Conducted Energy Weapons and Selected Police Complaints Audits — Issue No. 5

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPONS AND TO AUDIT SELECTED POLICE COMPLAINTS

Present: Murray Coell, MLA (Chair); Kathy Corrigan, MLA (Deputy Chair); Gordon Hogg, MLA; Joe Trasolini, MLA

• Randy Beck, Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Operations and Core Policing, RCMP

The following electronic version is for informational purposes only.
The printed version remains the official version.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(Hansard)

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INQUIRE INTO THE USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPONS AND TO AUDIT SELECTED POLICE COMPLAINTS


CONTENTS
Page
Restoring Public Confidence: Restricting the Use of Conducted Energy Weapons in British Columbia	35
R. Beck
M. Webster
C. Hall

M. Coell (Chair): Good morning. Welcome to the Special Committee to Inquire into the Use of Conducted Energy Weapons and to Audit Selected Police Complaints. My name is Murray Coell. I'm the Chair of the committee.

To start this morning, I'd like committee members to introduce themselves. Maybe I'll do that, because we've had some travel issues this morning. We have Kathy Corrigan, Deputy Chair; Joe Trasolini; and Gordie Hogg joining me this morning.

To my left is Kate Ryan-Lloyd, the Deputy Clerk and Clerk of Committees, and our researcher, Matthew Cleeves.

Today we are continuing our expert testimony on the topic of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2009 report Restoring Public Confidence: Restricting the Use of Conducted Energy Weapons by Thomas R. Braidwood, QC.

Our first presenter today, and welcome, is Assistant Commissioner Randy Beck, criminal operations and core policing of the RCMP.

Restoring Public Confidence:
Restricting the Use of Conducted
Energy Weapons in British Columbia

R. Beck: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and committee members. I'm Assistant Commissioner Randy Beck, the officer in charge of criminal operations, core policing, which refers to all uniform, all detachment and the services provided by way of the contract to the province of British Columbia.

I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you regarding the Royal Canadian Mounted Police implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2009 report, Restoring Public Confidence: Restricting the Use of Conducted Energy Weapons, by Thomas R. Braidwood.

In my presentation I will refer to the recommendations within Mr. Braidwood's report that referenced the RCMP and policing in general. I will explain the steps taken, policy, training and reporting changes that have been implemented in compliance with the recommendations. I will also provide some statistical data, reporting on the use of conducted energy weapons and the trending that it has identified.

As I proceed through my presentation, I'll make specific reference to the specific recommendations. I'll start with recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7.

In April of 2010 RCMP policy was issued. Officers can only deploy the conducted energy weapon in relation to the enforcement of federal criminal law. The subject behaviour threshold is when that subject is causing bodily harm or when that behaviour will imminently cause bodily harm. Officers must be satisfied that no lesser-force option has been or will be effective in eliminating the risk of bodily harm and de-escalation and/or that crisis intervention techniques have not been or will not be effective in eliminating the risk of bodily harm.

When dealing with emotionally disturbed people, officers are required to use crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques before resorting to deployment of the conducted energy weapon. In the province of British Columbia officers are prohibited from deploying the conducted energy weapon in the case of subjects threatening self-harm, unless the subject is causing bodily harm to him- or herself or the subject's behaviour will imminently cause bodily harm to him- or herself.

Officers are prohibited from discharging an electronic current from the conducted energy weapon for longer than five seconds, unless the officer is satisfied that the five-second discharge was not effective in eliminating the risk of bodily harm and further discharge will effectively eliminate that risk.

When possible, the officers must issue a verbal warning as part of the crisis intervention and de-escalation technique prior to discharging the conducted energy weapon, unless such warning would place any person at further risk of bodily harm or imminent bodily harm.

In addition, RCMP conducted energy weapon policy directs that officers will not discharge a conducted energy weapon near flammable, combustible or explosive material, including the alcohol-based oleoresin capsicum spray, known as OC spray or pepper spray, where there is a risk of this igniting.

Officers will not discharge a conducted energy weapon against a person where the person is at risk of a fall from an elevated height. Officers will not discharge a conducted energy weapon against a person in water where there is danger of the person drowning due to incapacitation. Officers will not discharge a conducted energy weapon against a person operating a vehicle or machinery in motion.

Officers will not discharge more than one conducted energy weapon simultaneously against a person.

Officers will avoid a person's head, neck or genitalia as target zones. In October of 2010, RCMP directed that officers' point of aim should be below the ribcage, if possible, and the preferred target zone, including large muscle groups of the back, legs and pelvic triangle.

Officers will not draw or display a conducted energy weapon unless the officer is satisfied that the situation has potential for bodily harm.

Exceptions to these directions are only made if the officer believes that the potential of death or grievous bodily harm is justified.
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I'll now move to recommendation 4. In 2009 and as recent as April of 2012, the RCMP has continually evaluated, modified and added to the training and recertification of our conducted energy weapon operators.

As of June 2009 conducted energy weapon operators must recertify annually. The recertification course is a one-day training. The training consists of lecture, practical skills maintenance and development through scenario-based training. Much effort and focus has been put into development of the new-user course. This is for officers who were previously not certified or trained, as in new users.

In July and November of 2011 and April of 2012 we delivered the first new-user courses. This course includes written, practical and scenario-based training over a three-day period, on-site training. All new course participants must have completed pre-course training requirements, including on-line conducted energy weapon user course; British Columbia conducted energy weapon supplementary on-line course; crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques training, which are on-line and in-classroom; as well, automated external defibrillator and cardiopulmonary resuscitation training.

In 2011 the conducted energy weapon instructor course was rewritten simultaneously with the new-user course and implemented in July 2011. This course is focused on the trainers themselves. This is a five-day course. The candidates must be previously trained as public and police safety instructors and must currently be trained and certified as users. Candidates must pass written, practical, scenario-based training tests over a five-day on-site training.

In January 2012 the British Columbia conducted energy weapon operators course and crisis intervention and de-escalation course was officially launched.

As of April 2012, 625 RCMP officers were identified as being current or requiring recertification to carry a conducted energy weapon. The reason for that is the cycle through the year — very difficult to proceed with one calendar date of training. So it does overlap, but it is within a 12-month calendar for each certification.

It is our objective, and we are confident that we are on target, to have all 625 users recertified, which will include training in crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques as well as automated external defibrillator training for those that had not previously received this training in their original new-user course.

Recommendation 8. Changes to RCMP policy in 2010 defined medically high-risk situations and acutely agitated and delirious persons. Medically high-risk incidents include when a conducted energy weapon is discharged in probe mode across the person's chest; discharge in probe mode for longer than five seconds; also, in any mode against an emotionally disturbed person, elderly person, a person the officer had reason to believe is pregnant, a child or a person who has a mild medical condition such as heart disease, implanted pacemaker or defibrillator.

Policy directs that officers must request paramedic attendance at all medically high-risk incidents before discharge of a conducted energy weapon or as soon as possible thereafter. Police officers are not medical personnel and are not able to diagnose. The crisis intervention and de-escalation training will assist our officers in recognition and assessment of a subject's behaviour.

Recommendation 9. In British Columbia the RCMP is complying with the provincial policing standards and has policy directing that all conducted energy weapon operators, when on duty, will be equipped with the automated external defibrillator and that all on-road supervisors are equipped with automated external defibrillators. Training in the course of the AED, as I refer to it, is delivered during the new-user course prior to certification.

Recommendation 10. Through the director of the police services for the province of British Columbia, the RCMP has been authorized to utilize the Taser X26 conducted energy weapon. The Taser X26 is the only approved conducted energy weapon. Currently the RCMP has 836 Taser X26s in use in British Columbia. Approximately 60 of those are dedicated to full-time training units. The earlier conducted energy weapons, Taser M26, have all been removed from service.

I believe I have previously explained what procedures, policy and training the RCMP in British Columbia have implemented in order to be compliant with the issues within recommendation 10 that deal with training. Since 2009 in British Columbia the RCMP has implemented strict, comprehensive reporting of each conducted energy weapon use. It is mandatory in all investigations where there is a use of force that it be reported through the subject behaviour–officer response reporting.

This is a standardized form and a method of recording subject behaviour and use of intervention options, and that's all intervention options. The report must be completed when a member is involved in a conducted energy weapon incident. The report includes assessing the legal authority, situational factors and subject's behaviour. It reports officer observations and perceptions, what actions were taken and what tactical considerations were present.

Given the totality of the situation, the police officer is expected to articulate any use of force. It also records the post–conducted energy weapon care given and provided. All usage data is reported to the director of policing, province of British Columbia. All conducted energy weapons must have data download conducted annually. This data is kept on record at the unit or detachment. If a conducted energy weapon is used in an incident, the weapon must be removed from service and have an operational data download conducted immediately.
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In the event an evaluative opinion of the conducted energy weapon data download is required for cases such as investigation or court purposes, the actual conducted energy weapon can be sent to designated officers for additional download and analysis.

Recommendation 11. All conducted energy training is delivered in the field at division and at provincial levels. The RCMP training academy, Depot division, does not deliver conducted energy weapon training to recruits. They, however, do receive familiarization to the conducted energy weapon. However, this does not certify them to be users in the conducted energy weapon.

Recommendation 12. In British Columbia RCMP members are not required to submit or volunteer for exposure to the conducted energy weapon. There has been no change made to our national policy, which allows for the voluntary exposure to the conducted energy weapon during user or instructor training.

Recommendation 14. The RCMP in British Columbia has implemented policy directing that all conducted energy weapons be independently tested annually. Prior to being sent for testing, all data is downloaded. Independent testing is conducted by MPB Technologies Inc., located in Kanata, Ontario.

Recommendation 15. Any conducted energy weapon that tests outside of specifications is removed from service and destroyed. Conducted energy weapons are tested if there is a malfunction during a deployment, if injury requiring medical treatment or death proximal to the deployment occurs or before a new conducted energy weapon is placed into service.

Recommendation 16. As I have previously stated, the RCMP has implemented the subject behaviour observation report in January of 2010. Subject behaviour–officer response reporting is a standardized method of recording the use of intervention options, including the conducted energy weapon, and describes not only the subject's behaviour but also the totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident. Subject behaviour–officer response reporting enhances police accountability and, following thorough analysis, assists in identifying trends and, if needed, modifications to training and/or policy.

In addition to a supervisor review of the report, policy also requires that commanders, division use-of-force coordinators and national criminal operations reviewers review all reports with conducted energy weapon use for adherence to directives and policy. Policy requires that commanders maintain a control log for each conducted energy weapon assigned to the unit by recording the time, date and name of each member who possesses a conducted energy weapon.

The requirement for monthly downloads is not being met. Currently we require annual downloads and downloads after each deployment. If a conducted energy weapon is used at an incident, the weapon must be removed from service and have an operational data download conducted. All data is stored either for a minimum of two years or longer, as dictated by the retention of the operational record of the incident in which the weapon is deployed. That download goes on the operational records system. In cases of assault, etc., the retention period is much greater than the two years. The RCMP submits conducted energy weapon usage reports to the director of policing in British Columbia annually or as required.

Finally, recommendation 17. In order to remain objective and allow independent research to remain transparent, the RCMP does not directly run its own research. The RCMP has and will appropriately continue to participate indirectly in research studies when and as requested.

I will now provide some statistical usage of conducted energy weapons by the RCMP in British Columbia. I would like to first share statements from the 2010 report by the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.

