[ Page 1365 ]

CONTENTS

Routine Proceedings

Oral Questions

Government advertising. Mr. Harcourt –– 1365

Admission fees to provincial museums. Ms. Edwards –– 1365

Mr. Rose

Interruptible power to Vancouver Island. Mr. Clark –– 1366

Admission fees to provincial museums. Ms. Edwards –– 1366

Highway tolls. Mr. Miller –– 1366

Allowances for forestry contractors. Mr. Williams –– 1366

Environmental appeal process. Ms. Smallwood –– 1367

Municipal Amendment Act (No. 1), 1987 (Bill 30). Third reading –– 1367

Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 (Bill 19). Committee stage. (Hon. L. Hanson), 1367 Mr. Gabelmann

Mr. Miller Mr. Jones Mr. Clark Mr. Sihota Mr. Lovick Ms. A. Hagen

Royal assent to bills –– 1387

Appendix –– 1388

The House met at 2:09 p.m.

HON. MR. COUVELIER: Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to welcome on your behalf four lovely ladies who are resident in the Victoria area: Mrs. Helen Lindholm, Mrs. Teresa Middleton, Mrs. Jane Lewis and Mrs. Kathy Stolle. All of these individuals are very active in greater Victoria in a variety of community enterprises. I would ask the House to give them a warm welcome this afternoon.

MR. JONES: I would like to introduce three very important people in my life: my wife Jennifer, my son Emery, and good friend Nina Hunter. Would the House please join me in making them welcome.

HON. MR. SAVAGE: It gives me great pleasure to introduce to the House four constituents of Delta: Murray and Elizabeth Jackson and Allan and Colleen Cash. Would the House please make them welcome.

HON. MR. COUVELIER: Mr. Speaker, we are fortunate to have in British Columbia many capable financial institution administrators. We're particularly pleased today to have in our presence senior executives from the B.C. Central Credit Union: Mr. Tod Manrell, first vice-chairman; Mr. Ken May, second vice-chairman; Mr. Barry Forbes, chairman of the legislative committee; and Mr. Wayne Nygren, the chief executive officer. I ask the House to give these gentlemen a warm welcome.

MR. DE JONG: It gives me great pleasure to introduce to the House two citizens of Central Fraser Valley riding, Mr. and Mrs. Bill Wiebe. I ask the House to welcome them.

MR. GABELMANN: I'd like the House to welcome a good friend of mine and her sister — Candace and Marianne Parker.

MR. CASHORE: I'd like to introduce Don and Jeanine Goodison, residents of your constituency, Mr. Speaker, and friends who are visiting in the precincts today. Would you please welcome them.

I would also like to welcome to the precincts Dawn Black and Linda Asgeirsson, constituency assistants in Maillardville-Coquitlam, who are at meetings in the area today.

Oral Questions

GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING

MR. HARCOURT: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask the Provincial Secretary about the advertising for Bill 19. We realize that this is just a proposal; it's not law; it's a bad proposal for which the government is plummeting in the polls. Yet last night we saw some ads that are paid-for public propaganda, and we want to know how the Provincial Secretary can justify the expenditure of public funds to promote Bill 19.

HON. MR. VEITCH: Mr. Speaker, I want to thank....

AN HON. MEMBER: I'll bet.

HON. MR. VEITCH: Yes. ...the hon. Leader of the Opposition for giving me the opportunity to respond to our constructive awareness program.

There are two elements to this advertising campaign. There is the JobTrac program: some $80 million that the government of British Columbia is putting into the JobTrac program. I think that's something that you ought to be proud of. And in a free and open society — in a democratic society — especially with an open government, it behooves that government to fully inform the citizenry; there's no question of that. I have no problem with these ads. I think they're timely. They're well done, and it's part of the government's plan for open government.

[2:15]

MR. HARCOURT: Supplementary. Can the minister confirm that this is only the first stage of a $350,000 campaign that will combine TV, radio and newspaper ads?

HON. MR. VEITCH: Well, I can confirm that this government will continue to be an open government and will continue to inform the citizens, and they'll be informed in all aspects of government.

MR. HARCOURT: Mr. Speaker, can the minister confirm that money, time and space that has been allocated to advertise the JobTrac program has been hijacked for the Bill 19 propaganda campaign?

HON. MR. VEITCH: Hijacking is a term that is without my lexicon. It may sit very well with the Leader of the Opposition, but not with me.

MR. HARCOURT: It may be beyond your comprehension, Mr. Minister. The simple question is: did the ads in which the Premier sat on a simple stool to talk about JobTrac and Bill 19 come from the advertising budget for JobTrac? Yes or no. That should be within your comprehension.

HON. MR. VEITCH: As the hon. Leader of the Opposition may or may not know, several ministries are involved in the JobTrac program; they will have already budgeted funding for this type of situation and the funding will come from that area. It is administered through my ministry, through government information services, and I think you will find it worthwhile. I know the hon. Leader of the Opposition would want to have the public of British Columbia informed, especially in such a very important area — $80 million in JobTrac — and beyond that, on one of the most important labour relations initiatives ever undertaken in British Columbia.

ADMISSION FEES TO PROVINCIAL MUSEUMS

MS. EDWARDS: Mr. Speaker, my question is to the Minister of Tourism, Recreation and Culture. Mr. Minister, are you contemplating the introduction of admission fees this summer at the Provincial Museum, Fort Steele and Barkerville parks, and British Columbia's other heritage sites?

HON. MR. REID: Mr. Speaker, since that concerns future action, future policy

[ Page 1366 ]

MR. ROSE: Could I have permission to rephrase the question? Has the minister decided to apply these fees to provincial museums?

HON. MR. REID: The answer is no.

INTERRUPTIBLE POWER TO VANCOUVER ISLAND

MR. CLARK: My question is to the Minister of Energy. Half of the homes on Vancouver Island, about 100,000 households, now rely on electric heating. What possible explanation does the minister have for setting up a system which will require that all of these people either install or maintain an oil backup system in order to get cheaper electric rates on the Island?

HON. MR. DAVIS: The recent announcement of new, interruptible rates will be followed by others. Basically, on Vancouver Island there are another 100,000 customers, most of whom are dependent on oil at the present time, and they can quite cheaply, quite economically, take advantage of the new rates. They can do this on a long-term basis, and by that I mean literally decades. So this is a new service; it's good news particularly to lower-income people, people in outlying areas, and it's the first phase of what I hope will be several announcements.

MR. CLARK: So the minister has confirmed that half of the homes on Vancouver Island simply won't be eligible for this program. Could he tell the House why it wouldn't be possible for those that have electric heating solely to pay the cheaper rate when there's a surplus and pay the firm rate when there is no surplus?

HON. MR. DAVIS: Mr. Speaker, those who are on electricity only clearly need a firm supply because they have no other way of heating, so they must pay the firm rate. The firm rate, in the longer term at least, will require additional dams to be built, power lines to be installed, distribution systems. They require a firm, reliable service. They have to pay the whole shot. If they have an alternate means of heating and can be interrupted, then they too can take advantage of this lower, favourable rate.

MR. CLARK: They're already paying the firm rate, so it doesn't enhance that at all. Virtually every week, on this side and everywhere in this province, we get another press release announcing a discount for electricity for industrial users. Does the minister agree that residential consumers of electricity, particularly in areas not served by natural gas like Vancouver Island, Revelstoke and those other communities, should take precedence, should get electricity before any future discounts are given to industrial consumers in the province?

HON. MR. DAVIS: The discounts to which the hon. member refers given to large industry will expire within the next three to four years. It's not a long-term policy; it's not a long-term rate. Few, if any, residential users would want to buy into some discount rate arrangement; they would have to make a substantial investment in the process and then find that they had to pay the firm rate after three or four years. The discount rates, in other words, are available short-term to major industries and then they have to pay the full rate. That is consistent with rulings by the Utilities Commission, which always looks at fairness and equity across the province.

ADMISSION FEES TO PROVINCIAL MUSEUMS

MS. EDWARDS: Again, I'm going to question the Minister of Tourism. Could you confirm that there will be no user fees imposed at the Provincial Museum, parks at Fort Steele and Barkerville, and other heritage sites in British Columbia this summer?

HON. MR. REID: Inasmuch as we're discussing future policy, the program will be unveiled when it's available.

MS. EDWARDS: Could the minister confirm that he has decided that no user fees will be imposed this summer at the Provincial Museum and the other provincial heritage sites?

HIGHWAY TOLLS

MR. MILLER: I have a question for the Minister of Highways. The minister has indicated that there will be a $2 increase in the toll on the Hope-to-Merritt section of the Coquihalla. Does the minister not feel that that increase will act as a deterrent to traffic taking that route?

HON. MR. MICHAEL: I thank the member for asking the question. However, I would like to clarify for the record that the minister has not decided that there will be an increase. It's one of the options being considered as an element of fast-tracking Coquihalla III.

MR. MILLER: The minister has indicated that he'd like to see a $5 fee on the connector route. Can the minister confirm that this is the new method adopted by this government to finance highway construction in British Columbia?

HON. MR. MICHAEL: Once again I thank the member for the question. The answer is no.

MR. MILLER: A supplementary. Will the minister confirm that he has decided there will be no tolls on the new Vancouver Island Highway when it is constructed?

HON. MR. MICHAEL: I thank the member for the supplementary question. The answer is that the minister has not given that aspect of tolls any consideration whatsoever.

ALLOWANCES FOR FORESTRY CONTRACTORS

MR. WILLIAMS: A question to the Minister of Forests. The Hopwood report indicated that allowances for contractors — that is, where a licensee contracts out works on his licence — exceed actual costs by about 25 percent, and the difference is pocketed by the corporations rather than being returned to the Crown in the form of stumpage. Can the minister confirm that those allowances have now been reduced and reflect the real contract prices?

HON. MR. PARKER: Mr. Speaker, the member knows full well that the stumpage appraisal system is under review at this time.

[ Page 1367 ]

MR. WILLIAMS: There are some bulging pockets out there in the private sector. The truck logger contractors, however, are the people who have been squeezed in these circumstances at the hands of the majors. Their income has gone down while pulp prices have gone up and commodity prices have gone up. They've been badly squeezed. Can the minister advise whether he has considered ministerially approved contracts that have arbitration clauses in them, so that these truck loggers can be protected from the unreasonable squeeze play by the major corporations?

HON. MR. PARKER: Mr. Speaker, the ministry doesn't have a policy of interfering in contractual obligations between business partners; but we have had discussions with the truck loggers, and they are seeking that sort of contract.

MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Speaker, these people, who are the real entrepreneurs in this industry, are becoming its sharecroppers. Can the minister confirm that he is considering this matter in a positive vein?

HON. MR. PARKER: Mr. Speaker, we consider all citizens of British Columbia in a positive vein.

ENVIRONMENTAL APPEAL PROCESS

MS. SMALLWOOD: My question is to the Minister of Environment. The ministry has removed the rights of citizens to full public appeal on environmental issues by eliminating the requirement for public hearings. The Regional District of Central Kootenay has been forced to take on the lawyers of the CPR in order to halt the spraying of herbicides in the Creston and Slocan valleys. In the name of open government — the point that we heard earlier — will the minister now reconsider the procedural changes that he put in place?

HON. MR. STRACHAN: The premise to the question is incorrect. I cannot accept that by allowing for written appeals the full public process is in any way destroyed. With respect to the second part of the question, as minister I cannot comment on any appeal before the Environmental Appeal Board, if there is an appeal in place.

MS. SMALLWOOD: I think it's clear to this side that the people concerned about herbicide spraying in their watershed have lost confidence in this government because of the changes in the appeal process. The minister said that when appeals came down he was prepared to reconsider, if it was brought to his attention that the recommendations were not going to work. This side is bringing that concern to the minister. We are saying that they are not working, and that regional districts are having to take on the courts.

MR. SPEAKER: Order, please. Could the member please come to a question.

MS. SMALLWOOD: My question to the minister is: will he reconsider the changes to the appeal process?

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Sure, I'm ready to reconsider anything, but not at this point.

Orders of the Day

MUNICIPAL AMENDMENT ACT (NO. 1), 1987

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, at the outset I'd like to ask leave that the order regarding Bill 30 made earlier today be discharged, and that leave be granted for third reading of Bill 30 now.

Leave granted.

Bill 30, Municipal Amendment Act (No. 1), 1987, read a third time and passed.

MR. HARCOURT: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

MR. HARCOURT: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to introduce to members of the House one of the reasons why culture has become such a significant part of our tourism and economic development. I'm sure the Minister of Tourism (Hon. Mr. Reid) will know the real people who make his job possible, the people who are daily in the cultural world. We have with us today Mr. Stuart Backerman, who is the cultural programmer for the city of Vancouver. He's the person who put together the cultural program that the minister was working on in California and other areas and who helped put together and was the founding force behind the Asia Pacific cultural festival, which is such a wonderful part of our relationship with the Asia Pacific nations. I would like us to give a very warm welcome to Mr. Stuart Backerman.

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, I call committee on Bill 19.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM ACT, 1987

The House in committee on Bill 19; Mr. Pelton in the chair.

[2:30]

On section 1.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, section 1 of the bill is not a significant Section in comparison to dozens of other sections that we'll come to in the weeks that follow, but I do want to take a moment to reflect on the passing in its thirteenth year of the Labour Code of British Columbia.

This section abolishes the title, "Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979," and replaces it with "Industrial Relations Act." In making this change, the act will — as we will canvass during subsequent sections — adopt an entirely different role and behaviour in labour relations in this province.

