[ Page 1417 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 (Bill 19). Committee stage.

(Hon. L. Hanson) –– 1417

Mr. Lovick

Mr. Gabelmann

Division

Mr. Clark

Mr. Miller

Mr. R. Fraser

Mrs. Boone

Mr. Williams

Mr. Serwa

Mr. Rose

Appendix –– 1428

The House met at 10:07 a.m.

[Mr. Pelton in the chair.]

Prayers.

MS. A. HAGEN: I'd like to ask the House to join me in welcoming Doug Hardy, a friend from New Westminister who occasionally comes to watch the deliberations in this House.

Orders of the Day

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987

(continued)

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mrs. Gran in the chair.

On section 5 as amended.

MR. LOVICK: Madam Chairman, yesterday when debate on this particular bill adjourned, the atmosphere, to put it charitably, was rather charged. On occasion, certainly, the moments were not entirely happy, and I am willing to acknowledge that I perhaps contributed to that atmosphere. I sincerely hope that today's will be somewhat more civilized and more restrained.

However, I am concerned about activities undertaken on the part of this government that impinge directly on this matter, activities which I think exacerbate the situation and threaten to make it as confrontational and contentious as it turned into yesterday. I'm referring specifically to this kind of advocacy advertising we see in the newspaper. This kind of advocacy advertising, while we're debating in the House....

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, hon. member. Would you please take your seat. Before you go any further in your remarks, I would like to ask that you direct your remarks to the section that is being debated.

MR. LOVICK: Well, Madam Chairman, I am trying to do precisely that and suggesting that what has happened is that our debate about the impact and the importance of section 5, and all the emotions surrounding that particular debate, are not helped one whit by this kind of activity on behalf of the government. Surely that is directly connected to the motion we're discussing.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, your point is well taken. Would you continue with debate on the actual section.

MR. LOVICK: I shall.

I want to touch on only one other question about section 5, and I don't believe I'm going to be very long today on that, Madam Chairman. What would constitute unreasonable behaviour on the part of an employer who was trying to discourage the organization of a particular workplace? We're talking now about the specific instance of employees banding together with a view to getting their workplace certified, and to getting themselves certified as a bargaining agent.

We have already put some pressure on precisely what that whole section about free speech means; we have asked how it differs significantly from the existing legislation that was there before, i.e. section 3 of the old Code. The question, though, is whether in fact we can come up with any scenario that wouldn't somehow qualify as being permissible because of that free-speech claim. I was reflecting on this and thinking that even though we have language like "coercion, intimidation, threats, undue influence," as I tried to suggest the other day, I think it doesn't require a great deal of imagination or creativity on the part of a lawyer to demonstrate that it is questionable whether any given act would fall into those three categories: coercion, intimidation, threats. I want to just try that out for a moment and see if I can't, in fact, build this case: namely, that what an employer would do in terms of trying to discourage a union — legitimately, perhaps, do under the guise of free speech.... I'm sorry; I'm struggling to get this concept straight. Let me try that again. Given this provision whereby free speech is allowed with only those narrow constraints, I'm suggesting that almost anything goes.

In other words — let me give you an example or two — if an employer were to say, "I believe that I am no longer going to be able to function in a competitive environment if this place becomes organized," is there anything at all that we could use to say to that person that that is not true, that that is intimidation, threat, coercion? Surely it's the right of the individual to say that, because obviously anything that is going to take away from the employer's side of the total benefit in any kind of employment arrangement in a place of work will be considered to be an interference with his or her right to make dollars, to prosper, to function. That's the nature of an adversarial system. Obviously every dollar that the trade union earns for its members is a dollar taken away from the management.

The question, then — let's have no illusions about that — is: can't an employer quite legitimately under this provision for free speech make almost any claim that he or she wants about the threat of a union? What constitutes unreasonable? What constitutes threat? What constitutes coercion? To be perfectly honest about it, when I think about this I cannot, in all honesty, come up with what I would call a paradigm case of violation. I can't see how you could violate — okay? — the legislation that is proposed to us.

[10:15]

If that's the case, if my conclusion is correct — and I would invite the minister, please, to try to demonstrate where I am wrong — then this is bad language, because it does not in any way, shape or form satisfy the requirements that were set out and does not in any way, shape or form satisfy the requirements that were set out, and does not in any way fulfill the promise that the minister has suggested it would.

So I would invite the minister to respond to that question if he can, and try to give us some specific illustrations of ways in which an employer would be doing the wrong thing and would be violating this provision as stipulated in section 5.

HON. L. HANSON: I'm still having difficulty in understanding whether we are here to debate the principles of this bill as it relates to section 5, or whether we are here to hear cases that may be presented to the new Labour Relations

[ Page 1418 ]

Board, if you will, with all of the facts and all of the evidence that leads up to that.

The member opposite is asking me to comment on a specific case that I don't know exists, that he doesn't know exists, and that nobody knows exists at this point. The reason we do put adjudication-type committees in place is to make decisions based on the law that they have to guide them. We say very clearly in the amendment that nothing in the act deprives a person of his freedom to express his views, provided he does not use undue influence, intimidation, coercion and threats. That, to me, is an indication that a good and properly constituted board will make a decision considering all of the facts that are presented to them.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains the following section. It says, "...freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication..." and it goes on to include freedom of association. Those are fundamental freedoms. They're so fundamental, as a matter of fact, Madam Chairman, that the Charter limits the extent to which they can be curtailed. The Canadian Charter of Rights — and I quote — "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out, subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. That's very important. If you try to limit freedom of association or freedom of expression, you will not succeed unless your limits are reasonable. We believe that the limits on the ability of the employer to express his opinions are reasonable, in that he cannot use undue influence, intimidation, coercion or threats.

Section 2(l) and (2) of the Labour Code is quite clear that freedom of association means employers and employees are free to be members of a trade union or an employers' organization. On the subject of freedom our new section 2(3) does two things: it declares that the act does not deprive anyone of his freedom of expression; and it prescribes reasonable limits to that freedom of expression. We believe it is a reasonable limit on that freedom to say that a person must not use intimidation, threats or coercion. We believe that it must be demonstrated and justified, that it is fair and reasonable and that it not imply intimidation, coercion or threats. We go even further and say that freedom of expression is to be curbed if it amounts to undue influence. At this point we have to stop. Any stronger curb on freedom of expression would be against the spirit of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The opposition seem to be reading some dire threats in this legislation that would allow threatening remarks to be made freely to someone who is trying to deal with the certification. I go again to the point that nothing in this act that should stop a person — and that includes the union organizer, the individual employee and the employer — expressing his views, providing he doesn't use undue influence, intimidation or coercion. I still have difficulty in understanding why the opposition are opposed to giving that freedom of information that must go between the various parties so that they can make up their minds fairly and reasonably as to which way they want to go, whether it be representation by a union or an association or individually.

