fact that there is not really a lot of industrial strife, and days lost to strikes and lockouts, in this province. If anybody were to understand that, it would seem to me that it ought to be the ministry. The Ministry of Labour, hence, it seems to me, if it were aware of those kinds of facts — which I am sure it is — would not have put forward a section which is so interventionist in its nature. It seems somewhat out of line, given the reality of the situation.

As a result of that, we have a piece of legislation that sort of stacks up all these powers that are available to not just the minister but to an individual.

I was looking for another quote here, which I can't seem to get my hands on. In any event, there is a mediator, the fact finder, the commissioner's conference, a public interest inquiry board, an industrial inquiry commissioner, the final offer vote, special mediators that can be appointed and a decision made by the minister. It strikes me as being a substantial overkill in terms of trying to deal with — as the minister said himself — the 5 percent of disputes that end up in a strike situation. With those types of broad and innumerable options.... It seems to me rather strange that those types of options are required in a jurisdiction where we don't have that many problems.

I would anticipate that the counterargument to that is that if you look at the current Labour Code, conceivably there are quite a few options available under the Labour Code to deal with industrial strife. That's very true; there are no two ways about it. There are six or eight options under the current legislation to deal with industrial strife, much as there are six, eight or ten options available under section 62 to deal with industrial strife. What differentiates, in my mind, the two pieces of legislation is the extent to which the powers are controlled and curbed under the Labour Code and the extent to which they are broad and wide open under proposed Bill 19 and section 62 — I think that sort of explains the dilemma.

I could — I think, if it was reasonably put — be convinced that there was a need to perhaps extend some of the options that exist in the Labour Code so as to allow one to deal in a more expeditious and efficient way with industrial strife. I may part company in this House with many who may not agree with that opinion, but I think that the bottom line is that it would have been appropriate to consider a fine-tuning of the options currently available under the Code so as to allow them to be directed more readily and immediately to industrial strife when it occurs. I don't think that's a farfetched proposition: I think it's reasonably put.

So recognizing that there are indeed a number of options in both pieces of legislation, it seems to me that the difference lies in the fact that this section in particular goes to an absolute extreme, in terms of using very broad and liberal language to deal with industrial conflict, as opposed to the narrower language in the Labour Code, which, I would agree, may in some instances have required fine-tuning and improvement.

Because this is not second reading, I don't intend to go into any depth or comment at all upon the sections that I could see within the Labour Code that would require some changes in language. Suffice it to say that these ones go so far. In fact, if I was a party — which I wasn't — to the original drafting

[ Page 1766 ]

back in 1973, I would find it hard to believe that someone would have taken that legislation to this extreme.

One of the things I find particularly galling is this matter of votes and the ability of the government to order votes whenever, while notice has been served and certainly after a strike or lockout begins. It seems to me that the parties to the conflict, the parties that decide to engage in inflicting economic harm on the other, ought to be free to decide when the pressures have built up sufficiently to warrant a vote. If that decision — as it now appears to be headed, under this section — were to be exclusively within the hands of the government, then I think the political public pressure on the government would be so great that the natural inclination would be to hold votes prematurely and often. The downside of that is the fact that it may end up solidifying the situation and encouraging people to be a little more excited about their positions and hence a little less likely to consider some form of resolution and settlement of the matter.

The pressure on politicians is always the greatest during these types of disputes — and I'm sure that's a handy quote that somebody can fire back at me. But within the context of this section and within the context of debate on ordering votes, I think the government is going to react too quickly in ordering those votes, as opposed to allowing those parties to decide freely among themselves as to when they think it would be appropriate to consider a vote. That provision in particular causes me considerable concern.

We're beyond the point now in the course of this debate, if one is to believe the Premier of the province, of sort of overturning the legislation, withdrawing it, sending it off to committee or finding some other way to deal with this pivotal section — section 62 — which is, once again, in the overall scheme of things, highly regrettable.

This weekend — if I may digress a bit — I spent a fair bit of time touring two fairs held in my riding, and the public feedback was incredible. To be honest, I received comments from both sides of the fence; I don't think anybody in this House receives comments only from one side of the fence on any of these controversial matters. I was really taken aback, more so this weekend than in just about any other instance since this legislation has been introduced, by the level of concern that people had; and secondly, the familiarity that they had with the legislation. I'm saying this without saying which side of the fence they stood on. It was surprising to me, the extent to which people seemed to understand not simply the intent or the propaganda that comes along with the introduction of the legislation, but actually understood the mechanics of the legislation. There were clearly some who felt that the mechanics were justified; an overwhelming majority on this side of the coin who were very understanding of what was incorporated in this legislation, who could point very specifically to the things that they thought about, which affected them at their workplace.

Once again, I don't particularly intend to go into all of the examples — in fact, any at all — because I think that might have been more appropriate in the debate we had earlier. But I was surprised, and a little disappointed, if I may say so for the record, that the Premier was questioning people to the extent of wondering whether or not they had had an opportunity to read the legislation. The fact of the matter is that people have a fairly good understanding of this legislation, a very good knowledge of where it's coming from and some very deep reservations. Once again, the point that was being made to me over and over again — as in many of the editorials that I have in this hand, which I won't bother to read — was that it's time for a sober second look.

There you have it. It was totally evident to me that if there was consensus around any point, not specifically dealing with this section but with sections in general, the consensus was that perhaps it ought to be taken away from the temperature of this chamber and placed in front of people who could take a look at it in a relatively cool environment.

If I can find it, I want to end by asking a question which I had identified and thought was well put in this section. Maybe I'll go through my notes and try to identify the two or three issues that I want to canvass after one of my other friends has had an opportunity to speak on the legislation.

MR. G. HANSON: I rise to oppose this particular section. As one of the individuals who was around in the summer of 1983 when we had the 26 bills that we honed down to the dirty dozen — being one of the walking wounded from that particular campaign.... The Social Credit government continues to interfere in the collective bargaining process. I think the economic indicators, Statistics Canada, the Conference Board of Canada, the Royal Bank, the universities, people acquainted with the industrial relations climate of the province, are pretty clear — there's a consensus — that the government, by intervening in 1983 and distorting the balance between a balanced collective bargaining process under the Labour Code, that framework that no one seems to be able to really criticize.... What you've got is a replacement with a totally atavistic, "back to the '68 Mediation Commission" approach that our economy has been ill served by the intervention of 1983 and then again by an upscale amplified intervention now.

As we proceed through this debate at committee stage of section 62 — some three weeks so far — we're trying to persuade the minister by logic and the force of argument, by appealing to him as the minister responsible for shepherding this bill through the House, that an about-turn really would be possible. An about-turn would be well received in the community. A cooling-off period, it's been called. Somehow politicians invest statutes with their egos, when I think they shouldn't. Governments feel that somehow their ego is in a basket and they must tough it out, put their tin hat on and just take whatever criticism is necessary, because they're on a Messianic mission to change what they perceive as a problem. What we seem to have before us is increased powers for a certain non-elected office — an increase in powers of intervention which the business community does not want and the labour community doesn't want. We're hearing from more and more individuals who are coming forward to ask the government to take that famous second took, and I'm rising to do the same.

[3:00]

My own community was particularly hard hit when the compensation stabilization program came into full force after 1983. Mr. Peck's office was working and overturning agreements, rolling back agreements, overturning arbitration awards, just generally creating conflict, and this community suffered badly. I alluded to the Conference Board of Canada and the Royal Bank, who do their own independent studies of economic performance. Their conclusion was that there was an adverse reaction within the B.C. economy that has stifled our recovery until now, and that continues to. The recovery that occurred in central Canada.... I know there are other dynamics occurring in Ontario and so on, but the lack of

[ Page 1767 ]

confidence.... I know the people in my own community — and let's just put it on the basis of an MLA speaking on behalf of his own constituency. I know what a dampening effect the '83 — and right to the present — impact on labour relations as brought about by the government has had on our community. Since that time people have always been fearful of their jobs, not willing to invest and not willing to look beyond a few paycheques. It affects their work performance. It affects the general economy of southern Vancouver Island, and I think even the business community here could reinforce and corroborate what I am saying to the minister: rather than instilling investor confidence and consumer confidence, this intervention....

It's not just from the labour community's point of view. We have all sorts of research that indicates it. There is an oil company executive, for example. who is quoted in one particular item I have here. He says: "Where a government doesn't accept the sanctity of the collective agreement and the contract, it can start intervening. There is no sanctity in a contract. If politicians by their acts can wipe out any requirements to keep a contract...... This is a Colorado oil executive, and I have the reference, if the minister is interested. But it's not just the labour community's concern. It's the business community, when they see a government setting up a super body that can intervene and override and interfere and move in at various stages to undermine the process.

If we could only just step back from it. Let's ask ourselves: what is the process based on in its essence? It really is based on trust. It's based on some notion of equality: withdrawal of services versus the power of the employer in terms of lockout. It seems that the examples are numerous where governments adopt this interventionist approach that the public interest is not well served and that the public interest, even though the government declares that to be its objective — to create a climate and an impression about British Columbia beyond our borders.... The Conference Board of Canada has done extensive canvassing of large corporations to determine what the factors are that help them make their judgment about where they are going to invest and establish themselves, and labour relations is not the number one criterion.

Many speakers on this side of the House have been trying to make the case that the perception abroad gets exaggerated by the ideological objectives of the current regime, so that when the government wants to protect the public interest or establish a more favourable climate abroad, they accomplish precisely the reverse, by adopting the approach that they're establishing here, with this non-elected body and the tremendous sweeping powers of the commissioner. Even though with amendments there is some reference back to the minister, it is really the wrong way to go.

The Premier made reference to functioning standing committees of this House prior to this session, and a whole series of things have been conducted — on labour, on liquor, on heritage, on various matters that really could appropriately have been referred to, for example, the Select Standing Committee on Labour, Justice and Intergovernmental Relations. In the eight years that I've been a member of this House that committee, which had the same name — Labour, Justice and Intergovernmental Relations — never ever met, and I thought that this year would be a perfect chance. And when your commission was off on the road, my first thought was: "Why is that not Labour, Justice and Intergovernmental Relations?" Why not? I think that for all of the two-month period that we've been debating 20 and 19 — and now the key feature of 19 in 62 — I can't help but wonder whether this whole scenario wouldn't have been quite different, and I'm sure it would have been, if that committee, even though six government members and the ministers are on that committee, and our labour critic is on that committee, had held hearings in the spring of this year, and had tangled and argued within the committee but had brought forward a bill to this House on amendments to the Labour Code. What a different scenario that might have been than what we have been engaged in.

The thing that I think most members on this side of the House, and the vast majority of the public, can't quite understand is why, when the hazards seem so predictable. so inevitable, so likely as a result of this bill, the government seems hell bent for leather to proceed. It is the prominent individuals in this province who seem to be willing to come forward and attach their name to their view, such as Bill Hamilton, such as Mr. Matkin initially — he softened a bit with the amendments. But the Cominco board and other individuals of stature in the business community, when they look at this particular section — because this is a central feature of the bill and the way it will function — are opposed and are concerned.