After examining a total of 597 subject behaviour observation response reports, the RCMP officers are less likely to use the weapon on people with mental health issues than previously. Actual deployment of the device dropped 14.2 percent in 2010, continuing the downward trend since 2008. As well, deployment fell 26.4 percent between 2009 and 2010. RCMP officers are more likely to threaten to use the weapon to cool down a situation. The commission said the statistics reflect a growing tendency to use the weapon as a means of deterrence or de-escalation without the device being deployed.

In 2010 the RCMP in British Columbia had 169 usages of the conducted energy weapon. These incidents include draw and display, which accounts for 60.9 percent of those usages; contact or stun deployment, which accounted for 15.4 percent; and probe deployment, when the probes are actually fired, which accounted for 23.7 percent. These numbers do not include incidents where the conducted energy weapon was present but not drawn or displayed but simply worn on the officer.

In 2011 the RCMP in British Columbia had a total of 160 usages of the conducted energy weapon, a consistent downward trend of approximately 6 percent. These incidents include draw and display, 56.9 percent of the time; contact-stun deployment, 9.4 percent of the time; and probe deployment, 33.8 percent of the time.

I would just like to share a comparison between 2010 and 2011 for those same statistics where we have drawn and displayed, contact-stun deployed or probe deployed. In 2010 we had 169 deployments, of which 60 percent were draw and display, 15 percent were contact-stun, and 23 percent were probe deployed.

I wish to move to where the subject was believed to either have a weapon or not have a weapon. In 2010, out of the 169, in 116 of those cases it was believed the subject had a weapon, which accounted for 68 percent; 31 percent of the time, or in 53 incidents, the subject was
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not believed to have a weapon.

In 2011, 62 percent of the time it was believed the subject had a weapon and 37 percent of the time, or in 60 of the cases, believed not to have a weapon. In all cases, as I mentioned, we report what medical treatment was offered or provided.

I would like to share with you that in 2010 we had a total of six incidents where medical treatment was required. Treated and released on scene — there was one of those, which accounted for 16.7 percent. There were two where the subject was transported to hospital, one where it was transported to hospital and treated for injury, and two where it was transported to the clinic but not related to the deployment of the Taser. But the Taser, the CEW, was involved in the incident.

In 2011 there were no cases where they were treated at the scene and released. There was one case where it was transported to hospital for the injury relating to our intervention and just minor treatment, and eight cases where they were transported to hospital for injury related to the complete intervention, for a total of nine.

Subjects perceived to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol or inhalants. Of the total incidents of 169, 70 percent of the time the subject was under the influence of some substance in 2010. In 2011, 66 percent of the time they were under some influence.

Mr. Chair, that is my report, and I will pleased to answer any questions that you or your fellow chairpersons have.

I know there will be some questions from members. Those I have on line — Kathy or Joe?

I have a few questions. Maybe I'll ask one or two and then see if anybody else does.

Just for clarification, when you were talking about those that appear to have a mental illness or something along that line, is it the case that you do not do a de-escalation unless there's appearance of mental illness or some agitation? I may have misinterpreted that.

Mr. Chair, in all cases our officers are required to use de-escalation techniques.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. It was probably a hearing thing. Thank you very much.

Now, the other thing I wanted to know about was in terms of passing the information on to the provincial authorities. I just want to be clear that the RCMP passes on all the information about the Taser use in their report — correct?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. Now, one of the concerns I had about provincial reporting was the reporting form. It didn't seem to include in a really obvious way information about what attempts were made to de-escalate the situation. I'm wondering if the RCMP uses the same reporting form as the province does. If it does, then do you feel that the form itself is adequate to reflect the efforts that were made by the officer to de-escalate the situation?

R. Beck: I'm not familiar with the form that the province uses to report, so I'm afraid I can't offer you an opinion.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. Would it be possible to get a copy of the RCMP form?

R. Beck: The officer response reporting form or the form used to report to the province?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): No, the form that is filled out after there has been a use of a Taser.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Yes, the SBOR. That's the same name as the one that the province is using, that municipal officers are using. So I'm assuming that it's the same form, then.

R. Beck: Ours — the SBOR, as I refer to it — was internally developed by the RCMP. I am not familiar with what the other police forces are using in the province of British Columbia. I will provide our….

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. I would be interested, if it would be possible, to have a copy of that provided to the committee.

M. Coell (Chair): That will be done, Kathy. I think that's a good point. What we might do is ask staff to get copies of the RCMP reporting process paper as well as the one that the municipal police forces would use. We could have a comparison. So that's a very good point. Thank you.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): In addition, if it's possible to have, in writing, the very useful data that was provided by Officer Beck today, that would, I think, be worthwhile, although it may actually be included in the
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report that we got, in our material — at least some of that information.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): It's tough when you're on the phone, because I may be interrupting other people who have their hands up. So just tell me if I'm continuing and other people want to ask questions, Murray.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): One of the recommendations — recommendation 19 by Commissioner Braidwood — was that the contract between the province and the federal government contain a provision that required the RCMP to harmonize its practices and procedures. I just wanted to clarify with Officer Beck that although there is a provision within the contract, it requires harmonization only to the extent, essentially, that the federal government agrees to, I guess. I do appreciate that there has been a great deal of harmonization, but I just wanted to make that clear.

R. Beck: I'm not sure of the question, other than I will comment that all efforts are continually being made to, in fact, harmonize and comply with the policing standards of British Columbia.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Yes, and I appreciate that. But this is basically good faith and by agreement. It is not required through the Police Act — is it? Or the Police Act does not have the authority to require the RCMP? The contract only is a good-faith measure, essentially — that the RCMP will comply, and on it the federal government agrees that it should comply. I just wanted to clarify that. I know that there is harmonization happening, but there is no legal requirement that that happen — right?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Yes, I'm asking your opinion. Is there a legal requirement or not?

R. Beck: I can't offer that legal opinion, but there is full effort to comply and harmonize in all cases.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Right. Okay. I'll take a break in case somebody else has questions.

G. Hogg: You made reference to the reduction in usage over a number of years. Can you compare those to the municipal reductions?

R. Beck: The provincial stats are made up of our statistics and the municipal combined. I have not compared specifically for the purpose of today.

G. Hogg: So at this point we don't have any sense of how the RCMP usage versus the municipal usage versus the provincial usage breaks out?

G. Hogg: Thank you. The reduction that we're seeing in the usage, which we've seen both provincially and municipally, and at the RCMP level — I think it would be interesting to be able to look at those three numbers. They may be informative. They're certainly not conclusive in terms of anything, but they might be of value to look at.

We had some discussion last week with respect to why the usage may be going down. Do you have any judgments with respect to that?

R. Beck: There is a tendency to shy away from the use by our officers. That is clear. There also is the direct effect of the increased training that we've received. Prior to the new user, new recertification and new trainer courses I can't account for the decrease in usage.

I will credit our training for a better understanding of the weapon, a better understanding of our continued assessment of the circumstance before using any use of force. But I must say I have received feedback from the constables, from the supervisors in the field, and it will take continued leadership to ensure that our officers are using all the authorized invention tools for safety of the general public. The conducted energy weapon is one of those.

G. Hogg: I think it would be fair to say that Taser usage has received a lot of media coverage over the past period of time, and I assume that that has some impact on front-line officers, as well, in terms of their look at and usage of it.

You describe the reporting process subsequent to the utilization of the Taser, and it sounds quite exhaustive. How long would it take to fill out that form subsequent to the usage of it?

R. Beck: If I can refer to it as the SBOR report…. It's
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filled out each and every time there is force used of any nature. That can take anywhere from five to 15 minutes.

Of course, the first number of times that an officer fills it out — there's familiarity — it would take longer. But on average, it is not prohibitive or is not a drag at this point to fulfil our requirement to be transparent and fully reporting. I think there's a balance, and I believe the report presents that.

It's electronic. It's on the workstations, and certainly, there's consistency in usage from one type of incident to the other. All of that allows effectiveness and efficiency when filling it out.

None of us like filling out forms. I'll be honest with you. There are far too many forms now, in some opinions, but I believe this is a very necessary one because it has such a wide-ranging effect — not just for the conducted energy weapon but for all other use of force, for our early warning systems as far as officer conduct and as far as looking forward into trending and necessary training for our officers.

G. Hogg: You also mentioned the subject behaviour response report. Is that the same report?

R. Beck: There may have been minor modifications, electronic version modifications, for ease of use. But the spirit and the critical points within the form have not changed.

G. Hogg: So prior to 2010 were there any types of reporting with respect to this?

R. Beck: There was an earlier version — independent of the subject, of other intervention models — specific to the CEW, or the conducted energy weapon. There was a specific form for that. There was an earlier version of subject behaviour observation. They were merged into one, and we now have, in 2010, the product that we use today.

G. Hogg: You've used the word "policy" in through this. In terms of policy…. Let me give you my understanding of the definition and see whether or not this fits for the RCMP. Policy is a practice meant to be applied in most circumstances. It's not a law or a bylaw but a practice meant to be applied in most circumstances, but there is some flexibility with respect to the judgment and circumstances. Is that a fair definition of "policy"?

R. Beck: That is fair. Every circumstance may have some element that is not foreseen within policy, and it is a guide.

It is also to be used in guiding our actions, along with the other lawful authorities that we have to perform our duty. So it isn't independent of any of those. But your assessment is correct.

G. Hogg: So you have to be able to respond to and justify actions. That, as you've defined the response report, allows that….

G. Hogg: So the reduction we've seen in the numbers, I'm assuming, is being explained by way of the more public scrutiny that's been occurring, the media coverage, more training taking place. My experience in working in large bureaucracies…. Also, when you put pretty exhaustive reporting relationships, there's some slippage in that, so I'm assuming there will be some slippage that will be in existence in this. Would that be primarily the three reasons that we'd see the reduction, or am I missing something?

G. Hogg: Any estimate or guess how much — I guess you can't — with respect to slippage that would occur in that?

R. Beck: I'm very optimistic that we're going to reach that level where the usage matches the threats, matches the expectations. Have we reached that? Will we see an increase because of that ebb and flow? I'll just be paying attention to our statistics.

G. Hogg: Mr. Chair, if there can be some chance to look at the comparisons between municipal forces, RCMP and the provincial…. Again, I don't think that provides us any specific data, but it might be informative.

M. Coell (Chair): I would ask staff if they could get that information for us.
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I wonder if I could just add to your comments, Gordon. Every time a Taser is used, that is recorded, so the slippage wouldn't be in someone using a Taser and then not filling out the form. The check to that would be the Taser information actually on the weapon.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I have more questions, sure. I don't know if Joe does.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): You talked about the 2010 statistics and said, I believe, that of the 169 incidents, in 68 percent, or 116 cases, it was believed that the subjects had a weapon. I'm wondering in how many cases it turned out there actually was a weapon.

R. Beck: I don't see why we wouldn't be able to. We would have to analyze each and every one of the SBOR reports associated in order to do that.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Are you saying that there is not data collection of that information that would be readily available without going back and looking at each of the incidents? I would think that would be part of the information that would be important to keep.

R. Beck: It's part of the SBOR reporting. When I say "analyze it," we'd have to go back to that data and pull that out, yes.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): So this type of analysis is not done either annually…? Can it say in how many cases actually that there was a weapon involved as opposed to that there was a belief that there was a weapon involved?

