Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills — Issue No. 7

SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, ETHICAL CONDUCT, STANDING ORDERS AND PRIVATE BILLS

Strategy Room 320, Morris J. Wosk Centre for Dialogue
580 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, B.C.

Present: Colin Hansen, MLA (Chair); Donna Barnett, MLA; Jagrup Brar, MLA; Murray Coell, MLA; Mike Farnworth, MLA; Randy Hawes, MLA; Jenny Wai Ching Kwan, MLA; Norm Letnick, MLA

2. The following witnesses appeared before the Committee and answered questions:

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(Hansard)

SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, ETHICAL CONDUCT, STANDING ORDERS AND PRIVATE BILLS


CONTENTS
Page
Members' Conflict of Interest Act	43
G. Levine
D. Mitchell
P. Meekison
L. Tarras

C. Hansen (Chair): Okay. I think what I'll do is call the meeting to order. I know there are two members who are running late but will be joining us. Randy Hawes will be joining us by phoning in. Also, Harry Lali is running late and will be here shortly, I expect.

First of all, I want to welcome Dr. Levine. Thank you very much for joining us for this session. I think your reputation precedes us, precedes this discussion, as probably one of Canada's leading authorities in this subject. So we're delighted to have your submission and your input to the work of the committee.

I'm going to start, just because we have as many people on the line as we do, calling in. I'll just start by recognizing those who are physically here at the committee hearing in Vancouver. That is Murray Coell, MLA for Saanich North and the Islands; Mike Farnworth, MLA for Port Coquitlam; Jenny Kwan, who is MLA for Vancouver–Mount Pleasant; and Jagrup Brar, who is MLA for Surrey-Fleetwood.

On the line is Donna Barnett, who is the MLA for Cariboo-Chilcotin. Also on line is Norm Letnick, who is the MLA for Kelowna–Lake Country.

With that, I will turn the floor over to Dr. Levine. We have the written submission. I think some members of the committee may not have received it till yesterday afternoon. So while everyone has had a chance to at least skim it at best, there's a lot of content in here that I'm sure we're going to want to go back and revisit.

G. Levine: Okay. Thanks for your introduction and your kind words. I very much welcome the opportunity to speak about the act. The act has proven to be a very effective tool in the promotion of ethical behaviour and for inquiring into allegations of unethical conduct. I think, as you see from the submission, that there are ways it could be enhanced and in which the ethics systems as a whole for government could be enhanced.

I won't go over in detail what the submission is, but I will try to highlight some of the topics and my overall thoughts on them, such as they are. In terms of amending the act, I discuss five areas: the name of the act itself, principles and purpose statement, some ideas about post-employment rules, offers of employment, and protecting witnesses.

I'll focus on those, but if we have time — I understood I was able to talk for about 15 minutes, and I shall do that — I'll look at some possibilities for expanding jurisdiction and whistle-blowing legislation.

G. Levine: Okay. In terms of the name of the act, I know this may seem like a small thing, but it's not really, in my view. The ethics acts across the country do a lot more than deal with conflict of interest, and I think that it's worthwhile considering a better descriptor in the legislative title. Ontario calls its law the Members' Integrity Act, Quebec's refers to ethical conduct and so on.

It is the case that most legislation at the provincial level and federal level still refers to conflict of interest in some way in the title, but I do think there's some value to considering a change in it, as Commissioner Oliver had suggested in 2007.

In terms of a principles and purpose statement, in the submission I go through a number of examples from Ontario, Alberta, Canada as a federal regime, and Quebec. I won't rehearse or recite each one of those, but I do think that a principles and purpose statement does serve a useful function. It frames the legislation, it provides an interpretive backdrop, and it is a way of promoting the values themselves which underlie the legislation.

They are an educational tool as well as an interpretive tool, and I think it's useful to have some sort of statement of values and principles within the act itself, and a purpose statement, as well, is useful. The federal regime has both, and when I say this, I should have said the federal conflict-of-interest code for members of the House of Commons. All of the various codes at the federal level have this, but that code, which is for the members of the House, has both a purpose and a principles statement.

The purpose is about maintaining and enhancing public confidence and trust, demonstrating to the public that members are held to high standards that place the public interest ahead of private interest, and so on. Those are very important things to state, I think, and for people to see. I do believe, I continue to believe that having such a statement in the act is important.

In terms of post-employment rules, I think it is useful to enhance this. Section 8 of the Members' Conflict of Interest Act focuses on contracting a benefit, but there are other issues around former members' and former ministers' conduct which is important. The federal Conflict of Interest Act contains a rule which I think is well worth considering. It says: "No former public office holder shall
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act in such a manner as to take improper advantage of his or her previous public office."

I think something like that is useful because it gets at the broader notion of influence of office. It's not only about receiving a benefit. It's about misusing power, in a sense, and connections, and it's broader than what is in section 8 of the current Members' Conflict of Interest Act. I think something like that makes sense.

In the submission that I gave you, I spend a certain amount of time talking about the appearance of improper use of influence. I recognize the idea of that can be a bit arcane, but if you think of the Mulroney-Schreiber affair and the inquiry into that, the commissioner ultimately found no illegal act but did find that the behaviour was inappropriate. From my perspective, it was inappropriate because it appeared that a very powerful official appeared to have misused his office.

A reasonable person would say that taking cash in envelopes for an unspecified task is kind of problematic, and there should be some way to deal with that kind of perception of use of influence as well. There are some formulations in recent commissions of inquiry, such as the Mississauga inquiry in Ontario, which may be helpful in framing some legislation around this.

Another issue I raised in that context was around representation. Former ministers are prevented from making representations in section 8 of the current legislation, but it's not defined. I understand why. It allows for flexibility. But for clarity's sake, I think that if you dovetailed that with the Lobbyists Registration Act, which talks about what lobbying means, that could be a useful clarification of the idea of representation.

Offers of employment. In his 2008-2009 annual report Commissioner Fraser noted that the federal Conflict of Interest Act requires that officeholders are to report firm offers of employment to the federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Now, public office holders are a wider group than ministers and members, but for ministers, this may be particularly important. And if you expanded the ambit of your act to include other types of officeholders, it could be an important change, I think.

There are requirements about when an officeholder is to disclose acceptance of an offer. The reason for this is to make clear potential influences on ministers and other officeholders. There is a fear of preferential treatment and influence of office arising as a result of potential employment.

The term "firm offer" in the federal act isn't defined, but it could be. It is an issue that I think is worthwhile monitoring, because if somebody is negotiating for a job while they're making decisions on issues pertinent to that, it can raise really problematic issues.

The last area I looked at in terms of amending the statute itself is protection of witnesses. I understand that the commissioner here functions largely on an informal method, and this is true of commissioners across the country. But when they do exercise formal power, and if they do subpoena people and summons them — and summonses are permitted in the members' act — there's no obvious protection, actually, at any level of the process for people who complain, for people who are witnesses and so on.

There really should be some kind of protection against reprisal. There is in other statutes in British Columbia. I cite the Ombudsperson Act. Section 16 of the Ombudsperson Act is a potentially very useful protection. Something like that could go into the members' act as well.