There are so many things that we are concerned about: the process that has brought us to this point; the way the bill was drafted; the way the bill is proceeding in the House without consensus, without support of the parties. You stated so clearly in your report that for a statute of such importance to the economy as the industrial relations guidelines, regulations, support network for collective bargaining.... It is the underpinning of our economy, in the sense of the working people, union or non-union, and their relationship with the employer, and the guidelines, the way the bargaining process takes place and how you reach resolution....

How many times in this debate have we talked about the resolution of disputes? The collective bargaining process is a conflict-resolution process, and it must be seen to be fair. It must function fairly; it must be based on trust. I have been an elected rank-and-file bargaining committee member. I have negotiated collective agreements, and they take some time. I am aware of that process; I am familiar with it. I am not an expert. I think you have to be with it an awfully long time to be an expert.

[Mrs. Gran in the chair.]

But it does not function without a sense of trust, equality, balance, fairness, all of the features that seem to be absent in this statute. When you sandpaper the people and you make them feel that you are a government ideologically positioned against the ordinary working people, union or non-union, it does not bode well. There is a sense of frustration, I think, on this side of the House, because unlike any debate that I have ever witnessed in this House, more positive suggestions have been submitted, made available to the minister, face-saving for both the first minister and the cabinet.... We are not in this debate to win Brownie points. We think there is still time left, right up until prior to proclamation. for a second took at this statute.

I mean that in all seriousness, representing a constituency that suffered greatly due to 25 percent of all public sector employees being fired, laid off, and the lack of investor confidence in this community. Small business suffered, went bankrupt. All you had to do was walk up and down the

[ Page 1768 ]

streets: shops closed.... What little extra disposable income people had.... They're still reluctant to spend it, because they still don't know. I hope it is wrong, but there is a rumour that there is going to be another 10 percent cut of public employees in this province. I hope that does not happen, because that is just a cutback of important services to families, to his own ministry, the Forest Service, Environment....

So, Mr. Minister, section 62 is like an exponential increase in the negative features.... I see my time is up. If someone could just give me a moment, I'll conclude.

[3:15]

MR. WILLIAMS: Madam Chairman, I'm intrigued by the presentation, and I trust it would carry on for a few minutes more.

MR. G. HANSON: Madam Chairperson, I do have a few more comments that I want to make.

As legislators, I think we should learn from experience. The province suffered badly in the '83 legislative package, which was sort of Bill 19 in its incipient form. What we have now is a full-blown potential crisis in front of us. I think it's our duty as legislators, and certainly as members of the opposition and government back-benchers, to make our concerns clearly noticed by the minister. Further down the pike, if what occurs is what we can see happening....

You know, the minister and the Premier can dismiss these events that are occurring — even last weekend — in ideological terms: rent-a-crowd, or partisan groups. That kind of dismissal is short-sighted. I think it's a mistake. It was pointed out to me when I first got elected here, by a member who will remain nameless, that one of the important things that often escape the public — visitors, school delegations or people who come into this Legislature and just get one snapshot or a small number of frames — is that this body, this room, the dynamics of this place, reflect the feelings that are occurring out in the community. It's a very representative body here. It's like the valve on the top of a pressure-cooker. If this place doesn't function properly and meet the legitimate needs and concerns of the community, of the people outside of this place, then we are not doing our job; this institution is not functioning the way it should. If the pressure builds, then our system is not functioning properly. The laws that come through this House should be reflecting the legitimate concerns, values, beliefs, desires and aspirations of the people whom we represent and who send us here.

Empowering Mr. Peck with super powers was not on the program for the last election. It wasn't on the agenda of the election. Style versus substance did not explain to the people of the province that rights, duties and obligations that were clearly understood, after a 12-year working into shape of the labour relations machinery that was in place in this province, that was functioning properly.... That wasn't on the program.

Mr. Minister, we think that the public would be well served, even at this late date, by referring this to the Labour and Justice Committee of this House, which is ready to function: six government members, three opposition members, the Minister of Labour, the opposition critic for the New Democratic Party. They could do a good job of cooling off the situation, inviting expert testimony from those who still have concerns about Mr. Peck's role, about the double-breasting and about other aspects of the bill that, it is crystal-clear to us, will be leading us down a route that is not going to serve our economy well. It is going to be combative, in the very worst sense of that word. If we learned anything.... I wasn't around at the time, but there are members in this House who were present during the whole Mediation Commission debate, and its ensuing strife, about which members could be bringing forward their suggestions and their recollections. Why do we have to step in the same swamp twice? We did have a model bill under the Labour Code. Sure, it could have been improved. There were other things the minister of the day wanted to elaborate on and to go on.... Unfortunately we didn't have that opportunity. But it did serve the province well right through until relatively recently, when various amendments came in.

Rather than have the underpinning of labour relations in the province based on stability, trust, fairness and notions of that type rather than Big Brother intervention — "we know best" — which will totally destabilize the climate, and already is.... I think that the minister, even though he has heard what I am saying before, in different forums, from our side, from other submissions that have been made to him.... It is not too late to make that decision. I think the public would respect you for it. They would respect the government for it. I think there are polls that indicate that, even though our political elbow and hundreds of years of democratic political history tell us that when governments get boxed in, and they back up and say, "The stakes are so high that we're willing to wait six months for a look, for more discussion...."

We have a statute in place. It's not as if there's a vacuum. That opportunity is still there, and we would obviously like the minister to take that under advisement. As the debate leader on our side has indicated, our job in this debate is not to crow. If you make that choice, our job is not to crow but to congratulate you for that.

MS. EDWARDS: I want to ask a rather specific question of the minister, if he doesn't mind, right now, because I have some concerns about the definitions under section 62, 137.1. Under the definition of "public sector employer," subsection (b) says that it means "a corporation or an unincorporated board, commission, council, bureau, authority or similar body that has (i) on its board of management or board of directors, a majority of members who are appointed by an Act, a minister or the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, or (ii) employees appointed under the Public Service Act...." I wonder, Mr. Minister, if you could just tell me in general what broad group of organizations you see falling under this. Can you define some of the breadth of that range of organizations — those councils, bureaus, authorities or similar bodies?

HON. L. HANSON: I think the words are fairly clear. They spell it out fairly.... Are you looking for specific examples, such as ICBC?

Interjection.

HON. L. HANSON: You know, there are so many that I could publish you a list about yea long. I think that if you look at "public sector employer" in the Compensation Stabilization Act, with the addition of "library board," that gives a fairly meaningful description of it. I can get a copy of that if you'd like. It gives a number of examples.

[ Page 1769 ]

MS. EDWARDS: Mr. Minister, I am more interested in subsection (i). You are talking about very large organizations such as the Workers' Compensation Board and ICBC. What is the smallest type of organization that you think would be included and therefore named a public sector employer? Are there small groups that you have in mind for this?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, it is all of those defined in the Compensation Stabilization Act. I will get a copy of the act and pick out the smallest one.

MS. EDWARDS: What I wondered is whether you had anticipated the kind of organization that I have been talking to recently, in very specific terms. One is the Friends of Barkerville, a private organization. It has been operating in order to support and add some broader dimension to the functions that can happen at Barkerville. Recently they have been asked to reorganize, and they have been asked to allow the minister to appoint their board of directors. That would mean that the Friends of Barkerville become a public sector employer. Is that what you had in mind?

HON. L. HANSON: No, that obviously isn't what we had in mind. I am not sure the Friends of Barkerville.... They are an advisory board that really, as far as compensation or as a public sector employer wouldn't.... I don't think they would even be considered an employer, actually.

MS. EDWARDS: Thank you, Mr. Minister, but I know that they are not.... One of the reasons that the Ministry of Tourism, Recreation and Culture wanted them to change their constitution and accept the minister's naming of the directors is that they want them to become more than an advisory board, and that they want them to raise money, to give money to functions that would not be there and to do various functions that would go beyond being an advisory group. One of the particular sticking-points was to have the minister name their board of directors; the minister wants to name the board of directors. I see this coming directly under the definition of who you say would be a public sector employer. In other words, if the Friends of Barkerville, or the Friends of Fort Steele, if you choose, or the Friends of the Provincial Museum, which is perhaps different.... Let's stick to those two, the Friends of Barkerville and the Friends of Fort Steele. If they hired anyone, they would then become a public sector employer.

I think there are some problems there. We seem to be coming at things from two directions. I am not sure that you meant a group such as the Friends of Barkerville to be a public sector employer if they chose to hire someone.

HON. L. HANSON: I really don't know anything about the Friends of Barkerville, but first of all, if they were to be a public sector employer, there would have to be an act created that would create them and in fact give them the responsibilities, whatever they may be, under that act. Then if the Friends of Barkerville were constituted that way and were in charge of the operation of Barkerville and were employing people under that enabling legislation, they would become a public sector employer.

But I think what you are suggesting is maybe more in the advisory capacity, is it not?

MS. EDWARDS: Mr. Minister, it says here that all it has to be is "a corporation or an unincorporated board, commission, council, bureau, authority or similar body that has on its...board of directors, a majority of members who are appointed" by the minister. That would describe the Friends of Barkerville.

I think that there will be a number of other Friends groups. There is a Friends group which now runs the transportation museum recently established in the lower mainland; it would become a public sector employer under this act. I was wondering if the minister intended that, and if not, perhaps the definition should be changed, because I don't understand, if that is the case, what the minister's intention would be to name groups like that, small community groups who are there to raise money, contribute, help the operation of these heritage parks and so on. Why would you want them to be named public sector employers?

[3:30]

HON. L. HANSON: But they won't be, unless they do have employees, first of all. Secondly, public sector employer means the government. a corporation or an unincorporated board, commission, council, bureau, authority or similar body that has on its board of management or board of directors a majority of members who are appointed by an act, etc. So it's not the intention — in fact it won't be — that the Friends of Barkerville as they are now constituted is to be considered a public sector employer.

MS. EDWARDS: I'm not sure why they wouldn't be included here. It doesn't say they have to be appointed by an act. They can be appointed by the minister, and that is what's happening with the Friends of Barkerville and the Friends of Fort Steele. Perhaps you would clarify for me then whether.... You say they do not fall under the definition of the act. Is that correct?

HON. L. HANSON: I don't know the circumstances to do with the Friends of Barkerville, but if they're being appointed by the minister on a voluntary basis, they wouldn't be caught under this public sector employer suggestion.

MS. EDWARDS: They are definitely registered as a society, and their constitution as registered under the Society Act requires that the minister name the directors.

HON. L. HANSON: There's only a bargaining relationship if they have employees. I don't know the circumstances, but I would be pleased to get all of the details that you're talking about and give you an interpretation of whether they are or not. From what you've told me, they're not a public sector employer, but I don't know on what basis they're being appointed, how many, or what the mandate is of that specific organization.

MS. EDWARDS: I don't think you're saying that they're not; you're saying you will investigate and get back to this House with an idea of how that fits in. It seems to me that if that kind of an organization fits in, there are many in the province that could; if they ever hired anybody, become a public sector employer. I don't know whether that's what the minister intended, and I don't know whether that would serve any particular function.