MR. LOVICK: Madam Chairman, sadly we are parallel streams; we are not converging. Clearly we're talking about different things, it would seem to any observer

I don't want to belabour the point; obviously we're not serving anybody's interest by my continuing to do so. Instead, let me just offer this observation. I would suggest that it is incumbent upon legislators of whatever persuasion to do that kind of hypothesizing, that kind of anticipating what the legislation actually means. I would argue further that to suggest that we will simply defer to a board, a tribunal or somebody else to answer the difficult questions, or even grapple with the difficult questions, amounts, frankly, to an abrogation of responsibility. That's my concern, and I say so without rancour. I say it, rather, with sadness, because it seems to me that what we have been trying to get for the last two days is precisely some specific answers to some very particular and specific kinds of questions.

The question in this case, again for the record, is simply: what constitutes coercion, intimidation or threat? I am suggesting to you, Mr. Minister, through you, Madam Chairman, that you cannot come up with something to which all of us can instantly say: "Yes, indeed. That equals coercion, intimidation and threat." I'm suggesting further that if you want to present that, Mr. Minister, I will happily take the adversarial point of view and suggest that I can build a pretty darned good case to suggest that that thing is not coercion, intimidation or threat. If I'm correct in that analysis, if that argument is correct, then the whole section, frankly, doesn't matter a great damn. That's the problem, Mr. Minister.

MR. GABELMANN: As we closed yesterday afternoon, I indicated that I was going to refer to a series of LRB and court decisions reflecting on earlier language, and ask questions relating to the language as it's now changed. But I've decided not to do that. I think we've had sufficient debate on this clause. In fact, frankly, Madam Chair, I think we've spent more than enough time on section 5. I think the problem yesterday was that it took a long time to clarify the issues that were at stake. It took considerable time — most of yesterday afternoon — to get the minister to be as forthright as we had hoped he would have been earlier. We did get that clear from the minister. There's clearly a division of opinion, which is quite significant, between that side of the House and this about issues involved with employer interference in organizing or in decertification campaigns. There is a difference of opinion. We feel strongly about it, and presumably some members, particularly the second member for Richmond (Mr. Loenen), feel quite strongly the other way. We are just going to have to leave it at that.

In conclusion I would like to read a very brief excerpt from a decision of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board which deals with the issue. I will quote the excerpt. It is not long — it's not as long as the thing I did a couple of days ago; it's just one paragraph — and we will leave the debate at that. This is the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board's 1981 Super-Valu case.

"During an organizing campaign, the employees while at work are a captive audience for whatever representation the employer wishes to make to them with respect to the union, whether directly or indirectly, while, on the other hand, the union representatives do not have free access to the employees at the workplace. The employees are economically dependent upon the employer for their livelihood, and, naturally, they are generally highly sensitive to any communications from the employer with respect to union organization, whether direct or indirect. It must

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also be recognized that the employer may in very subtle ways make its wishes known to the employees. Recognition of all these factors leads the Board to very careful scrutiny of all employer actions, communications and other conduct which might, in the eyes of the employees, constitute open or tacit efforts to interfere in the decision of the employees. In such circumstances the employer should remain strictly neutral, and where an employer takes any actions which stray from strict neutrality, he runs the inevitable risk of impinging upon the employees' right to choose or not to choose a union without interference from the employer."

[10:30]

Section 5 as amended approved on the following division:

YEAS –– 29

NAYS — 17

On section 6.

HON. L. HANSON: I move the amendment to section 6 standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

On the amendment.

MR. GABELMANN: I want to ask the minister what the motivation was for the changes that were made, which include eliminating the word "services" and inserting the word "buying" as a major change. What thinking went into that particular change?

HON. L. HANSON: The secondary boycott, as it relates to the deletion of or using the services of, clarifies that the intent of the section is to prohibit secondary boycotts and not to restrict the capacity of the parties to negotiate contracting out language. The primary impact of the change will be on the construction industry. Secondary boycotts and contracting out is also dealt with in a section that we will come to later in the process.

The word "buying" has been added at the request of the draftsman for relationship or symmetry with the word " selling," which is already included. It's not intended to change the substance of the section or to incorporate any new meaning that might not be captured by the phrase "using or otherwise dealing in the products of."

We also replace references to an agreement with reference to a provision of an agreement being void. It clarifies that the intent of the section was not to void a collective agreement but only to void the provision that was contrary to the legislation.

MR. GABELMANN: I understand the second change. I still am not clear on the first change. Would the minister agree that the effect of the new language in terms of what clauses are prohibited in a collective agreement is the same under the amendment as it was under the original proposal? Would the effect of the new language be the same as the effect of the old language, or would the effect be different with these changes?

HON. L. HANSON: The wording as it is in the old act, is it the same as the wording that's in this: is that your question? It isn't.

MR. GABELMANN: I'll try again. The wording in Bill 19 as originally proposed means certain things. Does the amendment to that original proposal mean now that it means different things?

HON. L. HANSON: Yes, it does. The section that I referred to further on deals with an exclusion as it relates to the contracting industry. The wording "or using the services of " was seen to have an effect on that exclusion of the contracting industry in a future section that we will be dealing with. It relates to a clause later that deals with affiliation and union work on a job site, and that sort of thing; but we'll be dealing with that in a later section. So it does change that in that sense.

MR. CLARK: I'm just struggling with how this materially affects it. Can I put a proposition? If a union and a company put a clause in a collective agreement that says you must buy something from somewhere, that's no longer allowed; but if a union and a company enter into an agreement that says that any contracting out of work performed by union members must go to a union company, would that be allowed?

In other words, to make it more specific, a janitorial firm, for example: if they contracted out the services.... Let me just put it this way: if you eliminated the janitorial services from the master agreement but said that any contracting out of janitorial services must be to a union company, would that clause now be allowed, or would it be struck down by this section?

HON. L. HANSON: Yes, it would be allowed under this section.

MR. GABELMANN: But not allowed under another one.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, we will be getting to the other sections. That is an anticipatory question and we'll deal with it as we come to that section.

[ Page 1420 ]

MR. GABELMANN: Dealing with the amendment, we're trying to clarify the purposes of the amendment. It's clear that the change in this section allows something which is prohibited later on, so I'm not sure we've really gained very much in terms of what we're talking about.

What's at issue here is secondary boycotts. The amendment appears to say now that it's.... I think it still includes services — implied, if not explicit — in the existing words. I wonder if the minister can comment on that?

HON. L. HANSON: Are you suggesting that by the deletion of the words "using the service of" it's still implied that you can't use the services of...? Is that your interpretation?

MR. GABELMANN: I'm having trouble understanding why you took it out. There may be a good reason; there may be a specific case, a set of circumstances that would have been covered if the word "services" were included but now is not covered. I wonder if the minister can give us an example of a situation which led to a decision to delete these words.