R. Beck: I can't answer what analysis is done in totality across the RCMP. Specific to my office, I haven't but certainly can. The SBOR and the articulation of the entire circumstances plus whether, in fact, a weapon was present is all within the SBOR and can be pulled out and analyzed at any time.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Right. I think that the point is, though, that I'm a little surprised that if analysis is done annually…. It is — right?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay, that would be useful information. If it turns out there is a disparity between the reporting of a perception that there's a weapon and the actual fact that there is a weapon, to me, that's important information. That would indicate to me that there's a problem.

I would imagine that would affect the use of Tasers, whether or not there's a weapon involved. If the perception is wrong in a good number of cases, then maybe there's Taser use that shouldn't be there, or at least, there may be more work to be done. I can't speak for individual cases.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Well, I'm happy to have you respond if you have thoughts on something without me asking a question. I was just positing something, and I wasn't sure if you agreed or not.

R. Beck: I agree with your point. Part of the specific supervision applied to any one case would be specific, of course, to that case. The overall tendencies, as I've spoken of, would be very important.

I can't speak today whether it is one of the considerations or not. I don't have the statistic with me today, but I do agree with you.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I would be interested, if it's possible, to get that information. I think it would be really useful to the committee. I appreciate that it would take some time, but this is an important review. I think that might be important information, if the committee agrees.

R. Beck: I would only add that you would need more than the statistical number to understand what the factors were which led the officer to believe that the weapon was present. I think that would be as critical to your analysis as the fact that a weapon was present or not.

It is what is perceived or believed at the scene, under the totality of the circumstances, by the officer that that decision is made. I believe that would be as critical for you to see, versus a singular view of a simple statistic.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I think whether or not there's actually a weapon there is as important as the perception, and the difference between the two. I would think that….

I'm not questioning whether, in the totality of circumstances, the officer is or isn't justified. I'm not suggesting they're not justified. These can be very tense situations. I
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appreciate that, particularly if there is a perception.

But if there is a big difference, then to me that would indicate: is there something that should be done in terms of training, or is there something more that should be done? I'm not a police officer, but I would think that would be important information to have.

Maybe I'll move on to the issue of follow-up. If there is a Taser use and then there's a report, can you explain what the accountability mechanism is? You spoke about accountability. What is the accountability mechanism within the RCMP?

What would happen after the use of the Taser and the report went in? Who audits? Who reviews the report? Then if there is a question about whether or not the Taser was properly used following these guidelines, these policies…. If somebody does not follow policy, what happens?

R. Beck: I'll start by just briefly explaining the process of supervision and review.

In all cases of the completion or situations where use of force is used — through the entire spectrum of use of force — the direct supervisor reviews the report and has to sign off on its completion, paying specific attention to quality of the articulation and quality of all data within the report. It then is made an official record and electronically locked down. Then it is forwarded to both a division here in British Columbia and to Ottawa, to the appropriate policy centre, where it is again reviewed and statistically gathered for the statistics within.

Now, at any one of those levels, when a CEW is used within the use of force, it is also reviewed by the commander of the detachment for an additional validation and accountability — followed by that, again, at division and headquarters.

During any one of those levels of supervision, if there is an incorrect application of policy or if there are allegations that go beyond the appropriate use of force, that venture into conduct of the member that may be requiring investigation to determine if there is any type of criminal aspect, then those two avenues — both code-of-conduct and criminal investigation — would be launched at the earliest opportunity.

In a case of a CEW where there is grievous bodily harm that meets the threshold of the guidelines of the recently stood up and enacted independent investigation office, it would be referred to them.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): A follow-up question to that, then, is: in how many of the 169 cases in 2010, if any, was there an inappropriate use of a CEW?

R. Beck: I'm not prepared to answer. Really, that would be a pure guess. I wasn't in the province at the time, so I'd have to go back. I don't have personal knowledge of that.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Would that be part of the information that the RCMP would gather and analyze and keep track of per year?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay, so you'd be able to provide that. That would be great. I appreciate it. More specifically, is that data that you believe the RCMP does keep track of as part of its full analysis?

R. Beck: As an independent element of the analysis? I'm sorry. I can't answer that.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): You know, it would be really interesting, I think, for the committee to see whatever reporting is done, subject to any privacy requirements.

But whatever analysis is done…. I'm not really clear what the analysis is, other than sending it to the province. Maybe you could give me a little more about what kind of analysis happens with the data related to CEW use.

R. Beck: In each case where an inappropriate use of the CEW is identified, either corrective action is taken or a code-of-conduct investigation ordered. Now, gathering that specific data for you, I can report back as part of the material that I will be providing the Chair as to what analysis is done. I will provide that.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Great. Included in that, if analysis does not include the number of cases where there was an inappropriate use of the CEW…. You'll provide us the numbers of that as well, even if it's not in that analysis?

M. Coell (Chair): Sure. We're running a little short of time for this portion, but go ahead.

I'll just make a general comment that I think these are very, very important discussions, very important questions and very important information. You're right. We have a fairly short timeline for this committee, but if we have to have people come back or more time at another time, I think it's worthwhile, and I suspect the committee does as well.

Now I will just ask maybe one more question, then. Officer Beck, you've said that…. You were talking about when paramedics are required. It's just a little bit of a hearing problem we're having at this end. Could you just go over again when it is that a paramedic is required — the circumstances where a paramedic is called prior to or after the use of the CEW?

R. Beck: It was in reference to medically high-risk incidents. I describe those incidents as being when a conducted energy weapon is discharged in the probe mode against a person's chest. That is specific to the testing that was done and the results and directive from Taser International, specifically, of the highest-risk type of deployment — when the probes were directly across the heart. So that is one.

Discharge in probe mode for longer than five seconds, where we would have had to use it in two cycles — each cycle is five seconds — or a malfunction, of course.

Also, in the electronic mode where there is an emotionally disturbed person, an elderly person, a person the officer had reason to believe is pregnant, a child, or a person who has a medical condition such as heart disease, implant pacemaker or defibrillator.

The policy directs that officers must require paramedic attendance at all medically high-risk incidents before discharge. Of course, in some of those incidents, they wouldn't have known — such as the probes in the chest, as an example, or any one of those. The officer therefore must request medical attention or paramedic attendance as soon as possible thereafter the deployment.

J. Trasolini: The question that I have is follow-up. Do we have a record of the number of incidents where paramedics were asked, either before or during the incident?

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I just wanted to clarify something. My understanding was that one of the recommendations was that the CEWs not be used in the chest area. I may be wrong on that. I'd have to go back and look at my information. Is there a difference, then, between the guidelines for the province and the RCMP, or are they consistent?

Doing it at the chest is considered high-risk for the RCMP. I thought that it was not something that was suggested at all in the municipal forces, but I could be wrong. Have you got a response to that?

R. Beck: I'm not aware of what the municipal forces policy is with regards to the deployment. It is not a preferred…. We are directed not to target there. The weapon is not an accurate weapon — not as accurate as a firearm, say. There are all kinds of factors, from subject movement to the tactical considerations at the time. So should the probes in fact make contact in the chest area, it then escalates it to a medically urgent situation.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): At that point, then, the paramedic would be called if it, in fact, did make contact with the chest.

R. Beck: That's correct. I make the distinction in calling the paramedic in a rural area. In fact, it would, in most cases, be much quicker to simply transport the subject ourselves.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Another area of high risk that you talked about was somebody that is perceived to be emotionally disturbed. I'm wondering why that is considered a high-risk situation.

R. Beck: Without getting into the medical side of…. If I could get the exact term, because I do wish to not use the term "excited delirium." I think "excited" and "delirious" are the terms that were used. As I said, we're not medical practitioners to diagnose, so it is the totality of the circumstance.

If the officer is aware, such as we are at a medical facility, a psychological facility, where we have been called to assist or where we have previous knowledge of the subject…. All of those factors could lead us to be able to make that early judgment and then call the medical staff before deployment.

In other cases, perhaps, when we've been called, the irrational behaviour could be construed one way or the other, but it is the risk factors taken into consideration and the subject's behaviour that's taken into consideration by the officer when considering the appropriate use of force.

I don't have any more questions for today, but I hope that if I do, maybe I can put them in writing or we can get responses in another way.

I'd like to thank the assistant commissioner for being here today. There have a been a number of questions to you, Randy. I'll work with our staff to make sure that
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we've got a copy of what the questions were and coordinate a response from your office.

We have a large number of people, witnesses, before the committee. We will have an opportunity, I think, once we have exhausted that list — and the public as well — to ask people to return. We will let you know if that's necessary. We certainly appreciate you being here today.

M. Coell (Chair): Our next witness is Dr. Michael Webster of Centurion Consulting Services, who specializes in crisis management.

M. Webster: I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me here today. I've got something written here prepared. I'll just read from my written preparation.

I'm a registered psychologist in private practice that has worked in the area of police psychology for over 30 years. I completed basic police training at the RCMP training academy, Depot division, in 1988. I specialize in the area of crisis management and have experience in the application of force across a broad array of police tasks, including hostage barricade incidents, kidnappings, incidents of public disorder and crisis intervention.

I've been instrumental in the creation and delivery of crisis intervention, crisis negotiation and incident command courses from the Canadian Police College in Ottawa to the B.C. Police Academy in New Westminster.

I've been an adjunct lecturer at the FBI training academy. I've consulted internationally with several law enforcement agencies, including Mexico, South America, Europe and Australia. I have consulted operationally at a variety of incidents, including the old B.C. Penitentiary hostage-takings during the 1970s. I was present at Waco, Texas; Gustafsen Lake; Jordan, Montana; Fort Davis, Texas; a variety of G8s and G20s; Apex Alpine; numerous kidnappings from Iraq to Indonesia and Kashmir to Colombia.

I'm familiar with both use-of-force models, the RCMP's integrated model of incident management and the national use-of-force framework. I provided testimony at both phases of the Braidwood Commission of inquiries.

I assume that your committee invited me here today to comment on my experience in the implementation of Justice Braidwood's recommendations in the areas of crisis intervention and training — as I have noted, both areas of specialty and experience for me.

As I was not invited to be a part of that implementation process, I can only make general comment on what has been done by others. I am more than willing to answer any questions that the committee may have after I have completed my presentation.

However, as it appears that electroshock weapons are here to stay, and in order to assist in an informed discussion and the formulation of future public policy, I would like to address, in the meantime, a couple of critical concerns.

I believe that your committee and the public should be advised of not only recent Taser-related science but also some of the more pertinent contemporary and historical concerns associated with the Taser's place in Canadian law enforcement. In providing this information, I hope to prevent the next-generation technology from being so easily accepted and under such compromised circumstances.

The B.C. government failed its citizens when Taser technology was introduced to the province. As someone who is trained to construct, conduct and be critical of research, I was taken aback last week to hear the assistant deputy minister and director of police services cavalierly gloss over the inadequate and flawed process used to approve the use of Tasers in this province.

Those who appreciate the scientific method prefer to regard that process as amateurish at best and replete with misrepresentations provided by what appears to have been a seriously compromised policeman/project manager. I would like to elaborate.

There was not enough rigorous science applied by the manufacturer to guarantee the safety of the weapon. Tasers were anecdotally and not scientifically developed. Universally, public officials failed to verify the safety claims being made by the company and its spokespersons. Tasers were rushed into service by decision-makers and police in British Columbia and throughout Canada in 1999.

The weapon has caused problems for the public and the manufacturer. For example, Taser International is presently engaged in damage control by offering trade-ins to recall older, more powerful weapons. Are you aware that the M26 model is powered at 26 watts? The next-generation model, the X26, is lower-powered, and the newest model, the X2, will be even lower. This begs the question as to why the manufacturer would lower the power of the weapon without alerting law enforcement first and providing some explanation.

