[ Page 1429 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Oral Questions

Cabinet minister's remarks. Mr. Gabelmann –– 1429

Freight rates for coal. Mr. Harcourt –– 1429

Voter registration. Mr. G. Hanson –– 1429

Vancouver log market review. Mr. Kempf –– 1430

Journalist's foreknowledge of Bill 28. Ms. Marzari 1430

Release of government information. Ms. Marzari –– 1430

Mr. Rose

Sooke school arbitration. Mr. Jones –– 1430

Vancouver log market review. Mr. Williams –– 1431

Industrial Relations Reform Act (Bill 19). Committee stage. (Hon. L. Hanson) –– 1431

Mr. Gabelmann

Mr. Clark

Mr. Sihota

Hon. Mr. Brummet

Mrs. Boone

Mr. Jones

Mr. R. Fraser

Division

Mr. Miller

Mr. Rabbitt

Mr. Lovick

Division

Mr. Rose

Appendix –– 1452

The House met at 2:07 p.m.

[W Pelton in the chair.]

MR. ROSE: Mr. Speaker, in your gallery today are....

I'm not quite sure of the number, and I was almost tempted to say 20 odd NDP constituency assistants; but I won't say that. They're here for their annual three-day get-together, briefing and learning session. They're somewhat chastened, however, because of the severe thrashing they received at the hands of the MLA softball team during the contest last evening. Despite that, I wonder if the House would bring them a nice warm welcome.

MR. CASHORE: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to welcome to the gallery today a very dear friend of our family. I could go on for a long time about her attributes, but the one I would like to affirm at this time is her ability to get the most out of children's choirs. I would like you to join me in welcoming Virginia Bartolic of Surrey.

MR. MESSMER: Mr. Speaker, I'm very pleased to introduce to the House today our youngest daughter Cindy, who is here visiting us. She is the assistant golf pro at the Kelowna Golf and Country Club — that small community to the north of Penticton. She came in last night to watch the great game between the press and the MLAs. Unfortunately we didn't have a no-show clause, so consequently the game did not go on.

AN HON. MEMBER: But we won by default.

MR. MESSMER: Yes, we won by default. Would you please welcome Cindy to the House.

MR. MOWAT: Mr. Speaker, in the House today we have a number of students from Eric Hamber high school in the Little Mountain riding, with their teacher Mr. Ballantyne. I'd ask the House to please make them welcome.

MR. CRANDALL: In the members' gallery today are two senior management people from the forest industry in the great southeastern part of British Columbia. I'd like the House to welcome Mr. Brody Swan, chief forester from Radium Forest Products, and Mr. John Murray from Crestbrook Forest Industries, vice-president of the woodlands division.

Oral Questions

CABINET MINISTER'S REMARKS

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Premier. This morning in the House we had a second cabinet minister make racist comments. The Minister of Labour and Consumer Services (Hon. L. Hanson) referred to people being free, white and over 21. The minister is responsible for human rights in this province. I want to ask the Premier whether or not he thinks the minister can continue in his responsibility for human rights, given that kind of racist comment.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: Mr. Speaker, I understand the member apologized. But I should comment here that I think all members on each side of the House perhaps need to consider sayings and colloquialisms that have perhaps been used over the years quite freely, not as a matter of expressing racism or any such thing. They were a part — unfortunately or otherwise — of the vocabulary. I guess we need to watch all those things. I'm sure that, while the member apologized, there was nothing intended such as has been suggested.

FREIGHT RATES FOR COAL

MR. HARCOURT: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask the Premier about western coal. Next week I will be meeting with the federal Minister of Transport, Mr. Crosbie, to lobby for him to take action on freight rates for western coal, which could create thousands of jobs if Ontario were to use more western coal. I'd like to know, Mr. Premier, if you have scheduled a meeting, when you're in Ottawa next week, with the Minister of Transport, to push for the freight subsidies that are necessary to make that coal be consumed in greater quantities in Ontario.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: Mr. Speaker, I think we've done better than that. We've established a committee involving Mr. Mazankowski, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. David Peterson, the Premier of Ontario, Mr. Don Getty, the Premier of Alberta, and me to consider what we can collectively do to ensure that the opportunities are provided for western coal to be sold throughout the east but perhaps most specifically in Ontario, not only to the public sector but also to the private sector. All of this is being worked on right now. Mr. Mazankowski has people in Ottawa working on some of the details, gathering information, as are the Premiers. A meeting will be called shortly to bring all of the information together and to see what we can do to develop a strategy that would allow us to sell coal to Ontario.

I should say as well that at present most certainly Ontario Hydro is committed until about 1992. They have orders and commitments and legal contracts with suppliers in the U.S. Obviously, in some respects, little can be done before that date, when these contracts come to an end. But we are working on it. We have certainly addressed this a number of times. I have had numerous meetings in Ottawa with various ministers. But I think for the federal government to charge the Deputy Prime Minister with heading such a committee speaks for itself.

VOTER REGISTRATION

MR. G. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, a question to the Provincial Secretary. The minister has recently alleged that people who used section 80 in the last provincial election to vote in one riding, though previously registered in another, represented abuse of the system. I have a letter here which the chief electoral officer wrote prior to the last provincial election in February 1986 clarifying this point, which states: "A voter honestly not remembering if he is registered in another electoral district may vote under the provisions of section 80 and have his ballot counted." Did the minister not bother to seek the ruling of Mr. Goldberg on this matter before making his statements?

[ Page 1430 ]

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Just before we proceed, it seems to me, hon. member, that we are dealing with a matter here that is before the House.

HON. MR. VEICH: Mr. Speaker, you are quite correct. Bill 28 is before the House, and I don't want to offend the House in any way. However....

Interjection.

HON. MR. VEITCH: Perhaps you have, hon. member, many times. However, yes, I have sought Mr. Goldberg's counsel at all times in all things to do with election legislation. Mr. Goldberg is a good adviser. And Mr. Goldberg, by the way, is completely on side with the elements contained in that legislation. It is before the House, and I think in discussing it now we have offended it enough at this point.

VANCOUVER LOG MARKET REVIEW

MR. KEMPF: Mr. Speaker, a question to the Premier. In view of the written tabled response by the Minister of Forests and Lands (Hon. Mr. Parker) to my May 12 question with respect to the possible $1 billion discrepancy between logs priced in the Vancouver log market and those priced in other jurisdictions, has the Premier decided to direct his minister to carry on an in-depth review or investigation of the Vancouver log market, as would have taken place if the quote in the document that I tabled on Thursday last would have proceeded?

[2:15]

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: Yes, it's part of the ongoing review, and certainly this information is being sought. I am sure that the questions asked and the response provided will also be part of the documentation that will be a part of the review.

MR. KEMPF: A supplementary question to the Premier. From the written response, it would appear that such a review is not taking place; an in-depth review of this situation is not taking place. Irrespective of the minister's apparent lack of concern about a possible $1 billion going into the pockets of multinational forest companies, forest monopolies in this province, and not into the coffers of the province of British Columbia, is the Premier not concerned about that?

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: I will wait until I get all the information and the documentation as a result of the review, and I will certainly express any concerns I have at that time.

JOURNALIST'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF BILL 28

MS. MARZARI: Mr. Speaker, I have a question about process in this House. A column in the Vancouver Sun on May 25 clearly indicated that the columnist had been briefed on the contents of Bill 28 24 hours before the bill was brought before this assembly. Can the minister confirm that this information came out of his office?

HON. MR. VEITCH: Well, not knowing what information she is speaking of, I can neither confirm nor deny it. I sometimes wonder myself how various journalists come up with their information. Maybe they were talking with the hon. member — I don't know.

MS. MARZARI: I am new to this House. Members of my side and the press sometimes are put under embargo. They are not allowed to talk about the contents of a bill before it hits the House — that's respected. Did your office give information about Bill 28 to various people before the bill came to the House?

HON. MR. VEITCH: I have given no information to any journalist regarding Bill 28 or any other piece of legislation before it came to this House. However, if the hon. member would take a little bit of time.... I also read that article, and it was most interesting. If the hon. member had taken the time to phone the chief electoral officer or check any of the statements of votes, she could have ascertained the same information herself without any problem at all.

RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

MS. MARZARI: Mr. Speaker, I have another question for the Provincial Secretary on process of information from this House. The minister has distributed a pamphlet which outlines the changes in the Election Act proposed by Bill 28, which, like Bill 19, is not yet law. The wording in the brochure suggests the changes are a fait accompli. Is this routine procedure for the government to engage in?

HON. MR. VEITCH: Well, Mr. Speaker, for the edification of the hon. member — and I'm glad that this is a kind of show-and-tell — yes, it's customary to put out press releases and other forms of informational material so that people can be apprised of what the government is doing, once information is tabled in the House. You're quite correct; it is.

MR. ROSE: I'm concerned about something, Mr. Speaker, that happened yesterday with the Minister of Tourism (Hon. Mr. Reid), and then we have another example of it today. I'd like to direct it to the Premier. I think that prerelease of information before this House sees it really shows disrespect for the House, and I'd like to know whether the Premier has thought about bringing his cabinet into line on these matters, and whether or not he intends to direct them not to indulge in this kind of deliberate leakiness, designed to allow the public to know what's going on in this Legislature even before its members know.

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: Mr. Speaker, in case the hon. member is not aware, I can assure the hon. member that I have total confidence in the best cabinet this Province has ever seen.

SOOKE SCHOOL ARBITRATION

MR. JONES: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Labour and Consumer Services. In response to my question yesterday regarding the Sooke arbitration, on the impact of an unfair appointment to that arbitration process, the minister suggested that my question was hypothetical. I would advise the minister that this arbitration process has begun, and unfortunately without the participation of both sides.

[ Page 1431 ]

Does the Minister of Labour still believe that the appointment of Mr. Gallagher as the sole arbitrator will still provide a fair and a reasonable arbitration process in Sooke?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, yes, I do, as a matter of fact. I believe that the boycott of the situation by the teachers' association is not true and fair to the system that is in place. I do believe that the result of that arbitration will be fair.

MR. JONES: Supplementary, Mr. Speaker. I don't see how the minister can construe that a fair process will happen when a partisan appointment has been made, and both sides are not party to that process.

The minister should be aware that this is the third case in which teachers have boycotted this arbitration process because of frustration with the unfairness of appointments and frustration with the irrelevance and unfairness in changes due to Bill 19 and 20. How can the minister expect anything but boycotts and disruptions of the entire bargaining process in education into the foreseeable future in light of this process with Bills 19 and 20?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Speaker, it appears to me that the question has now changed slightly, and there is a question now whether the arbitrator is fair and reasonable. Or is it a question that Bills 19 and 20 are unfair and unreasonable? Therefore, as a result of that, the arbitrator is unfair and unreasonable. It appears to me that that is a rather perverse reaction to an arbitrator whom we have appointed and whom we feel will be a reasonable person and will provide a reasonable and fair arbitration award.

VANCOUVER LOG MARKET REVIEW

MR. WILLIAMS: A question to the Premier, following up the question from the former Minister of Forests on these huge revenues that we have not yet achieved from our forests in British Columbia and that legitimately could be achieved. The review underway was to have reported last fall. Clearly, much data was available to the department and all ministries of government. Can the Premier advise us what date we will have that review, so the Crown can get these revenues that are long overdue?

HON. MR. VANDER ZALM: Mr. Speaker, we will certainly provide the information as soon as possible. We will try to expedite the process as much as we can, but we certainly must take great care in doing this, because we are all very pleased, I am sure, with the fact that the forest industry generally now is doing extremely well. Lots of people are employed throughout the whole of the province. The employment rates are at an all-time high, perhaps, and certainly we want to keep it that way.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987
(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mrs. Gran in the chair.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I would like to table an amendment to section 8.

On section 6 as amended.

MR. GABELMANN: As we finished this morning, I had asked the Minister of Labour a question. I wonder if he's prepared now to answer it.

HON. L. HANSON: We don't believe that the apartheid system in South Africa and the reference to it in the legal contract would be considered an employer, so it would be perfectly legal and legitimate to include it in the collective agreement.

MR. GABELMANN: Some of us didn't hear the entire answer because it has been quite noisy.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. members, could we have order in committee.

HON. L. HANSON: The reference to the question this morning dealt with a clause in a collective agreement that referred to apartheid in South Africa. We don't think the interpretation of an employer would extend to apartheid, and therefore that clause would be perfectly allowable within the collective agreement.

MR. GABELMANN: So we're to understand then that if provincially regulated teamsters, for example, have a clause in their contract saying they don't have to handle South African products, they would not be required to handle those products. The minister is saying yes to that.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Could I please ask the members conducting meetings if they could conduct them in the hall.

MR. CLARK: The minister has just made a very narrow interpretation of the question of employers, as I understand it. Just to follow up, if a collective agreement were to contain a clause saying that all products — let's say coveralls, to use that example again — must be produced in British Columbia, would that be acceptable under this section?

HON. L. HANSON: That really only expresses a prohibition; it's not a preference and leaves the ability for the free marketplace to find its own level. I think the reference that we made earlier in this act was to the effect that the requirement for an employer to use only products produced under a union label had connotations of unfairly forcing those people who were employees of a non-union company to become unionized members. I don't think, in suggesting in a contract that only B.C. products be used, that there is any connotation of unfair pressure towards unionization, or undue influence on the employees.