The other thing that's striking in terms of protections is that there's no allowance for anyone to claim a privilege. I guess people just would, but there's nothing in the Members' Conflict of Interest Act for someone to assert privilege — that something, information they hold, is privileged and they can't say it.

Typically, in these processes across the country, you are allowed to claim privileges that you would be able to in a court. Something of that nature should, I think, be put in the act.

I'm sorry about the rush through that, but those are the general amendments I would make to the act itself. Is it okay if I go on to the other part?

C. Hansen (Chair): Yes, for sure, and we will then come back and field questions at the conclusion.

G. Levine: I think that it's worthwhile considering enhancing the overall ethics regime. It's important to look at ethics in government in a holistic fashion. There needs to be consistent ethics rules in place throughout what people see as government as a whole. Failure to do so can lead to lack of public confidence.

The areas that I suggested in the submission were around expanding the jurisdiction of the commissioner himself and then considering whether there should be a whistle-blower system, which would also enhance the jurisdiction. But it's a bit of a different issue.

I know this issue had been considered some time ago in British Columbia, but I wonder if it isn't time to revisit and to think about expanding the system to include political staff, senior civil servants and ministerial appointees and so on, perhaps generally or perhaps in some restricted sense.

The federal Conflict of Interest Act, again, provides a good example. It deals with ministerial advisors and ministerial staff. And the definition of "public office holder," which I've included in the piece, is fairly broad. It may well be worth considering, because many of these non-elected officials hold considerable influence and power and should be subject to some sort of ethics regulation.

The federal regime does not cover "regular public servants," but they are subject to a different values and
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ethics code. Ontario has embarked on a really, really interesting and ambitious…It's created a conflict of interest commissioner for the public service itself. The task of the commissioner is essentially to monitor the ethical conduct of the public service, up to and including the ministerial level.

That, I think, is important, although I want to talk about the concept of wrongdoing, and I'll do that in the context of whistle-blowing.

In terms of municipal ethics…. I recognize this would be a huge expansion if you said, "Okay, the Conflict of Interest Commissioner is the commissioner for all municipalities," but there needs to be something, I think, beyond what's been done in the Community Charter. I won't belabour this.

It's interesting what's in the charter. It gives a code of conduct and has conflict-of-interest rules for members of councils, but it leaves enforcement totally in the hands of courts. That's time-consuming, it's expensive, and even though there are retrieval of costs allowed in it, it's a very difficult system.

Both Ontario and Quebec have taken a different approach with the establishment of integrity commissioners at the local level in Ontario, and in Quebec giving the Quebec Municipal Commission power to deal with ethics issues. I think that's well worth looking at. It may be beyond the scope of what you folks want to do at this point, but I think it's really well worth considering.

Okay. The final thing I think that's worth having a look at is a whistle-blower system as a whole. It is true that there are a number of statutes in British Columbia, including the Ombudsperson Act, which prevent reprisal for complaining or for exposure of wrongdoing in several different contexts, but there's no overall whistle-blowing statute. I know that there have been private member's bills and so on, but I think this is something that also is worth revisiting.

The federal example, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, is interesting, although it's not as inclusive as the Ontario act. I was surprised to see that ministerial wrongdoing had been deleted from the federal act, which sort of does away with part of the point of whistle-blowing. The Ontario act is more inclusive, and I've included the definition of wrongdoing there.

There's a complex process in the Ontario act which involves the Integrity Commissioner — not the new Conflict of Interest Commissioner but the provincial Integrity Commissioner, the equivalent of the Conflict of Interest Commissioner in B.C. That person has the responsibility of monitoring and taking disclosures and dealing with them.

The system is a bit complex, and I won't go into the details of it, but the idea of it, I think, is right. I think it makes sense to have the Integrity Commissioner tied into whistle-blowing — especially that which involves whistle-blowing at the ministerial level — because the conflict-of-interest commission is already dealing with ethics issues at that level.

Anyway, that was a bit of a whirlwind, but I think I'll stop there. If you folks have questions, that'd be great.

C. Hansen (Chair): All right. I appreciate that very much, and there's a lot of good information in this submission which is going to be very helpful to us.

So I will throw it open to committee members for any questions or comments, including those on the phones.

R. Hawes: Maybe I can start with a question. I just wonder about, when you use words like "ethics" and "integrity," having a real definition that at some point might be tried in court. How do you get it to where it's a little bit more concrete? It's a little less…. I don't know. It's very difficult to define, because everybody might have a little different definition. You know, the connotation people might have is….

R. Hawes: Well, that's one of them, yes. If we're going to try to define what ethics are — because even in the name of the act…. If you're going to talk about integrity or ethics, somewhere doesn't that have to be defined?

G. Levine: I'm sorry. I'm probably not understanding fully, but it seems to me that you have already created an ethics system within the Members' Conflict of Interest Act. You deal with a whole bunch of rules that are not necessarily about conflict of interest. You deal with insider information in section 4. You deal with influence of office in section 5. You deal with appropriate activities on behalf of constituents in section 6. You deal with accepting extra benefits and so on and so on.

You have already defined an ethics code, so I don't know that saying that this is the members' ethics act would be any less ambiguous than saying it's the Members' Conflict of Interest Act. I think it might be more helpful, because it would say to people that there are a whole set of things in here which are about appropriate rules of conduct, which is what ethics are about.

So I'm not sure. I don't know…. I didn't call for defining "ethics" per se within the act.

R. Hawes: No, but I'm just saying that when you use words like "ethics," I think you do need…. Maybe I'm wrong, but it just seems to me you need to then define what ethics means. As an elected official, I hear from the public quite often where they're talking about ethical conduct, and it comes from all over, from all kinds of places, really, and it's very difficult. It's very obvious
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that people have different connotations for what that word means.

G. Levine: I appreciate what you're saying, but in fact, in the act and in all these acts you are defining the behaviours that are problematic — right? Here's a conflict of interest. Here's what it means. That whole thing is an ethics code. But the specifics are, in fact, defined. When you talk about insider information, the rules are there.

R. Hawes: I was just thinking in terms of…. You have quite a discussion here about, for example, former Prime Minister Mulroney's ethical conundrum, if you will. That wasn't illegal. It didn't really breach any rules, I guess, but really would be looked at as unethical.

G. Levine: Yes, but it's interesting. Commissioner Oliphant eventually just said it was inappropriate because he couldn't tag it to a specific ethical rule.

G. Levine: Right. Maybe we're speaking past each other, and I apologize if that's the case.

R. Hawes: Well, maybe it's me that should apologize, but it does seem to me, when I look at that example…. I mean, the public, I think, believed that that was unethical conduct, and there should have been a consequence. There was no consequence. I guess I'm just trying to say, then, if you're talking about ethical behaviour but you're unable, in cases that clearly are unethical, to define it in such a way that you can build in a consequence…. I guess that's what I was trying to get to. How do you get to that place?