[ Page 1770 ]

Could I be assured that we will get an answer before the section passes?

HON. L. HANSON: We're on the Friends of Barkerville, but I don't know the circumstances and so on. If in fact the Friends of Barkerville are a board appointed by the minister and empowered to manage the Barkerville operation and receive public funds, and it does have employees, they would in fact be a public sector employer.

MS. EDWARDS: I'm not sure if that definition would also apply if they were not empowered to manage the.... I don't know whether that has real significance here. Why would that definition have to include that they were empowered to run the park? It doesn't, according to this definition. All it says is that they would be a council, board, bureau, authority, commission, etc. with a board that is named by the minister.

HON. L. HANSON: As I said, I don't know the circumstances. I guess I could relate that I recently appointed the travel advisory council; but they don't have any employees, so they're obviously not a public sector employer. I don't know what this group is being appointed for or what their mandate is, but if there is a ministerial management board that does have employees who are in fact administering and running a public facility, they would become a public sector employer, I think, under that interpretation.

MR. GABELMANN: Madam Chairman, let me try it a different way. If this body, which has its board of directors appointed by the minister, runs an operation that is largely funded by non-governmental funds — largely funded by its own operation or by voluntary contribution, or by funds solicited and received elsewhere other than government — they are still caught by this definition, and still remain public sector employers — if they have employees — even though they are not totally, or perhaps even mostly, funded by the government. I think what the member for Kootenay (Ms. Edwards) is trying to ascertain is why it is that in these cases — and there aren't many in British Columbia, but there are clearly some.... Why is it that these bodies, who are appointed by a minister but who don't spend the minister's money, or the government's money, are considered public sector employers? Because that, under this wording, is in fact what happens.

HON. L. HANSON: I suppose that I have in my own riding a relatively similar circumstance to the one you are talking about, and that's called the O'Keefe Ranch Society. I would suggest that if the minister were approached — the Minister of Tourism, I understand — to appoint the members to that society.... They aren't, in my view, a public sector employer, and shouldn't be appointed by the minister for that purpose.

MR. GUNO: I'm happy to rise today to express my opposition to the inclusion of section 62 in Bill 19, and I want to do that in very brief and general terms, Madam Chairman.

I just got back from touring the southern part of my riding this weekend. I was rather gratified and, to some extent, surprised by the number of people there whom I met who expressed very informed concern about Bill 19 and also section 62. I can state unequivocally that none of them is daunted by the so-called complexity of this bill. In fact, I would say that the complexity is overstated; that it's more convoluted than complex. It's frustrating to listen to the Premier dismiss the overwhelming public opinion against this bill, particularly section 62.

I think that we've overstated also the ability of experts, lawyers, to be the only ones that can somehow decipher the intent and thrust of the bill. I don't think it takes an expert to see that this bill is so seriously flawed that it will introduce an escalating instability in our industrial relations; that it is a radical departure, especially in section 62, from the way that we in British Columbia have in the past resolved our differences in the workplace.

Over the last few weeks, Madam Chairman, this side of the House has effectively pointed out the many flaws of Bills 19 and 20, and has shown that this bill appears to have been so hastily drafted that, even with the 40-odd amendments that have been made by government, fundamental objections still remain. The government, or the Premier, has attempted — unsuccessfully, I think — to portray that these amendments constitute real changes, or somehow have met the concerns of many people, not only the labour sector but also the business sector of our economy. They have attempted to portray these amendments as somehow meeting the legitimate concerns of a broad cross-section of the people in British Columbia.

But I think there are still fundamental problems that remain, none more troublesome than section 62. Here the government purports to establish a dispute resolution mechanism that would establish, as they say, more industrial labour stability. But in doing so, this government has — and I think many of my colleagues have pointed this out — abandoned the one area that works, and that is the cooperative approach: to allow the parties to be the essential ingredient in resolving differences in industrial relations. Instead, in section 62 this government gives an unelected official, a civil servant, powers beyond those which our democratic system of government would legitimately allow. I think it's been pointed out, and I think it bears repeating over and over again, that it provides for a massive increase in government intervention in the collective bargaining process. Ultimately it's going to result in more instability.

The Premier said just the other day that he is a good listener. I think that it's time he and the government demonstrated that ability to listen to the people. There's a growing consensus in this province that Bill 19 has so many flaws that it ought to be withdrawn to provide people the opportunity to address some of the more serious concerns, especially those involved in section 62.

[Mr. Weisgerber in the chair.]

Later, along with my colleagues, I want to point out some of the more detailed concerns, but I just wanted to go on record and say in very general terms that many people I've met in the Atlin riding are very concerned about this bill and about allowing an unelected official such awesome powers to intervene and deprive our workers of their legitimate rights rights that they have worked for over the last five decades.

MR. LOVICK: Mr. Chairman, I have now spoken on two occasions about the general principle of section 62, or at least the entire batch of materials within section 62. Pretty clearly, we're running to the end of our energies and the tether on this

[ Page 1771 ]

particular thing without being involved in some kind of blatant filibustering, and we don't want to be involved in that.

[3:45]

I wanted, however, to rise once again and offer a few more comments, for two reasons. One is that I'm a little concerned that the Minister of Labour has not responded to the last four or five statements that have been made by my colleagues, and I think we are owed some response to those statements. Secondly, as I suggested the last time I addressed this House, it seems to me there is something extremely and significantly fundamental embedded within section 62. I for one would feet guilty indeed if I did not take another opportunity to add a few more comments to the record about this bill and why we are so strenuous in our opposition to it, especially this section.

I suggested last time, Mr. Chairman, that the predicament with the bill was summarized very effectively by that management lawyer, Gavin Hume, whose comment was that this bill has a profound impact on the course of labour relations in this province. Most specifically and most importantly — and I'm going to quote him again, if I can, because I think those words are important — it provides authority to the commissioner to refer the disputes to a third party "without the consent of the parties involved in the dispute." That's what stands out in my mind and sets off alarm bells.

What I tried to articulate and enunciate the last time I spoke, Mr. Chairman, was that this section of the bill, whether we know it or not, effectively puts an end to collective bargaining in a free society.

AN HON. MEMBER: Oh, oh!

MR. LOVICK: It does. The Provincial Secretary (Hon. Mr. Veitch) can harrumph and declaim and protest for all he's worth. The fact of the matter is, however, that the moment we write legislation that says a third party can intervene without the consent of either of the two parties, we have effectively said that collective bargaining no longer means what it used to mean. As I suggested before and will restate here, that amounts to a redrawing of the rules by which we live. It amounts to a changing of the social contract. There may well be some who want to say: "So be it. We accept it. That's fine. We like it." But for heaven's sake, have the decency and the temerity and the honesty to at least acknowledge what it is we are doing. We are rewriting the social contract, and let's have no illusions about that.

I suggested that why that offended me so much was that it also takes on one of the fundamental and central assumptions of a democratic society. That fundamental assumption is that people are to be treated like adults. They are to be treated as independent, decision-making individuals who can decide for themselves what is in their best interest. When we say to those individuals, again as a matter of course, that what we are going to do is set up a mechanism and a system whereby we are going to solve their problems — "You no longer have to worry about such things as bargaining, because we have some seer, an individual in whom is vested this enormous amount of power, who will solve your problems for you...... That step, that measure is retrograde, regressive and unhealthy. It is not good for a free society to do that. There are, to be sure, occasions when we want to call upon a third party to help us out of our predicaments. But we don't write legislation that assumes an extreme situation as a matter of course. We don't need to give any individual these kinds of powers.

I am arguing, as my colleagues have argued, that this is simply retrograde; it is a bad measure, and one that we feel strongly about. Therefore I felt the need, Mr. Chairman, to add my few words more on this issue. I might end my remarks here by saying that we will continue to put pressure on the bits and pieces of part 8.1, because there are questions we have about the particular bits and pieces, the nuts and bolts. But the central issue remains and obtains. I would ask the minister to please make an effort to assuage and allay my fears. I think he owes us that.

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, I must apologize to my colleague from Shuswap-Revel stoke (Hon. Mr. Michael). I referred to the O'Keefe Ranch, and it is in his riding, not mine. I have to get the ridings straight.

The last speaker has been criticizing me for not speaking. Quite frankly, the concerns you have raised are the same concerns that have been raised for about three days, I guess, more or less. I have responded to them two or three times, but I can respond to them again if you would like.

There is a very basic difference in our thinking. You say that the powers of the commissioner are going to effectively destroy collective bargaining in British Columbia forever and a day. But to make that assumption, you have to make the assumption that every time there is any kind of a dispute, there is the commissioner with his intervention with a mediator or whatever it may be. I say to you that the reason we are formulating it in this manner is that that is a very important labour relations position. The mandate of the commissioner is that he is there to help, in any manner he can, the parties reach their own independent agreement. The commissioner's mandate is assistance. not interference. He can follow a dispute that is impending. and the individual, who is very experienced, in this particular case.... But the responsibility that lies with that commissioner — again I underline it — is to help, to facilitate, and not to interfere with collective bargaining. To say that collective bargaining is at an end in British Columbia.... I just can't accept that.

Again, I apologize to the member opposite if he feels that I don't respond often enough. But you keep raising the same concerns, which you have every right to, and I do respond to those concerns. But I have some difficulty in responding to those concerns every time someone speaks.

I think someone said in some of the earlier presentations that we have a fairly successful labour relations climate, and if you relate 95 percent of collective agreements being settled as opposed to those in which disputes erupt, I guess you can say that we have a fairly successful labour relations climate. But when we have difficulties that do in fact cause British Columbians as a whole great pain and great suffering. maybe "fairly successful" is not as good as we can be.

The approach in Bill 19 is totally different from the mediation act that was referred to in some of the earlier discussions. It's different in its objectives. Again I point out that the main objective is the voluntary resolution of disputes, not the interference in disputes.

I have to say to the members opposite that the proof of the Industrial Relations Council — the proof that everyone will see — is when it is there and when it is working. When it is working, it will work well. There seems to be an assumption, in these various concerns that the opposition has raised, as to the various responsibilities that the commissioner has being

[ Page 1772 ]

applied almost on a scheduled basis: "Hey, those two are fighting; we'll do this. That didn't work; then we'll do this. And that didn't work; then we'll do that." I would suggest that that's a pretty simple application of the responsibilities in section 62. I think everyone — the members on this side and the members on that side — understands how important industrial relations are to the province of British Columbia. Those people, given that responsibility to facilitate voluntary settlements, will recognize that serious responsibility and will use it in a very serious and responsible manner. I just have to reiterate that the responsibilities of the IRC and the commissioner are not only to adjudicate disputes if they are brought forward, but to enhance and facilitate collective bargaining and voluntary settlements.

I think one other factor that's been missing in most of the discussion is that they will have a responsibility for providing an information service on a regular basis to all of the participants in labour relations — which, by the way, has generally been a request of both labour and management. They see that as being a very real and helpful requirement in determining what is happening in labour relations in the rest of the industrial world as they may use that in their own bargaining process.