[2:30]

[ Page 1432 ]

MR. GABELMANN: I want to pursue the question of the apartheid clause in conjunction with the earlier discussion this morning about the clause in the UA agreement — the plumbers' Local 170 agreement — which, just to quickly refresh people's memories, is a clause that requires that products that the plumbers are using in construction in British Columbia have to be produced in a plant where a UA agreement is in place. That clearly is illegal now under this section. An apartheid-related prohibition is not illegal, according to the minister. If the clause in the agreement said something to the effect that the employer agrees not to buy or use products from countries in which fair and democratic elections are not held to elect governments, etc., would that clause be legal?

HON. L. HANSON: No, Madam Chairman, I don't think that would be illegal. There's no reference to an employer or a specific employer, and there's no undue influence on anyone to become part of an organized labour movement or not. I think that that could be included.

MR. GABELMANN: We now have the minister saying that restrictive clauses are legal. The only restrictive clauses that are illegal are those that refer to a unionized employer. Now he's saying you can have a restrictive clause in respect of governmental policies in another country. In respect of the South African situation, he said that clause would be legal. In respect of a hypothetical situation — I was thinking of South Korea and Taiwan — he said that clause would be legal. So it seems to me that the clause that the plumbers would seek to have their employers agree to would be a clause prohibiting the use of material imported from countries without a democratic form of government, and that would be legal. Or, for that matter, outside British Columbia; or a clause that said we favour a made-in-B.C. policy such as the government of B.C. has — a restrictive trade practice, I might say, but nevertheless a policy. Those kinds of restrictive clauses are now okay under this section. The only kind of restriction the government seems to want to make is a restriction against union-made products. Would the minister not agree with that assertion?

HON. L. HANSON: No, I can't, Madam Chairman. The legislation deals with the relations between employers, employees and unions. It does not deal with relations with other countries, nor does it deal with relations with other religions or whatever. It deals with the relativity of the employers, the employees and their trade unions.

MR. CLARK: The minister keeps referring to the fact that he's concerned about prohibitions that union companies would have, to say they can't buy non-union products. He keeps referring to that, but this act, once again.... His interpretation, or what he's intending to do, is not fulfilled by this act. As the member for North Island mentioned, the plumbers could conceivably say that products from outside the lower mainland.... If the companies dealing with pipe-manufacturing in the lower mainland were all union and they had a prohibition that specified a geographic area, that would be legal. Does the minister agree with that?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, we're getting onto issues that really have nothing to do with the intent of the legislation. The question was asked, would it be agreeable, because in a confined area they realize that there are only organized-labour manufacturers.... Could they have a clause that says they can only buy material from a specified area of the province? I suppose that would be true, but it would be difficult to understand what the benefit of that would be. There isn't any part of Canada or British Columbia that doesn't have the opportunity to import, or bring in, or start new businesses. So I don't understand the relativity of what you're saying.

What we're trying to deal with in the clause is that the agreement between an employer and a labour organization and its employees should not say that the goods that they have can only be purchased from another organized labour company, because it does restrict fair trade and also puts undue pressure on the employees of that company to fairly, and in their own right, make a decision whether they want to be organized or not.

MR. GABELMANN: Madam Chair, we haven't yet begun the debate on the major impact of this section, which is secondary boycotts, an issue separate from the issue we've been discussing this morning and now, relating to an attempt by people who work in construction to protect jobs. That's what's being wiped out, and we've been discussing that.

The curious situation that we've got now is that by this section, in respect of this first issue, the issue of attempting to protect jobs, which is being wiped out.... We've got a government bringing in legislation which we have to read for itself. We can't read the legislation based on what the government's intention was. We've enough court cases on that that intention doesn't matter. What the minister might have said in the House doesn't matter. What matters is the language of the law. And we have a law now that says employers and their unions can negotiate clauses which discriminate against political systems — if they want, whole countries; perhaps other provinces — but not unionized employers. That's the only prohibition that's in place. It's a prohibition against making an agreement that goods or services will be supplied by a unionized firm.

Let's take the Gainers dispute. Collective agreements at the present time, in many cases, have provisions — which will now become void — which say that union members do not have to handle struck goods. The language is put in various ways. When Gainers was on strike and being scabbed, the product was coming into British Columbia. Union members in this province who felt that they did not want to handle scab goods didn't have to. They will now be required to handle those goods, given this section, unless they amend their collective agreement — or unless they have a letter of understanding which could be negotiated at any time during the term of the collective agreement — to say: "We don't have to handle any products made by meat-packing plants in Alberta." If the company and the employer agree to that understanding, they would, if we follow the minister's logic all the way through, be able to have that clause stand up. I wonder if the minister wants to comment on that.

HON. L. HANSON: I think a very basic fact has to be brought back to the House. We're dealing with labour relations in British Columbia in this act. We're not dealing with the trade practices of other countries. We're not dealing with the trade practices of Canada or.... There's other legislation that deals with that. We're simply dealing with industrial relations as relating to British Columbia. If the carpentry shop, if you will, says that in their agreement with their

[ Page 1433 ]

employer they will not use oak trees grown in Arkansas, I would suppose that that is legitimate. We're not dealing with that issue here; we're dealing with labour relations as it relating to the employer, the employee, the union and other British Columbia companies.

MR. GABELMANN: Will the new law allow a hot declaration to be applied to goods produced outside of British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON: I suggest that we're getting a little bit off the subject, but no, it will not be allowed if it relates to a specific product or a specific employer out of British Columbia. In other words, if it relates to the fact that no goods used on the scene can be used that are imported from Australia — there are no employer connotations there — that is allowable, but if it says that no goods can be used on the scene regardless of their origin unless they are union-made, that is prohibited.

Excuse me, Madam Chairman. I just wanted to add something else. I think that we have a perfectly acceptable clause in our seventh master agreement with the British Columbia government. It says in there that the union and the employer agree that preference will be given to B.C. suppliers when clothing or wearing apparel are purchased by the employer. I think that's perfectly acceptable as a clause within an agreement between an employer and its organization.

MR. GABELMANN: Earlier the minister was defending this section on the basis that he didn't want to restrict trade. That clause restricts trade, especially the kind of free trade the government seems intent upon supporting in respect of the Mulroney initiative. I wonder if the minister can't see that contradiction.

HON. L. HANSON: No, I don't see that prohibition, because if you look at the wording it says "agree that preference," and that's no prohibition.

MR. GABELMANN: The minister argues that this legislation is required to prevent restrictive trade practices. He used different words but that is, in effect, what he was talking about. The restrictive trade practice that he wants to deal with is a practice where a unionized company has to purchase goods or services from another unionized company. That's the restrictive trade practice he wants to deal with. He defends it on the basis of wanting to get rid of restrictive trade practices and cites, as part of his defence, another restrictive trade practice. That's the contradiction that I would like the minister to explain.

HON. L. HANSON: Well, I guess we have a very different opinion of what that phrase means. It quite simply means to me that if available and priced competitively, let's say, preference will be made to buy in British Columbia, and that they agreed to. It doesn't prohibit purchase from anywhere else. What we're talking about in here is boycott, and boycott means prohibition.

[2:45]

MR. SIHOTA: The minister says that he doesn't see the contradiction in the section. I hope he does, and I hope he admits that there is an apparent contradiction. Now let me try to goat it from a different angle and just sort of step back for a minute.

The minister says this Section is designed to prevent agreements or contracts which have a clause in them that restricts trade vis-à-vis trade union companies. That is what I understand the intent of the minister to be in terms of introducing this section. Before I go any further, let me just make sure that I understand that; I'll sit down and see if the minister agrees with me that my understanding of that intent is correct.

HON. L. HANSON: It's not to restrict trade by union companies; it's to restrict the ability of two people — two persons, I guess, in this legislation is the correct terminology — from sitting down at a table and making an agreement that puts undue pressure on a third manufacturer for his employees to become part of organized labour.

They have that choice freely, to make that decision whether they wish to become organized or not. But the trade boycott that says it must be of a union label puts undue pressure on those employees, the employees of another employer, to become unionized or they suffer a restrictive trade atmosphere.

MR. SIHOTA: Fine, I'll accept that explanation. But if the minister reads the section, and particularly the use of the words "another employer" — in the copy that I have, in any event, in that second-to-last sentence — then surely he must agree that the usage of the words "another employer" is so broad that it could incorporate not only the situation the minister speaks about but also other employers in other jurisdictions, for example, Alberta or South Africa.

Does the minister not see that the provision of those two words in that section allows for a broader interpretation; and keeping in mind that the Interpretation Act, which is what we use as a guide to interpret legislation, says that legislation ought to be interpreted liberally, does he not see that the section extends way beyond what it is that the minister says that he's intending to do?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, I don't agree with the interpretation the hon. member made. Those words have to be read within the context of the whole section, and I think that the gentleman who just put that question is very learned in reading these sorts of things and can draw his own conclusions for it. My answer to his question is no.

MR. SIHOTA: Maybe I took one step too early, but I'll go back and cover that territory as well with the minister. Let's read the Section in its entirety.

"An agreement between an employer and a trade union, express or implied, by which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of . . . any other employer or to cease doing business with another person, is void."

If you read the entire context of that, the example of a limitation on trade with a South African employer, or ceasing to do business with another person — and person, of course, includes employers — can easily be construed.... Does the minister not agree that the example I've just cited of South Africa falls within all four squares of that section read as a whole?

[ Page 1434 ]

HON. L. HANSON: I'm sure I'm not pointing out anything to the member who has just spoken, because he's obviously very experienced in legal work, but it's my understanding that where an enactment restricts the right to contract, the courts read it very narrowly. The wording that is there has to be taken in the context of the whole section.

MR. SIHOTA: If it's the minister's argument that the courts will construe these provisions narrowly, which I think is a debatable point.... It's an interesting point, but it's highly debatable. I don't want to sit here and give a treatise on the law in that area, but I'll advise the minister that the two areas of law I specialize in are personal injury and commercial contracts, and I know darned well how courts are obliged to deal with commercial contracts. Surely the minister must see that that interpretation is possible, putting aside that debate for the time being; and would he not agree that it would be far more prudent to word this section such that it is narrow in its scope and deals with the one situation that the minister envisioned for it? Would the minister not agree that it would be far more prudent to go in that direction and eliminate doubt, instead of leaving it open for doubt?

The minister indicates "no" across the floor. Then let me ask the minister this: is the intent of this section solely to limit trade or contracts between trade union employers?

HON. MR. BRUMMET: Madam Chairman, I would like to just follow up and ask the minister this: when the term "employer" is used in the British Columbia Industrial Relations Act, is it more likely that "employer" would refer in a more narrow sense; or, just because the term is used without being specified, could it apply to every employer anywhere in the world?

HON. L. HANSON: If you turn to the interpretation section of the Labour Code, you'll see that employer is very specifically detailed out there. It would be read as requiring that the agreement specify the type of employer. The whole thing behind the legislation is again to ensure — and I've said it so many times that I'm getting tired of it — that two people sitting down at a table do not unduly restrict or pressure the employees of another firm that is not organized into organizing. They have the right to organize; it's clearly spelled out. They can make their own decision. We don't believe outside pressure should be put on them to form that organization.

MR. SIHOTA: In response to the defence of the Minister of Education and the comment that flowed from the Minister of Labour afterwards, the copy of the Labour Code that I have here before me.... And I'm only looking at the Labour Code. I don't see in Bill 19 where the definition of employer has been changed, unless the minister wants to bring that to my attention. The Labour Code says: "'employer' means a person who employs one or more employees and includes an employers' organization." The reference to the employers' organization doesn't matter, but the fact is that the definition of employer under the Labour Code would not restrict it to British Columbia employers.

I think that deals with the issue that the Minister of Education raises. Now I go back and ask the minister whether the sole purpose and intent of this Section is purely to prevent provisions in contracts which restrict an employer to dealing solely with unionized employers, as defined under the Labour Code. Can the minister answer that question?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, we are dealing only with British Columbia. We have no jurisdiction outside of British Columbia. There are all sorts of trade restrictions that flow between various countries. We are not dealing with that. We are dealing only with B.C. and its jurisdiction.

I would like to point out to the members opposite that it would be just as illegal to sit down at a table and bargain a clause in a collective agreement that said that only goods made by non-union employers would be used on the site.

MR. CLARK: Just following the logic, then, does the minister agree that a hot edict that applies to products that are from outside British Columbia, like Gainers, for example, would be allowed under this legislation?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, I point out that the Code deals only with labour relations in British Columbia. If a clause like that is in a collective agreement outside of British Columbia, we have no jurisdiction over it.

MR. SIHOTA: Well then, let me provide the minister with an example which involves a situation that would happen in British Columbia. I will pause while the minister is consulting, so that he can hear the example.

The example is simply this. An employer and an employee enter into an agreement whereby the employer agrees to refrain from handling or buying any goods that are made in South Africa. They negotiate that. It is a British Columbia employer and a British Columbia employee trade union. There is a provision in the contract which, like I said, says that the employer agrees to refrain from handling or buying goods made in South Africa.

The goods arrive in cargo in Vancouver. The employer directs his employees to go and remove those goods from the ship, for example, that they come in on. The employee organization says: "Look, we have this provision in the agreement that says we don't have to handle goods from South Africa." Remember, I am using the language here.... So here we have a situation that is wholly within the jurisdiction of British Columbia, with a British Columbia trade union and a British Columbia employer.

The employer then waves section 6 of this act and says: "That provision is void by virtue of section 6 of this act." Is the minister saying that that type of scenario is not captured by section 6, notwithstanding the fact that all of the action takes place in British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON: If I understood the question again, it's this: is it illegal to have in a collective agreement a clause that says: "We won't deal with products from South Africa"? And secondly, when those products come to Canada and they are refused to be handled under that clause, would that be legal?