G. Levine: That's true. I think in the case…. I read that paragraph, and it's interesting you picked that one out of the discussion, because that is very murky. I admit that. How I've been trying to deal with that…. I think the general answer I would give you is: what you're trying to do is to articulate rules around behaviours which you do see as problematic.

Each time a case is raised, you may not be able to deal with it, because you haven't figured out yet…. You have a sense that something's wrong, but you don't know yet what it is. It would, in a sense, be unfair to punish, say, the former Prime Minister if there wasn't a clear rule that did prohibit what he did. The lack of that clear rule leads you to say: "Boy, this is problematic, but we can't do anything about this now, so what do we do?"

We have to start to think about a rule or at least a way of thinking about this kind of behaviour which will change the way we behave in the future, and that's why I started to think about: "Well, what are activities…? What would a reasonable person say was problematic about Mr. Mulroney's and Mr. Schreiber's behaviour in there?" It has a lot to do with appearances. They made a loosey-goosey deal, and they passed cash in a way that you'd think: "Whoa. This is just bizarre."

C. Hansen (Chair): Dr. Levine, I think you've captured it in the end of that paragraph, where you say that it may be very difficult to craft legislation which fits this problem, and that's exactly what we're trying to wrestle with here. Randy has raised a good point, and I think the way you framed it in your submission is very good. It's something the committee will deliberate on at a later time. It's a good discussion, and I'm glad it has been flagged.

M. Farnworth: I just want to explore your comments and thoughts around the municipal side of things. There has been talk about expanding the act to cover local government officials, but I'm wondering whether or not you think, given the nature of local government — the sheer size of it, the number of officials involved, the issues that they deal with which very much often involve land use, landowners, rezonings and the ability for conflict to arise there — that should be done under a separate statute with a separate office.

Given the fact of just the sheer number of people, one of the challenges you may have if the act, as it is currently, is extended to municipal offices, is that it in fact loses its focus away from provincial members, because there are far fewer of them. The way in which they operate, I think, also comes under a lot more scrutiny than at the local level, and therefore, perhaps, a separate statute and office is probably more appropriate, dealing with them that way.

C. Hansen (Chair): Just before Dr. Levine responds to that, I think we are probably joined by David Mitchell.

G. Levine: I understand what you're saying, I think. In a sense, it's why Ontario and Quebec have opted for different methods of doing this. In Ontario they've opted for letting municipalities essentially establish their own integrity commissioners, and it's a growing system. There are now about 40 positions in the province where 40 different municipalities have opted to have their own commissioner. There are issues, then, about having different codes and differential enforcement, which can be problematic.

I'm the integrity commissioner for three municipalities in Ontario, and they have a different system than, say,
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Toronto and Vaughan do. I handle Waterloo, Kitchener and West Lincoln. There's an issue there, but it is actually a way of allowing municipalities to create something and to move beyond the court system, at least in part. There's a problem in Ontario, because there's a kind of bifurcation of the system.

In Quebec they've opted to have the Quebec Municipal Commission take this on. I do think that makes some sense, because then you'll have uniformity. It'll be a little less informal than courts and presumably less costly. I do think it makes sense to move the system beyond the courts, and then Quebec may have found the answer to it.

J. Brar: Thanks, first of all, for your very meaningful presentation, Dr. Levine. I just wanted to ask a follow-up question to the question asked by a member here before, about the municipalities.

There are two ways, maybe three ways, but if we bring the local government into this act under whatever we call the officer, are we basically saying here that all the rules of this act will apply to all the local officials in the same way? That's one thing I would like your response to. Or will there be a different set of rules for those people?

If the same rules are going to apply for those, then we're kind of open to criticism that we are framing this completely new set of rules for them without consultation with those people. So I would like to ask your response to that.

G. Levine: What I think I would do…. Two thoughts on that. The first is that if you look at the code within the Community Charter, it's pretty similar to the members' code. That's the first thing I'd say about that. But I do appreciate the point that (a) you don't want to surprise the municipalities, and (b) you'd want to create something that's suited to their problems and needs.

I would say: apply the Community Charter code. Keep that going. It's a very good statement of ethics issues on both conflict of interest and other ethical problems. But have the enforcement system change, and try to create an integrity commissioner system using the code that's already there.

Interestingly, Vancouver had proposed an integrity commissioner a few years ago. They were going to create one, because there is power within the Vancouver Charter to do so, but they haven't done it, and I gather it's sort of dropped off the horizon. I would just say: use the code that's there, and change the enforcement mechanism.

C. Hansen (Chair): One question that I have: in terms of the potential or the possibility of expanding jurisdiction — and I'm thinking particularly around political staff in ministers' offices — do you see or are there any examples in Canada where there is a distinction made between the conflict while holding the position versus conflicts post-employment?

I guess the reason I'm asking the question is around…. As I understand it, there are some legal questions as to whether or not an employer, for example, can restrict an individual's future employment opportunities without providing some kind of compensation for that in terms of a differing severance benefit or something like that. Any thoughts on the implications of expanding this to political staff?

G. Levine: I don't know of any cases that dealt with that issue of potential compensation for restriction. I mean, if people know the rules going in, that's one issue that may help to deal with that, because they'll know what's expected of them when they go out, so the request for compensation may not be as realistic.

The federal regime does deal with the post-employment period of political staffers as well as ministers and so on. Alberta's system definitely has rules for political staffers while they're on staff, but I'm not sure if it deals with the post-employment. It would be worth looking at their legislation.

Any other questions or comments from committee? Any of the committee members that are on the phone: any further questions or comments?

Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. Levine. This has been most helpful to us, and your written submission is something that will help guide us, as well, as we continue the work of the committee. Thank you very much for taking the time.

C. Hansen (Chair): Well, welcome. I appreciate the fact that you could join us today. With that, I'll throw the meeting over to you, and you can….

D. Mitchell: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to make a brief presentation to the committee. I do not have a written submission to make, but I do have a few brief comments that I would like to share with you. I make them in the context of being a former member of the British Columbia Legislature, who served as a member at the time of the first major set of revisions to the Members' Conflict of Interest Act in 1992.

There were a few points of reference that may be useful to members of the committee and that I'd like to share. One of them is the reflection that British Columbia is a leader in this area. It was one of the first jurisdictions
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in Canada to implement such legislation. Subsequently, we now have evolved to the point where virtually every Canadian legislature and parliament has similar legislation and full-time commissioners.

British Columbia was one of the pioneers, if I could put it that way. It was a leader, and I think it would be worthwhile for British Columbia to maintain its leadership position in terms of transparency, in terms of integrity of officeholders.

When I reflect back to 1992, when some major changes where made to the act that was initially passed in 1990, the circumstances under which the legislative amendments came to the House were, in my view, less than desirable, because they were quite rushed. They were quite hurried.

They were very substantial. At the time they broadened the definition of what a "conflict of interest" was to include the idea of "apparent conflict," for instance. They provided for ongoing financial disclosure. The amendments of that time permitted members of the public to request inquiries. So they were quite substantial changes.

