The committee met at 1:30 p.m.

[Elenore Sturko in the chair.]

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Elenore Sturko. I’m the MLA for Surrey-Cloverdale and Chair of the Special Committee on Police Complaints.

I’d like to acknowledge that we’re meeting today on the legislative precinct here in Victoria, which is located on the territory of the lək̓ʷəŋən-speaking Peoples, known as the Songhees and Esquimalt Nations.

The committee is responsible for conducting an audit respecting the outcome or resolution of randomly selected complaints and investigations pursuant to 51.2 of the Police Act.

Today we’ll be receiving briefings from the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General and the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner.

We’re going to start our presentation today with the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and I am pleased to welcome our first guests from the ministry. Joining us today are Deputy Minister Tara Richards; Glen Lewis, assistant deputy minister and director of policing and law enforcement services, policing and security branch; Megan Harris, assistant deputy minister, corporate strategic initiatives and office of the fire commissioner; Mark Fassina, executive director, corporate strategic initiatives; Matt Brown, executive director, policing and security branch.

We have 30 minutes for the presentation, followed by 45 minutes for questions from members of this committee, and I’ll now turn it over for your presentation.

Briefing by Ministry of
Public Safety and Solicitor General

Glen Lewis: Good afternoon. Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon to the other members of the committee.

I’d like to acknowledge at the outset, with respect, the lək̓ʷəŋən Peoples, on whose traditional territory we present today, and the Songhees, Esquimalt and W̱SÁNEĆ Peoples, whose historical relationships with the land continue to this day.

It’s my pleasure to appear before you today to provide information in support of your mandate concerning the audit of selected police complaints and misconduct files as required under section 51.2 of the Police Act. As the assistant deputy minister of the policing and security branch and as director of policing and law enforcement services appointed under the Police Act, I will provide a high-level overview for you today of the Police Act and the history of part 11, which governs the police complaints process.

My colleague Megan Harris will then speak to the previous special committees that conducted audits of police complaints and investigations under part 11 and provide an overview of legislative, regulatory and policy changes made in relation to part 11 since the initial special committee completed its review in 2013.

With me here today from the policing services branch is Matt Brown, executive director of municipal policing and governance and community safety division.

Going to slide 2, I understand you have a paper copy of the presentation. Can I confirm that? That was provided to you.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): We have electronic copies.

Glen Lewis: Great. Thank you.

Slide 2, to follow along, is just a brief overview of the Police Act. Under the Constitution Act, 1867, provinces have a constitutional responsibility for the administration of justice, which includes policing, for section 92(14).

B.C.’s Police Act, which was originally introduced in 1974, regulates the delivery and oversight of policing and law enforcement services in British Columbia. Section 2 requires the minister to ensure that an adequate and effective level of policing and law enforcement is maintained throughout British Columbia.

The minister, as the Solicitor General and top law-enforcement official for the province, must designate a director of policing and law enforcement services. The director, who acts on behalf of and subject to the direction of the minister, is responsible for “superintending policing and law enforcement functions in British Columbia” per section 39 of the Police Act.

[1:35 p.m.]

Next slide. The director, supported by everyone in the policing and security branch, discharges this responsibility by a number of means, including establishing policing standards, administering First Nations policing agreements and programs, inspecting and reporting on the quality of police services, conducting policing studies and investigations of persons appointed under the Police Act and making recommendations to the minister on the activities of police in their provision of policing and law enforcement services.

I’m now going to turn to providing a brief summary of how policing and law enforcement are organized in the province. We’re providing this to you in the context of the specific review that you’re discharged to execute, per this standing committee.

Slide 4. Under the Police Act, the province must provide policing and law enforcement to rural, unincorporated areas and municipalities under 5,000 people. Section 14 of the act establishes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as a provincial police service in B.C., which is administered through the provincial police services agreement, or the PPSA, with Canada. That agreement, as you all know, expires in 2032. In accordance with the PPSA, the province pays 70 percent of the cost, and the federal government pays the remaining 30 percent, in recognition of this mutual benefit to both governments.

Next slide, municipal police services. Municipalities over 5,000 must provide policing services within their boundaries by one of three means.

First, there are 12 independent municipal police services that serve 13 municipalities in B.C.: Abbotsford, Central Saanich, Delta, Nelson, New Westminster, Oak Bay, Port Moody, Saanich, Surrey, Vancouver, Victoria and Esquimalt, and West Vancouver. Their officers are subject to the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner.

Second, there are 67 municipalities that contract with the province to receive police services from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. RCMP officers are not subject to the OPCC oversight.

Third, there’s an ability to enter into an agreement with another municipality for a municipal police service.

I want to turn my attention next, on slide 6, to First Nations and designated policing units. Designated policing and law enforcement units provide supplemental policing in British Columbia. There are three designated policing units whose members are subject to OPCC oversight, relevant to your review that you’re commencing today.

The Stl’atl’imx tribal police is the only Indigenous-led self-administered police service or tribal police in British Columbia, providing policing to ten of the 11 Stl’atl’imx Nations.

Second, the Metro Vancouver transit police is a multi-jurisdictional policing agency policing the transit systems across Metro Vancouver, which includes 21 municipalities and one First Nation.

Three, the Organized Crime Agency, or OCA, is a unit with a mandate to combat organized crime in the province. It comprises specialized sworn officers and seconded officers from various units and municipal police agencies.

I want to turn my attention next to police boards, slide 7. Each of those 12 municipal police services and the designated law enforcement services are governed and overseen by a civilian board. Each board sets the priorities and direction for the police service; is responsible for financial oversight, including budget development; and is responsible for the administration of service and policy complaints filed against the police service.

Now, having painted that backdrop, I’d like to go to the issue of police oversight in British Columbia. Police in B.C. are accountable to various oversight bodies and mechanisms. They’re accountable to their boards; to the OPCC, in certain instances; to the independent investigations office of British Columbia, or the IIO; and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, or the CRCC, for members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. All are subject to provincial policing standards and things like inquests.

I want to paint this picture because the review that you are doing is part of a broader oversight framework that exists in British Columbia, and it applies to certain parts but not all. So to paint this picture and to show where there’s accountability, we wanted to spend a few moments just walking you through this.

As director, I work in close collaboration and coordination with each of these oversight bodies. Starting with the IIO — you’ll see this on your chart — the IIO has a mandate to conduct investigations into police-related incidents resulting in death or serious harm, to determine whether any offence may have been committed.

[1:40 p.m.]

The IIO has jurisdiction over all of B.C.’s policing services, including the 12 municipal police services, the RCMP, Metro Vancouver transit police and the Stl’atl’imx tribal police. The IIO is established under part 7.1 of the Police Act, and it’s the Attorney General who is responsible for this component of the act.

The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission of the RCMP is an independent agency created by parliament in 1988. The CRCC ensures that public complaints made about the conduct of RCMP members are examined, and it conducts reviews when a complainant is not satisfied with the handling of the complaint.

Another form of oversight is inquest. Established under the B.C. Coroners Act, all deaths occurring while a person is in the custody or care of a police officer, including a municipal police officer, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and sheriffs are subject to a mandatory inquest.

The Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General can also require an inquest if it’s considered necessary and in the public interest.

Another form of oversight that we’ve seen in this province, and relevant to the history of why we’re here today, deals with inquiries. Government, through an order in council, can call a formal public inquiry into a matter of serious public concern involving systemic failure, institutional misconduct or major harm to the public. A commission of inquiry is an independent, government-mandated process designed to publicly uncover any systemic failures and recommend reforms where ordinary oversight mechanisms have failed or public trust has been damaged.

As an example, and relevant to your reviews, is the Davies Commission that examined how police, government and oversight agencies responded or failed to respond in the death of Mr. Frank Paul in 1998. This case led to scrutiny of policing practices involving marginalized and vulnerable individuals.

