The committee met at 9:03 a.m.

[R. Singh in the chair.]

R. Singh (Chair): Good morning, everyone. I’m Rachna Singh. I’m the Chair of this committee. I thank you for coming and making the presentations today.

First, we will start with the introductions, and we’ll start with you.

J. Chalke: Good morning. My name is Jay Chalke. I’m the Ombudsperson for British Columbia.

D. Murray: Dave Murray, director of intake policy, planning and research for the Office of the Ombudsperson.

M. Morris (Deputy Chair): Mike Morris, MLA for Prince George–Mackenzie.

E. Ross: Ellis Ross, MLA for Skeena.

A. Olsen: Adam Olsen, MLA for Saanich North and the Islands.

G. Begg: Garry Begg, MLA for Surrey-Guildford.

R. Singh (Chair): Thank you, everybody.

Now we would really like to hear from you. I understand that you have important issues that you want to bring to our notice. So we would like you to do that.

Correspondence

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSPERSON

J. Chalke: Good morning. Thank you, Chair. Good morning, committee. Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you for a few minutes this morning concerning a gap in oversight in policing and detention. As Dave introduced himself, I’m accompanied by Dave Murray of my office.

[9:05 a.m.]

To begin, simply, as I outlined in correspondence to the committee in March, there’s currently no independent agency with legal authority to investigate complaints about the conduct of municipal lockup staff in RCMP police municipalities. This is in contrast to municipal lockups in communities with municipal police forces, which fall under the Police Complaint Commissioner’s authority, and provincial correctional facilities, which fall under the authority of both the investigation and standards office and my own office, and other places of detention operated under the province’s authority.

This issue was first brought to my attention through the work of my office’s intake and early resolution team that Dave leads. Through our intake process, my staff regularly receive inquiries and complaints regarding a range of matters, some of which fall outside of the Ombudsperson’s jurisdiction under the Ombudsperson Act. I pause just to say that our jurisdiction is entirely statutory, so if we’re given authority to investigate a particular public body, that has to come by statute.

Roughly one-quarter of all inquiries and complaints received by my office pertain to non-jurisdictional agencies, and one of the more common areas of non-jurisdictional complaints and inquiries is policing. When we receive a complaint about non-jurisdictional matters such as policing services, my staff do not merely advise members of the public that we’re unable to assist but, instead, refer people to other agencies who are better positioned to assist them with their concerns.

The intake staff in our office identified that there was no alternative agency available to whom they can refer a complaint about city cells in an RCMP-serviced municipality and escalated this gap in oversight to my attention.

As you know, municipalities in the province of over 5,000 population must provide policing services. They do so either by establishing a municipal police force or by contracting police services from the RCMP. Regardless of which route they adopt, the municipality is, under section 15 of the Police Act, required to operate detention services for persons detained by the police.

In communities with municipal police forces, the municipal lockup staff are designated as special municipal constables under section 35 of the Police Act. The legal effect of that is important. It brings the conduct of those individuals under the supervision of the chief constable and subject to discipline. Significantly, their conduct may be the subject of a complaint to the Police Complaint Commissioner under part 11 of the Police Act. However, this mechanism to appoint municipal lockup employees as special constables does not apply in the case of a municipality that is contracting its police services from the RCMP.

Complaints about the RCMP, specifically RCMP officers, fall under the oversight of the federal Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP. That commission’s authority, however, does not extend to guards in RCMP-policed municipalities, as they are not RCMP officers but civilian employees of the municipality. There is no existing legal mechanism to bring those municipal employees within the scheme of police discipline either through the Police Complaint Commission provincially or the federal Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

As for my office, the bottom line is that the Ombudsperson does not have authority to investigate matters that arise under the Police Act. The Ombudsperson Act gives my office general authority to investigate British Columbia municipalities. However, this authority is limited by section 72 of the Police Act, which states very simply that the Ombudsperson Act does not apply to the Police Act. As a result, my office cannot investigate complaints relating to policing services at all, whether they are delivered by municipalities, provincial agencies of the RCMP, and that provision excludes police lockups from my jurisdiction.

The only agency with direct authority over civilian guards is their employer. In most cases, this is the municipality that operates the lockup. There’s no further legal recourse for a person with a complaint about a municipal lockup employee other than the courts.

I would be remiss if I did not indicate that there’s some authority for the minister and the director of police services to establish standards about conditions in lockups. However, the application of that is at least somewhat complex in the context of the RCMP. More importantly, standards are not my focus here. Rather, it is the question of conduct and misconduct of the actual municipal employees or contractor in these spaces.

I’ll keep my comments to the committee concerning the general importance of independent oversight of complaints brief. I have no reason to believe that this gap in oversight is the result of a deliberate, intentional policy choice of either the Legislative Assembly or the government. All the government staff that we have discussed this matter with have, at all levels, acknowledged that it’s a problem that should be corrected.

[9:10 a.m.]

An independent process for receiving and investigating complaints ensures the protection of individual rights on a level playing ground where the decision-maker has no direct interest in the matter being complained about and is free from a reasonable perception of bias.

When complaints are validated through investigation, it ensures that government agencies are held to account and that, if measures are not taken to address issues and improve service delivery, the independent oversight agency can formally report to legislators as well as to the public to drive necessary change.

I must also emphasize that independent oversight ensures that a fair process external to the administration of the program exists for all parties. Agencies are held to account when complaints are substantiated but may also be vindicated where investigation concludes that a complaint is not substantiated — a conclusion that has little credibility in the public eye in circumstances where an agency has the final say in responding to complaints about their own services and programs.

In this setting and in the broader context of police-related complaints generally, the perception of bias, conflict and self-interest undermines public trust and credibility and, most significantly, can act as a deterrent to individuals who fear reprisal or traumatic impacts from filing a complaint with the agency they’re concerned about in the first place.

All of this applies to government complaints generally. However, the cases I’m referring to today are not typical government complaints but, arguably, the most significant intervention governmental authority can make in the lives of individuals: the deprivation of their liberty. The circumstances at issue here implicate fundamental human rights and international law and are, in that respect, not significantly different from the issues at play in the settings of correctional facilities or mental health facilities, where individuals are involuntarily detained.