HON. L. HANSON: Well, Madam Chairman, there's a conflict between the provision in this section as it was originally written and those of another section. Without this amendment to this section, in a section that we will come to discuss later the construction unions that are exempt would not have been able to pursue grievance in an orderly fashion for non-compliance with subcontractor clauses. But they would have been able, in effect, to strike — to put down tools and interrupt production for non-compliance with the nonaffiliation clause. So what we're doing here — this removing "the services of" — will not have the effect, as it would with the wording in there, of negating an exclusion that comes up later in the sections.

[10:45]

MR. GABELMANN: That's what I understand it to be too. Let me ask a further question. The position that the UA — the plumbers, Local 170 — have put to the minister in respect of clauses in their agreement which require that their employers use material manufactured in UA shops in North America.... That provision is clearly still illegal under this change. Would the minister agree with that? He nods, and that's sufficient; he does agree with that. So in terms of an ability for construction unions to have what are in effect affiliation clauses — which are allowed in a later section.... They are now precluded in this particular section.

HON. L. HANSON: I think just exactly the reverse is true. The allowance of non-affiliation clauses, without the removal of "using the services of," would have been voided under this section.

MR. CLARK: Just to get it clear, then, the first change, in "buying," is a technical amendment that no one requested but that was caught by some staff, or something, and the second amendment is really to deal specifically with construction unions and no one else. Is that fair to say? The minister is nodding.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, that's what we refer to specifically later in the bill, but substantially you're correct; it's relating primarily to the construction industry.

Amendment approved

On section 6 as amended.

MR. GABELMANN: What this section as amended does is strip freely-negotiated agreements out of collective agreements. It takes away provisions that have been agreed to by the parties affected by the agreement. In my view, that — and this is not the only section that does that — is a violation of a fundamental principle in our society. If two parties enter into an agreement freely, without coercion, what right does the government have to say to them: "You can't agree to do those things"?

What they've agreed to do in this case is to try — particularly in the construction industry, but elsewhere as well — to provide some job security. One of the fundamental reasons for a union's existence is to provide job security. Many would argue that it is the fundamental reason for a union's existence. The job security that plumbers are interested in, for example, relates to jobs in manufacturing — in a particular instance — of goods that are used in construction here in this province, particularly in pulp mills and other major elements of our industry. What this section will do in that case is say to plumbers in the construction industry in British Columbia: "You will now no longer be able to insist on working with goods produced in North America by your fellow union members." They will now have to work with imported goods from Korea, Taiwan or other Third World countries which are produced by what in many cases is virtually slave labour, destroying jobs around North America, but in particular jobs here in British Columbia, because a great portion of the goods produced that are used by the construction industry in fact come from British Columbia.

What this clause will do will be to wipe out existing jobs here in this province, and why the government would be interested in doing that is beyond me. Why the government would be interested in saying to manufacturers of piping or various components for the construction industry: "We think it's better that we buy this stuff offshore than buy it onshore. We think it's better that we provide employment in Korea than provide employment here in British Columbia." Because that is the effect of this section. Unions and their employers will no longer be able to agree freely to buy material from a union shop or a shop in which the same union is certified, or any other agreement that they might reach freely. Why would the government be interested in wreaking that kind of havoc on those jobs here in British Columbia that heretofore have been produced as a result of agreements such as the one the plumbers are so concerned about — and quite properly so, in my view? I'd just like to ask the minister why he feels it's better to bring in a section that creates jobs in Korea, rather than leaving it alone so we can preserve jobs here in British Columbia.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, it's obvious that there is a difference of opinion as to what the results of this section will be. The suggestion I hear from the hon. member on the opposite side is that this restrictive clause in Bill 19 will create all of the purchasing of products from offshore markets. I could give that member a number of instances where by that requirement, because the particular item was not of union-made calibre in British Columbia, it was mandatory to purchase it outside British Columbia, and in some cases outside Canada.

[ Page 1421 ]

We believe that the fundamental right, as it relates to free trade and competition, is that two parties who sit down at a table and negotiate an agreement that affects the viability and the jobs of a third party who is not party to those discussions...is unfair. We feel that the members of a shop producing goods should have the right, given all of the information, which we concluded in section 5, to make up their own minds to become a certified union shop or not. We don't believe that two parties who have no association with those two should effectively use economic pressure — that in order to maintain their job and the viability of their company, in order to compete in the free market, they should be pressured unduly by two parties they have no voice in to become union members. We feel that it's only fair that the employees of that particular firm make up their own minds, given all of the facts, how they want to be represented, whether it be by union or by association or by individual. We believe that the operation of the plant has some bearing on whether they have a job, and that if the ability of that plant to compete in the open market requires them to become members of a union before their owner's goods can be sold, that is an unfair situation.

I guess there's a basic difference in philosophy. We don't think that secondary boycotts should be used as a method to force people in another organization to become unionized. We feel that they should be able to make that decision without that coercive effect of secondary boycotts. We have cases where goods, as I said earlier, because of the union-made requirement....are actually sending business out of the province of British Columbia because there are not goods of the type that are required to be manufactured in British Columbia. It seems to me to be a negative aspect if we are concerned about jobs in British Columbia.

MR. MILLER: Surely this combines situation, or your fear of it, is covered under federal legislation. If that is the case, and I think it is, why would the minister want to change it? I think there are lots of other arguments here that this clause strikes at what people have freely negotiated. But surely that issue is covered by combines legislation.

HON. L. HANSON: I appreciate the remarks of the member opposite, but we are dealing in this bill with a fundamental philosophy that we believe should be in the workplace in British Columbia. We are quite simply, as I said earlier, ensuring that there is not any undue influence on the employees of a firm who are dependent upon their competitive position in the open market to become unionized or not.

We are simply saying that in the construction industry there is an understandable requirement for those people to have an agreement that the people working with them should be unionized, but we feel that it is a restriction on free trade that there be a requirement that the products used on the site are union made.

Going a little further, I think that I can give you a hypothetical case of a large firm with a coffee room that has a pop machine in it. We think it is unfair for the employer and the employees to insist that that pop machine be serviced by unionized employees, because that then puts pressure on the repairman of the pop machine to become a unionized member. We feel that he should have that right to make that decision, given all of the facts as we put in the earlier section 5, given all of the reasons and communication and information, without undue pressure on him because of economic pressure extended by secondary boycotts.

MR. R. FRASER: This section is such a great opportunity for the company itself. Certainly from my perspective, Mr. Minister, I would have left more things in it, because what you want to do is to make the unit that the employees are working in the most viable or survivable. Protecting your own job is number one; looking after someone else's job obviously must be number two.

There are circumstances where you might want to pick one unionized company over the other, not non-union or union necessarily. So you want to have that freedom of choice. You want to make sure as an employee, as an employer or as a member of a trade union that that economic unit survives. You make that survive by giving the widest possible freedom.