The Missing Women Commission of Inquiry in 2010 is another example that is directly tied to handling of police investigations, specifically in cases involving missing and murdered women from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

Another high profile example took place in 2008 following the death of Mr. Robert Dziekanski, who, after being subject to a conducted energy weapon, died in police custody.

These are just a few examples that contributed to changes in the Police Act and to the establishment of part 11, which I will speak to shortly.

Continuing in what is oversight in British Columbia, in terms of policing, is the issue of policing standards. In my role as director, I may establish standards under my authorities in section 40 of the Police Act. The B.C. provincial policing standards are binding on police and police boards once they are approved by the minister.

Currently there are provincial standards that may apply to a broad scope of topics. These include use of force; sexual assault investigations, with an emphasis on trauma-informed practice; training for police officers that includes crisis intervention and de-escalation; promotion of unbiased policing; investigation of missing persons; and the use of specialized equipment, such as body-worn cameras and CEWs.

I also want to touch on municipal police boards — again, relevant to your inquiry. They provide independent civilian police governance and oversight. They are indeed the front line, in my view, of police oversight. It is a statutory requirement that a municipal police board make rules consistent with the Police Act, regulations and provincial standards respecting the prevention of neglect and abuse by its constables, the efficient discharge of duties and functions by the department and its constables.

Finally, and the major portion of your attention in the coming months, is the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner, or the OPCC, established in part 9 of the Police Act. The process for investigation of conduct and service and police complaints that it oversees is found in part 11.

Between the municipal and designated policing services that I’ve just identified, the OPCC has oversight of about 3,500 officers, based on authorized strength.

We’ve done a brief overview of the landscape, and now, an overview of part 11. I know you’re going to be hearing in depth from subsequent presenters on this point, but we wanted to paint this backdrop on the work that you’re about to commence.

[1:45 p.m.]

While the OPCC will provide more detail on this part, in terms of their presentation, I hope it’ll be of some benefit to this committee to speak to the historical context of part 11, particularly its impetus.

Part 11 was created in response to Justice Josiah Wood’s 2007 Report on the Review of the Police Complaint Process in British Columbia. The report was prompted by public calls for transparency and civilian oversight following audits revealing major errors, challenges with the management of the complaints process, especially regarding excessive use of force, and a general lack of police trust in investigating themselves. It followed the 1994 Oppal Commission recommendations for policing reform, highlighting the need for legislative changes to the Police Act to establish a more effective independent oversight body and accountability for misconduct.

Informed by the inquest I spoke about earlier, part 11 was created in part as a response to the public’s demands for policy reform to enhance use-of-force protocols, mental health training and transparency in these matters, calls for independent civilian oversight, calls for greater accountability for misconduct and addressing systemic gendered and racial bias.

Justice Wood’s report found that the majority of complaints against police were actually handled appropriately and investigated. However, and critically, the report also found that approximately one in five complaints were not handled or concluded as well as they could have. There were concerns that some of the more serious complaints tended to be ones that had deficiencies in the investigations or the disposition. A variety of factors were thought to contribute to these deficiencies. In particular, the lack of unconditional acceptance by some police of the concept of civilian oversight was identified as concerning.

Justice Wood also observed challenges to the police commissioner’s authority during the course of that review.

The Wood report advanced 91 recommendations for improvements to the legislative framework aimed at addressing these issues. Generally speaking, those 91 recommendations aligned with one or more of the following objectives: (1) increasing the oversight role of the Police Complaint Commissioner; (2) improving accessibility for persons to lodge complaints; (3) increasing the rights afforded to both members and complainants throughout the investigative process, improving timelines, expanding the use of mediation and other informal resolution processes to deal with complaints, clarifying rules and responsibilities during an investigation and, finally, developing a new process for reviewing decisions regarding complaints.

After consultation with police stakeholders, the implementation of the recommendations was made through amendments to the Police Act. These resulted in significant changes to the police complaint process in British Columbia. Part 11 was created by Bill 7, the Police Amendment Act, in 2009 and brought into force March 31, 2010.

I would close with these final words. I have outlined the various forms of police oversight in British Columbia, but, frankly, we’re here today because this is another form of oversight. You have a statutory obligation to do this review, to bring out issues that may come from the audit and to advance recommendations to ensure that the oversight process in British Columbia remains contemporary and is transparent in its process.

I thank you for this time to be with you today.

I’ll turn to my colleague, Megan Harris.

Megan Harris: Thank you, Glen, and good afternoon, Madam Chair and committee.

It’s my pleasure to provide the special committee with information on the progress made since 2019.

Before I begin, I’d like to introduce my colleague, Mark Fassina, who’s the executive director responsible for policing and public safety modernization within our branch.

I’ll speak briefly to the two previous special committees that audited random samples of police complaints and investigations under part 11 of the Police Act. I will also provide an overview of the applicable legislative, regulatory and policy changes that have been made in relation to part 11 of the act since the initial special committee completed their review in March 2013.

Since the inclusion of section 51.2 in the Police Act, there have been two special committee reviews and reports completed, in 2012 and 2019. As you know, this is the third to be convened.

In addition to auditing a sample of complaints and investigations under part 11 of the act, the inaugural special committee in 2012 reviewed officer use and training with respect to conducted energy weapons, also known as Tasers, as required under section 40.1 of the act.

The current special committee’s mandate is limited to section 51.2, and our presentation will focus exclusively on complaints and investigations under part 11 of the act.

[1:50 p.m.]

Slide 14. The 2012 special committee brought forward a couple recommendations, both directed to the OPCC.

The second special committee was established in February 2019. The audit sampled 10 percent of complaints between 2012 and 2018 and found that 65 percent of those complaints were completed within the six-month period. This finding further substantiated the OPCC’s sustained performance improvement from 2010 to 2012, where only 45 percent of complaints were completed within the six-month benchmark.

The 2019 special committee endorsed the findings of the audit and made several recommendations, with some directed to the OPCC, some directed to government, or both. The 2019 committee’s recommendations focused mainly on enhanced training to staff and providing additional communications and outreach to the public. For government, the recommendations spoke to amending aspects of part 11 and reviewing the application of independent oversight in relation to police lockup staff and other roles such as special municipal constables.

The special committee also recommended the OPCC and government work together to strengthen the use of alternative dispute resolution and restorative justice to improve the accessibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the complaints process and to increase supports for police, such as providing standardized training and improving information-sharing.

Next slide. Within the context of the province’s legislative role, substantive work has been done in response to these 2019 recommendations. Bill 17, the Police Amendment Act, received royal assent in April 2024 and resulted in amendments to the Police Act, including part 11. It is worth noting that some of these recent amendments have not yet taken effect because further regulatory work is needed for implementation. Nevertheless, I will speak to how the 2024 recommendations are responsive to the 2019 recommendations.

First, recommendation 9 from the 2019 report noted how accessibility barriers and lack of understanding and mistrust can dissuade some potential complainants from even initiating the process. Bill 17 addressed this issue by broadening the range of people that can observe police misconduct investigations. The Police Complaint Commissioner can now appoint contractors, including members of Indigenous communities, to act as observers or cultural safety monitors as part of the process. This change aims to increase transparency and understanding of the police complaints process and ultimately increase public trust. This is now in effect.

In response to recommendation 16, the Police Complaint Commissioner can now conduct public hearings at any time and investigate the systemic causes and contributing factors associated with misconduct investigations. This change is also structured around enhancing the integrity of the investigative process and improving public confidence in policing. This is also in effect.

Recommendation 13 identified an opportunity to provide additional information for investigators and enhance consistency across investigations by granting the Police Complaint Commissioner with the authority to make binding guidelines. Recommendation 17 is related and called for a review of the overall timelines set out in part 11 to ensure appropriateness. Binding guidelines can now be established with respect to discipline procedures where future guidelines could offer valuable benefits, including with respect to timelines.

Recommendation 21 highlighted the special committee’s concern around how the act could be perceived as enabling a police board to subjectively dismiss a complaint. Bill 17 addressed this issue by prescribing when a service or policy complaint may be dismissed without an investigation. This is based on appropriate and administratively defensible rationale. This is also in effect.