These areas have been the focus of two of our office’s recent systemic reports: Under Inspection, focusing on the inspection of correctional facilities, and Committed to Change, focusing on the involuntary detention of individuals under the Mental Health Act.

Ensuring that the conduct of individuals involved in custodial functions is subject to some form of independent review is of particular importance given Canada’s international legal obligations. In 2016, Canada announced its intent to ratify the optional protocol to the convention against torture, or OPCAT. When OPCAT comes into force in Canada, a national preventative mechanism will be established to conduct inspections on places of detention to determine that rights protections are in place and to publicly report the results of those reviews. Obviously, addressing all gaps in independent oversight before OPCAT comes into force is highly desirable so that British Columbia is not criticized on the international level.

To help this committee understand the very real impacts of this issue on our citizens, I’d like to highlight some examples of specific complaints which have been raised with my office. Before doing so, however, I’d like to emphasize that the allegations made in these complaints are unverified, and I do not wish any of these statements to be interpreted in any way as a conclusion of wrongdoing by the guards employed or contracted by the municipalities involved.

The fact that neither we nor anyone has had the jurisdiction to independently verify these allegations is precisely the point. The issue of concern here is that there’s no agency with any formal authority to investigate these complaints and either substantiate and recommend appropriate remedies or vindicate the persons implicated in the complaints. Because we have not been able to investigate these cases, I will not identify the specific municipalities implicated in these examples.

The first example I’d like to raise is a complaint that was escalated to my attention last year. The complaint came from a 16-year-old girl who’d been held in a municipal lockup over a weekend. This teenager’s complaint to us alleged that she was menstruating and asked guards for feminine hygiene products as well as a shower. She told us that both of those requests were refused, and she reported to us that she spent the weekend in soiled clothing and felt humiliated by the experience.

We could not investigate the matter, nor could we refer her to any other independent agency with the authority to do so. My intake staff did consult with both the RCMP and municipal administrators on an inquiry basis and, to their credit, both sides of the administration expressed a willingness to respond directly to the complainant. However, by that time, she had left custody without providing us with forwarding contact information. We were unable to provide that information to her.

The second example introduces a further complication to the administration of municipal lockups, as it concerns a complaint about a municipality in which detention services were not provided by municipal employees but through a third-party contract between the municipality and commissionaires. The complainant, in this instance, identified herself as female, immigrant and a victim of domestic violence, attributes which I mention to further highlight the fact that diverse individuals are held in municipal lockups, and the lack of independent oversight impacts highly vulnerable persons, not just criminal offenders.

[9:15 a.m.]

In this instance, the woman alleged, among other things, an attempted strip search by a male guard, a physical assault and threats of consequences should she make a complaint about her treatment. She told us she had filed a complaint with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP and that they had accepted her complaint as it pertained to RCMP officers but had also told her that they could not accept her complaint about the lockup guard. She told us that the CRCC directed her that her recourse regarding the guard would be to raise her concerns not even with the municipality itself but with the commissionaires directly.

Again, I wish to be clear that none of the facts in these examples have been verified through investigation. But again, I want to reiterate that that’s precisely the point. These are serious allegations pertaining to the fundamental human rights of vulnerable persons, and they merit investigation by an agency with the full authority to determine their validity based on a thorough and objective examination of the evidence. It’s vitally important that our province ensure independent oversight of local detention facilities, regardless of whether the individuals working in those lockups are contractors, municipal staff, RCMP staff or municipal police officers.

I’ll also note that this problem is not new. A death in an RCMP municipal lockup over 20 years ago resulted in an investigation and report by the former RCMP Public Complaints Commission, which highlighted the limitations of having the RCMP and their oversighting commission be the only avenues available to investigate when the jail guards are not formally and directly under their authority.

In her report, the then commissioner highlighted a number of concerns regarding inadequate training of civilian guards and made recommendations that those deficiencies be addressed by the RCMP. The commissioner could not, however, make any findings or recommendations directed at the municipality, the employer of the guards.

As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, I’ve had a number of communications with government about this issue over the past year, certainly since my letter to the committee in March. I hope that I’m fairly representing the responses from the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General and his ministry in describing them as fully acknowledging that this gap in oversight raises serious concerns that should be addressed. They’ve made significant efforts to explore both short-term and long-term solutions.

I’ve recently been advised that interim steps are being taken, pending a longer-term solution. These interim steps include reminding RCMP leadership of the importance of holding RCMP members accountable, reminding them of contractual abilities the RCMP have with the municipality vis-à-vis who the lockup staff are, training standardization and physical plant upgrades. The minister has also indicated that the RCMP will be providing my office with its final reports in such cases during this interim period.

As for this latter point, I’ve emphasized with the ministry that because we have no jurisdiction to investigate these matters, any reports we receive will be for information only but should not be considered or positioned as part of oversight, since we have no ability to investigate or assess the adequacy of any steps taken.

I’m generally encouraged by the commitment of both the ministry and the RCMP to address this issue. I think this reflects the reality that there’s no policy rationale for this gap, and thus a widespread recognition exists that it needs to be closed.

However, the interim steps taken to date are neither a complete nor adequate solution. The federal commission would only have a role following a formal investigation by the RCMP and a report that would be sent to the complainant, who would have to formally request a further review by the commission.

The commission also would not have any authority over the municipality that employs the guards or the guards themselves, but only over the RCMP officers involved. The commission may be able to make recommendations that the RCMP staff involved address issues regarding training and standards applicable to civilian guards but lacks any formal avenue to ensure that any remedial actions or recommendations are implemented by municipal staff or otherwise hold the municipality accountable for the action of their employees or contractors.

I note that in his remarks to this committee last month, the Police Complaint Commissioner stated:

“Finally, we’ve noted that as the law enforcement models evolve…. So for example, when the special municipal constables became more widely used — Vancouver brought in a community safety officer program; special municipal constables are used in their jail — there had to be a regulation created to bring them within our office.”