MR. LOVICK: I shall be brief. First I thank the minister for his sincerity. I accept that, and I appreciate it. Let me just make a couple of points, and I shall be brief because obviously, as the Minister of Labour points out quite correctly, we have apparently unbridgeable, insurmountable differences, and all the talk in the world is not about to solve that predicament.

When I hear repeated assertions that this is really about assistance and not interference, I become, however, a little bit suspicious, Mr. Chairman. It reminds me, frankly, of those individuals who want to interfere in family squabbles — you know, the kind of neighbourhood busybody or something, the person who always wants to know what's going on and always feels that he or she can solve the problem that the two parties can't. In 90 percent of the cases, rather, the situation is that the two parties say: "Look, let us have our fight. Let us have our dispute. Let us have our discussion. We'll work it out." However well-intentioned the third party, the intervener, might be, the point is simply that the individuals who are having the dispute, if they know there is a third party who is going to come riding in on the mythical white horse.... Clearly the tendency on the part of the two parties is going to be: "Let the third party solve the problem then." I don't think it's a good approach; I think it's a bad approach.

[4:00]

The other point I would just make here is to say to the minister that he continues to make reference to the fact that there is a basic difference in our thinking. I am quoting the minister when I say that, Mr. Chairman. I have participated in this debate now for some three weeks, it seems to me — it's about that long, I think — and I have heard many, many references to that claim, many claims of that sort: namely, that there is a basic difference in our thinking, or that here we have a philosophical parting of the ways. What I have not heard, however, is just what that difference is. The minister will recognize that I have tried to get that read into the record, because I think it's important.

Now what I want to suggest that that difference is, and I do this carefully and considerately, is that the government seems predisposed to believe that you can legislate social harmony, that you can make democracy work by smoothing out its rough edges. In other words, the government's propensity, I would suggest, is to an authoritarian solution. Its propensity is to order rather than to freedom. It is prepared to argue the case that the public good, the public interest, the maintenance of order and stability and all of that stuff somehow are more significant and higher attributes in the scale of virtues and values than things like independence, freedom, democracy, liberty.

What we have been suggesting again and again, Mr. Chairman, is that there is a price one pays for a democratic society. The price one pays is discord and dissent and disagreement, and we say that we allow people sometimes to interfere with the public order. We accept that as given. We argue the case, rather, that no society is worthy of the name if indeed it maintains its order and its equilibrium and its stability by virtue of the fact and by means of the fact that it continues to repress dissent and disagreement. We are arguing that the measure of a grownup and civilized and adult society is to allow individuals the maximum opportunity to sort out their own differences of opinion. I would suggest to the minister that that perhaps is the point of departure; that is a starting point, at least, by means of or by way of elucidating what our "basic differences in thinking" happen to be.

Again, Mr. Chairman, as I say, I know that we have spent probably sufficient time now on section 62 in general terms, and I'm sorry that we are no closer together on that. I will, however, cease to speak on that. Rather, I and my colleagues — I'm sure I can speak for them as well — are now prepared to took at specific sections within Part 8.1, i.e. section 137.

MR. CLARK: As the member for Nanaimo pointed out, he's wrapped up our discussion in general of section 62, and I'm going to ask him to kick off debate on the first section — 137.1.

MR. CHAIRMAN: As I turn the floor back to the member, I would again remind him of section 61 and relevance, and hope that perhaps we can stick a little closer to relevance as we go through these sections.

MR. LOVICK: There's a marvelous irony in that, Mr. Chairman, because we're talking about section 62 — but of course I won't mention that — not section 61, as you suggested.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Standing orders — 61 of the rules.

MR. LOVICK: Of the rules? My apologies.

We don't have much difficulty, Mr. Chairman, with the definitions — i.e. the section of this bill called "Interpretation" — or at least I don't. Perhaps some of my colleagues who have had a little more time to look at all the details may want to raise questions. What I want to do, though, is simply to begin by posing one question: namely, the first definition, "arbitration board." I'm a little afraid when I see that kind of inclusivity written into legislation. I discover here that "arbitration board" means just about anybody involved in the process, and that scares me. It apparently means individuals; it means boards; it means groups of people or individuals who have widely diverging and different powers. We're talking about final offer selection, about special mediators, about mediators as well as arbitrators. All of us who know

[ Page 1773 ]

anything about the business of industrial relations know, of course, that there are very precise definitions for those terms. I'm wondering, then, why it is the case that "arbitration board" means so much. It's reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland or somebody who says: "It means whatever I think it means, or whatever I want it to mean." It seems to me that the people could be better served by a somewhat more rigorous and specific and exclusivist kind of definition process.

Would the minister care to respond to any of that?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, when it comes to the resolution of disputes, I think the Industrial Relations Council should have the broadest ability to make a selection of the formation of whoever may be responsible to settle a dispute so that he can better make a choice as to which he feels, knowing the circumstances of the situation, is the most appropriate method to impose, if you will. I think it's simply a method of giving some flexibility to that, as opposed to giving it a very narrow definition.

MR. LOVICK: I have no difficulty with the principle or the desirability of flexibility. I'm not sure, however, that we achieve that end simply by saying that language doesn't mean anything, which I think is the intention of — or at least the conclusion of — this definition process provided in 137.1.

We're apparently trying to say that "arbitration board" means one individual or a group of people. And not only does it mean that; it also means people with different powers. I think it's fair to ask: can't we tighten up the language somehow so that we know precisely what we're talking about? Are we talking about a single arbitrator or about a group of people? Clearly, I think the council chairperson would probably want to have a little more direction when he or she is given instruction — or chooses, I should say, to intervene in a particular dispute debate — to know what kind of mechanism he or she wishes to set up. This seems to me so wide and so flexible that it's in danger of meaning nothing because it apparently means everything. That's my concern.

I see a look of consternation and puzzlement on the minister's face. Fair enough. I apologize: my words were perhaps imprecise. If something means everything, it also tends usually to mean nothing. I think the predicament with "arbitration board" as defined here is that it means everything.

[Mr. Pefton in the chair.]

HON. L. HANSON: I guess I have to say to the member opposite that it says exactly what we intended it to say; it gives that flexibility to the council to use the mechanisms that they see as best. The discretion of the IRC will be used, and the intention here — which is why I said that it says exactly what we meant it to say — is to provide that flexibility to the board in the ability of choosing the single arbitrator, board of arbitration or whatever they see as being the most appropriate.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The second member — the member for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew.

MR. SIHOTA: The only member. It's too bad the member for Columbia River (Mr. Crandall) is not here, because that would obviously invite another comment from me.

Subsection (j) to section 137.1 talks about "an employer named in the Schedule to this Act." The copy of the act that I have doesn't have a schedule to it. Is the minister saying that the complete list is actually from (a) to (i)?

HON. L. HANSON: I think the member is probably referring to a future section of the bill — section 66. That schedule is set out in section 66.

MR. SIHOTA: My apologies to the minister. Indeed it is. I looked at the end of the act and didn't think it would be buried somewhere before that.

MR. CLARK: We're moving right along here, to section 137.2: "Duties and functions of disputes resolution division." I have some specific questions, if I could, regarding section 137.2(2).

This is a new feature. It seems to me, of labour relations, which empowers the chairman to authorize the employment of consultants by special mediators, a public interest inquiry board, a fact-finder or an arbitration board. These appointments may be made at any time during the course of collective bargaining. As I understand it, it means that in each of those areas, which are already unprecedented in terms of the interventionist scope of the legislation, they could then also in turn hire consultants. Is that how it reads to the minister as well?

[Mr. Weisgerber in the chair.]

HON. L. HANSON: Just in opening, I might say that it's not our intention to overlook any solution to a problem. The capacity to employ a consultant isn't seen as an additional power or another level of intervention. We feel it merely gives the authority they may require to hire additional assistants to carry out their responsibilities or duties.

MR. CLARK: Will the consultants be responsible to the chairman or will their immediate responsibility be to the fact finder, the mediator, the public interest board or whoever essentially hires them? I'm just trying to get a sense of the chain of command here.

HON. L. HANSON: They're effectively responsible to who authorized the hiring in the first place. Of course. the minister is ultimately responsible, and certainly the chairman has some responsibilities also, but they are immediately responsible to the people who took the contract or made the appointment.

[4:15]

MR. CLARK: Maybe I can get it clear, then. The chairman can appoint a fact-finder to look into a dispute, and the fact-finder can hire a consultant to assist him. Is that correct? Let me just give you a scenario.

The chairman can appoint a fact-finder to a dispute. Can the fact-finder therefore hire a consultant to help him look into the facts of the dispute? Then does the consultant report to the fact-finder?

HON. L. HANSON: If he is authorized by the chairman, that could be a case. Maybe I could give you a scenario that a fact-finder could, after consultation with the chairman, hire a

[ Page 1774 ]

pension actuary, if that were something that was part of the process that was going on.

MR. LOVICK: Further to that question, it is the case. Is it not, however, that by that particular section the following individuals or groups of individuals are empowered to hire consultants? This is a derivative of my earlier question. A special mediator may hire consultants; a public interest inquiry board may hire consultants; a fact-finder may hire consultants; or an arbitration board may hire consultants. Is that not the case?

HON. L. HANSON: Yes, but I think the member is referring to 137.2(2). Is that correct?

MR. LOVICK: Yes.

HON. L. HANSON: Well, I think it says: "The chairman may authorize a special mediator, a public interest inquiry board, a fact-finder or an arbitration board to employ consultants."

MR. LOVICK: My next question will reveal my ignorance, I'm afraid — and I'm surprised that members opposite aren't leaping up to take advantage of that opening I gave them. The question is whether this particular section, this reliance, apparently — or at least this avenue to employ consultants — represents a departure, a deviation from existing practice. Is this new, or has this always been the case in terms of the Ministry of Labour and its efforts to adjudicate and resolve disputes?

HON. L. HANSON: With some modification. We have had industrial inquiry commissions hire consultants in the past, but certainly with the authorization of the minister.

MR. LOVICK: My question, more precisely, is whether the existing Code, the old Code, had also as part of its mandate, its statutory authority, the stipulated right to employ consultants. Is that the case?

HON. L. HANSON: Sometimes too many conversations are going on at once. But it wasn't stipulated, I guess, before. It had been a practice that was used in a number of cases.

MR. LOVICK: May I assume then that what the minister is saying to me is that this is an effort to rationalize and legitimize a process that was going on before but was not statutorily provided for? Did I misunderstand?

HON. L. HANSON: There certainly is a budget limitation, of course, and I don't think it is through the process of industrial inquiry commissioners. In the past, you know, it was an accepted.... I don't think it was prohibited. There is, as I said, a budgetary one. But I think what we're trying to assure here is that, using good industrial relations practices, the efforts to resolve a dispute shouldn't be hindered if there is assistance required of a consultant with some particular expertise.

MR. LOVICK: I thank the minister for that answer. The reason I focused on this particular section within the bill, 137.2, is that in these days, when the new terminology to conjure with is privatization and all of that, I am just wondering if some persons are not likely to took at this particular section and say: "Aha! What we are looking at is a diminished staff within the Ministry of Labour and a growing army of private consultants." The minister, I hope, is prepared to assure us that that is indeed not the intention of this section.