MR. SIHOTA: That is essentially the question, but if the minister requires further clarification, I can supply a bit more.

HON. L. HANSON: Sure, please do.

MR. SIHOTA: Let's run through the example again. The employer and the employee negotiate a contract. Within the contract the following words are used: "The employer agrees to refrain from handling or buying any goods or products

[ Page 1435 ]

from an employer in South Africa." We are dealing with a British Columbia contract made between the employer and the employee, a freely negotiated agreement.

[3:00]

The goods arrive from South Africa in port. The employer tells its employees to go over and pick up those goods. The employees get over there, realize the goods are from South Africa and come back to the employer and say: "We won't touch those goods pursuant to the agreement that we have executed with you." The employer then stands up and says: "Well, that clause, although it is in the collective agreement, is void by virtue of section 6" — of this legislation before us now. Is the minister saying that that kind of situation is not captured by section 6, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement between the employer and the employee is a wholly B.C. agreement, and that the action is taking place within British Columbia?

HON. L. HANSON: Of course, a number of these things are hypothetical cases, and certainly will be dealt with in the jurisprudence that follows the enactment of this. But in the case of a clause such as you're suggesting — a British Columbia employer and a British Columbia employee agreeing not to handle the goods of another country — that would be permissible. But to agree in this clause that they would only handle unionized products with unionized labels out of the country of South Africa would not be legal.

MR. SIHOTA: Let me just seek clarification on that. Let's take the same example, which I hope I don't have to go over again.... On the assumption that the goods are union made in South Africa — let's say they're mining goods or something like that — but the rest of the story holds true, is the minister saying that in that instance this section would not capture that type of agreement?

HON. L. HANSON: I'm afraid there were so many conversations going on that I didn't catch the first part of your question. Are you asking if it would be legal if there was a clause in the contract that said no goods from South Africa could be handled? It's my opinion that it would be permissible. But if it said that all goods purchased from South Africa had to be union-made, I would suggest that that would be illegal.

MR. CLARK: This is a strange interpretation, and I see he's getting counselling. He's saying, on the one hand, that "employer" should be narrowly defined as unionized versus non-unionized employer, and that geographic considerations don't really apply — that South Africa doesn't really fall.... If you said unionized products in the generic sense, and didn't mention any employers, why wouldn't that be allowed under this clause? It simply talks about the products of another employer or person. But if the broader thing is okay, why wouldn't the broad statement of unionized...? It doesn't mention unionized companies in here.

HON. L. HANSON: Well, again, Madam Chairman, I'm not able or obliged to offer legal opinions, but the intent of the clause is quite clear. As I've said many times, the intent of the clause is simply that two people sitting down at a table shouldn't unduly affect a third party who is not sitting at the table, nor his employees. Nor should it affect their right to compete in the open market. That's very clear here.

MRS. BOONE: Further to what the minister has just said.... He keeps saying that it's to prevent anyone putting any undue pressure on a group to organize or unionize. I'd like to go from the other side — it's slightly different. If a hot edict or a boycott is put on a product because there is scab labour in there, and products are being put on the shelves — and usually this takes place in a small unionized place — is not the minister then taking the side of the employer by forcing other unionized people to handle those goods, and thereby taking a biased position on a strike where an employer is hiring scab labour and there are products being produced and are going out. The other unionized people in the past have been able to say: "I won’t handle this." They've been able to put some pressure on a small employer. Now, Mr. Minister, you are taking a biased position and saying that unionized people can no longer put that kind of pressure on the employer. Is that not correct? Are you not then taking the side of the employer in a position such as this?

HON. L. HANSON: Absolutely not, without any question. I'd like to point out to the members opposite that there is no restriction on anyone or any labour organization for putting out hot declarations or boycotts. But those boycotts cannot be written into an agreement. Union members still have the ability to refuse to do their shopping or whatever in the case of a hot declaration, if you will. But it's not permissible under this act to write it into the collective agreement being negotiated.

MR. JONES: I'd like to raise an example that's not a hypothetical one, and perhaps the minister can help me with this one. It's an example from my experience. A number of school boards in this province, including the one that I chaired, have agreements with groups other than their employees. For example, in Burnaby we had an agreement with the carpenters' union that suggested that our construction work would be done by members of the carpenters' union. I'm wondering if section 6 of this legislation does not override those kinds of collective agreements, or clauses in collective agreements. Does the legislation in section 6 override that? Does it make null and void future agreements, and agreements already in place?

MR. R. FRASER: Madam Chairman, I can't resist the invitation of the first member for Vancouver East (Mr. Williams) to participate one more time in this debate, because, like many of you, I think it's worthy of a great deal of thought, effort and time. I have the bill right here, which I've read carefully and will continue to read so that I will have a full and comprehensive understanding.

What I find interesting about the debate — and I tend to be supportive of the legislation generally — is that the second member for Nanaimo (Mr. Lovick) came out the other day with an argument that suggested that no one on this side of the House understood the bill or was even capable of understanding; and today, what we hear is a series of questions that would indicate that the other side has simply no comprehension of what is going on. So there is apparent conflict there that I think we should discuss. Which is it? Do you understand, and would you like to help us with our understanding? Or do you not understand, and you rely on the minister to carry on at great length?

[ Page 1436 ]

It seems to me that there are some things about the section that I would have strengthened, but what you really want to do....

Interjections.

MR. R. FRASER: You want to hear a little more. There's so much more. Oh, you want to take a turn too. Okay. If I could carry on for just a little while, Madam Chairman, it would....

Interjections.

MR. R. FRASER: They're heckling me unfairly, Madam Chairman. I have rarely been subjected to such intense pressure. Right through '83 and '84, nothing was ever this bad. It's incredible what you have to endure in a job like this, serving the public. This is one of those great occasions.

The minister has got something going for him here. I think this bill is going to be widely seen as fair, and this section will be no different than any of the others. It will give opportunity for everyone to participate in the supplying of product, which is naturally in the interests of all British Columbians, and it will....

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER: There should be some order here, Madam Chairman. Could you admonish those members over there. This is incredible. You know, perhaps I should go back to Hansard and get out the record where my hon. friend from Coquitlam told the story about how he was trying to quit smoking. That was a good one. We needed that one at the time; perhaps we could use it now.

It is a different House, isn't it? It's just amazing.

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER: Well, I wish you would, actually. It makes more sense than what I've heard today. You did hear the opposite members saying they're going to mail my speech, and in fact I got a piece of mail from Elsie McMurphy the other day that I thought was great. It was my hon. colleague the Minister of Education's speech. I was glad she mailed that around. I thought it was quite well done.

Anyway, back to this secondary boycott agreement prohibition.

MR. GABELMANN: Don't look at the bill, because it'll be dangerous.

MR. R. FRASER: Could it be dangerous? I remember once when the member from Atlin was asked to say something nice about the bill, he said: "The printing's good and the holes are punched neat." That was a long time ago.

Interjection.

MR. R. FRASER: That was research. That was an interesting guy. He went both ways on that bill.

MR. JONES: Does it override collective agreements between carpenters and school boards?

MR. R. FRASER: Well, it would certainly depend on whether or not they wanted to make an agreement.

MR. WILLIAMS: You know you're going to get the east side of the riding when it's split.

MR. R. FRASER: If I got the east side of the riding I now represent, I would win it. In fact, I've been looking at some of the numbers and they look interesting. I will speak on that at great length when I get a chance.

But I can see that the minister, who has returned, wants to speak. I wonder if I should let him, actually. He's had a lot of turns today. Hey, I think this section is good. I think there are lots of things that will work out. I think it will be to the great advantage of everybody in the province. Madam Chairman, with that I will wait until another moment.

MR. GABELMANN: I now know why the voters in Vancouver South elect the member as the first member. It's because they think they're voting for John Fraser.

I wonder if the minister would care to respond to the question put by the member for Burnaby North in respect of the agreement between the school board and the carpenters.

HON. L. HANSON: Thank you for that small recess. In any case, the only exclusion of an agreement of that sort, as I understood it, was an agreement with the school board that their work would be done by the carpenters. I would see no reason why that wouldn't be allowed within the contract, because it's actually effectively subcontracting, and what they have is an agreement that work of the bargaining unit would be subcontracted to someone specific.

[3:15]

MR. GABELMANN: So if you're a school board employer, to subcontract out carpentry work specifically to the carpenters' union is not prohibited by this clause — if I understood what the minister was saying — but to insist that the material used be subcontracted from a unionized employer or a specific employer is illegal. I guess I'm having some difficulty understanding the distinction that the minister makes between those two sets of circumstances.

Well, Madam Chair, the minister doesn't respond. I assume we now are to assume that there can be an agreement between an employer and a trade union which is of a positive nature. I think that must be the distinction. Because the language of the section says: "An express or implied provision of an agreement between an employer and a trade union by which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain from handling...." So you can't do the negative, but you can do the positive, it appears. And I wonder if that's the basis for the distinction, or is the basis for the distinction that the carpentry work done by the carpenters in Burnaby is not manufacturing but in fact a craft or a service? The minister nods.

If the service is of a construction nature, it's legal; if it's of a manufactured nature, it's illegal. Is that the distinction?

HON. L. HANSON: I think, for the member opposite's clarification, Bill 19, under the title "Secondary boycott agreements prohibited," reads:

"An agreement between an employer and a trade union, express or implied, by which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain from

[ Page 1437 ]

handling, using, selling," — and we've added buying, I believe, in that section — "transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other employer or to cease doing business with any other person, is void."

We've removed, by the amendment which is already passed, "using the services of." By removing that wording of "using the services of," it would appear to be quite legitimate in the circumstances the member mentioned under this section.

MR. GABELMANN: Then that would be my interpretation as well. Earlier on in the discussion — this is still this afternoon — the minister said, and this is a paraphrase, that the only intent of this section was to prevent — and these are my words — top-down organizing; that he wanted to make sure that plants or factories or whatever, fabricating factories in particular, didn't feel compelled to organize because they wouldn't be able to sell their product unless they were union; that that was, as the minister at one point said, the only intent of this section.

I don't think he meant that, because the major intent of this section is really to deal with secondary boycotts and strike situations, and that's what this section is primarily all about. I want to shift the focus of the debate on this section to that subject now. We're talking about the Famous Players case; we're talking about the Nikolai case and others, many others. I want to ask the minister if he doesn't agree that in labour relations a quick settlement isn't one of the most important objectives.

HON. L. HANSON: The member referred to a suggestion that it was only.... I don't think that was in the wording, but we can find that out. I think that what the member is referring to is the second section of it where, let's say, as an example — and I think this was an actual example — Pacific Press refused to carry the ads of Famous Players theatres. Pacific Press was not part of the dispute and, effectively, that would be not allowed under the new legislation. Does that answer your question?

MR. GABELMANN: No, the question was whether the minister didn't think it was a sound objective of labour relations that a quick settlement be effected in labour disputes. That was my question.

HON. L. HANSON: As a philosophy, I have no difficulty in subscribing to the philosophy of quick settlement of disputes. On the other side, I'd like to read just a small section of a judgment of the Labour Relations Board: "By recognizing that the union may employ the hot unfair declaration to serve as a broad interest, the board has accepted that the hot declaration is a weapon of general use not restricted to particular labour disputes."

Although the union had sought to organize a place, the boycott or hot declaration was used as a weapon to influence the employees to become organized, and that's what we, as a philosophy, disagree with.

MR. GABELMANN: I understand the point that there is an intent by the government to prevent what we call top-down organizing, rather than bottom-up, where the members freely determine they want to and there is no economic imperative from outside. I understand that argument. I don't necessarily agree with it, from a much greater philosophical argument which I'm not going to get into now.

The question I want to focus on now is.... After organizing is finished, and there is a union, and there is an employer, and they are bargaining, and they fail to reach an agreement in bargaining.... So either there is a strike or a lockout in place. The point I want to deal with follows from that. It seems obvious to some of us that there needs to be a balance between the employer and the employee, between the employer and the union. If there is no balance, in economic terms, the dispute will drag on. That is one alternative. The other alternative is that somebody will get drawn into signing an agreement that they can't really live with.

The union has too much power. The employer may feel compelled to sign an agreement that he can't really live with and may, in fact, jeopardize his business as a result of that. So it is important not to give the union too much power compared to the power the employer has. That is the argument, in terms of a balance.

Similarly, on the other side, you need to make sure the employer does not have too much power either. What happens in disputes in small industries in particular — we are talking here of employers with under 500 employees, and often a dozen, or two or three — is that when the strike or lockout commences and replacement workers are hired, the employer continues to make money. Business goes on and continues to make money. The worker is on the picket line, not making any money at all. There is no economic pressure whatsoever on the employer — none, unless there is an ability to persuade people not to do business with that employer.

One of the ways you can persuade people not to do business with the employer is to advise them of the fact that this particular employer is on strike, and is employing scabs, and may do so for years, as in the case of Dominion Motors. The strike started in 1968; it is still not resolved, and never will be.

In the Famous Players case, the agreement between Pacific Press and its unions allowed the Pacific Press unions not to run an ad in a situation where Famous Players was on strike, as a way of discouraging economic return to the employer. If workers have no ability to prosecute their strike, they will lose the strike. The scabs will become the permanent employees.

During the late sixties and early seventies, there were literally dozens of situations comparable to the Famous Players case, where a small group of employees.... I remember A.B. Dick. Retail Wholesale organized A.B. Dick, which is the duplicating company, a small company in Vancouver; the company hired replacement workers and continued to make a profit. The union workers were on the picket line going hungry; several years went by and the strike was lost. Those people's jobs were lost forever, and there were dozens and dozens of cases of that kind.