Continuing to quote from the Police Complaint Commissioner:

“You may want to consider, perhaps, a more flexible way to make sure that our office is overseeing those people who are doing jobs that hitherto were done by police officers. Some chiefs, for example, are moving towards tiered policing models, using different levels of officers. If those officers are engaged in activities, such as guarding in jails or otherwise enforcement activity, I suggest to you that it’s in the public interest that they come within our oversight.”

I agree completely with the commissioner. We need to make sure that as policing evolves, steps are taken to have the system of oversight evolve with it, and we need to ensure that formalistic distinctions about where a municipality obtains its policing services from do not stand in the way of effective oversight in the public interest.

I continue to be encouraged that this issue is being taken seriously and that the ministry has already taken meaningful interim steps to improve oversight in this area and continues to explore further measures that can be taken in the absence of a legislative solution.

[9:20 a.m.]

However, the only adequate and, thus, in my view, necessary solution lies properly in the lands of the Legislative Assembly to establish a transparent, unambiguous and principled statutory mechanism for oversight.

I hope this committee will give serious consideration to my submissions here today and include in its report a recommendation to close this unintentional but long-standing gap once and for all.

Thank you. I’d be happy to take any questions you have.

M. Morris (Deputy Chair): Thank you, Jay, for that.

I guess a couple of things. I do recognize that there is that gap there, so I don’t want to disassociate that part of it. But having been involved with these matters quite intimately over the years — there were a number of municipal contracts within the area of responsibility that I held — I can assure the committee and the folks in British Columbia that these things do not go uninvestigated.

Any complaint against somebody in a municipal lockup over 5,000, in my experience, has been investigated by the RCMP and by the complaints commission that’s responsible for the RCMP. If any of the employees were found to be negligent in their duties, training was required and a number of follow-up things were required, up to and including people being fired from their job by the municipality. So it’s not widespread disregard for the health and safety and well-being of the inmates that are incarcerated in municipal lockups because there is a high degree of oversight already.

Having said that, there’s a gap, and perhaps it can be addressed. Just listening to your presentation, it just sounds like there’s rampant disregard for the safety and security of inmates out there and the RCMP have not been paying attention to it. In my experience, they have been.

I don’t know what my colleague has. Surrey is, of course, a municipal contract as well. It’s not like there has not been anything done on this.

J. Chalke: Thank you. Certainly, the communication that I received from the current director of police services — who, as you know, was formerly with the RCMP — and the prior director of police services and now the Police Complaint Commissioner both have emphasized that exact point — that the RCMP do take those matters seriously. It is not my intention to convey that that’s not something that’s occurring.

However, the ability, once it goes past a determination by the RCMP in terms of the conduct of the municipal employees…. They’re outside the discipline authority of the RCMP and outside the discipline authority of the federal commission. That’s really the difficulty that can arise in the event that there is misconduct by those individuals and lack of oversight over that entire process.

Yes, I’m certainly not trying to convey that the RCMP haven’t taken it seriously. But the inability for there to be any oversight, when there’s oversight over just about every other detention context in the province…. Certainly, it’s established under provincial law. I can’t think of another detention context in which there’s no oversight, which there isn’t in this case. But I certainly take your point about the conduct of the RCMP.

A. Olsen: Thank you for the report. I think it’s important that…. Actually, in the context of Mike’s defence of the RCMP — which I would expect members of the RCMP to defend, or former retired members of the RCMP — I think that’s the point. One of the points that I think needs to be raised here is that there is a willingness and a desire to defend.

I think, not to cast aspersions on any of the investigations that may or may not be happening in this, that what’s important is the arm’s-length, independent oversight, where we don’t have organizations that are responsible for certain aspects of a thing, I guess, or an aspect of community security and looking after people, to be investigating themselves.

[9:25 a.m.]

That’s primarily what the point here is — that we extend the independence so that those who are delivering the service and those who are receiving the service can feel confident that the interests and the scrutiny is there if it’s necessary and that it’s not going to be the organization that’s undertaking the actions. I think that is important. I appreciate the point.

It’s interesting that this has been a situation going on in our province for quite a number of years now and hasn’t been dealt with. I certainly hope that the current government does find the legislative…. It seems like it’s well aware. So thank you for bringing it to our attention.

J. Chalke: I would say that the step to designate municipal staff in lockups in municipalities that do have a municipal police force — to designate them as special municipal constables and thus bring them under the jurisdiction of the Police Complaint Commissioner — is a relatively recent innovation. That has made the distinction more glaring. So a long-standing problem. Certainly, the designation of special municipal constables has been more recent. That’s just made that distinction that much more stark. It probably dates from around 2016.

G. Begg: Thank you very much for you presentation. If I can comment on your style, you’re very sensitive to the issues that, as policemen, we’re sensitive to.

The idea that we can deprive someone of their liberty in a country like Canada…. We took that with an amazing amount of concern, and that’s what we’re talking about here. We’re talking about people who are deprived of their liberty, put in situations in which they’re unfamiliar. They’re nervous. They’re afraid. There’s the potential for all kinds of issues to happen. So sometimes it’s not what you say; it’s what we hear that’s important.

Perhaps you can flesh out a little bit for me some metrics around the number of complaints you would receive in a year, for example.

J. Chalke: Not many. That’s partially because, of course, it’s not something that’s jurisdictional to us. So I think that it’s not surprising that we wouldn’t necessarily get a lot of them. But we have always had a sort of steady, low volume of people who find their way to us — incorrectly, of course, because we don’t have jurisdiction.

Where we’ve been able to identify that it’s a problem, as I said earlier, we try to help them to the degree that we can by linking them up with somebody. That’s always the case with a non-jurisdictional complaint. This one’s difficult, because there isn’t necessarily somebody with oversight authority, but typically we would refer them to the RCMP in that example. Certainly, the current director of police services has encouraged us to do so during the interim period.

Sorry, if I can have one moment.