The fact that "services" was taken out.... We hear from the minister that that was done for other reasons. But I think it would have been useful to have had it in. The product is fine; the product will work. It will be better. It will make everybody more competitive, more energetic. It is a survival opportunity really for everybody to work on.

We are not trying to protect the job in any other place but the company where that one individual works. That is what this does. So it makes unions compete with unions, companies compete with companies. It is a very energetic amendment. It is a very energetic section. It is useful; it has value. So it means you cannot restrict non-union; you cannot restrict union; you cannot restrict union versus union, non-union versus non-union. This is exactly what this economy needs.

MR. MILLER: I assume that that wasn't a question that the previous speaker had.

We spent quite a bit of time debating the previous section dealing with freedom. Mr. Minister, does this clause not interfere with people's freedom to freely enter into negotiations?

[11:00]

HON. L. HANSON: No, it doesn't, absolutely not. I think that the member opposite is suggesting that we are interfering with the freedom of the two individuals sitting at the table.

Carry that a little further. With secondary boycotts, an agreement that is made there is certainly much more seriously impeding on the freedom of the third individual who doesn't even have a voice at the table.

MR. MILLER: The minister is now casting himself in the role of arbiter, of deciding which freedom to allow and which one not to allow, so in essence there is no complete freedom.

For example, is there any provision or prohibition between companies deciding? Quite apart from the wishes of a trade union to decide to purchase or not purchase or decide that they will only purchase from one particular company, is there any prohibition anywhere that prevents that kind of decision being made? Is that a similar type of abuse? Does the minister not see that in the same light?

HON. L. HANSON: Something that's being forgotten in this discussion or debate is the fact that there's nothing in here

[ Page 1422 ]

that says that the employer, or whoever's doing the purchasing, can't continue to purchase union goods. It simply says that two parties sitting at a table can't agree to put undue pressure on the employees of a third party by that agreement. There is nothing in here that says that the purchaser who is purchasing goods doesn't have the freedom to purchase the goods wherever he wants. That's certainly his privilege. They can be union-made or not union-made. They can be imported. They can be anywhere. That's the basic philosophy that we're trying to state: two people sitting down at a table should not be able to reach an agreement that affects a third person who isn't in the discussion. But that is not to say that they can't purchase those goods that they had been purchasing for years. It's a free decision that they make. They just cannot limit it by agreement.

MR. MILLER: Following from that answer, then a company could not go to the labour board and say that because they couldn't sell their product to another company, there was an implied provision limiting the purchase of union-made goods. How are you going to sort that one out? For example, say an arrangement exists now in a factory that has a provision in its collective agreement with the workers that they will only buy union-made goods, and this act goes through and that clause is struck down, and yet that factory continues to follow exactly the same thing that they've been doing all along as a result of that original agreement. There is no breach of this section; because they continue in the same manner, that doesn't imply that there is an agreement. Is that what you're saying?

HON. L. HANSON: As I said — I guess I didn't make it clear enough — that's freedom of choice. Certainly they're free, white and 21 to do all of those things, as is everyone else in the world, wherever they are.

AN HON. MEMBER: Free, white and 21?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, that's an expression that wasn't meant to be a racial one. I withdraw it.

I'm simply saying that they're free in the free world to purchase from whomever they want, at whatever time.

I might ask the member on the other side: in the case of B.C. Ferries, do you think it's right that we have a coverall manufacturer in British Columbia that we couldn't buy our coveralls from because they weren't a unionized firm? We had to purchase them from out of British Columbia. It was a requirement.

MR. MILLER: I'd be happy to answer that.

MR. GABELMANN: First, Madam Chair, I think we need a more formal apology from the minister for that comment.

HON. L. HANSON: I'm sorry, and I do certainly make that. My apologies.

MR. GABELMANN: I'm just a little bit stunned by the fact that anybody in 1987 would still make those kinds of racial comments that were so prevalent in this society prior to a recognition that white people weren't the master race. I appreciate the....

Interjections.

MR. GABELMANN: Just relax. I appreciate that the minister has apologized. I must say it's just a stunning kind of comment that shakes one up a little bit. The issue's dead; fair enough. I'll just try to relax.

Dealing with the overalls, the people who have to wear those overalls on the ferries are the people who should be making the decision, I would not, as an employee of the B.C. Ferries, want to wear a non-union suit, coverall or whatever. It would violate my rights as an individual, my freedom to say that I will not wear clothing manufactured by a non-union company. That should be a freedom available to individuals.

Just continuing on this freedom issue, on the previous section the minister talked about the freedom of the employer to talk to the employees about things. This section takes away the freedom of the employees to talk to the employer about where goods that they use should be manufactured. In section 5 we deny employees a right by giving a freedom to their employer, a freedom to interfere; and in section 6 we take away a freedom from employees to discuss with employers. Is that fair? Is that balanced?

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I think the member opposite is taking the wrong approach to it. I think we've increased the freedom. I think that the freedom of the individual or the freedom of the businessman to compete in the free market is what we're talking about here. We're not talking about taking away the freedoms of individuals. As I said earlier, the employer is quite free to purchase wherever he sees as being the reasonable place to purchase.

Let's say as an example that there are coverall manufacturers, if you will, in British Columbia of both kinds. They're all British Columbians; they're all democratic, free people. Why shouldn't they all have the same right to compete in the open market, without an employer and an employee group sitting down and making a decision that's discriminatory against one of those two firms? The employer makes a decision based on price, quality and all of the other things that are involved in purchasing his goods. We just want to ensure that there isn't an agreement written that makes that ability to compete in that open market restricted.

MR. GABELMANN: Leaving the principle issue aside for the moment, you do more than that. The legislation does more than that because it contains the word implied. As I read this amendment, you cannot even have a discussion with your employer about which of those suppliers should be chosen; because if you do, if you say in conversation with your employer, "we want you to buy the union coveralls" — in this case or whatever — that's an implied agreement. So it's no longer legal, right?

HON. L. HANSON: No, it's not right. I think that it's right to say that there isn't an implied agreement that puts undue pressure on another organization to become unionized. There's certainly nothing that prohibits the discussion of quality, the discussion of delivery, and all of the other things that are related to a preferred product to purchase. But it certainly should not be restricted by the simple fact that if it's made in a union shop, the goods must be purchased from a union shop. There's certainly no reason why anyone, employer or employees, can't discuss the conditions, qualities,

[ Page 1423 ]

delivery of any product and decide to purchase a product, but not solely on the fact that it's made in a unionized shop or not.

MR. CLARK: Madam Chairman, I know the minister has apologized for his statement, but I can't help reflecting that it is kind of shocking coming from the minister responsible for human rights legislation in this province.

I must say that the minister has talked a number of times about fundamental philosophical differences, and there are on this question some very serious ones regarding how we view individuals freely allowed to negotiate their working conditions and the things that they do with respect to their work. We believe or I believe that workers do have a role not just in working but in participating in other decisions that affect their lives, and this is one of them. The minister is saying, when it comes to the free and competitive marketplace, that it's free for employers but not free for workers to decide how they would best like to see some provisions that deal with purchases of goods and services by the company they work for.