The Labour Code was conceived in the early 1970s following years of tumultuous and disruptive labour relations in British Columbia which followed upon the introduction of changes to the original Labour Relations Act introduced in the 1940s, and changes in 1959, through the sixties and in a major way in 1968 with the introduction of the Mediation Commission Act.

The Labour Code, which by this section we are now formally abolishing, grew out of a recognition that labour relations could not be conducted in our courts and that labour

[ Page 1368 ]

relations could not function given compulsory arbitration as a major mechanism of dispute resolution.

In repealing the Labour Code, as we are doing in section 1, we are repealing a lesson that all British Columbians learned in the early 1970s. We are repealing an approach to labour relations that was supported by all elements in our society, given their concern about how labour relations had been conducted in the sixties and very early seventies.

Given that, we are making a fundamental error, in my view –– I recognize that in these comments I am treading close to the line in terms of being in order, and I will not take too long –– I will be careful not to do that, but I think that some of these things need to be said just to set the framework.

We learned the lessons, but for some reason 14 years later we seem unwilling to recognize that we are going to have to go through the exercise once again. This change and the changes that follow will lead us back into those dark days of industrial relations characterized, as I said, by excessive court activity and by the unworkable provisions of compulsory arbitration. It is unfortunate that a consensus could not have been reached in respect of this legislation, as was reached in 1973 — a unanimous vote of this Legislature in second reading in favour of the Code that we are now abolishing. I think it important at this point to remind the House that the letter the minister wrote to the Premier on February 28 of this year contained a very telling and accurate paragraph, in which he warned the Premier this legislation will not work unless it has the support of the parties affected by it.

I want to say one other thing in respect of the change from the Labour Code to the Industrial Relations Act. This is not in order in any section but it needs to be said at this stage of debate –– I find it highly offensive and insulting, not only to members of this House on both sides but to all people in our society, that major changes to an act of this consequence are introduced at 2:15 on a Monday and are called for debate at 2:30 on a 'Tuesday –– 24 hours and 15 minutes to attempt to comprehend and to get feedback on just what exactly the words mean, which is impossible.

I think for that reason — and I say this quite candidly — it will take us a little longer to get through the first early sections, so that we can get caught up in terms of comprehension and understanding of the subsequent sections and don't miss important elements as we proceed through debating this section.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I want to say because I recognize your tolerance in allowing me these comments on this particular section –– I recognize they skate close to the edge in terms of order, but I did want to make the point that we are making a fundamental mistake by not recognizing the lessons of the late sixties; and we are making another mistake by rushing this legislation through, not only rushing it through the House but rushing it through society. Time should be taken before we consider legislation of this magnitude that is going to have the kind of impact it will have, not only on our society here in British Columbia but on our reputation around the world. I am sorry that that process will lead to a very negative image for this province. The government should be condemned for that.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the remarks of my critic. In fact, I don't think that at this point we are debating. We did through second reading of the bill debate the philosophy and so on, but I had understood that section 1 was relating to the title of the new act.

I would just like to say a couple of words about that, and that is that the titles of bills relating to labour relations have been a very fluid thing across Canada. If you look at the various titles that are prevalent across Canada, Alberta has the Labour Relations Act; Saskatchewan has the Trade Union Act; Quebec has the Labour Code; I understand Ontario is going to change theirs from the Labour Relations Act to the Labour Relations Code, and that sort of thing.

I think that changing the wording to the Industrial Relations Act is to signify that we do recognize that this is 1987 and not 1970, when the original one was introduced, and that there are some changes and some requirements for a different method of handling labour relations in British Columbia. That's one reason why we brought forward the Industrial Relations Act –– I guess the second reason is a lesser one, but certainly apparent to me. When it was called the Labour Code, a lot of the public had the misconception that labour meant that the ministry was responsible very directly for the creation of labour, as opposed to the Economic Development and Advanced Education ministries –– I spent a lot of time asking questions on JobTrac and that sort of thing, but that's a minor consideration. The main consideration is that there is a change in industrial relations in British Columbia, and therefore the name of the act should be changed.

MR. MILLER: Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate what my colleague from North Island had to say –– I listened very carefully to the minister's rationale — the reasons he provided for changing that — and quite frankly find it less than satisfactory. What difference does it make if it's 1987 as opposed to 1973? That in itself is completely immaterial and irrelevant to the issue. What I think is really the issue in terms of the title is that "Labour Code" signified and implied, and indeed was felt to be by both parties who operated under this code — the very word "code" itself implies — something meaningful. We talk about a code of ethics. The very use of that word was I think significant, in that the original Labour Code was viewed with a great deal of respect by both labour and management. It may be a small point. Some people may dismiss it in terms of only talking about a title. I think it is significant; we're departing from a document that both parties thought was pretty good, and one they could use to iron out their differences.

Section 1 approved.

On section 2.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, there are two issues that I want to deal with in section 2, again briefly. The first is the providing of collective bargaining rights to teachers.

First of all, if it were as simple as that, I would say to the minister: "Well done. It's appropriate. It's years overdue." The introduction of full collective bargaining rights would be an appropriate thing to do for teachers in our society. Unfortunately — and I can't talk about it in detail — later sections of this bill effectively withdraw the right of free collective bargaining.

I need to take a moment to try to make the point that if the government or its agent has the power to put an end to a dispute, as in education affecting teachers, the commissioner of the Industrial Relations Council has that power if he perceives "a threat to the provision of education." When

[ Page 1369 ]

teachers aren't teaching, that's a threat to the provision of education. So if teachers aren't teaching because they're on strike, there is a threat to the provision of education. The strike — or the lockout, for that matter; the same arguments apply — can be and most likely will be ended by the commissioner, because in a later section he has the right to put an end.... If you don't have the right to strike or the right to lock out, you don't have full collective bargaining. This country is a signatory to an international labour organization that is a United Nations agency convention — in different language, an international law — which says that workers have the right to withdraw their labour in order to protect their right to full and free collective bargaining.

So while this section ostensibly allows for collective bargaining by teachers, in fact it doesn't give them the option or the opportunity to carry out to the full extent their collective bargaining. Why? Because if they get into a crunch situation where the employer refuses to deal in a serious way with their request and they're forced to withdraw their labour, that will be stopped; and what bargaining power do they have then? They have no bargaining power whatsoever. They don't even have the bargaining power of public opinion anymore because of the way subsequent sections of this legislation are drafted.

[2:45]

Not to belabour it — I won't take a lot of time; other members may want to say a thing or two about this particular section — but the point needs to be made that full collective bargaining rights have not been provided to teachers, no matter what the press releases and the propaganda produced by the government's agents. No matter what they say, you do not have free collective bargaining if you cannot withdraw your labour. Nor do you have free collective bargaining if you cannot declare a lockout. In this case, as I said, if there's a "threat to the provision of education," the strike or lockout can be ended.

So let's not characterize this legislation as having given full, free collective bargaining to teachers. It has not. What it has done is to allow teachers to bargain as other so-called essential services in our society, services that are perceived by the government to be so important that someone should be given the authority to say a strike or lockout cannot occur. When that happens, you do not have free and full collective bargaining.

Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about another part of section 2, but I'll step down for the moment in case there are others who may want to comment on this issue.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I did want to take a moment to make a comment to the minister. Part (e) of section 2 should be a signal of a very proud and happy day for the teachers of British Columbia, because for many years teachers looked at other jurisdictions in Canada longingly, seeing that full collective bargaining rights were accorded those colleagues in other provinces — and also in looking at other employee groups in this province and seeing that they had full collective bargaining rights, the rights to bargain the conditions of employment that were denied teachers. As a result, the teachers of this province thought that by seeking their bargaining rights to be included under the Labour Code, they would achieve those fundamental rights enjoyed by others in B.C. and in Canada.

On the surface, it would appear that they have achieved this goal; but very sadly, this is not the case. Although the government has repeated numerous times, ad nauseam in fact, that we gave them what they wanted, this section does not do that. This section gives the appearance of that — gives with one hand and takes away with the other. What the teachers were asking for was inclusion under the Labour Code that would give them full collective bargaining rights, the right to organize as a union, the right of certification and to bargain collectively all terms and conditions of employment. Although it is true that they have the same rights enjoyed by other members under the Labour Code now, those rights have been taken away drastically by other sections in this act.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that what's happened here is analogous to purchasing a piece of property with a home on it; then when you go to take occupancy, you find the home isn't there. I think teachers have lost a home in this province. The home isn't under the Labour Code. Teachers are no better off than they've ever been. Rather than being a joyous and happy day in the history of the teaching profession, it's a very sad day, because teachers are very disillusioned, very frustrated and very angry at this government. I think the reactions that we see in the school system at the moment are a reaction to their frustration.

I just wanted to comment that this is a very illusory right given under section 2(e). When it should be a very positive thing, it turns out to be very negative.

MR. CLARK: I just wonder whether the minister would like to comment on that first line before I go to a different line of questioning.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, the presentations made to me during my tour of the province by the various teacher organizations were mixed, I guess. There was no question that the teachers wanted rights to bargain their working conditions which they didn't have previously. There was some difference of opinion whether they wished for the right to strike or not. But there was very definitely the wish that the teachers did have the right to bargain their working conditions, and we're pleased to do that in this act.

All we're doing by this section is ensuring that the teachers do come under the new Industrial Relations Act. The conditions that they bargain and so on will be the same conditions that all other employees are required to bargain under. I'm sure that those discussions will carry on in great detail as we reach those sections.

MR. JONES: Mr. Chairman, the minister implies that there was some disagreement on the part of teachers throughout the province, and I appreciate the minister traveling the province and hearing briefs. But I think when he heard those briefs, he heard unequivocally from teachers in this province, without any variance in their perception of their goals and aspirations for bargaining, that very clearly what they wanted was full collective bargaining rights, which included the right to strike, but primarily a choice mechanism so that at the point of impasse they would have a choice. And if the minister disagrees with that, that's fine, but I think the minister shouldn't state that what they wanted was at variance from group to group. What they wanted very clearly was at the point of impasse the right to choose strike action or compulsory arbitration. There was no variance around the province. I think that point has been missed and obviously it's been missed by the minister too, and I think that's sad.

[ Page 1370 ]

MR. CLARK: I have some brief questions and comments on section 2, subsection (f), and I'm sure other members — the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann) — will flesh it out. To begin with, this is the section which amends the Labour Code to exclude from coverage any person whose bargaining is regulated under the Canada Labour Code.

Could the minister please tell the House what is the government's understanding of what this clause does, and how many provinces have this kind of exclusion in their labour legislation?

HON. L. HANSON: I'm not sure I can answer how many provinces specifically. In any case, I think it's been fairly clear in some of the actions that have happened in the past that there has been a lack of clarity as to whose jurisdiction those employers who are regulated by the federal government come under. In the past, determining which court or tribunal had jurisdiction over picketing has often been a complex and difficult issue.

What we are simply saying here is that when there is a labour disagreement, I guess, if you will — and it could happen with either management or labour — and it relates to an employer who is governed federally, then he must seek his action, or at least his answer, either from the Canadian labour board or the courts. It's not a question of any of those individuals, or at least of those circumstances, not having access to a judicial body of some kind to make decisions on it; it's a question of clarifying where they should go for that decision.

MR. CLARK: Can the minister name one province where federally regulated employees are specifically excluded from coverage under its labour code?

HON. L. HANSON: No, I can't name another province. To the best of my knowledge I don't know another one that does have it. That doesn't mean that it isn't a good jurisdiction for British Columbia.

But by that same token, I want to reiterate that no one in the labour relations field, be it federally regulated or provincially regulated, is having his right to a hearing before a judicial body removed.

MR. CLARK: Can the minister confirm that one effect of this amendment is to ensure that no federally regulated employer can now be declared an ally of a provincial employer who's on strike or locked out?

HON. L. HANSON: I think that the opposition member has stated a fact. They cannot be considered an ally, but certainly it was not part of the motivation within the bill.

MR. CLARK: The minister says it's not part of the motivation for the bill. It seems to me the only motivation for the bill, in many respects. I think that it is unduly disruptive for labour relations. I'll just give you an example. If the provincial government Centrex staff go on strike, then it seems to me that they could call on B.C. Tel to keep the equipment going for them, because B.C. Tel is a federally regulated operation. So there'd be no protection in terms of provincially regulated bodies that are on strike from that work not being done by federally regulated operations. Can the minister confirm that that is, in fact, the major implication of this legislation?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, it's not a denial of right but a clarification of jurisdiction. That's the whole motivation behind it. But in the circumstance that the member opposite was talking about, I would suspect that the B.C. Tel, or its employees' union, would seek an injunction from a court to prevent that from happening. You suggested who? What was the other?

AN HON. MEMBER: Centrex.

HON. L. HANSON: Centrex? Well then, I would suggest that Centrex or its organization representing its employees would immediately seek an injunction from the court.

MR. CLARK: So simply to declare an employer an ally you have to go to court to get a ruling? Surely that's an incredibly expensive and time-consuming delay. And if that's true, then it's really counterproductive for industrial relations, as we've seen with many cases of attempts to move more of these matters into the courts.

One simple question. The minister said in the briefing documents that "someone asked for everything that was in this bill." Can the minister indicate, given that that ally provision — not being able to declare someone an ally — has tremendous consequences in all kinds of fields in British Columbia, which organizations asked for such an amendment?