Recommendation 23 advocated for the Police Complaint Commissioner to have the authority to appoint other persons as discipline authorities. These people review the investigation and determine if misconduct occurred. If necessary, they also initiate disciplinary proceedings and determine the appropriate disciplinary or corrective measures.

Usually a discipline authority is a chief constable or another senior member of a police service. However, the amendments will enable the Police Complaint Commissioner to appoint a different discipline authority, such as a retired judge or an officer from another police service, if there is a public interest in doing so, such as potential bias or concerns around the efficacy of the investigation. Work is underway right now on this regulation.

[1:55 p.m.]

Finally, recommendation 25 called for the review regarding the oversight of staff that monitor detention facilities in RCMP-policed jurisdictions.

As a reminder, like Glen said, the OPCC does not oversee the RCMP. Conduct complaints respecting RCMP officers are directed to the CRCC. However, as a result of Bill 17, as of September 1, 2025, all civilian detention guards, including those in RCMP facilities, are overseen by the independent investigations office, which investigates any incidents of serious injury or death occurring at a detention facility.

The amendments also empower the director of policing and law enforcement services with a new standard-making authority regarding the care, custody and supervision of persons in police detentions. A project has been initiated to develop these standards, and this is a priority for the director of policing and law enforcement services.

In 2024, the director wrote to all police services and police boards to inform them of the project and request information about local policies, procedures and practices related to detention facilities and detention guards from each B.C. police service, including RCMP E division. Ministry staff have initiated the work associated with this project and are engaging various partners and subject-matter experts, and this project is ongoing.

Next slide. The Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General has also advanced some relevant non-legislative changes that have been responsive to the recommendations of the 2019 special committee. The special committee called on the provincial government to ensure that training for police officers includes information regarding cultural competency, trauma-informed practices and best practices regarding interactions with those living with mental health issues.

The Police Act enables the director of policing and law enforcement services to create binding policing standards that set out minimum requirements for selected topics relevant to policing, including training. In 2024, the director advanced new standards on promoting unbiased policing and a requirement for all officers and supervisors to complete the B.C. fair and impartial policing training course or an approved equivalent.

Additionally, recommendation 7 in the 2019 report requested that there be opportunities for meaningful consultation with diverse community groups as part of a statutorily required review of the Police Act to ensure that the act is free of systemic discriminatory practices. In response to this recommendation as well as the 2022 final report of the Special Committee on Reforming the Police Act, the ministry completed extensive consultations with a wide range of diverse communities and First Nations on all aspects of police and public safety modernization, including part 11.

Next slide. In addition to the amendments I’ve noted, Bill 17 also included several other oversight-related changes. Some of these oversight-related amendments were in response to the 2022 final report of the Special Committee on Reforming the Police Act, and others were motivated by continuous improvement of day-to-day policing and public safety operations.

One change was to align the definition of “misconduct” in part 11 with the B.C. human rights code. Specifically, “discriminatory behaviours” by police now include jokes and gestures, and “protected attributes” include Indigenous identity and gender identity and expression.

Another amendment allows for the informal resolution of more categories of misconduct complaints. For example, informal resolution previously could not be used for incidents involving reportable injuries even if the complainant was open to alternative dispute resolution. Now, more expedient and constructive resolution pathways like mediation and restorative justice are available for a wider variety of misconduct complaints when the involved parties are amenable to using these approaches.

The 2024 amendments introduced a new requirement for police boards to develop policies regarding the handling of service and policy complaints, including public consultation requirements when policies are first developed or revised. This change aims to promote further transparency and public confidence with respect to police oversight processes.

A clarification was implemented to confirm that part 11 complaints can also be filed against former members. While this has always been the policy intention behind part 11, the process for doing so required further clarification.

Finally, within the regulatory context, in 2022, government consolidated the oversight provisions related to the province’s designated policing and law enforcement units under a single regulation to help streamline and simplify the legal framework. This regulatory amendment also reinforced the ongoing applicability of part 11 for members who move between municipal police departments, designated policing and law enforcement units, and vice versa.

[2:00 p.m.]

Last slide. Wrapping up our presentation today, I do acknowledge that the ministry is aware that the OPCC has also undertaken significant work to address the recommendations of the 2019 special committee that fall within their mandate. I know you’ll hear from them shortly after us.

In closing, I’ll emphasize the ministry knows that fair and impartial oversight of police is crucial for ensuring accountability and transparency and maintaining public trust in policing and the overall justice system. To that end, ministry staff and our partners continue to explore opportunities together for ongoing improvements in this area.

We truly appreciate the invitation to come speak with you today, and we’re happy to answer any questions or receive any comments. Thank you.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Great, thank you very much for the presentation.

Before we start questions, I’ll introduce the members of the committee that are here today. From West Kelowna–Peachland, MLA Macklin McCall; from Esquimalt-Colwood, MLA Darlene Rotchford; and our Deputy Chair, from Surrey-Guildford, MLA Garry Begg.

Do any members of the committee have any questions?

Seeing no questions, I’d like to thank you for coming. The presentation was very thorough. I appreciated, especially, having the review of some past work that’s been done through this committee and through the hard work of the ministry staff as well as members of this Legislature.

We look forward to carrying out our assignment here and doing the review of the police complaints. Thank you very much for your time today.

We will now take a short recess.

The committee recessed from 2:01 p.m. to 2:59 p.m.

[Elenore Sturko in the chair.]

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Thanks for joining us again, everybody, after quite a break there.

My name is Elenore Sturko, MLA for Surrey-Cloverdale. I’m the Chair of the Special Committee on Police Complaints.

Right now I’m pleased to welcome our next guests from the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner. Joining us today are Prabhu Rajan, Police Complaint Commissioner, and Andrea Spindler, our deputy commissioner, systemic reform and outreach.

We’ll have 30 minutes for their presentation, followed by 45 minutes for questions from members.

I will now turn it over to you for your presentation. Welcome and thank you.

Briefing by Office of the
Police Complaint Commissioner

Prabhu Rajan: Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair, Deputy Chair and members of the committee.

As you’ve noted, with me today is deputy commissioner Andrea Spindler. But with regret, our new deputy commissioner, Rachel Huggins, wasn’t able to attend today due to other pressing matters.

[3:00 p.m.]

Sandra Sajko, our chief administrative officer, is behind me in the gallery, as well as Cameron Loveless, executive director of oversight operations. It’s good to have them with us.

I wish to start by acknowledging that the work of the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner takes place across unique and diverse traditional Indigenous territories, and we respect the many territorial keepers of this place we now call British Columbia.

I thank the lək̓ʷəŋən People, also known as the Songhees and Esquimalt First Nations — communities past, present and future — for their stewardship, care and leadership on the land on which our main office in Victoria is located.

I’d also like to acknowledge that our Vancouver office is located on the unceded traditional territories of the xʷməθkʷəy̓əm, Sḵwx̱wú7mesh and səlilwətaɬ Nations.

I’d like to start off by accepting that we work within a system rooted in colonialism, and we must be alive to and address the harmful effects of systemic racism as we grapple with cases that are often manifestations of complex societal issues like poverty, homelessness, addiction and mental health crises.

This statutory audit will look at outcomes of the police complaint process under part 11 of the Police Act and as required by section 51.2 of the act.

I would like to thank the committee members for taking on this important task. My office and I look forward to working with you and the auditors and the Clerk of this committee to make this process as smooth and productive as possible.

I would like to emphasize at the outset that the police complaint system and police accountability under part 11 is a shared responsibility. While my office has an integral role, there are many other entities with oversight responsibilities, none of whom are under the OPCC’s direct control. One of the background documents that you have before you provides a brief description of the various system actor roles. We hope that this will assist the committee to better understand B.C.’s oversight system.