So the labour movement, seeing that there was no economic balance between management and labour — no neutrality, in economic terms — began to develop tactics to try to bring some balance to the situation, and developed things like the hot declaration. The first step was usually a boycott, and then a hot declaration. The boycott, in case the minister doesn't know, was a suggestion to people that they not purchase those goods, or deal with that supplier, or have any business with that particular company, but it was not a requirement that other union people not use the goods or the services. That's what the hot declaration was designed to do.

[ Page 1438 ]

The hot declaration in British Columbia has been applied very rarely. It was applied in the Famous Players case; it's been applied in perhaps a couple of dozen other situations in the last 15 or so years since it was developed. I used to be a staff person at the B.C. Federation of Labour, and I remember the weeks-long discussions that would go on prior to the application of a hot edict. Often the request from the union for a hot edict was turned down, because it was a weapon to be used only in rare circumstances. It has only been used in rare circumstances to try to effect some reasonable balance between the employer and the employee. If you don't have that balance, the employer has no reason to settle, to deal with the employees whose jobs are at stake. So the strike is lost, and the place becomes deunionized through that activity. The hot declaration is simply a carefully chosen weapon. If it was used too often, it wouldn't work. The labour movement knows that, so they apply it very rarely. It is simply a device to try to achieve some economic balance, given the fact that no law in British Columbia prevents hiring replacement workers.

That would be the solution. If we had a law saying that when a strike or a lockout is in place, people are on strike and are locked out and that's it, the place shuts down.... If we had the kind of provision in our labour law that says no replacement workers can be hired, we wouldn't need this section of the bill. But we have never been able to persuade governments of either political party to bring in that kind of law. They did in Quebec — in a modified way, but it's there. But we haven't been able to persuade governments in this province to do that.

[3:30]

The reason for doing it is to achieve balance and fairness between the parties. When you have a section such as the one under discussion now, you take away the only weapon available to small groups of employees, which is to be able to say to other people in other, organized situations: "Don't handle these hot goods, or don't use these hot services, because if you do, you will be putting money in the employer's pocket, which will enable him to continue not to bargain." If he continues not to bargain year after year, the strike will be lost and the people will disappear. It happens frequently.

Now we're going to have a law in place that will absolutely guarantee that the democratic rights of people to organize a union, to bargain and to reach a collective agreement will never happen in small situations. Every employer, unless he's very enlightened, wants the union and likes having a union, and then it's different, will now scab the strike — replacement workers — and just refuse to bargain, or will go through the motions, as has been done over the years, if the IRC demands that there be some bargaining. The only weapon those workers have is the ability to persuade colleagues to help them put some economic pressure on the employer. The minister and the government have talked repeatedly about this legislation being balanced and in favour of democratic rights. Here is a section that further destroys the balance, which we don't even have now, between the employer and the employee.

The employer has far more clout in situations such as Famous Players. This legislation will take away any vestige of the employees' ability to prosecute a strike.

MR. R. FRASER: You're off the subject.

MR. GABELMANN: I'm not off the subject; I'm on 4.1 of the Labour Code, as amended, which "prohibits secondary boycott agreements." In the Famous Players situation, the Pacific Press unions' clause with Pacific Press — which, incidentally, Pacific Press freely bargained with their unions; nobody compelled Pacific Press to sign that clause; and then they had the gall to go to court and try to get rid of it, and lost there too.... Nevertheless, that kind of agreement is now gone. Any agreement in countless industries that enlists the support of other workers to help provide balance between the employer and the employees is gone.

1 wonder if the minister can justify in a philosophical sense why he would want to destroy attempts to get balance between the parties. That balance would lead to shorter strikes, shorter lockouts and more favourable industrial relations. This will lead to more disruption, longer strikes, and the eventual collapse of the strike and of the jobs — in effect, the elimination of the jobs of those people. And when people begin to realize that that's happening, they won't, for fear of this language, organize, which is supposedly their democratic right. For fear of section 4.1 of the new code, they will say: "We'd better not organize, because if we do, we might get into a position where we're locked out or go on strike, and then our jobs will be gone, because we'll have no economic power whatsoever."

For the government to say that this legislation is fair and balanced and democratic is wrong on all counts, in this section and in others, and we'll get to them later. It's appalling that we would move in this kind of direction when the trend in labour relations is in the other direction, as we see in the Quebec example. I'd appreciate some comments on the general point there.

HON. L. HANSON: I guess the bigger question is what is balance or what is out of balance in a particular situation — and I guess that depends on your point of view. What I would like to point out to the member opposite is that there is no law that says a boycott or hot edict can't be issued, and, of course, people who support the dispute that is going on certainly will withdraw their business. In the case of a theatre, if a theatre is declared hot or whatever and picketed, I would suggest that the amount of business that that theatre was able to do would drop off to the point where it wasn't even viable to stay open, and to me that is considerable economic pressure on an operation.

The other thing that I'd like to point out to the hon. member is that people can still be persuaded, through that system, not to deal with a particular product or a particular organization, but with the new legislation they can no longer be required to boycott it. I guess our philosophy differs. We don't feel that that's fair.

MR. GABELMANN: Let's talk about fairness for a moment. We have a multinational company, such as Famous Players — I forget who owns them now; it could be Coca-Cola or Gulf and Western, or somebody big; in any event, a multinational company that has money coming in from sources all over the world, probably, and certainly all over North America; they have a collective agreement with employees in, let's say, British Columbia. I don't think there's one agreement for the whole province, but let's just say there is. Given what strikes and lockouts are all about — exerting pressure on the other side so they'll come to the bargaining table and reach an agreement — Famous Players, in this case,

[ Page 1439 ]

can continue to use profits from all over the world to sustain the fact that they're not making any profits in British Columbia, if the place wasn't scabbed. So if it wasn't scabbed, if they didn't try to operate, they still, even in that circumstance, have far more economic power than the 200 or 300 people who are walking the picket line. Because their revenues continue to come in, their balance sheet is hardly affected.

The people who are walking the picket line have no other income; they might get strike pay of $25 a week or so, or another $5 per kid, or that kind of minimal assistance — not enough to meet a mortgage. So even when it's not scabbed, there is an incredible imbalance between the employer and the employee. If you had a balance, the economic pain would be equal. But we go further with this case. They continue to operate, and here in this province they continue to make money. There is no economic pressure on them whatsoever. The economic pressure on the union is immense, because the members are making no money. After six months or so, what do they do?

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: In that industry it's low wages to begin with — that's right. But let's leave that aside; we're dealing with it in general terms.

There's no balance whatsoever if the pain isn't equal. That's the point that's being made. The ability to enforce the hot edict — and I agree with the minister that you can still declare something hot; you just can't enforce it — is a picket line. A picket line isn’t just somebody walking up and down a sidewalk in front of a building. A picket line is an effective tool, of whatever kind, that prevents the consumption of the product or the service that's being provided behind the picket line. The picket line can be an imaginary line; and when you impose a "hot" declaration, that's what it is. It's still permissible, under the amended legislation, for union members not to cross the picket line. But if you think about the picket line as being more than just people walking up and down in front of a theatre, but rather an effort to make sure that people don't use the goods or services — which is really what a picket line is — you're saying that part of that picket line can't be crossed, the actual physical one; the people can cross it but they can't be prosecuted for not crossing it, if they have a collective agreement provision that allows them not to cross a picket line.... But you're saying that the rest of the picket line, the invisible part of the picket line, or the "hot" edict part of the picket line cannot be honoured.

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: The member for Vancouver South says: "No, he didn't." Yes, he did, and so the language of the legislation says. If you have a clause in your collective agreement which gives you the right not to cross a legal picket line, you can do so under this legislation as it's amended, as I read it. But if that picket line is in the form of a hot edict, you can't refuse to cross it. That's what the new legislation says. That takes all the power away from the small service sector and small industries in particular. It's not a big deal when you come to the IWA or to the pulp unions, the a government employees or whatever else; that's not a tactic that's necessary for them. But it sure is for the little guy. And for a government that talks about fairness, democracy, balance and protecting the little guy, to bring in a law like this, taking away all those rights, is really hypocritical, to put it mildly.

I could go for a long time going through the Nikolai case, the decision in the House of Lords on this question, which I think is classic law, the Famous Players case, and a multitude of other stuff. I'm not going to do it. I'd like to, but we've taken a considerable amount of time on this section.

I just want to say in passing to the minister and to the government House Leader that all the sections won't take this much time, you can be sure. Some will take a bit more, but most will not.

What I'm struggling to get from the minister is some understanding that he violates some fundamental rights here: the right to be able to go on strike. In the small industry and small service sector, there will no longer be the right to strike and, in effect, no longer the right to organize, because the implication of it all at the end of the road is that you lose your job. I don't think the minister understands that. I would hope that the reason we have this legislation in place in this form is because he doesn't understand it and that he would seriously consider taking some time, standing this particular section, or using one mechanism or another — moving on to estimates or something — so that we can deal with the issues here. Because if the law stays as it is, that is the end of organizing in the small sector of our economy, and it is the end of small unions in this province. It's clear and simple.

[3:45]

Section 6 as amended approved on the following division:

YEAS — 30

NAYS — 19

On section 7.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I move the amendment standing on the order paper in my name. [See appendix.]

On the amendment.

[ Page 1440 ]

MR. GABELMANN: I'd like to ask the minister what his intent is in making the change suggested in (2)(b) of the amendment.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, the intent — first of all, I'll read it: "activity by the employee against the trade union contrary to this Act" — is that should there be a trade union member who, against the union's wishes, takes some action that is contrary to the act as it will be finally drafted, it will allow the trade union to discipline its employee or its member, even to the point of removing his union membership and causing his termination or other disciplinary action by the employer.

MR. GABELMANN: So what we basically have here is prohibitions on union discipline — in effect, saying that the only areas where effective discipline can take place relate to the paying of dues or the regular assessment of initiation fees; and also if employees, contrary to the wishes of a union, break the law of the province. Those are the only situations where effective discipline . . .

[Mr. Weisgerber in the chair.]

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: Or the collective agreement, right.

. . . can take place. Is that right?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, I think that's a hypothetical question. It certainly gives the union the ability, when the member is acting contrary to this act, to discipline them. I understand that the union has a number of internal disciplines that are still available to it within the organization.

MR. GABELMANN: Would scabbing a lawful strike be considered activity by the employee contrary to this act against the trade union?

HON. L. HANSON: Are you suggesting that in the case of a lawful picket line and a member crossing it, is that illegal? Is that your question?

MR. GABELMANN: I thought the question was clear, but I'll try it again. If you scab a strike, can the union revoke your membership?

HON. L. HANSON: The answer to that is yes, the union can revoke the membership.

MR. GABELMANN: Does that mean in a closed shop that the job is lost, too?

HON. L. HANSON: No, it does not.

MR. GABELMANN: Except for violations of the payment of periodic dues, assessments and initiation fees, or activity against the union's interest that's legal, there are no effective disciplines? The minister says he believes there is. I'm not going to make a big to-do about this particular section.

What we're really looking at is yet another interference in democratic organizations in our society. It's really, for me, baffling that a government that proclaims it wants to do this, that and the other to get the government out of people's lives introduces legislation which totally controls the way in which people in democratic organizations govern their own lives.

I concede that there is a legitimate debate about the question of losing your job as a result of some action or activity against the interests of the union. 1 concede there is a legitimate debate about that, and sometime perhaps we should have it. But this goes far beyond that simple question.

If it's the government's intent or their concern that there be proper, fair, appropriate internal disciplinary procedures, why doesn't the law say that? Why isn't this section drafted in a way that requires due process, fair application of discipline and proper procedures — all of the questions that we would all agree should happen in a union, and do happen in 99 percent of them? Why isn't the law drafted in a way that calls for them to have a fair process, rather than determining the rules in this way?

[4:00]

HON. L. HANSON: I guess we're making an assumption that the unions within their constitutions do have due process for disciplining their members. We've been assured that it's a fair and democratic process.

MR. GABELMANN: I don't think the minister understood me, Mr. Chairman. Let's just start slowly through this. In the first place, virtually every union — and there are exceptions, I concede — does have a fair disciplinary process built into its constitution and bylaws and in fact its own common law, as it were. There are exceptions, and if this legislation is designed to deal with the exceptions, then it's going about it in the wrong way. What the law could say, if this is a concern of the government — and I concede that it is a concern — is that there must be a process within the union that is fair and appropriate and has due process and all of that. If you simply said that, and left the question of what discipline could be about — the parameters of discipline — to the union organization, you would achieve, I think, the goals you want, unless there's a hidden agenda here that I don't quite understand.

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, I assure the member there's no hidden agenda. We are really only debating the amendment to the section, I believe. We are putting in place the wording that the activity by an employee against the trade union, contrary to this act, is an exemption where the employee can be disciplined or lose his job as a result of it. We do accept the fact that there are fair and reasonable disciplinary methods within the union, and are not dealing with that.

MR. CLARK: Those who have studied unions in British Columbia have indicated clearly that they are among the most democratic in North America. I can't believe that unionized employers would be happy with this kind of clause, because unions perform a number of functions in society. One of them is the orderly — not necessarily harmonious — resolution of disputes before they fester. If you reduce the ability of the majority to determine discipline of a few people over a wide range of issues, then what you're saying to them, in a sense, is that the majority does not have recourse to a kind of process that ensures the correct result in terms of majority rule.