HON. L. HANSON: I don't think there has to be a request for any amendment; in considering things, government must sometimes make up its mind as to what is best. But let me tell you of a case which appeared to require clarification. There was a request or an appeal, if you will, going to the Labour Relations Board of British Columbia. It involved a federal government-regulated organization, and the Labour Relations Board refused jurisdiction. They went to court, and the courts refused them jurisdiction. So all we're trying to do here is make sure that anyone who has a dispute or needs clarification of something that is in dispute knows where the resolution mechanism is.

MR. SIHOTA: I'm having some difficulty following the minister's supposed motivation for having put in this clause. The minister is saying that it's really to clarify issues of jurisdiction, so that people know where to go in a labour relations matter. This act, or its predecessor, clearly deals with B.C. labour relations matters; and we have a federal Canadian Labour Code that deals with federal matters. Under the British North America Act we know which areas the federal government has responsibility for and which areas the province has responsibility for. I don't see where the need arises to clarify the jurisdiction. I wonder if the minister could provide us with an example of what he means when he says there's a need to know where you have to go. It seems to me that we already know where we have to go: if you're a federally regulated company, you go to the federal jurisdiction, and you're covered by the federal Code; if you're a company that operates in the provincial realm, you work under the provincial Labour Code. Could he provide us with a concrete example of what he's thinking about when he talks about a jurisdictional motivation behind this?

[3:00]

[ Page 1371 ]

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, currently there's a conflict in the law regarding Labour Relations Board jurisdiction over employers subject to the Canada Labour Code. Some Labour Relations Board decisions suggest that where a federally regulated employer — for example, the CPR or CNR — is involved in a dispute, the employer must be subject to the B.C. Labour Code. That federally regulated employer must apply to the Labour Relations Board for an order to halt the picketing of its B. C. operations by the trade union. However, there are other judicial decisions which state otherwise, requiring the federally regulated employer to go to court to obtain such an order. That confusion that exists is all that we're trying to clear up. I'm sure that we can dig into case law and find some cases to present to the member opposite.

MR. SIHOTA: It seems to me then that the problem is really one of picketing, and that's obviously the intention here. If you have a federally regulated company being picketed and there's an ally activity going on, that company has to decide where it should go. If there's a flaw in the jurisprudence, in terms of the same board saying, "You should come to me," and then, "No, you should go to the other board," I don't think this is the way to correct it. The only example that the minister is able to point out, and the only one that makes any sense, is with respect to picketing and allies. Will the minister now confirm that the sole motivation behind this section is to deal with the matter of allies and picketing?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, I won't confirm that, because that is not the motivation. In fact, with picketing, we believe that the courts would apply section 12 of the Interpretation Act to find a contrary intention, which.... If the member opposite is suggesting that this is a deliberate attempt to avoid the application of section 84, regarding information picketing, it's our information that if that were taken to the courts, using section 12 of the Interpretation Act they would likely find a contrary intention.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, section 84 of the Code, which the minister referred to, deals with information picketing, which is different from picketing. They are two different kinds of picketing. What we're trying to establish here is that this section has implications, intended or otherwise — and I can't quite tell.... Earlier it sounded as if the minister didn't intend these implications, and later, as he gets warmed up, it sounds as if he did intend the implications. The clear implication is that if you are a provincially regulated employer and your employees are on strike, you as the employer enlist the assistance of a federally regulated company to produce your goods or services for you.

Under current law, you can go to the B. C. Labour Relations Board and have a declaration of ally status imposed on that federally regulated employer. With this change, you can no longer do that. What's the effect of that? To lengthen the strike in place in the first-named employer. Why would the minister want to bring in changes that would lengthen a dispute?

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, we understand the concern that the member opposite is expressing, but by the same token, all we're trying to do is clarify where they should go for their remedy. If in fact a B. C. company was obtaining goods from a federally regulated company, we're simply saying that they would go to the courts or to the Canada Labour Relations Board to get their remedy to stop that action which is harmful to their intent.

The member is saying that that is a delaying tactic. Well, I suspect that .... I don't know the court system that well — whether it's a delaying tactic or not — but we're certainly providing a judicial body for those people who feel they've been harmfully dealt with to get a remedy. All we're attempting to do is clarify that.

Another thing is, I guess there's some question then, if we did change that.... Would the federally regulated body be subject to the B.C. Labour Relations Board's ruling?

MR. GABELMANN: Well, Mr. Speaker, I'd like to go back to the beginning of this discussion. Dealing with this issue that the members for Esquimalt-Port Renfrew (Mr. Sihota), Vancouver East and I are pursuing at the moment, the minister said, as I remember, that this implication wasn't the reason this language was brought in. If I understood him, the reason was that people didn't know whether they were supposed to go to the LRB, to the Canada Labour Relations Board or to the courts for redress. I can't believe that we would bring in a section to a bill like this simply to help lawyers make up their minds which board or court they are to address their grievance to. Is that what the minister is suggesting — that people don't know where to go?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm not suggesting that people don't know where to go. The member is effectively putting words in my mouth, if you will. But by the same token, all it is is a jurisdictional clause. We're simply saying that if you have a difficulty with a federally regulated organization, go to this body and get your recourse. We're not stopping anyone from having the ability to have their decisions made. The member raised the question that it takes longer there; maybe it does, I don't know. But there has been confusion in the past with where someone goes for a remedy when they have a difficulty. There are cases that we can present to the members opposite, although we don't have them with us, that.... All this is saying is that we're clarifying that if it's a provincially regulated body, their court is the Industrial Relations Council; if it's a federally regulated body, it's the courts or the labour board of Canada.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, that's been the case for decades. Everybody knows it. If you have a labour dispute at B.C. Tel, you know that you go to the Canada Labour Relations Board; if you have a dispute with Mac-Blo in the woods industry, you go to the B. C. Labour Relations Board — everybody knows that. What we're talking about is if the dispute transcends the jurisdictions, and a provincially regulated employer takes advantage of the fact that he can get a federally regulated employer to do his business without having that federally regulated employer declared an ally and therefore subject to picketing.

Is the minister suggesting that if a provincially regulated company is on strike and uses as an ally a federally regulated company, the union can make an application to the Canada Labour Relations Board for a declaration that that federally regulated employer is an ally, and that that ally status will stand up in respect of B.C. labour law?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, the Hon. member is building a very hypothetical case. I am certainly not one to

[ Page 1372 ]

give out legal advice, even if I knew what legal advice to give.

We are simply clarifying jurisdiction, and quite often — I think the member is quite right — it is cross-jurisdiction that causes the confusion, when it is very clear there is no difficulty in finding that out.

I think that in most cases it is recognized. But there are cases we have heard and cases we can present that that is a question of argument. All we are simply saying is that federally that's where you go; provincially this is where you go.

MR. SIHOTA: As a further question to the minister, what is the minister proposing would happen in a situation wherein, to embrace what I understand now to be the minister's argument, there is a provincial dispute and a federal ally, and the provincial company then goes to the federal board trying to seek a remedy? The federal board turns around and says: "Hey, look, this is a provincial dispute. We don't have any jurisdiction."

Is the minister suggesting that in those instances the matter should go back to the provincial board? Or should it go to the courts, or should it be left where it is, because it seems to me that you are going to have that problem immediately, because a federal board will just simply say it is a provincial dispute.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. member has actually made the case for us. What we are saying is that the remedy to that individual would be to the court who has overriding jurisdiction, or at least crossing provincial boundary jurisdictions.

MR. SIHOTA: I can't believe what I am hearing. I mean, the minister is now saying that if the province can't decide and the federal board can't decide, I guess the courts will decide.

Does that then not result in lengthening of the dispute? Yes or no, given the fact that the courts, as we all know, are backlogged?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, with due respect to the member opposite, who I understand is a lawyer, we don't know that the courts are that slow.

But by the same token, when there is a question of jurisdiction, we have simply clarified here that the provincial jurisdiction lies with the provincial bodies, and that the federal jurisdiction lies with the others. If there is an interprovincial jurisdiction question that the federal board does not feel is under its jurisdiction, the recourse is then to the courts.

MR. CLARK: It is clear that the minister does not understand the consequences of this amendment. I just want to back up again. I am going to try not to be pejorative, but if the purpose of it is to clarify the distinctions between the Canada Labour Code and the B.C. Labour Code, no other jurisdiction in Canada has such a distinction. Everybody knows at B.C. Tel that they go to the federal labour board, and that the IWA goes to the provincial labour board. Those are common. If that is the only intent, to clarify the jurisdictions of the two boards, then this has unintended consequences which are serious and could be very disruptive. The minister is shaking his head.

Clearly it will. If it reduces the power of a provincially regulated trade union to declare as an ally a federally regulated company, which the minister admits is the unintended impact of this change, then it has serious ramifications for industrial harmony and peace in this province. I gave you an example of Centrex, which is a provincially regulated organization that could then use B. C. Tel. management to do their work, and it would have no impact. The provincially regulated union would have no recourse.

Could the minister tell us, if the courts are the redress, under what statute would the workers in the Centrex union, for example, apply to the courts to get an injunction to stop management employees at B.C. Tel from breaking their strike? Could the minister give us some example of where, if this change takes place, the provincially regulated union is now not allowed to declare as an ally a federally regulated company which has their employees — if that's the impact of this legislation...? Under what statute could the union go to court to get an injunction to stop that work from being performed?

[3:15]

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure that it's the business of the Industrial Relations Act to define what the courts can deal with. That's where he would go for recourse.

MR. SIHOTA: Let's just take that thought a bit further, then, Mr. Chairman. The minister is saying that a provincially regulated company that is involved in a dispute that cuts across borders and deals with a B.C. resident company that is federally regulated.... If you have a dispute, first of all — if the minister is to be accepted in this argument — you can't come to the British Columbia code; you have to go to the federal, and the federal says that in their view they don't have jurisdiction. Then you go to the court and the court makes a determination, and if the court makes a determination that really this is a matter of provincial jurisdiction, has that not frustrated, then, the very thing that the minister is trying to do?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, we in our deliberations with the labour legislation and this particular section, in an attempt to clarify it, certainly don't see the concern that the hon. member raises as being a very real one. We think that it will be handled quite comfortably with the method that we have suggested: the provincial jurisdiction for provincial bodies, the federal jurisdiction for federal bodies, and the courts where the federal body considers the jurisdiction should lie there. I assure the members opposite that there's no ulterior motivation in section 2.

MR. SIHOTA: Well, could the minister then explain if, to quote the minister in his opening statement on this legislation, the whole purpose was that the intent of the legislation was to have a speedy resolution of labour disputes in this province — how it is that the minister achieves that by carving out a greater role for the courts and excluding a role for the specialized body that we've created to deal with labour relations matters? How does the minister think that this section is going to achieve that goal of speedier resolution of labour disputes?

HON. L. HANSON: I think that it certainly will very quickly advise the members who need recourse to some

[ Page 1373 ]

decision-making body where they should go and go very quickly. That's the whole intent, and the whole intent behind that is to get a decision quickly and get the matter resolved and have everybody get on about their business.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, I want to make two points. One is that I don't think the minister understood what I was saying earlier about how in fact a section such as this could lengthen a dispute.

The minister in response to me talked about lengthening the process of resolution, but he didn't deal with lengthening the dispute. I think I need to make that point again. If you have an ally doing the work of the struck company, so that the employer is making money, there is no incentive to bargain, no need to come to a resolution. One of the ways you have the ally making money is you get them out of the jurisdiction; you use somebody in a federal jurisdiction. You can't do this in all industries or in all cases, but you can in some. And in law you can't read what the intent was — or what the motivation was, to use the minister's words — you've got to read the words. The words will allow for some provincially regulated companies to use federally regulated companies as allies — some. There doesn't appear to be a mechanism for declaring that federally regulated company as an ally under this Code. The courts aren't going to take that jurisdiction. The federal board might, but I don't think that the provincial board would necessarily accept that declaration. In order to protect, to give the right to picket not only at the source of production of the goods or services but perhaps at the distribution point — and this brings back the retail-wholesale case.... They won't be able to under this law.

So you're saying that you're giving another loophole for employers to go on and make money while the workers are starving. What does that do? It lengthens the dispute and poisons labour relations. One of the philosophies underlying the Labour Relations Board, through the Labour Code, was that the board would have a lot of discretion to operate within and without the law, formally and informally, in an effort to resolve these kinds of issues. The discretion that the board has, in a case like this, is now taken away. The board has no discretion any longer to declare any federally regulated employer an ally, or to make any other declaration of any kind about that particular employer. That kind of discretion is required.

The minister suggests that this section is needed only to tell people which court to go to, or which board to go to. What we're suggesting is that people know which board to go to. We're also suggesting that the discretion of the boards or the courts.... The Canada board, the B. C. board and the courts all have discretion as to how to deal with a particular situation without being constrained by the law. That flexibility, that discretion, can help to resolve a dispute, because other mechanisms can be used to bring the parties together or in one way or another exert pressure on somebody who isn't having enough pressure exerted on him. But when you put in a clause like this one, 2(f), you preclude that option. You make that option no longer available to the new Industrial Relations Council, so they can't undertake to get the parties on an even footing and therefore get the dispute over with quickly.

It's one of countless sections in this bill that will have the opposite impact to what's intended. It will prolong and inflame labour relations, not reduce the inflammation. When you have an inflamed ligament, you put a cold compress on it, not this hot pad. What we're doing is inflaming — making hot — all of these issues, when we should cool them down. You make them hot when you prevent agencies of mediation or reconciliation, or agencies empowered to bring parties together, from doing certain things; you make it more difficult to solve. That's why historically, over the last two or three decades, we have moved family law out of the rigidity of the courts and into a less formal kind of court setting; it's why we've moved labour law out of the rigidity of the courts as well. What the minister is suggesting is that we should go back to those rigid approaches.