As you likely know, the OPCC is a civilian oversight body that provides external accountability regarding the conduct of municipal police officers in B.C. We do not have jurisdiction over the RCMP. Our role is to ensure public confidence in policing, police accountability and that police officers are subjected to the same rule of law as everyone else. The OPCC is fortunate to have just over 50 employees who work extremely hard to achieve our statutory obligations — dedicated professionals who are committed to and believe in the work that we do.

Under the Police Act, we are responsible for acting as a gatekeeper. Before ordering a full investigation, we must first ensure a matter falls within the scope of the act: overseeing and monitoring investigations into possible misconduct, the administration of discipline, conducting systemic investigations and making recommendations to prevent the recurrence of misconduct.

As you are aware, I am an independent officer of the Legislature. This is different from my counterparts across the country, who do not have this level of independence. As commissioner, I must carry out responsibilities in the context of a highly complex and multilayered legislative scheme.

There are many functions of the Police Complaint Commissioner. Some of these functions cannot be delegated to anyone else, such as initiating ordered misconduct investigations, appointing retired judges, ordering public hearings, making recommendations and initiating systemic investigations. Other functions may be delegated to a deputy commissioner or others in the OPCC.

Investigations under the Police Act may arise in different situations, including a complaint from a member of the public regarding individual officer conduct; an investigation ordered by me into individual conduct, typically based on information from a police agency; and a public complaint about a more general police department policy or service.

My office does not itself conduct investigations into alleged police misconduct. Rather, such investigations are typically conducted by professional standards sections in police departments. In other words, a police officer investigates the conduct of another officer. However, what makes our system somewhat unique is that my office is tasked with contemporaneous oversight over all investigations.

[3:05 p.m.]

We seek to ensure that investigations into police conduct are handled and resolved in a timely, rigorous, fair and thorough manner and guided by the principles of fairness, integrity and independence. For example, our staff does their best to have police investigators interview the proper witnesses and gather the appropriate information.

As an aside, my office is responsible for conducting systemic investigations ourselves. However, I don’t believe such investigations are part of your audit.

As commissioner, I also have the authority in the public interest to appoint a retired judge to independently review a discipline authority decision in screening out a matter for lacking an appearance of misconduct; appoint a retired judge to sit as a discipline authority in place of a senior police officer; appoint a retired judge to conduct a public review on the record — this is a paper-based review — of a discipline authority decision; or appoint a retired judge to conduct a public hearing, which is a trial-like legal proceeding.

I’ve now been in the role for almost two years. I believe that the complaint process functions effectively and efficiently. I believe it is one of the best oversight systems in Canada. But I also accept that we can always do better. I am committed to continuous improvement and supporting earlier, better and more satisfying outcomes for all parties involved. It is my goal to prioritize and enhance restorative approaches in our processes. These approaches have shown to be an effective and efficient method for resolving suitable complaints.

Policing is extremely difficult, and officers are placed in dynamic and sometimes dangerous situations. But mistakes are made, which is true of any profession. I place great value on an officer accepting responsibility early on, and I believe many officers would be happy to do so when they believe they could have done better.

Many complainants just want some level of accountability for a negative police interaction. In almost all cases, an officer returns to policing in a complainant’s community, so it’s important that we do our best to try and bring the parties together to ensure that confidence in the police is not reduced.

I also note that with the increased use of body-worn cameras, early resolution should be easier to achieve as the parties would have a very good sense of exactly what occurred. We believe that restorative approaches should not be limited to a particular point in the process. Rather, they should be incorporated at all stages of the process from the outset of a concern being raised to during an investigation or disciplinary proceeding or even a public hearing. Deputy Spindler will be discussing the innovative approach we took at a recent public hearing.

We must also do better in ensuring that the voices of complainants are better heard during the process. Many complainants face barriers preventing them from fully engaging in the process. Without adequate support, complainants often find it difficult to navigate this complex process, understand their rights or advocate for themselves effectively.

The legislation also limits a complainant’s ability to participate in the process. While a complainant can make submissions prior to a discipline proceeding, a complainant cannot attend the hearing. If an incident occurs solely between an officer and a complainant, the member dictates whether a complainant or in fact any other witness will testify at a discipline proceeding. Consequently a discipline authority will typically only receive evidence describing one side of the story. Decision-makers have frequently commented on the limited and often one-sided information they have before them.

These challenges can lead to feelings of disempowerment and undermine public confidence in the system. The OPCC is also not a party to the proceedings and cannot actively participate in discipline proceedings. Without complainant or OPCC participation, the process can be lopsided, with discipline authorities making decisions largely based on evidence and arguments from the member alone.

In addition, discipline proceedings operate behind closed doors, with attendance generally restricted to the police themselves. I believe this has a negative impact on transparency and the public’s trust and confidence in the complaint system and is out of step with other professional regulatory bodies. I believe that there should be changes made to address these inequities. One option could be assigning a neutral party akin to a discipline representative or public hearing counsel to represent the public interest and be responsible for presenting the case to the discipline authority.

[3:10 p.m.]

Lastly, I believe that the OPCC should have the discretion to conduct investigations itself in appropriate cases. As mentioned earlier, my office does not conduct the actual investigations. That is the role of police officers within professional standards units at police departments. This is a source of concern from communities, who are critical of police investigating police, and it can lead to barriers in filing complaints and participating in the complaints process in a meaningful manner.

I would strongly support allowing the OPCC the ability to conduct certain investigations itself in the public interest.

I’ll now turn it over to Deputy Spindler, who will provide more detailed information about (1) the complaints process, (2) the steps we are taking regarding our number one priority, improved efficiencies, and (3) the results of previous audits.

Andrea Spindler: Thank you, commissioner, and good afternoon, committee members.

As the commissioner noted, there are multiple ways in which the complaint and disciplinary process can begin.

People can file complaints about a police officer’s conduct. The commissioner can independently order investigations in the absence of a complaint. There are mandatory investigations any time there is a police-involved serious injury or death. And there are internal discipline investigations when the alleged conduct does not directly involve or affect the public. All of these processes are subject to independent civilian oversight by the OPCC.

In addition, police have a statutory responsibility to send all injuries caused by the discharge of a firearm or when a person has been injured and has been transported to hospital for emergency care for review and determination as to whether there will be an investigation into that incident.

The OPCC must make numerous decisions along the complaint and disciplinary process, including screening of all complaints and determining next steps; directing investigations into police misconduct, including determining the police agency to complete the investigation and whether an external decision-maker is required; and reviewing investigative materials in real time and providing investigative advice and direction to investigators to ensure investigations are thorough and fair.

Also reviewing all resolution agreements between parties to ensure they are meaningful and appropriate; reviewing all decisions of misconduct to determine whether the appointment of a retired judge is necessary; reviewing all proposed disciplinary and corrective measures to ensure they are adequate and appropriate; and issuing recommendations to police boards, the director of policing and law enforcement services or the minister.

An efficient complaint and disciplinary process is essential to delivering fair, timely and trustworthy outcomes. As we strengthen our community outreach, we are streamlining complaint pathways to reduce delays and using resources more strategically. We are also leveraging opportunities where an officer can take early responsibility for questionable conduct and provide opportunities for a complainant to better understand what has happened to them and why, both of which can resolve concerns earlier in the process.

You see on slide 6 there, we talk about our complaint resolution program. This is a practical program that’s participant-centred and an efficient use of our resources. It shortens timelines, improves access to culturally appropriate supports and delivers meaningful remedies while preserving the right to a formal investigation when needed.

The complaint resolution process has been increasingly more successful, with almost 40 percent of all admissible complaints reaching a successful resolution last year. Participation is voluntary and can be offered at any point in the investigative process, to ensure flexibility and responsiveness.

It allows complainants and police to be actively involved in shaping outcomes and emphasizes learning and restorative practices so that everyone involved can reflect, repair harm and reduce the likelihood of repeat incidents. Typical outcomes include an apology or an acknowledgement of the impact of an officer’s conduct, or there may be targeted training for police officers.