D. Murray: Just to clarify, we simply do not know the actual numbers of complaints related to this subject matter because, when complaints come in to our intake process, our intake staff redirect those. Generally speaking, for complaints that are out of mandate we simply record a statistic as to what it’s about, but we don’t record the details.

How many of the police-related complaints that we redirect every year that actually relate to municipal lockups and RCMP police municipalities we simply do not know. But I believe the number of police act–related complaints, generally, is in the vicinity of a little over 142 in 2018-19. So some subset of that. It was last year that a single complaint that was escalated by our intake team actually brought this to our specific attention. So prior to that, we don’t know.

G. Begg: I recognize we’re talking about a gap here. It’s an important gap. I’m not speaking against anything that you’ve suggested is happening or that it’s inappropriate.

I think it’s worth mentioning, as well, to follow along Mike’s train of thought, that there is recent policy in the RCMP, within the past five years, that mandates closed-circuit television for all lockups everywhere. So there is, to a greater or lesser degree, more oversight than ever before or the ability to access more information that can verify or disprove a lot of things.

[9:30 a.m.]

Your point about the gap is one that is serious and that has to be addressed. There is an increasing awareness all over the world about wrongful detentions and — not in this country but certainly in others — atrocities that happen with imprisoned persons. So I commend you for your report and the sensitivity with which you send the message.

J. Chalke: One way of looking at metrics, a different way — rather than non-jurisdictional people, where people come to us when we don’t have jurisdiction — would be to look at the number of issues that have arisen in municipalities that are policed by a municipal police force, where it is jurisdictional to part 11, and then do a pro rata assessment as to what that might mean with respect to RCMP police municipalities. That’s a question, certainly, that one could pose to the Police Complaint Commissioner or through policing services.

G. Begg: One last question about metrics. Can you put a time frame in which we can expect implementation of policy to address the gap? I know it’s a legislative process.

J. Chalke: Certainly, I have heard from all senior levels at the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General that this is a gap that needs to be closed and that, in the longer term, that’s a legislative answer. As for when that happens, I think that’s probably best directed to police services.

E. Ross: It’s an odd technicality. It’s an odd omission of policy or legislation that I wouldn’t have been aware of unless I was in this chair or unless I was a detained person.

You talk about how this was actually brought up a number of years ago. Apart from the issue, is there some reason why this hasn’t been addressed — whether it be jurisdictional, whether there’s a costing issue or maybe even if it’s a political issue? Is there some reason why this hasn’t been addressed?

J. Chalke: That’s a good question. It’s not something I’m really, I think, qualified to answer. I think I’d probably suggest that that’s a good question for the Ministry of Solicitor General.

E. Ross: But it wouldn’t affect, say, a municipality’s budget or anything like that?

J. Chalke: Oh, I mean, not at a macro level. What affects their budget is actually providing the detention services, obviously, under that obligation. In terms of the budgetary impact, I guess one would have to assess the number of cases that would ultimately arise under part 11, if that was the route that was pursued.

E. Ross: Get right to the point. There wouldn’t be any real issue jurisdictional-wise between the municipality, RCMP or the Ombudsperson? There wouldn’t be a fight over that. There wouldn’t be any issue with that.

J. Chalke: No. My view is that the gap should be closed. I’m completely non-territorial about how one does it. Frankly, it’s not a perfect fit anywhere, but I think the most logical place is for oversight to be carried up with the Police Complaint Commissioner. That’s a matter for policy-makers, I guess. My big concern is that there should be some mechanism by which there is appropriate oversight.

R. Singh (Chair): Thank you so much. That was really important information. I just did not know about this, especially the examples that you brought about the most vulnerable population being treated the way they are. As you said, we don’t have the numbers, but even those small numbers…. Like, even if it was just two cases, that is just too much. I definitely see the gap. I’m glad for all of the questions that were being asked here.

You are in touch with the ministry. We, as a committee, also will definitely look into it, because this is a very, very important matter. Nobody should be…. Even if there’s no validity to it, there should be a complete investigation process, which is lacking, and I completely see the gap. Thank you so much for your presentation.

J. Chalke: Thank you, Madam Chair.

R. Singh (Chair): So, friends, we have about ten minutes of recess before we have the next presentation.

The committee recessed from 9:34 a.m. to 9:45 a.m.

[R. Singh in the chair.]

R. Singh (Chair): Good morning. I’m Rachna Singh. I’m the Chair of this committee.

Welcome. We are really pleased that you could make the time and come and see us.

I’m joined here by my other committee members.

M. Morris (Deputy Chair): I’m Mike Morris, MLA for Prince George–Mackenzie.

E. Ross: Ellis Ross, MLA for Skeena.

A. Olsen: Adam Olsen, MLA for Saanich North and the Islands.

G. Begg: Garry Begg, MLA for Surrey-Guildford.

M. Collins: I’m Mary Collins. I’m the president of the B.C. Association of Police Boards and a member of the Saanich police board.

J. Rizzuti: John Rizzuti. I’m a member of the Central Saanich police board and vice-president of the B.C. Association of Police Boards.

R. Singh (Chair): Wonderful. We would really like to hear your presentation.

Police Complaint Process Review

B.C. ASSOCIATION OF POLICE BOARDS

M. Collins: First of all, we’d like to thank you for this opportunity. To be able to do it here in Victoria was much more convenient and more economical for us than having to go to Vancouver.

Obviously, you’re very fortunate in this committee to have two of your members with such extensive experience in policing. I’m sure that’s a great benefit to you as well.

What we’d like to do is…. We’re here on behalf of the B.C. Association of Police Boards. Our association represents the 11 municipal police boards, plus the South Coast B.C. transit police board and the First Nations police board in the Squamish-Whistler area as well.

As you know, police boards are responsible for setting the strategic direction of our departments, approving annual budgets, approving the hiring and policy and evaluating the chief of police as the employer. We are the employer of all of the personnel in the police departments.

As well, we play a very important role in the complaints process at various stages, as well as in service and policy complaints process, which also falls under section 11 of the Police Act. I’m going to refer to that a little bit later on, because that’s certainly an interest for our members.