HON. L. HANSON: I certainly have no difficulty in agreeing with that, because it is not the intention at all. There is no relation to privatization of anything.

MR. LOVICK: One more question. I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that I had not thought, when I first started this line of questioning, that I would have this many questions. But it is fascinating, when one begins to look, to find out how many questions are inevitably engendered.

The next question I would pose is this: could the minister share with us the criteria that might be used in determining who the consultants are? Or is it perhaps a fair conclusion to say that we will hire consultants, but certain people, because of their past record of associating with trade unions or some such thing, need not apply? In other words, can we have some assurances that the Ministry of Labour will be a fair employer, to use that terminology? I won't name individual names.

HON. L. HANSON: The whole purpose of this is to enable the best possible experts, professionals or whatever, depending on what the requirement is, what the purpose is of hiring a consultant.... Certainly it is not limited to management people or legal people or trade.... Quite often, I think, consultants are used who have no relationship to either of those two communities, if you will, because they have some particular expertise that may be required. I don't know what the circumstances are, but I guess if you need an accountant, you would look for an excellent accountant.

MR. GUNO: Mr. Chairman, I have a series of questions to pose to the minister relating to the monitoring part of this section.

I would like to preface my question by saying that on first appearance, a lot of these terms may seem fairly innocuous and rather harmless, but that if you were to put them in the context of the hurly-burly of disputes, then they are fraught with all kinds of ambiguities.

If we were to start from the most basic level, this section establishes as the duty of the division that it is to monitor collective bargaining. If we were to combine that with section 27, which sets out the purposes and objects, then would the minister agree with me that combined with that section and particularly the expeditious resolution of disputes...? Combining that monitoring authority with section 27, would you not agree that at the very least more intervention is possible here than under the old Code?

HON. L. HANSON: No, I don't, because you also have to keep in mind that in order for anyone to help — which is the mandate of the board — or facilitate voluntary collective bargaining, the division must be kept aware of what is going on and the circumstances and so on. So I don't agree with that interpretation. I think the suggestion is that the stating in section 27 of the expeditious resolution of disputes means that getting this information will force them to intervene. But I don't see it as being that. I think that any help or facilitation

[ Page 1775 ]

of settling of disputes should be done from a very knowledgeable background. That's the basic reason under this. "Monitor" means that the division must keep itself informed about what is happening in the world. I don't think that has any relationship to the expeditious resolution of disputes. It's an informational type of thing. We would expect the division to be kept up to date on and aware of everything going on in the labour relations field.

MR. GUNO: But you would agree with me that it is a departure from the old practice of having that particular kind of intervention — arbitration — flow from collective agreements, and not from a third party imposing that kind of intervention. Would you not agree that that particular element has been introduced in this section?

HON. L. HANSON: I guess we can't agree on that point. It used to be part of the Essential Service Disputes Act. But the duty of the division is to know about what's going on in the world. I think the member is suggesting that knowing about that makes them more mandated to intervene, and I don't see that as being a relationship.

MR. GUNO: Well, I won't pursue that, but I think there is the possibility of that intervention.

Given the fact that in B.C. we don't have, I suppose, effective freedom-of-information or protection-of-privacy legislation, I would like to know from the minister exactly what form this public scrutiny, this monitoring process and the controls that will be imposed on it, will take, both in law and administrative practice.

[4:30]

HON. L. HANSON: I think the member is reading something sinister into this. We're not suggesting that the need to know is anything other than to be aware of things happening in the labour relations world. I suppose that if the member's question was what legal limits the need to know is restricted to.... The board will decide what the need to know is. But this is nothing sinister. I don't think it's an invasion of privacy. I think it's very clear what it says: there is a need to know for the DRD.

MR. GUNO: I'm not suggesting anything is sinister, by any means. We're quite curious to know in some detail the form that that kind of monitoring will take, once you establish that particular limit or the need-to-know basis. Just what form will that monitoring take? At what stage will it begin?

HON. L. HANSON: At what stage will it begin? I can't answer that. I think it's as simple as saying that the DRD has heard of some difficulty, and they have a requirement here to monitor all things in the labour relations field. It may be as simple as a phone call, and saying: "Can we be of assistance? Do you have some difficulty?" — that sort of thing.

MR. GUNO: Now we have the sort of minimum basis. But can it go up to the stage where you can have someone actually part of the bargaining process, or at least be there, taking note of the progress of the collective bargaining process?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, Mr. Chairman, I think that the sort of generalized discussions we had on 62 presented a lot of very black and very difficult situations — the forecasting of doom and that sort of thing. I suppose the answer to the member's question is that a mediator could be there, but it certainly would be very difficult for the mediator to be there without the agreement of the parties. Second of all, why would a commission with the mandate of enhancing and helping disputes have a mediator listening to the bargaining that's going on, when in fact if he knew the circumstances it would be a hindrance to reaching a voluntary agreement? So I guess it is possible, but it's very unlikely.

MR. GUNO: Given that there is a possibility that this kind of monitoring can take the form of a simple telephone call, as you suggest, or even the possibility of having someone present to monitor the progress of negotiations, wouldn't you agree that because of the delicate nature of these negotiations, that kind of presence, even if it's a telephone call, would inject a new kind of psychological element in the process?

HON. L. HANSON: I'd have to disagree with the member. It's nothing particularly new. We've been monitoring disputes for a number of years. Again I say to the member opposite that what he's suggesting is that a voluntary solution to a bargaining process would be very difficult to reach with a third party perched there, in effect interfering. I say again that the mandate is not to interfere, it's to enhance. We're talking about professional people in the field of industrial relations, and that sort of interference would be contrary to the mandate of the Industrial Relations Council.

MR. GUNO: This is my last question, but really an observation. When you talk about interference, I think that can take almost a passive form — just being there. The fact that you make a call, the fact that you're sitting there, is a form of interference and would, I suggest, add a different dimension to this whole negotiation process.

MR. CASHORE: Mr. Chairman, I think I represent that great body of British Columbians that the government likes to refer to as the third party. I certainly don't have a background in labour relations, so my questions are coming more from the perspective of a learner. Under duties and functions, 137.2(b) says: "to provide assistance to employers...." I would like the minister to give me about two examples of what assistance would look like — the first two examples that come to your mind. Just give me two things that you would see happening which you would call assistance.

HON. L. HANSON: Section 2(b) reads: "to provide assistance to employers and bargaining agents" in both cases, or at least in both.... It's a generalized information sort of a thing in a neutral fashion. Again I underline "to facilitate the making or renewing of collective agreements" on a voluntary basis, but it's a general kind of information that may be required.

MR. CASHORE: I'd like to thank the minister, although I was hoping that I would hear something much more specific than that — something that would be informative with regard to the actual kind of activity that would be taking place. For instance, would this mean that a monitor or a fact-finder would be sitting down with an employer or a bargaining agent and advising them with regard to how to proceed? Or if it

[ Page 1776 ]

wouldn't mean that, would it mean that just generally they would be there to be helpful, but you don't have anything more specific than that? The minister is shaking his head....

HON. L. HANSON: I think what the member is asking is: would somebody be providing assistance to the employer and not to the bargaining agent or vice versa? I would point out to the member (c): "to gather and publish information and statistics respecting labour relations, employment and collective bargaining in the province." That assistance may be part of some information that is required, readily available to everyone.

MR. CASHORE: I find that answer somewhat more helpful, although I wouldn't want to think that the minister was reading anything sinister into my comments. It does raise the question with regard to employers and bargaining agents as to whether or not there are quantitative or qualitative differences in the kinds of help that would be provided.

Sometimes help, again, is in the context of the helping hand that strikes again. I don't think anybody, either employers or bargaining agents, management or labour, are seeking that kind of help, which seems to be the kind of help that this section typifies and which is typical of the entire act. I'd like to go on and ask a question that follows along with the line of questioning of the second member for Nanaimo.

When we look at the duties of the division, there is quite a list of duties here. There is monitoring, there is providing assistance to employers and bargaining agents. We have facilitating the making or renewing of collective agreements. Then we have gathering and publishing information and gathering and publishing statistics. We have the administration of mediation services. We have the carrying out of the functions. We have a chairman who may authorize a special mediator or public interest inquiry board, fact-finder or an arbitration board to employ consultants.

It seems to me that there is a wide range there of possibilities — just to be more specific — with regard to employing consultants. I would think that, based on the statistical information that we have from years gone by with regard to the commission and, indeed, the ministry, there would be sufficient data there to enable the minister to give us some idea of what kind of cost we're looking at here. What kinds of moneys are going to have to be budgeted to enable this hiring? I'm interested in whether this hiring is the hiring of people who are on annual salary or whether they're on fee for-service. I think I heard you refer to contracting a few moments ago, and you may have been referring to this part here. Would you give us the benefit of your projections with regard to how much this process is going to cost and, to be really specific, especially with regard to clause (2) of section 137.2? What is that going to cost in terms of the ministry's projections? I am sure in drafting this legislation you have developed some sort of an idea of the frequency whereby some of these services might be called for.

I realize you can't be specific, and I'm not expecting you to be, because my hunch is that in a moment the minister will stand up, with all due respect, and say: "Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, but the member is asking me to be specific and I am sure he will appreciate I can't be specific." So I'm not asking the minister to be specific, but a lot of students are going through their exams today, and sometimes they have multiple choice, so here's a multiple choice: is this going to cost up to $100,000 a year; between $100,000 and $1 million; or is it going to cost over $1 million; and let's make a fourth choice of, say, over $500 million. Put it in one of those categories, please.

[4:45]

HON. L. HANSON: That was quite a question. I think that I should first of all point out that "the chairman may authorize a special mediator, a public interest inquiry board, a fact-finder or an arbitration board to employ consultants." The costs of those consultants will certainly depend on the consultant who is required. The member knows very well that I can pick a figure out of the air, he can pick a figure out of the air, and then we can both toss a coin at the end of the year and see how close each is. I think the member and the members in the opposition would totally agree that any consultant who would be helpful and.... Being responsible people that the chairman would deem to be helpful in the particular circumstances where they're being appointed...would certainly justify that expense if it arrived at a collective agreement. The member very well knows that I can't say $1 million, $2 million or $3 million, or $150,000. But the amount spent will be the amount necessary to do the job, and do it properly.

MR. CASHORE: I must say that I find that answer quite disturbing. If I understand correctly what the minister said, it was: "Well, the member well knows that we can't predict...." But if the minister is not able to predict in some way what he might expect to be the case, especially under 137.2(2), one then has to wonder why the clause was put in there in the first place. If it is something that is so nebulous, so unpredictable, that there's really no way, on the basis of the experience that has happened in the past, which is supposed to be the reason for bringing forward this legislation.... It becomes very, very disturbing to realize that the minister, who is introducing this legislation, doesn't really have a ballpark guess as to what this would quite likely cost.

I don't think it's a question, Mr. Chairman, of the minister making one guess, the member opposite making another guess, and then finding out sometime who was right or who was closest. We're not playing a game here. What we're doing is assuming that we're dealing with a piece of proposed legislation that this government takes very seriously. How serious can we assume this legislation is, and this particular part of it, if this minister has no ballpark guess based on previous experience with regard to the extent to which section 137.2(2) specifically might be used? I find that very disturbing.