In addition, in line with our efficiency efforts, we have focused attention on pre-hearing conferences, which are a confidential, without-prejudice mechanism under the Police Act where officers can accept responsibility following an investigation and a preliminary misconduct decision. An agreement is reached on appropriate discipline or corrective measures, which the OPCC must approve.

[3:15 p.m.]

By promoting and encouraging this process with police and unions, outcomes are reached in a much timelier manner, avoiding lengthy, resource-intensive discipline proceedings. Last year two-thirds of misconduct outcomes were resolved through a pre-hearing conference, with the member accepting responsibility for their actions.

We have also found efficiencies with adjudication processes such as a public hearing. For example, in a high-profile public hearing last year, the retired judge accepted a joint proposal between the commissioner and member council to resolve a case involving sexualized misconduct by a Vancouver police sergeant involving multiple women. The member accepted responsibility for sexual harassment and the discipline imposed, which included demotion and a suspension and was the most severe possible under the Police Act, save dismissal.

This process ensured accountability without the affected women going through a difficult hearing process with the real possibility of revictimization and re-traumatization. We also avoided the significant cost associated with a lengthy public hearing.

We are also creating efficiencies by acknowledging that all investigations do not need to look the same. Some cases are complex, and some are straightforward. The investigative process can be time-consuming. It can involve many interviews, extensive statements taken, documents collected and hours of video footage.

We are currently piloting an expedited investigative process with police departments. This process allows a police member to take responsibility for misconduct and accept disciplinary or corrective measures at the front end in approved cases. The investigative timeline is significantly compressed from the typical six months or longer. There have been four matters that have successfully gone through this expedited investigative process, and on average, they were completed from start to finish in less than two months.

As part of the process, we will be evaluating police satisfaction with the process, including length of time, accountability mechanisms and any suggestions for improvement. Feedback from participating departments and police associations thus far has been positive. We are planning a wider rollout of this expedited process to all municipal police agencies later in 2026.

We have also streamlined serious harm investigations. As you all know, the independent investigations office of B.C. and the OPCC have statutory responsibilities to investigate all incidents of serious harm and death. While our mandates differ, not all cases will require an in-depth misconduct investigation, given the IIO’s investigation.

We have implemented a robust front-end review of the IIO’s investigation and outcome. In doing so, we can identify matters that may be suitable for a discontinuation where there is objective evidence demonstrating no misconduct and no further need for an investigation. This allows both the OPCC and police departments to focus resources on the cases that need them the most.

If you look to slide 9, you’ll see that there’ll be some statistics on that slide. Data and other metrics are essential to understanding how our oversight system is performing. These figures show meaningful change year over year, with a steady increase in files coming to the OPCC.

Last fiscal year we opened over 1,500 files, which is up from the 1,450 seen the previous year, an increase of 5 percent that reflects growing public engagement with the complaint system but also the expansion of the Surrey police service from the RCMP to a municipal policing model. There was a 10 percent increase in files under investigation, comparing the last two fiscal years, acknowledging the volume and complexity of matters the OPCC is managing.

Importantly, more than half of all files opened were formal registered complaints, which can be the most resource-intensive to investigate. The concentration of formal complaints means a substantial portion of OPCC resources are devoted to these matters. And I will note that we’ve seen a 20 percent increase in the number of complaints filed to our office and an over-95-percent increase in the number of complaints coming to us through the phone.

[3:20 p.m.]

This data helps us target improvements, allocate resources where they are most needed and continue refining processes so that oversight can remain timely, thorough and responsive to the public. Recognizing this profile, we continue to steer less serious matters towards complaint resolution and other early resolution options, wherever appropriate, which helps to ensure that the resources are available for investigations.

In looking at patterns seen in complaints and investigations last year, half of allegations of misconduct forwarded for investigation involved police abuses of authority, with the majority of those relating to excessive use of force. The second-highest category of misconduct relates to neglects of duty and involves failures to comply with departmental policies, concerns related to inadequate investigations by police, unsafe operation of police vehicles and failures to provide assistance or medical attention.

Another notable trend involves allegations of sexual harassment, inappropriate touching and comments by police towards another fellow officer or a civilian and also off-duty impaired driving cases. With the new category of misconduct created to account for discriminatory jokes and gestures, approximately 9 percent of abuse-of-authority allegations fell under that new category.

Reportable injuries are at their lowest level in five years, with significant decreases seen in injuries resulting from the use of less lethal options, such as the ARWEN, or beanbag shotgun; conducted energy weapons, also known as tasers; and OC spray. Strikes, punches, kicks and takedowns accounted for the highest proportion of injuries where someone had to go to the hospital for emergency care, followed by injuries caused by the ARWEN, the beanbag shotgun, and police dog bites.

The OPCC is paying particular attention to the location of strikes, especially those directed towards the head area, and the documentation of force used by police and its accuracy. Detailed, accurate and comprehensive note-taking is a fundamental component of police accountability and transparency and is a necessity for public confidence in policing.

Adjudicator Wally Oppal, retired B.C. Court of Appeal justice, issued a decision on this issue last year at a public hearing, indicating that while police have a duty to make notes or otherwise account for their actions, he recommended that legislative reform is needed in this area to set out the legal framework for the treatment of notes and reports for both subject and witness officers. In line with adjudicator Oppal’s recommendations, we agree with the need for legislative guidance to make clear the duty to make notes and to ensure consistency and clarity respecting when a police officer must make notes and how those notes are to be accessed.

Through support from past special committee reviews and legislative reform, the OPCC now has the authority to investigate systemic issues. We have built this enhanced systemic mandate from the ground up and are preparing for the first systemic investigation. The OPCC will also use its systemic function to look at other ways to advance change. This includes leveraging data and research to help inform recommendations that can be made without the necessity of a full-scale systemic investigation. This is a priority focus for the OPCC.

In looking more specifically at the last statutory audit — the OPCC was last subject to one in 2019 — the scope of the audit examined not only compliance with the legislative requirements of part 11 of the of the Police Act, but also whether the OPCC met its goals as set out in our service plan. The overall results from the audit were positive. Recommendations were directed at the OPCC in several areas.

With respect to compliance, minor deficiencies were identified with recordkeeping and documentation. We were able to address these recommendations through development of new information directives to police departments clearly laying out their statutory responsibilities, and through the implementation of an integrated document management system.

Several recommendations were also made following a performance audit, which incorporated significant feedback from interests and other stakeholders, and included recommendations about outreach and engagement, plain language and translation, accessibility, staff training, alternative dispute resolution, implementation of an online database of past disciplinary decisions and improvements to data analytics.

[3:25 p.m.]

These recommendations were an opportunity for the OPCC to examine how we deliver our services. Much work has been done to not only improve public awareness of the OPCC, but also in our capacity to get out into communities and, importantly, to build relationships. This work has been embedded into the daily functions of the OPCC with the creation of dedicated positions and the development and implementation of various engagement strategies.

We have also updated our materials to be more accessible to the diverse public we serve. We have taken a plain-language lens to our complaint form, website and informational brochures. These materials have been translated into 13 different languages. Translation and interpretation services are available and are facilitated by our staff.

To better support complainants in accessing and navigating the system, the OPCC established and expanded a list of community-based organizations to help individuals who may be facing barriers to accessing the complaints process and participating in it. Many of these agencies do not have designated funding to provide this support and generously take on this role within their existing operational capacity.

The OPCC is in the process of finalizing our first reconciliation action plan following feedback and input from Indigenous service providers and organizations.

Also, in response to recommendations about staff training, the OPCC implemented several training and developmental initiatives with the creation of an organizational learning strategy. These include professional development workshops, experiential learning opportunities and activities that allow staff to engage with those with lived experiences to better understand the challenges faced by vulnerable and marginalized communities.

Also, as noted previously, the OPCC is prioritizing restorative approaches such as complaint resolution. We have also supported the establishment of more culturally relevant resolution pathways.