First of all, I do want to say that we don’t pretend to be the legal experts, and we’re not going to get into “change this particular section in this way,” because that’s not really our area of expertise. We just want to share with you some of the high-level concerns that our members have shared with us about the police complaints process.

We’re really pleased that you’re doing this review. I realize it’s a mandated review, but it is important. I would just like to say at the beginning that overall, I think the processes we have in B.C., both the police complaints and the IIO, are well respected and do serve a very important role.

It’s more a question of just looking at what might be tweaked or what might make things a little bit better. We’re not saying, fundamentally, there’s any basic, real problem with either of those.

We were very pleased to see that Clayton Pecknold was appointed as the new commissioner. With his background and experience in policing, I’m sure he’s going to provide great leadership to that function.

Again, we won’t be able to cover, perhaps, all the points in this submission, and we are planning, if we hear from our members on further issues, that we’ll provide you with a more detailed written submission before the end of June and you finish your work as a committee.

I also think many of the issues we raise will probably be aligned with what you would hear from the B.C. municipal chiefs and the B.C. Police Association, as we have talked with them and discussed some of these issues with them.

Of course, we all agree that the complaints process needs to be timely and fair and ensure public confidence. That’s what it’s all about, and again, we appreciate the good work of the Office of Police Complaint Commissioner, which they do under very difficult circumstances sometimes.

We also appreciate the excellent annual report that they do. It really provides some transparency, I think, on what happens in the cases and the numbers. Very helpful.

[9:50 a.m.]

Indeed, we see that the number of registered complaints has not really varied a lot from year to year. It goes up and down, but in the last year they reported, it was around 522 in 2017-18, as well as 48 ordered investigations. Really, only about half of them end up being having to be investigated or have founding.

Of course, we’d like to see all parties involved work to reduce those numbers. To that end, one of the issues we’re interested in yet don’t have data on and that we think would be helpful would be to know is: what age of service do most of the officers have who get involved or have complaints against them? Are they first-year constables, second-year? Are they more seasoned? I think that would be very helpful, because it could then help us reflect on the training. Is it adequate? Are there kinds of issues that we should be addressing more effectively and reducing any of the behaviours that may lead to public complaints?

Of course, one of the key issues of concern to police boards — it’s just growing really fast — is the health and welfare of police members, police personnel. We’re very concerned about both the physical and the mental health. Policing is a very stressful job, as you know. Some research conducted on mental health stress by the New Westminster police department show that investigative processes are one of the most often-noted stressors that police officers express. I’ve talked my own department about that as well. I think you can understand. You’re under investigation, you don’t know how it’s going to go, and you may be off work. It’s very stressful.

Therefore, we’re increasingly concerned about the physical and mental well-being of the women and men who serve. We want to make sure that whatever stresses they’re under can be alleviated to the degree possible. With that in mind, I’d like to focus on three areas that we think are our primary concern: the time limits of investigations, the consistency of decisions and the financial costs. Then I’ll talk a bit about service and policy complaints as well.

Certainly, timeliness is the number one issue that we hear from our members. We’ve attached to the brief a summary of the Police Act time limits, which we found useful. You may already have it, but we thought it might be of assistance to you in your consideration.

While the Police Act complaints process provides a whole range of time frames for each step of the investigative process, the goal is to complete the investigation in six months. However, there are many examples where the process, indeed, is extended well beyond that — in some outlier cases, for as long as seven years. While the average time is 189 days, it slightly exceeds the target. We’d like to see that actually reduced to the degree possible.

We’ve attached to the brief two examples of what we illustrate — where there appeared to be no end to the appeals and the costs involved in several instances, examples where this whole process has taken six or seven years. While these cases, I realize, are extreme, it’s not unusual for some cases to take well over a year to resolve, even on relatively minor matters.

While there are timelines — as you’ll see those outlined for police departments and the boards to follow in the many and various steps involved — sometimes there are not the same time restrictions for the OPCC itself at every step of the process. We’ve attached, again, an outline of that process.

The issue of time limits is not only limited to lengthy investigations, which, of course, is a concern. It also includes matters where a police officer is willing to admit to minor forms of misconduct — these are misconduct — and have the investigation resolved in a timely matter.

Now, we recognize the provisions for informal resolution and mediation in division 4 of the Police Act. We applaud the OPCC. We’re delighted. That’s a very important process. However, they only really apply in some areas for minor incidents, where the parties involved — the complainant and the officer — agree that the issues can be resolved through mutual dialogue and understanding and that no corrective measures or penalties may be given.

While we commend these processes, there still seems to be a gap that we’ve been told of by our departments, where a member may have committed a relatively minor one but still a misconduct and is prepared to admit the allegations from the very onset of the process and accept an appropriate penalty. We think that in those cases, there should be a process to resolve these as quickly as possible to reduce the traumatic effect on the officers involved, as well as the costs involved.

[9:55 a.m.]

Let me just give you an example that we’ve been given. Police officer A is involved in a vehicle stop…

[Interruption.]

R. Singh (Chair): It’s just the House sitting.

M. Collins: …where the member makes comments that are taken as, perhaps, being rude, and a complaint is submitted, alleging discourtesy. The member is willing to admit the default, acknowledges that what was said was accurate and inappropriate and accepts the minor corrective measures involved.

As this would not necessarily fall under division 4, at present there’s no process in place to allow a timely resolution to occur without the production of a full and complete investigation. This lack of options actually discourages members from seeking to admit and resolve minor issues that would, perhaps, also provide satisfaction to the complainants — who, I’m sure, often get frustrated with how long these processes take.

Consistency. Now, I realize this is not directly attributable to the Police Act itself, but it may be something to consider as we look at the Police Act. Some of our police agencies have expressed their concern about the sometimes inconsistent approach and application of the act that creates confusion among investigators, discipline authorities and police members.