It really is a very interventionist section of the act. I can't help reflecting that there are clauses like the plumbers' clause, which has been in existence for 60 years in this province. There are clauses relating to the operating engineers which will be voided by this section and have been in existence for 22 years in this province; but the plumbers' clause is the oldest one. I don't know if the minister knows, but every year that's up for negotiation. Almost every year for 60 years the employer has tried to get that out of the collective agreement and every year it stays in. It stays in because the union gives something up in their negotiations to retain that.

What this clause does is retroactively intervene on the side of the employer and takes something away from workers that they have fought for for 60 years and have won consistently for 60 years, and have done by trading off some other gain they could have made.

So it is very interventionist and really strikes at the way in which we've conducted collective bargaining in this province, and in North America for that matter, and intervenes directly to deal with something which has been an irritant for the employers. This clause will have significant economic impact. I don't want to overstate that, but it will have an economic impact in this province.

One of the last pulp mills we built — I think the last one — was the Skookumchuck pulp mill a few years ago, and there was an attempt by the employer or the builder to use non-union pipe. Seventy percent of the contract cost.... There was a lot of pipe; it was the single biggest contract in a pulp mill. Seventy percent of the pipe was going to go to a Japanese company but for this section of the collective agreement that was invoked by the union and fought over.

[11:15]

It went to the Labour Relations Board and was upheld; it went to the highest court in British Columbia — the appeal court of British Columbia — and was upheld. It's not a question of combines, legislation or otherwise. It has been upheld by courts in this province consistently for 60 years, and the latest fight over it was with respect to the construction of a pulp mill, Skookumchuck, which had great economic stimulus in the province in terms of the work it added.

Now we are faced in British Columbia with probably the largest pulp mill expansion in years — close to a billion dollars in investment is scheduled in the next year in pulp mill expansion — and I can't help thinking that this clause and this bill may, in fact, have something to do with the fact that we're on the verge of this kind of expansion in the pulp sector. The timing is really significant, because if this passes prior to tenders being let on all of those piping contracts, I think it's quite clear — in fact, it's inevitable — that the vast majority of that work will go to Japanese, Korean or other fabricators of pipe and not to British Columbia contractors.

That will be the impact of this legislation, and it is particularly significant in this sector now, because of the kind of expansion that's scheduled in the pulp sector. I wonder if the minister could tell the House whether he or his ministry has done any economic analysis of the impact of this section of the legislation.

HON. L. HANSON: Again, Madam Chairman, we haven't done any in-depth analysis, but certainly we've had discussions with various industries on the impact of the legislation. There may be some drift of work outside of the province in the short term. That's a possibility, but we believe that in the long run, when given the opportunity to compete freely in the marketplace, it will generate some new manufacturing that will fill that capacity.

The reality is that there are workers in both classes in the province of British Columbia. By class, I mean that some are in organized labour organizations, others are in simple bargaining associations, and others are totally unionized. But we want everyone to have a fair and reasonable right to compete in that market. We don't feel that the fact that they are one or the other or the third in their relationship with their employer means that they should suffer a hardship as far as the ability to find work — simply because there is a restriction on the ability of their employer to merchandise his goods.

I reiterate that we're not taking any freedom away from the purchaser of goods. He certainly has the right to purchase any goods that he wants, be they union-made or non-union made, but he can't write into an agreement by contract that he will purchase only certain kinds of goods, as they relate to organized labour or non-organized labour, union-made or non-union-made. That's not to say that he won't continue to purchase union-made goods forever and a day, but it will be done on a voluntary, free-decision basis.

MR. CLARK: Well, I think it's a shocking admission the minister made that there is a good chance we will lose work in the short run in a province with the highest unemployment rate in western Canada and one of the highest in Canada. The Minister of Labour and Consumer Services is saying that this section may well prohibit.... When will we next have a billion dollars in pulp mill expansion in this province and the kind of work for pipefitters that we're going to see?

I think it strikes at another question, because he keeps referring to the open market and how we have to compete in the long run. If you expect, Mr. Minister, that we're going to compete with Taiwan and Korea for pipe fabrication, then you're saying that we have to work for those wages. The minister is nodding his head. If that is the future that this government is talking about to the people of British Columbia, then it is not a future that we relish on this side of the House, if the minister or the government does. And it's not a future that the government is putting forward very clearly — although some would argue — to the people of British Columbia. Because that's the inevitability of what you're saying. Consistently you're saying that we have to compete with those countries, and you're saying that we can't compete

[ Page 1424 ]

now, and you're implicitly saying we can't compete now because of the union and because of high wages. So you're assuming that by this clause, if we lose work now because they're all union, we'll gain it later because they'll all be nonunion and working for less money. But how much less, and where does it end?

It is clearly ill-conceived, in my view, and the minister's comments indicate clearly that they are aware of the dangers and the potential consequences to the economy. I think that's a shocking admission.

MRS. BOONE: I'll know better than to let my colleague go before me again, because he's stolen most of what I wanted to say.

I wanted to reiterate the business of the contract — the fact that contracts are negotiated, and that in a contract negotiation there is give and take on both parts. Parts that have this section that gives the union the provision that they must use unionized products.... That's given at the cost of giving up something else. When you deliberately go in and by legislation void something that people have agreed upon, you're intervening in the worst way.

You have said you want to get the government off the backs of the private sector, but you have no fear about putting that government on the backs of the employees of this province. Government intervention, it appears, is no longer acceptable in the private sector, but most definitely acceptable in the employee sector. I'm really concerned about this, because, as I stated, people have given up things in order to have this in the contract.

One of the things that I find really interesting.... I find it funny that you mention the B.C. Ferries, and is it right that they have to use unionized contracts. You're stating that it shouldn't be right that we are limiting the purchaser's ability to go anywhere to purchase anything. Yet this government has deliberately said that B. C. Ferries must use in the kitchen only products purchased in B.C. That is what the minister has said.

Interjection.

HON. MR. STRACHAN: No, you're wrong.

MRS. BOONE: Am I wrong on that? I thought that's what the Minister of Transportation and Highways (Hon. Mr. Michael) indicated.

AN HON. MEMBER: Buy B.C.

MRS. BOONE: Buy B.C. Yes, that's what he's saying. On B.C. Ferries it's "Buy B.C." He stood in this House and said, "Buy B.C.," yet we are not allowing the employees to say: "We want to use coveralls made by unionized companies." So it appears that there is very much a two-faced idea here. You can do one thing on the one hand, but the unions — the employees — are not going to have any rights to insist on anything whatsoever.

Does the minister have any idea as to how the employers are going to give back to the employees something that they have given up in order to have these areas in their contracts? Do you have any idea how you're going to do that? You're most able and you seem most willing to go in there and void sections of contracts that are negotiated in a free and equal climate. What are you going to do to give these employees back something that they've given away?