What you are inviting, I think, is workers to take matters into their own hands. And workers will, because if an individual scabs on a lawful strike and you take away from the

[ Page 1441 ]

union majority the decision to revoke the membership and therefore require that individual to be discharged, then what is the remedy? What is the remedy for the majority in that case? If there is no remedy and nothing happens, you invite the other members of the minority potentially to disobey the collective wishes of the majority. It seems to me that you invite a kind of chaotic situation which invites industrial unrest and disruption within units. I can think of many in my experience: large pulp mills and others where a small minority of people disagree with the majority view. When you limit the power of the unions, the collective wishes of the majority to deal in a democratic way with those kinds of individuals, I think you invite serious problems.

I wonder if the minister has even thought about why that is, and whether employers in fact have made these kinds of representations with respect to the implications of weakening the ability of the majority to discipline the minority.

HON. L. HANSON: I think the question that was ultimately reached was whether I considered that, and certainly I have in the drafting of the legislation.

I would point out to the member — although I guess it's slightly off the proposed amendment that we're debating — that the union does, through its internal mechanism, have the ability to discipline its members. It has recourse to all of the other remedies that anyone else has to discipline its members. The only place we differ is that we don't believe that internal disagreement within the union should in effect cause the individual to lose his method of making a living.

MR. MILLER: The amendment is really simply a rewording — or perhaps a better wording — of the original proposal. The minister nods his head, so we may simply be debating the section.

Section 5.1(2)(a): failure by the employee to pay the periodic dues, assessments and initiation fees required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. I want to talk about that in relation to your explanation that union bylaws, their constitutions, their methods of disciplining their own members, remain intact; that this clause doesn't really conflict with that. The first question is that section (a) does not mention the word "fines." Most unions have, in their constitution bylaws, a mechanism for a variety of fines in relation to the seriousness of the offence or the breach of the bylaws committed. But that is not included. Dues, of course, are obvious. Assessments generally are levied in support of or for a particular purpose, either to raise money for a defence fund or to send money to another union that may be on strike. Initiation fees again are pretty straightforward.

The whole question of fines that are levied as a result of an internal hearing or a procedure that decides that a member has violated the constitution to the extent that a fine is warranted is not covered. I wonder if you could comment on that.

HON. L. HANSON: As it reads and as the member has read it, I think he is quite right that the failure by the employee to pay periodic dues and so on is a reason that the employee could be terminated; but the application of a fine, as it reads here, is not a reason that he should be denied employment. There is no question that the union may deny membership, but the question is: should it have the right to deny employment?

There are some circumstances, I suppose, where, as prescribed in the act in other areas, or except as prescribed in circumstances as allowed in the act.... But if your question is — and I think it is — if there is a fine for some contravention of the internal union workings, that fine could not result in the employee losing his employment.

MR. MILLER: I'm somewhat surprised, because I honestly didn't expect that response. I thought the minister would agree that's a situation that should have been covered. So what we have, then, is a clause that virtually allows the bylaws or the constitution of an organization — in this case, a trade union — freely adopted and voted on by that organization, to be violated by any member of that organization, and no penalty can be imposed. So we have, in a sense, a state of anarchy or a potential state of anarchy that could exist in that organization.

I really am concerned that this is something that does not apply to other organizations. For example, I presume if you are a member of the bar association and you violate a tenet.... I don't know whether they call them bylaws or what they call them, but there was one I think in relation to advertising. You weren't allowed to advertise. It is my understanding that if you violated that bylaw of the bar association, you could be fined, and that, I believe, is still the case. Yet you're saying that a trade union can't have that same right. Am I correct in this assumption?

HON. L. HANSON: No, I don't think you're quite correct. As a matter of fact, I know you're not quite correct. There is absolutely no reason why a trade union can't fine its member. I am sure it has in its bylaws and constitution circumstances where it can fine its members. All we're saying is that a decision to fine its member and its member refusing to pay those fees is not in itself a reason that the employer is obligated to relieve the employee of his employment.

MR. MILLER: Will the minister then explain or suggest how the trade union could possibly enforce its bylaws with respect to any fine that they may wish to levy against a member for a clear violation of the constitution? How can it be enforced? What other mechanism exists?

HON. L. HANSON: It can be enforced, the same as anyone else can enforce that sort of thing, by civil action, garnisheeing, whatever. There is a method of collecting the fine, and I think that unions, being the democratic organizations that they are, have in their constitutions all sorts of protections that they are able to discipline their members with, freely agreed to among all the membership.

MR. RABBITT: Mr. Chairman....

Interjection.

MR. RABBITT: I'll relinquish the floor in a few minutes, hon. member. To the minister, I just received a phone call approximately an hour ago from a former constituent, and he has related a problem that I would like to get some direction on from you today. He is presently employed in the lower mainland. He was informed verbally by his union that there will be a picket line outside his place of employment next week, and that if he crosses that picket line — an illegal picket line — he will be suspended or fined. He will possibly have his union card revoked, and the operation is a closed

[ Page 1442 ]

shop. This appears to be abuse and not use of a union's authority. What they are discussing....

MR. CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Member. Is this relevant to the amendment?

MR. RABBITT: Yes, it is very relevant. The item I'm talking about is the specific thing we are talking about in this section.

The question that was related to me and I am relating to the minister is this: how will this legislation, specifically this section of the bill, protect him? I realize that there is a section further on in the act — I believe it's section 70, which is also a transition section of the act.... Will this specific legislation cover an individual who wishes to obey the law, rather than break the law?

[4:15]

HON. L. HANSON: That is really the main part of section 5, I guess, as opposed to section 7. But it is in the act that in that circumstance the individual would be protected.

MR. RABBITT: Supplementary to the minister. Will it be retroactive? Do I have that assurance?

MR. GABELMANN: On this question I would just like to ask the minister and the member for Yale-Lillooet.... He should read section 5 of the existing Labour Code, which has been in place for a long time: "...'unlawful industrial action' means industrial action that is prohibited by or under this Act. No trade union shall expel, suspend or impose a penalty...." So when members of the House are asked questions by their constituents or former constituents about how the law might affect them, it might be useful, first of all, for those members to read the law.

MR. RABBITT: Mr. Chairman, I was directing the question to Bill 19 and the amendment that is before us. I was not asking the question about the existing Labour Code.

HON. L. HANSON: The member opposite is quite right. The new Industrial Relations Act, when it is proclaimed, will protect that. But I would refer the member to section 5 of the old Code, which in fact does protect that and which is being carried forward in substance to the new act.

MR. MILLER: I hope the member for Yale-Lillooet would advise that person that protection is there already. We don't really need a change in the present act. I would hope he wouldn't fan the flames of anything now that he has received that information.

Getting back to the train of questioning I was conducting earlier in relation to the union's ability to enforce its bylaws with respect to fines they might levy, my own union's constitution has a line in there that effectively says that assessments and fines are payable before dues. If the minister understands what I am saying, it is that any money the individual may put forward.... Let's say, for example, that the person is fined $50 and the dues are $50, and he hands over the $50. That $50 goes for the assessment, and therefore the dues remain unpaid. Would the minister confirm or not confirm that that type of arrangement is quite legal, and would not be a contravention under this proposed section of the act?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, we're getting into a lot of hypothetical cases, and I guess that clause in the union's agreement would be.... If the employee agreed to the fine, there'd certainly be no difficulty, because he would authorize the employer — if he wished to do it that way, and not pay it — to deduct so much of his money and pay it to the union, as a result of that fine. But I guess it would be wrong to assume that if the union, which had taken these periodic payments each month for 100 years as their monthly dues, all of a sudden said that because of a fine, this normal monthly payment that would come forward is not dues this month, it's a fine.... I would think that the adjudication division would find it difficult to accept that as his not having paid his dues, but it would be subject to the jurisprudence that would eventually be evolved through the board.

MR. MILLER: Mr. Chairman, going back just a touch, when people.... I'm really talking about industrial applications here, where membership in the union is a requirement of employment. In other words, after the 30-day probationary period required by most employers, that individual is required, as a condition of employment, to join the union, and in so doing.... It takes a variety of forms, but the person signs an undertaking to abide by the constitutional bylaws. They often appear before the general assembly of the union — the monthly meeting — and come up to the front. There's a little ceremony, in terms of a swearing-in, and they agree to accept the conditions laid out in the constitution and bylaws — again, bylaws that have been arrived at quite democratically, because in my own case, they can't be changed, except with a two-thirds majority vote.

So the bylaws are generally a fairly carefully watched item in terms of the internal workings of a union. Nonetheless, the person agrees that they will abide by those bylaws. Now in there, it clearly spells out that that's the case — that assessments and fines are payable before dues — so they are agreeing to that at the time.

So with that understanding, why would that kind of provision be a contravention, and why wouldn't the minister agree to it? Because it seems to me that when we talk about the ability to enforce, that would provide a very stable way for trade unions to enforce those kinds of bylaws. After all, in society generally we have a variety of methods.... Even under this act there are a variety of penalties imposed if an individual or a person — let's use the word "person" — contravenes a section of the act, and that applies right throughout whatever we do. I mean, if we park in the wrong spot, we could be towed away, we have to pay the towing fee, and we could get a parking ticket. So I wonder why the same consideration cannot be afforded to the trade union in their pursuit of enforcing their bylaws, which — and maybe I'm repeating this too much — have been freely arrived at through a very, very democratic process.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, again we're dealing with a hypothetical case. I'm sure that that case will come up someday, if the member is suggesting that that is a circumstance, and I guess the board — we'll call it the board for the time being — would eventually make a decision that dues that had been collected over a period of time and were obviously for that purpose all of a sudden become part of a fine, and the dues are still payable. They would determine if that was a fair and reasonable circumstance, and that in fact the dues had not been paid.

[ Page 1443 ]

But I want to emphasize that we're not interested in how the fines are collected. What we're interested in ensuring is that people do not lose their jobs because of non-payment of a fine, which is not a uniform assessment. The jurisprudence that evolves around the circumstance that you're talking about may decide that if that clause is in the bylaws of the union, in fact the dues were not paid. Not being a person offering legal advice, my opinion is that that would not construe a non-payment of dues. If the dues had been collected in a certain manner, over a period of time, and a precedent established, all of a sudden they're applied to a fine, and the dues haven't been paid. I would find that a little hard to accept. But it would be decided eventually. I think the circumstances of the case would have to be considered.

MR. MILLER: I guess our purpose in these clause-by-clause debates is to determine the meaning of particular clauses: why they've been brought in; what their intended purpose is, and how they will apply. I think it's entirely reasonable for us to ask the kinds of questions I've been pursuing, which I don't think are particularly complex, and to get a reasonable answer about what the intent is. You say there is no legal opinion on whether the situation I described....

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: Oh, you said you didn't offer one. Well, perhaps there is one. Maybe you'd like to offer it; I'll gladly sit down if you want to. Is the minister agreeing to stand up or not? Well, I'll have to continue this.

First of all, I'll use your phrase, "I'm not a lawyer." So I'm not certain as to the enforceability or the applicability or what happens when a union tries to use the courts to enforce their bylaws. Maybe the minister is more familiar, and he might want to enlighten me about that. My feeling is that it's probably a fairly difficult process. Yet quite often, fines are levied or penalties are imposed, not because of some desire to penalize someone who's different, who doesn't agree with the majority.

I think you have to recognize that unions are pretty responsible groups when it comes to that. After all, organizations that have spent really most of their time defending people find it very difficult to have a shift of focus and put themselves in the role of penalizing people. There's always a pretty hot and heavy debate before this kind of thing takes place. There are also appeal mechanisms, at least in my union, that give a wide avenue of appeal to penalties that may have been imposed. Quite often the penalty may have been imposed as a result of an activity that took place that in fact endangered someone's life. That's clearly spelled out in the constitution; I refer to mine, because I know it better. There's a section in there that says we're responsible for each other, and if we violate that in any way, particularly on the job, through reckless behaviour, the union through their bylaws has the ability to correct that behaviour.

Yet if we get into a situation where that becomes an unenforceable situation, it seems to me you've taken away maybe not all of the safety opportunities that exist on the job, but certainly one of them. I can recall instances — in fact, I remember arguing strongly against my own union at one point because an employee had conducted a terribly unsafe act that could have resulted in many deaths, and fortunately didn't. As a result of that, the union felt quite strongly and advised the employer that that person should be suspended, and the employer acquiesced. It wasn't anything that was written down anywhere; it was just a deep concern — and it corrected the situation. We didn't have a repeat with that person. It wasn't a long suspension, but it was enough to teach a lesson. That kind of activity, I think, would be denied now under this section. I think that's an important loss; that policing mechanism is simply being taken away.

[4:30]

Yet I get the feeling that this clause has been inserted somehow because of other arguments that have been used: the one that the member for Yale-Lillooet (Mr. Rabbitt) was attempting to put — that is, that the union says, "If you don't do what you're told, we're going to get you." Quite often, there's a real reason why these situations exist. I'd hate to see a watering down or a taking away of the right of a group of people to exercise self-discipline, and that's really what it is. That really wasn't a question, it was more of a statement, but it expressed my concern about what I see as a loss as a result of the inclusion of this clause.

HON. L. HANSON: There is nothing that I know of in the old act or the new act that precludes a person whom the union recognizes as being a danger in the workplace and the employer recognizes as being a danger in the workplace from releasing that employee. There is nothing that requires that. What we're saying in the act is: "No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate the employment of an employee or otherwise discriminate ... in regard to employment or condition of employment..." because of the following.