But they were brought to the Legislature without much notice — very little notice and very little time for thoughtful debate. It was quite hurried. My thought at the time, and it continues to be, is that these kinds of changes should not be made in an apparent time of crisis. They shouldn't be hurried through. They should be thought through carefully by members of the House. They should be done in what I would call peacetime.

At the time, just without going into any detail, there was a bit of a crisis of confidence in the province. We had just gone through a change in government. The new government wanted to move quickly. There's nothing wrong with a bias for action.

The previous administration had clouds of perceived scandal hanging over it, and the impetus seemed to be to move very, very expeditiously with changes. I didn't feel that that was desirable or useful at the time — even though the legislative amendments had very great merit and were supported, I think, broadly in the House, on both sides of the House.

That's one point I'd like to make: any amendments, any changes, ideally should take place in a reasoned way with some sober reflection and debate and not be rushed through. A time of crisis is not the time to do this. I think you've got my point there.

Two other brief points I'd like to make. We shouldn't seek to discourage British Columbians from seeking public office, nor should we in any other Canadian jurisdiction.

I'm not saying that conflict-of-interest legislation as it applies to members has that effect, but I do note that in the generation since this legislation was first brought in, in British Columbia — and it has almost been a full generation that has passed now — there has been, broadly speaking, declining confidence in public institutions in the province and, indeed, in our country. There's no single cause for that. I think there are other bodies that are looking into issues like declining voter turnout, declining public engagement.

Any changes that might be contemplated for this law or for the role of the commissioner should be sensitive to the fact, I believe — and I'm assuming that there might be agreement on the idea — that we do not want to inhibit or prevent the natural leaders of our community from offering themselves for public service.

The final point that I would simply like to leave with members of the committee, just as an observation and a reflection, is relating to the generational change that is occurring. It's not simply the passage of time, but there is a significant generational change occurring in all sectors of society right now.

There's a younger generation of emerging leaders who, by and large, are not as engaged in the traditional institutions of our democracy to the extent that many would like to see. We'd like to see more democratic engagement, especially among youth.

So again, conflict-of-interest legislation is desirable; transparency and accountability are desirable. But over the generation that has existed since the law was initially put in place, there has been almost what I would call a cult of accountability. We've seen a proliferation of officers of the Legislature — of efforts to hold people accountable, especially elected representatives.

We've seen so much of the apparatus of accountability in place that it almost complicates our system of governance to the point where it makes it bewildering. Any changes, therefore…. I would encourage members to think about changes that would simplify and streamline processes rather than add layers of complication on top of what already exists. I think that would demonstrate a bit of sensitivity to this issue of the engagement of a new, emerging generation of leaders.

Mr. Chairman, those are just a few points that I wanted to make as a former member of the Legislature, and I wish you and other members of the committee well in your review of the act.

C. Hansen (Chair): Great. Thank you very much. We will throw it open to questions or comments.

M. Farnworth: David, one of the issues that's been around for a long time…. You'd be familiar with it. It was never really acted on. It was sort of more at the discussion stage when the act was first done back in the early '90s. It's the issue of expanding coverage to cover political appointees, such as ministerial assistants, for example, but also, and perhaps more importantly, local government.

Do you have any thoughts on that? And if you were to say yes, should it be by using the existing act or — rec-
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ognizing that that's a pretty significant task in its own right — should it have its own legislation and structure?

D. Mitchell: Thank you for the question, Michael. It's very nice to hear your voice. It brings back great memories of debates in the Legislature — just to hear your voice.

Let me say this. I do think that there is a strong case that can be made for extending the existing act to cover local government elected officials. I do believe that would be much more desirable than creating yet another piece of legislation that may have different features.

Simple is better, in my view. If there would be a separate piece of legislation, at the very least it needs to be not only complementary but extremely well aligned with the existing legislation so that we don't end up with different rules for different levels of government. I think that citizens, quite honestly, can be understandably confused by the complexity that we impose upon our system of governance. Making it simpler is better.

The idea, though, of extending this to appointed political staff is not so simple, in my view. I do believe that one of the real challenges in our system of government is the lack of accountability of appointed officials — order-in-council appointments, political staff — who, by and large, are in the shadows of our constitution in our country. They're not referred to explicitly in any statutes, in any constitutional documents, and yet they do have, as we all know, significant influence and impact on public policy, on public service and on governance.

How one would extend legislation to cover them is not so easy. In my view, it's not simply achieved by extending legislation that covers elected officials to include their staff. It's something that does require some careful attention. But that's one of the foremost challenges that we face in our country in public administration.

Actually, David, I forgot to acknowledge that on the line also, not present physically but on the telephone, are Donna Barnett, Randy Hawes and Norm Letnick — MLAs from the Interior. Anybody have questions for David?

I've got one. I wanted to ask specifically about the provisions in the act for the appointment of an acting commissioner, which you, of course, went through. Obviously, there are fairly clear rules around the establishment of a special committee of selection when a term is up for a conflict commissioner or the conflict commissioner leaves office.

Then there are also the provisions for an acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner. I just wondered: do you think that, basically, the provisions that are in the legislation now are effective? Or could they be improved, in your view?

D. Mitchell: It's a very good question. Thank you for drawing my attention to it. My memory, if it serves me well, was that we had a debate about this way back in 1992 when the provision in the act first, at that time, allowed for an acting commissioner.

I think that the existing act probably achieves the aim and goal of ensuring that someone can serve in the role if the commissioner himself or herself is not available to do so.

There is an alternative that has occurred to me, however. I'm not sure if this goes beyond the mandate of the committee to consider it, but with the proliferation of officers of the Legislature in recent years, if one officer of the Legislature is, for whatever reason, unavailable to perform their task, could it be that the acting commissioner might be another officer or agent of the Legislature? That might seem like a little bit of a radical proposal.

Having said that, I do believe that it is desirable to have officers of the Legislature working in concert, sharing similar goals in terms of serving members of the House and in providing accountabilities where they're required. The idea of having a horizontal approach to this rather than a vertical approach is one that has occurred to me and, to my knowledge, has not been used elsewhere. I've often wondered why not.

C. Hansen (Chair): That's helpful. In fact, I think there is actually a precedent for that from last year, when the…. I think, actually, Paul Fraser filled in as the acting Information and Privacy Commissioner for a period of time.

J. Kwan: Thank you very much, David. I was just wondering if you had some thoughts around the suggestion by some presenters to the committee that the legislation be amended to include a principles and purpose statement for the act — and terminology. Two terms have been used around that. One is ethics, or ethical conduct, if you will, and the other is integrity.

I think Randy Hawes alluded to this earlier, around the definition of these terms and how the public would perceive what that means as it applies to politicians or anyone else to which the act would apply — how to ensure clarity is there for the public's interpretation as well as that of, obviously, the people to which those two terms would be used to assess their behaviours.

I'm wondering if you have any thoughts around that and how best to address this issue of clarity that you referenced.
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D. Mitchell: Very good. Thank you very much for that question. It's an excellent question. I honestly believe, Jenny, that you're in a better position to provide an answer than myself or any non-current member of the Legislature, because you and other members of the committee will have a sensitivity to the awareness of this legislation and the public awareness of the role and purpose of the legislation.