MR. WILLIAMS: I'd like to pursue the argument that the second member for Vancouver East (Mr. Clark) made. It's very significant. It's desperately necessary, given the economy of British Columbia, that we think about the whole business of putting people to work. It happens that there are these kinds of clauses that trigger those opportunities for employment in British Columbia.

The bulk of the people on the other side probably don't know what's happening in the pulp industry at the moment, but it's fat city. They've never had it so good in the pulp industry in this province in terms of profits and returns. That's because of the market — great demand for pulp. The profits are so significant because we undercharge for the resource, but that's another story, and we've dealt with it before. There is a tremendous amount of money in return there that could, in one way or another — if not through the Crown hands, through private sector hands — be recirculated in British Columbia. If you're on top of things, that's what you should be pursuing, in terms of your broader role in cabinet.

The fact that there may be these private sector agreements with unions that help us in that regard is good news — very good news indeed. We in British Columbia should get the benefit of all this. We produce pipe in this province. We produce it by and large through union firms at decent wages. Now I think that's reasonable, and it should be a decent public policy goal that there should be decent wages in every industry in British Columbia.

What you're opening up in this whole exercise, in terms of pressures, is the downward spiral in wages, which may serve the narrow interests of a few foreign owners. What kind of public policy is that? What kind of British Columbia policy is that? What we really need is a made-in-British Columbia public policy throughout the piece, and we would have, I suggest, very close to full employment in British Columbia, not the desperate levels of unemployment we have right now, particularly in some of the regions where these pulp mills are. It's absolutely incredible that that isn't going through your minds, or at least through your bureaucrats' minds, in terms of this business of putting British Columbians back to work. You should really reconsider these matters.

It seems to me that there's so much belied by everything you're saying today — and that's been covered by others. It indicates a mindset that is so narrow, it's really hard to fathom. Take this whole business of workers being able to choose what they wear. You choose what you wear every day of the week. Workers in jobs that you and I might not like collectively having some kind of say about what they wear, at least in terms of how it was made, is hardly asking for the moon, in terms of the rights of those people as workers. It just indicates a bias that is there again and again in every section of this legislation. The surrogate representatives in the Legislature of the boss are delivering what he wants in terms of public policy and legislation.

All of it pushes us into a downward spiral in terms of the economy of the province and in terms of working conditions and wage levels. It's absolutely extraordinary. If you could just pull yourselves back and see what you're really doing to this province by this piece of legislation and others, you might finally come to your senses.

[ Page 1425 ]

HON. L. HANSON: I'd like to ask a question of the member opposite who says that we have lost our senses. If there were a purchase-B.C. policy, would that mean a purchase-B.C. policy only using union goods? You can continue...

Interjections.

HON. L. HANSON: Just give me a second.

...to make the conclusion that all work is going to go outside B.C., but that is totally hypothetical. I think that if you really got honest about the situation, you would find more jobs in British Columbia as a result of this legislation.

MR. WILLIAMS: We face hundreds of millions of dollars in new capital investment in the pulp sector here and now, and you talk about some pie-in-the-sky right-wing theory. You're the captive of narrow-minded ideology, and that's typical of the government on the other side. We're talking about hundreds of millions here and now that could create jobs in British Columbia here and now — spinoffs from our basic industry here and now. It's not unreasonable that we could have a fair-wage policy as well, as the city of Vancouver had over the last few years. That's not asking too much. That's not asking for too much creativity, even from you and your handmaidens there. I apologize for the potentially sexist remark. There is no creativity on the other side. It continues to turn the screw in terms of wage levels in British Columbia.

It's incredible that we in British Columbia should be worse off in the eighties than we were in the seventies. That isn't the case in Ontario; that isn't the case in Manitoba.

Interjection.

MR. WILLIAMS: There is linkage in terms of public policy, and this bill before us right now is one of the big links, pushing wages and working conditions down and limiting opportunities for fuller employment in British Columbia. You only need some....

[11:30]

MR. HEWITT: Answer the question.

MR. WILLIAMS: I have — if you would but listen. Why don't you get up, Mr. Member from Penticton, and talk about the jobs necessary in your region, which could be improved with a change in public policy? We were there last week, and you guys were asleep at the switch, even in your own riding, as you are here in the Legislature. So I don't need to hear anything from the cheap seats down there, the reduced-value seats, the émigrés from cabinet.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, please take your seat. Would all members please take their seats for a minute. I'd just like to suggest that all remarks be addressed through the Chair, so that we can keep this debate sane and sensible.

MR. SERWA: I would just like to discuss briefly the coverall issue that the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) brought up in reference to this particular section.

I would like to make the point that the member for North Island indicated that the employee should be able to choose whether he wears union-made garments on the job. I would like to emphasize that that same employee has the choice individually of taking advantage of the marketplace for his own economic viability.

Food, clothing and shelter, individual independent choices are made with the intentions of utilizing the marketplace to the benefit of that particular union employee. He will purchase grapes that are grown in southern California; he will purchase fruit and vegetables produced by Mexicans at substantially lower wages than we have in our own area. He will take full advantage of that marketplace.

What hypocrisy on the part of the opposition members to deny the employer that similar opportunity of taking full advantage of the marketplace. That hypocrisy and economic viability of a corporation or a company that is unionized would then deny the employee the opportunity for a job. The members opposite are well aware that we live in a much smaller world today with international competition and trade.

We produce resource materials, unionized, contributing greatly to the economy of British Columbia and Canada. In exchange, we purchase goods made by these foreign companies — perhaps Korean, who have just accepted a large shipment of coal. I firmly believe that if we deny the hypocrisy of the situation, we cannot do anything other than recognize that employee viability is so necessary in the case of maintaining union and non-union jobs.

MR. MILLER: We have really entered a very interesting debate, and really at the crux of this section. I would like to deal with the important topic relating to this section, the downward spiral that could result if this thing has full implementation. We have got to go back and look at it, because the bill is the sum of its parts. So we now have a section that we have just passed that says the employer can talk to their employees about advising them whether or not they should be union or not.

Of course, if we tie that in with this discussion, we can see an employer advising employees in a coverall factory: "Look, I don't think it is a good idea. I think we can get that government contract if we don't go union." So there is the insidiousness, if you like, of this bill. We will deal with that as we go along. It will pile up and pile up.

Let's deal with the downward spiral of wages that could happen as a result of this clause. The previous speaker talked about buying vegetables from Mexico. You know, there is a big debate in California right now where California agricultural workers, who are probably making about $4 or $5 an hour, are faced with some serious competition from Mexican produce, where they make about $4 or $5 a day.