It appears that with the lack of regular and rigorous peer-reviewed independent measurement, no policeperson could be sure of the amount of current being emitted from the weapon at any given deployment, for unlike
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breathalyzers, defibrillators and radar guns, the police do not routinely measure the output of their Tasers.

The CBC had 50 randomly chosen police Tasers tested independently in a lab in Chicago in 2008. They discovered that not all Tasers perform in the same way, as reflected in their output variance. Electroshock weapons manufacturers readily admit that the output of these devices can vary due to factors beyond their control. According to the Canadian blog, Truth Not Tasers, which has been tracking the death toll, approximately 750 people have died proximal to Taser use in North America since the higher-powered M26 was introduced.

The lower-powered five-watt system was what was field tested in Canada by the Victoria police department in 1999 in the field study mentioned by Mr. Pecknold. The policeman in charge initially said he had concerns about the new, soon-to-be-available higher-powered 26-watt weapons and that more research was needed before he could recommend them. Yet a few months later this was exactly the model of Taser that his police department purchased.

In his final report, an independent evaluation of conducted energy weapons, there was no evidence that the 26-watt system had ever been subjected to any controlled research. Yet the higher-powered 26-watt system is what our police services decided to buy and deploy.

The medical safety studies promised by this policeman/project manager were never produced. Contrary to Mr. Pecknold's statement of last week, the people of B.C. received no medical evidence assuring them of the safety of Tasers prior to them being brought into service.

Despite the glaring omissions of the 26-watt system and safety concerns about it in his final report, this same Victoria policeman wrote in both of his reports that Tasers had been overstudied. In fact, this was not true.

It is widely known that Taser spent only $14,000 in research and development when it shot the single pig in 1996 to develop the waveform and then five dogs in 1999 to further test the weapon. The results of these tests were not published or reviewed by third-party peers. These results are not even included in Taser International's own medical compendium.

The higher-powered technology was never subjected to independent, impartial, rigorous research prior to being deployed throughout Canada. The policeman who claimed that Tasers were medically safe, not being scientifically or medically trained, was not qualified to make such a judgment. This same policeman claimed that Tasers met electrical safety standards as set by the Underwriters Laboratories and the International Electrotechnical Commission. This policeman's claim of electrical safety was untrue because the devices have never been tested by these safety standards bodies.

You will note that Tasers do not bear certification marks from any of these organizations, as other electrical products sold and used in Canada must. The fact is that the Canadian public still has an untested, unregulated electrical device in the hands of police — this in violation of the electrical Safety Standards Act, which says that no electrical devices are to be sold or used without a proper certification mark. The Taser carries no such mark, even though it emits electrical current into the body.

Remarkably, this policeman/project manager's report, replete with what appear to be false claims, was vetted by Taser International and the Canadian Police Research Centre, and neither saw fit to make any amendments. Today these claims are no longer made.

Although somewhat technical, it is well to recognize that the dangers lie in the peaks of the current, even though Taser International prefers to use averages in its description of the weapon's electrical characteristics. It is medically uncontroversial that electrical currents between 70 and 100 milliamps can kill. Following Taser International's original specification sheets, the peak currents of the M26 and X26 models are obscured in average calculations.

These weapons at peak current — that is, 162 and 151 milliamps respectively — are powerful enough to kill, as suggested by Commissioner Braidwood at the conclusion of his commission of inquiry. Moreover, according to the International Electrotechnical Commission's standard 479, shocks of 151 to 162 milliamps over five seconds can stimulate the heart adversely in 50 percent of the population that receives the shock. Today the electrical output of these weapons does not appear in the manufacturer's product specification sheets.

This same Victoria police department member was then seconded to manage the joint RCMP and Canadian Police Research Centre conducted energy weapons evaluation project. This was not a study into health and safety effects, as one may have hoped, but simply a cataloguing of the effects of the harsh Canadian winter on the functioning of the weapons.

It was later discovered and reported by the Vancouver Sun that this policeman had an undisclosed financial relationship with Taser International. This was revealed when he testified at a wrongful death lawsuit in 2005. The family of Robert Bagnell was suing the Vancouver police department after Mr. Bagnell was shocked multiple times and died in the Downtown Eastside.

The policeman in question was asked to testify, as he had been brought over from Victoria by the Vancouver police department as a so-called independent investigator into Mr. Bagnell's death. When pressed by lawyer Cameron Ward, the policeman admitted he had done undisclosed freelance work for Taser International.

On the surface it appears that this policeman, at some point in 2000 tasked with evaluating the technology for British Columbia — and, ultimately, the rest of Canada — was quietly being given stock in Taser International while
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he led master Taser trainer courses for the manufacturer with other police services.

Taser International chairman Tom Smith told a federal all-party subcommittee looking into Taser stock options and televised nationwide on the parliamentary channel that stock options were given to this officer for designing a holster. Ironically, the holster in question was for the M26 model, the very weapon this officer claimed to be uncertain of.

There are those who understand the objectivity of the scientific method who would describe the receipt of payment, in whole or in kind, from Taser International while evaluating the safety of its products for the British Columbia government as a hopeless conflict of interest.

Ujjal Dosanjh, who had given the Victoria police department permission to field test the five-watt system in 1999, told CTV News that he felt he had been deceived. He was concerned that the policeman in question had failed to disclose his relationship with Taser International and, worse still, that false claims were made in the various versions of his so-called independent evaluation.

This policeman remains on the job today with the Victoria police department and has never been held accountable by decision-makers for making these misrepresentations. Mr. Dosanjh has said that if he knew then what he knows now, he would never have given Tasers the go-ahead.

Also related to the absence of independent scientific evidence, American authorities allowed Tasers to be deployed despite significant data gaps and other concerns raised in three key U.S. government reports. Canadian law enforcement was unaware of or, worse, ignored these oversights.

One of these critical oversights involved not questioning Taser International for placing a conformity mark on their M26 brochure. This mark is used to indicate conformity with standards necessary for a product to enter the European economic area. The European community did not have, nor even have today, any standard for electrical safety that it would apply to the M26 advanced Taser.

In sum, there was a glaring lack of due diligence undertaken by authorities when these weapons were first introduced. As a result, approximately eight people have died in British Columbia proximal to their use.

Times Colonist reporter Rob Shaw has said that your special committee will be considering "the scientific research into the medical risks to persons against whom conducted energy weapons are deployed." This is encouraging, as there is much that even Commissioner Braidwood did not uncover. Not one Canadian government agency or department — including Health Canada, Public Safety Canada or the RCMP — bothered to verify Taser International's medical and safety claims. The RCMP even used photocopied Taser promotional information in its first Taser report in 2000.

Remarkably, law enforcement in Canada is still able to use Tasers in probe mode when there is no electrical safety standard for invasive shocks — that is, electrical current introduced below the skin.

One Vancouver journalist approached the International Electrotechnical Commission, the Underwriters Laboratories and the Canadian Standards Association and learned that the standard they use to measure safety thresholds is for shocks on the skin, not subcutaneous shocks. All these laboratories assert that we know so little about the effects of electricity below the skin that they could not in good faith certify these weapons with one of their safety marks like you find on your electric shaver, toaster or hair dryer.

Contrary to Dr. Lu's assertion last week before this committee, there has been important Taser-related research since 2008.

Regarding cardiac risks, a study published this year in the journal Circulation by Dr. Douglas P. Zipes, cardiologist and professor emeritus at Indiana University, clearly demonstrates that the electric shock delivered to the chest by a Taser can lead to cardiac arrest and sudden death. "This is no longer arguable," said Dr. Byron Lee, a cardiologist and director of the electrophysiology laboratory at the University of California, San Francisco. "This is a scientific fact," Dr. Lee added.

With respect, the question before your committee should now focus on whether the risk of sudden death from a Taser shock is low enough to warrant widespread use of the weapon by police in British Columbia. It seems at this point that governments and/or police decision-makers don't really want to know or admit they made grave errors by not adequately verifying Taser International's safety claims.

Presently in the U.S., courts are being asked to consider for the first time police use of Tasers. No longer are Taser cases based strictly upon product liability. The cases now before the courts are different. These cases challenge the policepersons who deployed the weapon.

The question, in light of current evidence, is now: when is electrical force excessive force? Appellate judge Mary Schroeder has noted: "One could argue that the use of painful, permanently scarring weaponry on non-threatening individuals who were not trying to escape should have been known to be excessive by an informed police officer."

This may give you some insight into the major and consistent decrease in Taser use mentioned by the deputy minister last week before this committee. It is only a matter of time before cases of this nature work their way into the Canadian legal experience.

In contrast to Dr. Lu's statement that "Tasers are generally shown to be relatively safe," Taser International's own voluntary exposure and liability release form includes a long list of alarming, known and possible side effects that
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contradicts its original safety claims and confirms what critics have been saying for over a decade.

Here are only a few of those known and possible side effects. The company cautions that the weapons "have not been scientifically tested on pregnant women, the infirm, the elderly, small children and low-body-mass persons. The use on these individuals could increase the risk of death or serious injury."

The company goes on to admit that the Taser "can produce physiologic or metabolic effects which include changes in acidosis, adrenergic states, blood pressure, heart rate and rhythm." With this statement, Taser International confirms experts' beliefs that the Taser can capture the heart and alter its rhythms in healthy adults.

Taser International then goes on to shift the responsibility for their weapons onto the user by recommending that "all Taser users conduct their own research, analysis and evaluation." Wouldn't you think a manufacturer would want to be able to assure its customers of its product's safety before it went to, or even after it was on, the market?

A final concern that should be of interest to this committee involves the Taser tester Verus One being put forward by the B.C. police services. Police services has accepted a test protocol developed by Andy Adler of Carleton University, Ottawa's MPB electronics and Datrend Systems of Richmond, B.C., despite the authors themselves admitting that this protocol is far from comprehensive or independent.

The Verus One actually tests to determine whether an ESW, electroshock weapon, is operating within Taser International's specifications. The Verus One does not determine the electrical energy delivered into the subject. The 600 ohms resistance value being used in the formula by the B.C. police services actually comes from Taser International's chief engineer, Max Nerheim, via Adler et al.

Now, I'm talking here about a rather technical…. When you get into ohms, I don't know how familiar the committee is. If the committee could think of how every substance has an opposition to electricity being passed through it, that's its resistance. They're measured in ohms. If I have a product and I want to pass electricity through a certain substance, I must make sure that my product is powerful enough to overcome whatever the resistance is in this particular object — all right?

I'll read that sentence again. The 600 ohms resistance value being used in the formula by the B.C. police services actually comes from Taser International's chief engineer, Max Nerheim, via Mr. Adler et al. According to a study by the American Heart Association, the resistance for a transthoracic shock could be as low as 25 ohms. So the suggested 600 ohms indicates a base resistance that would appear to be an artificially high value that does not necessarily reflect the reality of all subjects.

When the CBC did its testing in 2008 and found a 12 percent failure rate, it employed a resistance value of 250 ohms, which it got from Taser International. The company has since recommended raising the resistance level to 600 ohms, but I have found no literature from the manufacturer that has offered the scientific references or rationale for doing so.

Several significant considerations should be pointed out concerning the Verus One:

(2) It only tests to determine whether electroshock weapons are in tolerance or out of tolerance.

(3) A test result of "in tolerance" does not indicate or imply that injury or death will not result from the use of the tested electroshock weapon or that the tested electroshock weapon will incapacitate a person against whom the weapon may be deployed.