HON. L. HANSON: I don't know whether this is a fair question or not, because the member wasn't here, but I would doubt very much that when the '73 Code was introduced there was an estimate on the cost of, or how much was needed for, the industrial inquiry commissions. You know, we provide a number of services in the province of British Columbia that are driven by the need for those services, and there are always budgets. But we believe this is such an important aspect of industrial relations in British Columbia that there is a good and justifiable reason for providing the reasonable funding that's needed to make it work.

MR. CLARK: I just have one question, then I think we can move on to the next section.

[ Page 1777 ]

In terms of the consultants, the minister is explaining that it's meant, I guess, mostly for technical things — pension actuaries, I assume, and those kinds of things. Will those reports of the consultants be available to all the parties in the dispute or in the issue? In other words, will they be made available to the union, to the company and to the mediator, fact-finder or whoever commissioned it, or will they be private reports that go directly to the body that hired the consultant?

HON. L. HANSON: I suppose that the consultant who's hired would report to the person or group or whoever hired him, would he not? That would be very logical, and that's, I assure you, what the case is. Whether that consultant's information, depending on what it was, would be a help to the resolution of whatever the issue is that they're dealing with.... They would make that determination. Because again, the mandate is to help and to facilitate reaching an agreement.

MR. GABELMANN: I want to deal with the whole question of mediation, which starts in section 137.2 and moves into 137.3.

The philosophical decision that was made by the government to move mediation services from the government to the board or the council is one that I think on balance, in the normal course of events, would be a good decision. There is some real argument for a labour board — whatever you call it — which has the confidence of the parties to in fact have responsibility for the mediation services as well, to get it out and remove it a bit from the political arena. I think there is some real value in that.

However, I must say that given the nature of the powers of the board and given all that we have been talking about in terms of this section, I worry about the ability of the mediation officers appointed by this particular council to have any credibility in doing their job. I worry also about how long it will be in each case before these mediation officers have worn out their welcome and will be unable to carry out their tasks, given the kinds of things that they may well end up involved in, including recommending settlements and all that kind of activity.

[Mrs. Gran in the chair.]

I think once your mediation officers get themselves involved in arbitration and in compulsion, they lose an ability to continue effectively as mediation officers. It is a good thing, I guess, that the legislation allows for the retaining of private sector mediation services, so that the Clive McKees of the world.... There are a number of them out there; I guess for a while Vince Ready was in that position, but not now. Given the nature of this particular section, and given the nature of the responsibilities of the council which allow for so much compulsion, I don't think the mediation officers are going to be able to do their job. In a few years most of them won't be welcome in most disputes, and that's too bad, because I think a professional, highly competent mediation services branch, wherever it works, whether in the ministry or at the board level, is really important. We need to upgrade those services, and that is not a negative comment on persons now employed in that area. In the really tough disputes, we almost always have to rely on outside people to come in and act in a mediation role. That is going to accelerate now, as a result of these mediation officers being tied into this process that Ed Peck will be administering.

So I just want to say that in principle the idea of removing it, of upgrading the service and of making it a highly professional relevant body of people, is sound, and I would support it. But given the context in which this group of people is going to have to work, it just won't work. There's no doubt whatsoever in my mind that these people will be burned and will not be welcomed, and the whole effort to establish a respected mediation branch will be out the window, and that is too bad.

I want to deal just with a couple of parts of 137.3. Given what I have just finished saying, the authority of the chairman of the labour board — I will use that term, and I mean it to be council or LRB or whatever happens to be current — to appoint mediation officers is appropriate. But given all of the range of options that the commissioner will have.... Or the chairman working for the commissioner; I recognize this is going to be the chairman of the separate body. It's not the disputes.... It's a separate arm of the council — I understand all of that — but reporting to the commissioner. The fact that the commissioner is there over it all will mean that even if those chairman's appointments could be trusted, they won't be trusted because of that context. I guess that is the only point I want to make there. We would accept, I think, the idea that the chairman make those appointments, but not when the chairman is working for an agency that is able to go the next step and lead into various kinds of compulsion.

I am a bit worried about.... The final words of subsection (4) on page 20 of the consolidated bill are: "...and such other information as the mediation officer considers relevant to the collective bargaining between the parties." This is pretty wide language.

This isn't the worst thing in here; I want to make that point quickly. I don't want us to stall on this. But it's very wide latitude to a mediation officer in reporting out in terms of the dispute. Why access there to report all kinds of extraneous matters which may well have been front and centre during some of the meetings that the mediation officer attended, and he got so wrapped up in it that he ends up putting in subjective information about how he feels about certain people's role and behaviour. and on and on? I'm not sure that's useful to the eventual resolution of a dispute through collective bargaining.

The next section, number (5), gives the mediation officer the opportunity to include recommended terms of settlement. That is power that no mediation officer really wants, unless both parties come to him in a sort of med-arb manner. This is more than med-arb, as I read it, because either party can request the chairman to direct that, in effect, the mediation officer come in with the proposed language. If I'm reading that correctly, I don't think it's going to do very much for the longevity of the mediation officers. If they allow themselves to get caught up in that kind of thing — in a situation where both parties are not fully in agreement that that's what should happen.

[5:00]

This number (6) is really, again, the language that one wonders about. "Parties conferring with the mediation officer under this section shall provide such information concerning their collective bargaining as the mediation officer requests." That can be wide open. That can be strategies, information — and it cuts both ways — that employers feel is their business and no business whatsoever of any public

[ Page 1778 ]

servant. It seems to me to be too wide open. It's yet another illustration, I think, of the way the legislation was written: it was written to catch everything. Rather than to focus on what the objective was and be precise about it, the language is written in a way that allows for wide-open opportunity to do almost anything. I think that's a mistake, and it's particularly a mistake in sections dealing with mediation, which is such a tricky business requiring skilled people.

Taken together, what this whole section of the bill does, and what this particular subsection does, is in effect to make it impossible over the long haul for these mediation officers to be successful. That's a shame, because they are very important players in helping to reach settlements freely and without compulsion.

MR. LOVICK: Just as my colleague the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) has concerns about the mediation services section of Bill 19, so do 1. What I want to do is refer to some particular items in this section as they are numbered, dare I say — in order — and outline my concerns.

First of all, I think it's important that we all recognize precisely what that first statement says: "Where notice has been given to commence collective bargaining between a trade union and an employer...the chairman may appoint a mediation officer." What we're in fact saying is that once the collective bargaining process begins, the chairperson of the commission can appoint a mediation officer, with no grounds, no need and no demonstrated purpose in doing so.

The phrase has been used here on a number of occasions in the last hour about sinister purposes, and I would again emphasize that I am not for a moment wanting to suggest there are sinister purposes emanating from the other side of the House, I do want to suggest, however, that in the labour/management climate we have in the province of British Columbia today, that kind of declaration as the opening section of a mediation section of a labour relations bill is guaranteed to be perceived as a means whereby the government will once more interfere in the normal collective bargaining procedure. It is, in short, wide open. It says, in effect, that a mediation officer could come into a debate on its first day. The moment we say that collective bargaining will cease, or request the parties to commence collective bargaining, we could appoint a mediation officer. Again I'm suggesting, Madam Chairman, that that kind of power, that kind of discretionary ability on the part of the commissioner, is too much ability and power. It's 0 clause, I suspect, Mr. Minister, that's going to return to haunt your government. I suspect that we will indeed hear a number of expressions of anguish and concern about precisely that single section, which, I grant you, on the face of it appears to be innocuous enough.

That's the first part. Section 137.3(2) — again, one wonders why. This is a new section that says, in contradistinction to the old Code: "A person appointed as a mediation officer need not be an employee of the council." Aha! will argue the critics, yet another manifestation of the privatization impulse. Just as I said some minutes ago, Mr. Chairman — or Madam Chairman; I'm going to keep doing that, I'm sure, until you reprimand me specifically — about the section that said that each of those bodies created by this bill has the power, given the commissioner's approval, to hire private consultants, so too, it would seem, we have effectively made, almost as a matter of course, the same remedy available here. I'm not entirely sure why we need to be this specific and say that a mediation officer can be anybody that the commissioner chooses to appoint. Given the climate of suspicion, misunderstanding, frustration and everything else in which we are now living, I would not be at all surprised to discover that a whole bunch of individuals look at this particular section and say: "Aha! This may well be a way to reward one's friends."

HON. MR. REID: Oh, come on!

MR. LOVICK: I see the Minister of Tourism is demonstrating signs of being alert and aware, and I'm delighted to note that.

The point I'm making is simply that this particular section of the bill makes it possible for the commissioner, whose powers are, as we know, already immense, to also reward his or her friends, and those kinds of contracts — let me remind the Minister of Labour — are very lucrative. It's a very good business to be in, consulting in industrial relations. It has a higher charge-out fee, I think, than any lawyer makes. So it's a very attractive prospect, and again, as I suggest, given the climate we are now in, given the suspicions that people have, the minister will be pilloried for precisely that section, though it may well be innocent.

HON. MR. REID: Trust us.

MR. LOVICK: I hear the Minister of Tourism saying,"Trust us," with a certain passion. I am sorely tempted to respond in an indelicate way, but I will resist the temptation and carry on looking at sub (3). It's important to recognize that this ostensibly innocuous little bit of material provided in 137.3(3) also represents a significant, indeed dramatic, change from the status quo, because the preconditions have been changed. Under the old legislation the old criterion was that the minister believed the appointment was "likely to contribute to more harmonious industrial relations between the parties." That was the old system.

Interjections.

MR. LOVICK: I'm delighted to hear members opposite applauding and saying,"Isn't that good," because that was precisely the point I was about to make: the old one was good. The new criterion, however, is as follows: "....to facilitate the making of a collective agreement...."

HON. MR. RICHMOND: That sounds even better than the old one.

MR. LOVICK: I cannot believe that individuals opposite have such a superficial analysis of the difference between those two statements. Let me try to elucidate for you. The first one says we are geared and committed above all else to providing some kind of harmonious labour relations environment. The second one says to simply get a collective agreement. The second one, I would hasten to point out, because it isn't excluded, means: by hook or by crook, by intimidation or by coercion or by exhaustion, or by whatever means we so choose. If you don't say it doesn't do that, then it does, as members opposite well know, The problem is, it says quite simply: "Give us a collective agreement." That's what is at issue, and nothing else. I'm suggesting to you that the road to getting a collective agreement can indeed be rocky, can

[ Page 1779 ]

indeed be perilous, can indeed be one in which one or both of the parties feels aggrieved and injured, and frequently with justification.

Again, what we've done here is change the conditions. It's a substantive, significant amendment. It's a new precondition. And I suggest it's a precondition that amounts, frankly, to a retrograde step. It's a mistake.