The solution that seems to be coming from that side of the House is: buy the cheapest goods. On top of that, lower our wage levels to the level of our cheapest competitor so that the wages in British Columbia should be the same as the wages in Taiwan and a number of our competitors. It is surprising that we have remained competitive in so many things while paying such good wages in the unionized sector. I don't know why the government feels that they want to unravel that. It's good for this province. It is good that people earn a fair wage.

MR. WILLIAMS: If forces management to be efficient. Has that ever gone through your head?

MR. MILLER: So could the minister respond? Surely that must be a serious concern. We are talking about the economy of British Columbia, not just a simple clause that talks about freedom.

[ Page 1426 ]

HON. L. HANSON: I think the opposition is suggesting that the reason behind this clause is to drive wages down. Then I think I heard another member over there on the other side say that it forces management to be efficient, or it forces operations to be efficient — unionization. Well, I say to him that there's also another factor, and that's that outside competition that you're worried about coming in from out of the province or out of the country with "slave labour," as you put it, that also forces people in Canada to become competitive.

Interjection.

HON. L. HANSON: It simply isn't the union wages that require it. But I also suggest to the members that unionization is alive and well in British Columbia, and it will continue to be alive and well in British Columbia. Those employers who are unrealistic and in fact do pay slave wages are certainly ripe fields for organized labour to organize and bring in a standard of living and a level of wages that they feel are reasonable.

MR. LOVICK: Ironically, Madam Chairman, my last utterance in this House was a kind of farewell to rancour, but it's awfully difficult to pursue that theme after I listen to some of those platitudinous vacuities coming from across the floor. Look, let's be candid about this. If we're going to talk about the free market, marvelous mechanism though it is, let's recognize that it also carries within its wake some capacity to commit horror stories. Madam Justice Rosalie Abella of the Canadian Supreme Court made the point very well some time ago when she said: "We have had too many people sacrificed on the altar called the marketplace in this country's history, thank you very much."

The predicament is that if we leave the marketplace to decide, we cannot, frankly, compete with people who are not protected by health and safety standards, who do not work within safe environments, and who do not have any other assets at their disposal and therefore have to pay low wages. We simply can't compete. And to try to suggest that we in B.C. can freely and completely compete with our counterparts in Malaysia or Singapore or the Philippines or something is patent nonsense. I'm horrified to think that a Minister of Labour, who ought to know better, can possibly suggest that.

What we're talking about when we talk about this business of secondary boycotting — this particular section of the bill — is what we on this side of the House have contended is clearly an interference with the right of the union to do its collective bargaining, the right of the union indeed to function. We're suggesting that this clause, in effect, comes down on the side of management. I think we can argue that fairly readily, if you stop and pause even for a moment to reflect on the nature of what trade unions are: a collectivity that is based on a concept called solidarity that says nobody can, frankly, be allowed to deviate from what we, the collectivity, bargains for. That's how we get good wages. If we allow some people to deviate, obviously our wages go down; that's elementary economics. We surely don't have to spend any time on that.

The point, though, is that workers, having combined together, have indeed accomplished great things. They have accomplished things like safety in the workplace. They've accomplished decent wage rates. They've forced governments to take steps to improve society. They've improved, if you like, on the marketplace, on the kind of state of nature. They've done that.

What the bill does now is suggest to unions that they can no longer engage in those kinds of secondary-boycott activities, and in doing so, I'm suggesting, makes it perfectly possible, indeed inevitable, that we're going to encourage competition from a non-unionized sector with whom we cannot compete. Thus the downward pressure on wages; thus the downward pressure on working conditions and so forth. There's nothing mysterious, nothing esoteric in that; that's just a simple calculus, and certainly anybody who pauses to reflect can see that.

What we're suggesting is that the concept of secondary boycott, freely negotiated by two parties, is a marvelous opportunity to do things that governments can't perhaps otherwise do. Because recognize that when an employer and a set of employees or a group of employees agree to a clause such as those that are specifically prohibited in this particular clause before us, what they are saying is a marvelous manifestation of something that is traditionally called Christian charity. In other words, we will treat our brothers and sisters elsewhere as we do ourselves. What we desire for ourselves, we desire for others.

That's what the purpose of a secondary boycott is: it effectively says that we — management and employees — have agreed to patronize those other firms that abide by the same labour standards and have the same commitment to fairness in the workplace as we have. It's an opportunity, then, for government surely to recognize that here is, in fact, a window on opportunity, if you like, to do something about an otherwise rather frightening and indeed anarchic sort of marketplace.

The other point in this.... And again, ere you think that I'm jumping to some conclusion that isn't borne out and substantiated by the bill before us, let me draw your attention to the first section of this, the enabling language, if you like. Because the crux of that statement is just this: an agreement is void. Think about that: an agreement is void.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sanctity of contract.

MR. LOVICK: Yes, whatever happened to sanctity of contract? What we're saying, in effect, is that if we don't like the kind of agreement you have, then we'll void it; we'll say it's not allowed. I'm willing to acknowledge that there are occasions when governments ought to say some contracts are perhaps not allowable — contracts that interfere with basic human rights; contracts that condone violence by one set of individuals against another and suchlike. But those are highly principled declarations in which government takes that extreme step of interfering with contracts freely negotiated between two parties. In this case what we have, rather, is the government asking for the power via section 4 to scrap and otherwise put an end to agreements freely negotiated, whose only object is to make life better for workers. To suggest that that is somehow interfering with the marketplace and that is, ipso facto, bad is, I think, a scandalous kind of logic and scandalous reasoning.

The issue, as I've said before, is that the marketplace, thank you very much, cannot adjudicate quality of life. It can do all kinds of good things, Mr. Minister, but it can't adjudicate quality of life. Freely negotiated agreements between workers and their employers can do something. They can do something to improve indirectly the standard of living in

[ Page 1427 ]

Korea, because in fact if every employer and employee interaction, every context of that kind, were to have agreements that say, "We will not buy non-union goods and we will not buy goods that come from workers who are earning substandard, indecent wages," then think what kind of improvement we will have made thereby.

I'm suggesting that this clause is a retrograde step. It doesn't, frankly, make much economic sense; indeed if anything, as my colleagues have already alluded to, it would seem to make quite the converse of that; it's bad economics.

[11:45]

Let me just leave you with one other observation if I might, Madam Chairman, directed to the minister. I'm asking in effect that this clause just be withdrawn. The whole business of secondary boycotting as spelled out here is simply wrong. I think it's wrong-headed. It's wrong pertinently, as my remarks have already made clear, I'm sure, on moral grounds. Please — I say this in anticipation of what I might hear from the other side — don't suggest to me that that's some kind of bleeding-heart, soft and fuzzy, warm feeling morality, because I want to remind members opposite that all economic questions are political questions and all political questions are moral questions. Please, let's be guided by that rather than some slavish acceptance of the primacy of the marketplace.