In relation to the recommendation about the implementation of an online shared database, the OPCC launched an online, publicly available and searchable database for substantiated allegations of misconduct and corresponding disciplinary measures. This digest allows decision-makers such as discipline authorities and retired judges to use this database to identify and review similar cases.

Data analytics have been embedded into the enhanced systemic mandate of the OPCC. It is our goal to use data to advance reconciliation efforts; to drive evidence-based decision-making; to improve accessibility; to better detect systemic issues, patterns and trends; and to inform operational effectiveness.

We also implemented several improvements to our statistical reports such as disaggregated demographic data, multi-year statistical comparisons, revised reportable injury categories and more detailed breakdown of allegation types.

It is important to note that our work in these areas remains ongoing, and there is much more to do. We have integrated these areas into our organizational structure and into the strategic direction of the OPCC to ensure that it remains a priority.

Several recommendations were also directed towards provincial government and resulted in amendments to part 11 of the Police Act. In addition to the ability to initiate systemic investigations, the commissioner can now arrange public hearings sooner in the process. Since the introduction of this amendment, the commissioner has done so in three of the four most recent public hearings called.

As you all appreciate, public hearings are a cornerstone of transparency and police accountability. In addition to addressing individual conduct, public hearings offer opportunities to advance systemic change.

For example, adjudicator Baird Ellan, in her decision following the public hearing into allegations of sexualized misconduct that I referred to earlier, cited several areas requiring change, including the need for dedicated workplace policies and training programs dealing with sexual harassment, and for there to be systems developed and implemented to prevent the victimization or revictimization of those who come forward.

While the benefits of public hearings are clear, they can be costly and take time. We are in the process of further streamlining these adjudications to reach outcomes in a timelier and cost-effective manner.

[3:30 p.m.]

The commissioner has also delegated discipline authority responsibilities to retired judges as qualified persons in 14 matters. These cases are often complex and involve serious and concerning allegations of misconduct. Involving an independent decision-maker as a discipline authority earlier helps to instil greater trust in the civilian oversight system.

Thank you, committee members. I now turn this back to Commissioner Rajan.

Prabhu Rajan: We thank you for your time and attention, and we look forward to any questions you might have for us.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Thank you very much for the presentation. I was wondering if you might be able to provide a little bit of insight into what you’re hoping to learn from our committee. The mandate of this committee is that the special committee must conduct an audit respecting the resolution or outcome of randomly selected complaints.

In that description, is it more helpful to your office, Commissioner and deputy commissioner, for us to be looking at a scope that looks at the process and whether or not the process is being followed according to the legislation, or is this to look at whether or not there was fairness in the process and if the outcome was what would be expected? Are we looking at outcomes?

The wording of it might suggest it’s looking at outcomes, but if you would provide a little bit of insight into what type of information would be most beneficial for both the public’s understanding and trust in the process and for your office, please.

Prabhu Rajan: Well, Madam Chair, thank you very much for your question. Obviously, the 2019 audit was a little bit different, in terms of how you describe, and that had its benefits. It resulted in us now having, for example, the systemic investigations power. So that was of benefit.

I mean, the way I look at an audit is…. We obviously think our process is very good and that we are constantly reviewing our work and our process to ensure fairness and efficiencies.

Your committee and your auditors will come at it from a neutral, separate perspective and a removed perspective. So I think, first of all, I would say anything that you wish to look at that might improve our process for British Columbians would be of benefit.

The point about fairness is…. In some ways, the legislation as it is today, in my view and as I’ve already described, creates certain types of, I would say, questions around fairness. So it’s hard for me to separate what I believe might be improvements to the act from simply looking at the existing process and considering fairness.

I’d like to think that within the current four corners of the act and our process, we are doing everything we can to ensure fairness. But I believe, and I’ve been quite clear in expressing it in different forums, that…. And this is no fault of anybody. It’s just that the inherent nature of the act and how it’s written creates certain limitations that I believe, at times, does result in unfairness. I described a few of those in my remarks.

Certainly the discipline process itself, the proceeding, the legal proceeding, where evidence is called and final determinations are being made about whether misconduct occurred, is limited. I’m not criticizing police officers, because that’s the process that we have in the act, and of course they are going to use it in a way that is most effective in fairness to them. I take no issue with that. But I do believe that it needs to be more….

I believe that decision-makers are left without all the information necessary to make a proper decision, a full decision. Again, it’s not a criticism of them. They can only do what they can.

For example, in the Myles Gray public hearing that was called last year, the discipline authority that found that there was ultimately no misconduct might have done so but also indicated throughout his decision that the process itself was limited. I’m paraphrasing, of course.

[3:35 p.m.]

There was not the opportunity to cross-examine the members. Not everybody testified that should have, that would have benefited the decision-maker, which, in large part…. And this is a public matter. In large part, that was the reason that I called a public hearing, because of that limited nature.

Now, I can’t call public hearings into every case. And trust me. I see many cases where I see a decision, and I think it would have really benefited from an actual full hearing, where you can actually call not just the member but the person who is aggrieved from that conduct — or eyewitnesses or experts, what have you.

If your committee were to look at fairness but from the context of how maybe the act might lead to some levels of unfairness, of course that would be appreciated and, I think, beneficial.

I can tell you that I’ve had many conversations — I think Deputy Spindler alluded to this — and we have engaged in a fair bit of community outreach over the last year and a half. I think Deputy Spindler and I, and now Deputy Huggins, have met with over 80 organizations, and we speak to people.

I went to Surrey — which you well know about, Chair — and I appeared on two radio programs. In my conversations with them, they felt…. Like, why are the police investigating the police? “Well, I’m glad for your body, Commissioner. I’m glad that you’re there, but why is that happening?”

Well, like I said, our system is very good, where we provide contemporaneous oversight. But I can tell you, from a public standpoint, there are concerns about that, inherent concerns. I can tell you that from our perspective, it is different to provide oversight versus actually conducting the investigation yourself.

As much as I might look at a case, and I think I would have asked these 20 more questions and interviewed these three witnesses…. We can encourage and can push, but it’s harder when you don’t have full control over those investigations.

Beyond that, it’s just really the optics of it, too, where people immediately…. You know, police investigators and police departments — some of them can make fantastic investigations. So it’s not even so much about that. It’s about the appearance.

If your committee were to say, “We want to look at that, because that might create some inherent unfairness and maybe put into question public confidence in the discipline process,” I’d be happy to look at that. If you have another couple of hours, I’m sure I could identify a number of different areas. That’s a long answer to your question. I would always welcome another perspective on how we can improve the system.

Within the current construct, I feel confident, within the limitation of the act, that it is as fair a process as it can be. As Deputy Spindler identified, we’ve made changes based on the 2019 audit. We’re constantly looking at how we’re improving things and creating better efficiencies.

I would suggest to you that some of the concerns that you allude to might be more a result of the construct of the act rather than, maybe, what we are doing on the ground.

Do you have anything you want to add?

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Thank you for that. I guess, because we are tasked with auditing the resolutions and outcomes of randomly selected complaints, and given the answer that you just gave us, which was really good, and interesting…. I hope that people who are listening from across the province also are following along.

Can you talk to me a little bit…? If we’re thinking about, as a committee, and looking, for example…. If the audit was to understand if the process is following legislation, are there compliance checks, which are done through the OPCC as investigations are being conducted, already in the system to ensure that type of compliance is being done as your investigations reach their conclusion?

Prabhu Rajan: Maybe the short answer is yes, but I think Deputy Spindler would probably be a bit more expansive than one word.

Andrea Spindler: Yes. Thank you for the question.

In relation to checks and balances that we have implemented in the organization to ensure the system actors are adhering to their statutory responsibilities, as we laid out, there are various system actors that have various roles and responsibilities under the legislation.

All of our staff in our organization, such as our investigative analysts and the supervisors of those staff, are all responsible for ensuring that there is compliance with the legislation. That is part of their day-to-day responsibilities.