(4) It does not measure the electrical energy delivered into a body that is an invasive shock. It also does not disclose scientific references or rationale as to why 600 ohms is identified as the measurement base versus having a range of resistances.

In closing, it is worth mentioning that the International Electrotechnical Commission and the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the U.S. are presently developing a standardized method of measurement for electroshock weapons. This standard will result in the International Electrotechnical Commission's 62792, electroshock weapon measurement method.

Moreover, it is my understanding that no Canadian law enforcement agencies have even bothered to investigate, nor has Datrend disclosed, the issue of intellectual property rights regarding Verus One. This is significant, as a lack of intellectual property rights could cost Canadian law enforcement and the Canadian taxpayer a significant amount of money due to intellectual property and licensing issues.

Based upon these concluding statements, I would strongly urge care and caution be exercised before purchasing any electroshock weapon analyzer.

M. Coell (Chair): Thank you very much, Dr. Webster. Your comments are greatly appreciated.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Thank you for your presentation, Dr. Webster. It's very interesting.

M. Webster: They could have been, but I try and make a practice out of backstopping everything I say, and everything I've said to you here today is public record.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): The conclusion that Commissioner Braidwood came to was that considering everything, the pros and cons, if the 19 recommendations that he made in his report are implemented, then he felt that the world would be better having Tasers than not having Tasers. It sounds like you don't agree with his conclusion. Is that correct?

M. Webster: That's correct. I have the greatest respect for Justice Braidwood. I think he's a very thoughtful and considerate man. However, it just made absolutely no sense to me to go forward with all these recommendations when, as I've said to you here today in this presentation, what we have on our hands is an uncertified and unregulated weapon.

You have had testimony before you here at this committee that Tasers are relatively safe — not true. They are not relatively safe. The company itself now is admitting that these weapons can kill. You have been asking and the media has been asking: why this drastic decrease in the use of Tasers?

I circulate through the police community as a police psychologist, and I'll tell you why: because policemen are afraid to use them. That's why. There has been no great enlightenment about de-escalation techniques. Policemen are absolutely afraid to use them, because they can see how the public reacts. They can see the investigative process, the criticism they have to go through. They go south of the border to conferences, to workshops. They talk to their brothers and sisters south of the border. They can see what's happening down there, and they do not want it to happen to them.

They are leaving their Tasers in the trunk of the police car. They are failing to recertify, because they are afraid to use these weapons.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Do you think that they are afraid to use the weapons because of the criticism, or is it because they're actually afraid of the results? I got the sense that perhaps it was more that they are afraid to use the weapons because they feel that they could end up in trouble if they used the weapons and that there is some fear attached to that.

Do you think it is that as well as fear that there might be harm that comes to the people that they use them on?

M. Webster: Taser brainwashed the police community in telling them that these weapons were…. I think their tag line was: "Safe for any assailant. Wouldn't you rather be shocked than shot?"

Police people, in general, are well-motivated people. They want to serve their communities. They don't want to hurt anybody. To directly answer your question, I believe that they are not using these weapons because they don't want to hurt anybody. It's Russian roulette when you deploy one of those weapons. You don't know what is going to happen. They don't want to hurt anybody, and they also don't want to be subjected to a great deal of criticism and scrutiny.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I have more questions, Murray, but if somebody else has some, then they can go ahead.

M. Coell (Chair): I have a quick question. Dr. Webster, you referenced two medical studies out of the United States. I wonder if you could give those references to our staff so we can track those down.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Thank you, Dr. Webster. I did have another question. You talked about the different amount of energy in the M26 versus the X26 and now the X2. Are you comfortable with the lower-energy weapons being used? Also, are you aware whether or not the ones that you apparently have greatest concern about — the M26 — are still being used?

M. Webster: They are still being used by some police services. Taser International is in the process now of recalling these weapons and attempting to take them on what is basically a trade-in and to give them new technology, to exchange new technology for them.

Am I comfortable with the new technology because it's lower-powered? I must say to you that I'm not an electrical engineer. I'm not an electrophysiologist. I'm not an electrocardiologist. But when you work in the area that I work in, it's very difficult not to come in contact with these other disciplines and to learn something about the day-to-day business of whatever it is that they do.

I'm not comfortable with any of these weapons because none of them have ever been subjected to any rigorous, independent and impartial research. None of them have.

Now, if you spoke to an electrical engineer…. An electrical engineer or an electrocardiologist might say to you
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that the X2, because it will be lowest-powered of all of the models that are offered to the police, presents less danger. However, I'm not willing to accept that.

I think what's instructive is…. Mr. Chair has just asked for the reference to Dr. Zipes's study. Dr. Zipes is indicating that according to his data, the heart of a healthy adult is susceptible to be captured by a Taser. So no, I'm not comfortable with any of them.

G. Hogg: The information you provided us with today — was all of that provided to the Braidwood Commission?

M. Webster: No, a lot of it hadn't happened in 2007. A lot of this didn't exist. A lot of it has come since.

G. Hogg: The most salient portions that have come subsequent to that — could you highlight those for me, please? Is virtually all of this since 2006?

G. Hogg: I understand that. I'm just trying to understand what went before the Braidwood Commission and what new information you're putting forward now. Then I want to ask you a question with respect to judgment regarding that.

M. Webster: Okay. I went to the Braidwood Commission with a different mandate. My mandate at the Braidwood Commission was to take a look at the Pritchard video, and from my perspective as a police psychologist specializing in crisis intervention, what did I think of their intervention?

G. Hogg: So the Braidwood Commission came to the conclusion that Tasers were safe to use.

M. Webster: Justice Braidwood did say that he thought that the Canadian public would be better off with them than without them, yes.

G. Hogg: So your argument would be that now there is more information available with respect to research on this than was available for Justice Braidwood.

G. Hogg: Has he made any comment subsequent to that with respect to this information?

M. Webster: I'm not aware. I don't have any contact with Justice Braidwood, and I'm not aware if he's made comment or not. I'm not even aware if he's aware of Dr. Zipes's work or Dr. Lee's work. I'm not sure.

G. Hogg: So at the time it appeared before him, there were no studies that were done that were either peer-reviewed or had this same type of substance as these two reports you're making reference to?

M. Webster: There was some…. Dr. Zian Tseng came up from the very same university that Dr. Lee is at. Dr. Tseng's research was preliminary at the time, but yes, there was some indication that the myocardium could be captured by the Taser's waveform.

G. Hogg: Are you aware of any international studies or any other organizations, groups, that are looking into the use of Tasers anywhere in the world?

M. Webster: No, I'm not. I think the most activity comes south of the border in the U.S., because that's where the manufacturer is. There's a great deal of back-and-forth between the medical community and the manufacturer.

G. Hogg: In the final line in your submission you say: "I would strongly urge care and caution be exercised before purchasing any ESW analyzer." Is that partially because of the notion that the analyses that you refer to, the Verus One, are just looking at Taser specifications rather than any others? Is that the primary issue with respect to that?

M. Webster: No. I think it's important to consider that when the Taser is used in probe mode…. I'm assuming that the committee understands the difference between drive-stun and probe mode. When the barbs are deployed in probe mode, now you're talking about electricity under the skin, in the body. We really don't know what sort of resistance exists beneath the skin to electricity. Therefore, you need an analyzer that is going to address….

Presently NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the International Electrotechnical Commission are establishing these standards. I would suggest that you need an analyzer that is…. There will be a standard for shocks on the skin and a standard for shocks in the skin. The Verus One doesn't do that. Its software doesn't do that. I would suggest that that would be necessary.

G. Hogg: If you were to make a recommendation with respect to this, would I be fair to suggest you would be recommending that Taser use should be terminated until there are accepted peer-reviewed studies and standards in place?

M. Webster: I would like to see a moratorium declared on Tasers until they're finally independently, rigorously studied.
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J. Trasolini: Dr. Webster, you've made a statement that none of the Taser models have had electrical certification that most tools and appliances that use electricity have. Could you perhaps tell us if you know how that came about, because as far as I know, in order to use any of that type of equipment, it must have Canadian certification.

M. Webster: I'm sorry. I didn't catch the last part. Could you repeat your question?

J. Trasolini: The question is: are you aware of how the Tasers were able to be used without Canadian certification?

M. Webster: Yes. The short answer to your question is that Taser engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign. Policy-makers and police failed to verify their safety claims, which were false, and they were rushed into service across the country.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Murray, just a follow-up on that. I was going to ask some questions about that as well.

Just to follow up on Joe's question, you're saying that to your knowledge, the CEWs, Tasers, are not CSA-approved?

M. Webster: Exactly. They are not. I'll say that categorically. They are not CSA-approved. If you used a hair dryer or a curling iron this morning, you will have a CSA certification mark on it that does not appear on a Taser.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Well, I guess that's something the committee's going to have to take a look at. My understanding would be that you can't use products in Canada unless they are CSA-approved, but I could be wrong.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. Then do you have any understanding how it could happen — if you are in fact right about CSA approval?

M. Webster: Yes. As I said to the last questioner — and I'm sorry; I've forgotten his name; I think it was Joe, if I may be so formal as to call him Joe — Taser International brainwashed the police community not only in Canada but in North America. They are a very slick company. They engaged in a highly aggressive marketing campaign. They made all kinds of assertions, promises, misrepresentations, and their weapon was rushed into service.

Police people are generally well-meaning people. They want to serve their communities. When you tell them, "Here is a better way to serve your community. Policing at the end of 35-foot wires is much safer for you and much safer for your customer," they are going to buy it. They are not psychologically sophisticated. They are not scientifically sophisticated.

Weapons like this and all of these varieties of sound cannons and so on that are being introduced to the police universe…. There needs to be a public advisory board in place that has requisite experts on it. In the case of the Taser there needed to be electrocardiologists, electrical engineers, research analysts, policy analysts and, of course, judges, retired policemen and so on, on the panel.

However, this did not happen. This was a decision that was made by police people who swallowed whole what Taser International sold them, and then they went on to sell it to policy-makers. And policy-makers, trusting their police, also swallowed it whole. That's how they got into service without any kind of regulation or certification.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): You also said that there was a lack of peer-reviewed studies. We have in our materials medical studies on various aspects of the use on various parts of the body and circumstances that are peer-reviewed. At least, that's my understanding from reading the materials that we have been given.

Are you talking about peer-reviewed studies on the actual qualities of the Tasers themselves — how much energy they put out and so on? Is that what you're talking about — that there are no peer-reviewed studies?

M. Webster: No. I'm saying that there are no…. I'll say very few, because now we've got Dr. Zipes and Dr. Lee.

There are very few peer-reviewed studies on the health and safety effects of electroshock weapons. There are a great deal of studies on the specifications of the Taser. Does it meet the manufacturer's specifications? That's an entirely different issue than health and safety effects. There is a paucity of those types of studies.

If you find some, you must be very careful and read the authors' names, because Taser International has an army of medical professionals and engineers and on and on that it pays. They do the research for Taser International. You have to know who the cast of characters is in order to judge the research.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Can I give you a couple of names from an annotated bibliography that we were given as members of the committee?
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K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I'm looking for one that's more directly related We have, for example, Human Research Review of the TASER Electronic Control Device, Dawes and Heegaard and Miner, who are involved in emergency medicine, in the safety of it. We have Alcohol and CEW by Moscati and Dr. Ho.