MR. ROSE: Madam Chair, I get terribly upset when I hear what I regard as a very narrow ideological view of the sanctity of the marketplace. It's patent nonsense, and it comes from somebody who's not been educated but indoctrinated. That's what bothers me. If you say it often enough, it will become the truth. It's almost like chanting; somehow it's self-hypnotic. It reminds me a lot of an estimable gentleman by the name of Herbert Hoover: if we say it often enough....

I'd like to talk a little bit about what the member for Okanagan had to say. He said something about a worker buying his grapes from here, there and everywhere, and therefore the market economy is going to be the final arbiter. That may be the case in some cases, but I don't think it should be. Let's extend the logic of that just a little bit.

First of all, I think we might assume that the prosperity that we've enjoyed over the last 200 years has been based on exploiting people in the Third World. The reason we've done well is not that we've got a tremendous amount of intelligence or even technical expertise. That is part of it, and that's perhaps allowed us to develop educational systems, factories and all the rest of it. If you really take that to its logical conclusion, we've done well, Britain's done well and North America's done well because of the exploitation of the people of the Third World.

If you take that thing again to its logical conclusion, you come to this point: the only way we can compete is if we can get our costs and wages down to the level of the Third World. We're not interested, apparently, in bringing the Third World up; in order to compete, we want to bring us down. To me that makes no sense at all.

We always hear: "Get the government off the backs of the people." Let's take the city of Kelowna. Let's take all the schoolteachers' wages out of Kelowna. Let's take all the postal workers' and social workers' wages out of Kelowna. Let's take all the publicly administered funds: welfare, old age pensions, family allowances and all that socialist stuff.

Where is your individual initiative then, Mr. Member? It's not there. That's just patent nonsense.

We cannot compete in wages with the Third World. It's impossible for us to do that and maintain the standard of living that we have. When I was a kid, which was a long time ago, we did not have decent union wages. We did not have very many people employed; in fact, we had a lot of unemployment even though the going wage in those days was two bits an hour. That is not going to bring us full employment — the fact that we lower the wages, or destroy some kind of union contract.

The reason we have prosperity, and the reason we have an internal market in Kelowna, Vernon or any other place is that we have decent wages in this country. You can't sell cars to somebody who's broke. You can't sell Cadillacs to people on welfare. It's impossible. It doesn't work that way. We have created an internal market that we have in our society now. My mom and dad did not have a car. We did not have a fridge, a television, or cameras. We didn't have all those things that are purchasable because we have an internal market and a decent standard of living.

Do you want us to have the buying power of people in Korea? You say Japan has done well. What have they got in Japan? They've got paid vacations, lifetime job security, low interest loans on houses and health schemes in their institutions. We don't need to emulate a Third World country in order for us to be successful. What we have to do is encourage our people to be as productive as they can and our managers to be as efficient as they can, and then see that we share the pie better so more people can afford the things that we — the lucky ones, the MLAs — can afford. But I think it's just absolute nonsense and stupidity to think that by breaking up union organizations or associations or anything else that people bargain collectively through to improve their welfare, their safety or anything else, somehow we're going to restrain ourselves into prosperity. That is patent nonsense.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, it's certainly an interesting debate. I think that we've all of a sudden come from the fact that we're trying to, in the legislation, ensure that all our British Columbia companies have the ability to compete.... I'd like to remind the members on the opposite side that not quite 40 percent of the workforce in British Columbia, I believe, are organized, and simple arithmetic says that about 60 percent are not, and I guess those 60 who are working for employers who buy in the open marketplace are all, from the discussion that I heard, purchasing goods from Korea. I don't think that that's the case. I don't know what relativity it has in its entirety. One member on the opposite side seems to be very concerned about the pipe industry, and apparently in the pipe industry some of our foreign competitors are very competitive. They're also very competitive in the automobile industry and a number of other things.

It's interesting to note that it is better to have a boycott clause in there that in effect could put a British Columbia manufacturing corporation out of business than it is to have that firm non-unionized. That just doesn't make sense. All we're trying to say — and I think the members on the other side do realize that, but won't acknowledge it — is that two people sitting down at a table making an agreement shouldn't affect another person in our British Columbia society as to their ability to make a living. There is absolutely no reason, as I said earlier, that they aren't free to purchase their goods

[ Page 1428 ]

wherever they feel that they wish to purchase them. If there is a quality or some other consideration on the purchase of goods, well and good. That's the reason they should buy from somewhere, not the fact that it is made in a shop that is organized or not organized.

MR. GABELMANN: Did the minister just say that two parties sitting down to reach a collective agreement cannot do anything that might impact upon some third parties who are not party to the negotiations?

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: The minister whispers over: "As it relates to the purchase of goods" — if I heard him correctly. That's not what he said — nor is it what it does, either.

What the minister said was that parties cannot sit down and make agreements that might have some impact on somebody else. Every collective agreement, every agreement between two parties, is going to have some impact on somebody else, inevitably.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's too complex an item.

MR. GABELMANN: I wonder if the minister wouldn't concede that.

HON. L. HANSON: I had assumed, and I guess I had assumed wrongly, that the discussion was on secondary boycotts and on the issue of whether the individuals could sit down at a table and bargain the purchase of particular goods as it relates to whether the manufacturer of those goods is unionized or non-unionized. I guess I should have preambled it with that because somewhere we've gone off on another tangent.

But what I was saying — if there is any misunderstanding in it — is that with this clause the negotiations that go on at a table between two parties cannot unduly affect the decision of where goods are purchased as it relates to whether they are purchased from a unionized or non-unionized firm.

MR. GABELMANN: I don't see the word "unduly" in there, but I'm going to leave that alone for a moment. The minister suggests — if I can paraphrase him, and hopefully accurately — that two parties cannot make an agreement to limit the purchasing of goods from a unionized firm, and that's what this section is all about.

Let me read a clause from a collective agreement and ask the minister if this clause would be a legal clause.

"The employer agrees not to buy or use products from South Africa. The employer further agrees that an employee cannot be disciplined or otherwise penalized for exercising his/her right to refuse to handle products made in or distributed from South Africa. It is agreed between the parties that the operation of this provision will be in effect so long as South Africa has a government that is not elected on the principle of one person, one vote and practises apartheid."

Is that clause legal?

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Shall section 6 as amended pass?

The House resumed; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

Hon. Mr. Strachan moved adjournment of the House.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 11:59 a.m.

Appendix

AMENDMENTS TO BILLS

19 The Hon. L. Hanson to move, in committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 19) intituled Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 to amend as follows:

SECTION 6, in the proposed section 4.1

(a) by deleting subsection (1) and substituting the following:

(1) An express or implied provision of an agreement between an employer and a trade union by which the employer ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, buying, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of another employer or to cease doing business with another person is void.

(b) in subsection (2) by deleting "enter into an agreement" and substituting "include in any agreement a provision", and

(c) by deleting subsection (3) and substituting the following:

(3) A provision of an agreement is not void by reason only that it recognizes the right to refuse to cross a picket line.