[3:40 p.m.]

Not only are they ensuring compliance with the legislative requirements of the act and reaching out to police departments if they’re deviating from the statute, but they’re also…. The other critical feature is the oversight of investigations and the quality of those investigations. So there’s a two-pronged, dual role, so to speak, of our investigative analysts and the supervisors in the organization to ensure adherence to the statutory requirements of the legislation.

To answer questions. We have a general responsibility to inform, advise and assist, and that is our responsibility as well to the various system actors, such as discipline authorities, investigators and police boards. So that does occupy a large piece of what we do.

That is our raison d’être in addition to the oversight that we perform relating to the quality of the oversight decisions, reviewing of all outcomes of misconduct determinations, disciplinary or corrective measures. They’re also assessing the substantive outcome of those to determine, you know, should the commissioner exercise any one of his functions to deal with maybe something that we see that is not correct or not right, and we need to appoint a retired judge or we need to reject an investigation and send it back for further work.

Prabhu Rajan: Now if I could just add, if you’ve taken the time — I’m sure you have — to look through the act, it is complicated. And there are a lot of major highways, side streets, back alleyways. Sometimes, it’s…. You have to know the entire act to understand what provision might apply in a particular circumstance.

I’m surrounded by experts right here. As Deputy Spindler indicated, our role of informing and assisting and advising…. We don’t just simply react to issues. We proactively engage with the system actors because we feel it is incumbent on us, in fact our obligation, to ensure that the entire system operates in compliance. So if we see something, even if it’s not our responsibility, we will reach out, and we’ll say: “Hey, you have a 60-day deadline for this.”

I can tell you, when a case is presented to me for one of my many decisions that I have to make during the course of my work, staff are excellent in terms of identifying all the nuances around that particular decision and the statutory requirements, because they are, at times, complicated. So I feel…. Obviously, nobody, no entity, no person is perfect, but I feel very well supported and comfortable that our office knows the act inside and out, identifies issues, and even when maybe something is missed by an external actor, we find ways to remedy the situation.

Again, maybe I’m biased, but I’m quite confident that that is exactly what we do.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Thank you. That was a very comprehensive answer. Appreciate it. Any other questions from the committee.

Macklin McCall: Thank you for that very in-depth answer and everything leading up to that as well.

Just a couple of clarifying questions. I was making some notes. I just want to make sure I understand everything. First, I just want to be clear. What is a systemic investigation?

Prabhu Rajan: It’s a great question, MLA McCall.

This is how I would look at it. We receive hundreds and hundreds of complaints, and we are involved in a number of different investigations. You can see patterns in those cases. We’ve seen them over and over again. It keeps on arising, you know. It could be sexualized conduct. It could be the treatment of Indigenous peoples. It could be certain types of use of force, maybe even with respect to certain departments or certain types of use of force.

So you see these things repeated. You learn through those cases, and you can potentially identify gaps in the process or policies that aren’t applied properly or the misapplication of law. And you see these patterns. When you see these patterns, we have individual cases that might deal with individual conduct, but sometimes individual conduct is as a result of a broader systemic concern.

So what we would do in a systemic investigation is try to understand better those gaps and why those gaps exist and maybe ideas to close those gaps and potential barriers to make recommendations to make broad change so that these individual cases don’t keep happening.

[3:45 p.m.]

For me, I see it as two sides of a coin. One side of the coin, you have the individual cases, then you have, on the other side of the coin, the systemic issues. They’re related. They’re symbiotic.

The hope is that we identify…. Trust me, we’ve identified systemic issues. You identify these systemic issues. We hopefully address them through recommendations, and the people who receive the recommendations actually implement those recommendations. The hope is that it reduces the number of individual complaints down the road. Now, it’s not instant gratification in the sense you’re not going to get it changed by tomorrow, but it’s about moving the boat, the ship, I guess, slowly. That is the hope.

My background, you may not be aware. I used to be involved with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and I was in part responsible for the inquest system in Ontario. In both those roles, there was a huge systemic component, because it was very much about going upstream and trying to find the issue. We can keep trying to plug the dike with all these individual cases, but sometimes it’s better to kind of be more systemic about how you approach those.

I’ve now probably undercut Deputy Spindler, because this is her area. She’s responsible for it, so I will turn it to her, because I’m sure she has other things she’d like to say about that.

Andrea Spindler: Thank you.

It’s a really important question that you asked, because this is a new feature to the legislation that was implemented through the amendments to the Police Act. This has been really exciting, to get out there into the communities. We are working on finalizing a memorandum of understanding with each of the individual municipal police agencies to establish the framework in terms of how we are going to conduct these systemic investigations.

Our approach is that we’re not taking an approach that we’re here to call police out. That’s not what we’re looking to do here. We want to bring police in, and we want to work collectively to identify practical solutions and actionable recommendations to address broader systemic issues that may be leading to complaints that the OPCC is seeing.

By taking this approach, in addition, there’s the individual issues and complaints that we’ll deal with, but we are not able to sufficiently address the underlying system issues or underlying gaps in training or policy that might be leading to that kind of conduct coming up in police interactions with the public or in the complaints that we’re seeing. With the systemic investigation powers, it allows us to identify more generally what the systemic issues are that we’re seeing at the OPCC, making a decision: “Okay. This is the issue that we think is in the public interest, that we’re going to initiate an investigation into.”

Then the goal is to identify recommendations for change, to move the ship, as the commissioner speaks of, to really help improve the quality of policing in British Columbia and public confidence in policing.

Prabhu Rajan: If you wouldn’t mind, MLA McCall, this may not be directly responsive to your question, but I think it will be helpful for the committee to understand how we’re changing how we do things.

Deputy Spindler mentioned the MOU we’ve worked on with the various chiefs. We didn’t need to do that. They didn’t need to do that. The requirements and the obligations for systemic investigations are set out in the act. But we felt it was important to work as much as we could with the departments, to talk to them, hear from them what their concerns are about systemic? Because, in fairness, their immediate concern is: “Well, you’re trying to….” I’m paraphrasing, and I’m not ascribing this to any one particular chief but, generally speaking, the concern is: “Are you trying to elicit more complaints? Are you trying to point the finger at us?”

No. I mean, we’re trying to explain it. “We’re trying to work with you. We’re going to need your cooperation.” And as Deputy Spindler indicated, we’re not trying to point fingers at people. But we’re trying to improve things. I think they should be interested in it, as well, as should this committee.

It also speaks to how we’ve been approaching issues more broadly with all the system actors. I can tell you, since I’ve been here, we have made significant efforts at working with the police departments, working with police unions because, as we talked about restorative processes and approaches, we need the members there. We can’t do it without the police officers.

[3:50 p.m.]

We have engaged a fair bit with the police unions and spoken to them, engaged them. I think that is important, that we’re just not this office where they hear only bad news from. We’re here to work with them to try to improve more broadly, and that cuts across systemics. That’s what we’re trying to get across. We’re trying to improve things.

We understand how difficult dealing with a complaint is for a police officer. I know we have three former officers sitting here today. I’m sure while you’ve never had to deal with a complaint, some of your colleagues have, and it’s not a pleasant experience. So we’re looking for ways to work with them to make our processes better so it’s not as difficult.

Macklin McCall: Thank you for that.

After that, one more question popped up regarding the systemic investigation. I just want to be clear. Hopefully you can shed some light on this.

How is it determined through your office what would actually constitute something being systemic in the first place? Is that stat-driven based on the complaints that come in or something else?

Prabhu Rajan: That’s an excellent question. I think that’s what we’re engaging in, and the deputy is actually setting up that process.

It is in the act. What is a systemic…. We’re looking at causes and contributors, and as I mentioned earlier, absolutely we have to look at the complaints because I can tell you in two years I’ve seen a lot of different types of complaints. Trust me when I tell you that I see patterns. Deputy Spindler has been in the role much longer than I have. We look at the cases, and stats are really important.