If I could just say, however, I do think there is some value, potentially, in playing what I would call an educational role for the public in order to understand how the Legislature works and how this particular office of the Legislature works to ensure its role. I don't think we can ever assume, or we should ever assume, that this is widely appreciated or known among your constituents, amongst the general public.

So having such a statement as the one you referred to, a statement of principles and purpose for this office, I think could be valuable, because members of the Legislature — I remember very well — get so close to the system. We're in a bit of a bubble at the time, and we make assumptions that are not necessarily reflective of what the public, citizens of the province, really understand.

There have been changes, of course, because British Columbia was one of the early adopters of developing a commissioner of conflict of interest. There have been in other jurisdictions…. I'm sure you will be aware, with some comparative research that's available, of utilizing terms like "integrity," "ethics" and other roles to sometimes having specific officers look at those areas of function.

My own view is that sometimes it complicates and confuses the public to see all of these terms being used in such general ways. What's the difference between a commissioner who's examining ethics versus integrity versus conflict of interest? It can sometimes be a little bit overwhelming, I think, for many citizens, and I'm not surprised.

However, the clarity that is desirable, I believe, could be achieved by a statement such as the one you alluded to, Jenny, and I think that's definitely worth considering.

C. Hansen (Chair): Thanks very much. Any other questions or comments for David from those on the line — Norm, Randy or Donna?

C. Hansen (Chair): Great. Well, thank you very much, David, for taking the time. I think you've given us some good things to chew on here, so I appreciate it very much.

D. Mitchell: You're very welcome, Colin. Thank you for the invitation to spend a few minutes with you, and I wish you and the members of the committee well in your review of the act. It's important work.

To those members on the line from the Interior: I hope you're staying dry and your communities are safe. The rest of the country has you in our thoughts.

I'll allow you to take the chair in the centre of the room. The members of the committee who are here you can see from their nameplates. There are also three members of the committee who have joined us on line. Donna Barnett, Randy Hawes and Norm Letnick have phoned in.

We appreciate the fact that you've been able to share with us some written thoughts ahead of time. I think, as with our previous presenter, you had the unique opportunity of serving in a capacity as the acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner. In fact, in B.C.'s history I think there have only actually been two individuals filling an acting role. That is yourself and David Mitchell. That gives you a very helpful perspective, I think, that can help with the work of the committee.

P. Meekison: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to read the speech — it's easier to stick to the time — if you don't mind.

I'd first like to thank the select standing committee for inviting me to make a presentation with respect to the Members' Conflict of Interest Act. I served as acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner from May 8, 1997, to August 7, 1997, a period of approximately three months. I replaced the Hon. Ted Hughes, who had been reappointed as acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner from July 19, 1996, to March 26, 1997. Given my short term in office, I will keep my remarks equally brief.

Mr. Hughes finished his first term as Conflict of Interest Commissioner on March 26, 1996. The government appointed David Mitchell as his replacement. He resigned a week later. Mr. Hughes was immediately reappointed and continued to serve in an acting capacity for a further three months. His acting appointment ended shortly after the 1996 provincial election. Following a brief hiatus, he served once again in an acting capacity for another nine months. He stepped down a year to the day after his first term had ended. Six weeks later the government appointed me by order-in-council as acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner.

Before Mr. Hughes left office in the spring of 1996, he made a number of recommendations with respect to the scope of the commissioner's responsibilities. My understanding is that the search committee for his replacement was divided over the question of whether or not to appoint his replacement before or after considering what, if any, amendments were in order.
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Not long after my acting appointment, the Liberal opposition commenced a legal action in respect of my appointment on the grounds that the government had not followed procedures set out in section 14(6) and (7) of the act. Given that they were challenging my appointment, they would submit letters addressed to the "yet-to-be-appointed Conflict of Interest Commissioner," as opposed to me, the acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner. Government members would send in the material addressed to me as acting Conflict of Interest Commissioner for review.

As chance would have it, on one occasion I was in the Parliament Buildings. I bumped into Colin Hansen. He may not remember this.

P. Meekison: I had been a board member of the Asia Pacific Foundation and met him when he worked for the foundation. I had not seen him since stepping down from the board. He made it very clear to me that the lawsuit and boycott had nothing to do with me personally and was the result of differences between the government and opposition.

As I was concerned about the potential difficulties a member might encounter should that member, unfortunately, be in a conflict or apparent conflict of interest, I sought legal advice on this boycott. Essentially, the advice I received was to respect the wishes of the individual members but to caution them that there could be consequences down the road. While I cannot be sure, I believe that the court action and boycott led to the government's and opposition's agreement to expedite the appointment of a new Conflict of Interest Commissioner.

I was fortunate in being briefed on the position and its responsibilities by Mr. Hughes. I also had the opportunity to read his rulings and reports, and from these I gained an appreciation of the importance of the position. At the conclusion of a meeting requested by one of the government members, the individual concluded by saying: "This is like talking to a priest." I've not forgotten that comment and its significance.

Of all the officers of the Legislative Assembly, the Conflict of Interest Commissioner is the only one who interacts on a personal basis not only with all 85 members but also, if applicable, with their spouses and minor children. The position and its relationship with the individual member is one where complete trust is essential and, as with the other officers of the Legislative Assembly, is completely non-partisan.

The seamless transition from the end of the Hon. H.A.D. Oliver's term to the commencement of Mr. Paul Fraser's term is what one would expect to be the norm. The transition from the end of Mr. Hughes's term in March 1996 to the appointment of Mr. Oliver in August 1997 was not seamless. For more than a year there were four acting appointments and two short periods where nobody occupied the office.

This may have been one of those unfortunate or unpredictable sets of circumstances, but it was far from the norm. From my perspective, this committee should review the wording of section 14(6) and (7) of the act with respect to the appointment and the termination of the appointment of an acting commissioner so that at no time are MLAs without counsel.

C. Hansen (Chair): Great, thank you very much. In your submission, your recollection of that time and our encounter in the hallway is exactly as I recall it as well. And I just want to start off by saying, having known you and having had the chance to work with you at the Asia Pacific Foundation, that I knew the degree to which you brought integrity to the office, and I don't think that was ever in question during that time that you were the acting commissioner.

J. Brar: Thanks for your presentation. I just wanted to ask you…. You did raise the issue but didn't make any recommendation about that, so would you like to recommend something in terms of section 14(6) and (7)? Is there any recommendation you have in mind, particularly?

P. Meekison: I thought about that, but I thought…. If you go to the section — which is 14, in particular — in looking at that, the issue, I believe, when I was appointed was the question of: the House was sitting, and should the government have acted? In other words, there's always a question that if the House is not in session…. If you look at certain times, an acting one is appointed because the House is not sitting and you need somebody there. I think you need to be covered at all times.

What I learned from the position, from being there even briefly and looking at some of Mr. Hughes's reports and other things, I thought: "This is very important." I believe a person has to be there whenever a member needs attention. I felt I would go to the assembly, not having people come to the office.