I don't think we need to take a lot more time on this section. In the scheme of things in this bill it's a minor element, but it's significant as yet another illustration of either a misunderstanding of labour relations or a deliberate attempt to inflame the situation and to give all of the ammunition to the employers. That's what this kind of regulation does.

MR. CLARK: Mr. Chairman, I won't take too much longer, but I have a case here. The minister referred to cases. Just so the minister doesn't think that we're being hypothetical in this matter, it's a very clear application of this particular point. It's right on point.

It has to do with Canadian Pacific — a federally regulated company — the IWA and MacMillan Bloedel, on September 23, 1986. Remember the IWA dispute? Canadian Pacific was doing work previously done by the struck employer. The issue before the board was whether or not a federal undertaking can be declared an ally in a provincial labour dispute where there is a lawful strike in progress and that federal undertaking is doing struck work within the meaning of the ally definition of the Code. The decision was based on the courts: they have adopted the origin-of-dispute approach when dealing with interjurisdictional labour disputes. Accordingly, the board has jurisdiction to hear this matter, which concerns an application for an ally declaration and a federal undertaking. The board has jurisdiction, in the context of a provincial labour dispute, to declare any person, including a federal undertaking, an ally to a provincially struck employer.

This decision of a year ago will now be reversed if this very small change takes place. Even accepting the motivation of the minister.... The minister says it's not something that he's trying to slip in to thwart this, and I accept that you simply want to define the jurisdiction. That's not the consequence. The consequence of this amendment is to take this major decision of the Labour Relations Board, which had an impact on shortening the labour dispute because it declared Canadian Pacific an ally to MacMillan Bloedel, and the IWA could picket it and therefore extend economic pressure on the employer and shorten the dispute. That is no longer the case under this Code.

If the minister is sincere that the motivation for this clause was not to strike down this decision under the old Labour Code, then he has to do something about this section of the bill, because it has consequences which he admits he didn't foresee, or that are unintended. If that's the defence that the minister wants to take, then the only option I can see is that he stand this section of the bill and come back with different wording that tries to deal with his intent. You either stand it and really clarify it, or admit to this House that it is the intention of the government to no longer have this kind of

[ Page 1374 ]

decision allowed under the new legislation. It's one or the other, it seems to me, Mr. Minister.

HON. L. HANSON: I just want to make one last statement to the Hon. member who just spoke. I don't think he's making a case for the ally provision; I think he's making a case as to who should make the decision. The decision is still available through the courts, and that's what we've always said. He's saying that the Labour Relations Board should make the decision. The IWA would have the right to the courts to get that same decision.

Another thing I'd point out is that the federally regulated ally may be a federally regulated ally operating here in British Columbia; but if it were an ally shipping out of the province, the right to picket and so on would be much more difficult. Again, we're not taking away from anyone the right to get those sorts of decisions. All we're doing is making sure that the jurisdiction as to who has the decision is clear.

MR. MILLER: Relating to the last point, the minister has said that satisfaction can be found in the courts. First of all, we're not certain that that's true; in fact, the intent of the amendment would be to deny that. Secondly — and this is dealing more or less with the philosophy — the original Labour Code was founded on the premise that labour dispute matters are best kept out of the courts. I think that even the minister would agree, given the continuing adjudication procedures, etc., throughout the new act, that it is preferable. Yet the minister seems to be saying — and I wonder if he would give his opinion on preferability as to where these matters are resolved — that it's preferable that they be resolved in court. Regardless of the minister's lack of knowledge of lawyers and the law — and I doubt it's as limited as he's confessing to this House — it seems to me that labour matters dealt with by the courts tend to get frustrated, to get bound up in delays and to be dealt with by people who have no particular familiarity with the parties or the issues at stake. Perhaps the minister could comment on that point. If the result of the amendment is to create that situation, where the courts rather than labour bodies are dealing with issues, then surely we are heading in the wrong direction. Perhaps the minister might like to....

[3:30]

MR. GABELMANN: I'd hoped we could do this more quickly. The minister didn't respond to the Canadian Pacific Ltd-lWA decision or board ruling that was made last September 23 and raised by the second member for Vancouver East (Mr. Clark). The situation is that in this case the board dealt with an application by the IWA to have Canadian Pacific, a federally regulated employer, declared an ally in the dispute; and the board was able to do so. Is the minister suggesting that that particular application will now no longer be able to be sought at the Industrial Relations Council?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I think it's very clear in the bill that that's where the case would go. We're not suggesting that they shouldn't have the ability to present their case and get a decision. We're simply clarifying where it's going to go — in that particular case, I would imagine, to the courts.

The other question that was raised by the other member who spoke earlier was: are we suggesting that everything should go to the courts now, as opposed to the Labour Relations Board? I suggest to you that the number of federally and provincially regulated bodies that get into disputes is very small. Secondly, what it does is free up the Labour Relations Board to deal with other things, if you will. I'm not suggesting that a number of things are going to go to the courts. You are assuming that there are going to be ally tests, if you will, two or three times a month. I'm suggesting to you that it's a very small issue, that it isn't an issue that gets raised very often and that the jurisdiction within section 2 is very clear — where, if there's a dispute, they should go for their remedies.

MR. GABELMANN: The minister says that it's very clear where the affected parties should go for their remedy. What application should be made in the Supreme Court to seek a declaration that a federally regulated company be declared an ally?

HON. L. HANSON: I would suggest that the member opposite see a lawyer. I'm not sure what approach is made when you go before a court.

MR. SIHOTA: Let this lawyer tell the minister that you can't do that. You can't go to the court and ask for a declaration that one party is an ally to the other. All you can do is go to the court and seek a declaration as to who has jurisdiction, and then whoever has jurisdiction makes a decision on the ally.

So the minister is quite wrong on that point, and that's the legal answer to it. The courts do not have jurisdiction on those types of labour matters with the presence of a Labour Code. But if the cases are so minimal, and if there isn't that much confusion, will the minister then explain why this change is there?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, Mr. Chairman, for purposes of clarification. I would assume that rather than getting a declaration of an ally, they would probably seek an injunction through the court to stop them from performing the service.

MR. SIHOTA: I'm not too sure that a court would grant that injunction, given that you've got a Labour Code that is able to provide that remedy in any event. We can argue about whether a court would or not. I'm sure the minister can cite examples, much as I can, of instances where there have been injunctive orders made which are tantamount to a picketing order. I'll grant you that. But the point is, there is also enough jurisprudence out there that says no, this is a matter that has been deemed by this Legislature to be a matter of the Labour Code, given privative clauses; that this is something the labour board should be dealing with. Hence, all you do is compound your problem.

I don't mean this in a negative way, but the point is that if the minister wants to provide that kind of a rhetorical answer to the question that I raised, it clouds the field a lot more than it clarifies it. If the intent of this section is to crystallize things, you've achieved the exact opposite. Hence the need to introduce the forty-ninth or the forty-sixth amendment, or whatever it is, to make that clause go, or to stand the clause.

Section 2 approved.

On section 3.

[ Page 1375 ]

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, looking at this section, it appears that there couldn't be much to debate, and that's true. Having said that, however, these amendments do open up three sections of the Code that are not otherwise opened up, and I want to pursue that briefly. I see the Deputy Speaker smiling. I'm not being too coy, I hope.

I do want to pursue just very quickly a couple of issues here, because those sections are now opened up as a result of this. Section 90 of the Code is the section which allowed the board...will allow the council to issue declaratory opinions. What is the relationship of this clause now to a later change, the new proposed 4.1 on secondary boycotts? I wonder if you really need them both.

HON. L. HANSON: I'm not sure. Could I ask the hon. member to clarify that?

MR. GABELMANN: Section 90 of the Code, declaratory opinion by the council-to-be; new proposed 4.1 of the Code dealing with secondary boycotts — same issues involved. I just wonder whether any consideration or any thought is given to the relationship of those two sections now: the new 4.1 in respect of its proposed law on secondary boycotts and the declaratory opinions that come from that. I think the answer is that the minister hasn't given it any thought, and that is really what I'm trying to find out.

HON. L. HANSON: I think the answer to that would be no. We can't see that that is a concern.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Just before we continue, hon. members, just so that the Chair can be fully aware of what is transpiring in dealing with this particular section, I'm sure the member for North Island (Mr. Gabelmann), when he started off, understands that dealing with this section does not give us the right to debate the particular sections in mind. Really, what we're debating here is the substitution of "board" and "board's" for "council" and "council's." That's the way I read it.

MR. GABELMANN: I wanted just to have an opportunity to ask the question, because it does open those particular sections of the Code. These are in fact amendments to a whole series of sections of the Code and therefore, technically, open to debate — granted, however, open to debate about the powers of the council or the board, and I recognize that.

Can I just ask one more question? I'm going to abandon most of the other questions and ask one other, because I'm curious and this is a good opportunity to ask. Given the fact that this opens section 133 of the Code.... Mr. Chairman, I say this again to the minister; he was listening to somebody else: given that it opens section 133 of the Code, which is in the ombudsman section, is this a foreshadowing of the fact that rather than repealing the ombudsman section of the Code, these changes are being made to it...? Is that a foretelling of proclamation of that particular section?

HON. L. HANSON: No, it isn't. I don't think we're trying to signal that in any way.

MR. CHAIRMAN: On section 3, the second member for Vancouver East — bearing in mind what we have just discussed a moment ago.

MR. CLARK: I simply want to ask leave to make an introduction.

Leave granted.

MR. CLARK: We have joining us today in the gallery a friend of mine and other members on this side of the House, a constituent of Point Grey a dedicated professional social worker currently on leave from her profession: Susan Irwin. I'd ask the House to make her welcome.

Sections 3 and 4 approved.

On section 5.

HON. L. HANSON: I move the amendment to section 5(3) standing in my name on the order paper. [See appendix.]

On the amendment.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, the amendment is to insert the words "undue influence" in front of "intimidation, coercion and threats," if my memory is correct. Yes. Can I ask the minister what he perceives "undue influence" to mean?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, that the other three words that were in the original wording, "intimidation, coercion or threats," are quite heavy. The change responds to the concern raised that some employers might abuse the freedom-of-expression provision in trying to pressure employees. The "undue influence" was added in there to give the Industrial Relations Council the ability to make a discretionary decision when they hear the facts of the case, and it also affords some protection to the employees, while removing some obstacles to full, open communication between the employers and the employees.

MR. GABELMANN: Mr. Chairman, would it be undue influence for an employer to say to his employees: "I sure hope that this bid for a union doesn't go through, because if it does, you know, it's probably going to mean that I'm not going to be able to make a profit, and my business will go under"? Is that undue influence?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I won't deal with the specific that the hon. member mentioned. Certainly the jurisprudence of the board will eventually determine the answer to the question that he raised. But I'd like to point out to the members opposite that the freedom-of-expression and anti-discrimination amendment or suggestion here is that we want and feel that it's necessary for people who are thinking of organizing, thinking of deorganizing or decertifying, or dealing with the issues regarding a labour dispute, whether it be strike or lockout or negotiations in train, to have the benefit, within reason, of all the information that is available so that they can in fact make a good, educated, democratic decision. But the concern that was expressed was that by putting in the original wording it was making it far too open, and that there may be cases of discrimination that in fact were coercion or intimidation. So we're giving the board some discretionary right to listen to the case if the case comes up and make their decision based on that. I think the most simple one is if the employer makes the statement — and I

[ Page 1376 ]

can't prejudge him — that: "If you join the union or organize the union, you're fired." I think that's a very clear case and would be found to be wrong, and the Industrial Relations Council would deal with it.

By the way, the language adopted is very similar to that which exists in a number of other Canadian jurisdictions. For example, it's in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island; and Alberta has it in their Bill of Rights.

[3:45]

MR. GABELMANN: The minister wants to argue in one section of the bill that it doesn't matter what other provinces have because we have to make up our own minds what to do here; and then he comes to this section and he says: "Well they have it in XYZ and M province." Not a major point but think consistency might be useful.

The minister suggested — we're dealing with the amendment — that it would be undue influence if the employer were to say something like: "You organize a union and you're fired."

Interjection.

MR. GABELMANN: Well, I would have assumed that was intimidation, or a threat actually, rather than undue influence; but since we're discussing the amendment and the question is about what undue influence means, I wonder if the minister wants to recast that answer.

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to stand here with a dictionary and define what undue influence is, but I think that by inserting that amendment into Bill 19 we're simply saying that the board — the new council — has the right to make a decision on what they consider to be undue influence. And that jurisprudence will be left to them in the specifics of the case.

MR. LOVICK: To the minister, through you, Mr. Chairman. My colleague gave what I think was a very reasonable and fair and non-inflammatory kind of hypothesis, suggesting: would this be construed as undue influence? Would you, the minister, please respond to that hypothesis? Would you give us your opinion if that is indeed constituting undue influence?

May I expand that by saying that you gave us an example, it seems to me, with all due deference, Mr. Minister, that was rather extreme. My colleague I think presented what I would call a very reasonable and understandable hypothesis, and yet you have chosen not to deal with that hypothesis. Would you now?

HON. L. HANSON: Mr. Chairman, no, because you can take degrees of coercion and threats and so on, and all I was attempting to say is that it is very clear to me that a threat to fire someone if they get involved in union activity is coercion or intimidation or unfairness or whatever. When you get to the finer points of it, that's why we have the labour relations adjudication division there, to determine those finer points. But I'm not sure I understand. Are the members opposite suggesting that we should remove "undue influence?" Is that your concern?