An example of this is how the penalty of reduction of rank is imposed. Over the years, several officers have been reduced in rank. On most occasions, limitations and conditions have been imposed as part of that penalty, including when the officer could return to his or her prior rank. This provided some flexibility and variation in the severity of this penalty. However, recently the OPCC indicated that all reduction-in-rank sanctions were considered to be full reduction to the lower rank level and that there is not the ability for the discipline authority to set time limitations on this reduction.

This seems to be inconsistent with previous positions. It doesn’t appear to arise out of a legal challenge or precedent, but it seems to be a more arbitrary change of position.

Costs. The costs of investigations, as we all know, can be very high and are also a concern. The home departments of the officers under investigation have to pay the costs, also, when an external investigator is appointed. There doesn’t seem to be any limitation over these expenses. There are examples, of course, where cases have been referred to the courts seeking judicial relief, in some cases with costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some of these have related to access to confidential and legally protected source informant information, which the OPCC wanted but which were turned down by the courts. It seems to us there should be some way of, hopefully, limiting those costs.

Now, I want to mention the issue of the discipline authority of the chief, because this has come up from some of our members. Under the act, section 76, division 1, the chair of the police board is the discipline authority for any complaints or investigations against the chief or the deputy chief. Fortunately, that doesn’t happen very often. However, in recent years, one of our members, the Victoria and Esquimalt police board — as I’m sure you all know — has had a very difficult experience with this requirement.

The recommendation is that, rather than the chair, the police board should be the discipline authority or, failing that, that at least all the information and reports arising from these investigations should be available to the full board, not just the chair — there were some real issues around that in Victoria and Esquimalt — as it is the board which is the employer, not just the chair. It’s the board that’s responsible for hiring and the ongoing evaluation. It’s logical that they would also be involved in the discipline when necessary. So there are some amendments that the Victoria and Esquimalt board has given to us, suggested to section 76, that we’ve attached and that might be helpful.

I ask, with respect to the police complaints side of things, that the act should be updated to streamline the processes where you can and expand the options for dealing with relatively minor complaints. Let me just say something now about service and policy complaints. Police boards are also responsible for these, and they’re also included in section 11 of the Police Act. While there are not many, fortunately — there were only 15 in the 2017-18 year, and the majority, actually, are Vancouver — they can result in lengthy and costly investigations, which don’t always meet the needs of the complainants.

With respect to changes to the service and policy complaints process, we’d like to suggest the following. These have come from our members.

[10:00 a.m.]

There needs to be some mechanism in the act to provide for an informal process or explanation to some complaints, rather than having to direct all complaints to the board, automatically being categorized as service and policy, recognizing that the concern may arise from a simple misunderstanding or misinformation. There should be ways of resolving these without being looped into the current lengthy and expensive processes.

Two, there also should be an option for the board to accommodate oral submissions from the complainant if the board so chooses. The Police Act says the board can dismiss the complaint. The word “dismiss” is rather negative in its connotations, so we think it should provide for the board to investigate and resolve or investigate and conclude, which is really what they do. We’d like to see a more expedited process provided for in the act.

There also needs to be some form of contact information for the complainant. It should be mandatory in order to proceed with the complaint, as in some cases they are submitted to a board without this information.

Finally, the definition of “service and policy complaints” perhaps could be clearer. It’s very, very broad, and it really seems to go beyond, in some circumstances, what really is a public complaint kind of issue. At the moment, they just say they’re filing a service and policy complaint, and it’s generally accepted, because the wording of the act is so broad.

There’s another issue that I think you’re going to be hearing about as well, and that’s who should be responsible for investigating police complaints. We know that one of the proposals is that all police complaint investigations should be handled by investigators from the Office of the Police Com­plaint Commissioner, rather like the independent inves­ti­gations office, rather than individual police departments. We have some concerns that using an outside body for all investigations right from the get-go may not be ideal, as the members involved in doing those investigations wouldn’t necessarily have the knowledge of the individuals in the departments involved.

Another option that some have suggested — because it is a challenge, particularly for the smaller police departments, to do these investigations — would be to have an integrated police unit across a number of municipal police departments that complaints would be sent to for investigations, instead of each individual police department having to have its own investigative unit. We’re continuing to canvass our members on this issue. We may be able to provide more information in a written submission to the committee later in June.

Those are our issues and our suggestions. We thank you for your consideration, and we look forward to your questions.

R. Singh (Chair): Thank you so much. I’m sure my colleagues would have some questions.

G. Begg: Good morning. Thanks very much for your report. Before Mike says this, I’m going to say it. This whole process is a microcosm of the Canadian legal system, and many of the problems that you want us to look at here are the result of the increasingly litigious nature of our contact with the courts.

Police people who enforce the law will take advantage of the law and their ability to seek counsel and their ability to call in outside experts, which, in some cases, is designed to delay the process. I don’t know how we’re going to be able to deal with that. We can’t make police people immune from the ordinary protection that all Canadians receive, but I know I’ve investigated many files where deliberate and overt actions of the members involved have stalled the process.

I would be interested in your thoughts as to how we solve problems like that, because it is a conundrum. It’s very troublesome. I’m familiar with a couple of cases that are cur­rently ongoing involving municipal police members that have been ongoing for more than five years. That adds to the stress of the members involved. It adds to the financial and other burdens of the home department. They’re left in a very confusing situation. So if you have some ideas, I’m all ears.

M. Collins: Of maintaining it within the legal system.

G. Begg: Absolutely, because that is a requirement.

[10:05 a.m.]

M. Collins: I guess one of the things…. We look at the time frames. Can some of them be shortened, particularly if you triage the kinds of complaints? Obviously, some of them are egregious. Some of them are going to take a long time because there’s a real disagreement, obviously, between the officers and the department and the complainants and the OPCC.

A lot of them are not that egregious. If we can find ways to make sure that they get dealt with in a shorter time…. Even six months is a long time for a police officer to, often, be off if he needs to be — his family and his compatriots. If there were processes within the act that allowed for ways out along the way, but still obviously have to comply with the law….