In circumstances like you're talking about, which are to the benefit of everyone in the workplace, the employer included, I see no difficulty in that happening or any exclusion in the act.

MR. CLARK: The second member for Kamloops (Mr. S.D. Smith) and I were discussing this question, and I'm sorry he had to catch a plane to Kamloops; otherwise he could have asked this.

If a union and a company enter into a collective agreement that states that it is a requirement under that collective agreement to be a member of the union if you work in the bargaining unit, and if a trade union, through its bylaws, decides to expel that member from the trade union, then is the employer required to discharge that individual?

So the second member for Kamloops and I are wrong. The revoking of a membership, even if it's in the collective agreement.... The clause that's in almost every collective agreement that I've ever seen says that it is a requirement to be a member of the trade union to work for that company. It's not a closed shop; it's a union shop clause which simply says you have to be a member of the union. If that person is no longer a member because he has been expelled by due process, then that section of the collective agreement is void essentially. Is that correct?

HON. L. HANSON: Essentially I believe the member has an understanding all right, but subsection (1) does not apply. First of all, 5.1(1) reads:

"No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate

[ Page 1444 ]

the employment of an employee, or otherwise to discriminate against an employee in regard to employment or a condition of employment, because the employee has been expelled or suspended from membership in the trade union, or because membership in the trade union has been denied or withheld from that employee.

"(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the expulsion or suspension from membership, or the denial or withholding of membership, was occasioned by (a) failure ... to pay ... dues, assessments ... or (b) activity by the employee ... contrary to this Act."

MR. GABELMANN: The answer we get from the minister is that he reads the section. We've been reading the section for how long — since Monday afternoon? We're not going to take a long time with this particular section — in fact I think we're close to finishing it — but I think the point needs to be made that when government members deny that we're moving towards right-to-work in British Columbia, they should read this section each time they feel like saying that, because this is a step toward right-to-work laws.

If there is any mystification about that, it's clear that except for those grounds so listed in sub (2), a union shop will no longer be a union shop if a group of employees decides to deliberately flout union rules in the constitution of the union, and are therefore expelled from the union. They keep their jobs without belonging to the union in a union shop. That's not the full concept of right-to-work, but that is more than just opening the door. The door is fairly wide open, and that can be manipulated. Employers can hire.... In a union shop, the employer has control over hiring, as long as there's no recall list on the seniority list and all of that. The employer can hire persons who may be anti-union; when they're hired they will be required, after their probationary period — normally 30 days —  to join the union. They can then undertake some action or activity for which the union by majority decision feels compelled to discipline these people.

AN HON. MEMBER: They have to pay dues.

MR. GABELMANN: They have to pay dues, yes; no question of that. They have to pay assessments as well. They might take some other activity. I'm just setting up a situation which is hypothetical right now but won't be hypothetical for long. These employees — and there could eventually be a large group of them — will continue to work in a shop that has been determined to be a union shop (a) by the majority of the membership or bargaining unit and (b) by a freely negotiated agreement with the employer, and in fact it isn't a union shop anymore. There are a group of employees whose jobs are protected, who are actively campaigning or working against the interests of the union, and they're working side by side. Can you imagine what tension is going to exist between those groups of employees — the union members and the non-union members working in a union shop? Can you imagine the kind of industrial chaos that could eventually follow from such tension and such anger?

I'm going to say something that I want to be very careful about, because it's treading difficult ground, always being careful not to predict things that are bad, to predict violence, to predict events; because sometimes the mere fact of the prediction adds to its coming true. I'm very careful about that. But I will predict that in a few years — because it will take a few years — if this provision remains in place, there will be in workplaces such animosity and such confrontation between workers that it will impair the ability of that union and that employer to have a meaningful and productive relationship. I make that prediction with confidence. I'm not spelling out the kinds of things that could happen, and inevitably will happen, in terms of the way people treat each other in those situations. By this particular provision, the minister is opening up, not this year and probably not next year, but in the years to come, if the government is given a second term, and we aren't elected to be able to repeal this.... Given a few years, there will be pools of anti-union employees working in union shops, and the damage to industrial relations and the damage to that employer's productivity will be untold. I don't believe the government can comprehend just how bitterly people will feel towards each other in those workplaces.

I suspect that the government is determined to plow through with this stuff; but just keep an eye on this over the next little while, and I predict you'll be forced to come in with amendments. This move toward right-to-work will not be tolerated in this province.

MRS. BOONE: I think my colleague from North Island has made some very valid points there, ones that I hope the minister listens to.

I have some very direct questions to the minister. If in a case where a union employee is suspended or denied membership.... He's not listening.

If the trade union has terminated, the membership of an employee in the trade union, and that member is still allowed to work with the employer, do you see that employee still paying dues to the union? Would they still pay dues to a union, even after they'd been suspended and expelled from that union?

HON. L. HANSON: I guess the simple answer is no, because it's difficult to understand how someone who is expelled from union membership could be expected to pay union dues.

MRS. BOONE: If the unionized employee has been terminated and has quit paying his union dues, would the employer be forced to terminate employment? In this act you state that failure to pay dues would be a reason for dismissal.

HON. L. HANSON: I think the member is forgetting that, first of all, he's no longer a union member because he has been expelled.

MR. LDVICK: Except what about paying members as a condition of employment? What about a closed shop?

MR. CHAIRMAN: Would you care to stand, hon. member?

MRS. BOONE: I don't understand where the minister is coming from on this. The union has terminated the unionized person's membership — has taken away that membership — and that employee still maintains employment. He no longer pays dues. The act specifically says that you can — or must — fire somebody who fails to pay periodic dues. Surely the act is quite clear on that: that if that person stops paying dues, then that person must be fired by the employer. The minister

[ Page 1445 ]

shakes his head "no." The non-union person is now working in the place. He's not paying dues. Who negotiates for this person? Is this person then working in a shop? Does he have the same conditions? Does he have the same employment? What conditions is that person working under when he is now one person in a unionized place that has conditions of employment worked through for him by his union?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, Madam Member, there are other jurisdictions that have this and we haven't any examples of such drastic action.

In any case, the person has been expelled from union membership. He hasn't quit union membership; he hasn't resigned from union membership; he has been expelled from union membership. If the union should say: "We lift your expulsion and you come back into the union," and he refuses and doesn't pay dues, he would be expelled and terminated.

[4:45]

MRS. BOONE: This is incredible. I'm getting that the minister is able to twist things any which way he wants to in this. Just in reading the first three sections — the sections that we've gone through today — in two areas you have negated or made void sections of contracts that people have negotiated. In the previous section you voided — and it's stated right in the act — a negotiated part of a contract. Now you are doing it. Although you don't actually state it, you are making void a negotiated part of a contract. For the government to even pretend that this is not anti-union legislation, that the intent — and the sole intent — of every section of this legislation, including this section here, is to non-unionize the sector out there, to make every area non-union, to give everybody the opportunity to get out of the union, they are just covering their eyes and putting their heads in the sand. This is absolute garbage.

MR. LOVICK: I was listening very carefully to that interchange of a few minutes ago, and in order to be entirely sure that I have my facts correct, let me just run through this argument as we heard it.

We have created a scenario that the minister has gone along with which says that an individual is expelled by the membership. As a result of that expulsion, the member no longer pays dues to the union. However, the contract governing the workplace demands a union shop, whereby membership in the union is a condition of employment. First, is the minister telling us that that is not the case, and that in fact if somebody is expelled from the union, that individual still must pay dues or some such thing? How can that work? Let's start with that question.

HON. L. HANSON: If in a closed shop or a union shop the union expels the member from unionship — remember he has been there, and he has joined the union, and he is paying dues and everything — that is not in itself, subject to these other reasons, a thing that would trigger the requirement for the employer to dismiss him. The union has all of the remedies within its own contract to discipline the member. And if he was expelled from membership and that expelling action was raised and they said, "Come on back into the union," and he refused, there is no question that then he would be subject to paying dues and would be fired out of the union.

MR. LOVICK: The question, though, is: is this in effect the end of a union shop?

Interjection.

MR. LOVICK: No, wait a minute. Let me try it again. The minister says no, but I am suggesting by definition that it is the end of a union shop. Look, a union shop by definition is one that says: "Membership in ... is a condition of employment." We have just listened to the minister sketch out a scenario in which he tells us that an individual can be a nonmember of the union, having been expelled, and apparently, subject to the discretion of the employer, may not have to pay dues. I suggest to you that if you are not paying dues in a union shop, then it is no longer a union shop. Not true?

HON. L. HANSON: No, that isn't true. What we are saying — and I guess I will have to say it again — is that it is a union shop. Everybody is in the union, and there is a requirement to be in the union. For some reason, there is a member of that union expelled. If the reasons are not contrary to the ones here, that is not in itself a reason that the employer must dismiss that employee.

Interjection.

HON. L. HANSON: But the member is willing to be a union member. He wasn't by his own volition expelled.

MR. LOVICK: Obviously the ghost of Orwell walks. With all due respect, Mr. Minister, that's newspeak. That is really newspeak. What you have just told us in effect is, well, it is a union shop, but the normal means of defining a union shop don't obtain in this case. But it is still a union shop. I would suggest to the minister that he review the record of that brief interchange of opinion from the last five minutes, and he will see that that is indeed the case.

That's what leads me to my point. I wanted first to ask those few questions to determine whether my ears indeed were still functioning. I am afraid that what we are dealing with here is probably the most insidious and frightening thing of all. Certainly it is going to be perceived to be so in the minds of the trade union movement. For years we have had discussions about something called right-to-work. We have heard about that for years. Always at Social Credit conventions, as long as I have been reading newspapers, the tide has apparently been turned back. Reason prevailed, sanity was triumphant, and there was going to be no right-to-work. I for one have always felt: good for you guys. In some small wise, at least, you are coming to your senses; you are doing something intelligent. I've always been pleased by that.

However, what we have sketched out here before us is very clearly a prescription for precisely that kind of thing to happen. It is quite possible, given this particular section of the Code, section 5, the restrictions of discriminatory practices, to have a group of people working within a union shop no longer paying dues — still getting the benefits of membership, by the way — who can spend all of their time telling the rest of the workers in the shop: "You guys really ought to get out of this union." Of course, in time what can happen is that that group of individuals can become the majority of workers, and what we know will then happen is that some kind of decertification vote will occur. The whole concept of

[ Page 1446 ]

union and non-union working together, where union membership in fact becomes entirely voluntary, is again anybody's classic definition of right-to-work.

Do you not see what I am getting at, Mr. Minister? I'm getting at why it is the case that the trade union movement is going to rise up in righteous indignation and say: "Look, this is precisely what we are getting here. This is precisely what we suspected this government was up to all along."

I dearly wish I could be proven wrong in those assertions, Mr. Chairman. I dearly wish that were the case. However, having some capacity to read English, and some rudimentary grasp at least of logic, I think my conclusions are absolutely correct, and I would challenge the minister to demonstrate to us where we're wrong.

Amendment approved on the following division:

YEAS — 26

NAYS — 15

Section 7 as amended approved.

On section 8.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I move the amendment to section 8 tabled earlier today in my name.

MR. GABELMANN: First of all, Mr. Chairman, can I get the procedure clarified? At this point we're debating an amendment to an amendment. Or are we debating an amendment to the original...? Are we going to debate these as two separate amendments, or are we debating an amendment to an amendment?

[5:00]

HON. MR. STRACHAN: In response to the member's question, Mr. Chairman, there is only one amendment to section 8. There are no amendments on the order paper, only an amendment tabled by the minister earlier today. So the amendment we would deal with right now, and the only amendment, is the one tabled earlier today.

MR. GABELMANN: That's right, Mr. Chairman. It's my mistake, and I apologize.

On the amendment.

MR. GABELMANN: This is an amendment that was introduced at 2:30 today. It came out of last night's cabinet meeting and relates to some apparent activity that might take place next Monday. Am I correct so far, Mr. Minister?

HON. L. HANSON: The section we're dealing with is section 8, and it's entitled "Duty of fair representation." The section requires a union or council of unions, or an employers' organization, not to act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The amendment proposed is to add subsections (3) and (4), which require that a union or employers' organization must carry out its responsibility in a fair and lawful manner. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that parties, either trade unions or employer organizations, who are given powers and authorities over individuals, must discharge those responsibilities in both a fair and lawful manner.

[Mrs. Gran in the chair.]

A union or an employers' organization cannot discharge its duty of representation if it advocates or counsels, or leads its members into, an unlawful activity. We have witnessed trade unions placing extreme pressure on their members to participate in unlawful activity. Those members deserve protection or representation that is both fair and lawful. To quote the gentleman often quoted, Mr. Weiler, he stated in his book Reconcilable Differences: "While the trade union may represent the employees as a result of their majority vote, it is not in a position to govern them." The amendments to section 8 are clearly stated: the obligations to represent are obligations to represent within the law.

MR. GABELMANN: Before we deal with the main point of this amendment, which I think is in (4), I want to ask the minister why trade unions are compelled to act fairly, why councils of trade unions are compelled to act fairly and why employers' organizations are compelled to act fairly, but employers aren't.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, employers are required to act fairly; there are other sections of the Code dealing with that.