M. Webster: Dr. Ho is an emergency medicine physician and is on the Taser payroll.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Well, those are allegations…. This is going to be very difficult for us to evaluate.

M. Webster: If you get a hold of some of Dr. Ho's work, he should declare at the outset of his study…. When he writes it up, it should say who he has a relationship with. You heard Dr. Lu, when he came in here to talk to you. He said: "I have no financial relationship with Taser International. I have no financial relationship with so-and-so and such-and-such."

Well, Dr. Ho, when he publishes his research, must declare that at the outset of his report.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Okay. I guess that's work we have to do, because there is a fairly significant body of literature that does talk about the medical effects and various aspects of the medical effects, so we're in a bit of a quandary.

Can I ask you a question, quickly, about the resistance? I do remember, from physics 11 and 12, ohms, to a small degree. I wanted to clarify what you were saying. When Taser suggested that the standard for resistance should be increased to 600 ohms, is what they are saying that the amount of resistance that the weapon needs to overcome should be 600 ohms? That would be the amount of resistance that would need to be overcome in order for it to be effective, or to overcome the resistance of the human body. Is that what it's saying?

M. Webster: Well, you and I can only assume that, because Taser International has raised its resistance level from 250 to 600 ohms. I can't find anywhere in the literature any reason, any scientific rationale for doing that. You and I could assume that they are raising it because they want to be able to push it through the substance that is providing opposition to the current, which in this case is a human body.

As I also offered you in my report, the American Medical Association is suggesting that the transthoracic resistance across the chest is about 25 ohms. I'm as puzzled as you are as to why we would need 600 ohms in our equation, in our software.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I'm not necessarily saying I'm disagreeing or agreeing. I wanted to make sure I understand the principles of what you were saying. I would be interested if you could provide us with the study or the report that says that the resistance could be as low as 25 ohms. That would be useful to the committee, at least from my perspective.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): Thank you very much. I appreciate your information. It gives us lots of food for thought and more work that we have to do.

M. Coell (Chair): All right. With that, I'll thank you very much, Dr. Webster, for appearing before the committee — greatly appreciated. We will be back in touch with you.

M. Coell (Chair): I will call the committee meeting back to order and introduce Dr. Christine Hall, who is with the department of emergency medicine with the Vancouver Island Health Authority.

C. Hall: Apologies to the people who are not in the room for the slides. I'll try to do a decent job of letting you understand tables. I'll review them anyway, so hopefully it won't be too annoying.

Thank you for the opportunity to come to this committee meeting. It's always interesting to make a presentation when you don't really know what your role is. I've tried to paraphrase my presentation to take into account the Braidwood recommendations and how the work I do interacts with those recommendations, to try to enlighten the committee a little bit about what's going on in the world.

The title of my presentation. I chose to call it "Understanding Police Use of Force and Sudden In-Custody Death: Toward Evidence-Guided Practice," which in medicine is what we strive toward. Certainly, in policing in the last ten years there has been a major shift in paradigm toward this end.

The first slide is the mandatory declaration of conflict. I was following the last discussion with great interest about this. It is important that people declare their potential and real conflicts to organizations with whom they
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speak. I'll be right upfront and let you know that I do not have any industry ties.

Certainly, I'm asked all of the time how my Taser research is going. I constantly have to remind people that Taser is a teeny, tiny part of what I do. My interest is in the detection and prevention of sudden in-custody death as it relates to police use of force on the whole. I am not funded by Taser. I have no plans to be funded by Taser and no affiliation with that entity whatsoever.

My day-to-day work is that I'm an emergency medicine physician. I have to let you know that I prepared this presentation after a long weekend of night shifts, so I'll call attention to things that need to have some caveats as we go. It's a lot of data, and we're in the middle of a large data analysis just now.

I work in emergency medicine. That's my interest in sudden in-custody death. I'm also the director of the medical part of trauma services for the south Island of Vancouver Island. That's my basic work.

On top of that, however, I'm an epidemiologist. I study patterns of disease on a population. That's my research interest. I'm cross-appointed clinically to the University of British Columbia through the department of emergency medicine — as a clinical assistant professor, I think it is — and to the University of Calgary, through the faculty of medicine, department of community health sciences, for my epidemiology tenure there.

The funding for the research that I'm going to present to you and discuss is by contract and by grant. The Defence Research Development Canada grant is through the Canadian Police Research Centre, and that's to look at the study that I'm going to talk to you about, called the RESTRAINT study. I'm also the only Canadian grant holder, through the National Institute of Justice, for our American centre, whose data I will not be presenting today because it's the American centre.

I also hold a contract with the city of Calgary to look at all 31 Taser-related in-custody deaths that have occurred in Canada, and we're in the middle of that analysis as well.

We just got a new National Institute of Justice grant to look at biomarkers of extreme physiologic stress for agitated persons and will be starting to work toward that grant very shortly.

I also need to let you know that this is an introduction. Twenty-five minutes is a profoundly short timeline to try to give you some idea of what we do. I don't envy your task, because this is no small question that you have before you.

I thought I'd go through the Braidwood recommendations, as they reference what I do in my research career. The first one that strikes me…. I testified at Braidwood. I was there for the day that I testified, and followed the outcome and discussion closely.

One of the recommendations that's coming to fruition just now is crisis intervention training or CID training becoming mandatory — that was recommendations 3 and 4 — and to use a conducted energy weapon when crisis intervention training fails first, or right off the top, or is anticipated to be unsuccessful by police officers.

I think this is an important recommendation for a few reasons mainly, in my world, because it speaks to context. Understanding the context in which police use force is something that I've really had to learn during the course of doing this research work. It's not widely well understood.

The subject group for whom crisis intervention training can be successful is probably the population at large, and I'll talk to that in a second. There is a very specific subgroup of people with whom police officers interact for whom crisis intervention cannot be successful, and we'll talk about that in a minute.

I think it's quite important that we understand context. Certainly, I did not understand police use of force when I started this. I'm no police-use-of-force expert by any stretch.

The other challenge in all of this is that how and what police officers document is key in understanding the events that they faced. If you've ever read physicians' notes, they're no better than police officers' notes. How and what you teach officers to document is probably extraordinarily important.

I'm going to skip this video because it's kind of unfair to show a video when not everyone can see it. It's basically a case of a highly agitated, unresponsive, naked, sweating and bleeding man who punches a hole in a fence with his bare hand and then tries to crawl through a six-inch hole and ends up with multiple police officers attempting to restrain him.

That's the reality of police work. It's the reality of what I do every day. Saturday night at the General was no exception.

I think it's a little bit naive, honestly, to be fair, to expect…. I don't think anyone really expects this. Crisis intervention training has its place, but there are situations in which it's ineffective, and I'll speak to that in a minute.

How do you investigate police use of force in a research study? I think it's important to know that the design and conduct of any research work is pivotal in the interpretation of its findings — full stop. Methodology is essential, it's critical, and it's what makes research findings adaptable or not to general practice.

To that end, when I set out to look at sudden in-custody death, I realized very clearly that in order to understand risk, you have to understand the whole population on whom force is used. You cannot start with death only and comment about risk. You can generate hypotheses, but you cannot document risk.

I designed a prospective, which means we start at the event and follow the data forward by collecting it. We don't start with an event and then look back to try to understand what happened. Everybody documenting
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everything about everybody is how we do this work. It's consecutive, which means that every use-of-force event in that agency in the study period is recorded, and we are rigorous about maintaining that.

This is a rigorous population-based study design, which means the only thing probably higher than that in a population-based study would be a randomized control trial. You will never see a randomized control trial of police use of force or not. Ethically, that's a non-starter, and operationally, that would be dangerous.

What we look at in our work is all use of force above soft-hands physical control. What that means is that with everything above a simple arm joint lock, where you bend a wrist or grab a hand to escort someone to a car, we collect data.

As soon as there is anything — an armbar, a leg sweep, a stun or a strike or a modality used — we collect data from all comers, all of the time, across the board. We have mandatory forms completion. We audit that in real time. We look at the data that we're getting weekly. We send incomplete and inaccurate forms back. We correct them, we enter them, we audit the data entry process, and we do that continuously.

From this I'm going to present to you a bit of our data. We've already analyzed three years of police-public interactions, finishing in 2009. We're about to undertake analysis of the next wave, from 2006 to 2012 data, but today I can give you the first wave.

That first wave includes 1½ million police-public interactions — in other words, a member of the public and a police officer in the same space at the same time having an interaction. That's your denominator on which force occurs. We didn't count calls for service where no officer was near a member of the public.

In three consecutive years of study across, at that time, two police agencies, the bulk from one agency, we found that in 1.5 million police-public interactions, there was no use of force in 99.9 percent. If you're talking about incident de-escalation, it's hard to beat that standard.

Across published police records…. None of them are in peer-reviewed publications, because that's not what has been the standard for police agencies for many years. Most police agencies that collect their own data report up to a use of force of about 1½ percent.

When you're talking about do police officers de-escalate situations, if you don't use force in 99 percent, that's a pretty high standard. That number in our study of 99.9 percent — it was actually 99.93 percent of police interactions had no use of force — was a stable number across three consecutive years. We analyzed that independently. It did not vary.

Now, the next slide — and I will discuss the findings of the slide — looks specifically at those events. We had 1,269 use-of-force events, everything above soft-hands physical control, in that interval of three years — so on average, say, 400 a year, or over one a day. In this slide, for those in the room, the yellow bar is where the money is, so to speak. I took out a lot of the statisticalese. Basically, this is who use-of-force occurred in.

I can let you know that these parameters that I'm about to discuss with you have not changed, really, at all in our preliminary of where we are now.

The age range of the subjects was 22 to 39. So 25 percent were under 22, and 25 percent were over 39. The median age — because it's not what we call normally distributed data; you don't care — is 31. Males are 88 percent of the use-of-force population. That's not new to police officers. We sort of tell them what they already know.

The interesting part of this slide is that when we asked officers to record at the scene if this individual has evidence of alcohol intoxication, drug intoxication, emotional disturbance or any combination, they can check "all" or "none." So 87 percent — and I'm rounding up a little bit; 86.8 percent — of individuals with whom police officers interacted and used force had at least one of those anomalies listed, and usually very often in combination.

Of interest for this committee — and this is a remarkably stable number — is that 9 percent of use of force involves persons judged by officers at the scene to just have an emotional disturbance. That number is the same number that Vancouver published in its study of mental health in policing in Vancouver, for example. This is not Vancouver as an agency. I find that remarkable.

Forty percent were thought by officers to just be drunk, 10 percent just on a drug and 27 percent to have some combination of drugs, alcohol or emotional disturbance.

The reason that's important is that when force is used, subjects are abnormal. Our normal crisis intervention that we use with a goal-directed individual is severely hampered. The toxicological reality for officers is that you have no way to verify at the scene whether what you're interpreting as intoxication is correct or not. Management decisions are made based on information at the scene.

Officers identified that 9 percent of subjects in whom they used force were probably just an emotional disturbance. That's where your crisis intervention training is probably going to get its best bang for the buck, but we're talking about 9 percent of 0.1 percent of police-public interactions.

We have no ability to track how often emotionally disturbed individuals are seen where no force is used. Any research study has to start with a defined population, and we were disallowed from following all police interactions.

Braidwood recommendation No. 16 suggested a reporting form and that adequate data be collected surrounding conducted energy weapons. Knowing what I know now and knew then, to limit our focus on only conducted energy weapons necessarily confounds our findings. In other words, if you think you're following cause and effect but really the effect comes from a third item,
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that's called confounding. If you don't study the whole population in whom force is used, you think you're focusing on the item of interest, and you're not.