MR. LOVICK: I don't think for a moment that's the case. What the members opposite are doing, at least certainly what this member is doing, is trying to get some clarification of precisely what that language means. Clearly that amendment has been put in to deal with what are perceived to be particular kinds of problems. I don't doubt for a moment the good intentions of the minister. However, I'm becoming a little apprehensive when the minister is not prepared to explain what he and his officials understand that phrase to mean. That's all we're saying, and again I would invite the minister to respond. Would you provide us with a paradigm case of undue influence? Give us something.

HON. L. HANSON: It's sort of interesting. The adding of the words "undue influence" was primarily at the request of a number of very prominent labour organizations. Their legal advice felt that the interpretation of undue influence was reasonable protection for the ability of the employer to communicate with his employees, but yet to be held within reasonable bounds. I guess the explanation of undue influence will be determined by the board — what they see to be reasonable bounds of that communication process that goes on.

MR. SIHOTA: The employer, during the course of a certification process, comes up to a set of employees and says: "I don't know if I'm going to be able to afford those wage increases you are going to be asking for." Now is that coercion; is that intimidation; is that undue influence? Is that, indeed, a violation of the larger issue here, which is the ability to express his or her views as to the certification process? I'm not going to ask the minister whether or not he thinks the example I just cited is an example of undue influence. I do; I would suspect that the minister's officials will. If not, indeed it's coercion.

You know, I think there is a larger issue here in that by putting the words "undue influence" forward as an amendment — and that's what I'm talking to, the amendment — there is a recognition on the part of the government that employees ought to be able to engage in the certification process without overt interference from the employer. But recognizing that, the section also gives the employer the right to say things. Does the minister not agree that instead of putting in interpretive words like "undue influence" or "coercion" or "intimidation" — whatever you want to use — a far superior route would be not to put any of that in, not to put that section in, and to put in a blanket clause against the expression of those types of opinions? Would the minister not agree that all we're doing by putting in these types of words is countenancing something that you're trying to prevent?

HON. L. HANSON: Well, no, I wouldn't, quite simply put. The hypothetical case that the member opposite gave.... I think he, as a legal person, would find great difficulty in making a decision as to whether that was undue influence or not, unless he considered all of the other facts that were involved in it. He is certainly a legal mind; I think he would recognize that. It appears to me that that statement would have been tempered by whether, in fact, the company was making millions of dollars, or was losing millions of dollars, or whatever all of the circumstance are.

That's where we have given the undue influence discretionary decision, why we have put that in, so that the board does have some flexibility to consider those things.

[ Page 1377 ]

MR. SIHOTA: It's kind of an overlap, the thinking of the minister and me, and the overlap is on this area. The minister is quite correct in saying that it would depend on a galaxy of factors as to whether or not there was indeed undue influence. Surely the larger point is: why are we getting into this, when there is a way to prevent all sorts of litigation or jurisprudence on what is or is not undue influence or coercion or intimidation?

It seems to me that we ought to sanitize the system so that the employer does not have the ability to say anything. I realize that I'm sort of walking on the parameters of the debate that deals with the section as opposed to the amendment. I certainly see the Chair nodding, but I'm making the point within the context of the amendment only to point out that it's not the amendment that's really the problem here. It's the subsection that's the problem.

MR. LOVICK: I want to come back to the phrase "undue influence" again, and this time I'm going to try it from the other side, because the minister seemed reluctant to deal with hypotheses from one side; perhaps he might from the other. Would the minister agree that this scenario would constitute undue influence? Let us say we're dealing with a bunch of people who are trying to organize a union in a particular workplace, and one individual says to other workers on the shop floor, or whatever it might be: "You really should join this union because we can almost guarantee that it's going to improve your wages and working conditions, based on the history of X, Y and Q." Would that constitute undue influence? In other words, could an appeal, effectively, to somebody's self-preservation, or to improve their standard of living and so forth, be seen as somehow undue influence?

HON. L. HANSON: I would suppose it could. But I'm not sitting here making that decision. I think, as your colleague suggested, that those kinds of decisions are based on a number of facts, not just a very simple statement. That's why we have put the consideration of undue influence in there. That's broad enough to give the adjudication division the ability to get all of those facts gathered together and to make a reasonable decision.

MR. LOVICK: I think that is precisely the problem, however, that a number of us have now recognized and are addressing. We continue to hear phrases like "broad" and "broad discretion" and "judgment." I'm sorry, I don't mean to put words into somebody's mouth, but that's certainly the suggestion we're getting. The question, I think, is whether in fact we are giving too much discretionary power to this board, to the point that the result of this amendment is really going to be to open things up to such a degree that theoretically anything can constitute undue influence, given a certain set of circumstances. I think that's the kind of concern we're beginning to perceive here.

The other thing is.... Let me see if I can phrase this in terms of a specific question — and I'm sure the minister shares our concern and would like to allay our fears, as well as anybody else's. What constitutes evidence in terms of what influence is and whether that influence is undue or not? I'm struggling at the moment. It seems to me that we have a wide-open field here, and I'm wondering how the devil any board is ever going to adjudicate.

HON. L. HANSON: The board establishes its own regulations as to what constitutes evidence. But I'm sure that there are many precedents and examples that they would use, being learned individuals in their fields.

MR. LOVICK: Fair enough. Just pursuing the same line, what then is influence? What is a good argument? How much can you do in the name of trying to persuade somebody either to join or not join a union? Where do we draw the line and say that that's an argument that's allowed to convince your friends that they should be part of a certified bargaining unit — or conversely, that they should not be involved in a trade union?

HON. L. HANSON: Again, Mr. Chairman, the member opposite is asking me to deal with very specific sorts of circumstances. What constitutes undue influence will be decided by the board as they develop the various cases and hear all of the cases that are presented to them. They may even come out with a policy statement as to what in their opinion undue influence is. I think that the important point we're missing here is that, first of all, the addition of "undue influence" was felt by practitioners from the labour side to be a reasonable assurance, because the other wording, "intimidation, coercion and threats," was too specific and too tight, that the board would have the flexibility and the ability to make a decision as to what they considered undue influence.

[4:00]

[Mrs. Gran in the chair.]

To my very practical mind it seems that if someone says, "I can’t afford to give you a $1-an-hour increase," when in fact the company is making millions of dollars, that's intimidation, coercion or threatening. But if in fact the company is not, and is suffering very badly, the employer may have some justification for making that statement, and by producing the records that show what his position is.

It's quite a complicated sort of interpretation of undue influence, but the whole thing behind this is that we're trying to make sure that the employees have all of the information correctly and fairly given to them, so that they can make a decision based on all of the facts. But we also don't want anyone to be giving them facts that are not in effect the truth.

MR. LOVICK: I had thought I had reached the end of that line of questioning, Madam Chairman, but now something else I hear makes me wonder. Are we suggesting, then, that the board, or the council, or whatever it's called in this new incarnation, will be given the right to open the books of the companies that are being — what? Approached with some kind of union drive, some kind of organization drive? Does that become part of the mandate, then, of the board, to examine whether in fact freedom of speech was used within the limitations as suggested here; that what we're going to do is say: well yes, you as a potential employer, or as an employer, cannot say that you can't afford to pay that much because your books show differently? Are we saying that that's a power we're now giving to this board?

HON. L. HANSON: That's not what we're saying. I think, in fairness, that if someone is accused of using undue influence, which may be in the form of some statement that they can't afford to do something, and there is an accusation that that is a statement of undue influence — do you understand that? — then it is most likely that the individual, to

[ Page 1378 ]

prove that it wasn't undue influence, is going to present the facts to say what he said are the facts. That's not saying that he's got to open up his books. He may choose to say: "Hey, I'm not going to open up my books for anybody." They may choose to say that that was undue influence if he doesn't.

MR. LOVICK: Once more, with feeling. Has there ever in recorded history been an instance when any company that is threatened with union organization has said: "Sure we can afford to pay whatever you want"? Even if they are showing a healthy balance sheet, what they're going to say is: "Look, we need this money for research and development. We need it for new product development. We want to have something to pay a higher dividend to our shareholders." There is always going to be another claim on those dollars. So surely the suggestion about the balance sheet being the determinant in terms of undue influence is a pretty bogus and suspect argument, Mr. Minister, with all due deference.

MR. MILLER: Just as a prelude, the amendment is to a new section of part 1. Of course, the first two sections — the heading, if you like, of part 1 refers to the rights of employees and employers and unfair labour practices. I would assume that we shouldn't get too narrow in terms of what situations might arise where the words "undue influence" could be applied. For example, I think the common kind of example that's been used so far in debate is where an employer uses undue influence to its employees, either singly or collectively, and that in itself may be a problem in terms of the addition of.... Well, we'll get into more extensive debate presumably.

My concern is the application of that in the setting where there may be, for example, an application to decertify, which would lead to some pretty hot and heavy debate, say on the shop floor or on the plant floor, within the plant among employees. My own experience on the shop floor tells me that you can get some pretty hot and heavy discussions going. Certainly someone who is not familiar with that milieu might construe that one person was using undue influence, or indeed the other descriptions contained in clause 3.

I'm wondering if the minister would acknowledge, first of all, that I'm correct in applying that different scenario; and secondly, whether or not he feels there may be some difficulty in that kind of situation, in terms of the board trying to get into that kind of situation. I think the other may be a little bit easier given, hopefully, a board with some experience in labour relations matters, which would easily, or fairly easily, be able to distinguish between genuine use of undue influence in terms of employer-employee relationships, but may have a great deal of difficulty in terms of what happens on the shop floor. Sometimes it can get pretty hot, I can tell you. Perhaps the minister might want to....

HON. L. HANSON: Well, Madam Chairman, I suppose if the case ever got to the Industrial Relations Council where one member said to the other member, "If you vote for decertification, I'll break both your legs," that would certainly be considered to be an unfair.... But I would think that there would also be access to civil courts for that sort of thing if such a case were. What we're trying to do is provide the ability of the individual to have all of the information that's available to him. I'm not sure what the question was. Would I consider that undue influence? I certainly would.

MR. MILLER: Well, there's an established phrase in labour relations matters and it's called industrial language. Maybe that will give you some idea of what I'm talking about; you know, the difficulty in interpreting "undue influence" in that kind of setting. And increasingly, with our economic difficulties over the last several years, unions have really gone through some pretty severe strains and there have been quite a few internal struggles, not for power necessarily in unions, but.... Just as an example, the question of the application of seniority where the workforce is going to be cut back considerably, the question of who's going to remain — who gets the job — and the employer's application of whatever seniority clauses.... And they have been tested and found wanting, really, in many instances. We've seen the case of a lot of older workers tossed out the door while younger workers have remained.

For the first time in my memory we suddenly were faced with a lot of applications under section 7, in which an employee really went to the board and said: "Look, the union is not representing me, my case." My personal feeling is that a lot of this came out of the turmoil of layoffs and all the rest of it and people being very defensive about their jobs, and I'm sure if the minister would want to check.... I don't know if that's something that happened generally; I'm sure it's not strange just to my experience that there was a general increase in those section 7 applications.

But if the minister could understand that setting, would the temptation be for employees to misuse or take advantage of this section in terms of running to the board and saying: "Look, I think I should have had that job, and there's a fight about it, and so-and-so has threatened me physically"? Or some similar incident might have happened. Just finally, if the minister wants to comment on that, he referred earlier, when we were talking about section 2, to not wanting the board to be tied up in those kinds of situations. So is there a danger there? Perhaps I'm straying too much into section 5, but if the minister could respond to that: is there a danger that the board could be dealing with essentially frivolous applications?

HON. L. HANSON: No, I don't think there is a danger of the board dealing with frivolous applications. I think that the hon. member is well aware of what happens in the workplace, and usually those things are settled right there in the workplace if they're between two individuals. There is lots of recourse to common law for people who are abusing each other. I don't think you can read into this section of the act a concern for abuse; I really don't think it will ever even be considered. If in the scenario that you described he felt he was unfairly dealt with, I would think that there would be much more likelihood of claims under the section 7 side of it than this particular one — as it relates to two employees.

MR. MILLER: Just to follow up, I think I am really sticking to the amendment because of the words "undue influence."

Going back to section 7, in every case that I am talking about, ultimately the board found that there was no violation; in fact that the trade union had acted in the best interests of the employee in terms of pursuing their grievance to the level that they thought was as far as they could take it.

And yet, in one instance that I recall, in the initial grievance procedure and on into arbitration procedure, the union expended a considerable amount of money, a considerable

[ Page 1379 ]

sum. I won't quote it because I can't recall it accurately, but it was in the many thousands of dollars. Despite that, two individuals chose to file a section 7 and pursue it. I must confess that when I first heard about it, I laughed, and I said: "There's not a hope in the world. Somebody will come down from Terrace and investigate the matter and make a report to the board that clearly section 7 was frivolous."

That didn't happen. That went on, and we will get into talking about how much lawyers are going to profit by this bill. It is a perfect example, because that went on and on. More money was expended. Unfortunately the people who launched section 7 should have been advised right at the outset not to proceed because they were going to lose, but they weren't.

A very minor matter the way it started, and the minister might say the same thing doesn't and couldn't apply to this clause, but I think there is a grave danger that it could apply to this clause. Perhaps it takes a bit of experience, particularly in industry where there has been a great deal of turmoil and a great deal of layoffs and a great deal of defensive feeling among working people, because they are really fighting for their jobs. I disagree with that. Maybe that is not a question, but it's for your edification at any rate.