MR. GABELMANN: Here we're dealing with section 7 of the Code, which is entitled "Duty of fair representation". Parts of it have been there since 1973-74 — proposed amendments, about which we will talk in a few minutes. This section wasn't going to give us a long debate; there were some points we wanted to make in terms of that, and it wasn't a long debate. But what we've entered into here now is something far more significant. We've not had much time to consider the implications of this section, given the fact that we're debating other sections and attempting to understand this one at the same time. Clearly, if this is the "duty of fair representation" section of the Code, then duty of fair representation should apply equitably and evenly. It applies to unions, to councils of trade unions and to accredited employers' organizations, presumably — although those aren't the words used to describe employers' organizations — but not to employers. Why not?

HON. L. HANSON: I think I should point out to the hon. member opposite that an employer does not have a duty of

[ Page 1447 ]

representation other than of himself. We're dealing with those organizations that have a representation responsibility to a constituency. Therefore, the wording is "union," "council of unions" or "employers' organization," which are all representative bodies.

MR. GABELMANN: I understand that, but I want to suggest, before we get into the debate we have to have on (4).... In effect, what (4) says, without reading it, is that any person can go to the Industrial Relations Council, if that person feels that somebody in a trade union, council of unions or employers' organization is going to break the law, and get a judgment from the council ahead of time, before the law is broken. But if somebody perceives that an employer is going to break the law, they can't go.

HON. L. HANSON: I believe that an employer is also in the definition of "person."

MR. GABELMANN: Madam Chairman, in question period today I suggested a reason why the minister should be divested of one part of his portfolio; this is another reason for divesting him of this portfolio. He doesn't know what he's talking about.

A "person" can be an employer, under definition. But it's the person who goes to the IRC to lodge a complaint. That can be an employer — no question. But you can't lodge a complaint about an employer who may be about to break the law. That's the question I'm asking. A person — an individual, a trade union, an employer, anybody — can go to the Industrial Relations Council and say: "I perceive that next week a law is going to be broken by a trade union, a council of unions or an employers' organization. I perceive that one of those three groups is going to go and break a law next week, and I ask you to tell them they can't break a law." But if a person perceives that an employer — singular — is going to break a law next week, he can't go and get a judgment.

It is so symbolic of this whole insidious legislation. From beginning to end, it takes the employer's side in every single respect, and does whatever it can to put the employees down, in a position where they have no strength, no rights, no nothing. The words aren't particularly important here, except that they are so symbolic of this government's attitude towards workers and their organizations; and so determined to do everything they can in favour of the employer that they even write a section like this. Where an apprehended lawbreaking might take place, it's only if it's a trade union or an employers' organization or a council of trade unions. But if somebody perceives that an employer is going to break the law — go to it!

I'm not suggesting that this section would be remedied by adding the word "employer." The whole section cannot be remedied, because it's a bad section. But we'll get to that debate in a minute; I want to pursue this point first. How is it that no one can go to the IRC for a declaration to prevent an employer from breaking the law next week?

HON. L. HANSON: I have to point out to the member opposite that the title of this section is "fair representation." Representation means bodies that are representing a constituency. We're ensuring in this act that those bodies that represent a constituency act in a lawful manner.

MR. GABELMANN: Just because the section is entitled "Duty of fair representation" doesn't mean the contents of the section have anything to do with that issue.

What we have here is an amendment that was scribbled together, coming out of the cabinet chamber last night, at an emergency cabinet meeting; no consideration; certainly no consultation; no real thought. I can see them saying: "Let's find a section of the Code where we can add a section that will make activities illegal such as next Monday's activity, if it comes off."

AN HON. MEMBER: Before the fact.

MR. GABELMANN: Before the fact.

Given other sections of this legislation, one person can go to the IRC, get a declaration that the activity is illegal, and have it filed in the Supreme Court; and everybody who might take such action as is being proposed is in violation of a Supreme Court order — in contempt of court. That's what you've done here.

[5:15]

Once the remedies of taking all the assets and the financial wherewithal of unions is complete, and you've got all of their assets, through this process, the next step is jail. Madam Chair, there are not enough jails in this country to keep all of the people who will be in violation of this kind of legislation incarcerated. It will do great wonders for our economy and our construction workers, because we will be building jails to hold thousands and thousands of people, if this kind of law is allowed to go through. You invite lawlessness in a society that is built on a foundation of respect for law. You invite lawlessness by this kind of activity.

It is never good law when it is written in the heat of the moment, after a long day at work, at a night meeting, hastily scribbled together and introduced the following day. Some of us have a rule about reacting to certain situations by saying we'll sleep on it before reacting. In this case, the government comes in with a law that invites disrespect for law and will not solve the problem. What will happen is what the minister predicted in his letter to the Premier dated February 28 of this year — the Australian example. In that letter — and I paraphrase because I didn't memorize it — he suggested to the Premier that making strikes illegal, as they did in Australia, doesn't prevent strikes, it just makes them illegal. If the minister or the government think they will be stopped by making an opportunity for such demonstrations of anger to be made illegal, he's got another think coming.

I'm going to say something kind about the Bill Bennett government in this context, which may sound strange; but at least in that government for many years there were people like Allan Williams, Hugh Curtis, Jack Heinrich and others — Bob McClelland too — who understood that they could not bring in laws of this kind. They understood, when those recommendations were being made to them in 1984, partly by Ian Stewart and partly by other representations — certainly by representations from members in the Social Credit Party — that they could not go that extra length. They went a long way in the 1984 amendment, but they knew they couldn't go that extra step, because they would invite chaos in industrial relations in this province; and to their credit they did not go this step.

This government has no one in its ranks who has any contact with — or any ability to communicate with, in an effective way — leaders of both the business community and

[ Page 1448 ]

the labour community. If it did, they wouldn't bring in this kind of legislation. What we have in this province now is a government of Poujadists who don't understand how this society is organized.

MR. WILLIAMS: They don't understand what that is.

MR. GABELMANN: He can ask the library to send him a few books on Poujadism, or however it's pronounced. There's a variation on it called Peronism, Peronists; a somewhat different philosophy, but similar. It's the shopkeeper mentality which fails to recognize that in the real world there's a different set of relationships between people than that which exists between shopkeepers and the community or shopkeepers and their employees.

What we have for the first time since the thirties and Louisiana is a shopkeepers' government. I say with real regret that by introducing this kind of provocative legislation, this kind of provocative action, the words in the minister's letter to the Premier will come true. People will not obey the legislation, because they see it's bad. It will make lawbreakers out of them, and no purpose will have been achieved except to inflame yet further the industrial relations climate in this province.

What we have talked about now for eight weeks is the need to try to reach some accord, to reach some common purpose, so that we have a reputation around the world that is positive. Our reputation as a result of this bill.... Sections such as this amendment guarantee that for years, if not decades, our reputation is set in stone: our reputation as a province where there is nothing but industrial unrest. I regret to say that. It will take a massive campaign on our part, when we're government, to try to undo that bad international reputation, which for some reason members on that side of the House are so determined to engender in this province.

Madam Chair, if you can believe this, I'm being moderate in my comments. My instincts tell me to be much stronger in my language, but I won't. I'm determined to get through to the government, on this issue, what the effect will be, and I hope I've done that.

HON. L. HANSON: As the member said earlier, Madam Chairman, I should be removed from office because of a remark I made this morning. I might just remind the critic opposite that his reference to a "shopkeeper mentality" may not be as acceptable to the shopkeepers as it should be.

I would like to ask the member opposite what his real concerns are, as they relate to a responsibility on the part of employers' organizations and unions to represent and be tested by tests of fairness and lawfulness.

MR. GABELMANN: We referred earlier, in response to the member for Yale-Lillooet (Mr. Rabbitt), to activities such as those proposed on Monday being violations of collective agreements. He raised the question of whether people could be disciplined by the union as a result of not going along with the union's position on Monday. The answer clearly, in the Code is, no, they can't. So I think that issue is clear.

The minister asks me, as if I'm introducing the legislation and have to defend it, whether or not I don't think that there should be a duty of fair representation on trade unions, councils of trade unions and employer organizations. There is in the law already, as far as I'm concerned. But let me ask him: if he feels it's so important that there should be a duty of fair representation on these three groups, why was the amendment not included in the original bill?

HON. L. HANSON: The question wasn't really answered very clearly by the member on the opposite side, but that's understandable, I guess. We're introducing law that says organizations that are representative of a constituency should not be advocating illegal actions, and they should be required to represent in a fair and lawful manner. Certainly the media reports are an indication of unlawful representation or advocacy of unlawful actions by those representative organizations.

MR. LOVICK: I am really not sure whether I can respond as calmly as my colleague for North Island did. I admire his restraint. I find it very difficult not to become incensed and indignant when I listen to this kind of exchange, when I hear the minister responding by not making any effort at all to answer the question as posed, but rather engaging in what I would call frankly a little bit of a cheap rhetorical trick to simply ask another question.

It seems to me that the question that was posed is a very significant one, because what we are saying — and the minister is obviously not denying — is that this legislation, these amendments, were tailored specifically for a particular group of people and for a particular purpose. We are also saying that any Legislature in any jurisdiction that makes laws on that basis is wrong. That's vindictive; it's punitive; it's immoral. It is not the way you make laws in a civilized society in which the primacy of law is the first principle.

If you use law in a punitive manner, and you say, "What we are going to do is to get a particular group, and we are going to do that by writing the law for that special occasion and for that special group," then, by heaven, you have violated a very sacred and important covenant between people and their governors. Law must be above that kind of vindictive, punitive, specific approach. It must be.

MR. WILLIAMS: The author should be here to hear that.

MR. LOVICK: Unfortunately, we are getting no denials whatsoever when we make that very serious charge, and it is a serious charge. My colleague from North Island, though he was restrained in his manner of delivery, the matter of what he said is serious indeed. That charge ought to be responded to. It has not been, therefore all I can assume is qui ne dit mot, consent. As the French proverb says, silence is consent. I am scared to death of that.

When you look at this amendment, it is so patently obvious that this thing was done in the heat of the moment. For heaven's sake, there is even a grammatical error in the first sentence. We are actually dealing with a sentence put together by apparently well-educated, competent, capable bureaucrats who don't even know the language, it seems.

"A trade union, a council of trade unions and an employers' organization shall carry out its function." Who the devil is "it"? The pronoun doesn't connect to any antecedent, friends. Pretty obviously, one has to wonder, if it is the case that one's language defines who one is, as many philosophers will argue, what then is going on? What is the mindset and the comprehension and the understanding coming to us from the other side of this House?

[ Page 1449 ]

MR. WILLIAMS: There was a dangling modifier last week.

MR. LOVICK: I am glad to see a little note of levity creeping in, because we need to do that. Otherwise I would break into tears as I look at this bill.

But the minister has set himself up for precisely this kind of attack, because you recall, friends, not too many hours ago — I believe it was probably yesterday afternoon — we had considerable debate about section 5 of the bill and the justification for putting in the word "buying." We already had "selling" and a bunch of other things, but we had a considerable justification from the minister about putting in the word "buying." I think if anybody looks at the record, what we will discover there is that the case made by the minister was that it gave it balance and symmetry and all that stuff.

Well, if that's the case, then surely what we are talking about in a much more profound way is: just where is the balance and symmetry in these two clauses? What we have instead is one side of the equation being dealt with; namely, the side loosely called management. There's no reference to labour in here. I should say there's no reference to management — it's strictly labour. So where, then, is the balance?

[5:30]

I'm concerned more than anything else, I suspect, Madam Chairman, about this, and I'm incensed more than anything else by the fact that the minister has apparently decided to once again take a vow of silence. That may be commendable in a Trappist monastery, but I don't think it applies here. I would implore the minister once again, as I have before: please answer some at least of the questions we have posed. I think you owe the people of this province an explanation for these amendments, done on the eve of what you perceive to be some kind of anarchy loosed upon the world.

MR. CLARK: Madam Chairman, I feel compelled.... It's very easy to get angry about this, but I really do feel that anger is probably not appropriate. It's very sad, because it is so inflammatory, it is so dumb, to bring in this kind of legislation now, in the heat of the moment, because of what's going on in British Columbia. I must say that I don't quite know.... Other than being inflammatory, what does it accomplish? Because as I understand it, if there is something contemplated which is a violation of a collective agreement, it is therefore illegal under the contract but not illegal under the law of the land, I suppose. But an employer can go to the Labour Relations Board and get an injunction against the employees doing that. Then they could take that injunction and file it in court, and it becomes a court document. It becomes illegal. They have that remedy now. What this does is attempt to say that that's not enough, that the employer's remedy is not enough, that there will be some attempt to make it illegal in a preemptive way under the law of the land. It simply exacerbates the kind of problem we have in British Columbia today.

What we need more than anything else is for people and the government to step back and recognize that what John F. Kennedy said is true. You cannot legislate the hearts and minds of men. You can't do it. You can't do it by legislation. You can't say there won't be any more strikes; we're not going to allow it. It doesn't work. It has never worked in history. You have to work with people. You have to convince people that it's not the appropriate course of action. And you have to be fair. You consistently haven't been fair, but this in particular inflames a very serious situation in British Columbia and is the exact opposite of what is needed on the government side. It is the opposite of statesmanship. It is the opposite of leadership. It's very serious.

I cannot emphasize enough the fact that we need a consensus in labour relations and that you cannot legislate a consensus. You cannot legislate cooperation. You simply have to work with people to do that. Consistently, this government doesn't understand that to end confrontation doesn't mean to obliterate opposition. It doesn't mean to destroy the opposition. To end confrontation requires a mutual respect and trust and working together, and we haven't had that in British Columbia for many years. But more than ever, we haven't had it in recent months and weeks. This particular clause, brought in at this particular time to respond to a very serious situation in this way, is the worst possible response and is inflammatory.