Data must be robust to be useful, and that means it has to be audited. It has to be entered correctly, and police officers have to be accountable to the data in some way. In other words, a blank section does not mean that thing did not happen. It's blank.

In research, blank sections are a nightmare, because you cannot infer blanks to be a negative response. It's structurally, from a research perspective, terrible. Data must be audited. It must be corrected.

Now, police services is certainly collecting volumes of data, and there is a nine-page report form that officers fill out. I'm not part of the police services mandate, of course, and I don't know what the structure of their reports look like. I've never seen one.

Real-time data collection can be done, however. We've learned in our study that computer-based, in-car reporting works, but the limitations in terms of what this committee is looking at for that is that the RCMP database and municipal databases are categorically different. PRIME and PROS use different electronic platforms, and those data are not easily combinable.

When you do data collection, you have to have the same variables in order to have comparable data. Data, in our experience, must be audited at least weekly. If you let it go, it's a big problem. It requires scheduled effort and a lot of perseverance on the part of the use-of-force officer for the agency and on the part of the data collector or the data manager.

Officers aren't research personnel, and they leave sections blank. Our ideal centre has mandatory fields where you cannot leave a variable blank. You can't get past it if you leave it blank, and that's ideal. But you'd have to change databasing.

An interesting thing for this committee to know…. One of the goals in my study is to look at medical outcomes, and we're just starting to look at that. It is a laborious process. EMS and hospital records are not electronically linked, nor are EMS records to police response records. There is no electronic linking of that data. They have different case file numbers. We have many situations where you have police officers recording that the subject went to EMS, and we go to EMS, but there's no record.

It's often there's an alias with police and a different name with EMS and then another different name in the hospital. It's ridiculously difficult.

The other thing you need to know is that unlike the U.S., where police agencies have medical directorates, there is no automatic access to medical charts by police agencies, including when the subject dies. That cannot be done. That necessarily hampers investigations. I only have access under a specific research protocol that I can look at specific pages of the chart and nothing else.

For the people not in the room, this is a picture of the restraint form. The only reason to put this up is that in every section of our restraint form for every single variable, we have a box that says either "none of the above" or "unknown," so police officers do not leave blanks. If they do, we send it back to them and say: "Which one was it?" This is just the top and bottom half of our form.

We have a single-page form for the agency that uses paper forms, because once you go to a second page, compliance drops by about 80 percent.

What do we know? Modalities overall. In the restraint study we looked at what police officers used overall in restraining subjects. The answer is overwhelming that it's physical. Stuns and strikes or physical takedowns in the 2006 to 2009 data was about 50 percent, baton about 7 percent. Hobble in Canada is just a leg strap that secures the ankles so that the individual can't kick out the windows of the police car. That occurred in about 22 percent, pepper spray in 3 percent. Conducted energy weapons were 27 percent in that section of the cohort. I'll come back to that. Vascular neck restraint in 6 percent. I'll skip down to firearm pointed, in about 3.7 percent.

Over the weekend I ran a quick data analysis on our current database. We now have 4,186 use-of-force events in Canadian police agencies across six agencies. What you'll see is that physical, and stuns and strikes — we've separated those leg sweeps compared to kicks and punches — is now about 76 percent, hobble still about 17 percent, neck restraints still about 6 percent, baton still about 4½ or 5 percent, OC spray or pepper spray is still about 3 or 4 percent, and Taser here is now 15 percent. I'm rounding up, for the people that aren't in the room.

The reason for that, in part — and this is when we get into issues around confounding — is that prior to adding more agencies to our study, the first biggest agency has Taser on the duty belt of every police officer. The other agencies that have been added have Taser on the duty belt of supervisors and specifically trained officers. By necessity, because that person is not at the scene, you see a decrease in Taser deployment on the whole.

The other comment around that is that I was in the room for the last witness's comments, and I would argue that he's correct, in part, in that officers are not using Taser as often, perhaps. I don't have good data on that. But I would not presume to comment on why that was without specifically finding that out. I'm not about my opinion. We're about what do the numbers show.

Interestingly, in this data you'll see that firearm pointed, in our big cohort of all comers in six years, is 8½ percent compared to the previous slide, where it was 3.7 percent. Why that is I have not analyzed yet, but we'll be looking at that to see if there's a relationship somewhere.

Going back to the original data that we've published on, when officers used force, we wanted to know how often they used a single-force modality. In other words, when you're a police officer, the usual mandate is to
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choose the level of force that will bring an event to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible within the relativity of the use-of-force paradigm — in other words, what's appropriate and effective.

When I started use-of-force training, I thought the use of force was linear. You started with talking, and if that didn't work, maybe you used a baton, and if that didn't work you used some pepper spray, and if that didn't work, whatever happened. I've now come to realize — again, I'm not a use-of-force expert — that use of force is not linear and that depending on the presentation and the situation at hand, you can go first to whatever modality is appropriate.

We looked at the numbers on use of force, and we found so far — and this is remaining consistent — that a single use-of-force modality is chosen by police officers in three-quarters of events. Predominantly, that's physical — stuns, strikes, armbar takedowns and leg sweeps. In this cohort of the study, however, about 25 percent, as per the previous slide, were conducted energy weapon deployments, with a median number of trigger pulls or deployments recorded by officers as 1.6. So we split that down.

Important point. No medical study or simple frequency count can determine the appropriateness of police use of force — full stop. The appropriateness of use of force is dictated by the paradigms that police agencies use and not by frequency counts. Injury outcomes, in addition, do not determine appropriateness. Lack of an injury could occur in a completely inappropriate use of force and vice versa. A significant injury could occur in a very appropriate use of force.

There have been some publications recently, one in particular, that discuss the appropriateness of use of force as judged by emergency department physicians who have no education in police use of force and were not present at the time of the event.

Braidwood recommendation No. 6 is around limiting the application of conducted energy weapons use when an individual is displaying self-harm. In our study, we've just begun to track and look at when subjects are injured how many of those were self-inflicted or self-intended. In other words, in the text of the discussion did there include articulation of suicide by cop? Also, in terms of lacerations, was force used to try to stop an individual from injuring themselves? So when you just count lacerations after use of force, you can't tell how many of those were self-induced unless you specifically look for that.

There's a recommendation around the number of deployment being limited. That's recommendation No. 7. On further research to understand multiple deployments, probe modes to the chest and use in emotionally disturbed persons, I'm going to tell you a little bit about what we're doing there. I, unfortunately, at this exact moment don't have large amounts of data for you, because we're just doing that.

However, in our study we collect the dart location of all Taser applications across all Taser deployments. All trigger pulls have to be indicated where the darts and probes were. So we look at all the probe deployments plus contact stun, or drive-stun is the other term for that, and also three-point pairings.

Is the committee familiar with what a three-point…? A three-point deployment — so people know, because it's sort of a new thing — is when the officer is very close to the subject such that if they deploy a probe mode, there will be inadequate probe spread. The probes won't spread far enough to incapacitate the individual. What happens is that there's a close proximity deployment. The probes fly as closely together as the distance determines. Then, without breaking the wires, the officer will put the nose of the weapon in its contact stun mode distal to the probe.

Let's say the probes go in the back of the subject, the probes fly in a pair to the left shoulder, and then the officer deploys the nose of the weapon against the left thigh. Then you'd have a wide spread of deployment and incapacitate the subject when the two probes together would have only incapacitated the left rear deltoid. That's called a three-point contact. It's not so common but certainly does exist.

What we're doing is we are looking at all Taser deployments in our study specifically for where the darts went, but I'm just starting that analysis now. We only started doing that after the Swerdlow paper came out in 2008, so we'll have data from the last three years.

What this slide shows is that in our 4,186 use-of-force events, we have 616 Taser deployments. I only have probe deployment data or location data in 543, because the other 90-some, however many that adds up to, happened before we started to collect that. We have got data that 13 percent of the use of force was Taser with dart location known.

What we found in looking at this — I did this on the weekend — is that the weapon has been displayed only, just held up once, and that was the entire use of force. We count laser illumination as a use of force in our study because it could change behaviour, and it's a modality. That happened 16 percent of the time; contact stun, so just the nose of the weapon, in 27 percent; probe mode only in 55 percent; and a three-point deployment in about 1 percent of Taser deployment. So that's where we are.

What I can tell you without giving you a boring table is that exactly like the original HECOE paper, which was the human effects of conducted energy weapons analysis that was done in the U.S., about 20 percent are chest deployments because of the nature of aiming. I think our research will show that that's about the same.

Further research was Braidwood recommendation No. 17, specifically identifying high-risk subjects, the circumstances and talking about where the darts land, and we are doing that work. Contrary to the previous witness, we
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are actually very diligently working on this behalf.

We published this year, for example, the frequency of signs of excited delirium encountered by police when police use force. That's the evaluation of this prospective consecutive cohort in a peer-reviewed journal in an unbiased, non-industry-affiliated prospective epidemiological study.

What we found in that work, in short, is that if you give officers a list of features to watch for, they can accurately and consistently check them off. But most importantly, if you give officers a list, you do not compel them to find that list. That's perhaps more important than the original paper.

In 51½ percent of use-of-force events, officers documented that there were no worrisome features about the individual in terms of excited delirium. In about 83 percent, if I just do the math, there were two features of extreme agitation, superhuman strength, sweating, etc. — two or less. In only about 16 percent of use-of-force events did officers document three or more concomitant worrisome features.

Why is this important? The first point is that giving officers a list, unlike the critics like to say, does not in fact compel them to find those features present. Secondly, a small number have a few features that are worrisome, and while it's only 16 percent, we have to turn that into real-world application. That's 1 in 6 use-of-force events. More worrisome is that a very small number overall have six or more concomitant features, at about 3 percent. But that's 1 in 33 use-of-force events with a highly abnormal individual.

We also looked at prone positioning because there's a lot of discussion around the use of a prone position either in use of force in general or in the context of Taser deployment. What we were able to document in this work, which comes from restraint, is that about 46 percent of subjects do stay in the prone position following police use of force. That's all comers across the board — normal, abnormal.

There are equal numbers of normal- and abnormal-behaving people on both sides. There are exactly equal incidents of Taser deployment in probe, drive-stun or a combination. One subject died in our cohort, who was clearly documented by all witnesses at the scene, including health care providers, to be in a non-prone position.

Braidwood recommendation No. 8 was that paramedic assistance be requested for all conducted energy weapon deployments. I have issues with that recommendation because I'm not sure that's the best use of our paramedics. But if we wanted to track that, it should be known by this committee that there are data-linking issues. There is no pairing of data between one and the other.

A little word about testing. Recommendations 14 and 15 surrounded testing. Testing issues are interesting to me. It's not what I do, but I am involved in another committee, and I'll tell you about that in a second. The testing issues that are important for me in terms of predicting sudden in-custody death are that what defines failure does not necessarily define medical effect issues — in other words, if there's a red-light, green-light or pass-fail evaluation on specifications, whatever. But what's the importance of failure? What does that mean medically?

In the CBC testing document there was a lot of discussion about weapons that failed, and it's my understanding that the majority of that was weapons that were underpowered or underperforming. The question becomes: what's the medical effect of 4 microcoulomb variation? To that end, there is a panel that's been struck to evaluate things along that line.