G. Begg: The problem with the process is that you have to comply with the process. In the RCMP, in days gone by, if a complainant or a person who thought they were aggrieved came to the office, there was an opportunity to deal with it there rather than conduct a process. In other words, you could bring the member in, the member who was alleged to have been rude or whatever, meet with the complainant, resolve it to the satisfaction of the complainant and to the internal policies of the force and move on.

This process encumbers the agency with the responsibility to actually conduct an investigation, irrespective of the complainant’s, perhaps, desire to resolve it there. So it is an increasing conundrum.

M. Collins: Yeah. I think that’s why we suggest, in addition to the alternative dispute resolution mechanism that is provided for and is very supportive, there should also be something that can fast-track, where the officer pleads guilty or not guilty. Get it done.

G. Begg: Or go completely off track and there not be a track for the matter to be resolved and a complaint not lodged — or perhaps a complaint lodged with the agency for tracking purposes but not necessarily involving the outside agency. Just a thought.

M. Morris (Deputy Chair): Great presentation and, of course, highlighting concerns that…. As a police manager, I had a lot of those same concerns.

Garry is right. The implicated members do have the protection of the rule of law, because as you alluded to, if you lose a rank, there are some pay consequences to that, as well, in the thousands of dollars. Over a lifetime, it could affect pensions and everything else. So that’s a very serious consequence and a serious punishment.

I go back. Oftentimes, as a police manager, there are complaints that surface. You’re trying to designate who’s going to be looking after that. A lot of the issues that you’ve spoken about today are resource-constricted. We just simply don’t have enough resources to do the day-to-day police work in many of our municipalities, in addition to all of the added burden of internal investigations.

I used to wish for an internal or an external agency to come in and look after all our police complaints. “Here. You go look after them for us, and our guys can concentrate on doing police work.” Of course, by doing that, you don’t get the benefit, like somebody has alluded to — it might have been yourself — of knowing who your people are. So I think there’s a saw-off there someplace.

I think it boils down to…. We live in this very permissive society, in a lot of cases. Police officers are confronted every day with these new issues dealing with fentanyl and the fact that people are allowed — not allowed but permitted, I guess, in our society — to do all of these different things. Policemen become more of a social worker combination, and it provides for a lot of different complaints that are surfacing in today’s world.

I think if we were able to provide resources to address that, a lot of the concerns that you would have would go away. A lot of the time factors would disappear as well, because we would have the resources to investigate. When you have investigators that might have 20, 30, 40 internal investigations on the go at any particular time…. And within the independent forces, they might already be helping out each other with different resources or with different investigations. If we were able to address the resource level, I think a lot of these other concerns, you’d probably find, would disappear.

[10:10 a.m.]

M. Collins: For the individual departments? I know that Vancouver has advised that they estimate it’s about $3.7 million for their investigation, professionals…. I asked my own department. We actually have three people involved. So we figured…. One of them isn’t full-time, obviously, for that area, but it’s $350,000 to $400,000, which, for a small department, is still a big chunk of change. It is something that we….

Of course, one of the other issues you raised with the change is the public videotaping interactions with the police that then have to go into evidence, but it may not be the full interaction. It’s partial, so it doesn’t tell the whole story. So then you get into a whole conundrum of whether this is right or wrong. It just adds another level of complexity to the whole process or investigation. It’s a big challenge in policing these days.

M. Morris (Deputy Chair): A very big challenge.

E. Ross: You brought up a good point in terms of triage. I’ve often wondered about how…. I know you can’t do that. But is there a system of categorizing which complaints are actually based on an officer being rude versus something blatantly being wrong? Is there some type of categorizing that happens?

M. Collins: Before it goes to the OPCC — like, in the home department?

E. Ross: Yes.

M. Collins: Well, the home department has to report them to the OPCC.

E. Ross: Yes, yes.

M. Collins: Actually, if you look at the stats from OPCC, about half — I think it’s about half; I don’t have it quite with me — are unfounded. But that’s after they go through an investigation. If you looked at all of those, you’d think: “Would there be a simpler process by which some of those could have been addressed rather than having to go through the whole investigative process?” Now, I don’t know, quite honestly. I don’t have that level of detail. But yeah, you’d think there should be some other way of dealing with these.

E. Ross: So there isn’t. The timeliness actually includes everything — the complaint, whether or not it’s a rudeness complaint versus something really drastic. The timeliness applies to everything. Every complaint has to be addressed in the same manner. There is no triage. There is no categorization. But we know it exists, right? We know there’s….

M. Collins: There’s a big difference.

E. Ross: I don’t want to say “frivolous.” I don’t want to say that. But there are some complaints, it seems to me, that could be addressed in a different manner if all parties agree that this has got to do with the rudeness or the manner.

M. Collins: I certainly agree with you. Yeah. I think that’s the challenge — how to do that yet still maintain the integrity of the system and the public confidence in the system. But I’m sure, with all the knowledge around this table, you could come up with some ideas.

E. Ross: So there is no system, really. Everything is treated equally, right?

M. Collins: Do you want to comment?

J. Rizzuti: Well, other than…. If you look at the chart provided by the OPCC, it does indicate that there must be some form of screening that they determine what’s admissible and what’s inadmissible. There must be some level where that’s done, but after that, it seems to just carry on. Once they’re deemed admissible, then the process is set.

E. Ross: Right. So my point is: does the rudeness of an officer, if it’s admissible, still get addressed in the same manner as something really reprehensible, basically?

M. Collins: Yeah. I mean, I think some of that does happen. I’m sure you’ll be hearing from the OPCC himself. I’m sure they’ll provide you with some information on that. I think they probably try to do a fair amount of that, but they are bound by the legislation to do the investigations. They’re accountable to the complainant. If they’re not happy, then the complainant can keep the process going all the way through. Some complainants…. I mean, obviously, there are some issues that have been very serious that well deserve that kind of lengthy, intense process, but the majority really aren’t.

R. Singh (Chair): Thank you so much, Ellis.

[10:15 a.m.]

A. Olsen: I don’t have a lot to add to this. I want to thank you both for coming in and giving a presentation. I find the way that you have laid out the specific issues here, from the police boards’ perspective, very helpful, as we work through them and certainly, I think, as we work through our recommendations upcoming.