Let me look at number (4). Fascinating! The predicament in number (4), however, is that it does indeed appear to be the case that the mediation officer is required to report, even if a dispute is resolved. If you look closely at the language, what you see is: there is no cap; there is no limitation. In short, then, it appears that the mediation officer has to report, even if on the second day of the negotiation between the two parties they say: "Right, we've resolved our differences; there's no dispute here. Thank you very much. It was a lovely time, took forward to seeing you at the end of the next contract." Even if that happens, according to this language — certainly as I read it, and others have examined it — the mediation officer still has to make a report. Why? What an expense! What a waste of time, energy and expertise!

I don't have anything to say about subsection (5) — I'm expecting cheers from opposite.

Interjection.

MR. LOVICK: I do that, I must admit, simply to give the second member for Kamloops (Mr. S.D. Smith) an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that he was in the House this day.

Subsection (6) is what I want to touch on.

Interjections.

MR. LOVICK: I'm not vicious. That was in good humour.

Subsection (6) we have some difficulty with also, as my colleague the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) pointed out so effectively. The predicament, again, is simply that the language, frankly, is too enabling, too loose. It allows room to manoeuvre that is greater than we think there is a case for. It apparently is suggesting that the mediation officer can ask for almost anything that she or he requests, and be empowered to get it. That is, the parties in the dispute can be told: "You must give whatever the mediation officer asks for; anything remotely tangentially connected to the heading "collective bargaining."' We're suggesting that that too is too loose. That provides powers and provides an authority and a discretionary ability beyond which the circumstances require.

So we have those concerns, then, about section 137.3. I hope that the minister and his officials will give some thought to the points I raised there, and will perhaps be able to demonstrate to me how I err in my reading of this particular section; or they will, rather, as I expect, conclude that yes, indeed, we're absolutely right, and they will hasten to make the necessary and appropriate amendments.

MR. SIHOTA: I want to talk about 137.4, unless someone else on the other side wants to talk about 137.3.

Section 137.4 is one that struck me as being somewhat peculiar, in that it talks about the commissioner informing the minister about threatened disputes, if I read subsection (2) correctly. I'm not sure why the minister would want to put in that provision. Maybe he could explain, before I talk, why he'd want to be informed about strikes or industrial disputes that may be threatened as opposed to ones that are occurring.

HON. L. HANSON: I find it interesting that that question would be asked. It would appear to me that the minister should always be informed of potential and actual disputes that are going on in the industrial relations world. That is not to say that there is going to be a reaction to that, but certainly it is a responsibility of the ministry to keep informed in that sense.

I just wanted to make one comment to the second member for Nanaimo (Mr. Lovick) about the suggestion that the appointment of special mediators, which I believe is what he was referring to, may allow for friendliness to take over from practicality. I would suggest to the member for Nanaimo that the subject of industrial relations as it relates to British Columbia, its future and its economic development is so important that the sort of suggestion that he was making is very difficult to even comprehend or think of.

[5:15]

I am not sure that it was a really serious suggestion, but there was some discussion going on to the effect of the quality of our present mediators. I am sure that the members opposite would acknowledge that the mediators currently working out of the Ministry of Labour have an excellent reputation and are accepted with that reputation. I know that the remark was made in the sense that some of the new sections in here may make it difficult for mediators to keep a high degree of respect. I don't agree with that, by the way, but I did just want to point that out and ensure that there is no question that this House does not respect those people who are currently in the mediation services.

MR. ROSE: I don't mean to intrude for very long, but I didn't really feel that we got an answer to the member for Nanaimo's question about whether or not a mediator was required to report even though there might have been a resolution of the question. The nature of that report and what it would be like.... Is it simply a matter of saying to the chairman: "The thing is completed; the matter is resolved"? Is it as simple as that, or does the minister have in mind in this section a more elaborate document or a more elaborate structure?

HON. L. HANSON: No. Again, there is nothing mysterious about that. I think that anyone who is hired or who has a responsibility as a mediator would report to those people who gave him his instructions, and that report might be as simple as: "It's settled."

MR. CASHORE: I just want to make a comment with regard to the dialogue that resulted from the question asked by the member for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew (Mr. Sihota). It had to do with the term "threatened."

I just want to say that what really bothers me about this.... I understand the minister's answer was that he would think it was the responsibility of any minister of the Crown to be aware of things that are threatened. Well, that may be how some ministers perceive their responsibility, but what really bothers me about this is that the minister would feel that this needs to be ensconced in wording in this legislation. I find this extremely upsetting, and it seems to me that

[ Page 1780 ]

what results from doing this unnecessary thing is participation in the very thing that the minister wishes to avoid. which is to be threatening.

MR. SIHOTA: If the minister is going to answer, I'll bow to the minister. No?

Look, the point is this: I don't know how much we're paying this commissioner — you and I and all the other taxpayers in this province — a day. It's $108,000 a year divided by 365 days; he only works 250 of those 365. We're hiring this person to keep a press-clipping service to tell us about when strikes or lockouts are threatened.

Someone else made a comment about legal fees, so I won't talk about hourly rates charged by lawyers. But it's incredible that we're actually paying somebody to inform the government of strikes or lockouts that are threatened when it seems to me that the government has got the ability in this huge apparatus to keep itself informed as to strikes or lockouts that are threatened. I'm not trying to be frivolous about the question. I just don't quite understand why we would want to hire someone at $108,000 a year to tell the government of strikes or lockouts that are threatened or even, for that matter, occur.

I'm not debating the first section of 137.4, but maybe I should, because the government has eliminated the 28-day provision in there and has now basically set up a condition whereby it becomes, the moment a strike or lockout is threatened, I guess, to use the language of the section.... Every time a strike or lockout is threatened, the government automatically becomes a part of the process. With the elimination of the 28-day provision that was originally incorporated in the legislation, you've now allowed yourself to become a part of every industrial dispute, whether it has occurred or is threatened, as I understand it.

No, I'm sorry, it doesn't apply to the threatened one. I apologize. The opening line is "where a strike or lockout has commenced."

The point still remains that the moment one of these disputes has commenced, why would the government want to become a party to it at that point and have all of this apparatus available to intervene and intrude, as I said in an earlier speech which I won't repeat? It makes no sense at all. Perhaps the minister could justify why we're paying someone $108,000 a year to look at strikes that are threatened and why, philosophically — if the minister cares to answer — the government would want to become a party to any strike or lockout immediately upon its commencement. It doesn't make any sense whatsoever to me.

HON. L. HANSON: In response to the previous speaker, I think he's reading into the word "threatened" some sort of dire thing happening. I think it very well expresses the situation that there's a requirement that the Ministry of Labour be kept informed of what is going on in the labour relations world as it relates to strikes and lockouts and possible ones happening. To interpret that as suggesting that we're a party to the dispute, or that we're immediately going to become involved in the dispute is.... I would suggest that just by the simple title of the Ministry of Labour, we're involved in disputes in British Columbia as they go on, maybe not in a direct manner. To suggest that because of that wording it is a duty of the commissioner to keep the minister informed, that we have a $108,000 messenger there.... I think the member very well realizes that it's a responsibility to ensure that the minister is kept informed. But to suggest that one particular person — and that's the commissioner — who is going to do that....

I think the commissioner is going to ensure that the minister is kept informed, and he may use a number of methods for doing that. But I assure you that the commissioner has a lot of responsibilities, one of which is to keep the minister informed. I'm surprised that that would be a matter of concern to the members of the opposition.

MR. CASHORE: Just one question following along on the explanation that the minister gave to my part of this question with regard to the term "threatened." I guess I can get at it another way by saying: instead of a word like "threatened," why wouldn't you use a word like "considered"?

HON. L. HANSON: I think this word says exactly what we're intending it to say; that is, we want to keep the minister informed. It is the duty of the commissioner to keep the minister informed of strikes or lockouts that occur or are threatened. I think the member knows very well what that says. I think he understands that it is not a threat to any of the parties involved or anything. It is simply suggesting that if strikes or lockouts are a possibility, then I should be kept informed. I don't see anything sinister about the word "threat."

MR. CLARK: Moving right along to 137.5, this deals with the imposition of a first collective agreement, should either party deal with it.

I have had some experience with the section under the Labour Code, and my experience has not been very good in terms of trying to get intervention in this case; in other words, trying to get a collective agreement imposed on an employer.

Personally, I have been involved in a number of cases where, through what I perceive to be deliberate manipulation, employers have failed to negotiate a first collective agreement and therefore thwarted the wishes of the majority, and in fact ended up with all employees losing their jobs. I don't know the up-to-date numbers, but I think there have only been half a dozen first contracts imposed in the history of the Labour Relations Board.

You may have those numbers there, but it is very few. The way I read this section, it seems to me that it strengthens that section to enable the council to intervene more readily to impose a first collective agreement. There are a number of changes that lead me to believe that. So I would like the minister's philosophy when it comes to first collective agreements, and some explanation of the reason why this section 1s significantly changed from the previous Labour Code.

HON. L. HANSON: As a matter of interest, my information is that it has been used very infrequently. I think since it was introduced in the 1973 Code, it has been used about 12 times.

But we feel that it does have some potential value. We believe it has some potential in defusing potentially serious first agreement conflicts. With that in mind, we felt that we should retain that feature in this new act.

MR. CLARK: I won't belabour the point, but this seems to be more than simply retaining the feature of the old Code. This is a strengthening of it, so it seems to me — maybe the

[ Page 1781 ]

minister could confirm this — that it's in all likelihood the intent of the minister to see slightly more first contracts imposed, in order to expedite collective bargaining and mitigate against the adverse effects the minister just alluded to. Is that a fair interpretation?

[5:30]

HON. L. HANSON: We have provided some revision because of experience we've gained from 1973 to 1987 — 14 years. We see it as a section that under some circumstances may have some application for the benefit of strength.

MS. A. HAGEN: I would like to pursue this "first collective agreement," particularly clause (5) of 137.5. Just so that I have the minister in tune with the sections I want to refer to, I want to go ahead to the next clause as well, because that deals with the terms and conditions under which this particular council-appointed group would act in order to move toward a first collective agreement; and that particular clause also refers to 137.96, which has to do with the ability-to-pay argument and a number of factors related to that. I'd like to ask the minister, first, whether the intent of this particular clause, sub (5), is.... When that sub refers to section 137.96, and says that it applies, could you explain what applies? Is it the whole clause that applies? Is it the ability-to pay aspect of it? Or are all aspects of clause 137.96 to be brought into operation if this happens to be a public sector employer, and the dispute has gone to a panel under this section?

There are a number of aspects to that. There is the ability to-pay argument, there is final offer, and there is the possibility, under sub (9) of that later clause, for there to be a review of an arbitration board's decision, and so on. I'm trying to have some sense of the application of 137.96 if it comes into play, as is suggested in sub (5) of the clause we're discussing.

The minister is looking a little puzzled. I'm certainly prepared, if he has a question to come back to me, to try to clarify my question as well.

HON. L. HANSON: I guess you're talking about.... Where a party to a dispute is referred to — and this is a public sector employer — a panel under this section, 137.96 applies. It really refers to the factors that should be considered when there is the imposition of the first collective agreement. There are five factors: a comparison of overall terms; a need to maintain an appropriate relationship between occupations; the skill, effort and responsibility; the cost and impact of the parties; and other factors. Also, "Where the ability to pay of the public sector employer is in issue, then, notwithstanding...." So it does have, in the case of an imposed settlement under the first collective agreement, the implications of these factors considered when the solution is brought forward.