I believe that was the essence of the court challenge — that it should have gone to the…. There was a committee that I believe was sitting, looking for a member. They could have done something, but it didn't happen.

J. Brar: You also read the question about the transition from the one commissioner to the other one. Is there any…? Things can go in many ways when you talk about something like that. It depends on the circumstances. But is there any specific recommendation about that?
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P. Meekison: Well, I am not sure I understand the question. When Mr. Hughes stepped down, I was appointed about six weeks later. I don't know what happened in that six weeks, but there were six weeks when there was nobody in the position, and yet there was a committee that, I believe, was looking for a replacement.

P. Meekison: That's right. What that represented to me was that something was happening. How do I put this? To some extent the position, which, as I have said, is non-partisan, was somehow being buffeted, shall I say — I'll use that language — by, obviously, differences of opinion with the opposition and the government of the day over what should be done. To me, it didn't bring the office into disrepute, but it did, to me, just sitting there for a few months, raise concerns in my mind that there was conflict over the Conflict of Interest Commissioner and who should be appointed.

When a person is appointed — I'm not going to get into the details — such as Mr. Mitchell and he resigns a week later, that does raise…. I have my own theories as to why that might have happened, but it does bother me. A person is appointed and then is gone in a week. That creates instability within and undermines, I think, the dignity and authority of the office — and the perceived impartiality. Let me add that.

M. Farnworth: Actually, I just want to explore this a little further. I've got some thoughts on this. My comments, just so no one misconstrues what I'm going to say, apply equally, I think, to whichever party is in government and in opposition. The examples of what you went through manifest themselves in other appointments to independent officers of the Legislature on some other occasions. I think it's a problem that comes down to two things, and I'd be interested in your thoughts on how you might be able to approach it.

I think one is a lack of a communication from government to opposition in terms of what should take place or what they want to happen. Funnily enough, I think that it's not so much amongst the elected members, who could probably come to an understanding or an agreement on how to fill the position pretty quickly, but rather it's decisions made by unelected individuals, generally in either the Premier's offices or the Leader of the Opposition's offices, who see a political advantage or they're not happy about things.

As a result, a lack of consultation, if you like, let's say between government and opposition…. We want to put somebody in for an acting position, and instead of sort of asking and saying, "What do you think?" there is: "Here's who it's going to be. If you don't like it, too bad."

That automatically sets up conflict, which spills over onto the individual who is either in the acting or is potentially looking at filling the position on a full-time basis. I think that is a real problem that needs to be dealt with.

Part of the issue, for example, around Mr. Mitchell has, I think, evolved since then. I don't think that government now would go and say: "We are appointing so-and-so to the position of Conflict of Interest Commissioner."

I think there is a well-established precedent now of it going to a committee to hire a new individual. I don't think that would happen again. I think, rather, the situation, though, for the acting while that takes place is still very real and is still a potential problem. I'd be interested if you've got thoughts on how that could be fixed.

P. Meekison: It's a good point to make. I was approached by Doug McArthur to see if I would be interested in the position. I went down to talk to him, and he said: "We've got a bit of a problem here." I said: "Well, why me?" And he said: "Well…."

I'd just moved back. I was born in British Columbia, and I'd just moved back from living in Alberta for 29 years, and so in that sense I was unknown on the political radar screen, shall I say. But I'd also worked in the government of Alberta as Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs for a number of years, so I had a knowledge of government. That was really why he said: "We thought we should bring somebody in from outside." In effect — it goes back to your point — who do you trust? And who's going to have the advantage?

I think your point could be answered by saying "as soon as there's a vacancy," and then you could put a provision in the act. I don't have the wording, but "should there be a vacancy, for whatever reason," because I heard Mr. Mitchell…. When a person's not able to serve…. They could be ill or even if they're away on vacation or something like that. But let's set that aside. But if there is a vacancy, I think there could be something in the act or in some general legislation saying that the appropriate people — we could figure out who that would be, like the Leader of the Opposition, whatever — would sit down and strike a committee to do something.

Or if the position is vacant, really vacant, for whatever reason, then automatically a committee of the Legislative Assembly should be set up to act on it, either to fill it with a permanent appointment or a temporary one depending on the circumstances.

But I agree with you. And this is why I like the title of the act. It's the members', not the government's. It's
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the Members' Conflict of Interest Act. So you've got 85 people, and this individual is their servant. That comment by one of your former colleagues at the time really struck home. This is like talking to a priest. To me, it left an indelible impression.

So either you try to put something in the legislation that overcomes this, shall we say, interference from those on high or leave it to the members themselves, some kind of committee — maybe this type of committee; I don't know — to say that as soon as there's a vacancy, we'll try to fill it this way.

That's the only thing I can think of at this time. I mean, I understand that there are opportunities to talk behind the Speaker's chair and things like that, but the real world, unfortunately, is looking for partisan advantage occasionally.

M. Coell: Thank you, Dr. Meekison. Just following on Mike's comments, I don't think you could take the politics out of the appointment if it's made by politicians. Here's where I'd like your comment. If we were to have someone else make this appointment…. This is someone who oversees the members' conduct and ethical behaviour. If it was appointed by the judiciary, by a separate group that wasn't MLAs, that might have some changes to how the position is appointed. I just wondered if you had any comments on that.

P. Meekison: Well, you could do that, but then if you applied it to this office only, I think that would be a mistake. If you did it to all officers, if you had some nocturnal committee or something like that, you could say "all appointees."

But I guess, Mr. Coell, I just don't agree with you. This is a person, and as an officer of the Legislature, I think the members of the assembly themselves should be comfortable with the individual. I can't say they know what they're looking for, but this is the person that they will be working with, and I think…. I would not have the judiciary do it. I think that's just a total negation of the legislative authority. I don't think the judiciary should be involved in this at all. I think it's a person who's working for the Legislative Assembly, and I think it should be the people of the Legislative Assembly who make the decision.

C. Hansen (Chair): Any other comments or questions from those on the phone or in the room? Great.

I think this has been helpful because I think this is an area of the legislation that we haven't focused in on prior to today, but I think it is an important question that has to be part of the committee's work. Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts with us today.

P. Meekison: I knew it would be brief, Mr. Chair, but I thought it important to come and go back over a little history.

With that, we're going to take a short recess of the committee, and we'll reconvene shortly.

C. Hansen (Chair): Thank you very much for coming. We have on the line three members of the committee from the Interior and from the Fraser Valley. Donna Barnett, Randy Hawes and Norm Letnick are joining us via telephone.

With that, first of all, thank you for the submission that you've put in. It's a good read, and I know that we look forward to your adding to it as well. I'll throw the floor open to you.

L. Tarras: Good afternoon. I'd like to thank the committee for asking me to come and talk to you about this very important subject.

It may be of interest to you that I've been in the role of the head of the B.C. Public Service Agency since January 2009, but I've been an executive with the agency since it was created in 2003. During this time I've had many an occasion to think about the issue of values and ethics in the public service, particularly as I was responsible to oversee the development of the most recent update to the public service standards of conduct.