I’m somewhat inclined to be drawn into the broader philosophical debates about power and how we distribute power and then the checks and balances that we create on people who we give power to, but other than just acknowledging that it’s in this room and it’s in the walls of this building every day, I’ll just leave it at that. But I really appreciate the clarity in your presentation. We have a couple of examples where our system has been rather publicly challenged. As John and I were talking about before, if police boards are in the news, then, you know…. Fill in the blanks.

Thank you for your presentation. The information very clearly gives us some direction from your perspective.

R. Singh (Chair): Mike has some more input, but before that, I just wanted to thank you. You’re talking about an informal resolution. We have heard from the Police Complaint Commissioner while we were doing the hiring process also. My understanding is that they also emphasize a lot on the mediation process, which is a great way to resolve the issues.

My concern about the informal resolution is…. I’m a little concerned because if you don’t take the complaint outside, how do you think that would be…? The fair process of it. I am a little concerned, but you might have better…. You have talked about it in detail. Do you think there is a possibility of a fair resolution when there is an internal investigation? These are your own people, and they’re investigating your own people. So how do you think a fair resolution would happen there?

M. Collins: Within the department? When it’s still within the department?

R. Singh (Chair): Within the department. Yeah.

M. Collins: Well, I guess, from my experience, anyway — and I’ve served on two different police boards, actually — the professional standards group or division, whatever it’s called, of the police board is very thorough. I realize it can be challenging sometimes if they’re investigating a colleague, but I think they’re, in my experience, always very professional in what they do.

Of course, the complainant has the right, if they’re not happy at any stage, to keep the process going up the chain to the OPCC. They still have to report everything to the OPCC, so the OPCC can still review a decision that’s been made by the department. If they’re not happy with it, they can go back and require further deliberation.

I think there are pretty good checks and balances. I mean, nothing’s ever going to be perfect, I realize, but I think on the whole, it’s worked fairly well.

J. Rizzuti: I was just going to add…. The test for it is public confidence. If there’s any doubt that that’s going to be impeded or interrupted by any form or suggestion of bias, then we take it external.

G. Begg: I just wanted to comment on something you had said, Madam Chair. There is lots of empirical evidence that policemen and women investigating policemen and women have a higher expectation, and when given an opportunity, they impose greater penalties than would a civilian oversight agency. It sounds counterintuitive, but within the ranks, we have an expectation of a very high standard of performance, and we’re disappointed when it’s not replicated in the people that work for us.

Like I say, it’s substantiated by lots of empirical evidence, particularly in the RCMP, where rulings of disciplinary authorities have been overruled by civilian courts as too harsh, inappropriate….

[10:20 a.m.]

I know it doesn’t make sense, but if there’s a bias, it’s for law and order within the organization, right? Policemen have very low tolerance for stupidity or bad behaviour of any kind, whether it be treating someone disrespectfully or using excessive force. There’s a very low tolerance for that. Just as a point of interest.

E. Ross: I’m not looking for a definitive answer — a yes or no or anything like that — but public confidence…. Given social media, given all the news that we see in terms of what’s happening in the United States, is there a general feeling that, overall, people are okay with the way things are playing out in B.C. in terms of the police force?

M. Collins: Generally, the surveys that we’ve seen…. I was just at a session yesterday. We had some survey results. They’re pretty high in Canada. Any incident can impact those, like what happened in Toronto — the boy on the streetcar. That reverberates now across the country. It makes people nervous. So anything like that…. Thunder Bay — you know, the horrible situation.

E. Ross: Those are spikes that go away.

M. Collins: Yeah. On the whole, it’s pretty good, but you have to keep it that way. I mean, that’s the thing. These days, things could change in an instant with something bad that happens, so we have to be very careful.

E. Ross: But there’s no campaign or some rising tide — change the system or some anti-policing type…?

M. Collins: In terms of the overall complaints in the system?

E. Ross: Just overall, in terms of the confidence in the police and the RCMP in B.C.

M. Collins: Oh, right. No, there are more issues around the costs of policing with municipalities, and the organization. Do we have the optimum structure for policing in B.C.? That’s an issue we’re going to be talking to the minister about. There are lots of issues we’re dealing with, for sure. How do we get the most effective…?

E. Ross: But not the general public? There’s no rising animosity towards policing?

M. Collins: You always get individuals. At our police board, we will get people who will complain about the budget — we’re getting too much money, and things like that — or they’re not happy with something. They don’t actually file a service and policy complaint. They just want to come and vent about something. But I don’t think that reflects the general….

We work really hard these days, and I think most police agencies do, at being out in the community. I know for Saanich, and I’m sure for Central Saanich, a big part of our work is being out in the community and working with our community partners, multicultural groups and First Nations groups. It’s a big change from the way it used to be with policing. They were more isolated.

E. Ross: More PR, right? More community law.

J. Rizzuti: If I could add, the amount of awareness now of the importance of working in a healthy environment, in a good relationship with communities. I mean, most depart­ments now are all actively doing something. Their visibility is higher at community events. We do the strategic plans, which become public so that there’s an element of transparency about the work and how we’re going to approach it. The list goes on.

Right now I think it would be safe to say that in most of our services, they’re out in the community. If something untoward were coming our way, we would probably be able to get involved and mitigate it or answer to it or shore it up — whatever needs to be done — so our response to some of the community levels of satisfaction is more attuned. I think we can get at them a little quicker, and we have a variety of ways of responding.

Ultimately, we’re judged on the level of service and how safe the community feels. But then there are these peripheral areas that you’re probably alluding to that can cause those levels to moderate, go up or down.

E. Ross: Molehill into a mountain, basically.

R. Singh (Chair): Thank you so much for coming and giving this presentation and bringing some important points. We really appreciate that.

M. Collins: All the best in your deliberations. We’ll look forward to your report.

R. Singh (Chair): Now I need a motion to adjourn.

Motion approved.

The committee adjourned at 10:24 a.m.