[4:15]

Amendment approved.

On section 5 as amended.

MS. A. HAGEN: It always seems to me useful when we begin to discuss and question a section — now that we have dealt with the amendment on this section — to put it in the context of the original bill into which it is going to fit. So I am going to, because it is very brief, just read the two clauses of section 2 of the existing Labour Code, which this particular section 5 will be amending and to which it will be adding clauses (3), (4) and (5). I want to do that because I think it spells out that what we are dealing with here are the rights of the employer and the employee, and the two existing clauses are very clear, unencumbered and I think make a very definite statement about what this clause intends to permit under labour relations legislation.

The first clause says that every employee is free to be a member of a trade union and to participate in its lawful activities. The second clause says: "Every employer is free to be a member of an employer's organization and to participate in its lawful activities." The amendment that I particularly want to speak to is the addition of clause (3), which says: "Nothing in this act deprives a person of his freedom to express his views provided he does not use undue influence, intimidation, coercion or threats."

We are dealing now, clearly from our discussion, with a matter that I anticipate will have a great deal to do with the rights of employers around issues of certification and decertification. The first thing I would like to state as a premise that I have, which is very much expressed in the first two clauses that I just read around the rights of the employee and the rights of the employer, is that it is a fundamental right of an employee to decide the terms by which he will undertake his or her industrial relations with an employer.

If that means that a group of workers decide that they wish to certify and to form a union, that is a most fundamental right, and a right that I think should not be compromised. In that regard, an employer too has certain rights, and he has the right to run his business. In those two activities, these two parties are going to have the need to consult and work with one another.

It seems to me that already in the existing Code there are some fairly clear definitions about what should or should not be good labour practice in the development of those working relationships. If I may, because I think it is relevant to this discussion, I just note that the next clause deals with unfair labour practices, and it defines very clearly some of the things which an employer may or may not do.

I would anticipate. although I am not nearly so experienced in the practice of labour relations as some of my colleagues who have been speaking up to this point, that the various clauses in that succeeding section are very much the basis for decisions about any actions by employers that are not fair and that infringe on the rights of employees to organize.

We're dealing in section 2 and this new subsection (3) with a "freedom to express" clause. There is in the succeeding clause a very clear, succinct and, I think, uncompromising statement of what the employer's rights and prerogatives are. In 3(3)(g), the next clause speaks about the methods and the parameters of communications that an employer may in fact have available to him. It states that the employer may "communicate to an employee a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business." It seems to me that that's what the minister has been talking about, to some extent, as we have defined undue influence. But when we talk about freedom to express views as long as they do not exercise undue influence, intimidation, coercion or threats, we're looking at a clause that appears to me to be much broader in the latitude that it provides to an employer. Even with my limited knowledge of the day-in, day-out working relationships with certification, I, just as an average person in society, know that in many ways the cards are stacked in favour of employers as to the information that they may provide and the influence that they may have on a group of employees seeking to certify.

I'm concerned about this addition to the new act that we are now fleshing out in more detail, because it appears to me that we are shifting again the kind of prerogatives and rights that employers have. We're giving to those employers more rights that shift the balance in favour of employers as compared to employees. Two or three years ago there was an amendment that required that every certification go to a vote — a change from the automatic sign-up once there was a certain majority of people who had signed union cards.

So I would like to ask the minister to comment on his motivation for this particular clause in the new bill; to comment particularly on the rights that he sees it giving to employers; to comment about it in the context of the unfair labour practices section of the current Labour Code, which certainly does give to the employer very definite rights to communicate statements of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to his business — to give some indication of the need for this particular clause as it pertains to employers' rights around issues of certification and decertification.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I guess the member opposite wasn't in the room when I originally stated the intent of the legislation, but that's fair. I think the member is zeroing in on certification and decertification. The intent of this section is to ensure that the employees have the right, the ability and the knowledge of all of the information that they should have before they make the decision as to whether

[ Page 1380 ]

they're voting for certification, decertification, contract acceptance, going on strike, all of those things. We're simply saying that there should be reasonable communication without threats, intimidation, coercion or undue influence, so that the individuals can vote from a very knowledgeable point of view.

MS. A. HAGEN: Mr. Minister, through the Chair, I find it a little puzzling that we would assume that we need to have this kind of a clause for that right of information to be there.

Let me take the case of an employer who obviously has an interest in his employees certifying — becoming a part of a bargaining unit. From your answer am I to assume, Mr. Minister, that you anticipate that in the course of certification many of the matters that would be the subject of collective bargaining between the employer and the union are to be defined and to be defined accurately? You speak about contract; you speak about all of the information that I would assume would normally be the subject of discussion between the employer presenting his particular perspective as a person running a business, and the employees presenting their particular requests as to the remuneration that they would like to seek, or the working conditions that they would like to have in place, or the safety conditions that they would like to have in place. What kind of information would the minister anticipate employers providing to employees at this time that would be necessary for them to decide that they want as a group to present their particular requests to their employer and bargain freely and collectively with that employer across the table? I'm not clear about the kind of information that it would be important for employees to have at that time that is not in fact the appropriate information to have on a bargaining table as the parties move to reach some kind of an agreement, once certification has taken place.

HON. L. HANSON: I don't think you're quite getting the point. The situation as it evolves across a bargaining table.... There is obviously management and those representatives of organized labour sitting at that table communicating very freely, and I'm not sure that the undue influence and the intimidation and coercion doesn't go on at that table from both sides. But we're not talking about that. We're talking about the ability of the employees, who are being represented at that table by the union leaders and the management, getting the story from both of their sides to make a decision whether they want to go on strike, whether they want to accept the offer that's being presented to them, or whether they want to form a union, or whether they want to decertify.

We're not talking about the situation at the bargaining table. I think it's probably fairly well known just via the media that at the bargaining table intimidation, coercion and undue influence do go on; but that's part of the bargaining process. We're not talking about that communication level. We're talking about the communication level of the employer with the employees — the broader band of the employees —  and with the employees' ability to get both sides of the story so they can make a decision on the question that is being presented to them.

MS. A. HAGEN: Am I to understand the minister to say at this point, then, that we are going to have two sets of communication occurring with collective bargaining? I heard him say we're not talking about what goes on at the bargaining table, where all of these nefarious things — coercion, intimidation and threats — he says do go on. I've sat at bargaining tables, and quite honestly I have not thought that those were nouns that described some of the spirited discussion that took place at that table. But I thought I heard you say that this did not involve the bargaining table, and then I think I heard you say that what we want to do is to have two kinds of communication: we want to have communication where the employer and the representatives of the unions sit down at a bargaining table and discuss the matters before them as they hammer out a collective agreement; and in addition to that, you want with this clause to provide for the employer a further opportunity to make certain that certain information from that employer is made available to that employee —  some information about the matters that the two parties are discussing around the table. Is the intent of this legislation to have the employer communicate not only with the representatives of the union across the bargaining table but also to communicate matters relating to that collective agreement and the processes that they are working on directly to union members? Is that the intent of this particular clause?

[4:30]

HON. L. HANSON: I'm not sure that the member really understands the bargaining process very well. There's no question that across the table from each other, the two sides really understand them well, and they divulge as much information as they want to the other side. We're not talking about that. We're talking about the situation where the employer at this point feels that he is subject to an unfair labour practice if he communicates anything to his employee. All we're suggesting in this is that without using undue influence, without using intimidation, coercion and threats, the employee, when he is voting on a specific issue, whether it be certification, decertification, the acceptance of a contract or the decision to go on strike.... There is certain information that the employer should be able to communicate to his employee, not to make the employee change his mind about which way he is going to vote but to make sure that the employee is making the best decision, having all of the knowledge in front of him.

MS. A. HAGEN: It is, as I feared, that all of the decks are stacked in favour of the employer. It doesn't appear to me that there is any indication here that the employees have an opportunity to have information about their employers' books. The employer has a carte blanche to provide information to his employees that may or may not be complete, that may or may not be in the context of the discussions that are taking place. There is nothing in this legislation to enable the employee to tap into what the due rights of the employer are, which is to manage his business.

I would ask the minister again what right the employer has, once a certification has occurred, or if we're looking at a decertification. Even if we're looking at a certification, to provide information that cannot in fact be authenticated except through some sort of an unfair labour practice.... What right does the employer have to have prerogatives in the giving of information, other than across the table between the parties that have agreed that this is the vehicle by which they will arrive at their duly negotiated settlements?

HON. L. HANSON: I'm not sure I really understand your line of questioning. Why shouldn't the employee have the benefit of that knowledge? If it is in fact coercive, or if it in fact is intimidating, or undue influence, that's why we have

[ Page 1381 ]

put it in the act that the adjudication division of the disputes resolution council will rule on that if the employer has acted with undue influence, intimidation, coercion, or in a threatening manner. That's why it's in the Code. But we do feel, and I think that you would agree, that the employee should have the right to as much information as is really reasonable to make a fair and honest decision. The employer should be restricted from using unfair or intimidating, coercive threats to influence them to decide in one way or the other, and we're putting it in the act to give the adjudication division the ability to make decisions on whether that has been done in a proper manner.

MS. A. HAGEN: I know that various colleagues will be looking at some instances to bear out some of the kinds of unfair practices that have, in our province, been manifested over the last number of years.

One of the people I have found very down-to-earth and realistic in his assessment of labour-management relations has been Paul Weiler, who is the first chairman of the Labour Relations Board as it was manifested in 1973. I would just like to conclude my remarks this time by reading into the record from his article "Free Collective Bargaining by Canadian Workers" a statement that I think probably sums up the reality for many groups of workers who are seeking to certify, where, even with the present Code, there have been unfair practices in that certification process. Mr. Weiler says:

"In my experience of four years of administering representation law in British Columbia — to the tune of about 1,000 certification cases a year — when we did have a hotly contested representation campaign between the union and the employer, the employer normally found it impossible to resist the temptation to engage in improper tactics to turn his employees against the union. I do not think I am unduly cynical in saying that the labour relations version of the Marquis of Queensbury rules tends to be ignored by employers if they are drawn into that kind of battle."

I would just conclude, Mr. Minister, by saying that I think that anything that further stacks the deck to make it difficult for working people to be able to collectively certify and to carry out their needs, in terms of their role in industrial relations, is a step backward, and one of the clauses in this bill that I think will be a disadvantage and will produce more in the way of conflict and resorting to the new industrial relations commissions, with all of the attendant problems.

MR. CLARK: I want to follow the excellent remarks of the member for New Westminister. Maybe I am unique in this House as someone who has actually worked as a union organizer. I don't imagine there are too many such people over on that side of the House. I do, therefore, have some specific experience with this section of the old Labour Code, and I want to relate to the minister some of the real difficulties that workers face under the current Code and how this really is a very serious amendment that you're putting forward.

I want to recognize that the intent stated by the minister is not going to be the result, again. That's the second time in this very short debate we've seen the minister say, "This is the intent of this clause," when in fact the consequences will be far different. I want to try and outline that.

The old Labour Code of 1973 recognized that it was a fundamental right of individuals to organize collectively without interference from the employer. It recognized that economics dictates the tremendous power and influence the employer has over workers and that those who sign the cheques, by that very nature, have a tremendous influence over how people survive and how they work, their working conditions, wages and standard of living. That very structural nature of the system we live in has a tremendous influence on it. So what the Labour Code did was to say that in spite of that inherent bias in favour of the employers, in spite of that economic imperative, we will try and say that workers collectively, if they choose, should be free from any interference by that employer in their fundamental right to determine for themselves, without interference, whether or not they should join a union.

One of the things that the original Code did in recognizing that was to provide for automatic certifications. It said that where a certification drive takes place and where more than 55 percent of the employees decided and paid money to join a trade union, they would automatically be certified and be allowed to participate in collective bargaining. This was not done in great haste, but it was done particularly because of the history of voting in the United States and across Canada.

The American model is one that I don't think would be wanted by anybody who recognizes or agrees, as the minister professes to, that it is up to individuals to determine whether or not they want to join a union. The minister should know that a very small percentage of certification votes in the United States succeed. That is because of a kind of thing we have had in British Columbia since a previous government amended the Code to require secret ballots on all certification drives, even if 100 percent of the employees joined the trade union. Then, of course, there is a lag between the time of certification and the time of the vote, and it is that time where the employer recognizes that the majority of employees have decided to unionize, but the employer has another chance to influence the decision of those employees to join a union. That is where the interregnum between the certification application and the vote...where the pressure is the greatest on the employees.

The secret ballot amendment that was brought in a few years ago by the previous administration, together with the section of the Code — and I want to read this section — still exists. It's section 3(3)(g): "...this act shall not be interpreted to limit or otherwise affect the right of the employer to...communicate to an employee a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business." So currently under the Code, and historically in British Columbia since 1973, the employer has had the clear right to communicate with his employees any statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business. So we now have a secret ballot and a section of the Code that allows the employer to communicate to his employees very clearly his opinion with respect to the impact of that certification on his business.

Gee, I may have to make this speech again when the minister comes back.

AN HON. MEMBER: It bears repetition.

MR. CLARK: So we have right now a situation under the current Code where we have secret ballots required for all certification attempts, regardless of the numbers of people who have signed up. And we have a section of the Code that says clearly that employers have the right to communicate their position to their employees. We already have those two

[ Page 1382 ]

sections, so what is the purpose of this amendment? The purpose of this amendment clearly is to make the employer's clause stronger. We already have the fact under the Code that the employer is allowed to communicate to its employees. We already have a secret ballot; there's no automatic certification. The employer will have an opportunity to convince his employees not to join the union. That's already in the act. So this whole section can only be to strengthen that clause, to strengthen the employer's position in any attempt to unionize his or her workforce.