I worked with the deputies council to introduce the concept of corporate values into the public service. I also had oversight over the update to the public service oath and was accountable for implementing the new oath and orientation program, which I'll talk briefly about.

You've been provided, as you mentioned, with many of the technical elements of our policy framework. Rather than simply reciting directly from that document, I thought I'd take a few minutes to give you a little bit of insight into the philosophy behind this approach, following which I'd appreciate hearing from the committee on your areas of interest. I'm very happy to answer any questions you may have on this topic.

So first of all, in keeping with some of the best practices that we see around the world, the B.C. Public Service has taken a very principled and values-based approach to our policy and implementation framework when it comes to ethics and conflict of interest in particular. Our system was designed to create a common culture across all ministries and a common set of values. In fact, when we began developing this value set, we began with a broad-based consultation with all of our employees across all ministries in all regions of the province.

Once the corporate values were published, they were embedded in Being the Best, our corporate HR plan, and
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then we set out to weave the values into everything we do with respect to the employment relationship that we have with our employees.

Organizations that manage their cultural and ethical climate begin by hiring people who embody the values of the organization. They orient and train people to those standards. They assess performance against those expectations, and they widely communicate and hold people accountable to those standards.

In the B.C. Public Service our values are now embedded into our hiring process. As I mentioned earlier, we have introduced a comprehensive oath and orientation program that begins with in-classroom training for all new employees, where we discuss and debate scenarios and test people's understanding of our standards of conduct. We end that day-long session with an oath ceremony conducted by the Deputy Attorney General, where he introduces their responsibilities as public servants and administers the oath.

We invite longtime public service employees, as well, to join that ceremony to reinforce and remind everyone of the importance of their oath as a public servant. I'm always struck by the feedback that I get from our employees who attend this event. They find it very impactful. It's an example of how a very simple strategy can sometimes make all the difference in reinforcing culture.

We integrate professional values into training and recognition programs, as well, by defining the qualities we value in our colleagues and our organization and visibly placing value on those when we invest in people.

We have embedded the assessment of ethics and value into our performance management systems. I recently oversaw a review board process of over 400 senior leaders in the public service where committees of ADMs and deputies assessed and provided concrete feedback to these individual people, not only on what they had accomplished but on how well they exhibited the corporate values and ethics that we expect.

Senior executives are evaluated on how well they role-model the highest standards of conduct as part of their day-to-day responsibilities. Deputy ministers regularly seek advice from me and from the Deputy Minister to the Premier with respect to questions that may come up in their organizations around conflict of interest and post-employment restrictions. These expectations are laid out in all employment contracts and offers of employment.

The onus is on the employee at all levels of the B.C. Public Service to ensure appropriate conduct. If employees have questions, there are various avenues of support available to them through their supervisor, on-line and classroom training, performance coaching and specialist advisers within the Public Service Agency.

Employees at all levels of the organization know what is expected of them. They also know that there are consequences for violating the standards of conduct. We make that a condition of employment. As part of our culture, I can assure you, we take the violations very seriously, and employees know that we follow up and take action where necessary.

Thankfully, the need to discipline or dismiss employees happens relatively rarely, but we will take appropriate action when we need to, and our employees and our unions know this. We're very clear about that.

Another best practice that we implement to reinforce culture and values is to ensure that our communications and engagement with employees about ethical issues are ongoing. We have been recognized for an internal Internet site that we have in place in the public service called @Work. It has been identified as one of the best employer Internet sites in the country.

This is a forum where employees have a chance to participate in ongoing dialogue with their colleagues across the public service, and it provides employees with an opportunity to pose questions, collaborate and share information, and learn about corporate initiatives. Many of the topics centre on ethical issues. For example, we've recently posted three-minute videos to remind employees of the conduct that's expected of them when they use social media.

This commitment to ongoing communication as learning is really important to sustaining an ethical environment, which is also a powerful recruitment and retention tool.

The B.C. Public Service continues to focus on the fundamentals of what seems to be working: ethical leadership aligned with corporate values; integration of ethics into all of our HR programming; ongoing communication and engagement to reinforce expectations and remind employees of the importance that the organization places on those values and ethics; and being responsive to the emerging needs and priorities.

Public service employees use guiding principles and incorporated values in their day-to-day work every day in the public service across the province. I believe that we've supported a culture to ensure that our expectations of values, ethics and standards of conduct permeate every aspect of our structures and systems, and I think that is what is making a difference in B.C.

Thank you for the opportunity to address you, and I'm happy to answer any questions you have about the specifics of the paper that I've presented.

M. Farnworth: One of the questions that we are considering in terms of reviewing the act is whether or not to extend it to other political appointments such as ministerial assistants — and a suggestion around deputy ministers, ADMS, for example. From your presentation, what you've laid out is clearly that deputy ministers and
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ADMS, for example, are already covered under existing policies and practices in place.

So I'd just like your thoughts on whether you think it would be appropriate, then, to cover them under legislation that covers members of the assembly and whether or not that act should be extended to political appointments such as ministerial assistants.

L. Tarras: Well, I understand that question was canvassed — I believe it was in 1999 — by my predecessor, John Mochrie. We've looked at this issue over the years, and we don't believe that it's necessary. We believe that we're well covered by the existing framework that we have in the public service. Again, this is why I have spent some time talking about the reasons behind the framework. In my belief, it is about the culture and the expectations that make all the difference in terms of creating that environment where ethics rule the day.

I think that we've come to the conclusion that we don't believe it's necessary, and therefore we've never made that recommendation — not in the '90s and not today.

J. Brar: I just want to ask a follow-up question on that one. You have the policies in place for that. But how do you enforce that? There is no one person enforcing those policies, particularly if there is any conflict or perceived conflict with regard to the post-employment situation.

L. Tarras: On the post-employment restrictions in particular, the decision stops with me. The policy specifically outlines a process where employees, executives in particular, who leave the public service and are finding themselves in a potential conflict of interest are required to submit a request to me to have me consider whether the conflict exists or not. I'm required to consult with the Deputy Minister to the Premier, but I make the decision, and I determine whether any further restrictions should be in place.

C. Hansen (Chair): If I can just follow up on that. I think coming back to Jagrup's question, how is that, then, enforced? What would happen if you had a deputy minister who was offered new employment and the advice from you was that this would be a conflict, given the knowledge that he had from his role as a deputy minister? What powers, then, do you have to deal with that?

L. Tarras: Thankfully, we've never had this situation. In all the situations that I've had to deal with since I've been the head of the agency, they have been resolved through dialogue and discussion and through my putting restrictions and boundaries in place for people who leave the public service. That said, if we ever found ourselves in a situation where we felt there was a violation of the expectations that are laid out, we would take legal action, I think.

I want to clarify as well that the standard with respect to confidentiality of information applies to all public servants, no matter what level you're at. There are additional restrictions for senior public servants.