Keeping up with the medical literature and following the medical literature is no small task. Interpreting papers is rife with difficulty. You must have adequate biomedical statistical knowledge to understand the implications of a paper, and remaining current in the medical literature is a difficult, time-consuming task. I'll come to the Zipes paper in a moment.

There's a national committee currently investigating the status of medical knowledge regarding conducted energy weapons, and I'm on that committee, along with more than ten colleagues. I believe the total number is 14. Don't quote me on that. It might be 13; it might be 15. This academic work is being funded by Defence Research and Development Canada through the oversight of the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences. I am one of many physicians on that panel. There's a final report coming from that panel, due in August of next year.

What that panel is looking at is: what is the state of the medical literature? What's missing? What's present? What needs to be done? What has already been done? So that may help you in this work.

I bring up this paper quite serendipitously after the last presentation, because this year this paper was presented in the journal Circulation by Dr. Doug Zipes. It talks about sudden cardiac arrest and death associated with it.

Now, this is important work. There's no denying it. Those of us that are interested in sudden in-custody death…. I don't give a hoot — let's call it that — regarding whether Taser as a modality stays or goes. I really don't care. What I want to know is: what does people harm?

This paper is being held up as the new proof that Taser induces cardiac arrest. I'll just let you know that the methodological concerns with this paper are many and large. This paper generates a hypothesis, but it would be a mistake to hold it up as proof. We've actually requested the documents that went into the writing of this paper, because there are so many things missing.

I'm going to a meeting in November in Vegas, the IPICD Conference. I'm presenting there. I'm also hearing Dr. Zipes present his paper and will be able to ask
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questions about it — much caution in the widespread interpretation of a case series of seven, with significant methodological concerns, save for its importance as a hypothesis-generating piece of work, which it is.

Braidwood recommendation 17 is on further research. I just need to let the committee know that I've presented to many a committee. Everybody talks about the fact that there should be more research, but there's very little funding coming down the pipe.

What is missing in our world now is that population-based studies are few and far between. Bill Bozeman does Taser-specific population-based studies in the U.S. No one else in North America or the U.K. is doing what we're doing, which is looking at all comers across police use of force, and there are no plans to do so.

There is no further funding forthcoming. Our research funding runs out in March of 2013. In Canada continuing in this effort…. All of the agencies that are in our study currently would like to continue, but my office door closes for this study at the end of March.

It's interesting that in Canada, because federal and provincial policing is managed differently, there is no go-to agency to say: "Please direct this effort." The CACP does not have a mandate to direct what police do. It's an advisory panel. The Solicitor Generals operate in isolation from each other.

Just as an example of that, the Ontario ministry collects data on use of force that, for physical control tactics, begins only if there's a reported injury from physical use of force. That's not helpful. To compare it to what we do and what RCMP does around collecting use of force, it's quite different.

Overall thoughts — just in part, because I'm way out of time. Sudden in-custody death registry in Canada — it is my view that it is essential.

If we only track Taser-related death, we are missing half of the problem. There are 31 post–conducted energy weapon, sudden in-custody deaths documented in Canada since 1999, when Taser came to Canada. In that interval there are at least 22 — and I think it's actually more — non–conducted energy weapon deaths that have occurred in strikingly similar circumstances. Read that identical, virtually. But for me to find those, I have to do Google searches and media searches and try to dig boxes out of coroners' offices, and that's impossible.

If we don't understand who dies, we can't understand what killed them. Data collection has to be robust. It has to be monitored. It has to be comparable.

Probe location documentation across the board of Taser deployments. If we want to understand the risk of this weapon in a population, we must look at all probe deployments across all persons. If we only look at death, we can't know what the risk is of the same probe deployment in a live individual who didn't die and we will misunderstand the problem.

Interestingly, I testified at the Prentice inquiry in Alberta. I think it's a week ago. It might be two weeks ago now. It's two weeks. What we found…. It was remarkable in that case. I was just there for one day, but both the paramedic and the police officer who testified could not separate the issues and worries or concerns in monitoring Taser individuals from agitated, incoherent and superhuman strong individuals, such that we would call them excited delirium subjects. They could not separate those two things, because we train them together.

They're different. People die of excited delirium without taser, and yet we teach it as though it's one and the same.

Just to let committee members know, we have this room until one o'clock, and it is ten minutes to one. We might want to ask Dr. Hall to come back another time if she is willing. But I'll throw it open for questions at this point.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): I have a number of questions. I'll do a few. Then I'm sure other people do. I do hope you can come back, because I think your information is absolutely critical to the committee. I appreciate it.

Last week we had a presenter, Dr. Lu, who said there was no such thing as excited delirium. I'm wondering why you use that term and whether you would agree with him. That's my first question.

Oh my, this debate does go on. The short story on this discussion…. There's kind of no short story, but I'll try to paraphrase.

What is missing currently is a case definition for "excited delirium." There's no arguing that. I wholeheartedly agree that there is no case definition.

A case definition requires understanding a set of symptoms or signs that can be ascribed to an entity, documenting the frequency with which it occurs and then documenting what we call the morbidity and mortality — the injury and death rate. If we don't start to document what police officers are seeing in the pre-hospital setting, we can't understand what it is and how often it occurs.

What usually happens in the debate is people say: "Oh, there's no such thing. You can't look in the DSM-5 or DSM-IV-TR and look up the case excited delirium. You can't look in the AMA or CMA handbooks of diagnoses, and there's a reason for that.

Both of those documents evolve as medical encounters change. For example, in the AMA, the American Medical Association or Canadian Medical Association handbooks of diagnoses in the 1970s, you would not find HIV or AIDS. It hadn't been seen yet. There was no case defin-
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ition. No one knew about it. It wasn't there.

As physicians started to encounter…. I was working in intensive care in the '80s, when HIV came to be a very real clinical entity. Of course, once we understood how often we encountered it, came up with a case definition and could document the outcome, it became an accepted medical diagnosis.

The DSM-IV and -5 is the psychiatry handbook of diagnoses. For example, that handbook is specific to what general psychiatrists will see such that they can bill appropriately. I mean, really, handbooks of diagnoses are for tracking disease and also for billing purposes.

Undifferentiated, agitated, incoherent, sweating, superhuman-strong people who make no sense and who are violent and combative and unresponsive to pain don't present themselves for care at psychiatrists, clinics or offices. It's not who sees these people. If I call the psychiatrist on duty about that patient in my emergency department, I will guarantee you that the response to that is: "Call me when he's sober" or "Call me when you've ruled out all medical illnesses."

What's happened over the last ten years — and I think enjoyably so — is that perhaps police agencies can be credited with saying: "You know what? There's something really unusual about these people, and we're going to start to call ambulances."

When you start to call ambulances, a person who dies on a street corner is no longer the concern of a pathologist and is now the concern of a medical director of an ambulance service. That's why emergency medicine physicians are engaged in this work.

Cardiologists do not see undifferentiated, agitated persons, about whom you know nothing, who die in the emergency department or on a sidewalk. Cardiologists have much to add to this discussion. There is no question. So what we're left with is outside the walls of a hospital.

When I see the undifferentiated, agitated, sweating, incoherent, superhuman-strong, resistant-to-pain restrained person in my department, I do a history, a physical, some ancillary tests, and then I confirm or refute that it's cocaine versus methamphetamine versus an isolated psychiatric outbreak, for example. But I do that after I know what's wrong with the person and can do some tests. We now need a way to describe these people in the pre-hospital environment, because that's where they're dying.

The other reason the terminology is important is we never want police officers doing the dreaded making a diagnosis. Giving people a list of things to watch for is not making a diagnosis. We teach officers to watch for concealed hands. We teach officers to watch for erratic driving. We teach officers to watch for assaults on spouses and children, and we don't call that making a diagnosis.

But for some reason, asking officers to recognize when someone is incoherent, super strong, sweating, not making any sense, unresponsive to pain modalities such that you can transfer them to health care rather than to cells becomes making a diagnosis. It's not. It's describing what you see. The diagnosis piece is up to me and other researchers to say: "This is now the case definition."

The other problem is: who cares anyway if we say it's never a diagnosis? Recognizing these individuals in this state changes after the care of the subject. It does not change what you do with the subject at the time. That's a great misconception. "You must do something different because they're in this state." That's not the point. The point is that once you gain control of the individual, however that is, knowing that they're in that state changes the aftercare so that we can try to mitigate death.

K. Corrigan (Deputy Chair): No. Oh yeah, I do have more questions. I just didn't know if somebody else wanted to step in right away.

M. Coell (Chair): What I'm going to suggest, because we have another committee using this room at one o'clock and it's now five to one, is that we would ask Dr. Hall if she'd be willing to come back later in the process to answer questions.

C. Hall: Okay, we'll need to get that in quickly. Just so you know, I get booked, or I'm overbooked.

Just one last quick, little thing to finish off that question, as if there could possibly be more. In the International Classification of Diseases, which is what the World Health Organization puts forth that hospitals can code for….

So when you go to the hospital, your chart, when you're done being at the hospital, goes to medical records. Individuals in medical records go through the chart line by line for words so that the hospital can bill for your care. They look for a bypass or appendix removed or things like that.

There are more than eight codes in the World Health
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Organization international classification of diseases, the ICD codes. There are more than eight codes for agitation with physiologic derangement, abnormal excitement, abnormal mania, psychomotor agitation, giving recognition to the fact that different providers use different words and that all of those words make you more expensive to care for because you're a lot of work.

The World Health Organization recognizes that different practitioners use different terminology and that multiple terminologies can mean the same thing. I don't care what you call it. The reason we stayed with excited delirium when I was on the American College of Emergency Physicians task force around excited delirium is because the medical background, the literature around excited delirium, uses that term. If we embrace a new term, none of that research applies. So it's very important that this term came from medicine.

Unlike the Canadian Medical Association Journal editorial a few years ago that Taser made this up, I think we're giving Taser a lot more credit than it deserves. Excited delirium comes from medical terminology from the '80s — before Taser technology was ever around.

It becomes important in this context because the people who die are always the same. They're agitated, incoherent, unresponsive to pain modalities, sweating, profoundly strong, etc.

That is, I think, why it came together in this way and why it's so criticized. Throw out the darn thing. I don't care. But I think you'll find that just like what happened in the '70s and the '80s and the '90s, pre-Taser, people will die and will point to the police officer as the method of that death.

M. Coell (Chair): I think so. We have the room being occupied by another legislative committee.

I would like to thank Dr. Hall very much. Those words are greatly appreciated by the committee. We will be in touch with you to hopefully have you back at a later date.

C. Hall: Sounds good. If we can try for a Monday. Monday is my research office day.

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Chair:	* Murray Coell (Saanich North and the Islands BC Liberal)
Deputy Chair:	* Kathy Corrigan (Burnaby–Deer Lake NDP)
Members:	Eric Foster (Vernon-Monashee BC Liberal)
	* Gordon Hogg (Surrey–White Rock BC Liberal)
	Leonard Krog (Nanaimo NDP)
	John Slater (Boundary-Similkameen BC Liberal)
	* Joe Trasolini (Port Moody–Capilano NDP)
	* denotes member present
Clerk:	Kate Ryan-Lloyd
Committee Staff:	Matthew Cleeves (Committee Research Analyst)

Witnesses:	Randy Beck (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
	Dr. Christine Hall
	Dr. Michael Webster

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS (Hansard)

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPONS AND TO AUDIT SELECTED POLICE COMPLAINTS

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
(Hansard)

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INQUIRE INTO THE USE OF CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPONS AND TO AUDIT SELECTED POLICE COMPLAINTS