[4:45]

What I'd like to do instead of going over that again is relate to the minister my own personal experience with one company, and how the current two provisions — a secret ballot, which always gives the employer the opportunity to communicate to his employees before they're unionized, and the section of the Code which allows the employer to communicate clearly any opinion reasonably held with respect to his business.... That's the current situation. How is it interpreted in British Columbia now?

Well, there's a steel-fabrication plant in Richmond with 300 to 500 employees. It's recently been unionized — a few years ago — and I played a part in that unionization. I want to say that once the application for certification was made, in the period between the application for certification and the vote there was industrial relations chaos in that operation. The reason there was industrial relations chaos was because the employer attempted to convince his employees under the old Code — using his rights under the old Code — not to join the trade union.

So what did they do? Every day for two months between the certification application and the vote there was a debate between me, my trade union at the time and the employer. There were letters from me to the employees, and letters from the employees, from the owners and from the personnel manager, arguing their case against the trade union and arguing my case in favour of the trade union. There was a staff meeting held — two of them — with 400 employees on company time, where the owner talked to the employees and tried to convince them not to join a union. He used the section of the Code that says that any opinion reasonably held can be communicated to the employees.

The owner met with most of the employees individually in his office, privately, and tried to convince them not to vote in favour of the union. There were leaflets issued every two weeks with the paycheques, arguing the case of the employer against the trade union. They weren't strident statements saying, "We're going to shut the place down" or anything else; they were opinions reasonably held by the employer that it was his opinion as owner that this would not be in the best interest of the company. He repeated that personally and privately, he repeated that to the 400 people on company time at two different staff meetings, and he repeated that in letters to the employees with their paycheques. And if the minister doesn't think that the person who signs the paycheque has influence by the very nature of that person's position in this economic system, then there's something wrong.

So we had this for two months, and then we had a very interesting situation. The labour board ordered a vote, and we had ten days where every day the personnel manager put out a leaflet to the employees and every day the union put out one, or in some cases two, leaflets to the employees. The employer mailed to every employee personal letters to that employee's home — the trade union couldn't mail personal letters to the employees' homes, because we're denied the right of access to all the employees' names and addresses. So the employer also wrote letters to the employees at their homes — which were in some cases addressed to the family, not simply to the worker — to try to influence their decision.

Then the day before the vote, the employer raised the wages of the employees by 10 percent, which is expressly prohibited under the old Labour Code; yet he did it. And he did it under the advice of a labour relations professional, a management lawyer, a specialist in this field, Gary Catherwood. He probably had something to do with writing this act; I don't know. He might be one of the.... I wouldn't be surprised. That's another consequence of this kind of amendment, and it's the professional anti-union organizers in this province who have had a history of that. The workers decided to join the union anyway, in spite of this intensive campaign on the part of the employer.

Admittedly, the raise that the employees were given the day before the vote is illegal under the old Code. Probably, as a trade union organizer, I could have taken them to the Labour Relations Board on that matter. What would have happened, of course, would have been three or four months where there would have been no decision on whether or not the union would be accepted — an unfair labour practice hearing for three or four months, prior to which there would be no decision. So I decided, rather than go the unfair labour practice route, which would have taken three months and may have resulted in something, to risk the actual results of the vote, which were over 75 percent in favour of the trade union.

That was under the provisions of the old Code, the Code that's present. That kind of influence and that kind of communication to the employees is allowed under the old provisions. That's the kind of thing the employer is allowed to do: he is allowed to communicate with his employees any position on certification reasonably held. So what is the purpose of this amendment, if they're already allowed to communicate their position to employees? Even though they weren't allowed to give their position to the employees so clearly when there wasn't a secret ballot required, because if the employees decided to join a majority they could have joined, that secret ballot amendment meant that there's an interregnum between the certification and the vote, and in that interregnum the employer is allowed to communicate with his employees. So why this amendment? The only thing that you can say is that this amendment is to strengthen even more the employer's ability to thwart any attempt by the trade union to organize.

The minister should know that I have never been in an organizing drive for a trade union where the employer has not stated: "This operation will shut down if it's unionized." That's the common practice. It's never put in writing. It's constantly stated by the employer: "If this operation unionizes, we will close the doors." I've never been in a single, solitary case of union organizing — and I've been in many —  where the employer hasn't stated that. He has never stated that in writing, because of the provisions of the old Code. What this will do very clearly is allow and invite....

MADAM CHAIRMAN: The member for North Island.

MR. GABELMANN: We can't possibly have this story interrupted in mid-sentence, much less mid-paragraph, so I would suggest that I'll sit down for a moment.

[ Page 1383 ]

MR. CLARK: I'm just winding up. I have a couple of points I want to make.

This amendment invites abuse. If the minister's intent, as he stated clearly, is to simply provide information to employees.... And I believe the minister, because he has said before: "It's not our intent to have unscrupulous employers thwart, union organization drives." He said that. He said that in a previous clause where we had....

Interjection.

MR. CLARK: I don't think the minister understands what is currently allowed. I don't mean that in any pejorative way, Mr. Minister; I really don't. The minister has said that this is simply to allow employers to communicate with their employees. What I'm suggesting — and the evidence is clear; I can give you case after case — is that employers currently, constantly, give their opinion and their facts on the influence of a union drive on their operations. That is currently the case. So this amendment opens the door. It invites abuse. It invites employers to simply state that their operation will shut down, and to state it more aggressively. It means that when there is that organization drive, you are going to get industrial disruption. No one has done a cost analysis of the impact of secret-ballot voting. During the debate between the union and the employer, very little production gets done. When you allow employers more opportunity to essentially communicate to interfere in the collective right of the employees to join a trade union, then you delay and you cause more disruption.

Mr. Minister, I want to make one other point. That is that when an individual says, "This is what the employer said to me so that I won’t join a union," that individual, who is nonunion and does not have the protection of a collective agreement, has to testify before the Labour Relations Board to that fact. We now have a situation where employers can argue orally their position before employees privately, and if an employee wants to complain, he has to do it publicly and give evidence before the Labour Relations Board. The minister will say that we have this clause that says they can't intimidate. The enforcement of that clause is reactive. It means that the onus is on the individual to complain. The onus is on the individual to say that the employer is intimidating him, when what we need is legislation, which we had in 1973, which states very clearly that it is not the employer's right to interfere in the collective wishes of the employees. What we need is a framework which accepts as fundamental the right of employees to join a trade union, not something that allows employers to interfere and then puts the onus on individuals to fight that before the Labour Relations Board. I think it really is a blueprint for, and will open the door to, more abuse.

It means American-style, aggressive, professional management consultants who are hired by employers to communicate an anti-union message to their employees. Quite clearly we have a situation now that allows the employer to communicate his reasonably held views. We have a situation now that fulfils what the minister says is the intent of this amendment. So this amendment is clearly not needed, if that is the intent.

This amendment, I believe, is insidious in terms of the impact it will have on unionization drives in this province. It really means that more and more will be thwarted. It really means that this government does not accept that it is a right of individuals to decide on their own, without interference by the person who signs their cheque, whether or not they join a union. I feel very strongly that this is a bad clause, notwithstanding that it is bad legislation; that it will have a tremendous impact on the individual rights of workers.

MR. GABELMANN: I think it is important to take some time to deal with the issue from a philosophical perspective. When the Code was established, the principle was — and it is still in the legislation and will still be in the legislation — that an employer or a person acting on his behalf shall not participate in or interfere with the formation, etc., of a trade union. That particular philosophy was watered down somewhat by the subsequent section 3 of the Code, which allows an employer to communicate to an employee a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business. Those are contradictory sections of the act, enabling the board to make a series of decisions about the extent of employer interference in organizing campaigns.

I might just say in parentheses that when we talk here of organizing campaigns, the same arguments apply to decertification campaigns as well; that's the other side of the same coin. Over the last few years section 3(3)(g) has given employers increasingly more latitude in expressing reasonably held opinions. The second member for Vancouver East described one particular situation where it was, in effect, wide open — and he is right. A lot of cases don't end up at the board simply because of the delay involved, given the earlier elimination of the automatic certification sections. But we can't get into that. It's going to take a few minutes.

[5:00]

I want to try to talk about the different philosophies at stake. One is a Canadian tradition that was included in our legislation for some years: the opportunity for an automatic certification to prevent interference, delay, abuse or a variety of things. The Nova Scotia experiment seemed to be a worthwhile approach as well. It took the view that whether or not employees want to joint a union is their business. It's not the state's business, their neighbours' business, the competitors' business or the employer's business.

I want to suggest that in the United States we have the opposite situation. In the United States there is a view that the employer has as much at stake in determining how the employees should be represented for bargaining as do the employees. That's the American model. They have wide-open, contested elections, in effect, for that principle. They don't have the quid pro quo, Employees don't have the right to determine how employers will conduct their bargaining. Employees in the United States don't have the right to say to an employer: "You should establish the following system for doing collective bargaining for us." That doesn't happen. That's all done behind closed doors; it's secret and private; it is no business whatsoever of the employee. But the employer has all the right in the world to say whatever he or she wants to say to the employees.

This legislation, with these changes that we're debating, moves us considerably, if not all the way, to the American model. We wouldn't have these changes if the minister didn't feel there was already enough opportunity for employers to campaign. The only possible reason for these changes is to provide additional authority to the employer to campaign against the union. No other possible interpretation can be given to this.

[ Page 1384 ]

Earlier the minister suggested, as I understood him, that this section is really designed in contract situations. Employers communicate with their employees all the time now in contract disputes. Not to disparage the man, but Peter Bentley regularly sends newsletters to his employees in Canfor during the course of a labour dispute, telling the workers why the management position is good and fair and should be accepted. There is all kinds of employer activity now in terms of free speech, during contract negotiations, during a strike or lockout or at any time. They have that right. So this amendment couldn't possibly be for that purpose; it must be for some other purpose. What's the other purpose? It can only be to do with representation.

This is the only time I'm going to do this in the course of this entire committee stage. I'm going to take a few minutes to read two and a half or three pages of a book that sets out the arguments better than I could make them and better than they've been made in any other place that I can find them. The book is Reconcilable Differences by Paul Weilen

AN HON. MEMBER: The minister should read it.

MR. GABELMANN: I'm sure the minister has read it. No one would presume to take on the job of Minister of Labour in this province without having first read that book; it is the bible. I know the minister has read it, but I'm going to acquaint him again with one particular section of the book, and I'm also going to acquaint other members of the House, because this is an important issue: do we go the American route, or do we go the Canadian route? This legislation, of course, takes us in the American direction.

Paul Weiler, I should add — everyone in this House probably knows it — was a chairperson of the labour board in British Columbia, and in my view managed to bring a lot of disputes to an early settlement behind the scenes because he understood the powers he had in that business, and he understood that he didn't need legislative authority but could do it by sitting up all night with the respective parties. His politics, I suspect, are not reflected in this Legislature. His politics are certainly not reflected in our party, because he is not even a progressive liberal in our political terms, much less a social democrat. So he is not one of us in political terms, I can assure members who might be labouring under that apprehension. He writes:

"In the United States everyone assumes that there should be a representation campaign, if only out of a sense of fairness to the employer who is directly affected by his employees' decision to have a union as the bargaining agent with whom he will have to deal. Thus the employer should be given a fair opportunity to make a case against the union, to explain why the employees do not need a union, to promise that he will do more to improve their conditions on his own, and to point out that the employees do not have to pay dues to the employer. In the final analysis, American law provides for free competition between the union and employer for the hearts and minds of the employees, on the analogy of a political campaign between two parties."

That is a good summary of what will now become the law in British Columbia: a fair campaign, not a dirty one; no undue influence, no threats, no intimidation, no coercion, a fair election. Paul Weiler, in that one paragraph, outlines clearly what the law will be in British Columbia.

"I have always found it incongruous that the employer should be given a central role in the representation play, even if its campaign is perfectly legal, without a whisper of economic coercion of the employees. Suppose the employer simply mounts a sophisticated Madison Avenue kind of electioneering, complete with highly paid lawyers, consultants, psychological survey teams, perhaps even films. Is that consistent with what collective bargaining is all about? In making up their minds about union representation, the employees are really choosing how they will deal with their employer, how they will participate in settling and improving their terms of employment. The employer and the employees have an inherent conflict of interest in that topic. Clearly the employer is affected by the employees' judgment about whether they will be represented by a trade union. Yet surely that collective employee choice should be as off-limits to the employer as the employer's choice of a vice-president of industrial relations is off-limits to the employees.

"Perhaps this point is worth pursuing. Let us look again at the political analogy. Is the employer-union campaign really analogous to a Liberal-Conservative or a Republican-Democrat contest for government office? Not at all. Political campaigns produce a verdict about who is going to govern the citizens who participate in that election. The employer is not governed by the trade union chosen by the employees. The employer still has the right to pursue its own interests in dealing with the employee, whether this be on an individual basis or through the trade union. That is why the employer has no rightful role to play in the process by which employees make up their minds about how they will deal with their employer.