MS. A. HAGEN: We've looked at those particular factors which are first stated in 137.96, and 137.96 actually has a number of other clauses that relate to an arbitration. Would any of those other factors apply if we are dealing with this particular first collective agreement that is now with the public sector employer being covered? The final-offer issue, for example, is something that I think is included in 137.96.

In subsection (9), where it is shown to the satisfaction of an arbitration board — here it's named as an arbitration board — that the board has failed to deal with the matter in dispute or an error has been made, there is a process for that decision to be reviewed. What I'm trying to get at here is the extent to which 137.96 does apply. Is it all of it, or is it only those factors that relate to the public sector general guidelines in dealing with the dispute?

HON. L. HANSON: I would suggest to the member that it depends on the circumstances of the case that is going on, but it could be part of it or it could be all of it that would be applied.

MS. A. HAGEN: Then the other question that I want to raise here — and perhaps the minister can deal with this — is about the relationship between the particular group that's trying to achieve a first agreement and other comparable agreements that exist in that industry. We have the ability-to pay argument clearly stated in 137.96: the arbitrator is not able to offer a settlement beyond the ability to pay. In the terms and conditions that go with this first collective agreement, 137.6(i)(b) notes that "terms and conditions of employment negotiated through collective bargaining for comparable employees performing the same or similar functions in the same or related circumstances" will be one of the factors that this panel would take into consideration.

I am hoping that the minister will be able to interpret for me, better than I am able to interpret reading back and forth between these clauses, whether there is total consistency between that clause in 137.6 that I have just read and 137.96. Is there any inconsistency there in dealing with the kind of settlement that could be reached for parties in a collective agreement?

Perhaps the minister will remember that on Friday one of the issues that I raised was the issue of some of the inconsistencies that exist in the health field with various sectors. We have people working in the home support programs and in care facilities, and there is quite a range of salaries paid within that industry. Some of that range has a pretty clear relationship to whether the workers in particular operations are unionized or not — whether they have a collective agreement or not.

What I am trying to get at here is what kind of levellers there may be in these clauses dealing with first collective agreements that come out of the ability to pay, and how much latitude the panel would have in attempting to look at industry's standards here as they sort out what that first collective agreement will be. The issues in those disputes nearly always do relate to equal pay for work of equal value, some sort of pay equity in the industry. It could be dealing with a care home where the workers are not under a collective agreement and where their rates of pay will be very much lower than comparable operations where there is a collective agreement.

I want to know what latitude the panel is going to have to deal with some kind of an industry standard in the context of these clauses. As I say, I'm looking to the minister to give me some reassurance that in imposing that first collective agreement, the ability-to-pay argument won't be a leveller that will prevent those workers from getting to a reasonable industry standard in the rate of pay that may be agreed to by this panel and recommended, as they consider what particular terms of a collective agreement they will be prepared to recommend.

HON. L. HANSON: I think the question that the member is giving me.... I would point out that in settling terms and

[ Page 1782 ]

conditions under a first agreement — which is where we started — "a panel shall give the parties an opportunity to present evidence and make representations, and may take into account, among other things...." There are a couple of subsections here. I think the basic question that the member was asking me is: will the ability to pay take precedence over what is happening in the industry, if you will?

First of all, we're talking about the public sector only, and the way it's written, I don't see that the ability to pay is the.... "Where the ability to pay of the public sector employer is in issue, then, notwithstanding subsection (1)" — which is all of this — "the ability of the public sector employer to pay shall be the paramount factor." I think that's fairly clear and simple, but it certainly doesn't mean that it's an exclusive factor. The other considerations are "to maintain an appropriate relationship between occupations or classifications within the employer's employment," and the skill and effort and other things. But certainly the ability to pay in the public sector shall be a paramount factor; in other words, a very important one.

MS. A. HAGEN: If I hear the minister correctly, he seems to be saying that although those other factors will be taken into consideration, the ability-to-pay argument is the paramount argument. I would note that although we are in many instances talking about private sector care facilities.... I'm not sure I can refer to it specifically, but I know that that will be included in the list of those particular organizations sectors. The community licensing care facility is among those, and that's the reason I've chosen that example specifically: because they have been encompassed in that public sector. So we are talking about an example that I think does pertain.

Let me ask it again, if I may, Madam Chairman. The minister is indicating that in this first collective agreement, notwithstanding that the terms and conditions do instruct the panel to take into consideration the terms and conditions of employment of comparable employees performing the same or similar functions, the ability-to-pay argument is paramount.

HON. L. HANSON: I think it's very clearly stated that it is a paramount factor. But I'd also point out, in the wording where that is in issue.... If this is only in the case of arbitrary collective agreements, in the case of the first collective agreement, where one is being ordered, I have to agree with the member that that is a consideration.

MS. A. HAGEN: Let me just pursue this with one further example or question. I think on Friday there was some discussion about a very lengthy dispute which occurred in a private nursing facility. It went on, I think, for about six months. It would be a dispute, as the second member for Vancouver noted, that, under this new process, might very well have come under this kind of panel.

The issue in that dispute was a very major pay discrepancy between the women who worked in that centre and people who worked in exactly the same kind of centres and facilities where a collective agreement pertained. Is it the view of the minister that the panel that might be functioning under 137.5 would be required under the terms of this whole section, including the ability-to-pay argument, to give to that particular ability-to-pay requirement such emphasis that those people would be prevented from achieving pay equity with other people in their sector? Would that be the outcome of the panel's decision, acting according to the terms of this particular clause? All parts of it may affect their carrying out of their duties as a panel to achieve a first collective agreement. Is it possible that those people working in that sector could, in fact, be kept in a wage ghetto as a result of the clauses that we're talking about in this discussion?

[5:45]

HON. L. HANSON: I certainly think that's highly unlikely. Again, one of the paramount considerations in the public sector in an enforced settlement is the ability to pay, and it should be a paramount factor with other things being considered, but it will be a major factor if it is in issue. What the member is suggesting is, in my opinion, most unlikely to happen. I suppose it is a very remote possibility, but I just can't see that happening, because you have to remember that it's only in the cases where there is enforced settlement, not in the cases where there is voluntary agreement or not enforced settlement.

MS. A. HAGEN: The reason I raise this particular case is that under the new section 137.5, the likelihood of there being a panel appointed seems to me reasonably high. I know we can only hypothesize with this; we can't know. But this dispute involved the care of elderly. It involved the bringing in of scabs. There were a whole range of issues that might have perhaps caused those people to have their strike defeated long before it was, because of terms and conditions that limit secondary boycotting and a whole range of allied resources that they were able to bring to bear. But even assuming that they were not defeated in that and the strike had gone on....

I'm hearing two things from the minister in terms of the likely outcome. I want to ask him again: if this kind of dispute got to a panel and the ability to pay is paramount, hypothetically, why does he think it highly unlikely that there would not be this outcome that kept those wages suppressed? Are there other things in this legislation that are equal in importance to the ability to pay? Is that panel going to have sufficient latitude as it looks at the clauses that govern the way in which it can impose a first agreement? I don't understand why the minister said, on the one hand, the ability to pay is paramount, and on the other hand that he thinks it is highly unlikely that the outcome of the imposition of this first agreement would be at a wage level that stayed below the industry standard.

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, I think I mentioned earlier that in 14 years there have been 12 cases of the imposition of a first contract. The particular section that the member is talking about is the health care section of public sector employers. The member is suggesting that there will be imposed settlements on that sector as a result of this. There have been cases, and I think another member referred earlier to having had some difficulty in trying to get an imposed settlement in a first collective agreement some years ago. It will be a decision of the IRC whether there will be, in the case of a first collective agreement, an imposed settlement.

But to suggest that there is always going to be an imposed settlement is, I think, wrong. There may be a number of cases where in fact, depending on the circumstances, the essential services are designated, and there is a labour disruption. So that is why my reference was to the fact that I think it is a

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remote possibility. But there is no question that the way the act is written, a consideration in imposed settlements, if it is an issue, has to be the ability to pay.

MR. SIHOTA: Just following the discussion between the minister and the member for New Westminster (Ms. A. Hagen), it seems to me that it will indeed be for those cases. The minister is quite correct that we are only talking about situations where there might be the imposition of an agreement. It seems to me that it will be quite difficult for anybody to conclude an agreement, given the language of 137.96, which, I guess, we will save until then — except that ability to pay always conjures up strange comments in my mind.

If I was a rather wealthy employer able to pay all sorts of money, am I expected to pay more than the going rate? Under the provisions of this act, one would be restricted to looking at conditions of employment in similar occupations in the relevant community in the province. We'll talk a little bit more about that when we get to 137.96.

I think the point is that.... It seems to me that if you go through a rather contentious certification process in which there is a lot of dispute and hostility, a lot of intervention on the part of the employer, a lot of attempting on the part of the employer to encourage people to not unionize, a rather contested certification process, and then at the end of the day you do have certification, despite all of the other comments that I've made about this legislation as we worked our way through it, you still have to conclude a first agreement. If one of the guiding principles of the union was pay equity, it seems to me that the employer would dig in his or her heels on that issue, and given the wording of 137.96, it would be very difficult, it seems to me, to conclude an agreement that would have pay equity as a central feature, unless and until, of course, there were other similar pay equity agreements elsewhere in the province. But that would seem to me to be a little bit difficult, because in cases of intervention 137.96 invites one to look at other agreements; and if that was the stickler, you could get yourself into a box and a bit of a catch-22. So I'm not convinced that at the end of the day it would be easy, in the case of first contracts, to conclude a pay equity agreement, and I think that's regrettable.

I think we begin to see a movement in society towards a call for pay equity. I was interested to read in, I believe it was, today's Globe and Mail that Ontario — and I haven't looked at the legislation — has introduced legislation which tries to move towards pay equity. I don't know how progressive the legislation is, and I guess that's another issue, given the fact that they're ready to move into an election. I don't even know if it's going to be legislation that's going to be proclaimed. Other jurisdictions are moving in this direction, and in this legislation, in my view, we see ourselves moving in almost an opposite direction when it comes to encouraging, as a matter of public policy, pay equity programs in the province.

MR. JANSEN: Cheer up.

MR. SIHOTA: I'm sorry if I.... The member for Chilliwack wants me to cheer up. I guess I'm being overly serious today — instead of behaviour that members on the other side may have become more accustomed to. But perhaps I'm in a more academic mood today than there would otherwise be. I hate to disappoint the member for Chilliwack, but I'll be here tomorrow, and I hope he will be too, and maybe when we get to 137.7, we'll pick up.

Now that he's gotten me off to the side, and I notice the Speaker is in the House, I just want to wrap up on this point. It seems to me that it will indeed be difficult to conclude a pay equity agreement on a first contract. Perhaps we will leave it at that and deal with the larger matter of pay equity when we get to 137.96.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

The committee. having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. Mr. Strachan moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 5:56 p.m.