M. Coell: I just want to follow up on Mike's comments about ministerial assistants and executive assistants. I think the discussion we're having is that they don't seem to fall within your purview or ours, and there's a group of people that we want to make sure have the same sort of safeguards that we do or the people who work with you. How we achieve that, I guess, is what Mike was getting at. I have the same problem in my mind. How do we achieve that?

L. Tarras: Yeah, it's an interesting question, because I think there's the reality and the perception — or the reality and the practicality. In reality, they do actually fall under our terms and conditions. They are appointed under the Public Service Act, under section 15, so the public service terms and conditions of employment do apply to them.

The challenge is on a practical level. I don't actually have authority over that group of employees in terms of the day-to-day employment relationship, but I am asked often for advice and guidance from the Premier's office on how those terms apply to that group of employees. Technically, the public service terms are their terms and conditions as well.

J. Kwan: Just to follow up on that, because I think I recollect at least one incident where an issue of, if nothing else, perceived conflict was raised. It was a high-level public servant, per se. So in that instance, while this would have applied, nonetheless, the issue of challenging the appearance of conflict didn't actually come from this. It appeared to me that it wasn't what was written into the code of conduct, in its application, that ultimately dealt with the issue. It was through some other mechanism. So it's a unique situation.

In that instance and perhaps, hopefully, in the future we won't have similar situations like that. But it shouldn't be such that the follow-up action to pursue an end result to correct the concern — the process of trying to arrive at that — had to come from a different means — right?

Theoretically, this would have applied, and it would
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have sorted itself out, but it didn't. And I don't think, as it stands, that it allows for the opportunity for that to happen. I still don't see the possibility of addressing that issue if the act was not amended to explicitly apply it to a certain category of employees of government, in that instance a very high-level employee of government — and a political appointment as well, I would argue to say.

L. Tarras: I'm not sure I can speak to it, because I don't know the specifics. What I can confirm, though, is that these employees that are appointed into the Legislature — so ministerial assistants, executive assistants, other people employed by the members of the cabinet — are section 15 appointments under the Public Service Act. So the public service provisions apply to them.

The practical issue is that I don't have authority over enforcing those in that milieu. So that is, I think, where the challenge might be for me to try to explain that — right?

J. Brar: You have on this page, the second of your presentation: "The commitment to fostering a leadership culture based on corporate values and principled decision-making is central to Being the Best." I assume that there is a definition of corporate values and principled decision-making and that covers the conflict-of-interest areas. So if you can just elaborate on that one.

L. Tarras: We have two documents that outline our expectations of public servants. One is on corporate values and one is on standards of conduct. Both of those documents define and articulate on a principled basis our expectations of people in terms of their integrity to public service and expectations around things like conflict of interest and other things.

The reason we've approached it on a principle level is that we don't believe it's possible to define every possible scenario that we could potentially encounter in dealing with an employment situation. This is why we've taken a comprehensive approach and embedded and woven into everything we do a discussion and expectations about values and the standards of conduct.

I'm not sure that I've answered your question, but there are documents available for you to review if you're interested.

J. Brar: Have you received any complaints about the conflict situation, and if you did, what was the nature of those complaints?

L. Tarras: I can't recall any in the recent time other than…. There have been some issues that have come to my attention around post-employment conflict of interest. In every single case where I've received some concerns from either the general public or an employee in government, I take action to investigate those and report my findings to the Deputy Premier.

M. Farnworth: I just want to come back to this issue of this group of employees who are covered under section 15, but in practicality, there's no authority from your end over them. I think that's in part the nature of the work that they do.

I fully understand that when it comes to deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers or any other individuals involved in the implementation or the development of public policy and the administration of a particular…. That's their role and function, and that's very clear-cut,whereas with ministerial assistants and, to a certain extent, executive assistants, their role is much more political in nature than it is in the development of public policy or the administration of public policy. I think that's where one of the issues that we're wrestling with is.

Those systems and those rules and procedures that are in place for the main body of the public service — are they applicable, and are they enough in terms of dealing with this other group of employees? While covered by the act because of section 15, at the same time their function is significantly different.

It may require us to say: "You know what? The reality is that they should be covered by many of the procedures or some of the rules and regulations that members are covered by." Because their role is that much different than, let's say, mainstream public service from the deputy or the ADM on down.

L. Tarras: It is true. They are appointed under a different section of the act than other public service employees, so presumably, the legislators saw them as different. Again, I can't comment on that other than to say that they are public servants appointed under the Public Service Act, and therefore, the policies that we put in place apply at this point.

M. Coell: Thanks, Lynda. I think if post-employment was directed to your agency for that group of people, then you would have the ability to look at potential conflicts in post-employment.

L. Tarras: And from time to time I am invited in to give advice and to examine issues, and we do that when we're asked to. Absolutely.

C. Hansen (Chair): I wanted to ask about the oath ceremonies. Does every new public servant go through that? How often do you…? How does it happen for somebody in Fort Nelson, for example?

L. Tarras: It depends on how many new hires we have in a year as to how many ceremonies we hold. We of course know who's hired in any region of the province,
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and they get a personal invitation from my office to attend that ceremony. We move the ceremonies around the province so that we give opportunity for people to join from various parts of the province. Most often in that case we would probably hold the event in Prince George, and they would travel to the event.

C. Hansen (Chair): And do the section 15 employees participate in anything comparable to that?

L. Tarras: Comparable but not the same. What happens, typically — and it typically happens when there's a big turnover of people — is that we have been known to be asked to come down to the Legislature and hold an event with people that have been appointed under section 15. So I or my staff take them through an orientation to their responsibilities and their terms of conditions of employment. We have done that.

We haven't necessarily invited them into the oath ceremony, although if they come with a public servant, they're certainly welcome. But they don't take the same oath as everyone else.

Well, thank you very much, Lynda. I think this has been helpful. We appreciate your coming today and presenting to us.

C. Hansen (Chair): Back in session. I think the only thing we have left to do is a motion to adjourn. Moved by Mike Farnworth and seconded by Murray Coell.

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Chair:	* Colin Hansen (Vancouver-Quilchena BC Liberal)
Deputy Chair:	Harry Lali (Fraser-Nicola NDP)
Members:	* Donna Barnett (Cariboo-Chilcotin BC Liberal)
	Bill Bennett (Kootenay East BC Liberal)
	* Jagrup Brar (Surrey-Fleetwood NDP)
	* Murray Coell (Saanich North and the Islands BC Liberal)
	* Mike Farnworth (Port Coquitlam NDP)
	* Randy Hawes (Abbotsford-Mission BC Liberal)
	* Jenny Wai Ching Kwan (Vancouver–Mount Pleasant NDP)
	* Norm Letnick (Kelowna–Lake Country BC Liberal)
	* denotes member present
Clerk:	Kate Ryan-Lloyd

Witnesses:	Dr. Gregory Levine
	J. Peter Meekison
	David Mitchell
	Lynda Tarras (B.C. Public Service Agency)

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS (Hansard)

SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, ETHICAL CONDUCT, STANDING ORDERS AND PRIVATE BILLS

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(Hansard)

SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, ETHICAL CONDUCT, STANDING ORDERS AND PRIVATE BILLS