MR. SIHOTA: Madam Chairman, on this amendment which I hold in my hand right now are fingerprints. The fingerprints on this amendment are the fingerprints of the Premier of this province. And I wish he was here, because one common thread coming out during the course of dealing with not only these amendments and these clauses but also this act in its entirety is that there is a bullying attitude on the part of this government — and particularly on the part of the Premier, who cannot accept protest, cannot accept the fact that some people may not like this legislation, and above all, cannot seem to accept that he can't get his way.

This legislation was not authored by all those hearings that went around the province. This legislation was conceived during the course of the IWA strike last fall, when the Premier got it into his head that he was going to decide that there was going to be a new atmosphere, to put it in his own way, in labour relations in this province. It was going to be an atmosphere where the balance would be tilted incredibly in favour of management, and there would be trappings in the legislation that would ensure that balancing. As a result, we have seen amendment after amendment, provision after provision, tied in with a public relations game on the side, to try to create the impression that what we have feared all along is not happening.

The amendment that is before the House....

MR. REE: Madam Chairman, I bring to your attention section 43 of our standing orders, I think it is, which deals with relevancy of debate. We are talking about an amendment to a specific section at this time, and I believe the member for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew is talking about all sorts of amendments. Can we have relevancy in debate, please.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Would the member for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew perhaps direct his comments more particularly to the amendment itself.

MR. SIHOTA: The words that I was using, Madam Chairman, were the words "the amendment," and at that point the member stood up and spoke. I will continue from that word on.

The amendment before this House is simply continuing that attitude on the part of this government. I read the paper this morning, and the headline, I believe, in the Times-

[ Page 1450 ]

Colonist was about a "secret plan" on the part of the government to deal with this issue. Well, the plan is no longer secret, and we know what took place last night in the confines of that cabinet discussion. It's represented in the amendment. When it came down to making a decision as to how to deal with the issue that is going to be before us on June 1, there were two approaches. One was to consider defusing the entire issue and trying to sit down and deal with the problem at hand. The other was the war cry. In the rhetoric and in the confined atmosphere of that room — and I think we all understand what often happens inside caucuses — this amendment was hatched and brought forward to this House.

This amendment simply continues that arrogance, that bullying attitude on the part of the government that if it can't get its way one way, if the legislation is deficient and doesn't go far enough, then we will use our majority of 47 to come in and introduce another amendment that will ensure that we can deal with the problem at hand today.

This government will not tolerate dissent, and this amendment shows it. This government is interested in trying to outlaw dissent, and that is what this amendment tries to achieve. It is a disgrace to our democratic traditions. It is a disgrace to the concept of natural justice which runs right through our Canadian traditions. It is a disgrace to the rule of law as we have understood it in this country and in this province. It is an insult to labour jurisprudence in this province.

If the messenger — as I say, we all know whose fingerprints are on this — had any gumption, he would not have introduced this amendment before the House today. If there was any ability on the part of the member who has introduced this amendment today to stand up to the Premier, to recognize once and for all that there is potentially a crisis that is going to come upon us on Monday.... Sanity ought to have prevailed. Something better than this ought to have come, and the secret plan ought to have been something conducive to consultation and to ensuring labour peace before June 1, not something that was only going to add fuel to the flames. That's all this section does.

If this is a secret plan, then the people of this province, let alone the members on this side of the House, have been let down by this government. If there has been one thing that has been exposed, it is the arrogance of this government, which wants to bully this type of legislation through.

It is becoming more and more evident that this section and the legislation before us has but one mission: to destroy the trade union movement in this province. That's the intent of the government, and if all of the sections and all of the debate and all of the amendments that have come before this stage didn't achieve it, then this section is designed to do it.

I just say that the author of this, the person who simply has to bully his way, who couldn't accept it, ought to have been in this House to defend it and should not have sent a messenger to defend it.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: I'm sort of wondering what I'm hearing from the opposition members in relation to this amendment. Strikes are legal in this province according to certain rules and regulations. That right is there. Most laws, when drafted, basically state what is legal and what is illegal. Here we have the members opposite apparently saying that once the laws and the agreements are in place that make certain things legal or illegal, if someone then counsels persons to violate the agreement or the law, the government should then say, in order to get consensus, in order to get some sort of labour peace, that certain groups do not need to abide by the laws of their agreement or this country or this province. That is basically the argument that is being made.

You say that we need to get natural justice. Somebody mentioned natural justice. Natural justice, by that member's definition, is the right to legalize an illegal activity. Is that not what the argument is here? When the amendment says.... For instance, there is reference to next Monday's activities. Next Monday's activities are in many cases illegal activities. What the members opposite are saying is that in order to get consensus, in order to act responsibly, this government should sanction those illegal activities. By inference, that is the argument you're putting forth when you say that this government should not take any action that deals with illegal actions. You are therefore implicitly saying that what we should be doing is finding a method to sanction illegal activities.

[5:45]

Interjections.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: Is that what you mean? Is that what the members opposite mean by consensus? Is that what it requires? That there are certain groups in society that, despite the laws, should get approval for counselling illegal activities and carrying out illegal activities, and that no government should make any effort to deal with illegal activities? As I mentioned, most of the laws are written to sanction what is legal, what is acceptable and what is not legal. What the members opposite are saying now is that when somebody does something illegal anyway, we should find a clause to say that it's okay.

MR. LOVICK: It hasn't been done.

HON. MR. BRUMMET: That's what you're saying, Mr. Member for Nanaimo. You could, with a little tolerance, even in your grammatical expertise, recognize that there was a series there and if you refer to each of them, there is antecedent for "its" if you would allow a little bit of tolerance. But you're so sanctimoniously correct in your academic expertise that you will not allow that, and so you get into those sorts of things.

MR. ROSE: Madam Chairman, I think the Minister of Labour must be in very serious trouble if he needs our friend here, the Minister of Education. If he needs to be protected by the eloquence of the Minister of Education, then I think he is indeed in deep trouble.

To the minister, who is my old friend, the minister asks us about sanctioning the breaking of laws. We're not doing that at all. We've handled respect for the laws in Canada for centuries before we ever had this piece of abhorrent, dictatorial nonsense that has come here in the form of an amendment.

Madam Chairman, maybe one of the problems with Canadians is that they have too much respect for the law that they will allow a government to impose this kind of stuff over their head. They may have too much respect for the law. They may be too respectful in many cases.

Interjections.

MR. ROSE: I'm not counselling any....

[ Page 1451 ]

Interjections.

MR. ROSE: I am the one member....

Interjections.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Would you please allow the member to make his statements and....

MR. ROSE: I can't speak over the heads of the rabbit pack down there.

I am the one....

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, could I just make a comment before you continue. Would you please just take your seat, and maybe we could just calm down a little bit.

A lot of latitude has been allowed by the Chair in debate that is not relevant to the amendment. I would just ask in a very nice way if we could get back to the amendment. Would the opposition House Leader please continue.

MR. ROSE: I will certainly be guided by your wise counsel, Madam Chairman, and I will be as close to order as the Minister of Education was — probably.

Madam Chairman, what we're talking about here is a piece of apprehended legislation. This is what it says: "... is contravening or is about to contravene this section." That's what he might be thinking about. I don't know how you're going to look inside his head. I'm one of the few members in this House — probably one of two — who were in the House of Commons at the time of the War Measures Act. This bill is a labour war measures act. That's what it is. It has powers in it that are far in excess of what is needed to handle the problem. As a matter of fact, I think it may be designed to provoke the problem. It's provocative legislation.

I was in Canada in October 1970, in the House of Commons, when James Cross and Pierre Laporte were kidnapped. One of them later died in a horrible accident — which wasn't an accident, it was a murder. We brought in the War Measures Act and 92 percent of Canadians supported it at that time. There were hundreds of people jailed, with little or no evidence. Their civil rights were removed. And Canadians applauded — 92 percent of them did. Sixteen of us in the House of Commons voted against that. We couldn't have been elected dogcatchers the next day. We couldn't have run for office anywhere.

Two years later, the whole thing turned around. They didn't find anybody guilty. They didn't lay one charge. Nor did they find any guns to speak of. As a matter of fact, it caused one member to say: "This was the most poorly armed insurrection we've ever apprehended."

So what I'm saying is that you're using this kind of stuff as a legislative sledgehammer to smash some sort of a peanut problem that might occur some time. We've seen dissent systematically obliterated: you've abolished the resource boards, appointed the college boards, got rid of the hospital boards — any kind of elected opposition — and muzzled the school boards; either browbeaten them or starved them for funds. This is what worries me.

It's going to be tossed out by the courts. I can't see how it can stand up under the Charter of Rights, for somebody that's about to do something. Even a dog is entitled to the first bite.

In case I haven't made myself clear, I don't like this amendment very much. I think it's mean-spirited, and it's not going to work. It's going to lead to far more trouble.

Madam Chair, when I said that I felt Canadians had too much respect for the law, I don't mean that we shouldn't be law-abiding citizens. Canadians are law-abiding citizens, and nobody on this side is counselling that anyone break the law. We're not counselling that, but the minister himself....

Interjections.

MR. ROSE: I could name you two or three pretty important lawbreakers, if you want to hear their names: one was called George Washington, another was called Mahatma Gandhi and the other was called Jesus Christ. There are three pretty outstanding lawbreakers for you.

The minister himself said that people are not going to sit still, to paraphrase his words, for bad laws being imposed on them. Or he said it in another way: "Unless a large segment of the population can support a piece of legislation, then it's bad legislation." Madam Chair, this is bad legislation, and people are not going to support it. If they do initially, as they did with the War Measures Act, in some benign, naive belief that somehow this is going to bring labour peace, it will turn around and bite you like that dog.

MR. MILLER: Madam Chairman, it is indeed hard to follow my colleague and his words on this amendment, but I don't know where we're heading in British Columbia. It seems to me that if the government doesn't understand that at this point, we are indeed in serious trouble. We have progressed from a Premier who was unable to solve a labour dispute last year, to bringing in an amendment which in effect denies free speech, and that was one of the principles that this minister and this bill have been talking about for some time.

The way I read this amendment is that it would simply deny anybody the opportunity to counsel people to not abide by the law. If that's not taking away that individual's right to free speech, then you don't really understand it. I think it's fundamental that you can't be found guilty of an act until you've actually committed it. In no other field do they try to bring in legislation that actually prevents people from doing something. We have normal rules and regulations. People know the penalties, and people should, quite frankly, be prepared to pay the penalties. If as a trade union leader it was my opinion that it was appropriate under the circumstances to walk out, to partake in an illegal act or break the collective agreement, then I would counsel people to do that, in good conscience, and no amount of legislation would prevent me from doing it.

I spoke some time ago about conditions, and I think it's worth repeating. In a single operation in the plant that I worked in we killed a number of people, and ultimately there was a wildcat. It was a clear violation of the contract, but that wasn't the point. Sometimes these issues come up that transcend it.

We haven't condoned what is being proposed for Monday. Do none of the members on the government side think they have any responsibility in what's happening on Monday? Vast numbers of people in this province have said they've gone too far, that they should pull back. Despite even these amendments, people were looking for the government to.... It had an opportunity, in terms of amending this bill,

[ Page 1452 ]

to actually draw back, to arrive at a situation where we would cool things off; but did they take that? They brought in probably the worst amendment that could be conceived of.

So we go more and more into the hole; more and more confrontation. Is that why the former president of the Social Credit constituency in Prince Rupert wrote a letter to the paper last night saying that this is not what the people asked for, chastising the Premier? Where are we heading in this province? We came down to this Legislature — and I think everybody agrees on that side of the House — quite prepared to get rid of the inflammatory rhetoric, to get on with trying to do a job in this province, to pull back from the brink of confrontation, and where do we find ourselves? Why is it that we find ourselves dealing with this kind of resolution today?

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: "Captive to one group" — the simplistic Minister of Education.

I don't know what it would take. We've tried the calm, reasoned, dispassionate approach. Nothing seems to work.

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: It's unfortunate, Mr. Member, but we have a responsibility as the opposition in this province to speak up on behalf of the people and against bad legislation, and we'll carry that out.

Interjections.

MR. MILLER: Not by counselling people to break the law; by counselling people to use some common sense. And quite frankly, I'm appalled that the government doesn't take that counselling.

Madam Chairman, this clause undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable debate, and it should be. This is one clause that should be debated and debated and never passed. But we will have ample opportunity at the next sitting.

The House resumed; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. Mr. Strachan moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 5:58 p.m.

Appendix

AMENDMENTS TO BILLS

19 The Hon. L. Hanson to move, in Committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 19) intituled Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 to amend as follows:

SECTION 7, by deleting the proposed section 5.1 and substituting the following:

Discriminatory practices restricted

5.1. (1) No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall require an employer to terminate the employment of an employee, or otherwise to discriminate against an employee in regard to employment or a condition of employment, because the employee has been expelled or suspended from membership in the trade union, or because membership in the trade union has been denied or withheld from that employee.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the expulsion or suspension from membership, or the denial or withholding of membership, was occasioned by

(a) failure by the employee to pay the periodic dues, assessments and initiation fees uniformly required to be paid by all members of the trade union as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the trade union, or

(b) activity by the employee against the trade union contrary to this Act.

SECTION 8, by adding the following:

(c) by adding the following subsections:

(3) A trade union, a council of trade unions and an employers' organization shall carry out its function of representation referred to in this Section 1n a fair and lawful manner.

(4) A person who considers that a trade union, a council of trade unions or an employers' organization is contravening or is about to contravene this section may apply to the council for a remedy under section 28.