We need to improve our front-end data collection because if we don’t have that as being solid, then the information we have at the back end isn’t going to be great. So we’re working at that as well.

There are certain issues that you can just almost take judicial notice of, as they say. You know, I’ve seen cases where there are interactions that, frankly, feel different when it involves marginalized people, which includes Indigenous people. This is all work we have to do, including my own office. We all have to do that. So you see patterns in how folks are treated.

Yes, it can be stat-driven, but it can be something that’s not anecdotal but fact-driven in individual cases. But it is a requirement under the act that our systemic investigation must flow from the complaints that we receive.

Is there anything else?

Andrea Spindler: Yeah. As the commissioner mentioned, it’s in the legislation in relation to what the statutory criteria is to initiate a systemic investigation. That would look at: is it a significant cause or contributor to complaints? Is it about the complaints process itself? Looking at the nature and seriousness of the issue, looking at the prevalence of the matter — is it isolated within one police agency, or is it across multiple agencies? — looking to see if the director of policing and law enforcement services has looked at a similar matter.

There are things that we look at to meet that statutory bar to initiate a systemic investigation. What’s really important in all of this is, yes, we have our complaints, and that is what drives our analysis. However, I cannot underscore how important it is for there to be community input. We can’t be sitting in our office at the OPCC being insular and reviewing our complaint data without context and understanding the real impacts from communities.

That’s a lot of the work that myself and the commissioner are doing in relation to getting out into communities and hearing from them directly on what concerns they’re seeing. And that helps us when we see complaints come through our office. That gives it more context so we can better understand: “Okay, where are the community concerns coming from when there is a certain type of police interaction?” That helps us when we’re identifying systemic issues.

Prabhu Rajan: We would be happy to hear from police officers too, former ones as well, as to issues they might have seen. It is exactly what Deputy Spindler indicated, which is that we need all this information. It’s just not us sitting in a room making that decision.

Yes. I hope that answers your question.

Macklin McCall: Yeah, very thorough answers all around here actually, so I appreciate that. Just a couple more quick questions here.

You talked about a suggestion from your office that a potential amendment would be the ability for your office to do the investigations rather than police. A couple questions around that.

[3:55 p.m.]

First, I’m just wondering: does your office deal with allegations of criminal offence?

You don’t touch that at all? If there’s an assault allegation, you’re not involved with that? That’s police in general?

Prabhu Rajan: Let me be a bit more nuanced. It is not, our offices and the system actors that we deal with, our responsibility to investigate as to whether criminal conduct has occurred. That is the IIO. That’s the independent investigations office.

That being said, we still have the ability…. If we see something that might cross into the criminal territory, we can then refer that in different ways. You know, the director of police service — his name is changed; the title is changed — Glen Lewis, who we just met with, we can inform him. We can go directly to Crown. There are different methods. It’s not like we can just ignore something that we see. And I can tell you, we’ve done that a couple of times since I’ve been here.

But no, in terms of actually determining whether criminal conduct has occurred, that is not our office’s responsibility.

Macklin McCall: Okay. And in terms of the investigations of police, you touched on that in your speech here earlier. I’m just wondering: what would that look like? If you could just give a brief summary on that. Would that be independent? Would it be that there’s just no police involved, kind of like what the IIO is doing? I’m just trying to understand what that would mean.

Would there be some police involvement in that in terms of certain investigations, like taking statements, this type of thing? Or would it be completely with your office doing the whole investigation, whatever that might look like?

Prabhu Rajan: There’s a spectrum of options. I presented you with one where potentially I would have the discretion to determine which cases are significant enough that we would keep within our office. And when I say “keep within our office,” it would be us doing the investigations. That being said, we have a number of former police officers in our office. So it could be…. But I believe for me, there needs to be a mix of former officers, civilians. Yes, we would just do the interviews.

You have to keep in mind a lot of regulatory bodies that conduct investigations, you don’t need to be a police officer necessarily, not to disparage any police officers present and outside who are excellent at that. I think certain cases might do better with that removal, and sometimes it’s optics.

The other end of the spectrum is we do all of them, right? There are certainly oversight agencies that do that, keep them all. I think I was trying to be a little less dramatic when I said at least the discretion would be helpful.

Yeah, that’s my answer. I’m not sure if….

Macklin McCall: Thank you. Last one, I promise, here.

The IIO would deal with serious injury or death involving a police officer. If you had a model like you just spoke of where it’s independent and your office is doing the investigations and so on…. Obviously, outside of serious injury or death, you have an investigation that turns to be…. Perhaps an assault charge may come about in terms of the investigation.

From what you’re proposing or what you’re suggesting might be a possibility in the future here, are you saying that your office could potentially be the ones responsible to do that investigation and actually lay the charges and so on? Kind of like an IIO but not to the threshold of IIO? I just want to be clear on that.

Prabhu Rajan: It’s an excellent question. No, we wouldn’t. Potential criminality — not us.

Now, it’s outside of my lane. I can comment on this. I mean, I think it would be great if the IIO had broader powers because I can tell you with absolute certainty that I have seen cases in my time here that are exactly as you describe it, as assault. But because the definition of serious…. Death is easy. We can move that aside. Serious harm, I have a perspective on serious harm, but it’s a rather limited definition in the act.

What a layperson might see as serious harm, there’s often a conclusion that that’s not serious harm because it’s not long-lasting and so on. Maybe you haven’t lost a limb or something. I’m not sure. But it’s a fairly high standard to reach.

I think it would be excellent if, for example…. Not to give my colleague Ms. Berglund additional work, but I think an independent body to also deal with those types of cases that do not constitute serious harm would be beneficial. As of now, it’s a police department that would look at those if it doesn’t rise to the level of serious harm.

Macklin McCall: That’s it. Thank you. Appreciate it.

Prabhu Rajan: Thank you very much for your questions.

[4:00 p.m.]

Elenore Sturko (Chair): I actually just have one question, just based on your answer. Do you see a value, though, in having police do investigations?

I know that there is — from your communication with this committee right now, and I can see it as well — a value in ensuring that the public has trust, that it isn’t a biased investigation based on police investigating police, which was one of the founding principles of having a civilian oversight into police complaints.

But do you believe that there is some value in having police as subject-matter experts in their field involved at some level in investigations?

Prabhu Rajan: Absolutely. I can tell you right now that I don’t make any decisions that involve use of force without a former officer to give me that advice because I’m a lawyer — and I’ve given a bit of my background — and I’ve never been in harm’s way the way that at least three of you have been. I don’t necessarily understand what happens on the ground.

As an example, we have a former recent chief of one of the municipal police departments as an adviser. So without a doubt, you know, I’m a big believer. I’m not a believer that says it has to be all civilian or all police. I believe that when I’m making a decision, I need a diversity of perspectives. That includes a police officer’s perspective.

Now, I may not agree with it after hearing it all, but I absolutely need it. I need to understand exactly how they might see it or how they might have lived it when they were there.

So I agree that it is not to the exclusion of former police officers or even current police officers. But rather, I think they have a definite value to add that way.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): Excellent. Thank you very much. Seeing no further questions, thank you both, commissioner, deputy commissioner, for coming today and the staff that you have also brought in support. Thank you for very comprehensive answers and a great presentation.

We will now take a short, two-minute recess before we conclude.

The committee recessed from 4:02 p.m. to 4:09 p.m.

[Elenore Sturko in the chair.]

Elenore Sturko (Chair): I’d like to thank everyone for their engagement in today’s meeting. Is there any other business?

Seeing no other business, I’d like to thank everyone for participating, on behalf of the entire committee. I’ll also take this opportunity to note that we will be proceeding with a request for proposal to hire an external auditor to conduct the audit of the police complaints, from which the committee will produce a report with any recommendations.

That concludes our business for today, and so I will now seek a motion to adjourn.

Motion approved.

Elenore Sturko (Chair): This committee is adjourned.

The committee adjourned at 4:10 p.m.