"Indeed, I can think of a much better political analogy. Take the case of a Canadian election, either federal or provincial. Obviously the United States does have a major interest in which party is elected in Canada, related to their contrasting policies about defence, trade, natural resources, energy and general continentalist attitudes. Surely no one will argue that the United States government should thereby have the right to participate in Canadian election campaigns, to try astutely to get Canadians to vote for a government favourable to the United States. The rightful reaction in both Canada and the United States is that this would be a clear conflict of interest. It would be condemned as American manipulation of the selection of the Canadian authority which must deal, often in an adversarial manner, with the United States government. No one will seriously deny that the only legitimate response is a hands-off attitude on the part of the American government.

"Should the same not be true of a union representation vote? That analogy clearly does apply to representation contests between two unions. The British Columbia mining industry is now almost entirely organized. However, there are a number of trade unions which hold certifications at one mine or another. There is a history of raids by these unions on bargaining units held by others. Currently" — this

[ Page 1385 ]

was written a few years ago — "the most bitter rivals are the United Steelworkers of America and the Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW). These unions differ sharply, both in style and philosophy. An employer may strongly prefer one to the other. Should that employer be able to pull out all stops to get its preference elected, even to the extent of making promises that the employees will get a better deal with one union rather than the other? I realize that if the employer tried that too crudely, it would likely backfire, just as would American intervention in a Canadian election. But that kind of intervention can be done astutely, carefully and effectively. The question is whether the law should structure the certification process so as to facilitate that kind of employer intervention. Clearly the answer is no. The rightful parties to the campaign are the two unions, Steel and CAIMAW, and the employer must stay completely out of it.

"The logic of this principle applies equally to the original organizational campaign. Here the workers are choosing not which union representative they will have, but rather the system by which employees will deal with their employer: either individual bargaining, perhaps with an informal plant committee, or collective bargaining through an organized trade union. Obviously there will be some differences of opinion among the workforce. Some will be attracted by the possibility of improved benefits; others will be more impressed by the risk of strikes and the cost of dues. These employees, with their contrasting viewpoints, should rightfully debate the issues. It is the employees who decide whether to go with the union or not. Certainly the employer does not campaign in the interests of the employees. The employer's concern is not that the employees make a free and informed choice in their interest. Rather, the employer wants to influence the employees to make a choice in his interest.

"I do not think that the law should try to penalize any but the grossest form of such employer activity. But at the same time I believe that the law should design the certification process so as to avoid any suggestion that the employer is being invited into the campaign, that it has a rightful place as the central opponent to the trade union for the allegiance of the employees.

"A proponent of the value of the employer campaign might retreat to one final line of argument. He would agree that a posture of employer non-intervention is the only legitimate stance in the case of a raid by one union of an existing bargaining unit already represented by another union. But the situation in which a union seeks initial bargaining rights in a hitherto unrepresented unit is not really the same. Why? Because this is an unfair contest between the union supporters, who have the union and its resources to help them, and the non-union employees, who are divided and unsophisticated. The latter need the help of the employer."

[5:15]

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. member, your time has expired.

MR. LOVICK: I think that the comments being read into the record are extremely important. I would like to hear more.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Thank you, hon. member. The member for North Island on section 5 as amended.

MR. GABELMANN: Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks to the member for Nanaimo. The first member for Boundary-Similkameen (Mr. Hewitt) asks why I don't just table the report. First of all, it's not a report. Secondly, if I tabled it, he wouldn't read it. And thirdly, Hansard will record it and thousands of British Columbians will have an opportunity to read it, too.

Before I was so politely interrupted, Madam Chairman, I'd got to the point that.... I think I'll just go back a little bit to pick up the thread.

Paul Weiler says:

"The latter need the help of the employer. In that situation the employer actually performs the social function of vigorously putting the case against the union, responding to the inflated claims of the proponents of collective bargaining. This is all to the benefit of the employees, since it enhances their freedom of choice and permits them to make a more informed and rational judgment about collective bargaining."

That's the argument. as Paul Weiler portrays it, against the position of there being no employer interference. He then says:

"Frankly, I am not persuaded. I do not think that the non-union employees, who are often the more senior, long-service employees, are that unsophisticated. They can and do counter many union organizational drives. Most important, in the final analysis, the employer rarely acts in the interest of the employees. It has its own reasons for fighting the union, and these coincide only accidentally with those of the non-union employees."

Skipping a few paragraphs and picking a final paragraph that I wish to quote, Paul Weiler says:

"The employer has all the advantages, even when it behaves fairly: day-to-day contact with the employees, the absence of the union from the plant, the lack of any tangible union benefits during the trauma of the representation contest, a gradual changeover in the employee complement, with all newcomers unilaterally selected by the employer. And the ugly fact of life is that too often employers do not behave. Forty years of legal enforcement has not stemmed the tide of unfair labour practices by employers right across North America."

Paul Weiler puts the argument as well as I think it has been put or can be put. What we are talking about in this section is whether or not employers should have enhanced opportunities to campaign against a union certification. There isn't a member on the other side of the House, I'm sure, who would argue that — to use Weiler's example — the union should be able to participate in the selection of the industrial relations vice-president. There isn't anybody on the other side of the House who would argue that the union should be able to use the same kind of economic influence that the employer has to persuade the employer whether or not to join an accredited employers' council for bargaining purposes.

[ Page 1386 ]

The union doesn't have those rights; the employer makes those decisions on his or her own.

So why is the quid pro quo not in place? Why is the opposite not in place? Why is it fair that unions can't interfere with the employer...? Let me put that another way. What logic is there for denying unions some economic leverage in helping to determine what course employers take in industrial relations, to the extent perhaps of saying to the employer: "Well, we're going to exert the same kind of economic influence on you as you do on us; we're going to say you may have to shut down your business if you join an employers' accredited organization"? It's absurd, isn't it? No one would expect us to write a law saying that the unions have the right to shut down an employer if he chooses a certain course in determining how to handle his industrial relations. But here we say to the employer: "You can say whatever you like to the employee about how you handle your industrial relations." There's no balance; there's no fairness.

I don't propose to argue that they are entirely analogous situations. They're not. But they can be made more fair by understanding that the employer has no concern, no business, no interest, no involvement in whether workers decide to bargain individually or to bargain collectively. It is none of the employer's business — period. And in that respect the current legislation goes too far, inasmuch as 3(3)(g) allows employers to communicate statements of fact or opinion, such as: "In my opinion, if you form a union, the place will go broke and you'll lose your job." He doesn't have to prove it's true. He just has to say: "Well, it's my honestly held opinion that that's what's going to happen." The employer does not have the right to say to workers how they will represent themselves — one on one or a group on one, it's none of the employer's business.

So why this section? Why this move towards the American political model? Maybe the minister would like to answer that question right now.

HON. L. HANSON: First of all, your contention that this bill is moving towards the American pattern, if you will, is not true. Secondly, we have a philosophical disagreement about the employer not having any interest in how his employees bargain. I think he does have a very serious interest, as well as I think the employees respect that interest. I think that labour organizations respect it also. What we're doing in this bill is ensuring that the employers are able to communicate their message to their employees. Whatever decision is being made, the employees are informed people making a vote from an informed position, and we are protecting undue influence, intimidation, coercion and threats. I can't accept the member's argument. By the way, just before I finish, I do have a copy of the book, I have read it, and I do remember that passage.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: Hon. members, just before we go any further I want to remark about the reading of the material. It is not an acceptable practice. Although I know the member prefaced his remarks by saying it would be the one and only time....

MR. GABELMANN: The only one that long.

MADAM CHAIRMAN: The only one that long? Well, the Chair allowed some latitude, but I would just like to remind the members that it really isn't an acceptable practice.

MR. MILLER: Madam Chairman, you mean I can't read this?

Before I get into my remarks, I want to ask the minister a question relative to succeeding sections of the bill and have him respond as to whether he's sought legal opinions on whether or not conflicts do exist. I'll just cite the sections.

First of all, under 2(3), the one we've been talking about: "Nothing in this act deprives a person of his freedom to express his views provided.... We then go on to the following section 3(l), which says an employer or person acting on his behalf shall not participate in or interfere with the formation or administration of a trade union; and further on under 3(3)(g) that's qualified somewhat in terms of the employer's right to communicate to an employee a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held.

My question is, does 3(l) in fact supersede 2(3)?

HON. L. HANSON: Was your question does 3(l) supersede 2(3)?

MR. MILLER: Yes. Section 3(l) talks about the existing Labour Code.

HON. L. HANSON: In the amendment and in section 2 of the Labour Code, we're dealing with the rights of the employer and the employee, and in section 3 of the existing act we're dealing with unfair labour practices in more detail, which does have some relationship to the rights of employers and employees. But we wanted to make it very clear what the relationship in communications was with the employee and employer and therefore have created those changes to that section.

So they were always there before. Section 3(l), again, details unfair labour practices and will stay as it exists, and we've made some changes to section 2(l) to clarify the rights of the employer and the employee.

MR. MILLER: I still have some doubts whether or not, for example, if under section 2(3).... It can be interpreted from this clause that an employer has the freedom to express views provided that they don't contradict the qualifiers —  undue influence, intimidation, coercion or threat. But at the same time, in the subsequent section an employer is clearly prohibited from participating in or interfering with the formation of a trade union.

I talked earlier about the bill perhaps being a lawyer's dream. Maybe that's one illustration of what I meant.

Nonetheless, getting back to the clause, again I'll have to relate to my own experience as a worker in various places in British Columbia. I don't think anybody is foolish enough not to believe that if it was easier to form a trade union there would be a heck of a lot more people in trade unions in British Columbia. The fact is, it's not easy. The kind of fear and intimidation that can be exercised almost silently is something to behold, and I have had some limited participation in organizing drives to know that that's completely true. For example, if we go back even before the so-called organizing drive, even before the supposedly independent-minded and free employees decide that perhaps a union is what they need to represent their interests, there are ample opportunities for lots of employers to influence the process even before it gets there.

I'll illustrate: the coal port in Prince Rupert, a big project coming up. The history in British Columbia was that the other

[ Page 1387 ]

coal port, the major port at Roberts Bank, was unionized under the jurisdiction of the longshoremen's union. That employer, with a great deal of thought, set about recruiting employees and, in the process of questioning these employees as to their qualifications and all the rest of it, also included a number of questions to deduce whether or not these individuals held strong views about trade unions. Naturally, in a time of high unemployment when you're going for a job and the boss is saying to you, "Well, you know, what do you think about trade unions?" most people probably would modify their position or their stance in full recognition that jobs are hard to come by — if I give the right answers maybe I'm lucky enough to get one.

The other example I had was a friend of mine who tried to get a job during the Depression. He managed to get an interview in Vancouver, and the guy asked him: "Well, yeah, you know, I might hire you, but what do you want to work for?" He said: "Well, the union rate will do." Needless to say, he never got in the door. So there's an example of somebody who expressed himself freely about his desire to belong to a trade union to join forces with other working people to advance their cause. Obviously the result of that was you don't get in the door in the first place, which.... But let me finish the story about the coal port.

AN HON. MEMBER: Finish the story.

MR. MILLER: Yeah, I think it's an important one, and it's worth telling.

The result of that, of course, is that by the time all of the people who were hired — who went through this screening process — got together as employees and in conjunction with some programs that the company brought in, there wasn't a snowball's chance that....

[5:30]

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: I wasn't going to finish that. Is that unparliamentary? I think everybody can finish that in their own imagination. There was not that chance of a union being formed for those employees.

Maybe the minister would like to say that that doesn't happen, or how he feels about that, but that's certainly one angle.

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: I see the big T over there. I see my time is up, Madam Chairman. I would move that the House....

Interjection.

MR. MILLER: Okay. I shall return.

HON. L. HANSON: Madam Chairman, I just wanted to make one observation, and make it very quickly so that we can let our House Leader take over. I think that the members opposite should look at section 2 as it reads. It says:

"Nothing in this Act deprives a person of his freedom to express his views provided he does not use intimidation, coercion or threats." All I want to point out is that it does not say "nothing prevents an employer." It says "a person."

HON. MR. STRACHAN: I move the committee rise and report remarkable progress and ask leave to sit again.

Motion approved.

The House resumed; Mr. Speaker in the chair.

The committee, having reported progress, was granted leave to sit again.

MR. SPEAKER: Hon. members, I am informed that His Honour the Lieutenant- Governor is about to enter the chamber.

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor entered the chamber and took his place in the chair.

CLERK-ASSISTANT:

Dentists Amendment Act, 1987 

Boundary Act

Sechelt Indian Government District Enabling Act

Assessment and Property Taxation Amendment Act, 1987

Home Owner Grant Amendment Act, 1987

Corporation Capital Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Income Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Amendment Act, 1987

Insurance Premium Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Social Service Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Hotel Room Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Motor Fuel Tax Amendment Act, 1987

Miscellaneous Statutes (Finance Measures) Amendment Act, 1987

Property Purchase Tax Act 

Teaching Profession Act

Insurance (Captive Company) Act

Municipal Amendment Act (No. L), 1987

Taxation Statutes Amendment Act, 1987.

CLERK OF THE HOUSE: In Her Majesty's name, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor doth assent to these bills.

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor retired from the chamber.

HON. MR. STRACHAN: Mr. Speaker, in view of the extraordinary amount of work we did today during the lunch hour, and also in view of other events that are occurring at 6:30 this evening, I move the House do now adjourn.

Motion approved.

The House adjourned at 5:37 p.m.

[ Page 1388 ]

Appendix

AMENDMENTS TO BILLS

19 The Hon. L. Hanson to move, in Committee of the Whole on Bill (No. 19) intituled Industrial Relations Reform Act, 1987 to amend as follows:

SECTION 5, in the proposed section 2 (3) by adding "undue influence, " before "intimidation".